Mercurial > hg > Aquinas


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            <h2 id="FP.x-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ[103]-119)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FP_Q103">Q. 103. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q104">Q. 104. THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q105">Q. 105. OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q106">Q. 106. HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q107">Q. 107. THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q108">Q. 108. OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q109">Q. 109. THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q110">Q. 110. HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q111">Q. 111. THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q112">Q. 112. THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q113">Q. 113. OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q114">Q. 114. OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES) </a><br/><a href="#FP_Q115">Q. 115. OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q116">Q. 116. ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q117">Q. 117. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q118">Q. 118. OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q119">Q. 119. OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/></div>
            <div id="FP_Q103" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q103-p0.1">Q. 103. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q103-p2"> Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof,
                  and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there
                  are eight points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q103-p3"><a href="#FP_Q103_A1"> (1) Whether the world is governed by someone?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p4"><a href="#FP_Q103_A2"> (2) What is the end of this government?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p5"><a href="#FP_Q103_A3"> (3) Whether the world is governed by one?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p6"><a href="#FP_Q103_A4"> (4) Of the effects of this government?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p7"><a href="#FP_Q103_A5"> (5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p8"><a href="#FP_Q103_A6"> (6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p9"><a href="#FP_Q103_A7"> (7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p10"><a href="#FP_Q103_A8"> (8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 pr."><a name="32692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32692]
Iª q. 103 pr.</span></a> Postquam praemissum est de creatione
rerum et distinctione earum, restat nunc tertio considerandum de
rerum gubernatione. Et primo, in communi; secundo, in speciali de
effectibus gubernationis. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo,
utrum mundus ab aliquo gubernetur. Secundo, quis sit finis
gubernationis ipsius. Tertio, utrum gubernetur ab uno. Quarto, de
effectibus gubernationis. Quinto, utrum omnia divinae gubernationi
subsint. Sexto, utrum omnia immediate gubernentur a Deo. Septimo,
utrum divina gubernatio cassetur in aliquo. Octavo, utrum aliquid
divinae providentiae contranitatur.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q103_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A1-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 1. Whether the world is governed by anyone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work
                     for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have
                     no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32693] Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod mundus non gubernetur ab aliquo. Illorum
enim est gubernari, quae moventur vel operantur propter finem. Sed
res naturales, quae sunt magna pars mundi, non moventur aut
operantur propter finem, quia non cognoscunt finem. Ergo mundus non
gubernatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but
                     has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32694] Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
eorum est proprie gubernari, quae ad aliquid moventur. Sed mundus
non videtur ad aliquid moveri, sed in se stabilitatem habet. Ergo
non gubernatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle
                     of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their
                     actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32695] Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id
quod in se habet necessitatem qua determinatur ad unum, non indiget
exteriori gubernante. Sed principaliores mundi partes quadam
necessitate determinantur ad unum in suis actibus et motibus. Ergo
mundus gubernatione non indiget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.3" target="asv">Wis. 14:3</a>): "But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Thou Who governest this
                     universe by mandate eternal."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32696] Iª q. 103 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>tu autem, pater, gubernas omnia
providentia</i>. Et Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., <i>o qui
perpetua mundum ratione gubernas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p6"> I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance.
                     But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves: for we observe that
                     in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed
                     nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is
                     a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that
                     put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration
                     of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (
                     <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A4" id="FP_Q103_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[4]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A2" id="FP_Q103_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[65], A[2]</a>), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as "it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is
                     not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate
                     perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence,
                     so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 co."><a name="32697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32697] Iª q. 103 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod quidam antiqui philosophi gubernationem mundo subtraxerunt,
dicentes omnia fortuito agi. Sed haec positio ostenditur esse
impossibilis ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex eo quod apparet in ipsis
rebus. Videmus enim in rebus naturalibus provenire quod melius est,
aut semper aut in pluribus, quod non contingeret, nisi per aliquam
providentiam res naturales dirigerentur ad finem boni, quod est
gubernare. Unde ipse ordo certus rerum manifeste demonstrat
gubernationem mundi, sicut si quis intraret domum bene ordinatam,
ex ipsa domus ordinatione ordinatoris rationem perpenderet; ut, ab
Aristotele dictum, Tullius introducit in libro de natura deorum.
Secundo autem apparet idem ex consideratione divinae bonitatis, per
quam res in esse productae sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Cum enim
optimi sit optima producere, non convenit summae Dei bonitati quod
res productas ad perfectum non perducat. Ultima autem perfectio
uniuscuiusque est in consecutione finis. Unde ad divinam bonitatem
pertinet ut, sicut produxit res in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem
perducat. Quod est gubernare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures;
                     and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for
                     an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end
                     unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end
                     shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge,
                     shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32698] Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod aliquid movetur vel operatur propter finem
dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut agens seipsum in finem, ut homo et
aliae creaturae rationales, et talium est cognoscere rationem
finis, et eorum quae sunt ad finem. Aliquid autem dicitur moveri
vel operari propter finem, quasi ab alio actum vel directum in
finem, sicut sagitta movetur ad signum directa a sagittante, qui
cognoscit finem, non autem sagitta. Unde sicut motus sagittae ad
determinatum finem demonstrat aperte quod sagitta dirigitur ab
aliquo cognoscente; ita certus cursus naturalium rerum cognitione
carentium, manifeste declarat mundum ratione aliqua gubernari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement
                     we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing,
                     would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q104_A1" id="FP_Q103_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[104], A[1]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32699] Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in omnibus rebus creatis est aliquid stabile, ad
minus prima materia; et aliquid ad motum pertinens, ut sub motu
etiam operationem comprehendamus. Et quantum ad utrumque, res
indiget gubernatione, quia hoc ipsum quod in rebus est stabile, in
nihilum decideret (quia ex nihilo est), nisi manu gubernatoris
servaretur, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God,
                     directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression
                     from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their
                     nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their
                     nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer,
                     so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32700] Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae
determinantur ad unum, est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad
finem, sicut necessitas qua sagitta agitur ut ad certum signum
tendat, est impressio sagittantis, et non sagittae. Sed in hoc
differt, quia id quod creaturae a Deo recipiunt, est earum natura;
quod autem ab homine rebus naturalibus imprimitur praeter earum
naturam, ad violentiam pertinet. Unde sicut necessitas violentiae
in motu sagittae demonstrat sagittantis directionem; ita necessitas
naturalis creaturarum demonstrat divinae providentiae
gubernationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A2-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 2. Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the
                     government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the
                     thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in him. Therefore the end of government of
                     things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32701] Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod finis gubernationis mundi non sit aliquid
extra mundum existens. Illud enim est finis gubernationis rei, ad
quod res gubernata perducitur. Sed illud ad quod res aliqua
perducitur, est aliquod bonum in ipsa re, sicut infirmus perducitur
ad sanitatem, quae est aliquod bonum in ipso. Ergo finis
gubernationis rerum non est aliquod bonum extrinsecum, sed aliquod
bonum in ipsis rebus existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends are an operation; some are a work"---i.e. produced by an operation.
                     But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic
                     can be the end of the government of things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32702] Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus dicit, I Ethic., quod <i>finium quidam sunt
operationes, quidam opera</i>, idest operata. Sed nihil extrinsecum
a toto universo potest esse operatum, operatio autem est in ipsis
operantibus. Ergo nihil extrinsecum potest esse finis gubernationis
rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine
                     says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the
                     world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32703] Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
bonum multitudinis videtur esse ordo et pax, quae est tranquillitas
ordinis. Ut Augustinus dicit XIX de Civ. Dei. Sed mundus in quadam
rerum multitudine consistit. Ergo finis gubernationis mundi est
pacificus ordo, qui est in ipsis rebus. Non ergo finis
gubernationis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord hath made all things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of
                     all things is something extrinsic to them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32704] Iª q. 103 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Prov. XVI, <i>universa propter se operatus est
dominus</i>. Ipse autem est extra totum ordinem universi. Ergo
finis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their
                     beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what
                     has been expounded above (
                     <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q103_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it is clear
                     that good has the nature
                     of an end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of all things
                     is the Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a
                     particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which
                     is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 co."><a name="32705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32705] Iª q. 103 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum finis respondeat principio, non potest fieri ut,
principio cognito, quid sit rerum finis ignoretur. Cum igitur
principium rerum sit aliquid extrinsecum a toto universo, scilicet
Deus, ut ex supra dictis patet; necesse est quod etiam finis rerum
sit quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Et hoc ratione apparet. Manifestum
est enim quod bonum habet rationem finis. Unde finis particularis
alicuius rei est quoddam bonum particulare, finis autem universalis
rerum omnium est quoddam bonum universale. Bonum autem universale
est quod est per se et per suam essentiam bonum, quod est ipsa
essentia bonitatis, bonum autem particulare est quod est
participative bonum. Manifestum est autem quod in tota universitate
creaturarum nullum est bonum quod non sit participative bonum. Unde
illud bonum quod est finis totius universi, oportet quod sit
extrinsecum a toto universo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something
                     done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the
                     buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe
                     being the good to which it is directed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32706] Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod bonum aliquod consequimur multipliciter, uno modo,
sicut formam in nobis existentem, ut sanitatem aut scientiam; alio
modo, ut aliquid per nos operatum, sicut aedificator consequitur
finem faciendo domum; alio modo, sicut aliquod bonum habitum vel
possessum, ut ille qui emit, consequitur finem possidendo agrum.
Unde nihil prohibet illud ad quod perducitur universum, esse
quoddam bonum extrinsecum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the
                     end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder
                     is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made,
                     but also as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say that
                     Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is
                     the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation
                     thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32707] Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de finibus artium, quarum
quaedam habent pro finibus operationes ipsas, sicut citharistae
finis est citharizare; quaedam vero habent pro fine quoddam
operatum, sicut aedificatoris finis non est aedificare, sed domus.
Contingit autem aliquid extrinsecum esse finem non solum sicut
operatum, sed etiam sicut possessum seu habitum, vel etiam sicut
repraesentatum, sicut si dicamus quod Hercules est finis imaginis,
quae fit ad eum repraesentandum. Sic igitur potest dici quod bonum
extrinsecum a toto universo est finis gubernationis rerum sicut
habitum et repraesentatum, quia ad hoc unaquaeque res tendit, ut
participet ipsum, et assimiletur ei, quantum potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this. however, is not its ultimate
                     end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in
                     Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32708] Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso
existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi, hoc autem bonum non est
ultimus finis, sed ordinatur ad bonum extrinsecum ut ad ultimum
finem; sicut etiam ordo exercitus ordinatur ad ducem, ut dicitur in
XII Metaphys.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A3-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 3. Whether the world is governed by one?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government
                     of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously
                     different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32709] Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod mundus non gubernetur ab uno. De causa
enim per effectus iudicamus. Sed in gubernatione rerum apparet quod
res non uniformiter moventur et operantur, quaedam enim
contingenter, quaedam vero ex necessitate, et secundum alias
diversitates. Ergo mundus non gubernatur ab uno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the
                     ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the
                     case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32710] Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ea
quae gubernantur ab uno, a se invicem non dissentiunt nisi propter
imperitiam aut impotentiam gubernantis, quae a Deo sunt procul. Sed
res creatae a se invicem dissentiunt, et contra se invicem pugnant;
ut in contrariis apparet. Non ergo mundus gubernatur ab uno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it "is better that two should be together than one" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.4.9" target="asv">Eccles. 4:9</a>). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32711] Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in
natura semper invenitur quod melius est. Sed melius est simul esse
duos quam unum, ut dicitur Eccle. IV. Ergo mundus non gubernatur ab
uno, sed a pluribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:6</a>): "To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs
                     dominion over subjects; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A8" id="FP_Q103_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[13], A[8]</a>). Therefore the world is governed by one.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32712] Iª q. 103 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod unum Deum et unum dominum confitemur; secundum illud apostoli
I ad Cor. VIII, <i>nobis est unus Deus, pater, et dominus unus</i>.
Quorum utrumque ad gubernationem pertinet, nam ad dominum pertinet
gubernatio subditorum; et Dei nomen ex providentia sumitur, ut
supra dictum est. Ergo mundus gubernatur ab uno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which
                     is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the
                     best government is the government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things
                     governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness,
                     as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which
                     they would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as
                     they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is
                     unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord,
                     except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several
                     things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of
                     the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi,
                     10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 co."><a name="32713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32713] Iª q. 103 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est dicere quod mundus ab uno gubernetur. Cum enim
finis gubernationis mundi sit quod est essentialiter bonum, quod
est optimum, necesse est quod mundi gubernatio sit optima. Optima
autem gubernatio est quae fit per unum. Cuius ratio est, quia
gubernatio nihil aliud est quam directio gubernatorum ad finem, qui
est aliquod bonum. Unitas autem pertinet ad rationem bonitatis; ut
Boetius probat, in III de Consol., per hoc quod. Sicut omnia
desiderant bonum, ita desiderant unitatem, sine qua esse non
possunt. Nam unumquodque intantum est, inquantum unum est, unde
videmus quod res repugnant suae divisioni quantum possunt, et quod
dissolutio uniuscuiusque rei provenit ex defectu illius rei. Et
ideo id ad quod tendit intentio multitudinem gubernantis, est
unitas sive pax. Unitatis autem causa per se est unum. Manifestum
est enim quod plures multa unire et concordare non possunt, nisi
ipsi aliquo modo uniantur. Illud autem quod est per se unum, potest
convenientius et melius esse causa unitatis, quam multi uniti. Unde
multitudo melius gubernatur per unum quam per plures. Relinquitur
ergo quod gubernatio mundi, quae est optima, sit ab uno gubernante.
Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in XII Metaphys., <i>entia nolunt
disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum, unus ergo
princeps</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity
                     of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe (
                     <a href="FP_v.html#FP_Q47_A1" id="FP_Q103_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[47], AA[1]</a>,2;
                     <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A2" id="FP_Q103_A3-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[48], A[2]</a>), and not by a diversity of governors.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32714] Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod motus est actus mobilis a movente. Difformitas ergo
motuum est ex diversitate mobilium, quam requirit perfectio
universi, ut supra dictum est; non ex diversitate gubernantium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so
                     far as they are included in the one order of the universe.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32715] Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod contraria, etsi dissentiant quantum ad fines
proximos, conveniunt tamen quantum ad finem ultimum, prout
concluduntur sub uno ordine universi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is
                     possible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32716] Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod in particularibus bonis duo sunt meliora quam unum,
sed ei quod est essentialiter bonum, non potest fieri aliqua
additio bonitatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A4-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 4. Whether the effect of government is one or many?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is that
                     which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example
                     of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32717] Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod effectus gubernationis mundi sit unus
tantum, et non plures. Effectus enim gubernationis esse videtur id
quod per gubernationem in rebus gubernatis causatur. Hoc autem est
unum, scilicet bonum ordinis; ut in exercitu patet. Ergo
gubernationis mundi est unus effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A3" id="FP_Q103_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore also the effect of this government is but one.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32718] Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ab
uno natum est unum tantum procedere. Sed mundus gubernatur ab uno,
ut ostensum est. Ergo et gubernationis effectus est unus
tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the
                     many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects
                     of government.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32719] Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
effectus gubernationis non est unus tantum propter unitatem
gubernantis, oportet quod multiplicetur secundum multitudinem
gubernatorum. Haec autem sunt nobis innumerabilia. Ergo
gubernationis effectus non possunt comprehendi sub aliquo certo
numero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government belongs
                     to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32720] Iª q. 103 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Dionysius dicit, quod <i>deitas providentia et bonitate
perfecta omnia continet, et seipsa implet</i>. Gubernatio autem ad
providentiam pertinet. Ergo gubernationis divinae sunt aliqui
determinati effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected.
                     Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things
                     tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself;
                     and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good.
                     Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature
                     is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in
                     two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly,
                     with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to
                     be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things
                     to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without
                     number.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 co."><a name="32721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32721] Iª q. 103 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod effectus cuiuslibet actionis ex fine eius pensari potest, nam
per operationem efficitur ut pertingatur ad finem. Finis autem
gubernationis mundi est bonum essentiale, ad cuius participationem
et assimilationem omnia tendunt. Effectus igitur gubernationis
potest accipi tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius finis, et sic
est unus effectus gubernationis, scilicet assimilari summo bono.
Alio modo potest considerari effectus gubernationis secundum ea
quibus ad Dei assimilationem creatura perducitur. Et sic in
generali sunt duo effectus gubernationis. Creatura enim assimilatur
Deo quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad id quod Deus bonus est,
inquantum creatura est bona; et quantum ad hoc quod Deus est aliis
causa bonitatis, inquantum una creatura movet aliam ad bonitatem.
Unde duo sunt effectus gubernationis, scilicet conservatio rerum in
bono, et motio earum ad bonum. Tertio modo potest considerari
effectus gubernationis in particulari, et sic sunt nobis
innumerabiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two
                     things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32722] Iª q. 103 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ordo universi includit in se et conservationem rerum
diversarum a Deo institutarum, et motionem earum, quia secundum
haec duo invenitur ordo in rebus, secundum scilicet quod una est
melior alia, et secundum quod una ab alia movetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p8"> From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32723] Iª q. 103 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad alia duo patet
responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A5-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 5. Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.9.11" target="asv">Eccles. 9:11</a>): "I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches
                     to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all." But things subject to the Divine government are not
                     ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine
                     government.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32724] Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia divinae gubernationi subdantur.
Dicitur enim Eccle. IX, <i>vidi sub sole nec velocium esse cursum,
nec fortium bellum, nec sapientium panem, nec doctorum divitias,
nec artificum gratiam, sed tempus casumque in omnibus</i>. Quae
autem gubernationi alicuius subsunt, non sunt casualia. Ergo ea
quae sunt sub sole, non subduntur divinae gubernationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>): "God hath no care for oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject
                     to the Divine government.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32725] Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
apostolus, I ad Cor. IX, dicit quod <i>non est Deo cura de
bobus</i>. Sed unicuique est cura eorum quae gubernantur ab ipso.
Non ergo omnia subduntur divinae gubernationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it
                     is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed.
                     Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32726] Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
illud quod seipsum gubernare potest, non videtur alterius
gubernatione indigere. Sed creatura rationalis seipsam gubernare
potest, cum habeat dominium sui actus, et per se agat; et non solum
agatur ab alio, quod videtur esse eorum quae gubernantur. Ergo non
omnia subsunt divinae gubernationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal,
                     even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their
                     nature." Therefore all things are subject to His government.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32727] Iª q. 103 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, V de Civ. Dei, quod <i>Deus non solum caelum
et terram, nec solum hominem et Angelum, sed nec exigui et
contemptibilis animantis viscera, nec avis pennulam, nec herbae
flosculum, nec arboris folium, sine suarum partium convenientia
dereliquit</i>. Omnia ergo eius gubernationi subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q103_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection;
                     and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal
                     being, as proved above (
                     <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government.
                     This can also
                     be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those things which come under
                     the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A2" id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have
                     said above (
                     <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A4" id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[44], A[4]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A2" id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[65], A[2]</a>), so it is impossible for
                     anything to escape from the Divine government.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q103_A5-p7"> Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even
                     human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, "God hath abandoned the earth"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.9.9" target="asv">Ezech. 9:9</a>).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 co."><a name="32728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32728] Iª q. 103 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod secundum eandem rationem competit Deo esse gubernatorem rerum,
et causam earum, quia eiusdem est rem producere, et ei perfectionem
dare, quod ad gubernantem pertinet. Deus autem est causa non quidem
particularis unius generis rerum, sed universalis totius entis, ut
supra ostensum est. Unde sicut nihil potest esse quod non sit a Deo
creatum, ita nihil potest esse quod eius gubernationi non subdatur.
Patet etiam hoc idem ex ratione finis. Intantum enim alicuius
gubernatio se extendit, inquantum se extendere potest finis
gubernationis. Finis autem divinae gubernationis est ipsa sua
bonitas, ut supra ostensum est. Unde cum nihil esse possit quod non
ordinetur in divinam bonitatem sicut in finem, ut ex supra dictis
patet; impossibile est quod aliquod entium subtrahatur gubernationi
divinae. Stulta igitur fuit opinio dicentium quod haec inferiora
corruptibilia, vel etiam singularia, aut etiam res humanae non
gubernantur a Deo. Ex quorum persona dicitur Ezech. IX,
<i>dereliquit dominus terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such
                     things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element
                     of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government
                     of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would
                     tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which
                     constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher
                     cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but "time and chance," that is to say, that defects
                     may be found in these things according to some order of time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32729] Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod sub sole dicuntur esse ea quae secundum motum solis
generantur et corrumpuntur. In quibus omnibus casus invenitur; non
ita quod omnia quae in eis fiunt, sint casualia; sed quia in
quolibet eorum aliquid casuale inveniri potest. Et hoc ipsum quod
aliquid casuale invenitur in huiusmodi rebus, demonstrat ea
alicuius gubernationi esse subiecta. Nisi enim huiusmodi
corruptibilia ab aliquo superiori gubernarentur, nihil intenderent,
maxime quae non cognoscunt, et sic non eveniret in eis aliquid
praeter intentionem, quod facit rationem casus. Unde ad ostendendum
quod casualia secundum ordinem alicuius superioris causae
proveniunt, non dicit simpliciter quod vidit casum esse in omnibus,
sed dicit tempus et casum; quia scilicet secundum aliquem ordinem
temporis, casuales defectus inveniuntur in his rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable
                     thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is
                     an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover.
                     Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed
                     according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these
                     are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this,
                     that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational
                     creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that "God
                     hath no care for oxen," he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which
                     rational creatures are governed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32730] Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod gubernatio est quaedam mutatio gubernatorum a
gubernante. Omnis autem motus est actus mobilis a movente, ut
dicitur in III Physic. Omnis autem actus proportionatur ei cuius
est actus. Et sic oportet quod diversa mobilia diversimode
moveantur, etiam secundum motionem unius motoris. Sic igitur
secundum unam artem Dei gubernantis, res diversimode gubernantur,
secundum earum diversitatem. Quaedam enim secundum suam naturam
sunt per se agentia, tanquam habentia dominium sui actus, et ista
gubernantur a Deo non solum per hoc quod moventur ab ipso Deo in
eis interius operante, sed etiam per hoc quod ab eo inducuntur ad
bonum et retrahuntur a malo per praecepta et prohibitiones, praemia
et poenas. Hoc autem modo non gubernantur a Deo creaturae
irrationales, quae tantum aguntur, et non agunt. Cum ergo apostolus
dicit quod Deo non est cura de bobus, non totaliter subtrahit boves
a cura gubernationis divinae; sed solum quantum ad modum qui
proprie competit rationali creaturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the
                     Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own
                     act, it requires to be governed by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32731] Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum
et voluntatem, quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab
intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua
creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus,
indiget gubernari a Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A6-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 6. Whether all things are immediately governed by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the
                     opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly
                     things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to
                     watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain
                     spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32732] Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod omnia immediate gubernentur a Deo.
Gregorius enim Nyssenus reprehendit opinionem Platonis, qui divisit
providentiam in tria, primam quidem primi Dei, qui providet rebus
caelestibus, et universalibus omnibus; secundam vero providentiam
esse dixit secundorum deorum, qui caelum circumeunt, scilicet
respectu eorum quae sunt in generatione et corruptione; tertiam
vero providentiam dixit quorundam Daemonum, qui sunt custodes circa
terram humanarum actionum. Ergo videtur quod omnia immediate a Deo
gubernentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But
                     God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32733] Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
melius est aliquid fieri per unum quam per multa, si sit possibile,
ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Sed Deus potest per seipsum absque
mediis causis omnia gubernare. Ergo videtur quod omnia immediate
gubernet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others;
                     thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the
                     same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32734] Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
nihil in Deo est deficiens et imperfectum. Sed ad defectum
gubernatoris pertinere videtur quod mediantibus aliquibus gubernet,
sicut rex terrenus, quia non sufficit ad omnia agenda, nec ubique
est praesens in suo regno, propter hoc oportet quod habeat suae
gubernationis ministros. Ergo Deus immediate omnia gubernat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater
                     subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled
                     by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32735] Iª q. 103 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., <i>quemadmodum corpora
crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine
reguntur; ita omnia corpora per spiritum vitae rationalem, et
spiritus vitae rationalis desertor atque peccator per spiritum
vitae rationalem pium et iustum, et ille per ipsum Deum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q103_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution
                     of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some
                     things by means of others.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q103_A6-p7"> The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest
                     degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and such is the design
                     of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his
                     attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we
                     must say that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q103_A6-p8"> But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better
                     in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself
                     and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some
                     of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils,
                     but gives also the faculty of teaching others.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 co."><a name="32736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32736] Iª q. 103 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod in gubernatione duo sunt consideranda, scilicet ratio
gubernationis, quae est ipsa providentia; et executio. Quantum
igitur ad rationem gubernationis pertinet, Deus immediate omnia
gubernat, quantum autem pertinet ad executionem gubernationis, Deus
gubernat quaedam mediantibus aliis. Cuius ratio est quia, cum Deus
sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, unumquodque attribuendum est Deo
secundum sui optimum. Optimum autem in omni genere vel ratione vel
cognitione practica, qualis est ratio gubernationis, in hoc
consistit, quod particularia cognoscantur, in quibus est actus,
sicut optimus medicus est, non qui considerat sola universalia, sed
qui potest etiam considerare minima particularium; et idem patet in
ceteris. Unde oportet dicere quod Deus omnium etiam minimorum
particularium rationem gubernationis habeat. Sed cum per
gubernationem res quae gubernantur sint ad perfectionem
perducendae; tanto erit melior gubernatio, quanto maior perfectio a
gubernante rebus gubernatis communicatur. Maior autem perfectio est
quod aliquid in se sit bonum, et etiam sit aliis causa bonitatis,
quam si esset solummodo in se bonum. Et ideo sic Deus gubernat res,
ut quasdam aliarum in gubernando causas instituat, sicut si aliquis
magister discipulos suos non solum scientes faceret, sed etiam
aliorum doctores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of
                     government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32737] Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod opinio Platonis reprehenditur, quia etiam quantum ad
rationem gubernationis, posuit Deum non immediate omnia gubernare.
Quod patet per hoc, quod divisit in tria providentiam, quae est
ratio gubernationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would
                     not be accomplished by one.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32738] Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, si solus Deus gubernaret, subtraheretur perfectio
causalis a rebus. Unde non totum fieret per unum, quod fit per
multa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his
                     dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32739] Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non solum pertinet ad imperfectionem regis terreni
quod executores habeat suae gubernationis, sed etiam ad regis
dignitatem, quia ex ordine ministrorum potestas regia praeclarior
redditur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A7-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 7. Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol.
                     iii) that "God disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would
                     follow that no evil exists.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32740] Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid praeter ordinem divinae
gubernationis contingere possit. Dicit enim Boetius, in III de
Consol., quod <i>Deus per bonum cuncta disponit</i>. Si ergo nihil
in rebus contingit praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis,
sequeretur quod nihil esset malum in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs
                     outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32741] Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
nihil est casuale quod evenit secundum praeordinationem alicuius
gubernantis. Si igitur nihil accidit in rebus praeter ordinem
gubernationis divinae, sequitur quod nihil in rebus sit fortuitum
et casuale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design.
                     Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity,
                     and nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the Divine
                     government.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32742] Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ordo
divinae gubernationis est certus et immutabilis, quia est secundum
rationem aeternam. Si igitur nihil possit contingere in rebus
praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sequitur quod omnia ex
necessitate eveniant, et nihil sit in rebus contingens, quod est
inconveniens. Potest igitur in rebus aliquid contingere praeter
ordinem gubernationis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Esth.13.9" target="asv">Esther 13:9</a>): "O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32743] Iª q. 103 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Esther XIII, <i>domine Deus, rex omnipotens, in
ditione tua cuncta sunt posita, et non est qui possit resistere
tuae voluntati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal
                     cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding
                     cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of
                     the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which
                     again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the
                     first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside
                     the order of the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order
                     of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards
                     some other
                     cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 co."><a name="32744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32744] Iª q. 103 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae, aliquis effectus
evenire potest; non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis. Cuius
ratio est, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit
nisi ex aliqua alia causa impediente, quam quidem causam necesse
est reducere in primam causam universalem, sicut indigestio
contingit praeter ordinem virtutis nutritivae, ex aliquo
impedimento, puta ex grossitie cibi, quam necesse est reducere in
aliquam aliam causam, et sic usque ad causam primam universalem.
Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis non unius generis
tantum, sed universaliter totius entis; impossibile est quod
aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sed ex hoc
ipso quod aliquid ex una parte videtur exire ab ordine divinae
providentiae qui consideratur secundum aliquam particularem causam,
necesse est quod in eundem ordinem relabatur secundum aliam
causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (
                     <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A3" id="FP_Q103_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[48], A[3]</a>). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped
                     from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32745] Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod nihil invenitur in mundo quod sit totaliter malum,
quia malum semper fundatur in bono, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo
res aliqua dicitur mala, per hoc quod exit ab ordine alicuius
particularis boni. Si autem totaliter exiret ab ordine
gubernationis divinae, totaliter nihil esset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order
                     of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32746] Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod aliqua dicuntur esse casualia in rebus, per ordinem
ad causas particulares, extra quarum ordinem fiunt. Sed quantum ad
divinam providentiam pertinet, nihil fit casu in mundo, ut
Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not
                     as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside
                     the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32747] Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod dicuntur aliqui effectus contingentes, per
comparationem ad proximas causas, quae in suis effectibus deficere
possunt, non propter hoc quod aliquid fieri possit extra totum
ordinem gubernationis divinae. Quia hoc ipsum quod aliquid
contingit praeter ordinem causae proximae, est ex aliqua causa
subiecta gubernationi divinae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A8-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 8. Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.8" target="asv">Is. 3:8</a>): "Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32748] Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid possit reniti contra ordinem
gubernationis divinae. Dicitur enim Isaiae III, <i>lingua eorum et
adinventiones eorum contra dominum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against
                     God's commands, no one would be justly punished by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32749] Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
nullus rex iuste punit eos qui eius ordinationi non repugnant. Si
igitur nihil contraniteretur divinae ordinationi, nullus iuste
puniretur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things
                     rebel against the order of the Divine government.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32750] Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quaelibet res est subiecta ordini divinae gubernationis. Sed una
res ab alia impugnatur. Ergo aliqua sunt quae contranituntur
divinae gubernationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign
                     good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8" target="asv">Wis. 8</a>) of Divine wisdom.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32751] Iª q. 103 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Boetius, in III de Consol., <i>non est aliquid quod
summo huic bono vel velit vel possit obsistere. Est igitur summum
bonum quod regit cuncta fortiter, suaviterque disponit</i>; ut
dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q103_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause
                     of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q103_A8-p7"> Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly
                     from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and
                     effort tends to good only, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): secondly from the fact that,
                     as we have said above (A[1], ad 3; A[5], ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is
                     nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but
                     an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end,
                     as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said "to order all things sweetly."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 co."><a name="32752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32752] Iª q. 103 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ordo divinae providentiae dupliciter potest considerari, uno
modo in generali, secundum scilicet quod progreditur a causa
gubernativa totius; alio modo in speciali, secundum scilicet quod
progreditur ex aliqua causa particulari, quae est executiva divinae
gubernationis. Primo igitur modo, nihil contranititur ordini
divinae gubernationis. Quod ex duobus patet. Primo quidem, ex hoc
quod ordo divinae gubernationis totaliter in bonum tendit, et
unaquaeque res in sua operatione et conatu non tendit nisi ad
bonum, nullus enim respiciens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius
dicit. Alio modo apparet idem ex hoc quod, sicut supra dictum est,
omnis inclinatio alicuius rei vel naturalis vel voluntaria, nihil
est aliud quam quaedam impressio a primo movente, sicut inclinatio
sagittae ad signum determinatum, nihil aliud est quam quaedam
impressio a sagittante. Unde omnia quae agunt vel naturaliter vel
voluntarie, quasi propria sponte perveniunt in id ad quod divinitus
ordinantur. Et ideo dicitur Deus omnia disponere suaviter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for
                     even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their
                     nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32753] Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod dicuntur aliqui vel cogitare vel loqui vel agere
contra Deum, non quia totaliter renitantur ordini divinae
gubernationis, quia etiam peccantes intendunt aliquod bonum, sed
quia contranituntur cuidam determinato bono, quod est eis
conveniens secundum suam naturam aut statum. Et ideo puniuntur
iuste a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> is clear from the above.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32754] Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet
solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause;
                     but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32755] Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ex hoc quod una res alteri contrapugnat, ostenditur
quod aliquid reniti potest ordini qui est ex aliqua causa
particulari, non autem ordini qui dependet a causa universali
totius.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q104" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q104-p0.1">Q. 104. THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q104-p2"> We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise:</p><p id="FP_Q104-p3"><a href="#FP_Q104_A1"> (1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q104-p4"><a href="#FP_Q104_A2"> (2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q104-p5"><a href="#FP_Q104_A3"> (3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?</a></p><p id="FP_Q104-p6"><a href="#FP_Q104_A4"> (4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 pr."><a name="32756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32756]
Iª q. 104 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
effectibus divinae gubernationis in speciali. Et circa hoc
quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum creaturae indigeant ut
conserventur in esse a Deo. Secundo, utrum conserventur a Deo
immediate. Tertio, utrum Deus possit aliquid redigere in nihilum.
Quarto, utrum aliquid in nihilum redigatur.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q104_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q104_A1-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 1. Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in
                     being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature
                     cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is proved thus. That which
                     is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be
                     in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself,
                     because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of
                     the angels (
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q50_A2" id="FP_Q104_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[50], AA[2]</a>,5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality
                     to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies (
                     <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q66_A2" id="FP_Q104_A1-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[66], A[2]</a>). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality
                     to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since
                     it is not in potentiality to any other form.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32757] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod creaturae non indigeant ut a Deo
conserventur in esse. Quod enim non potest non esse, non indiget ut
conservetur in esse, sicut quod non potest abscedere, non indiget
ut conservetur ne abscedat. Sed quaedam creaturae sunt quae
secundum sui naturam non possunt non esse. Ergo non omnes creaturae
indigent ut a Deo conserventur in esse. Probatio mediae. Quod per
se inest alicui, necesse est ei inesse, et oppositum eius
impossibile est ei inesse, sicut necessarium est binarium esse
parem, et impossibile est eum esse imparem. Esse autem per se
consequitur ad formam, quia unumquodque secundum hoc est ens actu,
quod habet formam. Quaedam autem creaturae sunt, quae sunt formae
quaedam subsistentes, sicut de Angelis dictum est; et sic per se
inest eis esse. Et eadem ratio est de illis quorum materia non est
in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut supra dictum est de
corporibus caelestibus. Huiusmodi ergo creaturae secundum suam
naturam ex necessitate sunt, et non possunt non esse, potentia enim
ad non esse non potest fundari neque in forma, quam per se sequitur
esse; neque in materia existente sub forma quam non potest
amittere, cum non sit in potentia ad aliam formam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect
                     to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for
                     some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He
                     has ceased to create it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32758] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
est potentior quolibet creato agente. Sed aliquod creatum agens
potest communicare suo effectui ut conservetur in esse, etiam eius
operatione cessante, sicut cessante actione aedificatoris, remanet
domus; et cessante actione ignis, remanet aqua calefacta per
aliquod tempus. Ergo multo magis Deus potest suae creaturae
conferre quod conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and
                     violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through
                     some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are
                     spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to
                     not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32759] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
nullum violentum potest contingere absque aliqua causa agente. Sed
tendere ad non esse est innaturale et violentum cuilibet creaturae,
quia quaelibet creatura naturaliter appetit esse. Ergo nulla
creatura potest tendere in non esse, nisi aliquo agente ad
corruptionem. Sed quaedam sunt ad quorum corruptionem nihil agere
potest; sicut spirituales substantiae, et corpora caelestia. Ergo
huiusmodi creaturae non possunt tendere in non esse, etiam Dei
operatione cessante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious,
                     produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is
                     not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does
                     it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not keep the creature
                     in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore
                     creatures are not kept in being by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32760] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
Deus conservat res in esse, hoc erit per aliquam actionem. Per
quamlibet autem actionem agentis, si sit efficax, aliquid fit in
effectu. Oportet igitur quod per actionem Dei conservantis aliquid
fiat in creatura. Sed hoc non videtur. Non enim per huiusmodi
actionem fit ipsum esse creaturae, quia quod iam est, non fit.
Neque iterum aliquid aliud superadditum, quia vel non continue Deus
conservaret creaturam in esse, vel continue aliquid adderetur
creaturae, quod est inconveniens. Non igitur creaturae conservantur
in esse a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>): "Upholding all things by the word of His power."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32761] Iª q. 104 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Heb. I, <i>portans omnia verbo virtutis suae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a
                     thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything
                     by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire.
                     In this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a
                     nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said
                     to preserve another 'per se' and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot
                     exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God,
                     so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the
                     Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p8"> This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an
                     agent may be the cause of the "becoming" of its effect, but not directly of its "being." This may be seen both in artificial
                     and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its "becoming," but he is not the direct cause of its "being."
                     For it is clear that the "being" of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and
                     arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying
                     the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able
                     to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the "being" of a house depends on the nature of these
                     materials, just as its "becoming" depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For
                     if
                     an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of "being" which results from that form;
                     but it will be the cause of the effect, in its "becoming" only.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p9"> Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other's form as such, since it would
                     then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this
                     form for as much as it is in matter---in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter" receives "this form." And this
                     is to be the cause of "becoming," as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is
                     such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause,
                     then the "becoming" of the effect, but not its "being," depends on the agent.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p10"> Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists
                     in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus
                     the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause
                     of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of
                     "becoming" but also the cause of "being."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p11"> Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the "becoming" of
                     the effect: so neither can the "being" of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of
                     the effect not only in "becoming" but also in "being." This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire's
                     action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to
                     act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if
                     it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly
                     and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On
                     the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the
                     principle of light. Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p12"> Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by
                     its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence,
                     since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence.
                     Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His
                     creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse." In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says:
                     "As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns
                     at once to darkness."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 co."><a name="32762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32762] Iª q. 104 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est dicere, et secundum fidem et secundum rationem,
quod creaturae conservantur in esse a Deo. Ad cuius evidentiam,
considerandum est quod aliquid conservatur ab altero dupliciter.
Uno modo, indirecte et per accidens, sicut ille dicitur rem
conservare, qui removet corrumpens; puta si aliquis puerum
custodiat ne cadat in ignem, dicitur eum conservare. Et sic etiam
Deus dicitur aliqua conservare, sed non omnia, quia quaedam sunt
quae non habent corrumpentia, quae necesse sit removere ad rei
conservationem. Alio modo dicitur aliquid rem aliquam conservare
per se et directe, inquantum scilicet illud quod conservatur,
dependet a conservante, ut sine eo esse non possit. Et hoc modo
omnes creaturae indigent divina conservatione. Dependet enim esse
cuiuslibet creaturae a Deo, ita quod nec ad momentum subsistere
possent, sed in nihilum redigerentur, nisi operatione divinae
virtutis conservarentur in esse, sicut Gregorius dicit. Et hoc sic
perspici potest. Omnis enim effectus dependet a sua causa, secundum
quod est causa eius. Sed considerandum est quod aliquod agens est
causa sui effectus secundum fieri tantum, et non directe secundum
esse eius. Quod quidem contingit et in artificialibus, et in rebus
naturalibus. Aedificator enim est causa domus quantum ad eius
fieri, non autem directe quantum ad esse eius. Manifestum est enim
quod esse domus consequitur formam eius, forma autem domus est
compositio et ordo, quae quidem forma consequitur naturalem
virtutem quarundam rerum. Sicut enim coquus coquit cibum adhibendo
aliquam virtutem naturalem activam, scilicet ignis; ita aedificator
facit domum adhibendo caementum, lapides et ligna, quae sunt
susceptiva et conservativa talis compositionis et ordinis. Unde
esse domus dependet ex naturis harum rerum, sicut fieri domus
dependet ex actione aedificatoris. Et simili ratione est
considerandum in rebus naturalibus. Quia si aliquod agens non est
causa formae inquantum huiusmodi, non erit per se causa esse quod
consequitur ad talem formam, sed erit causa effectus secundum fieri
tantum. Manifestum est autem quod, si aliqua duo sunt eiusdem
speciei, unum non potest esse per se causa formae alterius,
inquantum est talis forma, quia sic esset causa formae propriae,
cum sit eadem ratio utriusque. Sed potest esse causa huiusmodi
formae secundum quod est in materia, idest quod haec materia
acquirat hanc formam. Et hoc est esse causa secundum fieri; sicut
cum homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. Et ideo quandocumque
naturalis effectus est natus impressionem agentis recipere secundum
eandem rationem secundum quam est in agente, tunc fieri effectus
dependet ab agente, non autem esse ipsius. Sed aliquando effectus
non est natus recipere impressionem agentis secundum eandem
rationem secundum quam est in agente, sicut patet in omnibus
agentibus quae non agunt simile secundum speciem; sicut caelestia
corpora sunt causa generationis inferiorum corporum dissimilium
secundum speciem. Et tale agens potest esse causa formae secundum
rationem talis formae, et non solum secundum quod acquiritur in hac
materia, et ideo est causa non solum fiendi, sed essendi. Sicut
igitur fieri rei non potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod
est causa effectus secundum fieri; ita nec esse rei potest
remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa effectus non
solum secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Et haec est ratio
quare aqua calefacta retinet calorem, cessante actione ignis; non
autem remanet aer illuminatus, nec ad momentum, cessante actione
solis. Quia scilicet materia aquae susceptiva est caloris ignis
secundum eandem rationem qua est in igne, unde si perfecte
perducatur ad formam ignis, retinebit calorem semper; si autem
imperfecte participet aliquid de forma ignis secundum quandam
inchoationem, calor non semper remanebit, sed ad tempus, propter
debilem participationem principii caloris. Aer autem nullo modo
natus est recipere lumen secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est
in sole, ut scilicet recipiat formam solis, quae est principium
luminis, et ideo, quia non habet radicem in aere, statim cessat
lumen, cessante actione solis. Sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad
Deum, sicut aer ad solem illuminantem. Sicut enim sol est lucens
per suam naturam, aer autem fit luminosus participando lumen a
sole, non tamen participando naturam solis; ita solus Deus est ens
per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est suum esse; omnis autem
creatura est ens participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius
esse. Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit IV super Gen. ad Litt.,
<i>virtus Dei ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si cessaret
aliquando, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura
concideret</i>. Et in VIII eiusdem libri dicit quod, <i>sicut aer
praesente lumine fit lucidus, sic homo, Deo sibi praesente,
illuminatur, absente autem, continuo tenebratur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Being" naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from
                     the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures
                     and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32763] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito
tamen influxu Dei, sicut lumen sequitur diaphanum aeris, supposito
influxu solis. Unde potentia ad non esse in spiritualibus creaturis
et corporibus caelestibus, magis est in Deo, qui potest subtrahere
suum influxum, quam in forma vel in materia talium creaturarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make
                     it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an
                     effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of 'being' but
                     only of "becoming."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32764] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Deus non potest communicare alicui creaturae ut
conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante; sicut non potest ei
communicare quod non sit causa esse illius. Intantum enim indiget
creatura conservari a Deo, inquantum esse effectus dependet a causa
essendi. Unde non est simile de agente quod non est causa essendi,
sed fieri tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not
                     need to be preserved thus, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32765] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de conservatione quae est per
remotionem corrumpentis; qua non indigent omnes creaturae, ut
dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either
                     motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32766] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam
actionem; sed per continuationem actionis qua dat esse, quae quidem
actio est sine motu et tempore. Sicut etiam conservatio luminis in
aere est per continuatum influxum a sole.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q104_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q104_A2-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 2. Whether God preserves every creature immediately?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God preserves every creature immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action, as
                     above stated (A[1], ad 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32767] Iª q. 104 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus immediate omnem creaturam conservet.
Eadem enim actione Deus est conservator rerum, qua et creator, ut
dictum est. Sed Deus immediate est creator omnium. Ergo immediate
est etiam conservator.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less
                     therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things without any intermediate cause
                     preserving them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32768] Iª q. 104 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
unaquaeque res magis est proxima sibi, quam rei alteri. Sed non
potest communicari alicui creaturae quod conservet seipsam. Ergo
multo minus potest ei communicari quod conservet aliam. Ergo Deus
omnia conservat absque aliqua media causa conservante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its "becoming," but also of its being. But all created causes
                     do not seem to cause their effects except in their "becoming," for they cause only by moving, as above stated (
                     <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q45_A3" id="FP_Q104_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[45], A[3]</a>). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32769] Iª q. 104 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
effectus conservatur in esse ab eo quod est causa eius non solum
secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Sed omnes causae creatae,
ut videtur, non sunt causae suorum effectuum nisi secundum fieri,
non sunt enim causae nisi movendo, ut supra habitum est. Ergo non
sunt causae conservantes suos effectus in esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore
                     He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32770] Iª q. 104 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod per idem conservatur res, per quod habet esse. Sed Deus dat
esse rebus mediantibus aliquibus causis mediis. Ergo etiam res in
esse conservat mediantibus aliquibus causis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q104_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q104_A1" id="FP_Q104_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a
                     corrupting cause; secondly, directly and "per se," by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as the being of
                     the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal
                     things there are many causes which
                     hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction;
                     and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when
                     we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally
                     on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the
                     principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all
                     the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q104_A2-p7"> For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes:
                     thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation
                     of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation
                     and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which
                     are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 co."><a name="32771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32771] Iª q. 104 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut dictum est, dupliciter aliquid rem aliquam in esse
conservat, uno modo, indirecte et per accidens, per hoc quod
removet vel impedit actionem corrumpentis; alio modo, directe et
per se, quia ab eo dependet esse alterius, sicut a causa dependet
esse effectus. Utroque autem modo aliqua res creata invenitur esse
alterius conservativa. Manifestum est enim quod etiam in rebus
corporalibus multa sunt quae impediunt actiones corrumpentium, et
per hoc dicuntur rerum conservativa; sicut sal impedit carnes a
putrefactione, et simile est in multis aliis. Invenitur etiam quod
ab aliqua creatura dependet aliquis effectus secundum suum esse.
Cum enim sunt multae causae ordinatae, necesse est quod effectus
dependeat primo quidem et principaliter a causa prima; secundario
vero ab omnibus causis mediis. Et ideo principaliter quidem prima
causa est effectus conservativa; secundario vero omnes mediae
causae, et tanto magis quanto causa fuerit altior et primae causae
proximior. Unde superioribus causis, etiam in corporalibus rebus,
attribuitur conservatio et permanentia rerum, sicut philosophus
dicit, in XII Metaphys., quod primus motus, scilicet diurnus, est
causa continuitatis generationis; secundus autem motus, qui est per
zodiacum, est causa diversitatis quae est secundum generationem et
corruptionem. Et similiter astrologi, attribuunt Saturno, qui est
supremus planetarum; res fixas et permanentes. Sic igitur dicendum
est quod Deus conservat res quasdam in esse, mediantibus aliquibus
causis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend
                     on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the principal cause of their preservation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32772] Iª q. 104 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Deus immediate omnia creavit, sed in ipsa rerum
creatione ordinem in rebus instituit, ut quaedam ab aliis
dependerent, per quas secundario conservarentur in esse;
praesupposita tamen principali conservatione, quae est ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only
                     produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving
                     another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32773] Iª q. 104 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum propria causa sit conservativa effectus ab ea
dependentis; sicut nulli effectui praestari potest quod sit causa
sui ipsius, potest tamen ei praestari quod sit causa alterius; ita
etiam nulli effectui praestari potest quod sit sui ipsius
conservativus, potest tamen ei praestari quod sit conservativus
alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue
                     of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in
                     the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is
                     lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of
                     the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32774] Iª q. 104 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod nulla creatura potest esse causa alterius, quantum ad
hoc quod acquirat novam formam vel dispositionem, nisi per modum
alicuius mutationis, quia semper agit praesupposito aliquo
subiecto. Sed postquam formam vel dispositionem induxit in effectu,
absque alia immutatione effectus, huiusmodi formam vel
dispositionem conservat. Sicut in aere, prout illuminatur de novo,
intelligitur quaedam mutatio; sed conservatio luminis est absque
aeris immutatione, ex sola praesentia illuminantis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q104_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q104_A3-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 3. Whether God can annihilate anything?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "God is not the cause of anything
                     tending to non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate
                     anything.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32775] Iª q. 104 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit aliquid in nihilum
redigere. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest.,
quod <i>Deus non est causa tendendi in non esse</i>. Hoc autem
contingeret, si aliquam creaturam redigeret in nihilum. Ergo Deus
non potest aliquid in nihilum redigere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because
                     God is good, we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be
                     the case were He to annihilate anything.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32776] Iª q. 104 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
est causa rerum ut sint, per suam bonitatem, quia, ut Augustinus
dicit in libro de Doct. Christ., <i>inquantum Deus bonus est,
sumus</i>. Sed Deus non potest non esse bonus. Ergo non potest
facere ut res non sint. Quod faceret, si eas in nihilum
redigeret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action
                     is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated
                     another undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32777] Iª q. 104 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
Deus in nihilum aliqua redigeret, oporteret quod hoc fieret per
aliquam actionem. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia omnis actio
terminatur ad aliquod ens; unde etiam actio corrumpentis terminatur
ad aliquid generatum, quia generatio unius est corruptio alterius.
Ergo Deus non potest aliquid in nihilum redigere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.24" target="asv">Jer. 10:24</a>): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32778] Iª q. 104 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Ierem. X, <i>corripe me, domine, verumtamen in
iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum redigas
me</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that God, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not annihilate
                     anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q104_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God created things
                     of His own free-will, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.134.6" target="asv"> Ps. 134:6</a>: "Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He
                     hath done." Therefore that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence
                     otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed,
                     God was free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their existence;
                     and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 co."><a name="32779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32779] Iª q. 104 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod quidam posuerunt quod Deus res in esse produxit agendo de
necessitate naturae. Quod si esset verum, Deus non posset rem
aliquam in nihilum redigere; sicut non potest a sua natura mutari.
Sed, sicut supra est habitum, haec positio est falsa, et a fide
Catholica penitus aliena, quae confitetur Deum res libera voluntate
produxisse in esse, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>omnia quaecumque
voluit dominus, fecit</i>. Hoc igitur quod Deus creaturae esse
communicat, ex Dei voluntate dependet. Nec aliter res in esse
conservat, nisi inquantum eis continue influit esse. Ut dictum est.
Sicut ergo antequam res essent, potuit eis non communicare esse, et
sic eas non facere; ita postquam iam factae sunt, potest eis non
influere esse, et sic esse desisterent. Quod est eas in nihilum
redigere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as
                     such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has
                     this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to
                     non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32780] Iª q. 104 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod non esse non habet causam per se, quia nihil potest
esse causa nisi inquantum est ens; ens autem, per se loquendo, est
causa essendi. Sic igitur Deus non potest esse causa tendendi in
non esse; sed hoc habet creatura ex seipsa, inquantum est de
nihilo. Sed per accidens Deus potest esse causa quod res in nihilum
redigantur, subtrahendo scilicet suam actionem a rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on
                     creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence,
                     so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32781] Iª q. 104 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod bonitas Dei est causa rerum, non quasi ex necessitate
naturae, quia divina bonitas non dependet ex rebus creatis; sed per
liberam voluntatem. Unde sicut potuit sine praeiudicio bonitatis
suae, res non producere in esse; ita absque detrimento suae
bonitatis, potest res in esse non conservare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32782] Iª q. 104 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, si Deus rem aliquam redigeret in nihilum, hoc non
esset per aliquam actionem; sed per hoc quod ab agendo
cessaret.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q104_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q104_A4-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 4. Whether anything is annihilated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing
                     but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced
                     to nothing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32783] Iª q. 104 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid in nihilum redigatur. Finis enim
respondet principio. Sed a principio nihil erat nisi Deus. Ergo ad
hunc finem res perducentur, ut nihil sit nisi Deus. Et ita
creaturae in nihilum redigentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves
                     (Phys. viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time." Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration;
                     and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32784] Iª q. 104 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
omnis creatura habet potentiam finitam. Sed nulla potentia finita
se extendit ad infinitum, unde in VIII Physic. probatur quod
potentia finita non potest movere tempore infinito. Ergo nulla
creatura potest durare in infinitum. Et ita quandoque in nihilum
redigetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are
                     reduced to nothing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32785] Iª q. 104 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
forma et accidentia non habent materiam partem sui. Sed quandoque
desinunt esse. Ergo in nihilum rediguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.14" target="asv">Eccles. 3:14</a>): "I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32786] Iª q. 104 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Eccle. III. <i>Didici quod omnia opera quae fecit
Deus, perseverant in aeternum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q104_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously,
                     and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FP_Q104_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[6]</a>). Now whatever God wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things
                     which occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, "To
                     each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>); and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q104_A4-p7"> Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no
                     potentiality to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible,
                     since it is the subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation
                     of grace; since rather the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in
                     existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 co."><a name="32787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32787] Iª q. 104 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod eorum quae a Deo fiunt circa creaturam, quaedam proveniunt
secundum naturalem cursum rerum; quaedam vero miraculose operatur
praeter ordinem naturalem creaturis inditum, ut infra dicetur. Quae
autem facturus est Deus secundum ordinem naturalem rebus inditum,
considerari possunt ex ipsis rerum naturis, quae vero miraculose
fiunt, ordinantur ad gratiae manifestationem, secundum illud
apostoli I ad Cor. XII, <i>unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad
utilitatem</i>; et postmodum, inter cetera, subdit de miraculorum
operatione. Creaturarum autem naturae hoc demonstrant, ut nulla
earum in nihilum redigatur, quia vel sunt immateriales, et sic in
eis non est potentia ad non esse; vel sunt materiales, et sic
saltem remanent semper secundum materiam, quae incorruptibilis est,
utpote subiectum existens generationis et corruptionis. Redigere
etiam aliquid in nihilum, non pertinet ad gratiae manifestationem,
cum magis per hoc divina potentia et bonitas ostendatur, quod res
in esse conservat. Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod nihil omnino
in nihilum redigetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that
                     they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving
                     all things in existence, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things by the word of His power" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32788] Iª q. 104 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod hoc quod res in esse productae sunt, postquam non
fuerunt, declarat potentiam producentis. Sed quod in nihilum
redigerentur, huiusmodi manifestationem impediret, cum Dei potentia
in hoc maxime ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat, secundum
illud apostoli Heb. I, <i>portans omnia verbo virtutis
suae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence
                     is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things,
                     however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent
                     from receiving the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot
                     resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue
                     to exist for ever.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32789] Iª q. 104 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod potentia creaturae ad essendum est receptiva tantum;
sed potentia activa est ipsius Dei, a quo est influxus essendi.
Unde quod res in infinitum durent, sequitur infinitatem divinae
virtutis. Determinatur tamen quibusdam rebus virtus ad manendum
tempore determinato, inquantum impediri possunt ne percipiant
influxum essendi qui est ab eo, ex aliquo contrario agente, cui
finita virtus non potest resistere tempore infinito, sed solum
tempore determinato. Et ideo ea quae non habent contrarium, quamvis
habeant finitam virtutem, perseverant in aeternum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for
                     it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely
                     reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of
                     the subject.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32790] Iª q. 104 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod formae et accidentia non sunt entia completa, cum non
subsistant, sed quodlibet eorum est aliquid entis, sic enim ens
dicitur, quia eo aliquid est. Et tamen eo modo quo sunt, non omnino
in nihilum rediguntur; non quia aliqua pars eorum remaneat, sed
remanent in potentia materiae vel subiecti.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q105" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q105-p0.1">Q. 105. OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q105-p2"> We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures
                  by God; secondly, the change of one creature by another.
               </p><p id="FP_Q105-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q105-p4"><a href="#FP_Q105_A1"> (1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p5"><a href="#FP_Q105_A2"> (2) Whether He can immediately move a body?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p6"><a href="#FP_Q105_A3"> (3) Whether He can move the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p7"><a href="#FP_Q105_A4"> (4) Whether He can move the will?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p8"><a href="#FP_Q105_A5"> (5) Whether God works in every worker?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p9"><a href="#FP_Q105_A6"> (6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p10"><a href="#FP_Q105_A7"> (7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p11"><a href="#FP_Q105_A8"> (8) Of the diversity of miracles.</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 pr."><a name="32791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32791]
Iª q. 105 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de secundo
effectu gubernationis divinae qui est mutatio creaturarum. Et
primo, de mutatione creaturarum a Deo; secundo, de mutatione unius
creaturae ab alia. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum Deus
immediate possit movere materiam ad formam. Secundo, utrum
immediate possit movere aliquod corpus. Tertio, utrum possit movere
intellectum. Quarto, utrum possit movere voluntatem. Quinto, utrum
Deus operetur in omni operante. Sexto, utrum possit aliquid facere
praeter ordinem rebus inditum. Septimo, utrum omnia quae sic Deus
facit, sint miracula. Octavo, de diversitate miraculorum.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q105_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A1-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 1. Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii,
                     Did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets
                     like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32792] Iª q. 105 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit immediate movere materiam
ad formam. Sicut enim probat philosophus in VII Metaphys., formam
in hac materia nihil facere potest nisi forma quae est in materia,
quia simile facit sibi simile. Sed Deus non est forma in materia.
Ergo non potest causare formam in materia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by
                     some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means
                     of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any
                     particular form, except by means of a particular agent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32793] Iª q. 105 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
aliquod agens se habeat ad multa, nullum eorum producet, nisi
determinetur ad ipsum per aliquid aliud, ut enim in III de anima
dicitur, universalis opinio non movet nisi mediante aliqua
particulari apprehensione. Sed virtus divina est universalis causa
omnium. Ergo non potest producere aliquam particularem formam, nisi
mediante aliquo particulari agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as
                     we have seen above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q104_A2" id="FP_Q105_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[104], A[2]</a>). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by God,
                     only by means of particular causes.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32794] Iª q. 105 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut esse commune dependet a prima causa universali, ita esse
determinatum dependet a determinatis causis particularibus, ut
supra habitum est. Sed determinatum esse alicuius rei est per
propriam eius formam. Ergo propriae rerum formae non producuntur a
Deo, nisi mediantibus causis particularibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God formed man of the slime of the earth."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32795] Iª q. 105 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>formavit Deus hominem de limo
terrae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God can move matter immediately to form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active
                     power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it
                     can be reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing
                     else but the act of matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 co."><a name="32796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32796] Iª q. 105 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus immediate potest movere materiam ad formam. Quia ens in
potentia passiva reduci potest in actum, a potentia activa quae eam
sub sua potestate continet. Cum igitur materia contineatur sub
potestate divina, utpote a Deo producta, potest reduci in actum per
divinam potentiam. Et hoc est moveri materiam ad formam, quia forma
nihil aliud est quam actus materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man,
                     and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in
                     its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they
                     are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that
                     over which the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have said above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A2" id="FP_Q105_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[2]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q105_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the
                     composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating
                     a composite thing like itself; so also can God. But
                     no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter. Hence
                     angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32797] Iª q. 105 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod effectus aliquis invenitur assimilari causae agenti
dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum eandem speciem; ut homo generatur ab
homine, et ignis ab igne. Alio modo, secundum virtualem
continentiam, prout scilicet forma effectus virtualiter continetur
in causa, et sic animalia ex putrefactione generata, et plantae et
corpora mineralia assimilantur soli et stellis, quorum virtute
generantur. Sic igitur effectus causae agenti similatur secundum
totum illud ad quod se extendit virtus agentis. Virtus autem Dei se
extendit ad formam et materiam, ut supra habitum est. Unde
compositum quod generatur, similatur Deo secundum virtualem
continentiam, sicut similatur composito generanti per similitudinem
speciei. Unde sicut compositum generans potest movere materiam ad
formam generando compositum sibi simile, ita et Deus. Non autem
aliqua alia forma non in materia existens, quia materia non
continetur in virtute alterius substantiae separatae. Et ideo
Daemones et Angeli operantur circa haec visibilia, non quidem
imprimendo formas, sed adhibendo corporalia semina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would hold if God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows
                     the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that
                     form on matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32798] Iª q. 105 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus ageret, ex necessitate
naturae. Sed quia agit per voluntatem et intellectum, qui cognoscit
rationes proprias omnium formarum, et non solum universales; inde
est quod potest determinate hanc vel illam formam materiae
imprimere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other causes
                     to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32799] Iª q. 105 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod causae secundae ordinantur ad
determinatos effectus est illis a Deo. Unde Deus, quia alias causas
ordinat ad determinatos effectus, potest etiam determinatos
effectus producere per seipsum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A2-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 2. Whether God can move a body immediately?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher
                     says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact between
                     God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is no contact with God." Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32800] Iª q. 105 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit immediate movere aliquod
corpus. Cum enim movens et motum oporteat esse simul, ut probatur
in VII Physic., oportet esse contactum quendam moventis et moti.
Sed non potest esse contactus Dei, et corporis alicuius, dicit enim
Dionysius, in I cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Dei non est aliquis
tactus</i>. Ergo Deus non potest immediate movere aliquod
corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object
                     of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal
                     power. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32801] Iª q. 105 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
est movens non motum. Tale autem est appetibile apprehensum. Movet
igitur Deus sicut desideratum et apprehensum. Sed non apprehenditur
nisi ab intellectu, qui non est corpus, nec virtus corporis. Ergo
Deus non potest movere aliquod corpus immediate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a
                     body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist
                     at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power. But God's
                     power is infinite, as we have explained (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q25_A2" id="FP_Q105_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore God
                     cannot move a body immediately.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32802] Iª q. 105 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus probat in VIII Physic., quod potentia infinita movet in
instanti. Sed impossibile est aliquod corpus in instanti moveri,
quia, cum omnis motus sit inter opposita, sequeretur quod duo
opposita simul inessent eidem; quod est impossibile. Ergo corpus
non potest immediate moveri a potentia infinita. Potentia autem Dei
est infinita, ut supra habitum est. Ergo Deus non potest immediate
movere aliquod corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> God produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.9" target="asv"> Gn. 1:9 </a>"Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore God alone can move a body immediately.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32803] Iª q. 105 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
opera sex dierum Deus fecit immediate; in quibus continetur motus
corporum, ut patet per hoc quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>congregentur
aquae in locum unum</i>. Ergo Deus immediate potest movere
corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause.
                     Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any
                     bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A1" id="FP_Q105_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light
                     result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or else
                     tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to
                     that form, and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and
                     moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever
                     in
                     respect of any movement whatever.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 co."><a name="32804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32804] Iª q. 105 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod erroneum est dicere Deum non posse facere per seipsum omnes
determinatos effectus qui fiunt per quamcumque causam creatam. Unde
cum corpora moveantur immediate a causis creatis, nulli debet
venire in dubium quin Deus possit movere immediate quodcumque
corpus. Et hoc quidem consequens est ad ea quae supra dicta sunt.
Nam omnis motus corporis cuiuscumque vel consequitur ad aliquam
formam, sicut motus localis gravium et levium consequitur formam
quae datur a generante, ratione cuius generans dicitur movens, vel
est via ad formam aliquam, sicut calefactio est via ad formam
ignis. Eiusdem autem est imprimere formam, et disponere ad formam,
et dare motum consequentem formam, ignis enim non solum generat
alium ignem, sed etiam calefacit, et sursum movet. Cum igitur Deus
possit immediate formam materiae imprimere, consequens est ut
possit, secundum quemcumque motum, corpus quodcumque movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of
                     sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches,
                     nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural
                     power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the
                     words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself be touched.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32805] Iª q. 105 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod duplex est tactus, scilicet corporalis, sicut duo
corpora se tangunt; et virtualis, sicut dicitur quod contristans
tangit contristatum. Secundum igitur primum contactum, Deus, cum
sit incorporeus, nec tangit nec tangitur. Secundum autem virtualem
contactum, tangit quidem movendo creaturas, sed non tangitur, quia
nullius creaturae virtus naturalis potest ad ipsum pertingere. Et
sic intellexit Dionysius quod non est tactus Dei, ut scilicet
tangatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended
                     by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32806] Iª q. 105 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod movet Deus sicut desideratum et intellectum. Sed non
oportet quod semper moveat sicut desideratum et intellectum ab eo
quod movetur; sed sicut desideratum et notum a seipso; quia omnia
operatur propter suam bonitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover "of
                     bulk," by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover
                     can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power "of bulk," would move without time, which is impossible;
                     therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is
                     not measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite
                     power. The reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an
                     infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the
                     velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does
                     not move in any time; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is
                     not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and
                     therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32807] Iª q. 105 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod philosophus in VIII Physic. intendit probare quod
virtus primi motoris non sit virtus in magnitudine, tali ratione,
virtus primi motoris est infinita (quod probat per hoc quod potest
movere tempore infinito); virtus autem infinita, si esset in aliqua
magnitudine, moveret in non tempore, quod est impossibile; ergo
oportet quod infinita virtus primi motoris sit non in magnitudine.
Ex quo patet quod corpus moveri in non tempore, non consequitur
nisi virtutem infinitam in magnitudine. Cuius ratio est, quia omnis
virtus quae est in magnitudine, movet secundum se totam, cum moveat
per necessitatem naturae. Potentia autem infinita
improportionabiliter excedit quamlibet potentiam finitam. Quanto
autem maior est potentia moventis, tanto est maior velocitas motus.
Cum igitur potentia finita moveat tempore determinato, sequitur
quod potentia infinita non moveat in aliquo tempore, quia
cuiuscumque temporis ad aliud tempus est aliqua proportio. Sed
virtus quae non est in magnitudine, est virtus alicuius
intelligentis, qui operatur in effectibus secundum quod eis
convenit. Et ideo, cum corpori non possit esse conveniens moveri in
non tempore, non sequitur quod moveat in non tempore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A3-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 3. Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its
                     own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is
                     moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. Therefore the intellect is not moved by another;
                     and so apparently God cannot move the created intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32808] Iª q. 105 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non moveat immediate intellectum
creatum. Actio enim intellectus est ab eo in quo est, non enim
transit in exteriorem materiam, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Actio
autem eius quod movetur ab alio, non est ab eo in quo est, sed a
movente. Non ergo intellectus movetur ab alio. Et ita videtur quod
Deus non possit movere intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the
                     intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as
                     the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle
                     of understanding. Therefore it is not moved by another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32809] Iª q. 105 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
quod habet in se principium sufficiens sui motus, non movetur ab
alio. Sed motus intellectus est ipsum intelligere eius, sicut
dicitur quod intelligere vel sentire est motus quidam, secundum
philosophum, in III de anima. Sufficiens autem principium
intelligendi est lumen intelligibile inditum intellectui. Ergo non
movetur ab alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible
                     to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32810] Iª q. 105 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut sensus movetur a sensibili, ita intellectus ab intelligibili.
Sed Deus non est intelligibilis nobis, sed nostrum intellectum
excedit. Ergo Deus non potest movere nostrum intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.10" target="asv">Ps. 93:10</a>) that God "teaches man knowledge." Therefore God moves the human intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32811] Iª q. 105 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
docens movet intellectum addiscentis. Sed Deus docet hominem
scientiam, sicut dicitur in Psalmo. Ergo Deus movet intellectum
hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q105_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said
                     to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement
                     of the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual
                     power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality;
                     while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands.
                     So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impresses
                     on him the likeness of the thing understood.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q105_A3-p7"> Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result
                     of immateriality, it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is the cause
                     of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He is the First
                     Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in
                     Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived
                     from Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that they
                     may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural,
                     or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and
                     species in existence.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 co."><a name="32812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32812] Iª q. 105 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut in motibus corporalibus movens dicitur quod dat formam
quae est principium motus; ita dicitur movere intellectum, quod
causat formam quae est principium intellectualis operationis, quae
dicitur motus intellectus. Operationis autem intellectus est duplex
principium in intelligente, unum scilicet quod est ipsa virtus
intellectualis, quod quidem principium est etiam in intelligente in
potentia; aliud autem est principium intelligendi in actu, scilicet
similitudo rei intellectae in intelligente. Dicitur ergo aliquid
movere intellectum, sive det intelligenti virtutem ad
intelligendum, sive imprimat ei similitudinem rei intellectae.
Utroque autem modo Deus movet intellectum creatum. Ipse enim est
primum ens immateriale. Et quia intellectualitas consequitur
immaterialitatem, sequitur quod ipse sit primum intelligens. Unde
cum primum in quolibet ordine sit causa eorum quae consequuntur,
sequitur quod ab ipso sit omnis virtus intelligendi. Similiter cum
ipse sit primum ens, et omnia entia praeexistant in ipso sicut in
prima causa, oportet quod sint in eo intelligibiliter secundum
modum eius. Sicut enim omnes rationes rerum intelligibiles primo
existunt in Deo, et ab derivantur in alios intellectus, ut actu
intelligant; sic etiam derivantur in creaturas ut subsistant. Sic
igitur Deus movet intellectum creatum, inquantum dat ei virtutem ad
intelligendum, vel naturalem vel superadditam; et inquantum
imprimit ei species intelligibiles; et utrumque tenet et conservat
in esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from
                     God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32813] Iª q. 105 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod operatio intellectualis est quidem ab intellectu in
quo est, sicut a causa secunda, sed a Deo sicut a causa prima. Ab
ipso enim datur intelligenti quod intelligere possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but
                     it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32814] Iª q. 105 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod lumen intellectuale, simul cum similitudine rei
intellectae, est sufficiens principium intelligendi; secundarium
tamen, et a primo principio dependens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of
                     which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient
                     to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A2" id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[2]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q56_A3" id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.2" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>). Hence He moves the created
                     intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A4" id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.3" shape="rect">Q[12], A[4]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32815] Iª q. 105 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod intelligibile movet intellectum nostrum, inquantum
quodammodo imprimit ei suam similitudinem, per quam intelligi
potest. Sed similitudines quas Deus imprimit intellectui creato,
non sufficiunt ad ipsum Deum intelligendum per essentiam, ut supra
habitum est. Unde movet intellectum creatum, cum tamen non sit ei
intelligibilis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A4-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 4. Whether God can move the created will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be
                     forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32816] Iª q. 105 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit movere voluntatem creatam.
Omne enim quod movetur ab extrinseco, cogitur. Sed voluntas non
potest cogi. Ergo non movetur ab aliquo extrinseco. Et ita non
potest moveri a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for
                     to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore God cannot move the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32817] Iª q. 105 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
non potest facere quod contradictoria sint simul vera. Hoc autem
sequeretur, si voluntatem moveret, nam voluntarie moveri est ex se
moveri, et non ab alio. Ergo Deus non potest voluntatem movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone,
                     but to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward
                     or blame. But this is false. Therefore God does not move the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32818] Iª q. 105 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
motus magis attribuitur moventi quam mobili, unde homicidium non
attribuitur lapidi, sed proiicienti. Si igitur Deus moveat
voluntatem, sequitur quod opera voluntaria non imputentur homini ad
meritum vel demeritum. Hoc autem est falsum. Non igitur Deus movet
voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.13" target="asv">Phil. 2:13</a>): "It is God who worketh in us [Vulgate---'you'] both to will and to accomplish."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32819] Iª q. 105 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur ad Philipp. II, <i>Deus est qui operatur in nobis
velle et perficere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A3" id="FP_Q105_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved
                     by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently
                     unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the
                     potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal
                     good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone
                     is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner
                     the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the
                     will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate
                     end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects
                     to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior
                     inclination of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 co."><a name="32820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32820] Iª q. 105 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut intellectus, ut dictum est, movetur ab obiecto, et ab
eo qui dedit virtutem intelligendi; ita voluntas movetur ab
obiecto, quod est bonum, et ab eo qui creat virtutem volendi.
Potest autem voluntas moveri sicut ab obiecto, a quocumque bono;
non tamen sufficienter et efficaciter nisi a Deo. Non enim
sufficienter aliquid potest movere aliquod mobile, nisi virtus
activa moventis excedat, vel saltem adaequet virtutem passivam
mobilis. Virtus autem passiva voluntatis se extendit ad bonum in
universali, est enim eius obiectum bonum universale, sicut et
intellectus obiectum est ens universale. Quodlibet autem bonum
creatum est quoddam particulare bonum, solus autem Deus est bonum
universale. Unde ipse solus implet voluntatem, et sufficienter eam
movet ut obiectum. Similiter autem et virtus volendi a solo Deo
causatur. Velle enim nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam in
obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale. Inclinare autem in
bonum universale est primi moventis cui proportionatur ultimus
finis, sicut in rebus humanis dirigere ad bonum commune est eius
qui praeest multitudini. Unde utroque modo proprium est Dei movere
voluntatem, sed maxime secundo modo, interius eam inclinando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the
                     proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then
                     it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural
                     inclination.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32821] Iª q. 105 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod illud quod movetur ab altero dicitur cogi, si
moveatur contra inclinationem propriam, sed si moveatur ab alio
quod sibi dat propriam inclinationem, non dicitur cogi; sicut
grave, cum movetur deorsum a generante, non cogitur. Sic igitur
Deus, movendo voluntatem, non cogit ipsam, quia dat ei eius
propriam inclinationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be
                     caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32822] Iª q. 105 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod moveri voluntarie est moveri ex se, idest a principio
intrinseco, sed illud principium intrinsecum potest esse ab alio
principio extrinseco. Et sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei quod
movetur ab alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed
                     for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have
                     stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32823] Iª q. 105 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, si voluntas ita moveretur ab alio quod ex se
nullatenus moveretur, opera voluntatis non imputarentur ad meritum
vel demeritum. Sed quia per hoc quod movetur ab alio, non
excluditur quin moveatur ex se, ut dictum est; ideo per consequens
non tollitur ratio meriti vel demeriti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A5-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 5. Whether God works in every agent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God
                     works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32824] Iª q. 105 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non operetur in omni operante. Nulla
enim insufficientia est Deo attribuenda. Si igitur Deus operatur in
omni operante, sufficienter in quolibet operatur. Superfluum igitur
esset quod agens creatum aliquid operaretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong
                     to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same
                     time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32825] Iª q. 105 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, una
operatio non est simul a duobus operantibus, sicut nec unus numero
motus potest esse duorum mobilium. Si igitur operatio creaturae est
a Deo in creatura operante, non potest esse simul a creatura. Et
ita nulla creatura aliquid operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore,
                     if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating.
                     But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the operating creature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32826] Iª q. 105 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
faciens dicitur esse causa operationis facti, inquantum dat ei
formam qua operatur. Si igitur Deus est causa operationis rerum
factarum ab ipso, hoc erit inquantum dat eis virtutem operandi. Sed
hoc est a principio, quando rem facit. Ergo videtur quod ulterius
non operetur in creatura operante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.12" target="asv">Is. 26:12</a>): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32827] Iª q. 105 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Isaiae XXVI, <i>omnia opera nostra operatus es in
nobis, domine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q105_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God
                     alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire,
                     and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things:
                     and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause,
                     that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be
                     bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way,
                     to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less
                     perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form
                     which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature.
                     We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q105_A5-p7"> In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action,
                     but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles
                     of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent;
                     the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own
                     form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought,
                     for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q105_A5-p8"> Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for
                     the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates
                     in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again
                     it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the
                     first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is
                     the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things to operated, as it were applying
                     their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the
                     axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action
                     not
                     only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy
                     and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation
                     of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is
                     within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things
                     God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God works
                     intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.10.11" target="asv"> Job 10:11</a>: "Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 co."><a name="32828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32828] Iª q. 105 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deum operari in quolibet operante aliqui sic intellexerunt,
quod nulla virtus creata aliquid operaretur in rebus, sed solus
Deus immediate omnia operaretur; puta quod ignis non calefaceret,
sed Deus in igne, et similiter de omnibus aliis. Hoc autem est
impossibile. Primo quidem, quia sic subtraheretur ordo causae et
causati a rebus creatis. Quod pertinet ad impotentiam creantis, ex
virtute enim agentis est, quod suo effectui det virtutem agendi.
Secundo, quia virtutes operativae quae in rebus inveniuntur,
frustra essent rebus attributae, si per eas nihil operarentur.
Quinimmo omnes res creatae viderentur quodammodo esse frustra, si
propria operatione destituerentur, cum omnis res sit propter suam
operationem. Semper enim imperfectum est propter perfectius, sicut
igitur materia est propter formam, ita forma, quae est actus
primus, est propter suam operationem, quae est actus secundus; et
sic operatio est finis rei creatae. Sic igitur intelligendum est
Deum operari in rebus, quod tamen ipsae res propriam habeant
operationem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum sint
causarum quatuor genera, materia quidem non est principium
actionis, sed se habet ut subiectum recipiens actionis effectum.
Finis vero et agens et forma se habent ut actionis principium, sed
ordine quodam. Nam primo quidem, principium actionis est finis, qui
movet agentem; secundo vero, agens; tertio autem, forma eius quod
ab agente applicatur ad agendum (quamvis et ipsum agens per formam
suam agat); ut patet in artificialibus. Artifex enim movetur ad
agendum a fine, qui est ipsum operatum, puta arca vel lectus; et
applicat ad actionem securim quae incidit per suum acumen. Sic
igitur secundum haec tria Deus in quolibet operante operatur. Primo
quidem, secundum rationem finis. Cum enim omnis operatio sit
propter aliquod bonum verum vel apparens; nihil autem est vel
apparet bonum, nisi secundum quod participat aliquam similitudinem
summi boni, quod est Deus; sequitur quod ipse Deus sit cuiuslibet
operationis causa ut finis. Similiter etiam considerandum est quod,
si sint multa agentia ordinata, semper secundum agens agit in
virtute primi, nam primum agens movet secundum ad agendum. Et
secundum hoc, omnia agunt in virtute ipsius Dei; et ita ipse est
causa actionum omnium agentium. Tertio, considerandum est quod Deus
movet non solum res ad operandum, quasi applicando formas et
virtutes rerum ad operationem, sicut etiam artifex applicat securim
ad scindendum, qui tamen interdum formam securi non tribuit; sed
etiam dat formam creaturis agentibus, et eas tenet in esse. Unde
non solum est causa actionum inquantum dat formam quae est
principium actionis, sicut generans dicitur esse causa motus
gravium et levium; sed etiam sicut conservans formas et virtutes
rerum; prout sol dicitur esse causa manifestationis colorum,
inquantum dat et conservat lumen, quo manifestantur colores. Et
quia forma rei est intra rem, et tanto magis quanto consideratur ut
prior et universalior; et ipse Deus est proprie causa ipsius esse
universalis in rebus omnibus, quod inter omnia est magis intimum
rebus; sequitur quod Deus in omnibus intime operetur. Et propter
hoc in sacra Scriptura operationes naturae Deo attribuuntur quasi
operanti in natura; secundum illud Iob X, <i>pelle et carnibus
vestisti me, ossibus et nervis compegisti me</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents
                     is superfluous.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32829] Iª q. 105 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Deus sufficienter operatur in rebus ad modum primi
agentis, nec propter hoc superfluit operatio secundorum
agentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a
                     primary and a secondary agent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32830] Iª q. 105 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod una actio non procedit a duobus agentibus unius
ordinis, sed nihil prohibet quin una et eadem actio procedat a
primo et secundo agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the
                     end of every action, as above explained.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32831] Iª q. 105 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Deus non solum dat formas rebus, sed etiam conservat
eas in esse, et applicat eas ad agendum, et est finis omnium
actionum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A6-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 6. Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3)
                     says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature." But that which is outside the natural order
                     seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32832] Iª q. 105 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit facere aliquid praeter
ordinem rebus inditum. Dicit enim Augustinus, XXVI contra Faustum,
<i>Deus, conditor et creator omnium naturarum, nihil contra naturam
facit</i>. Sed hoc videtur esse contra naturam, quod est praeter
ordinem naturaliter rebus inditum. Ergo Deus non potest facere
aliquid praeter ordinem rebus inditum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of
                     justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32833] Iª q. 105 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut ordo iustitiae est a Deo, ita et ordo naturae. Sed Deus non
potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem iustitiae, faceret enim tunc
aliquid iniustum. Ergo non potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem
naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that
                     He is changeable; which cannot be said.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32834] Iª q. 105 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
ordinem naturae Deus instituit. Si igitur praeter ordinem naturae
Deus aliquid faciat, videtur quod ipse sit mutabilis. Quod est
inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32835] Iª q. 105 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod <i>Deus aliquando
aliquid facit contra solitum cursum naturae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q105_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the
                     multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause.
                     Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human
                     affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is
                     contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that
                     of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q105_A6-p7"> If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for,
                     if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we consider the order of things
                     depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary
                     causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural
                     necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something
                     outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them,
                     or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts
                     against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against
                     Himself."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 co."><a name="32836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32836] Iª q. 105 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod a qualibet causa derivatur aliquis ordo in suos effectus, cum
quaelibet causa habeat rationem principii. Et ideo secundum
multiplicationem causarum, multiplicantur et ordines, quorum unus
continetur sub altero, sicut et causa continetur sub causa. Unde
causa superior non continetur sub ordine causae inferioris, sed e
converso. Cuius exemplum apparet in rebus humanis, nam ex
patrefamilias dependet ordo domus, qui continetur sub ordine
civitatis, qui procedit a civitatis rectore, cum et hic contineatur
sub ordine regis, a quo totum regnum ordinatur. Si ergo ordo rerum
consideretur prout dependet a prima causa, sic contra rerum ordinem
Deus facere non potest, sic enim si faceret, faceret contra suam
praescientiam aut voluntatem aut bonitatem. Si vero consideretur
rerum ordo prout dependet a qualibet secundarum causarum, sic Deus
potest facere praeter ordinem rerum. Quia ordini secundarum
causarum ipse non est subiectus, sed talis ordo ei subiicitur,
quasi ab eo procedens non per necessitatem naturae, sed per
arbitrium voluntatis, potuisset enim et alium ordinem rerum
instituere. Unde et potest praeter hunc ordinem institutum agere,
cum voluerit; puta agendo effectus secundarum causarum sine ipsis,
vel producendo aliquos effectus ad quos causae secundae non se
extendunt. Unde et Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod
<i>Deus contra solitum cursum naturae facit; sed contra summam
legem tam nullo modo facit, quam contra seipsum non facit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which
                     did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to
                     him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent
                     on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is
                     clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in
                     a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies
                     depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does anything outside this order, it is not
                     against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from
                     Whom
                     is all mode, number, and order in nature."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32837] Iª q. 105 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, cum aliquid contingit in rebus naturalibus praeter
naturam inditam, hoc potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo, per
actionem agentis qui inclinationem naturalem non dedit, sicut cum
homo movet corpus grave sursum, quod non habet ab eo ut moveatur
deorsum, et hoc est contra naturam. Alio modo, per actionem illius
agentis a quo dependet actio naturalis. Et hoc non est contra
naturam, ut patet in fluxu et refluxu maris, qui non est contra
naturam, quamvis sit praeter motum naturalem aquae, quae movetur
deorsum; est enim ex impressione caelestis corporis, a quo dependet
naturalis inclinatio inferiorum corporum. Cum igitur naturae ordo
sit a Deo rebus inditus, si quid praeter hunc ordinem faciat, non
est contra naturam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum,
quod <i>id est cuique rei naturale, quod ille fecerit a quo est
omnis modus, numerus et ordo naturae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do nothing
                     against such order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32838] Iª q. 105 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ordo iustitiae est secundum relationem ad causam
primam, quae est regula omnis iustitiae. Et ideo praeter hunc
ordinem, Deus nihil facere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do
                     otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32839] Iª q. 105 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Deus sic rebus certum ordinem indidit, ut tamen sibi
reservaret quid ipse aliquando aliter ex causa esset facturus. Unde
cum praeter hunc ordinem agit, non mutatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A7-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 7. Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not everything which God does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of
                     the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order; as not being
                     accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that God
                     does outside the natural order is a miracle.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32840] Iª q. 105 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia quae Deus facit praeter ordinem
naturalem rerum, sint miracula. Creatio enim mundi, et etiam
animarum, et iustificatio impii fiunt a Deo praeter ordinem
naturalem, non enim fiunt per actionem alicuius causae naturalis.
Et tamen haec miracula non dicuntur. Ergo non omnia quae facit Deus
praeter ordinem naturalem rerum, sunt miracula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond
                     our hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of
                     nature are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare
                     occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be
                     healed by the shadow of Peter (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.15" target="asv">Acts 5:15</a>). Nor do they surpass the faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we
                     all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all things
                     are outside the course of natur are miraculous.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32841] Iª q. 105 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
miraculum dicitur aliquid arduum et insolitum supra facultatem
naturae et spem admirantis proveniens. Sed quaedam fiunt praeter
naturae ordinem, quae tamen non sunt ardua, sunt enim in minimis
rebus, sicut in restauratione gemmarum, vel sanatione aegrorum. Nec
etiam sunt insolita, cum frequenter eveniant, sicut cum infirmi in
plateis ponebantur ut ad umbram Petri sanarentur. Nec etiam sunt
supra facultatem naturae, ut cum aliqui sanantur a febribus. Nec
etiam supra spem, sicut resurrectionem mortuorum omnes speramus,
quae tamen fiet praeter ordinem naturae. Ergo non omnia quae fiunt
praeter naturae ordinem, sunt miracula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes
                     things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge
                     without studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32842] Iª q. 105 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
miraculi nomen ab admiratione sumitur. Sed admiratio est de rebus
sensui manifestis. Sed quandoque aliqua accidunt praeter ordinem
naturalem in rebus sensui non manifestis, sicut cum apostoli facti
sunt scientes, neque invenientes neque discentes. Ergo non omnia
quae fiunt praeter ordinem naturae, sunt miracula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed
                     to observe, we call it a miracle."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32843] Iª q. 105 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod <i>cum Deus
aliquid facit contra cognitum nobis cursum solitumque naturae,
magnalia, vel mirabilia nominantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when
                     a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause
                     of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all
                     to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so
                     called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things
                     which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 co."><a name="32844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32844] Iª q. 105 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod nomen miraculi ab admiratione sumitur. Admiratio autem
consurgit, cum effectus sunt manifesti et causa occulta; sicut
aliquis admiratur cum videt eclipsim solis et ignorat causam, ut
dicitur in principio Metaphys. Potest autem causa effectus alicuius
apparentis alicui esse nota, quae tamen est aliis incognita. Unde
aliquid est mirum uni, quod non est mirum aliis; sicut eclipsim
solis miratur rusticus, non autem astrologus. Miraculum autem
dicitur quasi admiratione plenum, quod scilicet habet causam
simpliciter et omnibus occultam. Haec autem est Deus. Unde illa
quae a Deo fiunt praeter causas nobis notas, miracula dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because
                     they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do
                     not belong to that order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32845] Iª q. 105 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod creatio, et iustificatio impii, etsi a solo Deo
fiant, non tamen, proprie loquendo, miracula dicuntur. Quia non
sunt nata fieri per alias causas, et ita non contingunt praeter
ordinem naturae, cum haec ad ordinem naturae non pertineant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses
                     the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside
                     the usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of
                     the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in
                     which it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes
                     from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32846] Iª q. 105 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod arduum dicitur miraculum, non propter dignitatem rei
in qua fit; sed quia excedit facultatem naturae. Similiter etiam
insolitum dicitur, non quia frequenter non eveniat sed quia est
praeter naturalem consuetudinem. Supra facultatem autem naturae
dicitur aliquid, non solum propter substantiam facti sed etiam
propter modum et ordinem faciendi. Supra spem etiam naturae
miraculum esse dicitur; non supra spem gratiae, quae est ex fide,
per quam credimus resurrectionem futuram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown
                     to be wonderful.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32847] Iª q. 105 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod scientia apostolorum, quamvis secundum se non fuerit
manifesta, manifestabatur tamen in effectibus, ex quibus mirabilis
apparebat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A8-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 8. Whether one miracle is greater than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "In miraculous
                     deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer." But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore
                     one miracle is not greater than another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32848] Iª q. 105 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod unum miraculum non sit maius alio. Dicit
enim Augustinus, in epistola ad Volusianum, <i>in rebus mirabiliter
factis tota ratio facti est potentia facientis</i>. Sed eadem
potentia, scilicet Dei, fiunt omnia miracula. Ergo unum non est
maius alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason
                     exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32849] Iª q. 105 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
potentia Dei est infinita. Sed infinitum improportionabiliter
excedit omne finitum. Ergo non magis est mirandum quod faciat hunc
effectum, quam illum. Ergo unum miraculum non est maius altero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.12" target="asv">Jn. 14:12</a>): "The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32850] Iª q. 105 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XIV, de operibus miraculosis loquens,
<i>opera quae ego facio, et ipse faciet, et maiora horum
faciet</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power
                     of God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.15" target="asv"> Is. 40:15</a>: "Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance." But a thing is called
                     a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater
                     the miracle. Now the power of
                     nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place,
                     or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold
                     the highest rank among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it
                     is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the
                     dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which
                     it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air
                     is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias;
                     and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different
                     ways
                     in which the power of nature is surpassed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 co."><a name="32851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32851] Iª q. 105 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod nihil potest dici miraculum ex comparatione potentiae divinae,
quia quodcumque factum, divinae potentiae comparatum, est minimum;
secundum illud Isaiae XL, <i>ecce gentes quasi stilla situlae, et
quasi momentum staterae reputatae sunt</i>. Sed dicitur aliquid
miraculum per comparationem ad facultatem naturae, quam excedit. Et
ideo secundum quod magis excedit facultatem naturae, secundum hoc
maius miraculum dicitur. Excedit autem aliquid facultatem naturae
tripliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad substantiam facti, sicut quod duo
corpora sint simul, vel quod sol retrocedat, aut quod corpus
humanum glorificetur; quod nullo modo natura facere potest. Et ista
tenent summum gradum in miraculis. Secundo aliquid excedit
facultatem naturae, non quantum ad id quod fit, sed quantum ad id
in quo fit, sicut resuscitatio mortuorum, et illuminatio caecorum,
et similia. Potest enim natura causare vitam, sed non in mortuo, et
potest praestare visum, sed non caeco. Et haec tenent secundum
locum in miraculis. Tertio modo excedit aliquid facultatem naturae,
quantum ad modum et ordinem faciendi, sicut cum aliquis subito per
virtutem divinam a febre curatur absque curatione et consueto
processu naturae in talibus, et cum statim aer divina virtute in
pluvias densatur absque naturalibus causis, sicut factum est ad
preces Samuelis et Eliae. Et huiusmodi tenent infimum locum in
miraculis. Quaelibet tamen horum habent diversos gradus, secundum
quod diversimode excedunt facultatem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p6"> From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the Divine power.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 ad arg."><a name="32852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32852] Iª q. 105 a. 8 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
patet solutio ad obiecta, quae procedunt ex parte divinae
potentiae.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q106" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q106-p0.1">Q. 106. HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q106-p2"> We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely
                  spiritual creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature.
               </p><p id="FP_Q106-p3"> Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel
                  acts on a corporeal nature; (3) How an angel acts on man.
               </p><p id="FP_Q106-p4"> The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both
                  of the good and of the bad angels.
               </p><p id="FP_Q106-p5"> Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q106-p6"><a href="#FP_Q106_A1"> (1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?</a></p><p id="FP_Q106-p7"><a href="#FP_Q106_A2"> (2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q106-p8"><a href="#FP_Q106_A3"> (3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?</a></p><p id="FP_Q106-p9"><a href="#FP_Q106_A4"> (4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 pr."><a name="32853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32853]
Iª q. 106 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quomodo una
creatura moveat aliam. Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita, ut
primo consideremus quomodo Angeli moveant, qui sunt creaturae pure
spirituales; secundo, quomodo corpora moveant; tertio, quomodo
homines, qui sunt ex spirituali et corporali natura compositi.
Circa primum tria consideranda occurrunt, primo, quomodo Angelus
agat in Angelum; secundo, quomodo in creaturam corporalem; tertio,
quomodo in homines. Circa primum, considerare oportet de
illuminatione, et locutione Angelorum, et ordinatione eorum ad
invicem, tam bonorum, quam malorum. Circa illuminationem quaeruntur
quatuor. Primo, utrum unus Angelus moveat intellectum alterius
illuminando. Secundo, utrum unus moveat voluntatem alterius.
Tertio, utrum inferior Angelus possit illuminare superiorem.
Quarto, utrum superior Angelus illuminet inferiorem de omnibus quae
cognoscit.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q106_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q106_A1-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 1. Whether one angel enlightens another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain.
                     But one man will not then enlighten another, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.34" target="asv"> Jer. 31:34</a>: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten
                     another now.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32854] Iª q. 106 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus non illuminet alium. Angeli
enim eandem beatitudinem possident nunc, quam nos in futuro
expectamus. Sed tunc unus homo non illuminabit alium; secundum
illud Ierem. XXXI, <i>non docebit ultra vir proximum suum, et vir
fratrem suum</i>. Ergo etiam neque nunc unus Angelus illuminat
alium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of
                     nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes
                     from God. Therefore one angel does not enlighten another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32855] Iª q. 106 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
triplex est lumen in Angelis, naturae, gratiae et gloriae. Sed
Angelus illuminatur lumine naturae, a creante; lumine gratiae, a
iustificante; lumine gloriae, a beatificante; quod totum Dei est.
Ergo unus Angelus non illuminat alium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as
                     Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32856] Iª q. 106 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
lumen est forma quaedam mentis. Sed mens rationalis a solo Deo
formatur, nulla interposita creatura, ut Augustinus dicit in libro
octoginta trium quaest. Ergo unus Angelus non illuminat mentem
alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the
                     angels of the first hierarchy."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32857] Iª q. 106 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Dionysius, VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod <i>Angeli
secundae hierarchiae purgantur et illuminantur et perficiuntur per
Angelos primae hierarchiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q106_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation
                     of truth, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.13" target="asv"> Eph. 5:13</a>: "All that is made manifest is light." Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation
                     of the known truth; according to the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.8" target="asv">Eph. 3:8</a>): "To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all
                     men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God." Therefore one
                     angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii):
                     "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q106_A1-p7"> Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A3" id="FP_Q106_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[3]</a>), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known
                     truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened
                     by the neighborhood of a more perfect body ---for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is
                     hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual
                     things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one angel manifests the
                     truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by
                     a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is
                     natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth
                     which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge.
                     Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he
                     possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual substance with provident
                     power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards
                     by analogy."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 co."><a name="32858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32858] Iª q. 106 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod unus Angelus illuminat alium. Ad cuius evidentiam,
considerandum est quod lumen, secundum quod ad intellectum
pertinet, nihil est aliud quam quaedam manifestatio veritatis;
secundum illud ad Ephes. V, <i>omne quod manifestatur, lumen
est</i>. Unde illuminare nihil aliud est quam manifestationem
cognitae veritatis alteri tradere; secundum quem modum apostolus
dicit, ad Ephes. III, <i>mihi, omnium sanctorum minimo, data est
gratia haec, illuminare omnes quae sit dispensatio sacramenti
absconditi a saeculis in Deo</i>. Sic igitur unus Angelus dicitur
illuminare alium, inquantum ei manifestat veritatem quam ipse
cognoscit. Unde Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod
<i>theologi plane monstrant caelestium substantiarum ornatus a
supremis mentibus doceri deificas scientias</i>. Cum autem ad
intelligendum duo concurrant, ut supra diximus, scilicet virtus
intellectiva, et similitudo rei intellectae; secundum haec duo unus
Angelus alteri veritatem notam notificare potest. Primo quidem,
fortificando virtutem intellectivam eius. Sicut enim virtus
imperfectioris corporis confortatur ex situali propinquitate
perfectioris corporis, ut minus calidum crescit in calore ex
praesentia magis calidi; ita virtus intellectiva inferioris Angeli
confortatur ex conversione superioris Angeli ad ipsum. Hoc enim
facit in spiritualibus ordo conversionis, quod facit in
corporalibus ordo localis propinquitatis. Secundo autem unus
Angelus alteri manifestat veritatem, ex parte similitudinis
intellectae. Superior enim Angelus notitiam veritatis accipit in
universali quadam conceptione, ad quam capiendam inferioris Angeli
intellectus non esset sufficiens, sed est ei connaturale ut magis
particulariter veritatem accipiat. Superior ergo Angelus veritatem
quam universaliter concipit, quodammodo distinguit, ut ab inferiori
capi possit; et sic eam cognoscendam illi proponit. Sicut etiam
apud nos, doctores, quod in summa capiunt, multipliciter
distinguunt, providentes capacitati aliorum. Et hoc est quod
Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier., <i>unaquaeque substantia
intellectualis datam sibi a diviniore uniformem intelligentiam,
provida virtute dividit et multiplicat, ad inferioris sursum
ductricem analogiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another.
                     It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: "They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know
                     the Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest." But all the types of the Divine works, which
                     are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He
                     comprehends Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior
                     angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the
                     latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by the types of existing things."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32859] Iª q. 106 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod omnes Angeli, tam superiores quam inferiores,
immediate vident Dei essentiam; et quantum ad hoc, unus non docet
alium. De hac enim doctrina propheta loquitur, unde dicit <i>non
docebit vir fratrem suum, dicens, cognosce dominum. Omnes enim
cognoscent me, a minimo eorum usque ad maximum</i>. Sed rationes
divinorum operum, quae in Deo cognoscuntur sicut in causa, omnes
quidem Deus in seipso cognoscit, quia seipsum comprehendit, aliorum
vero Deum videntium tanto unusquisque in Deo plures rationes
cognoscit, quanto eum perfectius videt. Unde superior Angelus plura
in Deo de rationibus divinorum operum cognoscit quam inferior; et
de his eum illuminat. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de
Div. Nom., quod <i>Angeli existentium illuminantur
rationibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural
                     light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32860] Iª q. 106 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod unus Angelus non illuminat alium tradendo ei lumen
naturae vel gratiae vel gloriae; sed confortando lumen naturale
ipsius, et manifestando ei veritatem de his quae pertinent ad
statum naturae, gratiae et gloriae, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image
                     of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created mind is always considered to be unformed,
                     except it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were,
                     dispositions to this ultimate form.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32861] Iª q. 106 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod rationalis mens formatur immediate a Deo, vel sicut
imago ab exemplari, quia non est facta ad alterius imaginem quam
Dei, vel sicut subiectum ab ultima forma completiva, quia semper
mens creata reputatur informis, nisi ipsi primae veritati
inhaereat. Aliae vero illuminationes, quae sunt ab homine vel
Angelo, sunt quasi dispositiones ad ultimam formam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q106_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q106_A2-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 2. Whether one angel moves another angel's will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel can move another angel's will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q106_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to
                     the will: for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to be perfected is to obtain an
                     end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel's
                     will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32862] Iª q. 106 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus possit movere voluntatem
alterius. Quia secundum Dionysium, sicut unus Angelus illuminat
alium, ita purgat et perficit; ut patet ex auctoritate supra
inducta. Sed purgatio et perfectio videntur pertinere ad
voluntatem, nam purgatio videtur esse a sordibus culpae, quae
pertinet ad voluntatem; perfectio autem videtur esse per
consecutionem finis, qui est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo unus Angelus
potest movere voluntatem alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names of the angels designate their properties." Now the Seraphim are
                     so called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another
                     angel's will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32863] Iª q. 106 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier., <i>nomina Angelorum
designant eorum proprietates</i>. Seraphim autem incendentes
dicuntur, aut calefacientes, quod est per amorem, qui ad voluntatem
pertinet. Unus ergo Angelus movet voluntatem alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior
                     angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32864] Iª q. 106 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod appetitus superior movet
appetitum inferiorem. Sed sicut intellectus Angeli superioris
superior est, ita etiam appetitus. Ergo videtur quod superior
Angelus possit immutare voluntatem alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of the
                     will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change another angel's will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32865] Iª q. 106 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, eius
est immutare voluntatem, cuius est iustificare, cum iustitia sit
rectitudo voluntatis. Sed solus Deus est qui iustificat. Ergo unus
Angelus non potest mutare voluntatem alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q106_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A4" id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[4]</a>), the will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both
                     the good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points out
                     the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. But as we have said above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A4" id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[105], A[4]</a>), other goods in a
                     measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God. And this good
                     He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: "Show me Thy glory," answered: "I will show thee
                     all good" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.33.18" target="asv">Ex. 33:18,19</a>). Therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he inclines
                     the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God's
                     goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q106_A2-p7"> But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination
                     of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will:
                     just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination.
                     Now God alone gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the
                     intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's will.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 co."><a name="32866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32866] Iª q. 106 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut supra dictum est, voluntas immutatur dupliciter, uno
modo, ex parte obiecti; alio modo ex parte ipsius potentiae. Ex
parte quidem obiecti, movet voluntatem et ipsum bonum quod est
voluntatis obiectum, sicut appetibile movet appetitum; et ille qui
demonstrat obiectum, puta qui demonstrat aliquid esse bonum. Sed
sicut supra dictum est, alia quidem bona aliqualiter inclinant
voluntatem; sed nihil sufficienter movet voluntatem, nisi bonum
universale, quod est Deus. Et hoc bonum solus ipse ostendit, ut per
essentiam videatur a beatis, qui dicenti Moysi, <i>ostende mihi
gloriam tuam</i>, respondit, <i>ego ostendam tibi omne bonum</i>,
ut habetur Exod. XXXIII. Angelus ergo non sufficienter movet
voluntatem, neque ut obiectum, neque ut ostendens obiectum. Sed
inclinat eam, ut amabile quoddam, et ut manifestans aliqua bona
creata ordinata in Dei bonitatem. Et per hoc inclinare potest ad
amorem creaturae vel Dei, per modum suadentis. Ex parte vero ipsius
potentiae, voluntas nullo modo potest moveri nisi a Deo. Operatio
enim voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam volentis in volitum. Hanc
autem inclinationem solus ille immutare potest, qui virtutem
volendi creaturae contulit, sicut et naturalem inclinationem solum
illud agens potest mutare, quod potest dare virtutem quam
consequitur inclinatio naturalis. Solus autem Deus est qui
potentiam volendi tribuit creaturae, quia ipse solus est auctor
intellectualis naturae. Unde unus Angelus voluntatem alterius
movere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing
                     the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect
                     and will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q106_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience
                     in the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius
                     says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening of things
                     unknown, that leads them to more perfect knowledge." For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal
                     of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored
                     object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32867] Iª q. 106 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod secundum modum illuminationis, est accipienda et
purgatio et perfectio. Et quia Deus illuminat immutando intellectum
et voluntatem, purgat a defectibus intellectus et voluntatis, et
perficit in finem intellectus et voluntatis. Angeli autem
illuminatio refertur ad intellectum, ut dictum est. Et ideo etiam
purgatio Angeli intelligitur a defectu intellectus, qui est
nescientia; perfectio autem est consummatio in finem intellectus,
qui est veritas cognita. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, VI cap.
Eccl. Hier., quod <i>in caelesti hierarchia purgatio est in
subiectis essentiis tanquam ignotorum illuminatio in perfectiorem
eas scientiam ducens</i>. Sicut si dicamus visum corporalem
purgari, inquantum removentur tenebrae; illuminari vero, inquantum
perfunditur lumine; perfici vero, secundum quod perducitur ad
cognitionem colorati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion as explained above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32868] Iª q. 106 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod unus Angelus potest inducere alium ad amorem Dei per
modum persuadentis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because
                     it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does
                     not apply to the angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32869] Iª q. 106 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de appetitu inferiori sensitivo,
qui potest moveri a superiori intellectivo, quia pertinet ad eandem
naturam animae, et quia inferior appetitus est virtus in organo
corporali. Quod in Angelis locum non habet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q106_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q106_A3-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 3. Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and
                     represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called "our mother" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.26" target="asv">Gal. 4:26</a>). But in the Church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:31</a>): "You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted."
                     Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32870] Iª q. 106 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus inferior superiorem illuminare
possit. Ecclesiastica enim hierarchia derivata est a caelesti, et
eam repraesentat, unde et superna Ierusalem dicitur mater nostra,
Gal. IV. Sed in Ecclesia etiam superiores illuminantur ab
inferioribus et docentur; secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. XIV,
<i>potestis omnes per singulos prophetare, ut omnes discant, et
omnes exhortentur</i>. Ergo et in caelesti hierarchia superiores ab
inferioribus possunt illuminari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances.
                     But, as was said above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FP_Q106_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[6]</a>), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual
                     substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened
                     by God can enlighten
                     superiors.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32871] Iª q. 106 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut ordo corporalium substantiarum dependet ex Dei voluntate, ita
et ordo substantiarum spiritualium. Sed sicut dictum est, Deus
quandoque praeter ordinem substantiarum corporalium operatur. Ergo
quandoque etiam operatur praeter ordinem spiritualium
substantiarum, illuminando inferiores non per medios superiores.
Sic ergo inferiores illuminati a Deo, possunt superiores
illuminare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was above explained
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q106_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But since this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore
                     he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32872] Iª q. 106 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unus
Angelus alium illuminat, ad quem se convertit, ut supra dictum est.
Sed cum ista conversio sit voluntaria, potest supremus Angelus ad
infimum se convertere, mediis praetermissis. Ergo potest eum
immediate illuminare, et ita potest illuminare superiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that "this is the Divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior" (Coel. Hier.
                     iv; Eccl. Hier. v).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32873] Iª q. 106 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Dionysius dicit <i>hanc legem esse divinitatis immobiliter
firmatam, ut inferiora reducantur in Deum per superiora</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above explained
                     (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FP_Q106_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[6]</a>), one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore
                     there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior
                     cause, as in human affairs the command of
                     the president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously outside the order of
                     corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual
                     substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are
                     the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so that
                     the
                     inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 co."><a name="32874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32874] Iª q. 106 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod inferiores Angeli nunquam illuminant superiores, sed semper ab
eis illuminantur. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut supra dictum est,
ordo continetur sub ordine, sicut causa continetur sub causa. Unde
sicut ordinatur causa ad causam, ita ordo ad ordinem. Et ideo non
est inconveniens, si aliquando aliquid fiat praeter ordinem
inferioris causae, ad ordinandum in superiorem causam, sicut in
rebus humanis praetermittitur mandatum praesidis, ut obediatur
principi. Et ita contingit ut praeter ordinem naturae corporalis,
aliquid Deus miraculose operetur, ad ordinandum homines in eius
cognitionem. Sed praetermissio ordinis qui debetur spiritualibus
substantiis, in nullo pertinet ad ordinationem hominum in Deum, cum
operationes Angelorum non sint nobis manifestae, sicut operationes
visibilium corporum. Et ideo ordo qui convenit spiritualibus
substantiis, nunquam a Deo praetermittitur, quin semper inferiora
moveantur per superiora, et non e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some degree, but by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly hierarchy
                     the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more
                     sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas
                     in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in
                     sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science,
                     and fail in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32875] Iª q. 106 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ecclesiastica hierarchia imitatur caelestem
aliqualiter, sed non perfecte consequitur eius similitudinem. In
caelesti enim hierarchia tota ratio ordinis est ex propinquitate ad
Deum. Et ideo illi qui sunt Deo propinquiores, sunt et gradu
sublimiores, et scientia clariores, et propter hoc superiores
nunquam ab inferioribus illuminantur. Sed in ecclesiastica
hierarchia, interdum qui sunt Deo per sanctitatem propinquiores,
sunt gradu infimi, et scientia non eminentes, et quidam in uno
etiam secundum scientiam eminent, et in alio deficiunt. Et propter
hoc superiores ab inferioribus doceri possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As above explained, there is no similarity between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual
                     nature. Hence the argument does not hold.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32876] Iª q. 106 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod non est similis ratio de hoc quod Deus agat praeter
ordinem naturae corporalis, et naturae spiritualis, ut dictum est.
Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made
                     the order in the angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32877] Iª q. 106 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Angelus voluntate convertitur ad alium Angelum
illuminandum; sed voluntas Angeli semper regulatur lege divina,
quae ordinem in Angelis instituit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q106_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q106_A4-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 4. Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says
                     (Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual
                     knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the
                     superior angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being enlightened by the
                     former.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32878] Iª q. 106 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus superior non illuminet inferiorem
de omnibus quae ipse novit. Dicit enim Dionysius, XII cap. Cael.
Hier., quod Angeli superiores habent scientiam magis universalem,
inferiores vero magis particularem et subiectam. Sed plura
continentur sub scientia universali quam sub particulari. Ergo non
omnia quae sciunt superiores Angeli, cognoscunt inferiores per
superiorum illuminationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation,
                     whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring,
                     as it were, in ignorance: "Who is this King of glory?" other angels, who knew, answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King
                     of glory," as Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the superior
                     angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore they do not do so.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32879] Iª q. 106 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Magister dicit, in XI distinctione II Sent., quod superiores Angeli
cognoverunt a saeculis mysterium incarnationis, inferioribus vero
ignotum fuit usquequo completum est. Quod videtur per hoc quod,
quibusdam Angelis quaerentibus, quis est iste rex gloriae? Quasi
ignorantibus, alii respondent, quasi scientes, dominus virtutum
ipse est rex gloriae, ut Dionysius exponit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Hoc
autem non esset, si superiores Angeli illuminarent inferiores de
omnibus quae ipsi cognoscunt. Non ergo eos illuminant de omnibus
sibi notis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be
                     unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears
                     open to objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32880] Iª q. 106 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
omnia superiores Angeli inferioribus annuntiant quae cognoscunt,
nihil inferioribus ignotum remanet, quod superiores cognoscant. Non
ergo de cetero superiores poterunt illuminare inferiores. Quod
videtur inconveniens. Non ergo superiores de omnibus inferiores
illuminant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though there
                     are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually." And Dionysius says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the
                     inferior the gift derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q106_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32881] Iª q. 106 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Gregorius dicit, quod <i>in illa caelesti patria, licet
quaedam data sint excellenter, nihil tamen possidetur
singulariter</i>. Et Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier., quod
<i>unaquaeque caelestis essentia intelligentiam sibi a superiori
datam, inferiori communicat</i>; ut patet ex auctoritate supra
inducta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q106_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature
                     of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So
                     the more an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections
                     to others as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace
                     share in the Divine goodness; saying: "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards
                     of the manifold grace of God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.4.10" target="asv">1 Pet. 4:10</a>). Much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart the same
                     to those below them.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q106_A4-p7"> Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior
                     ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same thing better than the
                     pupil who learns from him.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 co."><a name="32882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32882] Iª q. 106 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod omnes creaturae ex divina bonitate participant ut bonum quod
habent, in alia diffundant, nam de ratione boni est quod se aliis
communicet. Et inde est etiam quod agentia corporalia similitudinem
suam aliis tradunt, quantum possibile est. Quanto igitur aliqua
agentia magis in participatione divinae bonitatis constituuntur,
tanto magis perfectiones suas nituntur in alios transfundere,
quantum possibile est. Unde beatus Petrus monet eos qui divinam
bonitatem per gratiam participant, dicens, I Petr. IV,
<i>unusquisque, sicut accepit gratiam, in alterutrum illam
administrantes, sicut boni dispensatores multiformis gratiae
Dei</i>. Multo igitur magis sancti Angeli, qui sunt in plenissima
participatione divinae bonitatis, quidquid a Deo percipiunt,
subiectis impartiuntur. Non tamen recipitur ab inferioribus ita
excellenter sicut est in superioribus. Et ideo superiores semper
remanent in altiori ordine, et perfectiorem scientiam habentes.
Sicut unam et eandem rem plenius intelligit magister, quam
discipulus qui ab eo addiscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32883] Iª q. 106 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod superiorum Angelorum scientia dicitur esse
universalior, quantum ad eminentiorem modum intelligendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Master's words are not to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation
                     but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards
                     when the Mystery was accomplished.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32884] Iª q. 106 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod verbum Magistri non sic est intelligendum, quod
inferiores Angeli penitus ignoraverint mysterium incarnationis; sed
quia non ita plene cognoverunt sicut superiores, et in eius
cognitione postmodum profecerunt, dum illud mysterium
impleretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the
                     world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to
                     the inferior.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32885] Iª q. 106 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, usque ad diem iudicii, semper nova aliqua supremis
Angelis revelantur divinitus de his quae pertinent ad dispositionem
mundi, et praecipue ad salutem electorum. Unde semper remanet unde
superiores Angeli inferiores illuminent.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q107" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q107-p0.1">Q. 107. THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q107-p2"> We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q107-p3"><a href="#FP_Q107_A1"> (1) Whether one angel speaks to another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q107-p4"><a href="#FP_Q107_A2"> (2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?</a></p><p id="FP_Q107-p5"><a href="#FP_Q107_A3"> (3) Whether an angel speaks to God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q107-p6"><a href="#FP_Q107_A4"> (4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?</a></p><p id="FP_Q107-p7"><a href="#FP_Q107_A5"> (5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 pr."><a name="32886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32886]
Iª q. 107 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
locutionibus Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo,
utrum unus Angelus loquatur alii. Secundo, utrum inferior
superiori. Tertio, utrum Angelus Deo. Quarto, utrum in locutione
Angeli aliquid distantia localis operetur. Quinto, utrum locutionem
unius Angeli ad alterum omnes cognoscant.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q107_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A1-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 1. Whether one angel speaks to another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection
                     "each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another.
                     But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to
                     another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32887] Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus alteri non loquatur. Dicit
enim Gregorius, XVIII Moral., quod <i>in statu resurrectionis
uniuscuiusque mentem ab alterius oculis membrorum corpulentia non
abscondit</i>. Multo igitur minus mens unius Angeli absconditur ab
altero. Sed locutio est ad manifestandum alteri quod latet in
mente. Non igitur oportet quod unus Angelus alteri loquatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior
                     speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and
                     this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32888] Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
duplex est locutio, interior, per quam aliquis sibi ipsi loquitur;
et exterior, per quam aliquis loquitur alteri. Exterior autem
locutio fit per aliquod sensibile signum, puta voce vel nutu vel
aliquo corporis membro, puta lingua vel digito, quae Angelis
competere non possunt. Ergo unus Angelus alteri non loquitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another
                     to listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32889] Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
loquens excitat audientem ut attendat suae locutioni. Sed non
videtur per quid unus Angelus excitet alium ad attendendum, hoc
enim fit apud nos aliquo sensibili signo. Ergo unus Angelus non
loquitur alteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:1</a>): "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32890] Iª q. 107 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur I Cor. XIII, <i>si linguis hominum loquar et
Angelorum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q107_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties
                     of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q107_A1-p7"> To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q82_A4" id="FP_Q107_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[4]</a>), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelligible
                     object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6,7);
                     secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear
                     that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition
                     of habit these words occur, "which anyone uses when he wills." So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second
                     to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either
                     to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual
                     consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior
                     word." And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel
                     himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another
                     only means to make known the mental concept to another.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 co."><a name="32891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32891] Iª q. 107 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod in Angelis est aliqua locutio, sed, sicut dicit Gregorius II
Moral., <i>dignum est ut mens nostra, qualitatem corporeae
locutionis excedens, ad sublimes atque incognitos modos locutionis
intimae suspendatur</i>. Ad intelligendum igitur qualiter unus
Angelus alii loquatur, considerandum est quod, sicut supra diximus
cum de actibus et potentiis animae ageretur, voluntas movet
intellectum ad suam operationem. Intelligibile autem est in
intellectu tripliciter, primo quidem, habitualiter, vel secundum
memoriam, ut Augustinus dicit; secundo autem, ut in actu
consideratum vel conceptum; tertio, ut ad aliud relatum. Manifestum
est autem quod de primo gradu in secundum transfertur intelligibile
per imperium voluntatis, unde in definitione habitus dicitur, quo
quis utitur cum voluerit. Similiter autem et de secundo gradu
transfertur in tertium per voluntatem, nam per voluntatem conceptus
mentis ordinatur ad alterum, puta vel ad agendum aliquid, vel ad
manifestandum alteri. Quando autem mens convertit se ad actu
considerandum quod habet in habitu, loquitur aliquis sibi ipsi, nam
ipse conceptus mentis interius verbum vocatur. Ex hoc vero quod
conceptus mentis angelicae ordinatur ad manifestandum alteri, per
voluntatem ipsius Angeli, conceptus mentis unius Angeli innotescit
alteri, et sic loquitur unus Angelus alteri. Nihil est enim aliud
loqui ad alterum, quam conceptum mentis alteri manifestare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within,
                     or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>: "What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" The other obstacle whereby the mental concept
                     is excluded from another one's knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens
                     that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known to another; but
                     some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): "To other eyes we seem to stand aloof
                     as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the
                     tongue to show what we really are." But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another
                     at
                     once.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32892] Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod in nobis interior mentis conceptus quasi duplici
obstaculo clauditur. Primo quidem, ipsa voluntate, quae conceptum
intellectus potest retinere interius, vel ad extra ordinare. Et
quantum ad hoc, mentem unius nullus alius potest videre nisi solus
Deus; secundum illud I Cor. II, <i>quae sunt hominis, nemo novit
nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est</i>. Secundo autem clauditur
mens hominis ab alio homine per grossitiem corporis. Unde cum etiam
voluntas ordinat conceptum mentis ad manifestandum alteri, non
statim cognoscitur ab alio, sed oportet aliquod signum sensibile
adhibere. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, II Moral., <i>alienis
oculis intra secretum mentis, quasi post parietem corporis stamus,
sed cum manifestare nosmetipsos cupimus, quasi per linguae ianuam
egredimur, ut quales sumus intrinsecus, ostendamus</i>. Hoc autem
obstaculum non habet Angelus. Et ideo quam cito vult manifestare
suum conceptum, statim alius cognoscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit
                     an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also
                     its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power,
                     whereby he manifests his mental concept.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32893] Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod locutio exterior quae fit per vocem, est nobis
necessaria propter obstaculum corporis. Unde non convenit Angelo,
sed sola locutio interior; ad quam pertinet non solum quod loquatur
sibi interius concipiendo, sed etiam quod ordinet per voluntatem ad
alterius manifestationem. Et sic lingua Angelorum metaphorice
dicitur ipsa virtus Angeli, qua conceptum suum manifestat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as one
                     ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each other,
                     and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as
                     sense is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the
                     sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32894] Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, quantum ad Angelos bonos, qui semper se invicem
vident in verbo, non esset necessarium ponere aliquid excitativum,
quia sicut unus semper videt alium, ita semper videt quidquid in eo
est ad se ordinatum. Sed quia etiam in statu naturae conditae sibi
invicem loqui poterant, et mali Angeli etiam nunc sibi invicem
loquuntur; dicendum est quod, sicut sensus movetur a sensibili, ita
intellectus movetur ab intelligibili. Sicut ergo per signum
sensibile excitatur sensus, ita per aliquam virtutem intelligibilem
potest excitari mens Angeli ad attendendum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q107_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A2-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 2. Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior. For on the text (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:1</a>), "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby
                     the superior enlightens the inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A3" id="FP_Q107_A2-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[106], A[3]</a>). Therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32895] Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod inferior Angelus superiori non loquatur.
Quia super illud I Cor. XIII, <i>si linguis hominum loquar et
Angelorum</i>, dicit Glossa quod locutiones Angelorum sunt
illuminationes, quibus superiores illuminant inferiores. Sed
inferiores nunquam illuminant superiores, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
nec inferiores superioribus loquuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as was said above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q107_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>), to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to speak. Therefore to speak and
                     to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion follows.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32896] Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
supra dictum est quod illuminare nihil est aliud quam illud quod
est alicui manifestum, alteri manifestare. Sed hoc idem est loqui.
Ergo idem est loqui, et illuminare, et sic idem quod prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and
                     invisible things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic
                     speech is an enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32897] Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Gregorius dicit, II Moral., quod <i>Deus ad Angelos loquitur, eo
ipso quod eorum cordibus occulta sua invisibilia ostendit</i>. Sed
hoc ipsum est illuminare. Ergo omnis Dei locutio est illuminatio.
Pari ergo ratione, omnis Angeli locutio est illuminatio. Nullo ergo
modo Angelus inferior superiori loqui potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this King of
                     Glory?"
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32898] Iª q. 107 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod, sicut Dionysius exponit VII Cael. Hier., inferiores Angeli
superioribus dixerunt, quis est iste rex gloriae?</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q107_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an
                     angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we have said
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such
                     a way, that it becomes known to the other. Now what the mind conceives may be
                     reduced to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby
                     we actually consider anything. But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all truth;
                     the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for
                     example, when one man says to another: "Heaven was created by God"; or, "Man is an animal." The manifestation, however, of
                     what
                     depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when
                     one says to another: "I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that." The reason is that the created will is not a light,
                     nor a rule of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as such, an
                     enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect;
                     but
                     only to know the truth in reality.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q107_A2-p7"> Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment,
                     which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will
                     as the principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed
                     to others by the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and
                     the inferior speak to the superior.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 co."><a name="32899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32899] Iª q. 107 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Angeli inferiores superioribus loqui possunt. Ad cuius
evidentiam, considerandum est quod omnis illuminatio est locutio in
Angelis, sed non omnis locutio est illuminatio. Quia sicut dictum
est, Angelum loqui Angelo nihil aliud est quam conceptum suum
ordinare ad hoc ut ei innotescat, per propriam voluntatem. Ea vero
quae mente concipiuntur, ad duplex principium referri possunt,
scilicet ad ipsum Deum, qui est prima veritas; et ad voluntatem
intelligentis, per quam aliquid actu consideramus. Quia vero
veritas est lumen intellectus, et regula omnis veritatis est ipse
Deus; manifestatio eius quod mente concipitur, secundum quod
dependet a prima veritate, et locutio est et illuminatio; puta si
unus homo dicat alii, caelum est a Deo creatum, vel, homo est
animal. Sed manifestatio eorum quae dependent ex voluntate
intelligentis, non potest dici illuminatio, sed locutio tantum;
puta si aliquis alteri dicat, volo hoc addiscere, volo hoc vel
illud facere. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas creata non est lux,
nec regula veritatis, sed participans lucem, unde communicare ea
quae sunt a voluntate creata, inquantum huiusmodi, non est
illuminare. Non enim pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus mei, quid
tu velis, vel quid tu intelligas, cognoscere, sed solum quid rei
veritas habeat. Manifestum est autem quod Angeli dicuntur
superiores vel inferiores per comparationem ad hoc principium quod
est Deus. Et ideo illuminatio, quae dependet a principio quod est
Deus, solum per superiores Angelos ad inferiores deducitur. Sed in
ordine ad principium quod est voluntas, ipse volens est primus et
supremus. Et ideo manifestatio eorum quae ad voluntatem pertinent,
per ipsum volentem deducitur ad alios quoscumque. Et quantum ad
hoc, et superiores inferioribus, et inferiores superioribus
loquuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objections 1
	  &amp; 2:</b> From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32900] Iª q. 107 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet
solutio ad primum, et ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the
                     perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the
                     angels, as was explained above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32901] Iª q. 107 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod omnis Dei locutio ad Angelos est illuminatio, quia
cum voluntas Dei sit regula veritatis, etiam scire quid Deus velit,
pertinet ad perfectionem et illuminationem mentis creatae. Sed non
est eadem ratio de voluntate Angeli, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q107_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A3-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 3. Whether an angel speaks to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make
                     known anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32902] Iª q. 107 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus Deo non loquatur. Locutio enim est
ad manifestandum aliquid alteri. Sed Angelus nihil potest
manifestare Deo, qui omnia novit. Ergo Angelus non loquitur
Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another, as was shown above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which in some ways
                     appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel never speaks
                     to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32903] Iª q. 107 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
loqui est ordinare conceptum intellectus ad alterum, ut dictum est.
Sed Angelus semper conceptum suae mentis ordinat in Deum. Si ergo
aliquando Deo loquitur, semper Deo loquitur, quod potest videri
alicui inconveniens, cum aliquando Angelus Angelo loquatur. Videtur
ergo quod Angelus nunquam loquatur Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.12" target="asv">Zech. 1:12</a>): "The angel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem." Therefore an
                     angel speaks to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32904] Iª q. 107 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Zachar. I, <i>respondit Angelus domini, et dixit,
domine exercituum, usquequo non misereberis Ierusalem?</i> Loquitur
ergo Angelus Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner.
                     In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in
                     human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns
                     the truth, or of whatever
                     depends on the created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way one thing
                     is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech
                     the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought to
                     be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels
                     speak
                     to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 co."><a name="32905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32905] Iª q. 107 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut dictum est, locutio Angeli est per hoc, quod conceptus
mentis ordinatur ad alterum. Sed aliquid ordinatur ad alterum
dupliciter. Uno modo, ad hoc quod communicet alteri; sicut in rebus
naturalibus agens ordinatur ad patiens et in locutione humana
doctor ordinatur ad discipulum. Et quantum ad hoc, nullo modo
Angelus loquitur Deo, neque de his quae ad rerum veritatem
pertinent, neque de his quae dependent a voluntate creata, quia
Deus est omnis veritatis et omnis voluntatis principium et
conditor. Alio modo ordinatur aliquid ad alterum, ut ab eo aliquid
accipiat; sicut in rebus naturalibus passivum ad agens, et in
locutione humana discipulus ad magistrum. Et hoc modo Angelus
loquitur Deo, vel consultando divinam voluntatem de agendis; vel
eius excellentiam, quam nunquam comprehendit, admirando; sicut
Gregorius dicit, II Moral., quod <i>Angeli loquuntur Deo, cum per
hoc quod super semetipsos respiciunt, in motum admirationis
surgunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose
                     of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32906] Iª q. 107 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod locutio non semper est ad manifestandum alteri; sed
quandoque ad hoc ordinatur finaliter, ut loquenti aliquid
manifestetur; sicut cum discipulus quaerit aliquid a magistro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by consulting
                     Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32907] Iª q. 107 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod locutione qua Angeli loquuntur Deo laudantes ipsum et
admirantes, semper Angeli Deo loquuntur. Sed locutione qua eius
sapientiam consulunt super agendis, tunc ei loquuntur, quando
aliquod novum per eos agendum occurrit, super quo desiderant
illuminari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q107_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A4-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 4. Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works
                     where he is." But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's
                     speech is limited by the bounds of that place.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32908] Iª q. 107 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod localis distantia operetur aliquid in
locutione angelica. Sicut enim dicit Damascenus, <i>Angelus ubi
est, ibi operatur</i>. Locutio autem est quaedam operatio Angeli.
Cum ergo Angelus sit in determinato loco, videtur quod usque ad
determinatam loci distantiam Angelus loqui possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one
                     to another" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32909] Iª q. 107 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
clamor loquentis fit propter distantiam audientis. Sed Isaiae VI
dicitur de Seraphim, quod clamabat alter ad alterum. Ergo videtur
quod in locutione Angelorum aliquid operetur localis distantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.24" target="asv">Lk. 16:24</a>). Much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32910] Iª q. 107 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod, sicut dicitur Luc. XVI, dives in Inferno positus loquebatur
Abrahae, non impediente locali distantia. Multo igitur minus
localis distantia potest impedire locutionem unius Angeli ad
alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2,3). And the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now." For even our own intellectual operation
                     takes place by abstraction from the "here and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at
                     all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from "here and now," neither difference of time
                     nor local distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 co."><a name="32911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32911] Iª q. 107 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod locutio Angeli in intellectuali operatione consistit, ut ex
dictis patet. Intellectualis autem operatio Angeli omnino abstracta
est a loco et tempore, nam etiam nostra intellectualis operatio est
per abstractionem ab hic et nunc, nisi per accidens ex parte
phantasmatum, quae in Angelis nulla sunt. In eo autem quod est
omnino abstractum a loco et tempore, nihil operatur neque temporis
diversitas, neque loci distantia. Unde in locutione Angeli nullum
impedimentum facit distantia loci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angelic speech, as above explained (A[1], ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists
                     in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel
                     seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another; and this is
                     to perceive his speech.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32912] Iª q. 107 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod locutio Angeli, sicut dictum est, est locutio
interior, quae tamen ab alio percipitur, et ideo est in Angelo
loquente, et per consequens ubi est Angelus loquens. Sed sicut
distantia localis non impedit quin unus Angelus alium videre
possit; ita etiam non impedit quin percipiat quod in eo ad se
ordinatur, quod est eius locutionem percipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of
                     what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less
                     one cries out."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32913] Iª q. 107 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod clamor ille non est vocis corporeae, qui fit propter
distantiam loci; sed significat magnitudinem rei quae dicebatur,
vel magnitudinem affectus, secundum quod dicit Gregorius, II
Moral., <i>tanto quisque minus clamat, quanto minus
desiderat</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q107_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A5-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 5. Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do
                     not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no effect, as above explained
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A4" id="FP_Q107_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32914] Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod locutionem unius Angeli ad alterum omnes
cognoscant. Quod enim unius hominis locutionem non omnes audiant,
facit inaequalis loci distantia. Sed in locutione Angeli nihil
operatur localis distantia, ut dictum est. Ergo uno Angelo loquente
ad alterum, omnes percipiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known
                     by one, it is for the same reason known by all.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32915] Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
omnes Angeli communicant in virtute intelligendi. Si ergo conceptus
mentis unius ordinatus ad alterum cognoscitur ab uno, pari ratione
cognoscitur ab aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because,
                     as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others." Therefore
                     the speech of one angel to another extends to all.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32916] Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
illuminatio est quaedam species locutionis. Sed illuminatio unius
Angeli ab altero, pervenit ad omnes Angelos, quia, ut Dionysius
dicit XV cap. Cael. Hier., <i>unaquaeque caelestis essentia
intelligentiam sibi traditam aliis communicat</i>. Ergo et locutio
unius Angeli ad alterum, ad omnes perducitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32917] Iª q. 107 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod unus homo potest alteri soli loqui. Multo igitur magis hoc in
Angelis esse potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his
                     will to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the concept of
                     one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another;
                     whereas others do not, not through the
                     obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 co."><a name="32918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32918] Iª q. 107 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut supra dictum est, conceptus mentis unius Angeli percipi
potest ab altero, per hoc quod ille cuius est conceptus, sua
voluntate ordinat ipsum ad alterum. Potest autem ex aliqua causa
ordinari aliquid ad unum, et non ad alterum. Et ideo potest
conceptus unius ab aliquo uno cognosci, et non ab aliis. Et sic
locutionem unius Angeli ad alterum potest percipere unus absque
aliis, non quidem impediente distantia locali, sed hoc faciente
voluntaria ordinatione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p7"> From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32919] Iª q. 107 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet
responsio ad primum et secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels;
                     and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created
                     will, which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32920] Iª q. 107 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod illuminatio est de his quae emanant a prima regula
veritatis, quae est principium commune omnium Angelorum, et ideo
illuminationes sunt omnibus communes. Sed locutio potest esse de
his quae ordinantur ad principium voluntatis creatae, quod est
proprium unicuique Angelo, et ideo non oportet quod huiusmodi
locutiones sint omnibus communes.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q108" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q108-p0.1">Q. 108. OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q108-p2"> We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders; for it was said above (
                  <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A3" id="FP_Q108-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[3]</a>), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely.
               </p><p id="FP_Q108-p3"> Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q108-p4"><a href="#FP_Q108_A1"> (1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p5"><a href="#FP_Q108_A2"> (2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p6"><a href="#FP_Q108_A3"> (3) Whether in one order there are many angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p7"><a href="#FP_Q108_A4"> (4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p8"><a href="#FP_Q108_A5"> (5) Of the names and properties of each order.</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p9"><a href="#FP_Q108_A6"> (6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p10"><a href="#FP_Q108_A7"> (7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p11"><a href="#FP_Q108_A8"> (8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 pr."><a name="32921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32921]
Iª q. 108 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
ordinatione Angelorum secundum hierarchias et ordines, dictum est
enim quod superiores inferiores illuminant, et non e converso. Et
circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum omnes Angeli sint unius
hierarchiae. Secundo, utrum in una hierarchia sit unus tantum ordo.
Tertio, utrum in uno ordine sint plures Angeli. Quarto, utrum
distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum sit a natura. Quinto, de
nominibus et proprietatibus singulorum ordinum. Sexto, de
comparatione ordinum ad invicem. Septimo, utrum ordines durent post
diem iudicii. Octavo, utrum homines assumantur ad ordines
Angelorum.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q108_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A1-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 1. Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident
                     that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the
                     Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality,
                     it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32922] Iª q. 108 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod omnes Angeli sint unius hierarchiae. Cum
enim Angeli sint supremi inter creaturas, oportet dicere quod sint
optime dispositi. Sed optima dispositio est multitudinis secundum
quod continetur sub uno principatu; ut patet per philosophum, XII
Metaphys., et in III Politic. Cum ergo hierarchia nihil sit aliud
quam sacer principatus, videtur quod omnes Angeli sint unius
hierarchiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that "hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action." But all the angels agree in one
                     order towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32923] Iª q. 108 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Dionysius dicit, in III cap. Cael. Hier., quod <i>hierarchia est
ordo, scientia et actio</i>. Sed omnes Angeli conveniunt in uno
ordine ad Deum, quem cognoscunt, et a quo in suis actionibus
regulantur. Ergo omnes Angeli sunt unius hierarchiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy.
                     Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32924] Iª q. 108 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
sacer principatus, qui dicitur hierarchia, invenitur in hominibus
et Angelis. Sed omnes homines sunt unius hierarchiae. Ergo etiam
omnes Angeli sunt unius hierarchiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32925] Iª q. 108 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Dionysius, VI cap. Cael. Hier., distinguit tres hierarchias
Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself and
                     the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also
                     of men and all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can
                     be participators of sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): "There are
                     two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked." But if we consider the principality
                     on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to be "one" accordingly as the multitude
                     can be subject in "one" way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince
                     belong to different principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities, which are governed by different laws
                     and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels;
                     for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, as Dionysius says
                     (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same manner
                     we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown above (
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A3" id="FP_Q108_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), in treating of the
                     angelic knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels. This universal
                     knowledge has three grades among the angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be
                     considered in a threefold manner. First as preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs
                     to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius
                     says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already
                     multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things
                     as depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat
                     of each of the orders
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A6" id="FP_Q108_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the
                     multitude of subjects.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A1-p7"> Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons,
                     and call it the "supercelestial" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is
                     no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): "The hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed,
                     enlightened, and perfected; and that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from us to apply to
                     the Divine Persons.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 co."><a name="32926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32926] Iª q. 108 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod hierarchia est sacer principatus, ut dictum est. In nomine
autem principatus duo intelliguntur, scilicet ipse princeps, et
multitudo ordinata sub principe. Quia igitur unus est Deus princeps
non solum omnium Angelorum, sed etiam hominum, et totius creaturae;
ideo non solum omnium Angelorum, sed etiam totius rationalis
creaturae, quae sacrorum particeps esse potest, una est hierarchia,
secundum quod Augustinus dicit, in XII de Civ. Dei <i>duas esse
civitates, hoc est societates, unam in bonis Angelis et hominibus,
alteram in malis</i>. Sed si consideretur principatus ex parte
multitudinis ordinatae sub principe, sic unus principatus dicitur
secundum quod multitudo uno et eodem modo potest gubernationem
principis recipere. Quae vero non possunt secundum eundem modum
gubernari a principe, ad diversos principatus pertinent, sicut sub
uno rege sunt diversae civitates, quae diversis reguntur legibus et
ministris. Manifestum est autem quod homines alio modo divinas
illuminationes percipiunt quam Angeli, nam Angeli percipiunt eas in
intelligibili puritate, homines vero percipiunt eas sub sensibilium
similitudinibus, ut Dionysius dicit I cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo
oportuit distingui humanam hierarchiam ab angelica. Et per eundem
modum in Angelis tres hierarchiae distinguuntur. Dictum est enim
supra, dum de cognitione Angelorum ageretur, quod superiores Angeli
habent universaliorem cognitionem veritatis quam inferiores.
Huiusmodi autem universalis acceptio cognitionis secundum tres
gradus in Angelis distingui potest. Possunt enim rationes rerum de
quibus Angeli illuminantur, considerari tripliciter. Primo quidem,
secundum quod procedunt a primo principio universali, quod est
Deus, et iste modus convenit primae hierarchiae, quae immediate ad
Deum extenditur, et quasi in vestibulis Dei collocatur, ut
Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Secundo vero, prout huiusmodi
rationes dependent ab universalibus causis creatis, quae iam aliquo
modo multiplicantur, et hic modus convenit secundae hierarchiae.
Tertio autem modo, secundum quod huiusmodi rationes applicantur
singulis rebus, et prout dependent a propriis causis, et hic modus
convenit infimae hierarchiae. Quod plenius patebit, cum de singulis
ordinibus agetur. Sic igitur distinguuntur hierarchiae ex parte
multitudinis subiectae. Unde manifestum est eos errare, et contra
intentionem Dionysii loqui, qui ponunt in divinis personis
hierarchiam quam vocant supercaelestem. In divinis enim personis
est quidam ordo naturae, sed non hierarchiae. Nam, ut Dionysius
dicit III cap. Cael. Hier., <i>ordo hierarchiae est alios quidem
purgari et illuminari et perfici, alios autem purgare et illuminare
et perficere</i>. Quod absit ut in divinis personis ponamus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection considers principality on the part of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as the
                     Philosopher asserts in those passages.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32927] Iª q. 108 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de principatu ex parte principis,
quia optimum est quod multitudo regatur ab uno principe, ut
philosophus in praedictis locis intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one way---that is, in His essence---there is no hierarchical distinction
                     among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things, as above explained.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32928] Iª q. 108 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, quantum ad cognitionem ipsius Dei, quem omnes uno
modo, scilicet per essentiam, vident, non distinguuntur in Angelis
hierarchiae, sed quantum ad rationes rerum creatarum, ut dictum
est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and hence
                     the same argument does not apply to both.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32929] Iª q. 108 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod omnes homines sunt unius speciei, et unus modus
intelligendi est eis connaturalis, non sic autem est in Angelis.
Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A2-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 2. Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined
                     is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there
                     is not one hierarchy only, but many.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32930] Iª q. 108 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in una hierarchia non sint plures ordines.
Multiplicata enim definitione, multiplicatur et definitum. Sed
hierarchia, ut Dionysius dicit, est ordo. Si ergo sunt multi
ordines, non erit una hierarchia, sed multae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different orders are different grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But
                     among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is possessed individually" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore
                     there are not different orders of angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32931] Iª q. 108 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
diversi ordines sunt diversi gradus. Sed gradus in spiritualibus
constituuntur secundum diversa dona spiritualia. Sed in Angelis
omnia dona spiritualia sunt communia, quia nihil ibi singulariter
possidetur. Ergo non sunt diversi ordines Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing," "enlightening,"
                     and "perfecting." For the order of deacons is "cleansing," the order of priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops "perfecting,"
                     as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction
                     of orders among the angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32932] Iª q. 108 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in
ecclesiastica hierarchia distinguuntur ordines secundum purgare,
illuminare et perficere, nam ordo diaconorum est purgativus,
sacerdotum illuminativus, episcoporum perfectivus, ut Dionysius
dicit V cap. Eccles. Hier. Sed quilibet Angelus purgat, illuminat
et perficit. Non ergo est distinctio ordinum in Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.20" target="asv">Eph. 1:20,21</a>) that "God has set the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion": which are the various orders
                     of the angels, and some of them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A6" id="FP_Q108_A2-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32933] Iª q. 108 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod apostolus dicit ad Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit Christum
hominem supra <i>omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et
dominationem</i>; qui sunt diversi ordines Angelorum, et quidam
eorum ad unam hierarchiam pertinent, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above, one hierarchy is one principality---that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince.
                     Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy
                     requires diversity of orders.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A2-p7"> This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and actions, as appears in one city where there are different
                     orders according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who judge, and another of those who fight, and
                     another of those who labor in the fields, and so forth.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A2-p8"> But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has
                     a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as
                     the nobles; others are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the middle-class [populus
                     honorabilis]. In the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their
                     actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three---namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so
                     in every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 co."><a name="32934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32934] Iª q. 108 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut dictum est, una hierarchia est unus principatus, idest
una multitudo ordinata uno modo sub principis gubernatione. Non
autem esset multitudo ordinata, sed confusa, si in multitudine
diversi ordines non essent. Ipsa ergo ratio hierarchiae requirit
ordinum diversitatem. Quae quidem diversitas ordinum secundum
diversa officia et actus consideratur. Sicut patet quod in una
civitate sunt diversi ordines secundum diversos actus, nam alius
est ordo iudicantium, alius pugnantium, alius laborantium in agris,
et sic de aliis. Sed quamvis multi sint unius civitatis ordines,
omnes tamen ad tres possunt reduci, secundum quod quaelibet
multitudo perfecta habet principium, medium et finem. Unde et in
civitatibus triplex ordo hominum invenitur, quidam enim sunt
supremi, ut optimates; quidam autem sunt infimi, ut vilis populus;
quidam autem sunt medii, ut populus honorabilis. Sic igitur et in
qualibet hierarchia angelica ordines distinguuntur secundum
diversos actus et officia; et omnis ista diversitas ad tria
reducitur, scilicet ad summum, medium et infimum. Et propter hoc in
qualibet hierarchia Dionysius ponit tres ordines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy
                     is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are
                     so called.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32935] Iª q. 108 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ordo dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, ipsa ordinatio
comprehendens sub se diversos gradus, et hoc modo hierarchia
dicitur ordo. Alio modo dicitur ordo gradus unus, et sic dicuntur
plures ordines unius hierarchiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things are possessed in common by the angelic society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some than
                     by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate
                     it; as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone
                     can communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect
                     grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among
                     the angels, according to their different offices and actions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32936] Iª q. 108 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in societate Angelorum omnia possidentur communiter;
sed tamen quaedam excellentius habentur a quibusdam quam ab aliis.
Unumquodque autem perfectius habetur ab eo qui potest illud
communicare, quam ab eo qui non potest, sicut perfectius est
calidum quod potest calefacere, quam quod non potest; et perfectius
scit qui potest docere, quam qui non potest. Et quanto perfectius
donum aliquis communicare potest, tanto in perfectiori gradu est,
sicut in perfectiori gradu magisterii est qui potest docere
altiorem scientiam. Et secundum hanc similitudinem consideranda est
diversitas graduum vel ordinum in Angelis, secundum diversa officia
et actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the words, "He that is the lesser in the
                     kingdom of heaven, is greater than he"---namely, John the Baptist, than whom "there hath not risen a greater among them that
                     are born of women" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher
                     way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the
                     heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32937] Iª q. 108 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod inferior Angelus est superior supremo homine nostrae
hierarchiae; secundum illud Matth. XI, <i>qui minor est in regno
caelorum, maior est illo</i>, scilicet Ioanne Baptista, quo nullus
maior inter natos mulierum surrexit. Unde minor Angelus caelestis
hierarchiae potest non solum purgare sed illuminare et perficere,
et altiori modo quam ordines nostrae hierarchiae. Et sic secundum
distinctionem harum actionum non distinguuntur caelestes ordines;
sed secundum alias differentias actionum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A3-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 3. Whether there are many angels in one order?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For it was shown above (
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q50_A4" id="FP_Q108_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[4]</a>), that all the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in one order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32938] Iª q. 108 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in uno ordine non sint plures Angeli.
Dictum est enim supra omnes Angelos inaequales esse ad invicem. Sed
unius ordinis esse dicuntur quae sunt aequalia. Ergo plures Angeli
non sunt unius ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs
                     to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs
                     to the office of the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore, the orders are distinguished by
                     their offices, as stated above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A2" id="FP_Q108_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, several angels in one order
                     would be superfluous.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32939] Iª q. 108 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
potest sufficienter fieri per unum, superfluum est quod fiat per
multa. Sed illud quod pertinet ad unum officium angelicum,
sufficienter potest fieri per unum Angelum; multo magis quam per
unum solem sufficienter fit quod pertinet ad officium solis, quanto
perfectior est Angelus caelesti corpore. Si ergo ordines
distinguuntur secundum officia, ut dictum est, superfluum est quod
sint plures Angeli unius ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was said above (OBJ 1) that all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or
                     four), are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than
                     with the highest of his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former.
                     Therefore there are not many angels of one order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32940] Iª q. 108 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
supra dictum est quod omnes Angeli sunt inaequales. Si ergo plures
Angeli sint unius ordinis, puta tres vel quatuor, infimus
superioris ordinis magis conveniet cum supremo inferioris quam cum
supremo sui ordinis. Et sic non videtur quod magis sit unius
ordinis cum hoc, quam cum illo. Non igitur sunt plures Angeli unius
ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one another" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the Seraphim.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32941] Iª q. 108 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Isaiae VI dicitur, quod Seraphim clamabant alter ad alterum.
Sunt ergo plures Angeli in uno ordine Seraphim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas
                     he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points. Thus,
                     one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one
                     order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another;
                     whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and
                     in each of the other orders.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A3-p7"> Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic
                     offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions
                     of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much
                     more so than any star, though this be hidden from us.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 co."><a name="32942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32942] Iª q. 108 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ille qui perfecte cognoscit res aliquas, potest usque ad
minima et actus et virtutes et naturas earum distinguere. Qui autem
cognoscit eas imperfecte, non potest distinguere nisi in
universali, quae quidem distinctio fit per pauciora. Sicut qui
imperfecte cognoscit res naturales, distinguit earum ordines in
universali, ponens in uno ordine caelestia corpora, in alio corpora
inferiora inanimata, in alio plantas, in alio animalia, qui autem
perfectius cognosceret res naturales, posset distinguere et in
ipsis corporibus caelestibus diversos ordines, et in singulis
aliorum. Nos autem imperfecte Angelos cognoscimus, et eorum
officia, ut Dionysius dicit VI cap. Cael. Hier. Unde non possumus
distinguere officia et ordines Angelorum, nisi in communi; secundum
quem modum, multi Angeli sub uno ordine continentur. Si autem
perfecte cognosceremus officia Angelorum, et eorum distinctiones,
perfecte sciremus quod quilibet Angelus habet suum proprium
officium et suum proprium ordinem in rebus, multo magis quam
quaelibet stella, etsi nos lateat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely
                     speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those
                     who are first, middle, and last.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32943] Iª q. 108 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod omnes Angeli unius ordinis sunt aliquo modo aequales,
quantum ad communem similitudinem secundum quam constituuntur in
uno ordine, sed simpliciter non sunt aequales. Unde Dionysius
dicit, X cap. Cael. Hier., quod in uno et eodem ordine Angelorum,
est accipere primos, medios et ultimos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32944] Iª q. 108 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod illa specialis distinctio ordinum et officiorum
secundum quam quilibet Angelus habet proprium officium et ordinem,
est nobis ignota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as
                     regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary
                     of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin
                     in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite
                     limit.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32945] Iª q. 108 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut in superficie quae partim est alba et partim
nigra, duae partes quae sunt in confinio albi et nigri, magis
conveniunt secundum situm quam aliquae duae partes albae, minus
tamen secundum qualitatem; ita duo Angeli qui sunt in terminis
duorum ordinum, magis secum conveniunt secundum propinquitatem
naturae, quam unus eorum cum aliquibus aliis sui ordinis; minus
autem secundum idoneitatem ad similia officia, quae quidem
idoneitas usque ad aliquem certum terminum protenditur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A4-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 4. Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is "a
                     sacred principality," and Dionysius places in its definition that it "approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be" (Coel.
                     Hier. iii). But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of
                     hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32946] Iª q. 108 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum non
sit a natura in Angelis. Hierarchia enim dicitur sacer principatus,
et in definitione eius Dionysius ponit quod <i>deiforme, quantum
possibile est, similat</i>. Sed sanctitas et deiformitas est in
Angelis per gratiam, non per naturam. Ergo distinctio hierarchiarum
et ordinum in Angelis est per gratiam, non per naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling," as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which
                     comes not from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic
                     orders are not from nature, but from grace.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32947] Iª q. 108 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Seraphim dicuntur ardentes, vel incendentes, ut Dionysius dicit VII
cap. Cael. Hier. Hoc autem videtur ad caritatem pertinere, quae non
est a natura, sed a gratia, <i>diffunditur enim in cordibus nostris
per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis</i>, ut dicitur ad Rom.
V. <i>Quod non solum ad sanctos homines pertinet, sed etiam de
sanctis Angelis dici potest</i>, ut Augustinus dicit XII de Civ.
Dei. Ergo ordines in Angelis non sunt a natura, sed a gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the
                     gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore
                     neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32948] Iª q. 108 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
hierarchia ecclesiastica exemplatur a caelesti. Sed ordines in
hominibus non sunt per naturam, sed per donum gratiae, non enim est
a natura quod unus est episcopus, et alius est sacerdos, et alius
diaconus. Ergo neque in Angelis sunt ordines a natura, sed a gratia
tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Master says (ii, D. 9) that "an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some
                     gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts." Therefore the distinction of orders among the
                     angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32949] Iª q. 108 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Magister dicit, IX dist. II Sent., quod <i>ordo Angelorum
dicitur multitudo caelestium spirituum, qui inter se aliquo munere
gratiae similantur, sicut et naturalium datorum participatione
conveniunt</i>. Distinctio ergo ordinum in Angelis est non solum
secundum dona gratuita, sed etiam secundum dona naturalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the angels
                     may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge
                     and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly,
                     the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural
                     powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end
                     they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the
                     gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the
                     capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q62_A6" id="FP_Q108_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[6]</a>). Hence
                     among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 co."><a name="32950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32950] Iª q. 108 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ordo gubernationis, qui est ordo multitudinis sub principatu
existentis, attenditur per respectum ad finem. Finis autem
Angelorum potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum facultatem
suae naturae, ut scilicet cognoscant et ament Deum naturali
cognitione et amore. Et secundum respectum ad hunc finem,
distinguuntur ordines Angelorum secundum naturalia dona. Alio modo
potest accipi finis angelicae multitudinis supra naturalem
facultatem eorum, qui consistit in visione divinae essentiae, et in
immobili fruitione bonitatis ipsius; ad quem finem pertingere non
possunt nisi per gratiam. Unde secundum respectum ad hunc finem,
ordines distinguuntur in Angelis completive quidem secundum dona
gratuita, dispositive autem secundum dona naturalia, quia Angelis
data sunt dona gratuita secundum capacitatem naturalium, quod non
est in hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Unde in hominibus
distinguuntur ordines secundum dona gratuita tantum, et non
secundum naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p7"> From the above the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 ad arg."><a name="32951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32951] Iª q. 108 a. 4 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A5-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 5. Whether the orders of the angels are properly named?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly
                     virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly
                     named.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32952] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod ordines Angelorum non convenienter
nominentur. Omnes enim caelestes spiritus dicuntur et Angeli et
virtutes caelestes. Sed nomina communia inconvenienter aliquibus
appropriantur. Ergo inconvenienter nominatur unus ordo Angelorum,
et alius virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the words, "Know ye that the Lord He is God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.99.3" target="asv">Ps. 99:3</a>). Therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "Dominations."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32953] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, esse
dominum est proprium Dei; secundum illud Psal. XCIX <i>scitote
quoniam dominus ipse est Deus</i>. Ergo inconvenienter unus ordo
caelestium spirituum dominationes vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the name "Domination" seems to imply government and likewise the names "Principalities" and "Powers." Therefore
                     these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32954] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
nomen dominationis ad gubernationem pertinere videtur. Similiter
autem et nomen principatuum, et potestatum. Inconvenienter ergo
tribus ordinibus haec tria nomina imponuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the
                     "Principalities."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="32955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32955] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
Archangeli dicuntur quasi principes Angeli. Non ergo hoc nomen
debet imponi alii ordini quam ordini principatuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But
                     charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="32956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32956] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
nomen Seraphim imponitur ab ardore qui ad caritatem pertinet, nomen
autem Cherubim imponitur a scientia. Caritas autem et scientia sunt
dona communia omnibus Angelis. Non ergo debent esse nomina
specialium ordinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it.
                     Therefore there ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim." Therefore it appears that the
                     orders of angels are not properly styled.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 6"><a name="32957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32957] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
throni dicuntur sedes. Sed ex hoc ipso Deus in creatura rationali
sedere dicitur, quod ipsum cognoscit et amat. Non ergo debet esse
alius ordo thronorum ab ordine Cherubim et Seraphim. Sic igitur
videtur quod inconvenienter ordines Angelorum nominentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8"> <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so named. For the name "Seraphim" is found in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.2" target="asv"> Is. 6:2</a>; the name "Cherubim" in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); "Thrones" in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.16" target="asv"> Col. 1:16</a>; "Dominations," "Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are mentioned in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.21" target="asv"> Eph. 1:21</a>; the name "Archangels" in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name "Angels" is found in many places of
                     Scripture.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32958] Iª q. 108 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
auctoritas sacrae Scripturae, quae sic eos nominat. Nomen enim
Seraphim ponitur Isaiae VI; nomen Cherubim Ezech. I; nomen
thronorum, Coloss. I; dominationes autem et virtutes et potestates
et principatus ponuntur Ephes. I; nomen autem Archangeli ponitur in
canonica Iudae, nomina autem Angelorum in pluribus Scripturae
locis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of
                     each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in coordinated things,
                     something may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing is
                     said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its
                     nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner,
                     as we have stated (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A2" id="FP_Q108_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[2]</a>) concerning all the names which are attributed to God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not
                     fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating
                     its property, it ought not to be named from what it participates
                     imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we
                     wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter
                     is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by participation;
                     nor do we call him a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of
                     a man,
                     and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p10"> So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are
                     all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior
                     perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely
                     the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of
                     excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p11"> So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections
                     they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior
                     ministrations; for he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and the archangels in the greatest;
                     by the virtues miracles are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities
                     preside over the good spirits themselves."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 co."><a name="32959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32959] Iª q. 108 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod in nominatione angelicorum ordinum, considerare oportet quod
<i>propria nomina singulorum ordinum proprietates eorum
designant</i>, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ad videndum
autem quae sit proprietas cuiuslibet ordinis, considerare oportet
quod in rebus ordinatis tripliciter aliquid esse contingit,
scilicet per proprietatem, per excessum, et per participationem.
Per proprietatem autem dicitur esse aliquid in re aliqua, quod
adaequatur et proportionatur naturae ipsius. Per excessum autem,
quando illud quod attribuitur alicui, est minus quam res cui
attribuitur, sed tamen convenit illi rei per quendam excessum;
sicut dictum est de omnibus nominibus quae attribuuntur Deo. Per
participationem autem, quando illud quod attribuitur alicui, non
plenarie invenitur in eo, sed deficienter; sicut sancti homines
participative dicuntur dii. Si ergo aliquid nominari debeat nomine
designante proprietatem ipsius, non debet nominari ab eo quod
imperfecte participat, neque ab eo quod excedenter habet; sed ab eo
quod est sibi quasi coaequatum. Sicut si quis velit proprie
nominare hominem, dicet eum substantiam rationalem, non autem
substantiam intellectualem, quod est proprium nomen Angeli, quia
simplex intelligentia convenit Angelo per proprietatem, homini vero
per participationem; neque substantiam sensibilem, quod est nomen
bruti proprium, quia sensus est minus quam id quod est proprium
homini, et convenit homini excedenter prae aliis animalibus. Sic
igitur considerandum est in ordinibus Angelorum, quod omnes
spirituales perfectiones sunt omnibus Angelis communes et quod
omnes abundantius existunt in superioribus quam in inferioribus.
Sed cum in ipsis etiam perfectionibus sit quidam gradus, superior
perfectio attribuitur superiori ordini per proprietatem, inferiori
vero per participationem, e converso autem inferior attribuitur
inferiori per proprietatem, superiori autem per excessum. Et ita
superior ordo a superiori perfectione nominatur. Sic igitur
Dionysius exponit ordinum nomina secundum convenientiam ad
spirituales perfectiones eorum. Gregorius vero, in expositione
horum nominum, magis attendere videtur exteriora ministeria. Dicit
enim, quod <i>Angeli dicuntur qui minima nuntiant; Archangeli, qui
summa; virtutes per quas miracula fiunt; potestates quibus adversae
potestates repelluntur; principatus, qui ipsis bonis spiritibus
praesunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angel means "messenger." So all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine things, are called "angels." But the
                     superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated.
                     The lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation
                     only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest
                     order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of "angels,"
                     forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p13"> "Virtue" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the medium between the essence and the operation, and in
                     that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly essences." Secondly, as meaning a certain
                     excellence of strength; and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the
                     "name 'virtues' signifies a certain virile and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those Divine
                     operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly
                     the Divine behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32960] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Angelus nuntius dicitur. Omnes ergo caelestes
spiritus, inquantum sunt manifestatores divinorum, Angeli vocantur.
Sed superiores Angeli habent quandam excellentiam in hac
manifestatione, a qua superiores ordines nominantur. Infimus autem
Angelorum ordo nullam excellentiam supra communem manifestationem
addit, et ideo a simplici manifestatione nominatur. Et sic nomen
commune remanet infimo ordini quasi proprium, ut dicit Dionysius V
cap. Cael. Hier. Vel potest dici quod infimus ordo specialiter
dicitur ordo Angelorum, quia immediate nobis annuntiant. Virtus
autem dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod
est media inter essentiam et operationem, et sic omnes caelestes
spiritus nominantur caelestes virtutes, sicut et caelestes
essentiae. Alio modo, secundum quod importat quendam excessum
fortitudinis, et sic est proprium nomen ordinis. Unde Dionysius
dicit, VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen virtutum significat
quandam virilem et inconcussam fortitudinem, primo quidem ad omnes
operationes divinas eis convenientes; secundo, ad suscipiendum
divina. Et ita significat quod sine aliquo timore aggrediuntur
divina quae ad eos pertinent, quod videtur ad fortitudinem animi
pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "Dominion is attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the Divine word
                     gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the
                     Divine gifts." Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Domination" means first "a certain liberty, free
                     from servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and
                     from tyrannical oppression," endured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies "a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy
                     which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act, of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants." Thirdly, it signifies
                     "the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God." Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation
                     of what belongs to God; as the name "Virtues" signifies the participation of the Divine virtue; and the
                     same principle applies to the rest.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32961] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius XII cap. de Div. Nom.,
<i>dominatio laudatur in Deo singulariter per quendam excessum, sed
per participationem, divina eloquia vocant dominos principaliores
ornatus, per quos inferiores ex donis eius accipiunt</i>. Unde et
Dionysius dicit in VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen dominationum
primo quidem significat quandam libertatem, quae est a servili
conditione et pedestri subiectione, sicut plebs subiicitur, et a
tyrannica oppressione, quam interdum etiam maiores patiuntur.
Secundo significat quandam rigidam et inflexibilem gubernationem,
quae ad nullum servilem actum inclinatur, neque ad aliquem actum
subiectorum vel oppressorum a tyrannis. Tertio significat appetitum
et participationem veri dominii, quod est in Deo. Et similiter
nomen cuiuslibet ordinis significat participationem eius quod est
in Deo; sicut nomen virtutum significat participationem divinae
virtutis; et sic de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The names "Domination," "Power," and "Principality" belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only to
                     prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Evang.), that "some companies of the angels, because others are
                     subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." The name "Power" points out a kind of order, according to what the
                     Apostle says, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.2" target="asv">Rom. 13:2</a>). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Power" signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception
                     of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above.
                     Therefore, to the order of "Powers" it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside
                     [principari] as Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is "to be first among others," as being first
                     in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of "Principalities" signifies
                     "one who leads in a sacred order." For those who lead others, being first among them, are properly called "princes," according
                     to the words, "Princes went before joined with singers" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.26" target="asv">Ps. 67:26</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32962] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod nomen dominationis, et potestatis, et principatus,
diversimode ad gubernationem pertinet. Nam domini est solummodo
praecipere de agendis. Et ideo Gregorius dicit quod <i>quaedam
Angelorum agmina, pro eo quod eis cetera ad obediendum subiecta
sunt, dominationes vocantur</i>. Nomen vero potestatis ordinationem
quandam designat; secundum illud apostoli ad Rom. XIII, <i>qui
potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi resistit</i>. Et ideo Dionysius
dicit quod nomen potestatis significat quandam ordinationem et
circa susceptionem divinorum, et circa actiones divinas quas
superiores in inferiores agunt, eas sursum ducendo. Ad ordinem ergo
potestatum pertinet ordinare quae a subditis sint agenda.
Principari vero, ut Gregorius dicit, est inter reliquos priorem
existere, quasi primi sint in executione eorum quae imperantur. Et
ideo Dionysius dicit, IX cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen principatuum
significat ductivum cum ordine sacro. Illi enim qui alios ducunt,
primi inter eos existentes, principes proprie vocantur secundum
illud Psalmi LXVII, <i>praevenerunt principes coniuncti
psallentibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix), are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." A medium compared
                     to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot,
                     and hot compared to cold. So the "Archangels" are called the "angel princes"; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the
                     "Angels," and angels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory
                     (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) they are called "Archangels," because they preside over the one order of the "Angels"; as it were, announcing
                     greater things: and the "Principalities" are so called as presiding over all the heavenly "Virtues" who fulfil the Divine
                     commands.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="32963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32963] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod Archangeli, secundum Dionysium, medii sunt inter
principatus et Angelos. Medium autem comparatum uni extremo,
videtur alterum, inquantum participat naturam utriusque, sicut
tepidum respectu calidi est frigidum, respectu vero frigidi est
calidum. Sic et Archangeli dicuntur quasi principes Angeli, quia
respectu Angelorum sunt principes, respectu vero principatuum sunt
Angeli. Secundum Gregorium autem, dicuntur Archangeli ex eo quod
principantur soli ordini Angelorum, quasi magna nuntiantes.
Principatus autem dicuntur ex eo quod principantur omnibus
caelestibus virtutibus divinas iussiones explentibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire.
                     Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name "Seraphim" according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of
                     heat. Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they
                     are borne inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is "heat," which
                     is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to
                     the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised
                     powerfully upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor, and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly
                     we consider in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these angels have in themselves an
                     inextinguishable light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p18"> In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge,"
                     which Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of God; the full reception of the
                     Divine Light; their contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to the fact that possessing this
                     knowledge fully, they pour it forth copiously upon others.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="32964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32964] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod nomen Seraphim non imponitur tantum a caritate, sed a
caritatis excessu, quem importat nomen ardoris vel incendii. Unde
Dionysius, VII cap. Cael. Hier., exponit nomen Seraphim secundum
proprietates ignis, in quo est excessus caliditatis. In igne autem
tria possumus considerare. Primo quidem, motum, qui est sursum, et
qui est continuus. Per quod significatur quod indeclinabiliter
moventur in Deum. Secundo vero, virtutem activam eius, quae est
calidum. Quod quidem non simpliciter invenitur in igne, sed cum
quadam acuitate, quia maxime est penetrativus in agendo, et
pertingit usque ad minima; et iterum cum quodam superexcedenti
fervore. Et per hoc significatur actio huiusmodi Angelorum, quam in
subditos potenter exercent, eos in similem fervorem excitantes, et
totaliter eos per incendium purgantes. Tertio consideratur in igne
claritas eius. Et hoc significat quod huiusmodi Angeli in seipsis
habent inextinguibilem lucem, et quod alios perfecte illuminant.
Similiter etiam nomen Cherubim imponitur a quodam excessu
scientiae, unde interpretatur plenitudo scientiae. Quod Dionysius
exponit quantum ad quatuor, primo quidem, quantum ad perfectam Dei
visionem; secundo, quantum ad plenam susceptionem divini luminis;
tertio, quantum ad hoc, quod in ipso Deo contemplantur
pulchritudinem ordinis rerum a Deo derivatam; quarto, quantum ad
hoc, quod ipsi pleni existentes huiusmodi cognitione, eam copiose
in alios effundunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p19">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The order of the "Thrones" excels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works;
                     whereas the "Cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the "Seraphim" the excellence of ardor. And although these two
                     excellent attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the "Thrones" does not include the other two; and so the
                     order of the "Thrones" is distinguished from the orders of the "Cherubim" and the
                     "Seraphim." For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the superior, but not
                     conversely. But Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name "Thrones" by its relation to material seats, in which we may
                     consider four things. First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to the angels who are called "Thrones"
                     are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in material seats is displayed
                     strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are made
                     firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the angels receive
                     God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is open
                     on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to serve Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 6"><a name="32965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32965] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum
dicendum quod ordo thronorum habet excellentiam prae inferioribus
ordinibus in hoc, quod immediate in Deo rationes divinorum operum
cognoscere possunt. Sed Cherubim habent excellentiam scientiae;
Seraphim vero excellentiam ardoris. Et licet in his duabus
excellentiis includatur tertia, non tamen in illa quae est
thronorum, includuntur aliae duae. Et ideo ordo thronorum
distinguitur ab ordine Cherubim et Seraphim. Hoc enim est commune
in omnibus, quod excellentia inferioris continetur in excellentia
superioris, et non e converso. Exponit autem Dionysius nomen
thronorum, per convenientiam ad materiales sedes. In quibus est
quatuor considerare. Primo quidem, situm, quia sedes supra terram
elevantur. Et sic ipsi Angeli qui throni dicuntur, elevantur usque
ad hoc, quod in Deo immediate rationes rerum cognoscant. Secundo in
materialibus sedibus consideratur firmitas, quia in ipsis aliquis
firmiter sedet. Hic autem est e converso, nam ipsi Angeli firmantur
per Deum. Tertio, quia sedes suscipit sedentem, et in ea deferri
potest. Sic et isti Angeli suscipiunt Deum in seipsis, et eum
quodammodo ad inferiores ferunt. Quarto, ex figura, quia sedes ex
una parte est aperta ad suscipiendum sedentem. Ita et isti Angeli
sunt per promptitudinem aperti ad suscipiendum Deum, et famulandum
ipsi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A6-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 6. Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the
                     names of "Dominations," "Principalities," and "Powers" of themselves imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be
                     supreme.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32966] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter gradus ordinum assignentur.
Ordo enim praelatorum videtur esse supremus. Sed dominationes,
principatus et potestates ex ipsis nominibus praelationem quandam
habent. Ergo isti ordines debent esse inter omnes supremi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; for nothing is
                     nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is the highest.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32967] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quanto aliquis ordo est Deo propinquior, tanto est superior. Sed
ordo thronorum videtur esse Deo propinquissimus, nihil enim
coniungitur propinquius sedenti, quam sua sedes. Ergo ordo
thronorum est altissimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher
                     than the "Seraphim."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32968] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
scientia est prior quam amor; et intellectus videtur esse altior
quam voluntas. Ergo et ordo Cherubim videtur esse altior quam ordo
Seraphim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the "Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed immediately
                     above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="32969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32969] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
Gregorius ponit principatus supra potestates. Non ergo collocantur
immediate supra Archangelos, ut Dionysius dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest hierarchy the "Seraphim" as the first, the "Cherubim" as the middle, the
                     "Thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the "Dominations," as the first, the "Virtues" in the middle, the
                     "Powers" last; in the lowest hierarchy the "Principalities" first, then the "Archangels," and lastly the "Angels."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32970] Iª q. 108 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Dionysius ponit, in prima quidem hierarchia. Seraphim ut
primos, Cherubim ut medios, thronos ut ultimos; in media vero,
dominationes ut primos, virtutes ut medios, potestates ut ultimos;
in ultima, principatus ut primos, Archangelos ut medios, Angelos ut
ultimos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as
                     regards all except the "Principalities" and "Virtues." For Dionysius places the "Virtues" beneath the "Dominations," and above
                     the "Powers"; the "Principalities" beneath the "Powers" and above the "Archangels." Gregory, however, places the "Principalities"
                     between the "Dominations" and the "Powers"; and the "Virtues" between the "Powers"
                     and the "Archangels." Each of these placings may claim authority from the words of the Apostle, who (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.20" target="asv">Eph. 1:20,21</a>) enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that "God set Him," i.e. Christ, "on His right hand in the
                     heavenly places above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion." Here he places "Virtues" between "Powers" and
                     "Dominations," according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16), numbering the same
                     orders from the highest, he says: "Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created
                     by Him and in Him." Here he places the "Principalities" between "Dominations" and "Powers," as does also Gregory.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p8"> Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A1" id="FP_Q108_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in
                     their application to particular effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the
                     whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the
                     universal disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which
                     is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering
                     the properties of the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are
                     taken from their relation to God, the "Seraphim," "Cherubim," and "Thrones"; and he places in the middle hierarchy
                     those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition---the "Dominations," "Virtues," and "Powers";
                     and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the "Principalities," "Angels,"
                     and "Archangels."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p9"> As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of
                     the end; thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and the third an addition
                     to both. And because God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii,
                     Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the
                     dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition are privileged to know his secrets;
                     and others above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this similitude, we can understand the disposition
                     in the orders of the first hierarchy; for the "Thrones" are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves,
                     in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first
                     hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know the Divine secrets supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is the supreme excellence
                     of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the "Thrones";
                     as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are all called "Angels."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p10"> As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which are to be
                     done, and this belongs to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done, which belongs
                     to the "Virtues"; the third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by others, which
                     belongs to the "Powers."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p11"> The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there
                     are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs to the "Principalities."
                     There are others who simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "Angels." Others hold a middle place; and these
                     are the "Archangels," as above explained.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p12"> This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the
                     lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Divine Persons,
                     which terminates in the Holy Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity,
                     denominated as it is from the fire of love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the "Thrones,"
                     who in their own order are akin to the "Dominations"; for the "Thrones," according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called
                     "because through them God accomplishes His judgments," since they are enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate
                     enlightening of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine ministrations. The order of the "Powers"
                     is akin to the order of the "Principalities"; for as it belongs to the "Powers" to impose order on those subject to
                     them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of "Principalities," who, as presiding over the government of peoples
                     and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof;
                     "for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, "The prince of
                     the kingdom of the Persians resisted me" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p13"> The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also reasonable. For since the "Dominations" appoint and order
                     what belongs to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things
                     in which the Divine ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), "bodies are ruled in a certain order;
                     the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good
                     spirit." So the first order after the "Dominations" is called that of "Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then
                     the "Powers," who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.3" target="asv">Rom. 13:3,4</a>). After these come the "Virtues," which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the
                     "Angels" and the "Archangels," who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within
                     the purview of reason.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 co."><a name="32971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32971] Iª q. 108 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod gradus angelicorum ordinum assignant et Gregorius et
Dionysius, quantum ad alia quidem convenienter, sed quantum ad
principatus et virtutes differenter. Nam Dionysius collocat
virtutes sub dominationibus et supra potestates, principatus autem
sub potestatibus et supra Archangelos, Gregorius autem ponit
principatus in medio dominationum et potestatum, virtutes vero in
medio potestatum et Archangelorum. Et utraque assignatio
fulcimentum habere potest ex auctoritate apostoli. Qui, medios
ordines ascendendo enumerans, dicit, Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit
illum, scilicet Christum, ad dexteram suam in caelestibus, supra
omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem, ubi
virtutem ponit inter potestatem et dominationem, secundum
assignationem Dionysii. Sed ad Coloss. I, enumerans eosdem ordines
descendendo, dicit, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive
principatus, sive potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata
sunt, ubi principatus ponit medios inter dominationes et
potestates, secundum assignationem Gregorii. Primo igitur videamus
rationem assignationis Dionysii. In qua considerandum est quod,
sicut supra dictum est, prima hierarchia accipit rationes rerum in
ipso Deo; secunda vero in causis universalibus; tertia vero
secundum determinationem ad speciales effectus. Et quia Deus est
finis non solum angelicorum ministeriorum, sed etiam totius
creaturae, ad primam hierarchiam pertinet consideratio finis; ad
mediam vero dispositio universalis de agendis; ad ultimam autem
applicatio dispositionis ad effectum, quae est operis executio;
haec enim tria manifestum est in qualibet operatione inveniri. Et
ideo Dionysius, ex nominibus ordinum proprietates illorum
considerans, illos ordines in prima hierarchia posuit, quorum
nomina imponuntur per respectum ad Deum, scilicet Seraphim et
Cherubim et thronos. Illos vero ordines posuit in media hierarchia,
quorum nomina designant communem quandam gubernationem sive
dispositionem, scilicet dominationes, virtutes et potestates. Illos
vero ordines posuit in tertia hierarchia, quorum nomina designant
operis executionem, scilicet principatus, Angelos et Archangelos.
In respectu autem ad finem, tria considerari possunt, nam primo,
aliquis considerat finem; secundo vero, perfectam finis cognitionem
accipit; tertio vero, intentionem suam in ipso defigit; quorum
secundum ex additione se habet ad primum, et tertium ad utrumque.
Et quia Deus est finis creaturarum sicut dux est finis exercitus,
ut dicitur in XII Metaphys., potest aliquid simile huius ordinis
considerari in rebus humanis, nam quidam sunt qui hoc habent
dignitatis, ut per seipsos familiariter accedere possunt ad regem
vel ducem; quidam vero super hoc habent, ut etiam secreta eius
cognoscant; alii vero insuper circa ipsum semper inhaerent, quasi
ei coniuncti. Et secundum hanc similitudinem accipere possumus
dispositionem ordinum primae hierarchiae. Nam throni elevantur ad
hoc, quod Deum familiariter in seipsis recipiant, secundum quod
rationes rerum in ipso immediate cognoscere possunt, quod est
proprium totius primae hierarchiae. Cherubim vero supereminenter
divina secreta cognoscunt. Seraphim vero excellunt in hoc quod est
omnium supremum, scilicet Deo ipsi uniri. Ut sic ab eo quod est
commune toti hierarchiae, denominetur ordo thronorum; sicut ab eo
quod est commune omnibus caelestibus spiritibus, denominatur ordo
Angelorum. Ad gubernationis autem rationem tria pertinent. Quorum
primum est definitio eorum quae agenda sunt, quod est proprium
dominationum. Secundum autem est praebere facultatem ad implendum,
quod pertinet ad virtutes. Tertium autem est ordinare qualiter ea
quae praecepta vel definita sunt, impleri possint, ut aliqui
exequantur, et hoc pertinet ad potestates. Executio autem
angelicorum ministeriorum consistit in annuntiando divina. In
executione autem cuiuslibet actus, sunt quidam quasi incipientes
actionem et alios ducentes, sicut in cantu praecentores, et in
bello illi qui alios ducunt et dirigunt, et hoc pertinet ad
principatus. Alii vero sunt qui simpliciter exequuntur, et hoc
pertinet ad Angelos. Alii vero medio modo se habent, quod ad
Archangelos pertinet, ut supra dictum est. Invenitur autem congrua
haec ordinum assignatio. Nam semper summum inferioris ordinis
affinitatem habet cum ultimo superioris; sicut infima animalia
parum distant a plantis. Primus autem ordo est divinarum
personarum, qui terminatur ad spiritum sanctum, qui est amor
procedens, cum quo affinitatem habet supremus ordo primae
hierarchiae, ab incendio amoris denominatus. Infimus autem ordo
primae hierarchiae est thronorum, qui ex suo nomine habent quandam
affinitatem cum dominationibus, nam throni dicuntur, secundum
Gregorium, per quos Deus sua iudicia exercet; accipiunt enim
divinas illuminationes per convenientiam ad immediate illuminandum
secundam hierarchiam, ad quam pertinet dispositio divinorum
ministeriorum. Ordo vero potestatum affinitatem habet cum ordine
principatuum, nam cum potestatum sit ordinationem subiectis
imponere, haec ordinatio statim in nomine principatuum designatur,
qui sunt primi in executione divinorum ministeriorum, utpote
praesidentes gubernationi gentium et regnorum, quod est primum et
praecipuum in divinis ministeriis; nam bonum gentis est divinius
quam bonum unius hominis. Unde dicitur Dan. X, <i>princeps regni
Persarum restitit mihi</i>. Dispositio etiam ordinum quam Gregorius
ponit, congruitatem habet. Nam cum dominationes sint definientes et
praecipientes ea quae ad divina ministeria pertinent, ordines eis
subiecti disponuntur secundum dispositionem eorum in quos divina
ministeria exercentur ut autem Augustinus dicit in III de Trin.,
<i>corpora quodam ordine reguntur, inferiora per superiora, et
omnia per spiritualem creaturam; et spiritus malus per spiritum
bonum</i>. Primus ergo ordo post dominationes dicitur principatuum,
qui etiam bonis spiritibus principantur. Deinde potestates, per
quas arcentur mali spiritus, sicut per potestates terrenas arcentur
malefactores, ut habetur Rom. XIII. Post quas sunt virtutes, quae
habent potestatem super corporalem naturam in operatione
miraculorum. Post quas sunt Archangeli et Angeli, qui nuntiant
hominibus vel magna, quae sunt supra rationem; vel parva, ad quae
ratio se extendere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angel's subjection to God is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the former.
                     Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their
                     name from their nearness and relation to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32972] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod in Angelis potius est quod subiiciuntur Deo, quam
quod inferioribus praesident, et hoc derivatur ex illo. Et ideo
ordines nominati a praelatione non sunt supremi, sed magis ordines
nominati a conversione ad Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nearness to God designated by the name of the "Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a more
                     excellent way, as above explained.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32973] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod illa propinquitas ad Deum quae designatur nomine
thronorum, convenit etiam Cherubim et Seraphim, et excellentius, ut
dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As above explained (
                     <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q27_A3" id="FP_Q108_A6-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved.
                     Now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler
                     way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things,
                     God above all, is
                     better than to know them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32974] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cognitio est secundum quod
cognita sunt in cognoscente; amor autem secundum quod amans unitur
rei amatae. Superiora autem nobiliori modo sunt in seipsis quam in
inferioribus, inferiora vero nobiliori modo in superioribus quam in
seipsis. Et ideo inferiorum quidem cognitio praeeminet dilectioni,
superiorum autem dilectio, et praecipue Dei, praeeminet
cognitioni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according
                     to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name "Principalities" from their "presiding over good spirits," which also
                     agrees with the "Virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in
                     the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the
                     "Virtues" seem to be the same as "Principalities" of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations;
                     since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the "Archangels" and the "Angels."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="32975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32975] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, si quis diligenter consideret dispositiones ordinum
secundum Dionysium et Gregorium, parum vel nihil differunt, si ad
rem referantur. Exponit enim Gregorius principatuum nomen ex hoc,
quod bonis spiritibus praesunt, et hoc convenit virtutibus,
secundum quod in nomine virtutum intelligitur quaedam fortitudo
dans efficaciam inferioribus spiritibus ad exequenda divina
ministeria. Rursus virtutes, secundum Gregorium, videntur esse idem
quod principatus secundum Dionysium. Nam hoc est primum in divinis
ministeriis, miracula facere, per hoc enim paratur via
Annuntiationi Archangelorum et Angelorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A7-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 7. Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:24</a>), that Christ will "bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the
                     Father," and this will be in the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will be abolished in that state.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32976] Iª q. 108 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod ordines non remanebunt post diem iudicii.
Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XV, quod Christus evacuabit omnem
principatum et potestatem, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et patri, quod
erit in ultima consummatione. Pari ergo ratione, in illo statu
omnes alii ordines evacuabuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment
                     one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore
                     the angelic orders would remain for no purpose.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32977] Iª q. 108 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad
officium angelicorum ordinum pertinet purgare, illuminare et
perficere. Sed post diem iudicii unus Angelus non purgabit aut
illuminabit aut perficiet alium, quia non proficient amplius in
scientia. Ergo frustra ordines angelici remanerent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says of the angels (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>), that "they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation"; whence
                     it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit
                     of salvation until the Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the Day of Judgment.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32978] Iª q. 108 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
apostolus dicit, ad Heb. I, de Angelis, quod <i>omnes sunt
administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi propter eos qui
haereditatem capiunt salutis</i>, ex quo patet quod officia
Angelorum ordinantur ad hoc, quod homines ad salutem adducantur.
Sed omnes electi usque ad diem iudicii salutem consequuntur. Non
ergo post diem iudicii remanebunt officia et ordines Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.5.20" target="asv">Judges 5:20</a>): "Stars remaining in their order and courses," which is applied to the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in
                     their orders.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32979] Iª q. 108 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Iudic. V, stellae manentes in ordine et cursu suo,
quod exponitur de Angelis. Ergo Angeli semper in suis ordinibus
remanebunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In the angelic orders we may consider two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The distinction
                     of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature, as above explained
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A4" id="FP_Q108_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; and these differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless
                     they themselves be corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever
                     remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain
                     degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices are
                     directed towards leading others to their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end.
                     Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 co."><a name="32980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32980] Iª q. 108 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod in ordinibus angelicis duo possunt considerari, scilicet
distinctio graduum, et executio officiorum. Distinctio autem
graduum est in Angelis secundum differentiam gratiae et naturae, ut
supra dictum est. Et utraque differentia semper in Angelis
remanebit. Non enim posset naturarum differentia ab eis auferri,
nisi eis corruptis, differentia etiam gloriae erit in eis semper,
secundum differentiam meriti praecedentis. Executio autem
officiorum angelicorum aliquo modo remanebit post diem iudicii, et
aliquo modo cessabit. Cessabit quidem, secundum quod eorum officia
ordinantur ad perducendum aliquos ad finem, remanebit autem,
secundum quod convenit in ultima finis consecutione. Sicut etiam
alia sunt officia militarium ordinum in pugna, et in triumpho.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to
                     their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words
                     of the Apostle, "When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father," i.e. when He shall have led the faithful
                     to the enjoyment of God Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32981] Iª q. 108 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod principatus et potestates evacuabuntur in illa finali
consummatione quantum ad hoc, quod alios ad finem perducant, quia
consecuto iam fine, non est necessarium tendere in finem. Et haec
ratio intelligitur ex verbis apostoli, dicentis, cum tradiderit
regnum Deo et patri, idest, cum perduxerit fideles ad fruendum ipso
Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions.
                     In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually
                     arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding
                     middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also as
                     regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms
                     he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since
                     the inferior angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the
                     light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the
                     knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things,
                     still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32982] Iª q. 108 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod actiones Angelorum super alios Angelos considerandae
sunt secundum similitudinem actionum intelligibilium quae sunt in
nobis. Inveniuntur autem in nobis multae intelligibiles actiones
quae sunt ordinatae secundum ordinem causae et causati; sicut cum
per multa media gradatim in unam conclusionem devenimus. Manifestum
est autem quod cognitio conclusionis dependet ex omnibus mediis
praecedentibus, non solum quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae,
sed etiam quantum ad scientiae conservationem. Cuius signum est
quod, si quis oblivisceretur aliquod praecedentium mediorum,
opinionem quidem vel fidem de conclusione posset habere, sed non
scientiam, ordine causarum ignorato. Sic igitur, cum inferiores
Angeli rationes divinorum operum cognoscant per lumen superiorum
Angelorum, dependet eorum cognitio ex lumine superiorum, non solum
quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae, sed etiam quantum ad
cognitionis conservationem. Licet ergo post iudicium non proficiant
inferiores Angeli in cognitione aliquarum rerum, non tamen propter
hoc excluditur quin a superioribus illuminentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who
                     are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32983] Iª q. 108 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, etsi post diem iudicii homines non sint ulterius ad
salutem adducendi per ministerium Angelorum; tamen illi qui iam
salutem erunt consecuti, aliquam illustrationem habebunt per
Angelorum officia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A8-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 8. Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest
                     heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest
                     hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32984] Iª q. 108 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod homines non assumantur ad ordines
Angelorum. Hierarchia enim humana continetur sub infima
hierarchiarum caelestium, sicut infima sub media, et media sub
prima. Sed Angeli infimae hierarchiae nunquam transferentur in
mediam aut in primam. Ergo neque homines transferentur ad ordines
Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the
                     like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32985] Iª q. 108 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
ordinibus Angelorum aliqua officia competunt, utpote custodire,
miracula facere, Daemones arcere, et huiusmodi, quae non videntur
convenire animabus sanctorum. Ergo non transferentur ad ordines
Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls
                     of bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the
                     souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32986] Iª q. 108 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut boni Angeli inducunt ad bonum, ita Daemones inducunt ad
malum. Sed erroneum est dicere quod animae hominum malorum
convertantur in Daemones, hoc enim Chrysostomus reprobat, super
Matth. Ergo non videtur quod animae sanctorum transferantur ad
ordines Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as the angels of God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>).</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32987] Iª q. 108 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dominus dicit, Matth. XXII, de sanctis, quod <i>erunt sicut
Angeli Dei in caelo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5a"> <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A4" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.2" shape="rect">AA[4]</a>,7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace.
                     Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction
                     will always remain. In view of this
                     distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting
                     as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.20.36" target="asv">Lk. 20:36</a>). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends
                     on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men
                     can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men are
                     taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders,
                     but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole
                     society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies
                     of
                     men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 co."><a name="32988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32988] Iª q. 108 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut supra dictum est, ordines Angelorum distinguuntur et
secundum conditionem naturae, et secundum dona gratiae. Si ergo
considerentur Angelorum ordines solum quantum ad gradum naturae,
sic homines nullo modo assumi possunt ad ordines Angelorum, quia
semper remanebit naturarum distinctio. Quam quidam considerantes,
posuerunt quod nullo modo homines transferri possunt ad
aequalitatem Angelorum. Quod est erroneum, repugnat enim
promissioni Christi, dicentis, Lucae XX, quod filii resurrectionis
erunt aequales Angelis in caelis. Illud enim quod est ex parte
naturae, se habet ut materiale in ratione ordinis, completivum vero
est quod est ex dono gratiae, quae dependet ex liberalitate Dei,
non ex ordine naturae. Et ideo per donum gratiae homines mereri
possunt tantam gloriam, ut Angelis aequentur secundum singulos
Angelorum gradus. Quod est homines ad ordines Angelorum assumi.
Quidam tamen dicunt quod ad ordines Angelorum non assumuntur omnes
qui salvantur, sed soli virgines vel perfecti; alii vero suum
ordinem constituent, quasi condivisum toti societati Angelorum. Sed
hoc est contra Augustinum, qui dicit XII de Civ. Dei, quod non
erunt duae societates hominum et Angelorum, sed una, quia omnium
beatitudo est adhaerere uni Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above explained

                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A4" id="FP_Q108_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4];</a>
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q62_A6" id="FP_Q108_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[62], A[6]</a>). So, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred
                     to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32989] Iª q. 108 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod gratia Angelis datur secundum proportionem
naturalium; non autem sic est de hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Et
ideo sicut inferiores Angeli non possunt transferri ad naturalem
gradum superiorum, ita nec ad gratuitum. Homines vero possunt ad
gratuitum conscendere, sed non ad naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels according to the order of nature are between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human
                     affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But holy men even after this life are of the same nature
                     with ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, "nor do they interfere in the
                     things of the living," as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a
                     certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; by working miracles,
                     by coercing the demons, or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xvi).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32990] Iª q. 108 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Angeli, secundum naturae ordinem, medii sunt inter
nos et Deum. Et ideo, secundum legem communem, per eos
administrantur non solum res humanae, sed etiam omnia corporalia.
Homines autem sancti, etiam post hanc vitam, sunt eiusdem naturae
nobiscum. Unde secundum legem communem, non administrant humana,
nec rebus vivorum intersunt, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de cura
pro mortuis agenda. Ex quadam tamen speciali dispensatione interdum
aliquibus sanctis conceditur, vel vivis vel mortuis, huiusmodi
officia exercere, vel miracula faciendo, vel Daemones arcendo, vel
aliquid huiusmodi; sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons
                     are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32991] Iª q. 108 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod homines ad poenam Daemonum transferri, non est
erroneum, sed quidam erronee posuerunt Daemones nihil aliud esse
quam animas defunctorum. Et hoc Chrysostomus reprobat.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q109" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q109-p0.1">Q. 109. THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q109-p2"> We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q109-p3"><a href="#FP_Q109_A1"> (1) Whether there are orders among the demons?</a></p><p id="FP_Q109-p4"><a href="#FP_Q109_A2"> (2) Whether among them there is precedence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q109-p5"><a href="#FP_Q109_A3"> (3) Whether one enlightens another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q109-p6"><a href="#FP_Q109_A4"> (4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 pr."><a name="32992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32992]
Iª q. 109 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
ordinatione malorum Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
Primo, utrum ordines sint in Daemonibus. Secundo, utrum in eis sit
praelatio. Tertio, utrum unus illuminet alium. Quarto, utrum
subiiciantur praelationi bonorum Angelorum.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q109_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q109_A1-p0.1">Q. 109. A. 1. Whether there are orders among the demons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no orders among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine
                     says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels.
                     Therefore in the bad angels there are no orders.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32993] Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod ordines non sint in Daemonibus. Ordo enim
pertinet ad rationem boni, sicut et modus et species, ut Augustinus
dicit in libro de natura boni; et e contrario inordinatio pertinet
ad rationem mali. Sed in bonis Angelis nihil est inordinatum. Ergo
in malis Angelis non sunt aliqui ordines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a
                     holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32994] Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
ordines angelici sub aliqua hierarchia continentur. Sed Daemones
non sunt sub aliqua hierarchia, quae est sacer principatus, cum ab
omni sanctitate sint vacui. Ergo in Daemonibus non sunt
ordines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said
                     to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders.
                     But we never find that they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or "Dominations." Therefore on the same ground they are not
                     to be placed in any other order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32995] Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Daemones de singulis ordinibus Angelorum ceciderunt, ut communiter
dicitur. Si ergo aliqui Daemones dicuntur esse alicuius ordinis,
quia de illo ordine ceciderunt; videtur quod deberent eis attribui
nomina singulorum ordinum. Nunquam autem invenitur quod dicantur
Seraphim, vel throni, vel dominationes. Ergo, pari ratione, non
sunt in aliquibus ordinibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.12" target="asv">Eph. 6:12</a>): "Our wrestling . . . is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32996] Iª q. 109 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. ult., quod <i>est nobis colluctatio
adversus principes et potestates, adversus mundi rectores
tenebrarum harum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q109_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A4" id="FP_Q109_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[108], AA[4]</a>,7,8), order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according to that of grace. Now grace
                     has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q109_A1-p7"> If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic
                     orders, and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at the time in
                     the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above (
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q62_A3" id="FP_Q109_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are
                     still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 co."><a name="32997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32997] Iª q. 109 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut iam dictum est, ordo angelicus consideratur et secundum
gradum naturae, et secundum gradum gratiae. Gratia vero habet
duplicem statum, scilicet imperfectum, qui est status merendi; et
perfectum, qui est status gloriae consummatae. Si ergo
considerentur ordines angelici quantum ad perfectionem gloriae, sic
Daemones neque sunt in ordinibus angelicis, neque unquam fuerunt.
Si autem considerentur quantum ad id quod est gratiae imperfectae,
sic Daemones fuerunt quidem aliquando in ordinibus Angelorum, sed
ab eis ceciderunt; secundum illud quod supra posuimus, omnes
Angelos in gratia creatos fuisse. Si autem considerentur quantum ad
id quod est naturae, sic adhuc sunt in ordinibus, quia data
naturalia non amiserunt, ut Dionysius dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good (
                     <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q49_A3" id="FP_Q109_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[3]</a>); so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32998] Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod bonum potest inveniri sine malo; sed malum non potest
inveniri sine bono, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo Daemones,
inquantum habent naturam bonam, ordinati sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself;
                     but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32999] Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ordinatio Daemonum, si consideretur ex parte Dei
ordinantis, est sacra, utitur enim Daemonibus propter seipsum. Sed
ex parte voluntatis Daemonum, non est sacra, quia abutuntur sua
natura ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of charity; and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the name "Dominations"
                     imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33000] Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod nomen Seraphim imponitur ab ardore caritatis, nomen
autem thronorum ab inhabitatione divina, nomen autem dominationum
importat libertatem quandam, quae omnia opponuntur peccato. Et ideo
peccantibus Angelis huiusmodi nomina non attribuuntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q109_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q109_A2-p0.1">Q. 109. A. 2. Whether among the demons there is precedence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no precedence among the demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice. But
                     the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no precedence among them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33001] Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in Daemonibus non sit praelatio. Omnis
enim praelatio est secundum aliquem ordinem iustitiae. Sed Daemones
totaliter a iustitia ceciderunt. Ergo in eis non est praelatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is
                     not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among the proud there are always contentions" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.10" target="asv">Prov. 13:10</a>). Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33002] Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ubi
non est obedientia et subiectio, non est praelatio. Haec autem sine
concordia esse non possunt; quae in Daemonibus nulla est, secundum
illud Prov. XIII, <i>inter superbos semper sunt iurgia</i>. Ergo in
Daemonibus non est praelatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> If there be precedence among them it is either according to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not
                     according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according
                     to sin or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the
                     inferior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33003] Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
in eis est aliqua praelatio, aut hoc pertinet ad eorum naturam, aut
ad eorum culpam vel poenam. Sed non ad eorum naturam, quia
subiectio et servitus non est ex natura, sed est ex peccato
subsecuta. Nec pertinet ad culpam vel poenam, quia sic superiores
Daemones, qui magis peccaverunt, inferioribus subderentur. Non ergo
est praelatio in Daemonibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> On
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:24 </a>the gloss says: "While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33004] Iª q. 109 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Glossa, I ad Cor. XV, <i>quandiu durat mundus, Angeli
Angelis, homines hominibus, et Daemones Daemonibus
praesunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since action follows the nature of a thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each other.
                     Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and
                     movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109_A1" id="FP_Q109_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that the demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence
                     their actions are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean by precedence---that the action of the
                     subject should be under the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should
                     be authority among them. This agrees too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which "reacheth from end to
                     end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 co."><a name="33005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33005] Iª q. 109 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum actio sequatur naturam rei, quorumcumque naturae sunt
ordinatae, oportet quod etiam actiones sub invicem ordinentur.
Sicut patet in rebus corporalibus, quia enim inferiora corpora
naturali ordine sunt infra corpora caelestia actiones et motus
eorum subduntur actionibus et motibus caelestium corporum.
Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod Daemonum quidam naturali
ordine sub aliis constituuntur. Unde et actiones eorum sub
actionibus superiorum sunt. Et hoc est quod rationem praelationis
facit, ut scilicet actio subditi subdatur actioni praelati. Sic
igitur ipsa naturalis dispositio Daemonum requirit quod sit in eis
praelatio. Convenit etiam hoc divinae sapientiae, quae nihil in
universo inordinatum relinquit, <i>quae attingit a fine usque ad
finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter</i>, ut dicitur Sap.
VIII.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33006] Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod praelatio Daemonum non fundatur super eorum iustitia,
sed super iustitia Dei cuncta ordinantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness
                     whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those
                     whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33007] Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod concordia Daemonum, qua quidam aliis obediunt, non
est ex amicitia quam inter se habeant; sed ex communi nequitia, qua
homines odiunt, et Dei iustitiae repugnant. Est enim proprium
hominum impiorum, ut eis se adiungant et subiiciant, ad propriam
nequitiam exequendam, quos potiores viribus vident.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men,
                     who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather
                     to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in
                     evil is to be more unhappy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33008] Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Daemones non sunt aequales secundum naturam, unde in
eis est naturalis praelatio. Quod in hominibus non contingit, qui
natura sunt pares. Quod autem superioribus inferiores subdantur,
non est ad bonum superiorum, sed magis ad malum eorum; quia cum
mala facere maxime ad miseriam pertineat, praeesse in malis est
esse magis miserum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q109_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q109_A3-p0.1">Q. 109. A. 3. Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon
                     can manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten
                     the inferior.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33009] Iª q. 109 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in Daemonibus sit illuminatio. Illuminatio
enim consistit in manifestatione veritatis. Sed unus Daemon potest
alteri veritatem manifestare, quia superiores magis acumine
naturalis scientiae vigent. Ergo superiores Daemones possunt
inferiores illuminare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior
                     demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33010] Iª q. 109 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
corpus quod superabundat in lumine, potest illuminare corpus quod
in lumine deficit; sicut sol lunam. Sed superiores Daemones magis
abundant in participatione luminis naturalis. Ergo videtur quod
superiores Daemones possunt inferiores illuminare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting, as stated above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q109_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>). But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean by the unclean?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:4</a>). Therefore neither can they enlighten.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33011] Iª q. 109 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
illuminatio cum purgatione est et perfectione, ut supra dictum est.
Sed purgare non convenit Daemonibus; secundum illud Eccli. XXXIV,
<i>ab immundo quid mundabitur?</i> Ergo etiam neque illuminare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A2" id="FP_Q109_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[107], A[2]</a>), enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens every intellect.
                     Another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the demon's
                     perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the
                     Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of
                     speech.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 co."><a name="33012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33012] Iª q. 109 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod in Daemonibus non potest esse illuminatio proprie. Dictum est
enim supra quod illuminatio proprie est manifestatio veritatis,
secundum quod habet ordinem ad Deum, qui illuminat omnem
intellectum. Alia autem manifestatio veritatis potest esse locutio;
sicut cum unus Angelus alteri suum conceptum manifestat.
Perversitas autem Daemonum hoc habet, quod unus alium non intendit
ordinare ad Deum, sed magis ab ordine divino abducere. Et ideo unus
Daemon alium non illuminat; sed unus alii suum conceptum per modum
locutionis intimare potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is above described.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33013] Iª q. 109 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod non quaelibet veritatis manifestatio habet rationem
illuminationis, sed solum quae dicta est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or
                     in the demons, because, as above explained (
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A2" id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[58], A[2]</a>;
                     <a href="#FP_Q79_A2" id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[79], A[2]</a>), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior
                     demons does not prove that they can enlighten
                     others.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33014] Iª q. 109 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod secundum ea quae ad naturalem cognitionem pertinent,
non est necessaria manifestatio veritatis neque in Angelis neque in
Daemonibus, quia, sicut supra dictum est, statim a principio suae
conditionis omnia cognoverunt quae ad naturalem cognitionem
pertinent. Et ideo maior plenitudo naturalis luminis quae est in
superioribus Daemonibus, non potest esse ratio illuminationis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q109_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q109_A4-p0.1">Q. 109. A. 4. Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially connected
                     with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels
                     do not rule over the bad.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33015] Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod boni Angeli non habeant praelationem super
malos. Praelatio enim Angelorum praecipue attenditur secundum
illuminationes. Sed mali Angeli, cum sint tenebrae, non
illuminantur a bonis. Ergo boni Angeli non habent praelationem
super malos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil.
                     Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot
                     be admitted.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33016] Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad
negligentiam praesidentis pertinere videntur ea quae per subditos
male fiunt. Sed Daemones multa mala faciunt. Si igitur subsunt
praelationi bonorum Angelorum, videtur in Angelis bonis esse aliqua
negligentia. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of nature, as above explained
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109_A2" id="FP_Q109_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the
                     natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33017] Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
praelatio Angelorum sequitur naturae ordinem, ut supra dictum est.
Sed si Daemones de singulis ordinibus ceciderunt, ut communiter
dicitur, multi Daemones multis bonis Angelis sunt superiores ordine
naturae. Non ergo boni Angeli praelationem habent super omnes
malos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just
                     spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that "the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33018] Iª q. 109 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod <i>spiritus vitae
desertor atque peccator regitur per spiritum vitae rationalem, pium
et iustum</i>. Et Gregorius dicit quod <i>potestates dicuntur
Angeli quorum ditioni virtutes adversae subiectae sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The whole order of precedence is first and originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer
                     to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection
                     and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection
                     the demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence over the
                     bad, and these are ruled by them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 co."><a name="33019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33019] Iª q. 109 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod totus ordo praelationis primo et originaliter est in Deo, et
participatur a creaturis secundum quod Deo magis appropinquant,
illae enim creaturae super alias influentiam habent, quae sunt
perfectiores et Deo propinquiores. Maxima autem perfectio, et per
quam maxime Deo appropinquatur, est creaturarum fruentium Deo,
sicut sunt sancti Angeli, qua perfectione Daemones privantur. Et
ideo boni Angeli super malos praelationem habent, et per eos
reguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice
                     requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's
                     assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can be called
                     an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an
                     enlightenment on the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33020] Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod per sanctos Angelos multa de divinis mysteriis
Daemonibus revelantur, cum divina iustitia exigit ut per Daemones
aliqua fiant vel ad punitionem malorum, vel ad exercitationem
bonorum, sicut in rebus humanis assessores iudicis revelant
tortoribus eius sententiam. Huiusmodi autem revelationes, si ad
Angelos revelantes comparentur, illuminationes sunt, quia ordinant
eas ad Deum. Ex parte vero Daemonum, non sunt illuminationes, quia
eas in Deum non ordinant, sed ad expletionem propriae
iniquitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels
                     or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33021] Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod sancti Angeli sunt ministri divinae sapientiae. Unde
sicut divina sapientia permittit aliqua mala fieri per malos
Angelos vel homines, propter bona quae ex eis elicit; ita et boni
Angeli non totaliter cohibent malos a nocendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the
                     power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise
                     among men, "the spiritual man judgeth all things" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:15</a>), and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33022] Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Angelus qui est inferior ordine naturae, praeest
Daemonibus, quamvis superioribus ordine naturae; quia virtus
divinae iustitiae, cui inhaerent boni Angeli, potior est quam
virtus naturalis Angelorum. Unde et apud homines, spiritualis
iudicat omnia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II. Et philosophus dicit, in
libro Ethic., quod <i>virtuosus est regula et mensura omnium
humanorum actuum</i>.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q110" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q110-p0.1">Q. 110. HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q110-p2"> We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q110-p3"><a href="#FP_Q110_A1"> (1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q110-p4"><a href="#FP_Q110_A2"> (2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q110-p5"><a href="#FP_Q110_A3"> (3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally?</a></p><p id="FP_Q110-p6"><a href="#FP_Q110_A4"> (4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 pr."><a name="33023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33023]
Iª q. 110 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
praesidentia Angelorum super creaturam corporalem. Et circa hoc
quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum creatura corporalis administretur
per Angelos. Secundo, utrum creatura corporalis obediat Angelis ad
nutum. Tertio, utrum Angeli sua virtute possint immediate movere
corpora localiter. Quarto, utrum Angeli boni vel mali possint
facere miracula.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q110_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q110_A1-p0.1">Q. 110. A. 1. Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action,
                     needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal
                     things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the government
                     of angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33024] Iª q. 110 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis non administretur per
Angelos. Res enim quae habent determinatum modum operandi, non
indigent gubernari ab aliquo praesidente, ideo enim indigemus
gubernari, ne aliter operemur quam oporteat. Sed res corporales
habent determinatas actiones ex naturis sibi divinitus datis. Non
ergo indigent gubernatione Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore
                     they need not be governed by the angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33025] Iª q. 110 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
inferiora in entibus gubernantur per superiora. Sed in corporibus
quaedam dicuntur inferiora, quaedam superiora. Inferiora igitur
gubernantur per superiora. Non ergo est necessarium quod
gubernentur per Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled
                     by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So also there would be as many orders
                     of angels as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A2" id="FP_Q110_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[108], A[2]</a>). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33026] Iª q. 110 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
diversi ordines Angelorum distinguuntur secundum diversa officia.
Sed si creaturae corporales administrantur per Angelos, tot erunt
officia Angelorum, quot sunt species rerum. Ergo etiam tot erunt
ordines Angelorum, quot sunt species rerum. Quod est contra supra
dicta. Non ergo corporalis creatura administratur per Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial. iv,
                     6), that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33027] Iª q. 110 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod <i>omnia corpora reguntur
per spiritum vitae rationalem</i>. Et Gregorius dicit, in IV Dial.,
quod <i>in hoc mundo visibili nihil nisi per creaturam invisibilem
disponi potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the
                     universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained
                     above (
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A3" id="FP_Q110_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a> ;
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A1" id="FP_Q110_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[108], A[1]</a>), the superior angels who preside over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power
                     of
                     any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized
                     by matter, and determined to the "here and now"; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the
                     inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels.
                     This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal
                     substances.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 co."><a name="33028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33028] Iª q. 110 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod tam in rebus humanis quam in rebus naturalibus, hoc communiter
invenitur, quod potestas particularis gubernatur et regitur a
potestate universali; sicut potestas ballivi gubernatur per
potestatem regis. Et in Angelis etiam est dictum quod superiores
Angeli, qui praesunt inferioribus, habent scientiam magis
universalem. Manifestum est autem quod virtus cuiuslibet corporis
est magis particularis quam virtus spiritualis substantiae, nam
omnis forma corporalis est forma individuata per materiam, et
determinata ad hic et nunc; formae autem immateriales sunt
absolutae et intelligibiles. Et ideo sicut inferiores Angeli, qui
habent formas minus universales, reguntur per superiores; ita omnia
corporalia reguntur per Angelos et hoc non solum a sanctis
doctoribus ponitur, sed etiam ab omnibus philosophis qui
incorporeas substantias posuerunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it belongs
                     to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33029] Iª q. 110 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod res corporales habent determinatas actiones, sed has
actiones non exercent nisi secundum quod moventur, quia proprium
corporis est quod non agat nisi motum. Et ideo oportet quod
creatura corporalis a spirituali moveatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved
                     by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly
                     bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps
                     human souls; and this was because he did not consider that any
                     operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed.
                     But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the
                     movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate
                     presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33030] Iª q. 110 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ratio ista procedit secundum opinionem Aristotelis,
qui posuit quod corpora caelestia moventur a substantiis
spiritualibus; quarum numerum conatus fuit assignare secundum
numerum motuum qui apparent in corporibus caelestibus. Sed non
posuit quod essent aliquae substantiae spirituales quae haberent
immediatam praesidentiam supra inferiora corpora, nisi forte animas
humanas. Et hoc ideo, quia non consideravit aliquas operationes in
inferioribus corporibus exerceri nisi naturales, ad quas
sufficiebat motus corporum caelestium. Sed quia nos ponimus multa
in corporibus inferioribus fieri praeter naturales actiones
corporum, ad quae non sufficiunt virtutes caelestium corporum; ideo
secundum nos, necesse est ponere quod Angeli habeant immediatam
praesidentiam non solum supra caelestia corpora, sed etiam supra
corpora inferiora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q110_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were
                     types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances
                     preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial
                     substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more
                     universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents,
                     the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to
                     preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these
                     sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial
                     substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the "active intelligence."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q110_A1-p10"> The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine
                     says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide
                     Orth. ii, 4): "The devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order"; and Origen says on the text,
                     "When the ass saw the angel" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q110_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Num.22.23" target="asv">Num. 22:23</a>), that "the world has need of angels who
                     preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things" (Hom.
                     xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than
                     over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal things:
                     the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does it follow
                     that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A2" id="FP_Q110_A1-p10.2" shape="rect">Q[108], A[2]</a>), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose proper office
                     it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the "powers"; so to the order of the "virtues" do those angels seem to
                     belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33031] Iª q. 110 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod de substantiis immaterialibus diversimode philosophi
sunt locuti. Plato enim posuit substantias immateriales esse
rationes et species sensibilium corporum, et quasdam aliis
universaliores, et ideo posuit substantias immateriales habere
praesidentiam immediatam circa omnia sensibilia corpora, et
diversas circa diversa. Aristoteles autem posuit quod substantiae
immateriales non sunt species corporum sensibilium, sed aliquid
altius et universalius, et ideo non attribuit eis immediatam
praesidentiam supra singula corpora, sed solum supra universalia
agentia, quae sunt corpora caelestia. Avicenna vero mediam viam
secutus est. Posuit enim cum Platone, aliquam substantiam
spiritualem praesidentem immediate sphaerae activorum et
passivorum; eo quod, sicut Plato ponebat quod formae horum
sensibilium derivantur a substantiis immaterialibus, ita etiam
Avicenna hoc posuit. Sed in hoc a Platone differt, quod posuit unam
tantum substantiam immaterialem praesidentem omnibus corporibus
inferioribus, quam vocavit intelligentiam agentem. Doctores autem
sancti posuerunt, sicut et Platonici, diversis rebus corporeis
diversas substantias spirituales esse praepositas. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>unaquaeque res
visibilis in hoc mundo habet angelicam potestatem sibi
praepositam</i>. Et Damascenus dicit, <i>Diabolus erat ex iis
angelicis virtutibus quae praeerant terrestri ordini</i>. Et
Origenes dicit, super illud Num. XXII, <i>cum vidisset asina
Angelum, quod opus est mundo Angelis, qui praesunt super bestias,
et praesunt animalium nativitati, et virgultorum et plantationum et
ceterarum rerum incrementis</i>. Sed hoc non est ponendum propter
hoc, quod secundum suam naturam unus Angelus magis se habeat ad
praesidendum animalibus quam plantis, quia quilibet Angelus, etiam
minimus, habet altiorem virtutem et universaliorem quam aliquod
genus corporalium. Sed est ex ordine divinae sapientiae, quae
diversis rebus diversos rectores praeposuit. Nec tamen propter hoc
sequitur quod sint plures ordines Angelorum quam novem, quia, sicut
supra dictum est, ordines distinguuntur secundum generalia officia.
Unde sicut, secundum Gregorium, ad ordinem potestatum pertinent
omnes Angeli qui habent proprie praesidentiam super Daemones; ita
ad ordinem virtutum pertinere videntur omnes Angeli qui habent
praesidentiam super res pure corporeas; horum enim ministerio
interdum etiam miracula fiunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q110_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q110_A2-p0.1">Q. 110. A. 2. Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul.
                     But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards
                     heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception
                     of an angel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33032] Iª q. 110 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod materia corporalis obediat Angelis ad
nutum. Maior est enim virtus Angeli quam virtus animae. Sed
conceptioni animae obedit materia corporalis, immutatur enim corpus
hominis ex conceptione animae, ad calorem et frigus, et quandoque
usque ad sanitatem et aegritudinem. Ergo multo magis secundum
conceptionem Angeli, materia corporalis transmutatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior
                     to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore
                     much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33033] Iª q. 110 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest virtus superior. Sed virtus
Angeli est superior quam virtus corporalis. Corpus autem sua
virtute potest transmutare materiam corporalem ad formam aliquam;
sicut cum ignis generat ignem. Ergo multo fortius virtute sua
Angeli possunt materiam corporalem transmutare ad aliquam
formam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q110_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in
                     effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the
                     instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to
                     the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to
                     the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is
                     from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects,
                     is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33034] Iª q. 110 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, tota
natura corporalis administratur per Angelos, ut dictum est, et sic
videtur quod corpora se habet ad Angelos sicut instrumenta; nam
ratio instrumenti est quod sit movens motum. Sed in effectibus
aliquid invenitur ex virtute principalium agentium, quod non potest
esse per virtutem instrumenti; et hoc est id quod est principalius
in effectu. Sicut digestio nutrimenti est per virtutem caloris
naturalis, qui est instrumentum animae nutritivae; sed quod
generetur caro viva, est ex virtute animae. Similiter quod secetur
lignum, pertinet ad serram; sed quod perveniatur ad formam lecti,
est ex ratione artis. Ergo forma substantialis, quae est
principalius in effectibus corporalibus, est ex virtute Angelorum.
Materia ergo obedit, ad sui informationem, Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33035] Iª q. 110 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., <i>non est putandum istis
transgressoribus Angelis ad nutum servire hanc visibilium rerum
materiam, sed soli Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q110_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p. 218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial
                     forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion
                     to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the "intellect"; and that corporeal
                     agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on
                     this point, through supposing a form to be something made "per se," so that it would be the effect of a formal principle.
                     But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the "composite": for this properly
                     speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something
                     is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but
                     the way to existence.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q110_A2-p7"> Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural
                     things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole
                     "composite" as to both matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every informing of matter
                     is either immediately from God, or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 co."><a name="33036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33036] Iª q. 110 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Platonici posuerunt formas quae sunt in materia, causari ex
immaterialibus formis, quia formas materiales ponebant esse
participationes quasdam immaterialium formarum. Et hos, quantum ad
aliquid, secutus est Avicenna, qui posuit omnes formas quae sunt in
materia, procedere a conceptione intelligentiae, et quod agentia
corporalia sunt solum disponentia ad formas. Qui in hoc videntur
fuisse decepti, quia existimaverunt formam quasi aliquid per se
factum, ut sic ab aliquo formali principio procederet. Sed sicut
philosophus probat in VII Metaphys., hoc quod proprie fit, est
compositum, hoc enim proprie est quasi subsistens. Forma autem non
dicitur ens quasi ipsa sit, sed sicut quo aliquid est, et sic per
consequens nec forma proprie fit; eius enim est fieri, cuius est
esse, cum fieri nihil aliud sit quam via in esse. Manifestum est
autem quod factum est simile facienti, quia omne agens agit sibi
simile. Et ideo id quod facit res naturales, habet similitudinem
cum composito, vel quia est compositum, sicut ignis generat ignem;
vel quia totum compositum, et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad
formam, est in virtute ipsius; quod est proprium Dei. Sic igitur
omnis informatio materiae vel est a Deo immediate, vel ab aliquo
agente corporali; non autem immediate ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's
                     concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject
                     to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does
                     not hold.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33037] Iª q. 110 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod anima nostra unitur corpori ut forma; et sic non est
mirum, si formaliter transmutatur ex conceptione ipsius; praesertim
cum motus sensitivi appetitus, qui fit cum quadam transmutatione
corporali, subdatur imperio rationis. Angelus autem non sic se
habet ad corpora naturalia. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example,
                     the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter
                     in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior
                     cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33038] Iª q. 110 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod id quod potest virtus inferior, potest superior non
eodem, sed excellentiori modo, sicut intellectus cognoscit
sensibilia excellentiori modo quam sensus. Et sic Angelus
excellentiori modo transmutat materiam corporalem quam agentia
corporalia, scilicet movendo ipsa agentia corporalia, tanquam causa
superior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would
                     not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating
                     the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since
                     to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the
                     power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33039] Iª q. 110 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod nihil prohibet ex virtute Angelorum aliquos effectus
sequi in rebus naturalibus, ad quae agentia corporalia non
sufficerent. Sed hoc non est obedire materiam Angelis ad nutum;
sicut nec coquis obedit materia ad nutum, quia aliquem modum
decoctionis operantur per ignem secundum aliquam artis
moderationem, quam ignis per se non faceret, cum reducere materiam
in actum formae substantialis, non excedat virtutem corporalis
agentis, quia simile natum est sibi simile facere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q110_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q110_A3-p0.1">Q. 110. A. 3. Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their
                     forms. But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q110_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33040] Iª q. 110 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod corpora non obediant Angelis ad motum
localem. Motus enim localis corporum naturalium sequitur formas
eorum. Sed Angeli non causant formas corporum naturalium, ut dictum
est. Ergo neque possunt causare in eis motum localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause
                     other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they cause local motion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33041] Iª q. 110 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
VIII Physic. probatur quod motus localis est primus motuum. Sed
Angeli non possunt causare alios motus, transmutando materiam
formaliter. Ergo neque etiam possunt causare motum localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle
                     of life. In natural bodies, however, there is not vital principle. Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33042] Iª q. 110 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
membra corporalia obediunt conceptioni animae ad motum localem,
inquantum habent in seipsis aliquod principium vitae. In corporibus
autem naturalibus non est aliquod principium vitae. Ergo non
obediunt Angelis ad motum localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this
                     without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33043] Iª q. 110 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod Angeli adhibent semina
corporalia ad aliquos effectus producendos. Sed hoc non possunt
facere nisi localiter movendo. Ergo corpora obediunt eis ad motum
localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second." Hence
                     it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is
                     below the spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves
                     (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in
                     potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic---that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has
                     a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted
                     that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body first and
                     chiefly by a local motion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 co."><a name="33044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33044] Iª q. 110 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut Dionysius dicit VII cap. de Div. Nom., <i>divina
sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum</i>, ex
quo patet quod natura inferior in sui supremo attingitur a natura
superiori. Natura autem corporalis est infra naturam spiritualem.
Inter omnes autem motus corporeos perfectior est motus localis, ut
probatur in VIII Physic., cuius ratio est, quia mobile secundum
locum non est in potentia ad aliquid intrinsecum, inquantum
huiusmodi, sed solum ad aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet ad locum. Et
ideo natura corporalis nata est moveri immediate a natura
spirituali secundum locum. Unde et philosophi posuerunt suprema
corpora moveri localiter a spiritualibus substantiis. Unde videmus
quod anima movet corpus primo et principaliter locali motu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the
                     sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements
                     result from the power of spiritual substances.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33045] Iª q. 110 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod in corporibus sunt alii motus locales praeter eos qui
consequuntur formas, sicut fluxus et refluxus maris non consequitur
formam substantialem aquae, sed virtutem lunae. Et multo magis
aliqui motus locales consequi possunt virtutem spiritualium
substantiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing corporeal
                     agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33046] Iª q. 110 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Angeli, causando motum localem tanquam priorem, per
eum causare possunt alios motus, adhibendo scilicet agentia
corporalia ad huiusmodi effectus producendos; sicut faber adhibet
ignem ad emollitionem ferri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the
                     body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel's power is not limited to
                     any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33047] Iª q. 110 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Angeli habent virtutem minus contractam quam animae.
Unde virtus motiva animae contrahitur ad corpus unitum, quod per
eam vivificatur, quo mediante alia potest movere. Sed virtus Angeli
non est contracta ad aliquod corpus. Unde potest corpora non
coniuncta localiter movere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q110_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q110_A4-p0.1">Q. 110. A. 4. Whether angels can work miracles?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues
                     by whom signs and miracles are usually done."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33048] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli possunt facere miracula. Dicit enim
Gregorius, <i>virtutes vocantur illi spiritus, per quos signa et
miracula frequentius fiunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice,
                     bad Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he
                     says elsewhere in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore
                     the demons can work miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33049] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaestionum, <i>quod
magi faciunt miracula per privatos contractus, boni Christiani per
publicam iustitiam, mali Christiani per signa publicae
iustitiae</i>. Sed magi faciunt miracula per hoc quod exaudiuntur a
Daemonibus, ut ipse alibi in eodem libro dicit. Ergo Daemones
miracula possunt facere. Ergo multo magis Angeli boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]
                     that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in
                     our atmosphere." But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle,
                     as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature.
                     Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33050] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus in eodem libro dicit quod <i>omnia quae visibiliter
fiunt, etiam per inferiores potestates aeris huius non absurde
fieri posse creduntur</i>. Sed quando effectus aliquis naturalium
causarum producitur absque ordine naturalis causae, hoc dicimus
esse miraculum; puta cum aliquis sanatur a febre, non per
operationem naturae. Ergo Angeli et Daemones possunt facere
miracula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore
                     an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="33051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33051] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
virtus superior non subditur ordini inferioris causae. Sed natura
corporalis est inferior Angelo. Ergo Angelus potest operari praeter
ordinem corporalium agentium. Quod est miracula facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written of God (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q110_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.135.4" target="asv">Ps. 135:4</a>): "Who alone doth great wonders."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33052] Iª q. 110 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod de Deo dicitur in Psalmo, <i>qui facit mirabilia magna
solus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if
                     something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone
                     upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a miracle is required that it be against the order
                     of the whole created nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or
                     any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence
                     God alone can work miracles.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 co."><a name="33053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33053] Iª q. 110 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod miraculum proprie dicitur, cum aliquid fit praeter ordinem
naturae. Sed non sufficit ad rationem miraculi si aliquid fiat
praeter ordinem naturae alicuius particularis, quia sic, cum
aliquis proiicit lapidem sursum, miraculum faceret, cum hoc sit
praeter ordinem naturae lapidis. Ex hoc ergo aliquid dicitur esse
miraculum, quod fit praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Hoc
autem non potest facere nisi Deus, quia quidquid facit Angelus, vel
quaecumque alia creatura, propria virtute, hoc fit secundum ordinem
naturae creatae; et sic non est miraculum. Unde relinquitur quod
solus Deus miracula facere possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some angels are said to work miracles; either because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are
                     said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the
                     dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33054] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Angeli aliqui dicuntur miracula facere, vel quia ad
eorum desiderium Deus miracula facit, sicut et sancti homines
dicuntur miracula facere. Vel quia aliquod ministerium exhibent in
miraculis quae fiunt; sicut colligendo pulveres in resurrectione
communi, vel huiusmodi aliquid agendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature.
                     But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created
                     nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own
                     natural power, these things are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in
                     reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by "private
                     contracts," forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in
                     a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On the
                     other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far
                     as
                     they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the "signs of public
                     justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33055] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod miracula simpliciter loquendo, dicuntur, ut dictum
est, cum aliqua fiunt praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Sed
quia non omnis virtus naturae creatae est nota nobis, ideo cum
aliquid fit praeter ordinem naturae creatae nobis notae, per
virtutem creatam nobis ignotam, est miraculum quoad nos. Sic igitur
cum Daemones aliquid faciunt sua virtute naturali, miracula
dicuntur non simpliciter, sed quoad nos. Et hoc modo magi per
Daemones miracula faciunt. Et dicuntur fieri per privatos
contractus, quia quaelibet virtus creaturae in universo se habet ut
virtus alicuius privatae personae in civitate; unde cum magus
aliquid facit per pactum initum cum Daemone, hoc fit quasi per
quendam privatum contractum. Sed iustitia divina est in toto
universo sicut lex publica in civitate. Et ideo boni Christiani,
inquantum per iustitiam divinam miracula faciunt, dicuntur facere
miracula per publicam iustitiam. Mali autem Christiani per signa
publicae iustitiae, sicut invocando nomen Christi, vel exhibendo
aliqua sacramenta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33056] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod spirituales potestates possunt facere ea quae
visibiliter fiunt in hoc mundo, adhibendo corporalia semina per
motum localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside
                     the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="33057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33057] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, licet Angeli possint aliquid facere praeter ordinem
naturae corporalis, non tamen possunt aliquid facere praeter
ordinem totius creaturae, quod exigitur ad rationem miraculi, ut
dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q111" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q111-p0.1">Q. 111. THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q111-p2"> We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power;
                  (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men.
               </p><p id="FP_Q111-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q111-p4"><a href="#FP_Q111_A1"> (1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q111-p5"><a href="#FP_Q111_A2"> (2) Whether he can change man's will?</a></p><p id="FP_Q111-p6"><a href="#FP_Q111_A3"> (3) Whether he can change man's imagination?</a></p><p id="FP_Q111-p7"><a href="#FP_Q111_A4"> (4) Whether he can change man's senses?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 pr."><a name="33058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33058]
Iª q. 111 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de actione
Angelorum in homines. Et primo, quantum possint eos immutare sua
virtute naturali; secundo, quomodo mittantur a Deo ad ministerium
hominum; tertio, quomodo custodiant homines. Circa primum
quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Angelus possit illuminare
intellectum hominis. Secundo, utrum possit immutare affectum eius.
Tertio, utrum possit immutare imaginationem eius. Quarto, utrum
possit immutare sensum eius.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q111_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q111_A1-p0.1">Q. 111. A. 1. Whether an angel can enlighten man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes
                     enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But faith is immediately from God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." Therefore man is not enlightened
                     by an angel; but immediately by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33059] Iª q. 111 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit illuminare hominem.
Homo enim illuminatur per fidem, unde Dionysius, in Eccles. Hier.,
illuminationem attribuit Baptismo, qui est fidei sacramentum. Sed
fides immediate est a Deo; secundum illud ad Ephes. II, <i>gratia
estis salvati per fidem, et non ex vobis; Dei enim donum est</i>.
Ergo homo non illuminatur ab Angelo, sed immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv">Rom. 1:19</a>), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed
                     them by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God---that is, natural reason and the creature.
                     Therefore God enlightens man immediately.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33060] Iª q. 111 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
super illud Rom. I, <i>Deus illis manifestavit</i>, dicit Glossa
quod <i>non solum ratio naturalis ad hoc profuit ut divina
hominibus manifestarentur, sed etiam Deus illis revelavit per opus
suum</i>, scilicet per creaturam. Sed utrumque est a Deo immediate,
scilicet ratio naturalis, et creatura. Ergo Deus immediate
illuminat hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels.
                     Therefore he is not enlightened by them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33061] Iª q. 111 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quicumque illuminatur, cognoscit suam illuminationem. Sed homines
non percipiunt se ab Angelis illuminari. Ergo non illuminantur ab
eis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But
                     such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q111_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A2" id="FP_Q111_A1-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[107], A[2]</a>). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33062] Iª q. 111 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Dionysius probat, in IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod revelationes
divinorum perveniunt ad homines mediantibus Angelis. Huiusmodi
autem revelationes sunt illuminationes, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
homines illuminantur per Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q111_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109_A2" id="FP_Q111_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[109], A[2]</a>); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q111_A1-p7"> The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above
                     (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q111_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect
                     is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior
                     intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby.
                     This takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity
                     of the inferior angel, as explained above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q111_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q111_A1-p8"> The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand
                     by turning to the phantasms, as above explained (
                     <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q111_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius
                     says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of
                     the sacred veils." On the
                     other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these two
                     ways man is enlightened by an angel.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 co."><a name="33063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33063] Iª q. 111 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum divinae providentiae ordo habeat ut actionibus superiorum
inferiora subdantur, ut supra dictum est; sicut inferiores Angeli
illuminantur per superiores, ita homines qui sunt Angelis
inferiores, per eos illuminantur. Sed modus utriusque
illuminationis quodammodo est similis, et quodammodo diversus.
Dictum est enim supra quod illuminatio, quae est manifestatio
divinae veritatis, secundum duo attenditur, scilicet secundum quod
intellectus inferior confortatur per actionem intellectus
superioris; et secundum quod proponuntur intellectui inferiori
species intelligibiles quae sunt in superiori, ut capi possint ab
inferiori. Et hoc quidem in Angelis fit, secundum quod superior
Angelus veritatem universalem conceptam dividit secundum
capacitatem inferioris Angeli, ut supra dictum est. Sed intellectus
humanus non potest ipsam intelligibilem veritatem nudam capere,
quia connaturale est ei ut intelligat per conversionem ad
phantasmata, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo intelligibilem veritatem
proponunt Angeli hominibus sub similitudinibus sensibilium;
secundum illud quod dicit Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod
<i>impossibile est aliter nobis lucere divinum radium, nisi
varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum</i>. Ex alia vero parte,
intellectus humanus, tanquam inferior, fortificatur per actionem
intellectus angelici. Et secundum haec duo attenditur illuminatio
qua homo illuminatur ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will
                     tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded
                     by the will; hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly." In this respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly,
                     faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is
                     accomplished by man, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.17" target="asv">Rom. 10:17</a>, "Faith cometh by hearing"; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels
                     have some part in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be
                     believed; but also as regards what is to be done.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33064] Iª q. 111 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ad fidem duo concurrunt. Primo quidem habitus
intellectus, quo disponitur ad obediendum voluntati tendenti in
divinam veritatem, intellectus enim assentit veritati fidei, non
quasi convictus ratione, sed quasi imperatus a voluntate; nullus
enim credit nisi volens, ut Augustinus dicit. Et quantum ad hoc,
fides est a solo Deo. Secundo requiritur ad fidem, quod credibilia
proponantur credenti. Et hoc quidem fit per hominem, secundum quod
fides est ex auditu, ut dicitur Rom. X; sed per Angelos
principaliter, per quos hominibus revelantur divina. Unde Angeli
operantur aliquid ad illuminationem fidei. Et tamen homines
illuminantur ab Angelis non solum de credendis, sed etiam de
agendis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the
                     human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures.
                     Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33065] Iª q. 111 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ratio naturalis, quae est immediate a Deo, potest per
Angelum confortari, ut dictum est. Et similiter ex speciebus a
creaturis acceptis, tanto altior elicitur intelligibilis veritas,
quanto intellectus humanus fuerit fortior. Et sic per Angelum
adiuvatur homo, ut ex creaturis perfectius in divinam cognitionem
deveniat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood; thus
                     whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made
                     known to him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows
                     what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like
                     manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33066] Iª q. 111 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod operatio intellectualis, et illuminatio, dupliciter
possunt considerari. Uno modo, ex parte rei intellectae, et sic
quicumque intelligit vel illuminatur, cognoscit se intelligere vel
illuminari; quia cognoscit rem sibi esse manifestam. Alio modo, ex
parte principii, et sic non quicumque intelligit aliquam veritatem,
cognoscit quid sit intellectus, qui est principium intellectualis
operationis. Et similiter non quicumque illuminatur ab Angelo,
cognoscit se ab Angelo illuminari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q111_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q111_A2-p0.1">Q. 111. A. 2. Whether the angels can change the will of man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels can change the will of man. For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers
                     a flame of fire" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.7" target="asv">Heb. 1:7</a>), the gloss notes that "they are fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices." This could not be, however,
                     unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33067] Iª q. 111 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli possint immutare voluntatem
hominis. Quia super illud Heb. I, <i>qui facit Angelos suos
spiritus, et ministros suos flammam ignis</i>, dicit Glossa quod
<i>ignis sunt, dum spiritu fervent, et vitia nostra urunt</i>. Sed
hoc non esset, nisi voluntatem immutarent. Ergo Angeli possunt
immutare voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." Damascene, however,
                     says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and
                     put into men" (De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could
                     only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is changed by them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33068] Iª q. 111 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Beda
dicit quod <i>Diabolus non est immissor malarum cogitationum, sed
incensor</i>. Damascenus autem ulterius dicit quod etiam est
immissor, dicit enim in II libro, quod <i>omnis malitia et immundae
passiones ex Daemonibus excogitatae sunt, et immittere homini sunt
concessi</i>. Et pari ratione, Angeli boni immittunt et incendunt
bonas cogitationes. Sed hoc non possent facere, nisi immutarent
voluntatem. Ergo immutant voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination
                     which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also
                     is a faculty using a corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33069] Iª q. 111 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Angelus, sicut est dictum, illuminat intellectum hominis
mediantibus phantasmatibus. Sed sicut phantasia, quae deservit
intellectui, potest immutari ab Angelo; ita et appetitus sensitivus
qui deservit voluntati, quia et ipse etiam est vis utens organo
corporali. Ergo sicut illuminat intellectum, ita potest immutare
voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> To change the will belongs to God alone, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.1" target="asv"> Prov. 21:1</a>: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33070] Iª q. 111 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod immutare voluntatem est proprium Dei; secundum illud Prov.
XXI, <i>cor regis in manu domini; quocumque voluerit, vertet
illud</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q111_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the
                     inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination
                     to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the
                     will is from God alone, Who causes the will.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q111_A2-p7"> Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can be only in one way---by the good apprehended by the
                     intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move
                     the will. In this way also God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion,
                     as above explained (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A2" id="FP_Q111_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[2]</a>).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q111_A2-p8"> In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing in the
                     sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. In this manner the angels, as being
                     able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or
                     to resist, the passion.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 co."><a name="33071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33071] Iª q. 111 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod voluntas potest immutari dupliciter. Uno modo, ab interiori.
Et sic cum motus voluntatis non sit aliud quam inclinatio
voluntatis in rem volitam, solius Dei est sic immutare voluntatem,
qui dat naturae intellectuali virtutem talis inclinationis. Sicut
enim inclinatio naturalis non est nisi a Deo qui dat naturam; ita
inclinatio voluntaria non est nisi a Deo, qui causat voluntatem.
Alio modo movetur voluntas ab exteriori. Et hoc in Angelo est
quidem uno modo tantum, scilicet a bono apprehenso per intellectum.
Unde secundum quod aliquis est causa quod aliquid apprehendatur ut
bonum ad appetendum, secundum hoc movet voluntatem. Et sic etiam
solus Deus efficaciter potest movere voluntatem; Angelus autem et
homo per modum suadentis, ut supra dictum est. Sed praeter hunc
modum, etiam aliter movetur in hominibus voluntas ab exteriori,
scilicet ex passione existente circa appetitum sensitivum; sicut ex
concupiscentia vel ira inclinatur voluntas ad aliquid volendum. Et
sic etiam Angeli, inquantum possunt concitare huiusmodi passiones,
possunt voluntatem movere. Non tamen ex necessitate, quia voluntas
semper remanet libera ad consentiendum vel resistendum
passioni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33072] Iª q. 111 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ministri Dei, vel homines vel Angeli, dicuntur urere
vitia, et inflammare ad virtutes, per modum persuasionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject
                     to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of
                     the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because
                     such a work is accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher
                     principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33073] Iª q. 111 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Daemones non possunt immittere cogitationes, interius
eas causando, cum usus cogitativae virtutis subiaceat voluntati.
Dicitur tamen Diabolus incensor cogitationum, inquantum incitat ad
cogitandum, vel ad appetendum cogitata, per modum persuadentis, vel
passionem concitantis. Et hoc ipsum incendere Damascenus vocat
immittere, quia talis operatio interius fit. Sed bonae cogitationes
attribuuntur altiori principio, scilicet Deo; licet Angelorum
ministerio procurentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something
                     following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33074] Iª q. 111 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod intellectus humanus, secundum praesentem statum, non
potest intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata; sed voluntas
humana potest aliquid velle ex iudicio rationis, non sequendo
passionem appetitus sensitivi. Unde non est simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q111_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q111_A3-p0.1">Q. 111. A. 3. Whether an angel can change man's imagination?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot change man's imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De Anima iii, is "a motion caused
                     by the sense in act." But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it
                     is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33075] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit immutare imaginationem
hominis. Phantasia enim, ut dicitur in libro de anima, est motus
factus a sensu secundum actum. Sed si fieret per immutationem
Angeli, non fieret a sensu secundum actum. Ergo est contra rationem
phantasiae, quae est actus imaginativae virtutis, ut sit per
immutationem Angeli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But
                     an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q111_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>). Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33076] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
formae quae sunt in imaginatione, cum sint spirituales, sunt
nobiliores formis quae sunt in materia sensibili. Sed Angelus non
potest imprimere formas in materia sensibili, ut dictum est. Ergo
non potest imprimere formas in imaginatione. Et ita non potest eam
immutare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to
                     the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other."
                     But it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge
                     of an angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33077] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>commixtione
alterius spiritus fieri potest ut ea quae ipse scit, per huiusmodi
imagines ei cui miscetur ostendat, sive intelligenti, sive ut ab
alio intellecta pandantur</i>. Sed non videtur quod Angelus possit
misceri imaginationi humanae; neque quod imaginatio possit capere
intelligibilia, quae Angelus cognoscit. Ergo videtur quod Angelus
non possit mutare imaginationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this
                     there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision,
                     by changing the imagination.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="33078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33078] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
visione imaginaria homo adhaeret similitudinibus rerum quasi ipsis
rebus. Sed in hoc est quaedam deceptio. Cum ergo Angelus bonus non
possit esse causa deceptionis, videtur quod non possit causare
imaginariam visionem, imaginationem immutando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears
                     from
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.20" target="asv"> Mat. 1:20</a>;[2]:13,[19] in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33079] Iª q. 111 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod ea quae apparent in somnis, videntur imaginaria visione. Sed
Angeli revelant aliqua in somnis; ut patet Matth. I et II, de
Angelo qui Ioseph in somnis apparuit. Ergo Angelus potest
imaginationem movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows.
                     For it was said above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A3" id="FP_Q111_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[3]</a>), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of
                     bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused
                     in us by the local movement of
                     animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis iii.], when assigning the cause of visions
                     in dreams, that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend
                     with it," that is, the impressions left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, "and move the sensitive principle";
                     so that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external objects
                     themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those
                     who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes
                     also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power
                     of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 co."><a name="33080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33080] Iª q. 111 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Angelus, tam bonus quam malus, virtute naturae suae potest
movere imaginationem hominis. Quod quidem sic considerari potest.
Dictum est enim supra quod natura corporalis obedit Angelo ad motum
localem. Illa ergo quae ex motu locali aliquorum corporum possunt
causari, subsunt virtuti naturali Angelorum. Manifestum est autem
quod apparitiones imaginariae causantur interdum in nobis ex locali
mutatione corporalium spirituum et humorum. Unde Aristoteles, in
Lib. de Somn. et Vig., assignans causam apparitionis somniorum,
dicit quod, cum animal dormit, descendente plurimo sanguine ad
principium sensitivum, simul descendunt motus, idest impressiones
relictae ex sensibilium motionibus, quae in spiritibus sensualibus
conservantur, et movent principium sensitivum, ita quod fit quaedam
apparitio, ac si tunc principium sensitivum a rebus ipsis
exterioribus mutaretur. Et tanta potest esse commotio spirituum et
humorum, quod huiusmodi apparitiones etiam vigilantibus fiant;
sicut patet in phreneticis, et in aliis huiusmodi. Sicut igitur hoc
fit per naturalem commotionem humorum; et quandoque etiam per
voluntatem hominis, qui voluntarie imaginatur quod prius senserat,
ita etiam hoc potest fieri virtute Angeli boni vel mali, quandoque
quidem cum alienatione a corporeis sensibus, quandoque autem absque
tali alienatione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the
                     senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed
                     in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33081] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod primum principium phantasiae est a sensu secundum
actum, non enim possumus imaginari quae nullo modo sensimus, vel
secundum totum vel secundum partem; sicut caecus natus non potest
imaginari colorem. Sed aliquando imaginatio informatur, ut actus
phantastici motus consurgat, ab impressionibus interius
conservatis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from
                     the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above
                     explained.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33082] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Angelus transmutat imaginationem, non quidem
imprimendo aliquam formam imaginariam nullo modo per sensum prius
acceptam (non enim posset facere quod caecus imaginaretur colores),
sed hoc facit per motum localem spirituum et humorum, ut dictum
est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect
                     which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the
                     way he knows.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33083] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod commixtio illa spiritus angelici ad imaginationem
humanam, non est per essentiam, sed per effectum quem praedicto
modo in imaginatione facit; cui demonstrat quae ipse novit, non
tamen eo modo quo ipse novit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these
                     images signify; and then there is not deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear
                     in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things
                     appear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to
                     the people in parables, which He did not explain to them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="33084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33084] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod Angelus causans aliquam imaginariam visionem,
quandoque quidem simul intellectum illuminat, ut cognoscat quid per
huiusmodi similitudines significetur, et tunc nulla est deceptio.
Quandoque vero per operationem Angeli solummodo similitudines rerum
apparent in imaginatione, nec tamen tunc causatur deceptio ab
Angelo, sed ex defectu intellectus eius cui talia apparent. Sicut
nec Christus fuit causa deceptionis in hoc quod multa turbis in
parabolis proposuit, quae non exposuit eis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q111_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q111_A4-p0.1">Q. 111. A. 4. Whether an angel can change the human senses?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation
                     does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33085] Iª q. 111 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit immutare sensum
humanum. Operatio enim sensitiva est operatio vitae. Huiusmodi
autem operatio non est a principio extrinseco. Non ergo operatio
sensitiva potest causari ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other
                     natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33086] Iª q. 111 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
virtus sensitiva est nobilior quam nutritiva. Sed Angelus, ut
videtur, non potest mutare virtutem nutritivam; sicut nec alias
formas naturales. Ergo neque virtutem sensitivam immutare
potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A4" id="FP_Q111_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[4]</a>). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are changed always by the sensible object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33087] Iª q. 111 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
sensus naturaliter movetur a sensibili. Sed Angelus non potest
immutare naturae ordinem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo Angelus non
potest immutare sensum, sed semper sensus a sensibili
immutatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels who overturned Sodom, "struck the people of Sodom with blindness or {aorasia}, so that they could not find the
                     door" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.19.11" target="asv">Gn. 19:11</a>). [*It is worth noting that these are the only two passages in the Greek version where the word {aorasia} appears. It expresses,
                     in fact, the effect produced on the people of Sodom---namely, dazzling (French version, "eblouissement"), which the Latin
                     "caecitas" (blindness) does not necessarily
                     imply.] The same is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:18</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33088] Iª q. 111 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Angeli qui subverterunt Sodomam, <i>percusserunt Sodomitas
caecitate (vel aorasia), ut ostium domus invenire non possent</i>,
ut dicitur Gen. XIX. Et simile legitur IV Reg. VI, de Syris quos
Elisaeus duxit in Samariam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for
                     we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged
                     with choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power,
                     can work a change in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object
                     from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as we have said above (
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q51_A2" id="FP_Q111_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in various ways.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 co."><a name="33089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33089] Iª q. 111 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod sensus immutatur dupliciter. Uno modo, ab exteriori; sicut cum
mutatur a sensibili. Alio modo, ab interiori, videmus enim quod,
perturbatis spiritibus et humoribus immutatur sensus; lingua enim
infirmi, quia plena est cholerico humore, omnia sentit ut amara; et
simile contingit in aliis sensibus. Utroque autem modo Angelus
potest immutare sensum hominis sua naturali virtute. Potest enim
Angelus opponere exterius sensui sensibile aliquod, vel a natura
formatum, vel aliquod de novo formando; sicut facit dum corpus
assumit, ut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam potest interius
commovere spiritus et humores, ut supra dictum est, ex quibus
sensus diversimode immutentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this
                     interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above explained.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33090] Iª q. 111 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod principium sensitivae operationis non potest esse
absque principio interiori, quod est potentia sensitiva, sed illud
interius principium potest multipliciter ab exteriori principio
commoveri, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power,
                     and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using a corporeal organ.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33091] Iª q. 111 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod etiam per commotionem interiorem spirituum et
humorum, potest Angelus aliquid operari ad immutandum actum
potentiae nutritivae. Et similiter potentiae appetitivae, et
sensitivae, et cuiuscumque potentiae corporali organo utentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since
                     he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel can work a change in the senses outside the common mode
                     of nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33092] Iª q. 111 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod praeter ordinem totius creaturae Angelus facere non
potest, sed praeter ordinem alicuius particularis naturae facere
potest, cum tali ordini non subdatur. Et sic quodam singulari modo
potest sensum immutare, praeter modum communem.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q112" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q112-p0.1">Q. 112. THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q112-p2"> We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q112-p3"><a href="#FP_Q112_A1"> (1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?</a></p><p id="FP_Q112-p4"><a href="#FP_Q112_A2"> (2) Whether all are sent?</a></p><p id="FP_Q112-p5"><a href="#FP_Q112_A3"> (3) Whether those who are sent, assist?</a></p><p id="FP_Q112-p6"><a href="#FP_Q112_A4"> (4) From what orders they are sent.</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 pr."><a name="33093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33093]
Iª q. 112 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de missione
Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliqui
Angeli mittantur in ministerium. Secundo, utrum omnes mittantur.
Tertio, utrum illi qui mittuntur, assistant. Quarto, de quibus
ordinibus mittantur.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q112_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q112_A1-p0.1">Q. 112. A. 1. Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual
                     actions do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts from the "here" and "now." Since therefore the angelic actions are
                     intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33094] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli in ministerium non mittantur. Omnis
enim missio est ad aliquem determinatum locum. Sed actiones
intellectuales non determinant aliquem locum, quia intellectus
abstrahit ab hic et nunc. Cum igitur actiones angelicae sint
intellectuales, videtur quod Angeli ad suas actiones agendas non
mittantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry,
                     it seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is unseemly.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33095] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
caelum Empyreum est locus pertinens ad dignitatem Angelorum. Si
igitur ad nos mittantur in ministerium, videtur quod eorum
dignitati aliquid depereat. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom; hence it is said: "He that is less in action, shall receive
                     wisdom" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.38.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 38:25</a>). So if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But the whole
                     of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which is
                     unfitting.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33096] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
exterior occupatio impedit sapientiae contemplationem, unde dicitur
Eccli. XXXVIII, <i>qui minoratur actu, percipiet sapientiam</i>. Si
igitur Angeli aliqui mittuntur ad exteriora ministeria, videtur
quod retardentur a contemplatione. Sed tota eorum beatitudo in
contemplatione Dei consistit. Si ergo mitterentur, eorum beatitudo
minueretur. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.27" target="asv">Lk. 22:27</a>): "Which is the greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" But the angels are
                     naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent to administer to us.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33097] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
ministrare est inferioris, unde dicitur Lucae XXII, <i>quis maior
est, qui recumbit, an ille qui ministrat? Nonne qui recumbit?</i>
Sed Angeli sunt maiores nobis ordine naturae. Ergo non mittuntur in
ministerium nostrum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.20" target="asv">Ex. 23:20</a>): "Behold I will send My angels who shall go before thee."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33098] Iª q. 112 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Exod. XXIII, <i>ecce ego mittam Angelum meum, qui
praecedat te</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q112_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> From what has been said above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A6" id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[108], A[6]</a>), it may be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we have already stated (
                     <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q43_A1" id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[43], A[1]</a>), in treating of the mission of the Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as to begin
                     to be where he was not, or to be in another way, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to be sent
                     as
                     proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before
                     by the presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent,
                     His power reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q8_A1" id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[8], A[1]</a>). An angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such
                     a way as not to reach
                     another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be "there." But it is clear from what was above stated (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.4" shape="rect">Q[110], A[1]</a>), that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal
                     creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this
                     takes place by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q112_A1-p8"> Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose
                     authority the angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is what is meant by a minister: for a minister
                     is an intelligent instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to another. Hence angels'
                     actions are called 'ministries'; and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 co."><a name="33099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33099] Iª q. 112 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ex supra dictis manifestum esse potest quod aliqui Angeli in
ministerium mittuntur a Deo. Ut enim supra dictum est, cum de
missione divinarum personarum ageretur, ille mitti dicitur, qui
aliquo modo ab alio procedit, ut incipiat esse ubi prius non erat,
vel ubi prius erat, per alium modum. Filius enim aut spiritus
sanctus mitti dicitur, ut a patre procedens per originem; et
incipit esse novo modo, idest per gratiam vel per naturam
assumptam, ubi prius erat per deitatis praesentiam. Dei enim
proprium est ubique esse, quia cum sit universale agens, eius
virtus attingit omnia entia; unde est in omnibus rebus, ut supra
dictum est. Virtus autem Angeli, cum sit particulare agens, non
attingit totum universum; sed sic attingit unum, quod non attingit
aliud. Et ideo ita est hic, quod non alibi. Manifestum est autem
per supra dicta, quod creatura corporalis per Angelos
administratur. Cum igitur aliquid est fiendum per aliquem Angelum
circa aliquam creaturam corpoream, de novo applicatur Angelus illi
corpori sua virtute; et sic Angelus de novo incipit ibi esse. Et
hoc totum procedit ex imperio divino. Unde sequitur, secundum
praemissa, quod Angelus a Deo mittatur. Sed actio quam Angelus
missus exercet, procedit a Deo sicut a primo principio, cuius nutu
et auctoritate Angeli operantur; et in Deum reducitur sicut in
ultimum finem. Et hoc facit rationem ministri, nam minister est
sicut instrumentum intelligens; instrumentum autem ab alio movetur,
et eius actio ad aliud ordinatur. Unde actiones Angelorum
ministeria vocantur; et propter hoc dicuntur in ministerium
mitti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an
                     operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "Even we ourselves as mentally tasting
                     something eternal, are not in this world." In another sense an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and
                     commanded by some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently
                     have sometimes a determinate place.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33100] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod aliqua operatio dupliciter dicitur intellectualis.
Uno modo, quasi in ipso intellectu consistens, ut contemplatio. Et
talis operatio non determinat sibi locum, immo, ut Augustinus dicit
IV de Trin., <i>etiam nos, secundum quod aliquid aeternum mente
sapimus, non in hoc mundo sumus</i>. Alio modo dicitur aliqua actio
intellectualis, quia est ab aliquo intellectu regulata et imperata.
Et sic manifestum est quod operationes intellectuales interdum
determinant sibi loca.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body
                     should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the
                     empyrean heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king
                     lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his
                     dignity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33101] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod caelum Empyreum pertinet ad dignitatem Angeli
secundum congruentiam quandam, quia congruum est ut supremum
corporum naturae quae est supra omnia corpora, attribuatur. Non
tamen Angelus aliquid dignitatis accipit a caelo Empyreo. Et ideo
quando actu non est in caelo Empyreo, nihil eius dignitati
subtrahitur, sicut nec regi, quando non actu sedet in regali solio,
quod congruit eius dignitati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through
                     the sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the
                     contrary, regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence it follows that his external occupations in
                     no respect impede his contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule
                     and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels
                     do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33102] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod in nobis exterior occupatio puritatem contemplationis
impedit, quia actioni insistimus secundum sensitivas vires, quarum
actiones cum intenduntur, retardantur actiones intellectivae
virtutis. Sed Angelus per solam intellectualem operationem regulat
suas actiones exteriores. Unde actiones exteriores in nullo
impediunt eius contemplationem, quia duarum actionum quarum una est
regula et ratio alterius, una non impedit, sed iuvat aliam. Unde
Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod <i>Angeli non sic foris exeunt,
ut internae contemplationis gaudiis priventur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In their external actions the angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them,
                     absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior
                     to every creature. Hence the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv">Phil. 2:3</a>): "Esteeming others better than themselves."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33103] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod Angeli in suis actionibus exterioribus ministrant
principaliter Deo, et secundario nobis. Non quia nos sumus
superiores eis, simpliciter loquendo, sed quilibet homo vel
Angelus, inquantum adhaerendo Deo fit unus spiritus cum Deo, est
superior omni creatura. Unde apostolus, ad Philipp. II, dicit,
<i>superiores sibi invicem arbitrantes</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q112_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q112_A2-p0.1">Q. 112. A. 2. Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>): "All are ministering spirits, sent to minister" [Vulg. 'Are they not all . . . ?'].
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33104] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod omnes Angeli in ministerium mittantur.
Dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. I, <i>omnes sunt administratorii
spiritus, in ministerium missi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the Seraphim, as stated above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A6" id="FP_Q112_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[108], A[6]</a>). But a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.6" target="asv">Is. 6:6,7</a>). Therefore much more are the inferior orders sent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33105] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
inter ordines supremus est ordo Seraphim, ut ex supra dictis patet.
Sed Seraphim est missus ad purgandum labia prophetae, ut habetur
Isaiae VI. Ergo multo magis inferiores Angeli mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more
                     are even the highest angels sent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33106] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
divinae personae in infinitum excedunt omnes ordines Angelorum. Sed
divinae personae mittuntur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo multo magis
quicumque supremi Angeli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute
                     the Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the angels are unequal, as stated above (
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q50_A4" id="FP_Q112_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[4]</a>), each angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the last angel would be sent in ministry;
                     which contradicts the words, "Thousands of thousands ministered to
                     Him" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="33107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33107] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
superiores Angeli non mittuntur ad exterius ministerium, hoc non
est nisi quia superiores Angeli exequuntur divina ministeria per
inferiores. Sed cum omnes Angeli sint inaequales, ut supra dictum
est, quilibet Angelus habet inferiorem Angelum, praeter ultimum.
Ergo unus Angelus solus ministraret in ministerium missus. Quod est
contra id quod dicitur Daniel VII, <i>millia millium ministrabant
ei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that "the higher ranks fulfil
                     no exterior service."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33108] Iª q. 112 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Gregorius dicit, referens sententiam Dionysii, <i>superiora
agmina usum exterioris ministerii nequaquam habent</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what has been said above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A3" id="FP_Q112_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[3]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q112_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[110], A[1]</a>), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior
                     things are administered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation, however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards
                     corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for
                     the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished
                     immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies. Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these
                     bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of the clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects.
                     Nor can anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels
                     without the inferior. From this standpoint some have said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent,
                     but only the inferior; yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 co."><a name="33109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33109] Iª q. 112 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, hoc habet ordo divinae
providentiae, non solum in Angelis, sed etiam in toto universo,
quod inferiora per superiora administrantur, sed ab hoc ordine in
rebus corporalibus aliquando ex divina dispensatione receditur,
propter altiorem ordinem, secundum scilicet quod expedit ad gratiae
manifestationem. Quod enim caecus natus fuit illuminatus, quod
Lazarus fuit suscitatus, immediate a Deo factum est, absque aliqua
actione caelestium corporum. Sed et Angeli boni et mali possunt
aliquid in istis corporibus operari praeter actionem caelestium
corporum, condensando nubes in pluvias, et aliqua huiusmodi
faciendo. Neque alicui debet esse dubium quin Deus immediate
hominibus aliqua revelare posset, non mediantibus Angelis; et
superiores Angeli, non mediantibus inferioribus. Et secundum hanc
considerationem, quidam dixerunt quod, secundum communem legem,
superiores non mittuntur, sed inferiores tantum; sed ex aliqua
dispensatione divina, interdum etiam superiores mittuntur. Sed hoc
non videtur rationabile. Quia ordo angelicus attenditur secundum
dona gratiarum. Ordo autem gratiae non habet alium superiorem
ordinem, propter quem praetermitti debeat, sicut praetermittitur
ordo naturae propter ordinem gratiae. Considerandum est etiam quod
ordo naturae in operationibus miraculorum praetermittitur, propter
fidei confirmationem. Ad quam nihil valeret, si praetermitteretur
ordo angelicus, quia hoc a nobis percipi non posset. Nihil etiam
est ita magnum in ministeriis divinis, quod per inferiores ordines
exerceri non possit. Unde Gregorius dicit quod <i>qui summa
annuntiant, Archangeli vocantur. Hinc est quod ad virginem Mariam
Gabriel Archangelus mittitur</i>. Quod tamen fuit summum inter
omnia divina ministeria, ut ibidem subditur. Et ideo simpliciter
dicendum est, cum Dionysio, quod superiores Angeli nunquam ad
exterius ministerium mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p8"> It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers
                     of the law; in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old law. Hence there is no need to apply this to
                     any other angels besides those who were sent to give the law.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33110] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut in missionibus divinarum personarum aliqua est
visibilis, quae attenditur secundum creaturam corpoream; aliqua
invisibilis, quae fit secundum spiritualem effectum, ita in
missionibus Angelorum aliqua dicitur exterior, quae scilicet est ad
aliquod ministerium circa corporalia exhibendum, et secundum hanc
missionem non omnes mittuntur; alia est interior, secundum
intellectuales effectus, prout scilicet unus Angelus illuminat
alium, et sic omnes Angeli mittuntur. Vel aliter dicendum quod
apostolus inducit illud ad probandum quod Christus sit maior
Angelis per quos data est lex; ut sic ostendat excellentiam novae
legis ad veterem. Unde non oportet quod intelligatur nisi de
Angelis ministerii, per quos data est lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order;
                     but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet.
                     It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the
                     ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying
                     by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope
                     is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33111] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum, secundum Dionysium, quod ille Angelus qui missus est ad
purgandum labia prophetae, fuit de inferioribus Angelis; sed dictus
est Seraphim, idest incendens, aequivoce, propter hoc quod venerat
ad incendendum labia prophetae. Vel dicendum quod superiores Angeli
communicant propria dona, a quibus denominantur, mediantibus
inferioribus Angelis. Sic igitur unus de Seraphim dictus est
purgasse incendio labia prophetae, non quia hoc ipse immediate
fecerit, sed quia inferior Angelus virtute eius hoc fecit. Sicut
Papa dicitur absolvere aliquem, etiam si per alium officium
absolutionis impendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been
                     said (
                     <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q43_A1" id="FP_Q112_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[43], A[1]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33112] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod divinae personae non mittuntur in ministerium, sed
aequivoce mitti dicuntur; ut ex praedictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent
                     immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the
                     inferior ministries.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33113] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod in divinis ministeriis est multiplex gradus. Unde
nihil prohibet etiam inaequales Angelos immediate ad ministeria
mitti; ita tamen quod superiores mittantur ad altiora ministeria,
inferiores vero ad inferiora.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q112_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q112_A3-p0.1">Q. 112. A. 3. Whether all the angels who are sent, assist?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "So the angels are sent,
                     and assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme Spirit, God, is not limited."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33114] Iª q. 112 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod etiam Angeli qui mittuntur, assistant.
Dicit enim Gregorius, in homilia, <i>et mittuntur igitur Angeli, et
assistunt, quia etsi circumscriptus est angelicus spiritus, summus
tamen spiritus ipse, qui Deus est, circumscriptus non est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he said, "I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before
                     the Lord" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.12.15" target="asv">Tob. 12:15</a>). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33115] Iª q. 112 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Angelus Tobiae in ministerium missus fuit. Sed tamen ipse dixit,
<i>ego sum Raphael Angelus, unus ex septem qui adstamus ante
Deum</i>, ut habetur Tobiae XII. Ergo Angeli qui mittuntur,
assistunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet Satan assisted God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.1.6" target="asv"> Job 1:6</a>: "When the sons of God came to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them." Therefore much more do the angels,
                     who are sent to minister, assist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33116] Iª q. 112 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quilibet Angelus beatus propinquior est Deo quam Satan. Sed Satan
assistit Deo; secundum quod dicitur Iob I, <i>cum assisterent filii
Dei coram domino, affuit inter eos et Satan</i>. Ergo multo magis
Angeli qui mittuntur in ministerium, assistunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is because they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately,
                     but through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is
                     highest of all. Therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to the text of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv"> Dan. 7:10</a>: "Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him." Therefore the angels who are
                     sent also assist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="33117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33117] Iª q. 112 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
inferiores Angeli non assistunt, hoc non est nisi quia non
immediate, sed per superiores Angelos divinas illuminationes
recipiunt. Sed quilibet Angelus per superiorem divinas
illuminationes suscipit, excepto eo qui est inter omnes supremus.
Ergo solus supremus Angelus assisteret. Quod est contra illud quod
habetur Dan. VII, <i>decies millies centena millia assistebant
ei</i>. Ergo etiam illi qui ministrant, assistunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says, on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Job.25.3" target="asv"> Job 25:3</a>: "Is there any numbering of His soldiers?" (Moral. xvii): "Those powers assist, who do not go forth as messengers to men."
                     Therefore those who are sent in ministry do not assist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33118] Iª q. 112 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Gregorius dicit, XVII Moral., super illud Iob, <i>numquid est
numerus militum eius? Assistunt, inquit, illae potestates, quae ad
quaedam hominibus nuntianda non exeunt</i>. Ergo illi qui in
ministerium mittuntur, non assistunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The angels are spoken of as "assisting" and "administering," after the likeness of those who attend upon a king; some of
                     whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately; while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed
                     by those who are in attendance---for instance, those who are placed at the head of the administration of various cities; these
                     are said to administer, not to assist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 3 co."><a name="33119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33119] Iª q. 112 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Angeli introducuntur assistentes et administrantes, ad
similitudinem eorum qui alicui regi famulantur. Quorum aliqui
semper ei assistunt, et eius praecepta immediate audiunt. Alii vero
sunt, ad quos praecepta regalia per assistentes nuntiantur, sicut
illi qui administrationi civitatum praeficiuntur, et hi dicuntur
ministrantes, sed non assistentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A3-p8"> We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those
                     who minister, are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "those who are sent on the external ministry of our
                     salvation can always assist and see the face of the Father." Yet not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the Divine
                     mysteries in the clearness itself of the Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the
                     inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special
                     prerogative it is to be enlightened immediately by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Considerandum est ergo quod
omnes Angeli divinam essentiam immediate vident, et quantum ad hoc,
omnes etiam qui ministrant, assistere dicuntur. Unde Gregorius
dicit in II Moral., quod <i>semper assistere, aut videre faciem
patris possunt, qui ad ministerium exterius mittuntur pro nostra
salute</i>. Sed non omnes Angeli secreta divinorum mysteriorum in
ipsa claritate divinae essentiae percipere possunt; sed soli
superiores, per quos inferioribus denuntiantur. Et secundum hoc,
soli superiores, qui sunt primae hierarchiae, assistere dicuntur,
cuius proprium dicit esse Dionysius immediate a Deo illuminari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A3-p9"> From this may be deduced the reply to the first and second objections, which are based on the first mode of assisting.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33120] Iª q. 112 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet
solutio ad primum et secundum, quae procedunt de primo modo
assistendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Satan is not described as having assisted, but as present among the assistants; for, as Gregory says (Moral. ii), "though
                     he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to the angels."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33121] Iª q. 112 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Satan non dicitur astitisse, sed inter assistentes
affuisse describitur, quia, ut Gregorius dicit II Moral., <i>etsi
beatitudinem perdidit, naturam tamen Angelis similem non
amisit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All the assistants see some things immediately in the glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the prerogative
                     of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than
                     is seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's
                     secrets than another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="33122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33122] Iª q. 112 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod omnes assistentes aliqua immediate vident in
claritate divinae essentiae; et ideo totius primae hierarchiae
proprium esse dicitur immediate illuminari a Deo. Sed superiores
eorum plura percipiunt quam inferiores, de quibus illuminant alios,
sicut etiam inter eos qui assistunt regi, plura scit de secretis
regis unus quam alius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q112_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q112_A4-p0.1">Q. 112. A. 4. Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as
                     Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33123] Iª q. 112 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli secundae hierarchiae omnes
mittantur. Angeli enim omnes vel assistunt vel ministrant; secundum
quod habetur Dan. VII. Sed Angeli secundae hierarchiae non
assistunt, illuminantur enim per Angelos primae hierarchiae, sicut
dicit Dionysius VIII cap. Cael. Hier. Omnes ergo Angeli secundae
hierarchiae in ministerium mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that "there are more who minister than who assist." This would not be the case if the
                     angels of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33124] Iª q. 112 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Gregorius dicit, XVII Moral., quod <i>plures sunt qui ministrant,
quam qui assistunt</i>. Sed hoc non esset, si Angeli secundae
hierarchiae in ministerium non mitterentur. Ergo omnes Angeli
secundae hierarchiae in ministerium mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the "Dominations are above all subjection." But to be sent implies subjection. Therefore
                     the dominations are not sent to minister.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33125] Iª q. 112 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Dionysius dicit, quod <i>dominationes sunt maiores omni
subiectione</i>. Sed mitti in ministerium, ad subiectionem
pertinet. Ergo dominationes in ministerium non mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q112_A1" id="FP_Q112_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal
                     creature; which is part of the execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names,
                     as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify
                     some kind of administration. But
                     the name "dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering. On the
                     other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels" and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing";
                     the "Virtues" and "Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the "Prince," according to what Gregory
                     says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), "be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to
                     external ministry; not to the four superior orders.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 co."><a name="33126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33126] Iª q. 112 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut supra dictum est, mitti ad exterius ministerium proprie
convenit Angelo, secundum quod ex divino imperio operatur circa
aliquam creaturam corporalem; quod quidem pertinet ad executionem
divini ministerii. Proprietates autem Angelorum ex eorum nominibus
manifestantur, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo
Angeli illorum ordinum ad exterius ministerium mittuntur, ex quorum
nominibus aliqua executio datur intelligi. In nomine autem
dominationum non importatur aliqua executio, sed sola dispositio et
imperium de exequendis. Sed in nominibus inferiorum ordinum
intelligitur aliqua executio, nam Angeli et Archangeli denominantur
a denuntiando; virtutes et potestates dicuntur per respectum ad
aliquem actum; principis etiam est, ut Gregorius dicit, inter alios
operantes priorem existere. Unde ad hos quinque ordines pertinet in
exterius ministerium mitti, non autem ad quatuor superiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be
                     done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others
                     are to do.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33127] Iª q. 112 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod dominationes computantur quidem inter Angelos
ministrantes, non sicut exequentes ministerium, sed sicut
disponentes et mandantes quid per alios fieri debeat. Sicut
architectores in artificiis nihil manu operantur, sed solum
disponunt et praecipiunt quid alii debeant operari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q112_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those
                     who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>) "thousands of thousands ministered to Him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands out of thousands";
                     thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number
                     of assistants is finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him." This explanation
                     rests on the opinion of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are
                     in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number
                     of orders, as six administer and three assist.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q112_A4-p8"> Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things;
                     so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures
                     surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by God. Hence,
                     as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way,
                     the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication, to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because
                     ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand" it would mean that there are as many assistants
                     as ministers: but since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are given to understand that the assistants
                     are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but
                     rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together
                     of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33128] Iª q. 112 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod de numero assistentium et ministrantium duplex ratio
haberi potest. Gregorius enim dicit plures esse ministrantes quam
assistentes. Intelligit enim quod dicitur, millia millium
ministrabant ei, non esse dictum multiplicative, sed partitive; ac
si diceretur, millia de numero millium. Et sic ministrantium
numerus ponitur indefinitus, ad significandum excessum;
assistentium vero finitus, cum subditur, et decies millies centena
millia assistebant ei. Et hoc procedit secundum rationem
Platonicorum, qui dicebant quod quanto aliqua sunt uni primo
principio propinquiora, tanto sunt minoris multitudinis, sicut
quanto numerus est propinquior unitati, tanto est multitudine
minor. Et haec opinio salvatur quantum ad numerum ordinum, dum sex
ministrant, et tres assistunt. Sed Dionysius ponit, XIV cap. Cael.
Hier., quod multitudo Angelorum transcendit omnem materialem
multitudinem; ut scilicet, sicut corpora superiora transcendunt
corpora inferiora magnitudine quasi in immensum, ita superiores
naturae incorporeae transcendunt multitudine omnes naturas
corporeas; quia quod est melius, est magis a Deo intentum et
multiplicatum. Et secundum hoc, cum assistentes sint superiores
ministrantibus, plures erunt assistentes quam ministrantes. Unde
secundum hoc, millia millium legitur multiplicativae, ac si
diceretur, millies millia. Et quia decies centum sunt mille, si
diceretur, decies centena millia, daretur intelligi quod tot essent
assistentes, quot ministrantes, sed quia dicitur, decies millies
centena millia, multo plures dicuntur esse assistentes quam
ministrantes. Nec tamen hoc pro tanto dicitur, quia tantus solum
sit Angelorum numerus, sed multo maior, quia omnem materialem
multitudinem excedit. Quod significatur per multiplicationem
maximorum numerorum supra seipsos, scilicet denarii, centenarii et
millenarii; ut Dionysius ibidem dicit.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q113" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q113-p0.1">Q. 113. OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q113-p2"> We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first
                  head eight points of inquiry arise:
               </p><p id="FP_Q113-p3"><a href="#FP_Q113_A1"> (1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p4"><a href="#FP_Q113_A2"> (2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p5"><a href="#FP_Q113_A3"> (3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p6"><a href="#FP_Q113_A4"> (4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p7"><a href="#FP_Q113_A5"> (5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p8"><a href="#FP_Q113_A6"> (6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p9"><a href="#FP_Q113_A7"> (7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p10"><a href="#FP_Q113_A8"> (8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 pr."><a name="33129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33129]
Iª q. 113 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de custodia
bonorum Angelorum, et de impugnatione malorum. Et circa primum
quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum homines ab Angelis custodiantur.
Secundo, utrum singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam
deputentur. Tertio, utrum custodia pertineat solum ad ultimum
ordinem Angelorum. Quarto, utrum omni homini conveniat habere
Angelum custodem. Quinto, quando incipiat custodia Angeli circa
hominem. Sexto, utrum Angelus semper custodiat hominem. Septimo,
utrum doleat de perditione custoditi. Octavo, utrum inter Angelos
sit pugna ratione custodiae.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q113_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A1-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 1. Whether men are guarded by the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how,
                     or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows
                     how by his natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33130] Iª q. 113 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod homines non custodiantur ab Angelis.
Custodes enim deputantur aliquibus vel quia nesciunt, vel quia non
possunt custodire seipsos; sicut pueris et infirmis. Sed homo
potest custodire seipsum per liberum arbitrium; et scit, per
naturalem cognitionem legis naturalis. Ergo homo non custoditur ab
Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But men are guarded by God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.120.4" target="asv"> Ps. 120:4</a>: "He shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel." Therefore man does not need to be guarded by an angel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33131] Iª q. 113 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ubi
adest fortior custodia, infirmior superfluere videtur. Sed homines
custodiuntur a Deo; secundum illud Psalmi CXX, <i>non dormitabit
neque dormiet qui custodit Israel</i>. Ergo non est necessarium
quod homo custodiatur ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: "Keep this
                     man; and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 20:39</a>). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in
                     some such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly
                     false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33132] Iª q. 113 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
perditio custoditi redundat in negligentiam custodis, unde dicitur
cuidam, III Reg. XX, <i>custodi virum istum, qui si lapsus fuerit,
erit anima tua pro anima eius</i>. Sed multi homines quotidie
pereunt, in peccatum cadentes, quibus Angeli subvenire possent vel
visibiliter apparendo, vel miracula faciendo, vel aliquo simili
modo. Essent ergo negligentes Angeli, si eorum custodiae homines
essent commissi, quod patet esse falsum. Non igitur Angeli sunt
hominum custodes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.11" target="asv">Ps. 90:11</a>): "He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33133] Iª q. 113 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo, <i>Angelis suis mandavit de te, ut
custodiant te in omnibus viis tuis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by
                     the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior
                     which are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions, about which we may have various
                     opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover
                     manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so
                     it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 co."><a name="33134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33134] Iª q. 113 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, secundum rationem divinae providentiae, hoc in rebus omnibus
invenitur, quod mobilia et variabilia per immobilia et invariabilia
moventur et regulantur; sicut omnia corporalia per substantias
spirituales immobiles, et corpora inferiora per corpora superiora,
quae sunt invariabilia secundum substantiam. Sed et nos ipsi
regulamur circa conclusiones in quibus possumus diversimode
opinari, per principia quae invariabiliter tenemus. Manifestum est
autem quod in rebus agendis cognitio et affectus hominis
multipliciter variari et deficere possunt a bono. Et ideo
necessarium fuit quod hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputarentur,
per quos regularentur et moverentur ad bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection
                     towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature
                     belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the
                     universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in
                     many ways. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33135] Iª q. 113 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod per liberum arbitrium potest homo aliqualiter malum
vitare, sed non sufficienter, quia infirmatur circa affectum boni,
propter multiplices animae passiones. Similiter etiam universalis
cognitio naturalis legis, quae homini naturaliter adest,
aliqualiter dirigit hominem ad bonum, sed non sufficienter, quia in
applicando universalia principia iuris ad particularia opera,
contingit hominem multipliciter deficere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX,
<i>cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae
nostrae</i>. Et ideo necessaria fuit homini custodia Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the
                     habit of mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this
                     the Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him
                     grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor,
                     Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FP_Q113_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[111], A[1]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33136] Iª q. 113 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ad bene operandum duo requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod
affectus inclinetur ad bonum, quod quidem fit in nobis per habitum
virtutis moralis. Secundo autem, quod ratio inveniat congruas vias
ad perficiendum bonum virtutis, quod quidem philosophus attribuit
prudentiae. Quantum ergo ad primum, Deus immediate custodit
hominem, infundendo ei gratiam et virtutes. Quantum autem ad
secundum, Deus custodit hominem sicut universalis instructor, cuius
instructio ad hominem provenit mediantibus Angelis, ut supra
habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation
                     of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish
                     is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside
                     the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise
                     that miracles occur outside the order of nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33137] Iª q. 113 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut homines a naturali instinctu boni discedunt
propter passionem peccati; ita etiam discedunt ab instigatione
bonorum Angelorum, quae fit invisibiliter per hoc quod homines
illuminant ad bene agendum. Unde quod homines pereunt, non est
imputandum negligentiae Angelorum, sed malitiae hominum. Quod autem
aliquando, praeter legem communem, hominibus visibiliter apparent,
ex speciali Dei gratia est, sicut etiam quod praeter ordinem
naturae miracula fiunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A2-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 2. Whether each man is guarded by an angel?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel. For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard
                     many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33138] Iª q. 113 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non singuli homines a singulis Angelis
custodiantur. Angelus enim est virtuosior quam homo. Sed unus homo
sufficit ad custodiam multorum hominum. Ergo multo magis unus
Angelus multos homines potest custodire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lower things are brought to God through the medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii).
                     But as all the angels are unequal (
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q50_A4" id="FP_Q113_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[4]</a>), there is only one angel between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel who immediately keeps
                     men.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33139] Iª q. 113 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
inferiora reducuntur in Deum a superioribus per media, ut Dionysius
dicit. Sed cum omnes Angeli sint inaequales, ut supra dictum est,
solus unus Angelus est inter quem et homines non est aliquis
medius. Ergo unus Angelus solus est qui immediate custodit
homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than
                     another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says
                     (Coel. Hier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33140] Iª q. 113 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
maiores Angeli maioribus officiis deputantur. Sed non est maius
officium custodire unum hominem quam alium, cum omnes homines
natura sint pares. Cum ergo omnium Angelorum sit unus maior alio,
secundum Dionysium, videtur quod diversi homines non custodiantur a
diversis Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.10" target="asv">Mat. 8:10</a>), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33141] Iª q. 113 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Hieronymus, exponens illud Matth. XVIII, <i>Angeli eorum in
caelis</i>, dicit, <i>magna est dignitas animarum, ut unaquaeque
habeat, ab ortu nativitatis, in custodiam sui Angelum
delegatum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the
                     execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible
                     creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common species,
                     but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which
                     cannot be said of other incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly exercised towards what
                     remains for ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their existence to
                     the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things
                     corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), the different orders are deputed to the different "genera"
                     of
                     things, for instance, the "Powers" to coerce the demons, the "Virtues" to work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable
                     that the different species are presided over by different angels of the same order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose
                     that different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 co."><a name="33142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33142] Iª q. 113 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur.
Cuius ratio est, quia Angelorum custodia est quaedam executio
divinae providentiae circa homines. Providentia autem Dei aliter se
habet ad homines, et ad alias corruptibiles creaturas, quia aliter
se habent ad incorruptibilitatem. Homines enim non solum sunt
incorruptibiles quantum ad communem speciem, sed etiam quantum ad
proprias formas singulorum, quae sunt animae rationales, quod de
aliis rebus corruptibilibus dici non potest. Manifestum est autem
quod providentia Dei principaliter est circa illa quae perpetuo
manent, circa ea vero quae transeunt, providentia Dei est inquantum
ordinat ipsa ad res perpetuas. Sic igitur providentia Dei
comparatur ad singulos homines, sicut comparatur ad singula genera
vel species corruptibilium rerum. Sed secundum Gregorium, diversi
ordines deputantur diversis rerum generibus; puta potestates ad
arcendos Daemones, virtutes ad miracula facienda in rebus
corporeis. Et probabile est quod diversis speciebus rerum diversi
Angeli eiusdem ordinis praeficiantur. Unde etiam rationabile est ut
diversis hominibus diversi Angeli ad custodiam deputentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one guardian
                     is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one
                     man is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his relation to
                     the whole community, such as external works, which are sources of strength or
                     weakness to others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation
                     of each one in his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33143] Iª q. 113 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod alicui homini adhibetur custos dupliciter. Uno modo,
inquantum est homo singularis, et sic uni homini debetur unus
custos, et interdum plures deputantur ad custodiam unius. Alio
modo, inquantum est pars alicuius collegii, et sic toti collegio
unus homo ad custodiam praeponitur, ad quem pertinet providere ea
quae pertinent ad unum hominem in ordine ad totum collegium; sicut
sunt ea quae exterius aguntur, de quibus alii aedificantur vel
scandalizantur. Angelorum autem custodia deputatur hominibus etiam
quantum ad invisibilia et occulta, quae pertinent ad singulorum
salutem secundum seipsos. Unde singulis hominibus singuli Angeli
deputantur ad custodiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As above stated (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q112_A3" id="FP_Q113_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[112], A[3]</a>, ad 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God directly; but as to other things,
                     only the superior are directly enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also applies to the
                     inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other respects by the one
                     immediately above him. Thus it
                     is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33144] Iª q. 113 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Angeli primae hierarchiae omnes
quantum ad aliqua illuminantur immediate a Deo, sed quaedam sunt de
quibus illuminantur superiores tantum immediate a Deo, quae
inferioribus revelant. Et idem etiam in inferioribus ordinibus
considerandum est, nam aliquis infimus Angelus illuminatur quantum
ad quaedam ab aliquo supremo, et quantum ad aliqua ab eo qui
immediate sibi praefertur. Et sic etiam possibile est quod aliquis
Angelus immediate illuminet hominem, qui tamen habet aliquos
Angelos sub se, quos illuminat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater,
                     and others to the lesser things, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.33.11" target="asv"> Ecclus. 33:11,12</a>: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and
                     some of them hath He cursed and brought low." Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33145] Iª q. 113 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, quamvis homines natura sint pares, tamen
inaequalitas in eis invenitur, secundum quod ex divina providentia
quidam ordinantur ad maius, et quidam ad minus; secundum illud quod
dicitur Eccli. XXXIII, <i>in multitudine disciplinae domini
separavit eos, ex ipsis benedixit et exaltavit, ex ipsis maledixit
et humiliavit</i>. Et sic maius officium est custodire unum hominem
quam alium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A3-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 3. Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says that
                     the text (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv">Mat. 18:10</a>), "Their angels in heaven," etc. is to be understood not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels
                     guard men.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33146] Iª q. 113 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod custodire homines non pertineat solum ad
infimum ordinem Angelorum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus quod hoc quod
dicitur Matth. XVIII, <i>Angeli eorum in caelo etc., intelligitur
non de quibuscumque Angelis, sed de supereminentibus</i>. Ergo
supereminentes Angeli custodiunt homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says that angels "are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in external
                     ministry (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q112_A4" id="FP_Q113_A3-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[112], A[4]</a>). Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33147] Iª q. 113 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
apostolus, ad Heb. I, dicit quod <i>Angeli sunt in ministerium
missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis</i>, et sic
videtur quod missio Angelorum ad custodiam hominum ordinetur. Sed
quinque ordines in exterius ministerium mittuntur, ut supra dictum
est. Ergo omnes Angeli quinque ordinum custodiae hominum
deputantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the
                     Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders
                     are also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33148] Iª q. 113 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad
custodiam hominum maxime videtur esse necessarium arcere Daemones,
quod pertinet ad potestates, secundum Gregorium; et miracula
facere, quod pertinet ad virtutes. Ergo illi etiam ordines
deputantur ad custodiam, et non solum infimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according to Dionysius
                     (Coel. Hier. v, ix).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33149] Iª q. 113 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod in Psalmo custodia hominum attribuitur Angelis; quorum ordo
est infimus, secundum Dionysium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113_A2" id="FP_Q113_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, man is guarded in two ways; in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an angel is appointed to guard
                     him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce
                     the "lesser things"; for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one
                     man. The other kind of guardianship is
                     universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship
                     of the human race belongs to the order of "Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels," whom we call the angel princes.
                     Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits
                     by
                     the "Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 co."><a name="33150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33150] Iª q. 113 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut supra dictum est, homini custodia dupliciter adhibetur.
Uno modo custodia particularis, secundum quod singulis hominibus
singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur. Et talis custodia pertinet
ad infimum ordinem Angelorum, quorum, secundum Gregorium, est
minima nuntiare; hoc autem videtur esse minimum in officiis
Angelorum, procurare ea quae ad unius hominis tantum salutem
pertinent. Alia vero est custodia universalis. Et haec
multiplicatur secundum diversos ordines, nam quanto agens fuerit
universalius, tanto est superius. Sic igitur custodia humanae
multitudinis pertinet ad ordinem principatuum, vel forte ad
Archangelos, qui dicuntur principes Angeli, unde et Michael, quem
Archangelum dicimus, unus de principibus dicitur Dan. X. Ulterius
autem super omnes naturas corporeas habent custodiam virtutes. Et
ulterius etiam super Daemones habent custodiam potestates. Et
ulterius etiam super bonos spiritus habent custodiam principatus,
secundum Gregorium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in each
                     order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen
                     by God for the higher degree of glory.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33151] Iª q. 113 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod verbum Chrysostomi potest intelligi, ut loquatur de
supremis in ordine infimo Angelorum, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, in
quolibet ordine sunt primi, medii et ultimi. Est autem probabile
quod maiores Angeli deputentur ad custodiam eorum qui sunt ad
maiorem gradum gloriae a Deo electi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater
                     or less, as above explained.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33152] Iª q. 113 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod non omnes Angeli qui mittuntur, habent particularem
custodiam super singulos homines; sed quidam ordines habent
universalem custodiam, magis vel minus, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the superiors'
                     power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons, and work miracles.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33153] Iª q. 113 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod etiam inferiores Angeli exercent officia superiorum,
inquantum aliquid de dono eorum participant, et se habent ad
superiores sicut executores virtutis eorum. Et per hunc modum etiam
Angeli infimi ordinis possunt et arcere Daemones, et miracula
facere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A4-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 4. Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.7" target="asv">Phil. 2:7</a>) that "He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." If therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship
                     of all men, Christ also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for Christ is greater than all the angels.
                     Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33154] Iª q. 113 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non omnibus hominibus Angeli ad custodiam
deputentur. Dicitur enim de Christo, Philipp. II, quod est <i>in
similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut homo</i>. Si
igitur omnibus hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputantur, etiam
Christus Angelum custodem habuisset. Sed hoc videtur inconveniens,
cum Christus sit maior omnibus Angelis. Non ergo omnibus hominibus
Angeli ad custodiam deputantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state
                     of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33155] Iª q. 113 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
omnium hominum primus fuit Adam. Sed sibi non competebat habere
Angelum custodem, ad minus in statu innocentiae, quia tunc nullis
periculis angustiabatur. Ergo Angeli non praeficiuntur ad custodiam
omnibus hominibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men, that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life,
                     encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation,
                     never attain to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good works, do not perform them well, for they
                     have not a right intention: for "faith directs the intention" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in

                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.31" target="asv">Ps. 31</a>). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of Satan," as it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>). Therefore angels are not deputed to the guardianship of all men.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33156] Iª q. 113 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputantur, ut per eos manuducantur
ad vitam aeternam, et incitentur ad bene operandum, et muniantur
contra insultus Daemonum. Sed homines praesciti ad damnationem,
nunquam perveniunt ad vitam aeternam. Infideles etiam, etsi
interdum bona opera faciant, non tamen bene faciunt, quia non recta
intentione faciunt, fides enim intentionem dirigit, ut Augustinus
dicit. Antichristi etiam adventus erit secundum operationem
Satanae, ut dicitur II ad Thessal. II. Non ergo omnibus hominibus
Angeli ad custodiam deputantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of Jerome quoted above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113_A2" id="FP_Q113_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, for he says that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33157] Iª q. 113 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
auctoritas Hieronymi supra inducta, qui dicit quod <i>unaquaeque
anima ad sui custodiam habet Angelum deputatum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on a road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is
                     threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.159.4" target="asv"> Ps. 159:4</a>: "In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for me." And therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have
                     to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When,
                     however, he arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will have an angel to reign
                     with him, in hell a demon to punish him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 co."><a name="33158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33158] Iª q. 113 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod homo in statu vitae istius constitutus, est quasi in quadam
via, qua debet tendere ad patriam. In qua quidem via multa pericula
homini imminent, tum ab interiori, tum ab exteriori; secundum illud
Psalmi CXLI, <i>in via hac qua ambulabam, absconderunt laqueum
mihi</i>. Et ideo sicut hominibus per viam non tutam ambulantibus
dantur custodes, ita et cuilibet homini, quandiu viator est, custos
Angelus deputatur. Quando autem iam ad terminum viae pervenerit,
iam non habebit Angelum custodem; sed habebit in regno Angelum
conregnantem, in Inferno Daemonem punientem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of God: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards
                     His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was
                     right that He should have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is
                     written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.11" target="asv">Mat. 4:11</a>) that "angels came and ministered to Him."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33159] Iª q. 113 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Christus, secundum quod homo, immediate regulabatur a
verbo Dei, unde non indigebat custodia Angelorum. Et iterum
secundum animam erat comprehensor; sed ratione passibilitatis
corporis, erat viator. Et secundum hoc, non debebatur ei Angelus
custos, tanquam superior; sed Angelus minister, tanquam inferior.
Unde dicitur Matth. IV, quod <i>accesserunt Angeli et ministrabant
ei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the state of innocence man was not threatened by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as we
                     have said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q113_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[95], AA[1]</a>,3). But peril threatened from without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the event. For this reason
                     he needed a guardian angel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33160] Iª q. 113 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae non patiebatur aliquod
periculum ab interiori, quia interius erant omnia ordinata, ut
supra dictum est, sed imminebat ei periculum ab exteriori, propter
insidias Daemonum; ut rei probavit eventus. Et ideo indigebat
custodia Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither
                     are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race---namely the guardianship of the angels. And
                     although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless
                     conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both
                     themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like
                     manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33161] Iª q. 113 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut praesciti et infideles, et etiam Antichristus,
non privantur interiori auxilio naturalis rationis; ita etiam non
privantur exteriori auxilio toti naturae humanae divinitus
concesso, scilicet custodia Angelorum. Per quam etsi non iuventur
quantum ad hoc quod vitam aeternam bonis operibus mereantur,
iuvantur tamen quantum ad hoc, quod ab aliquibus malis retrahuntur,
quibus et sibi ipsis et aliis nocere possunt. Nam et ipsi Daemones
arcentur per bonos Angelos, ne noceant quantum volunt. Et similiter
Antichristus non tantum nocebit, quantum vellet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A5-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 5. Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are "sent to minister for them who
                     shall receive the inheritance of salvation," as the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard
                     a man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33162] Iª q. 113 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non deputetur homini ad custodiam
a sua nativitate. Angeli enim mittuntur <i>in ministerium, propter
eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis</i>, ut apostolus, ad Heb.
dicit. Sed homines incipiunt haereditatem capere salutis, quando
baptizantur. Ergo Angelus deputatur homini ad custodiam a tempore
Baptismi, et non a tempore nativitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of instruction
                     as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon
                     as they are born.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33163] Iª q. 113 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
homines ab Angelis custodiuntur, inquantum ab eis illuminantur per
modum doctrinae. Sed pueri mox nati non sunt capaces doctrinae,
quia non habent usum rationis. Ergo pueris mox natis non deputantur
Angeli custodes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel
                     is appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore
                     angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33164] Iª q. 113 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
pueri in materno utero existentes habent animam rationalem aliquo
tempore, sicut et post nativitatem ex utero. Sed cum sunt in
materno utero, non deputantur eis Angeli ad custodiam, ut videtur,
quia neque etiam ministri Ecclesiae eos sacramentis imbuunt. Non
ergo statim a nativitate hominibus Angeli ad custodiam
deputantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (vide A, 4) that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33165] Iª q. 113 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Hieronymus dicit, quod <i>unaquaeque anima, ab ortu
nativitatis, habet in custodiam sui Angelum deputatum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian
                     is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves
                     (vide A, 4), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism;
                     such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred by God on man
                     as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter benefits
                     we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113_A1" id="FP_Q113_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 co."><a name="33166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33166] Iª q. 113 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut Origenes dicit super Matthaeum, super hoc est duplex
opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod Angelus ad custodiam homini
deputatur a tempore Baptismi, alii vero quod a tempore nativitatis.
Et hanc opinionem Hieronymus approbat; et rationabiliter. Beneficia
enim quae dantur homini divinitus ex eo quod est Christianus,
incipiunt a tempore Baptismi; sicut perceptio Eucharistiae, et alia
huiusmodi. Sed ea quae providentur homini a Deo, inquantum habet
naturam rationalem, ex tunc ei exhibentur, ex quo nascendo talem
naturam accipit. Et tale beneficium est custodia Angelorum, ut ex
praemissis patet. Unde statim a nativitate habet homo Angelum ad
sui custodiam deputatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if
                     we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic
                     ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious,
                     nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33167] Iª q. 113 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Angeli mittuntur in ministerium, efficaciter quidem
propter eos solos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis, si consideretur
ultimus effectus custodiae, qui est perceptio haereditatis.
Nihilominus tamen et aliis ministerium Angelorum non subtrahitur,
quamvis in eis hanc efficaciam non habeat, quod perducantur ad
salutem. Efficax tamen est circa eos Angelorum ministerium,
inquantum a multis malis retrahuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it has many
                     other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33168] Iª q. 113 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod officium custodiae ordinatur quidem ad illuminationem
doctrinae, sicut ad ultimum et principalem effectum. Nihilominus
tamen multos alios effectus habet, qui pueris competunt, scilicet
arcere Daemones, et alia nocumenta tam corporalia quam spiritualia
prohibere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still
                     part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree
                     of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes
                     separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above
                     quoted, says.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33169] Iª q. 113 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod puer quandiu est in materno utero, non totaliter est
a matre separatus, sed per quandam colligationem est quodammodo
adhuc aliquid eius, sicut et fructus pendens in arbore, est aliquid
arboris. Et ideo probabiliter dici potest quod Angelus qui est in
custodia matris, custodiat prolem in matris utero existentem. Sed
in nativitate, quando separatur a matre, Angelus ei ad custodiam
deputatur, ut Hieronymus dicit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A6-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 6. Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.51.9" target="asv">Jer. 51:9</a>) in the person of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: let us forsake her." And (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.5" target="asv">Is. 5:5</a>) it is written: "I will take away the hedge"---that is, "the guardianship of the angels" [gloss]---"and it shall be wasted."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33170] Iª q. 113 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus custos quandoque deserat hominem
cuius custodiae deputatur. Dicitur enim Ierem. li, ex persona
Angelorum, <i>curavimus Babylonem, et non est curata, derelinquamus
ergo eam</i>. Et Isaiae V, <i>auferam sepem eius, et erit in
conculcationem</i>; Glossa, <i>idest Angelorum custodiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.21.2" target="asv"> Ps. 21:2</a>: "O God, my God, look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?" Much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33171] Iª q. 113 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
principalius custodit Deus quam Angelus. Sed Deus aliquando hominem
derelinquit; secundum illud Psalmi XXI, <i>Deus, Deus meus, respice
in me, quare me dereliquisti?</i> Ergo multo magis Angelus custos
hominem derelinquit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), "When the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven." But sometimes
                     they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33172] Iª q. 113 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut dicit Damascenus, <i>Angeli, cum sunt hic nobiscum, non sunt
in caelo</i>. Sed aliquando sunt in caelo. Ergo aliquando nos
derelinquunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The demons are ever assailing us, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8</a>: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour." Much more therefore do the good
                     angels ever guard us.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33173] Iª q. 113 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
Daemones nos semper impugnant; secundum illud I Petri V,
<i>adversarius vester Diabolus tanquam leo rugiens circuit,
quaerens quem devoret</i>. Ergo multo magis boni Angeli semper nos
custodiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As appears above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113_A2" id="FP_Q113_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the guardianship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor
                     anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is
                     it subject to the providence that extends over all being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of
                     His providence, but only in so far as He
                     allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes
                     a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some
                     trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon and the House
                     of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being
                     subject to tribulation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 co."><a name="33174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33174] Iª q. 113 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod custodia Angelorum, ut ex supra dictis patet, est quaedam
executio divinae providentiae circa homines facta. Manifestum est
autem quod nec homo, nec res aliqua, totaliter divinae providentiae
subtrahitur, inquantum enim aliquid participat de esse, intantum
subditur universali providentiae entium. Sed intantum Deus,
secundum ordinem suae providentiae, dicitur hominem derelinquere,
inquantum permittit hominem pati aliquem defectum vel poenae vel
culpae. Similiter etiam dicendum est quod Angelus custos nunquam
totaliter dimittit hominem, sed ad aliquid interdum eum dimittit;
prout scilicet non impedit quin subdatur alicui tribulationi, vel
etiam quin cadat in peccatum, secundum ordinem divinorum
iudiciorum. Et secundum hoc Babylon et domus Israel ab Angelis
derelictae dicuntur, quia Angeli earum custodes non impediverunt
quin tribulationibus subderentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p7"> From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33175] Iª q. 113 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet
solutio ad primum et secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship:
                     for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be
                     with man in an instant.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33176] Iª q. 113 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Angelus, etsi interdum derelinquat hominem loco, non
tamen derelinquit eum quantum ad effectum custodiae, quia etiam cum
est in caelo, cognoscit quid circa hominem agatur; nec indiget mora
temporis ad motum localem, sed statim potest adesse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A7-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 7. Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.33.7" target="asv">Is. 33:7</a>): "The angels of peace shall weep bitterly." But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the ills
                     of those whom they guard.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33177] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli doleant de malis eorum quos
custodiunt. Dicitur enim Isaiae XXXIII, <i>Angeli pacis amare
flebunt</i>. Sed fletus est signum doloris et tristitiae. Ergo
Angeli tristantur de malis hominum quos custodiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is for those things that happen against our will." But the
                     loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33178] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
tristitia est, ut Augustinus dicit, <i>de his quae nobis nolentibus
accidunt</i>. Sed perditio hominis custoditi est contra voluntatem
Angeli custodis. Ergo tristantur Angeli de perditione hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance,
                     as we are told,
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.7" target="asv"> Lk. 15:7.</a> Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33179] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut gaudio contrariatur tristitia, ita poenitentiae contrariatur
peccatum. Sed Angeli gaudent de peccatore poenitentiam agente, ut
habetur Lucae XV. Ergo tristantur de iusto in peccatum cadente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.18.12" target="asv"> Numbers 18:12</a>: "Whatsoever first-fruits they offer," etc. the gloss of Origen says: "The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men
                     have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault." But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which
                     have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men's sins.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="33180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33180] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
super illud Num. XVIII; quidquid offerunt primitiarum etc., dicit
Glossa Origenis; <i>trahuntur Angeli in iudicium, utrum ex ipsorum
negligentia, an hominum ignavia lapsi sint</i>. Sed quilibet
rationabiliter dolet de malis propter quae in iudicium tractus est.
Ergo Angeli dolent de peccatis hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.4" target="asv">Apoc. 21:4</a>): "Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore they have
                     no cause for grief.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33181] Iª q. 113 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, ubi
est tristitia et dolor, non est perfecta felicitas, unde dicitur
Apoc. XXI, <i>mors ultra non erit, neque luctus, neque clamor,
neque ullus dolor</i>. Sed Angeli sunt perfecte beati. Ergo de
nullo dolent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (De
                     Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will
                     of the angels and the other blessed, because they will cleaves entirely to the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens
                     in the world save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply
                     speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is
                     called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances;
                     although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo
                     into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it.
                     Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Therefore universally and absolutely speaking
                     the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine
                     justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 co."><a name="33182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33182] Iª q. 113 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Angeli non dolent neque de peccatis, neque de poenis hominum.
Tristitia enim et dolor, secundum Augustinum, non est nisi de his
quae contrariantur voluntati. Nihil autem accidit in mundo quod sit
contrarium voluntati Angelorum et aliorum beatorum, quia voluntas
eorum totaliter inhaeret ordini divinae iustitiae; nihil autem fit
in mundo, nisi quod per divinam iustitiam fit aut permittitur. Et
ideo, simpliciter loquendo, nihil fit in mundo contra voluntatem
beatorum. Ut enim philosophus dicit in III Ethic. illud dicitur
simpliciter voluntarium, quod aliquis vult in particulari, secundum
quod agitur, consideratis scilicet omnibus quae circumstant,
quamvis in universali consideratum non esset voluntarium, sicut
nauta non vult proiectionem mercium in mare, absolute et
universaliter considerando, sed imminente periculo salutis hoc
vult. Unde magis est hoc voluntarium quam involuntarium, ut ibidem
dicitur. Sic igitur Angeli peccata et poenas hominum, universaliter
et absolute loquendo, non volunt, volunt tamen quod circa hoc ordo
divinae iustitiae servetur, secundum quem quidam poenis subduntur,
et peccare permittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels, i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words
                     of Rabsaces, as related
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.37.2" target="asv"> Is. 37:2 </a>seqq.: this would be the literal sense. According to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are the apostles and preachers
                     who weep for men's sins. If according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression
                     is metaphorical, and
                     signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to God
                     and the angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33183] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod verbum illud Isaiae potest intelligi de Angelis,
idest nuntiis, Ezechiae, qui fleverunt propter verba Rabsacis; de
quibus habetur Isaiae XXXVII. Et hoc secundum litteralem sensum.
Secundum vero allegoricum, Angeli pacis sunt apostoli et alii
praedicatores, qui flent pro peccatis hominum. Si vero secundum
sensum anagogicum exponatur de Angelis beatis, tunc metaphorica
erit locutio, ad designandum quod Angeli volunt in universali
hominum salutem. Sic enim Deo et Angelis huiusmodi passiones
attribuuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p9"> The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33184] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum patet
solutio per ea quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering
                     of the Divine Providence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33185] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod tam in poenitentia hominum, quam in peccato, manet
una ratio gaudii Angelis, scilicet impletio ordinis divinae
providentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="33186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33186] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod Angeli ducuntur in iudicium pro peccatis hominum, non
quasi rei, sed quasi testes, ad convincendum homines de eorum
ignavia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A8-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 8. Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be strife or discord among the angels. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.25.2" target="asv">Job 25:2</a>): "Who maketh peace in His high places." But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high angels there is no strife.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33187] Iª q. 113 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod inter Angelos non possit esse pugna seu
discordia. Dicitur enim Iob XXV, <i>qui facit concordiam in
sublimibus</i>. Sed pugna opponitur concordiae. Ergo in sublimibus
Angelis non est pugna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, where there is perfect charity and just authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the angels.
                     Therefore there is no strife among the angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33188] Iª q. 113 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ubi
est perfecta caritas et iusta praelatio, non potest esse pugna. Sed
hoc totum est in Angelis. Ergo in Angelis non est pugna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the
                     opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in the wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel
                     is a compounder of wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33189] Iª q. 113 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
Angeli dicuntur pugnare pro eis quos custodiunt, necesse est quod
unus Angelus foveat unam partem, et alius aliam. Sed si una pars
habet iustitiam, e contra alia pars habet iniustitiam. Ergo
sequitur quod Angelus bonus sit fautor iniustitiae, quod est
inconveniens. Ergo inter bonos Angelos non est pugna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>): "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days." But this prince of the Persians was the angel
                     deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus there is
                     strife among them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33190] Iª q. 113 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Dan. X, ex persona Gabrielis, <i>princeps regni
Persarum restitit mihi viginti et uno diebus</i>. Hic autem
princeps Persarum erat Angelus regno Persarum in custodiam
deputatus. Ergo unus bonus Angelus resistit alii, et sic inter eos
est pugna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the
                     kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his
                     prayers being offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having
                     led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of
                     the prayer which Daniel put up for that same people.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 8 co."><a name="33191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33191] Iª q. 113 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ista quaestio movetur occasione horum verborum Danielis. Quae
quidem Hieronymus exponit, dicens principem regni Persarum esse
Angelum qui se opposuit liberationi populi Israelitici, pro quo
Daniel orabat, Gabriele preces eius Deo praesentante. Haec autem
resistentia potuit fieri, quia princeps aliquis Daemonum Iudaeos in
Persidem ductos ad peccatum induxerat, per quod impedimentum
praestabatur orationi Danielis, pro eodem populo deprecantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A8-p7"> But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship
                     of that kingdom. To see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must note that the Divine judgments in regard
                     to various kingdoms and various men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, the angels are ruled by the Divine decree.
                     But it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits, so
                     that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels
                     cannot know it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult Divine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they
                     consult the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their
                     wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine decree; but that the things
                     about which they seek knowledge are in opposition.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sed
secundum Gregorium, XVII Moral., princeps regni Persarum bonus
Angelus fuit, custodiae regni illius deputatus. Ad videndum igitur
qualiter unus Angelus alteri resistere dicitur, considerandum est
quod divina iudicia circa diversa regna et diversos homines, per
Angelos exercentur. In suis autem actionibus Angeli secundum
divinam sententiam regulantur. Contingit autem quandoque quod in
diversis regnis, vel in diversis hominibus, contraria merita vel
demerita inveniuntur, ut unus alteri subdatur aut praesit. Quid
autem super hoc ordo divinae sapientiae habeat, cognoscere non
possunt nisi Deo revelante, unde necesse habent super his
sapientiam Dei consulere. Sic igitur inquantum de contrariis
meritis et sibi repugnantibus, divinam consulunt voluntatem,
resistere sibi invicem dicuntur, non quia sint eorum contrariae
voluntates, cum in hoc omnes concordent, quod Dei sententia
impleatur; sed quia ea de quibus consulunt, sunt repugnantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A8-p8"> From this the answers to the objections are clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 8 ad arg."><a name="33192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33192] Iª q. 113 a. 8 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q114" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q114-p0.1">Q. 114. OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES) </h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q114-p2"> We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q114-p3"><a href="#FP_Q114_A1"> (1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?</a></p><p id="FP_Q114-p4"><a href="#FP_Q114_A2"> (2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?</a></p><p id="FP_Q114-p5"><a href="#FP_Q114_A3"> (3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons?</a></p><p id="FP_Q114-p6"><a href="#FP_Q114_A4"> (4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray?</a></p><p id="FP_Q114-p7"><a href="#FP_Q114_A5"> (5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making further assaults?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 pr."><a name="33193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33193]
Iª q. 114 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
impugnatione Daemonum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo,
utrum homines a Daemonibus impugnentur. Secundo, utrum tentare sit
proprium Diaboli. Tertio, utrum omnia peccata hominum ex
impugnatione sive tentatione Daemonum proveniant. Quarto, utrum
possint vera miracula facere ad seducendum. Quinto, utrum Daemones
qui ab hominibus superantur, ab impugnatione hominum arceantur.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q114_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q114_A1-p0.1">Q. 114. A. 1. Whether men are assailed by the demons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by
                     God: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed
                     to assail man.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33194] Iª q. 114 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod homines non impugnentur a Daemonibus.
Angeli enim deputantur ad hominum custodiam, missi a Deo. Sed
Daemones non mittuntur a Deo, cum Daemonum intentio sit perdere
animas, Dei autem salvare. Ergo Daemones non deputantur ad hominum
impugnationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men
                     are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by God, the author of
                     all justice, that men should be assailed by demons.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33195] Iª q. 114 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, non
est aequa conditio pugnae, ut infirmus contra fortem, ignarus
contra astutum exponatur ad bellum. Sed homines sunt infirmi et
ignari; Daemones autem potentes et astuti. Non est ergo
permittendum a Deo, qui est omnis iustitiae auctor, ut homines a
Daemonibus impugnentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed
                     that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33196] Iª q. 114 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad
exercitium hominum sufficit impugnatio carnis et mundi. Sed Deus
permittit electos suos impugnari propter eorum exercitium. Ergo non
videtur necessarium quod a Daemonibus impugnentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.12" target="asv">Eph. 6:12</a>): "Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of
                     this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33197] Iª q. 114 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. VI, quod <i>non est nobis
colluctatio adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed adversus principes et
potestates, adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum, contra
spiritualia nequitiae in caelestibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons---the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself
                     is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance
                     of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man's
                     salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly
                     use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof
                     are to be referred to God as their first author.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 co."><a name="33198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33198] Iª q. 114 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod circa impugnationem Daemonum duo est considerare, scilicet
ipsam impugnationem, et impugnationis ordinem. Impugnatio quidem
ipsa ex Daemonum malitia procedit, qui propter invidiam profectum
hominum impedire nituntur; et propter superbiam divinae potestatis
similitudinem usurpant, deputando sibi ministros determinatos ad
hominum impugnationem, sicut et Angeli Deo ministrant in
determinatis officiis ad hominum salutem. Sed ordo impugnationis
ipsius est a Deo, qui ordinate novit malis uti, ad bona ea
ordinando. Sed ex parte Angelorum, tam ipsa custodia quam ordo
custodiae reducitur ad Deum, sicut ad primum auctorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail
                     us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to
                     man: and thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab, King of Israel, as is related in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 22:20.</a> For punishment is referred to God as its first author.
                     Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent; for they
                     punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33199] Iª q. 114 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod mali Angeli impugnant homines dupliciter. Uno modo,
instigando ad peccatum. Et sic non mittuntur a Deo ad impugnandum,
sed aliquando permittuntur, secundum Dei iusta iudicia. Aliquando
autem impugnant homines puniendo. Et sic mittuntur a Deo; sicut
missus est spiritus mendax ad puniendum Achab regem Israel, ut
dicitur III Reg. ult. Poena enim refertur in Deum, sicut in primum
auctorem. Et tamen Daemones ad puniendum missi, alia intentione
puniunt, quam mittantur, nam ipsi puniunt ex odio vel invidia;
mittuntur autem a Deo propter eius iustitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally
                     through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. Wherefore (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:16</a>), Eliseus said to his servant: "Fear not, for there are more with us than with them."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33200] Iª q. 114 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ad hoc quod non sit inaequalis pugnae conditio, fit
ex parte hominis recompensatio, principaliter quidem per auxilium
divinae gratiae; secundario autem per custodiam Angelorum. Unde IV
Reg., Elisaeus dixit ad ministrum suum, <i>noli timere, plures enim
nobiscum sunt, quam cum illis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the
                     demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of
                     the elect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33201] Iª q. 114 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod infirmitati humanae sufficeret ad exercitium
impugnatio quae est a carne et mundo, sed malitiae Daemonum non
sufficit, quae utroque utitur ad hominum impugnationem. Sed tamen
ex divina ordinatione hoc provenit in gloriam electorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q114_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q114_A4-p0.1">Q. 114. A. 4. Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show
                     itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>), his "coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." Much more therefore at other
                     times do the demons perform lying wonders.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33218] Iª q. 114 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Daemones non possint homines seducere per
aliqua miracula vera. Operatio enim Daemonum maxime vigebit in
operibus Antichristi. Sed sicut apostolus dicit II ad Thessal. II,
<i>eius adventus est secundum operationem Satanae, in omni virtute
et signis et prodigiis mendacibus</i>. Ergo multo magis alio
tempore per Daemones non fiunt nisi signa mendacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine
                     says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's
                     art or power." Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33219] Iª q. 114 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, vera
miracula per aliquam corporum immutationem fiunt. Sed Daemones non
possunt immutare corpus in aliam naturam, dicit enim Augustinus,
XVIII de Civ. Dei, <i>nec corpus quidem humanum ulla ratione
crediderim Daemonum arte vel potestate in membra bestialia posse
converti</i>. Ergo Daemones vera miracula facere non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade
                     one of what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. This is unfitting; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.16.20" target="asv">Mk. 16:20</a>): "The Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33220] Iª q. 114 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
argumentum efficaciam non habet, quod se habet ad opposita. Si ergo
miracula vera possunt fieri a Daemonibus ad falsitatem
persuadendam, non erunt efficacia ad veritatem fidei confirmandam.
Quod est inconveniens, cum dicatur Marci ult., <i>domino
cooperante, et sermonem confirmante sequentibus signis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says
                     <a href="#FP_Q83" id="FP_Q114_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(Q[83];</a> [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "Often by means of the magic art miracles are
                     wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of God."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33221] Iª q. 114 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, libro octoginta trium quaest., quod
<i>magicis artibus fiunt miracula plerumque similia illis miraculis
quae fiunt per servos Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q114_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A4" id="FP_Q114_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[4]</a>), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in
                     the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power
                     of a creature is contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience.
                     And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power
                     and outside his sphere of knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him
                     to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q114_A4-p7"> It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they
                     are sometimes nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons' power produced real serpents and frogs.
                     And "when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep; when the storm struck down his house
                     and with it his children---these were the work of Satan, not phantoms"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx,
                     19).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 co."><a name="33222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33222] Iª q. 114 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, si miraculum proprie accipiatur,
Daemones miracula facere non possunt, nec aliqua creatura, sed
solus Deus, quia miraculum proprie dicitur quod fit praeter ordinem
totius naturae creatae, sub quo ordine continetur omnis virtus
creaturae. Dicitur tamen quandoque miraculum large, quod excedit
humanam facultatem et considerationem. Et sic Daemones possunt
facere miracula, quae scilicet homines mirantur, inquantum eorum
facultatem et cognitionem excedunt. Nam et unus homo, inquantum
facit aliquid quod est supra facultatem et cognitionem alterius,
ducit alium in admirationem sui operis, ut quodammodo miraculum
videatur operari. Sciendum est tamen quod, quamvis huiusmodi opera
Daemonum, quae nobis miracula videntur, ad veram rationem miraculi
non pertingant; sunt tamen quandoque verae res. Sicut magi
Pharaonis per virtutem Daemonum veros serpentes et ranas fecerunt.
<i>Et quando ignis de caelo cecidit et familiam Iob cum gregibus
pecorum uno impetu consumpsit, et turbo domum deiiciens filios eius
occidit, quae fuerunt opera Satanae, phantasmata non fuerunt</i>,
ut Augustinus dicit, XX de Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says in the same place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will deceive
                     men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies,
                     they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33223] Iª q. 114 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit ibidem, Antichristi opera
possunt dici esse signa mendacii, <i>vel quia mortales sensus per
phantasmata decepturus est, ut quod non facit, videatur facere, vel
quia, si sint vera prodigia, ad mendacium tamen pertrahent
credituros</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q114_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As we have said above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q114_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute
                     matter from one form to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce
                     these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal
                     things which
                     can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the
                     operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs,
                     which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature,
                     cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance, that the human body be changed into the body
                     of a beast, or that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by
                     the operation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of reality.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q114_A4-p10"> Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a demon can work on man's imagination and even on his
                     corporeal senses, so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A3" id="FP_Q114_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[111], AA[3]</a>,4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as
                     he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same
                     way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Augustine says (De Civ.
                     Dei xviii, 18): "Man's imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things,
                     appears to other men's senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal." This not to be understood as though the
                     imagination itself or the images formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another
                     man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's senses.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33224] Iª q. 114 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, materia corporalis non
obedit Angelis bonis seu malis ad nutum, ut Daemones sua virtute
possint transmutare materiam de forma in formam, sed possunt
adhibere quaedam semina quae in elementis mundi inveniuntur, ad
huiusmodi effectus complendos, ut Augustinus dicit III de Trin. Et
ideo dicendum est quod omnes transmutationes corporalium rerum quae
possunt fieri per aliquas virtutes naturales, ad quas pertinent
praedicta semina, possunt fieri per operationem Daemonum, huiusmodi
seminibus adhibitis; sicut cum aliquae res transmutantur in
serpentes vel ranas, quae per putrefactionem generari possunt.
Illae vero transmutationes corporalium rerum quae non possunt
virtute naturae fieri, nullo modo operatione Daemonum, secundum rei
veritatem, perfici possunt; sicut quod corpus humanum mutetur in
corpus bestiale, aut quod corpus hominis mortuum reviviscat. Et si
aliquando aliquid tale operatione Daemonum fieri videatur, hoc non
est secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum apparentiam tantum. Quod
quidem potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo, ab interiori;
secundum quod Daemon potest mutare phantasiam hominis, et etiam
sensus corporeos, ut aliquid videatur aliter quam sit, sicut supra
dictum est. Et hoc etiam interdum fieri dicitur virtute aliquarum
rerum corporalium. Alio modo, ab exteriori. Cum enim ipse possit
formare corpus ex aere cuiuscumque formae et figurae, ut illud
assumens in eo visibiliter appareat; potest eadem ratione
circumponere cuicumque rei corporeae quamcumque formam corpoream,
ut in eius specie videatur. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit XVIII
de Civ. Dei, quod <i>phantasticum hominis, quod etiam cogitando
sive somniando per rerum innumerabilium genera variatur, velut
corporatum in alicuius animalis effigie, sensibus apparet
alienis</i>. Quod non est sic intelligendum, quod ipsa vis
phantastica hominis, aut species eius, eadem numero incorporata
alterius sensibus ostendatur, sed quia Daemon qui in phantasia
unius hominis format aliquam speciem, ipse etiam potest similem
speciem alterius sensibus offerre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different
                     right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the
                     latter by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is subject."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33225] Iª q. 114 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium
quaest., <i>cum talia faciunt magi qualia sancti, diverso fine et
diverso iure fiunt. Illi enim faciunt, quaerentes gloriam suam,
isti, quaerentes gloriam Dei. Et illi faciunt per quaedam privata
commercia; isti autem publica administratione, et iussu Dei, cui
cuncta creatura subiecta est</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q114_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q114_A5-p0.1">Q. 114. A. 5. Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ
                     overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore
                     it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33226] Iª q. 114 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Daemon qui superatur ab aliquo, non
propter hoc ab impugnatione arceatur. Christus enim efficacissime
suum tentatorem vicit. Sed tamen postea eum impugnavit, ad
occisionem eius Iudaeos incitando. Ergo non est verum quod Diabolus
victus ab impugnatione cesset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is
                     not befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33227] Iª q. 114 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
infligere poenam ei qui in pugna succumbit, est incitare ad acrius
impugnandum. Hoc autem non pertinet ad Dei misericordiam. Ergo
Daemones superati non arcentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.11" target="asv">Mat. 4:11</a>): "Then the devil left Him," i.e. Christ Who overcame.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33228] Iª q. 114 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Matth. IV, tunc reliquit eum Diabolus, scilicet
Christum superantem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other
                     sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to
                     be so for a certain definite time: wherefore (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.13" target="asv">Lk. 4:13</a>) it is written: "All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time." There are two reasons for this. One
                     is on the part
                     of God's clemency; for as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus Imperfectum, among his supposititious works],
                     "the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows him to tempt
                     for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness." The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil.
                     As to this, Ambrose says on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.13" target="asv"> Lk. 4:13</a>: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from
                     frequent defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.44" target="asv"> Mat. 12:44</a>: "I will return into my house from whence I came out."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 co."><a name="33229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33229] Iª q. 114 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod quidam dicunt quod Daemon superatus nullum hominum potest de
cetero tentare, nec de eodem nec de alio peccato. Quidam autem
dicunt quod potest alios tentare, sed non eundem. Et hoc
probabilius dicitur, si tamen intelligatur usque ad aliquod tempus,
unde et Lucae IV dicitur quod, <i>consummata omni tentatione,
Diabolus recessit a Christo usque ad tempus</i>. Et huius ratio est
duplex. Una est ex parte divinae clementiae, quia, ut Chrysostomus
dicit, super Matth., <i>non tandiu homines Diabolus tentat, quandiu
vult, sed quandiu Deus permittit; quia etsi permittat paulisper
tentare, tamen repellit, propter infirmam naturam</i>. Alia ratio
sumitur ex astutia Diaboli, unde Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, quod
<i>Diabolus instare formidat, quia frequentius refugit
triumphari</i>. Quod tamen aliquando Diabolus redeat ad eum quem
dimisit, patet per illud quod dicitur Matth. XII, <i>revertar in
domum meam, unde exivi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p6"> From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 ad arg."><a name="33230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33230] Iª q. 114 a. 5 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q115" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q115-p0.1">Q. 115. OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q115-p2"> We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal
                  actions there are six points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q115-p3"><a href="#FP_Q115_A1"> (1) Whether a body can be active?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p4"><a href="#FP_Q115_A2"> (2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p5"><a href="#FP_Q115_A3"> (3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p6"><a href="#FP_Q115_A4"> (4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p7"><a href="#FP_Q115_A5"> (5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p8"><a href="#FP_Q115_A6"> (6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 pr."><a name="33231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33231]
Iª q. 115 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
actione corporalis creaturae; et fato, quod aliquibus corporibus
attribuitur. Circa actiones corporales quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum
aliquod corpus sit activum. Secundo, utrum in corporibus sint
aliquae seminales rationes. Tertio, utrum corpora caelestia sint
causa eorum quae hic per inferiora corpora fiunt. Quarto, utrum
sint causa humanorum actuum. Quinto, utrum eorum actionibus
Daemones subdantur. Sexto, utrum caelestia corpora imponant
necessitatem his quae eorum actionibus subduntur.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q115_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A2-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 2. Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual
                     order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in
                     which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33244] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in materia corporali non sint aliquae
rationes seminales. Ratio enim importat aliquid secundum esse
spirituale. Sed in materia corporali non est aliquid spiritualiter,
sed materialiter tantum, secundum scilicet modum eius in quo est.
Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales rationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain
                     seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable
                     to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33245] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod Daemones quaedam opera faciunt
adhibendo occultis motibus quaedam semina, quae in elementis
cognoscunt. Sed ea quae per motum localem adhibentur, sunt corpora,
non rationes. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod sunt in corporali
materia seminales rationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above,
                     matter is not competent to act (A[1], ad 2,4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33246] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
semen est principium activum. Sed in materia corporali non est
aliquod principium activum, cum materiae non competat agere, ut
dictum est. Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales
rationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues" (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production
                     of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal
                     virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="33247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33247] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
materia corporali dicuntur esse quaedam causales rationes, quae
videntur sufficere ad rerum productionem. Sed seminales rationes
sunt aliae a causalibus, quia praeter seminales rationes fiunt
miracula, non autem praeter causales. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur
quod seminales rationes sunt in materia corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds
                     lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33248] Iª q. 115 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., <i>omnium rerum quae
corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, occulta quaedam semina in
istis corporeis mundi huius elementis latent</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal
                     nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural
                     things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation
                     of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are
                     generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united,
                     consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is
                     manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things
                     are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and
                     passive
                     virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q115_A2-p8"> These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
                     lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas." Secondly, they are in the elements
                     of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes." Thirdly, they are in those things
                     which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that
                     animal, as in "particular causes." Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from animals and plants. And these again are
                     compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 co."><a name="33249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33249] Iª q. 115 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod denominationes consueverunt fieri a perfectiori, ut dicitur in
II de anima. In tota autem natura corporea perfectiora sunt corpora
viva, unde et ipsum nomen naturae translatum est a rebus viventibus
ad omnes res naturales. Nam ipsum nomen naturae, ut philosophus
dicit in V Metaphys., primo impositum fuit ad significandum
generationem viventium, quae nativitas dicitur, et quia viventia
generantur ex principio coniuncto, sicut fructus ex arbore, et
foetus ex matre, cui colligatur, consequenter tractum est nomen
naturae ad omne principium motus quod est in eo quod movetur.
Manifestum est autem quod principium activum et passivum
generationis rerum viventium sunt semina ex quibus viventia
generantur. Et ideo convenienter Augustinus omnes virtutes activas
et passivas quae sunt principia generationum et motuum naturalium,
seminales rationes vocat. Huiusmodi autem virtutes activae et
passivae in multiplici ordine considerari possunt. Nam primo
quidem, ut Augustinus dicit VI super Gen. ad Litt., sunt
principaliter et originaliter in ipso verbo Dei, secundum rationes
ideales. Secundo vero, sunt in elementis mundi, ubi simul a
principio productae sunt, sicut in universalibus causis. Tertio
vero modo, sunt in iis quae ex universalibus causis secundum
successiones temporum producuntur, sicut in hac planta et in hoc
animali, tanquam in particularibus causis. Quarto modo, sunt in
seminibus quae ex animalibus et plantis producuntur. Quae iterum
comparantur ad alios effectus particulares, sicut primordiales
causae universales ad primos effectus productos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These active and passive virtues of natural things, thought not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal
                     matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes
                     ideales].
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33250] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae et passivae rerum
naturalium, etsi non possint dici rationes secundum quod sunt in
materia corporali; possunt tamen dici rationes per comparationem ad
suam originem, secundum quod deducuntur a rationibus idealibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement
                     for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33251] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae vel passivae sunt in
aliquibus partibus corporalibus; quae dum adhibentur per motum
localem ad aliquos effectus complendos, dicuntur semina adhiberi
per Daemones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female
                     contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed" covers both active and passive principles.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33252] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod semen maris est principium activum in generatione
animalis. Sed potest etiam dici semen id quod est ex parte feminae,
quod est principium passivum. Et sic sub semine comprehendi possunt
vires activae et passivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues,
                     just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so
                     is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things." Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues,"
                     but not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate
                     principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought
                     outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God
                     commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities
                     which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of
                     seminal virtues.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33253] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod ex verbis Augustini de huiusmodi rationibus
seminalibus loquentis, satis accipi potest quod ipsae rationes
seminales sunt etiam rationes causales, sicut et semen est quaedam
causa, dicit enim in III de Trin., quod <i>sicut matres gravidae
sunt foetibus, sic ipse mundus est gravidus causis nascentium</i>.
Sed tamen rationes ideales possunt dici causales, non autem proprie
loquendo seminales, quia semen non est principium separatum, et
praeter huiusmodi rationes non fiunt miracula. Similiter etiam
neque praeter virtutes passivas creaturae inditas, ut ex ea fieri
possit quidquid Deus mandaverit. Sed praeter virtutes activas
naturales, et potentias passivas quae ordinantur ad huiusmodi
virtutes activas, dicuntur fieri miracula, dum dicitur quod fiunt
praeter rationes seminales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q115_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A3-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 3. Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De
                     Fide Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"---namely, the heavenly bodies---"are not the cause of generation or corruption: they
                     are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33254] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia non sint causa eorum
quae hic in inferioribus corporibus fiunt. Dicit enim Damascenus,
nos autem dicimus quoniam ipsa, scilicet corpora caelestia, <i>non
sunt causa alicuius eorum quae fiunt, neque corruptionis eorum quae
corrumpuntur, signa autem sunt magis imbrium et aeris
transmutationis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and
                     there are contrary agents---heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need
                     to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33255] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad
faciendum aliquid, sufficit agens et materia. Sed in istis
inferioribus invenitur materia patiens, inveniuntur etiam contraria
agentia, scilicet calidum et frigidum et huiusmodi. Ergo non est
necessarium, ad causandum ea quae hic inferius fiunt, causalitatem
caelestibus corporibus attribuere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through
                     the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore
                     the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33256] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
agens agit sibi simile. Sed videmus quod omnia quae fiunt hic
inferius, fiunt per hoc quod calefiunt et frigidantur, et
humectantur et desiccantur, et aliis huiusmodi qualitatibus
alterantur, quae non inveniuntur in corporibus caelestibus. Ergo
corpora caelestia non sunt causa eorum quae hic fiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is more corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies:
                     a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly
                     bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="33257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33257] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut Augustinus dicit V de Civ. Dei, <i>nihil est magis corporeum
quam corporis sexus</i>. Sed corporis sexus non causatur ex
corporibus caelestibus, cuius signum esse videtur, quod duorum
geminorum sub una constellatione natorum, unus est masculus et
alter est femina. Ergo corpora caelestia non sunt causa rerum
corporalium quae hic fiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more
                     subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible
                     bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33258] Iª q. 115 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod <i>corpora crassiora et
inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur</i>.
Et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>lumen solis ad
generationem sensibilium corporum confert, et ad vitam ipsa movet,
et nutrit et auget et perficit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is
                     moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable.
                     Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the
                     heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save
                     locally. Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of
                     the heavenly bodies, as to their cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 co."><a name="33259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33259] Iª q. 115 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum omnis multitudo ab unitate procedat; quod autem immobile
est, uno modo se habet, quod vero movetur, multiformiter,
considerandum est, in tota natura, quod omnis motus ab immobili
procedit. Et ideo quanto aliqua sunt immobiliora, tanto sunt magis
causa eorum quae sunt magis mobilia. Corpora autem caelestia sunt
inter alia corpora magis immobilia, non enim moventur nisi motu
locali. Et ideo motus horum inferiorum corporum qui sunt varii et
multiformes, reducuntur in motum corporis caelestis, sicut in
causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption
                     here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33260] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod dictum Damasceni intelligendum est, quod corpora
caelestia non sunt prima causa generationis et corruptionis eorum
quae hic fiunt; sicut dicebant illi qui ponebant corpora caelestia
esse deos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like.
                     If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles
                     of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the "dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle
                     above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves
                     sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions
                     in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary
                     to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q115_A3-p10"> This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive
                     their substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable,
                     would always have the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior
                     bodies: which is clearly false.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q115_A3-p11"> Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of
                     its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies.
                     Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body:
                     thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33261] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod principia activa in istis inferioribus corporibus non
inveniuntur nisi qualitates activae elementorum, quae sunt calidum
et frigidum et huiusmodi. Et si sic esset quod formae substantiales
inferiorum corporum non diversificarentur nisi secundum huiusmodi
accidentia, quorum principia rarum et densum antiqui naturales
posuerunt; non oporteret super haec inferiora corpora aliquod
principium activum ponere, sed ipsa sufficerent ad agendum. Sed
recte considerantibus apparet quod huiusmodi accidentia se habent
sicut materiales dispositiones ad formas substantiales naturalium
corporum. Materia autem non sufficit ad agendum. Et ideo oportet
super has materiales dispositiones ponere aliquod principium
activum. Unde Platonici posuerunt species separatas, secundum
quarum participationem inferiora corpora substantiales formas
consequuntur. Sed hoc non videtur sufficere. Quia species separatae
semper eodem modo se haberent, cum ponantur immobiles, et sic
sequeretur quod non esset aliqua variatio circa generationem et
corruptionem inferiorum corporum; quod patet esse falsum. Unde
secundum philosophum, in II de Gen., necesse est ponere aliquod
principium activum mobile, quod per sui praesentiam et absentiam
causet varietatem circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum
corporum. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et ideo quidquid in
istis inferioribus generat, movet ad speciem sicut instrumentum
caelestis corporis; secundum quod dicitur in II Physic., quod
<i>homo generat hominem, et sol</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason
                     of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all
                     things are like God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33262] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod corpora caelestia inferioribus corporibus non sunt
similia similitudine speciei; sed inquantum sua universali virtute
continent in se quidquid in inferioribus corporibus generatur;
secundum quem modum dicimus etiam omnia esse Deo similia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter.
                     Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed
                     sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars: because
                     the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the
                     various dispositions of matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="33263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33263] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod actiones corporum caelestium diversimode recipiuntur
in inferioribus corporibus secundum diversam materiae
dispositionem. Contingit autem quandoque quod materia conceptus
humani non est disposita totaliter ad masculinum sexum; unde partim
formatur in masculum, partim in feminam. Unde ad hoc introducitur
ab Augustino, ad repellendum scilicet divinationem quae fit per
astra, quia effectus astrorum variantur etiam in rebus corporeis,
secundum diversam materiae dispositionem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q115_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A4-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 4. Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual
                     substances, as stated above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A3" id="FP_Q115_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[3]</a>), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it
                     seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33264] Iª q. 115 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum
actuum. Corpora enim caelestia, cum moveantur a spiritualibus
substantiis, sicut supra dictum est, agunt in virtute earum quasi
instrumenta. Sed illae substantiae spirituales sunt superiores
animabus nostris. Ergo videtur quod possint imprimere in animas
nostras, et sic causare actus humanos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems
                     that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33265] Iª q. 115 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
multiforme reducitur in aliquod uniforme principium. Sed actus
humani sunt varii et multiformes. Ergo videtur quod reducantur in
uniformes motus caelestium corporum, sicut in sua principia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect
                     and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human
                     actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33266] Iª q. 115 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
astrologi frequenter vera annuntiant de eventibus bellorum, et
aliis humanis actibus, quorum principia sunt intellectus et
voluntas. Quod facere non possent secundum caelestia corpora, nisi
essent humanorum actuum causa. Sunt ergo corpora caelestia
humanorum actuum causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33267] Iª q. 115 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>corpora caelestia humanorum actuum
nequaquam sunt causa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q115_A3" id="FP_Q115_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. They can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because
                     the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. Wherefore
                     if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding
                     that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice
                     and action. It would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there
                     are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action
                     of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate
                     actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however,
                     that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely,
                     as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the
                     intellect and will are differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive
                     powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity,
                     disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although
                     the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains
                     the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue
                     of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions,
                     than on the intellect.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q115_A4-p7"> To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does
                     not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and
                     of gods brings on" (Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal
                     organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 co."><a name="33268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33268] Iª q. 115 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod corpora caelestia in corpora quidem imprimunt directe et per
se, sicut iam dictum est. In vires autem animae quae sunt actus
organorum corporeorum, directe quidem, sed per accidens, quia
necesse est huiusmodi actus harum potentiarum impediri secundum
impedimenta organorum, sicut oculus turbatus non bene videt. Unde
si intellectus et voluntas essent vires corporeis organis
alligatae, sicut posuerunt aliqui, dicentes quod intellectus non
differt a sensu; ex necessitate sequeretur quod corpora caelestia
essent causa electionum et actuum humanorum. Et ex hoc sequeretur
quod homo naturali instinctu ageretur ad suas actiones, sicut
cetera animalia, in quibus non sunt nisi vires animae corporeis
organis alligatae, nam illud quod fit in istis inferioribus ex
impressione corporum caelestium, naturaliter agitur. Et ita
sequeretur quod homo non esset liberi arbitrii, sed haberet
actiones determinatas, sicut et ceterae res naturales. Quae
manifeste sunt falsa, et conversationi humanae contraria. Sciendum
est tamen quod indirecte et per accidens impressiones corporum
caelestium ad intellectum et voluntatem pertingere possunt;
inquantum scilicet tam intellectus quam voluntas aliquo modo ab
inferioribus viribus accipiunt, quae organis corporeis alligantur.
Sed circa hoc diversimode se habent intellectus et voluntas. Nam
intellectus ex necessitate accipit ab inferioribus viribus
apprehensivis, unde turbata vi imaginativa vel cogitativa vel
memorativa, ex necessitate turbatur actio intellectus. Sed voluntas
non ex necessitate sequitur inclinationem appetitus inferioris,
licet enim passiones quae sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili,
habeant quandam vim ad inclinandam voluntatem; tamen in potestate
voluntatis remanet sequi passiones, vel eas refutare. Et ideo
impressio caelestium corporum, secundum quam immutari possunt
inferiores vires, minus pertingit ad voluntatem, quae est proxima
causa humanorum actuum, quam ad intellectum. Ponere igitur
caelestia corpora esse causam humanorum actuum, est proprium
illorum qui dicunt intellectum non differre a sensu. Unde quidam
eorum dicebant quod <i>talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in
diem inducit pater virorum deorumque</i>. Quia ergo constat
intellectum et voluntatem non esse actus organorum corporeorum,
impossibile est quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum
actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies;
                     but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated
                     above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FP_Q115_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[111], A[2]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33269] Iª q. 115 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod spirituales substantiae quae caelestia corpora
movent, in corporalia quidem agunt mediantibus caelestibus
corporibus, sed in intellectum humanum agunt immediate illuminando.
Voluntatem autem immutare non possunt, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause:
                     so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine
                     intellect and will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33270] Iª q. 115 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut multiformitas corporalium motuum reducitur
sicut in causam in uniformitatem motuum caelestium; ita
multiformitas actuum qui sunt ab intellectu et voluntate, reducitur
in principium uniforme quod est intellectus et voluntas divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the heavenly
                     bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the
                     truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting
                     his passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say
                     that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy, Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33271] Iª q. 115 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod plures hominum sequuntur passiones, quae sunt motus
sensitivi appetitus, ad quas cooperari possunt corpora caelestia,
pauci autem sunt sapientes, qui huiusmodi passionibus resistant. Et
ideo astrologi ut in pluribus vera possunt praedicere, et maxime in
communi. Non autem in speciali, quia nihil prohibet aliquem hominem
per liberum arbitrium passionibus resistere. Unde et ipsi astrologi
dicunt quod sapiens homo dominatur astris, inquantum scilicet
dominatur suis passionibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q115_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A5-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 5. Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass
                     men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q115_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.24" target="asv"> Mat. 4:24 </a>and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33272] Iª q. 115 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia possint imprimere in
ipsos Daemones. Daemones enim secundum certa augmenta lunae aliquos
homines vexant, qui et propter hoc lunatici dicuntur; ut patet
Matth. IV et XVII. Sed hoc non esset, nisi corporibus caelestibus
subiacerent. Ergo Daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium
corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through
                     the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33273] Iª q. 115 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
necromantici observant certas constellationes ad invocandos
Daemones. Non autem per corpora caelestia invocarentur, si non eis
subiacerent. Ergo Daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium
corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies,
                     namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine
                     (De Civ. Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33274] Iª q. 115 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
corpora caelestia virtuosiora sunt quam corpora inferiora. Sed
quibusdam inferioribus corporibus Daemones arcentur, scilicet
herbis et lapidibus et animantibus, et quibusdam <i>sonis certis ac
vocibus, et figurationibus atque figmentis</i>, ut a Porphyrio
dictum Augustinus introducit in X de Civ. Dei. Ergo multo magis
Daemones subduntur actioni caelestium corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as Augustine
                     says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33275] Iª q. 115 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Daemones sunt superiores ordine naturae quam corpora
caelestia. Agens autem est superius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit
XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo Daemones non subiiciuntur actioni
corporum caelestium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There have been three opinions about the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and
                     held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies.
                     This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain
                     powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars." But this opinion is
                     manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would
                     in no way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors
                     of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q115_A5-p7"> For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are "animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius
                     says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned above: according to which
                     it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q115_A4" id="FP_Q115_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above (
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q51_A1" id="FP_Q115_A5-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[51], A[1]</a>): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to the action
                     of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 co."><a name="33276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33276] Iª q. 115 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod circa Daemones fuit triplex opinio. Prima Peripateticorum, qui
posuerunt Daemones non esse; sed ea quae attribuuntur Daemonibus,
secundum artem necromanticam, fiunt virtute caelestium corporum. Et
hoc est quod Augustinus, X de Civ. Dei, introducit dictum a
Porphyrio, quod <i>fabricantur in terra ab hominibus potestates
idoneae siderum variis effectibus exequendis</i>. Sed haec positio
est manifeste falsa. Experimento enim scitur multa per Daemones
fieri, ad quae nullo modo virtus caelestium corporum sufficeret;
puta quod arreptitii loquuntur lingua ignota, quod recitant versus
et auctoritates quas nunquam sciverunt, quod necromantici faciunt
statuas loqui et moveri, et similia. Ex quibus Platonici moti
fuerunt ut ponerent Daemones esse animalia corpore aerea, animo
passiva; ut ab Apuleio dictum Augustinus introducit VIII de Civ.
Dei. Et haec est secunda opinio, secundum quam dici posset quod
Daemones hoc modo subduntur corporibus caelestibus, sicut et de
hominibus dictum est. Sed haec opinio ex superioribus patet esse
falsa, dicimus enim Daemones esse substantias intellectuales
corporibus non unitas. Unde patet quod non subduntur actioni
caelestium corporum, nec per se nec per accidens, nec directe nec
indirecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to "defame
                     God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because
                     as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q114_A4" id="FP_Q115_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[114], A[4]</a>, ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended
                     result. Now it is manifest that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal.
                     ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property
                     of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the demons, according
                     to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto
                     disposed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33277] Iª q. 115 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod hoc quod Daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae
homines vexant, contingit propter duo. Primo quidem, ad hoc quod
infament creaturam Dei, scilicet lunam, ut Hieronymus et
Chrysostomus dicunt. Secundo quia, cum non possint operari nisi
mediantibus naturalibus virtutibus, ut supra dictum est; in suis
operibus considerant corporum aptitudines ad effectus intentos.
Manifestum est autem quod <i>cerebrum humidissimum est omnium
partium corporis</i>, ut Aristoteles dicit, et ideo maxime
subiicitur operationi lunae, quae ex sua proprietate habet movere
humorem. In cerebro autem perficiuntur vires animales, et ideo
Daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae perturbant hominis
phantasiam, quando considerant cerebrum ad hoc esse dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of
                     believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain constellations
                     corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33278] Iª q. 115 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Daemones advocati in certis constellationibus,
propter duo veniunt. Primo quidem, ut homines in hunc errorem
inducant, quod credant aliquod numen esse in stellis. Secundo, quia
considerant secundum aliquas certas constellationes materiam
corporalem magis esse dispositam ad effectus pro quibus
advocantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the "demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs,
                     rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered
                     to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33279] Iª q. 115 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XXI de Civ. Dei, <i>Daemones
alliciuntur per varia genera lapidum, herbarum, lignorum,
animalium, carminum, rituum, non ut animalia cibis, sed ut spiritus
signis</i>; inquantum scilicet haec eis exhibentur in signum divini
honoris, cuius ipsi sunt cupidi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q115_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A6-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 6. Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the
                     effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies,
                     with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of necessity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33280] Iª q. 115 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia imponant necessitatem
iis quae eorum actioni subduntur. Causa enim sufficienti posita,
necesse est effectum poni. Sed corpora caelestia sunt sufficiens
causa suorum effectuum. Cum igitur corpora caelestia, cum suis
motibus et dispositionibus, ponantur sicut ex necessitate entia;
videtur quod effectus eorum ex necessitate consequantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter
                     to itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher
                     power than theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33281] Iª q. 115 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
effectus agentis ex necessitate sequitur in materia, quando virtus
agentis tanta fuerit quod possit sibi subiicere totaliter materiam.
Sed tota materia inferiorum corporum subiicitur virtuti caelestium
corporum, tanquam excellentiori. Ergo ex necessitate effectus
caelestium corporum recipitur in materia corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal
                     cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle:
                     since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore, since also that heavenly principle
                     is necessary, it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered.
                     Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33282] Iª q. 115 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
effectus caelestis corporis non ex necessitate proveniat, hoc est
propter aliquam causam impedientem. Sed quamlibet causam corpoream
quae impedire posset effectum caelestis corporis, necesse est
reduci in aliquod caeleste principium, cum caelestia corpora sint
causa omnium quae hic fiunt. Ergo, cum et illud caeleste principium
sit necessarium, sequitur quod necesse sit impediri effectum
alterius corporis caelestis. Et sic omnia quae hic contingunt, ex
necessitate eveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin. per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed
                     in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of
                     heavenly bodies take place of necessity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33283] Iª q. 115 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod philosophus dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., <i>quod neque
eorum quae in corporibus sunt signorum caelestium, velut aquarum et
ventorum, inconveniens est multa non evenire</i>. Sic ergo non
omnes effectus caelestium corporum ex necessitate eveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> This question is partly solved by what was said above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q115_A4" id="FP_Q115_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations
                     in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to
                     prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other
                     things to which human action extends.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q115_A6-p7"> But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced
                     by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning
                     of some of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the cause, the effect follows
                     of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph.
                     vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q115_A6-p8"> For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes
                     are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to
                     fail in producing them. But that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause; consequently
                     the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q115_A6-p9"> Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally,
                     has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise
                     (that a man is) "musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause, because it is not truly
                     a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to
                     its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these
                     two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be
                     reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take
                     fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the
                     surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight
                     on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of
                     heavenly bodies result of necessity.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 co."><a name="33284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33284] Iª q. 115 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ista quaestio partim quidem absoluta est, secundum praemissa;
partim autem difficultatem habet. Ostensum enim est quod, quamvis
ex impressione corporum caelestium fiant aliquae inclinationes in
natura corporali, voluntas tamen non ex necessitate sequitur has
inclinationes. Et ideo nihil prohibet per voluntariam actionem
impediri effectum caelestium corporum, non solum in ipso homine,
sed etiam in aliis rebus ad quas hominum operatio se extendit. Sed
nullum tale principium invenitur in rebus naturalibus, quod habeat
libertatem sequendi vel non sequendi impressiones caelestes. Unde
videtur quod in talibus, ad minus, omnia ex necessitate proveniant,
secundum antiquam quorundam rationem, qui, supponentes omne quod
est causam habere, et quod, posita causa, ex necessitate ponitur
effectus, concludebant, quod omnia ex necessitate contingant. Quam
quidem opinionem repellit Aristoteles in VI Metaphys., secundum duo
quae ipsi supponunt. Primo enim, non est verum quod, posita
quacumque causa, necesse sit effectum poni. Sunt enim quaedam
causae quae ordinantur ad suos effectus non ex necessitate, sed ut
in pluribus, quae quandoque deficiunt in minori parte. Sed quia
huiusmodi causae non deficiunt in minori parte, nisi propter
aliquam causam impedientem, videtur adhuc praedictum inconveniens
non vitari, quia et ipsum impedimentum talis causae ex necessitate
contingit. Et ideo, secundo, oportet dicere quod omne quod est per
se, habet causam, quod autem est per accidens, non habet causam,
quia non est vere ens, cum non sit vere unum. Album enim causam
habet, similiter et musicum; sed album musicum non habet causam,
quia non est vere ens, neque vere unum. Manifestum est autem quod
causa impediens actionem alicuius causae ordinatae ad suum effectum
ut in pluribus, concurrit ei interdum per accidens, unde talis
concursus non habet causam, inquantum est per accidens. Et propter
hoc, id quod ex tali concursu sequitur, non reducitur in aliquam
causam praeexistentem, ex qua ex necessitate sequatur. Sicut quod
aliquod corpus terrestre ignitum in superiori parte aeris generetur
et deorsum cadat, habet causam aliquam virtutem caelestem, et
similiter etiam quod in superficie terrae sit aliqua materia
combustibilis, potest reduci in aliquod caeleste principium. Sed
quod ignis cadens huic materiae occurrat et comburat eam, non habet
causam aliquod caeleste corpus, sed est per accidens. Et sic patet
quod non omnes effectus caelestium corporum sunt ex
necessitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which
                     can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33285] Iª q. 115 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod corpora caelestia sunt causa inferiorum effectuum
mediantibus causis particularibus inferioribus, quae deficere
possunt in minori parte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local
                     distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly
                     body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature
                     or other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly
                     body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33286] Iª q. 115 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod virtus corporis caelestis non est infinita. Unde
requirit determinatam dispositionem in materia ad inducendum suum
effectum, et quantum ad distantiam loci, et quantum ad alias
conditiones. Et ideo sicut distantia loci impedit effectum
caelestis corporis (non enim sol eundem caloris effectum habet in
Dacia, quem habet in Aethiopia); ita et grossities materiae, vel
frigiditas aut caliditas, aut alia huiusmodi dispositio, impedire
potest effectum corporis caelestis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless
                     the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33287] Iª q. 115 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod licet causa impediens effectum alterius causae,
reducatur in aliquod caeleste corpus sicut in causam; tamen
concursus duarum causarum, cum sit per accidens, non reducitur in
causam caelestem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q116" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q116-p0.1">Q. 116. ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q116-p2"> We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q116-p3"><a href="#FP_Q116_A1"> (1) Is there such a thing as fate?</a></p><p id="FP_Q116-p4"><a href="#FP_Q116_A2"> (2) Where is it?</a></p><p id="FP_Q116-p5"><a href="#FP_Q116_A3"> (3) Is it unchangeable?</a></p><p id="FP_Q116-p6"><a href="#FP_Q116_A4"> (4) Are all things subject to fate?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 pr."><a name="33288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33288]
Iª q. 116 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de fato. Et
circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, an fatum sit. Secundo, in quo
sit. Tertio, utrum sit immobile. Quarto, utrum omnia subsint
fato.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q116_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q116_A2-p0.1">Q. 116. A. 2. Whether fate is in created things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is
                     called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33295] Iª q. 116 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod fatum non sit in rebus creatis. Dicit enim
Augustinus, V de Civ. Dei, quod <i>ipsa Dei voluntas vel potestas
fati nomine appellatur</i>. Sed voluntas et potestas Dei non est in
creaturis, sed in Deo. Ergo fatum non est in rebus creatis, sed in
Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal
                     cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q116_A1" id="FP_Q116_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33296] Iª q. 116 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
fatum comparatur ad ea quae ex fato aguntur, ut causa; ut ipse
modus loquendi ostendit. Sed causa universalis per se eorum quae
hic per accidens aguntur, est solus Deus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
fatum est in Deo, et non in rebus creatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according
                     to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but
                     in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33297] Iª q. 116 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
fatum est in creaturis, aut est substantia, aut accidens, et
quodcumque horum detur, oportet quod multiplicetur secundum
creaturarum multitudinem. Cum ergo fatum videatur esse unum tantum,
videtur quod fatum non sit in creaturis, sed in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33298] Iª q. 116 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol. quod <i>fatum est dispositio
rebus mobilibus inhaerens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been stated above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q22_A3" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A6" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[103], A[6]</a>), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two
                     ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this
                     ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects,
                     thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is
                     served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements
                     of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain
                     of fate is forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q116_A1" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.3" shape="rect">(A[1];</a>
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q104_A2" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[104],
                        A[2]
                     </a>;
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.5" shape="rect">Q[110], A[1]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.6" shape="rect">Q[113];</a>
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q114" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.7" shape="rect">Q[114])</a>. It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 co."><a name="33299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33299] Iª q. 116 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, divina providentia per causas
medias suos effectus exequitur. Potest ergo ipsa ordinatio
effectuum dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod est in
ipso Deo, et sic ipsa ordinatio effectuum vocatur providentia.
Secundum vero quod praedicta ordinatio consideratur in mediis
causis a Deo ordinatis ad aliquos effectus producendos, sic habet
rationem fati. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit, IV de Consol.,
<i>sive famulantibus quibusdam providentiae divinae spiritibus
fatum exercetur; seu anima, seu tota inserviente natura, sive
caelestibus siderum motibus, seu angelica virtute, seu Daemonum
varia solertia, seu aliquibus eorum, seu omnibus, fatalis series
texitur</i>, de quibus omnibus per singula in praecedentibus dictum
est. Sic ergo est manifestum quod fatum est in ipsis causis
creatis, inquantum sunt ordinatae a Deo ad effectus
producendos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature
                     of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But
                     essentially fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33300] Iª q. 116 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ipsa ordinatio causarum secundarum, quam Augustinus
seriem causarum nominat, non habet rationem fati, nisi secundum
quod dependet a Deo. Et ideo causaliter Dei potestas vel voluntas
dici potest fatum. Essentialiter vero fatum est ipsa dispositio seu
series, idest ordo, causarum secundarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33301] Iª q. 116 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod intantum fatum habet rationem causae, inquantum et
ipsae causae secundae, quarum ordinatio fatum vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies
                     order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one;
                     and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple.
                     In this sense the poet wrote: "Thy fate draws thee."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33302] Iª q. 116 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod fatum dicitur dispositio, non quae est in genere
qualitatis; sed secundum quod dispositio designat ordinem, qui non
est substantia, sed relatio. Qui quidem ordo, si consideretur per
comparationem ad suum principium, est unus, et sic dicitur unum
fatum. Si autem consideretur per comparationem ad effectus, vel ad
ipsas causas medias, sic multiplicatur, per quem modum poeta dixit,
<i>te tua fata trahunt</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q116_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q116_A4-p0.1">Q. 116. A. 4. Whether all things are subject to fate?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and
                     the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are
                     born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be
                     excluded from the domain of fate.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33309] Iª q. 116 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod omnia fato subdantur. Dicit enim Boetius,
in IV de Consol., <i>series fati caelum et sidera movet, elementa
in se invicem temperat, et alterna format transmutatione; eadem
nascentia occidentiaque omnia per similes foetuum seminumque
renovat progressus; haec actus fortunasque hominum indissolubili
causarum connexione constringit</i>. Nihil ergo excipi videtur,
quod sub fati serie non contineatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the
                     Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject
                     to fate.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33310] Iª q. 116 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, quod fatum aliquid est,
secundum quod ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei refertur. Sed
voluntas Dei est causa omnium quae fiunt, ut Augustinus dicit in
III de Trin. Ergo omnia subduntur fato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are
                     changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q9_A2" id="FP_Q116_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[2]</a>). Therefore fate is in all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33311] Iª q. 116 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
fatum, secundum Boetium, est <i>dispositio rebus mobilibus
inhaerens</i>. Sed omnes creaturae sunt mutabiles, et solus Deus
vere immutabilis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in omnibus creaturis
est fatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33312] Iª q. 116 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol., quod <i>quaedam quae sub
providentia locata sunt, fati seriem superant</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q116_A2" id="FP_Q116_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject
                     also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to
                     fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol.
                     iv): viz. that "those things which are
                     nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing
                     is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 co."><a name="33313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33313] Iª q. 116 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut supra dictum est, fatum est ordinatio secundarum
causarum ad effectus divinitus provisos. Quaecumque igitur causis
secundis subduntur, ea subduntur et fato. Si qua vero sunt quae
immediate a Deo fiunt, cum non subdantur secundis causis, non
subduntur fato; sicut creatio rerum, glorificatio spiritualium
substantiarum, et alia huiusmodi. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit,
quod <i>ea quae sunt primae divinitati propinqua, stabiliter fixa,
fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Ex quo etiam patet quod
quanto aliquid longius a prima mente discedit, nexibus fati
maioribus implicatur</i>; quia magis subiicitur necessitati
secundarum causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in
                     the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33314] Iª q. 116 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod omnia illa quae ibi tanguntur, fiunt a Deo
mediantibus causis secundis; et ideo sub fati serie continentur.
Sed non est eadem ratio de omnibus aliis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever
                     is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33315] Iª q. 116 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod fatum refertur ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei, sicut
ad primum principium. Unde non oportet quod quidquid subiicitur
voluntati divinae vel potestati, subiiciatur fato, ut dictum
est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these,
                     therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33316] Iª q. 116 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, quamvis omnes creaturae sint aliquo modo mutabiles,
tamen aliquae earum non procedunt a causis creatis mutabilibus. Et
ideo non subiiciuntur fato, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q117" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q117-p0.1">Q. 117. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q117-p2"> We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual
                  nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from
                  man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q117-p3"><a href="#FP_Q117_A1"> (1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge?</a></p><p id="FP_Q117-p4"><a href="#FP_Q117_A2"> (2) Whether man can teach an angel?</a></p><p id="FP_Q117-p5"><a href="#FP_Q117_A3"> (3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?</a></p><p id="FP_Q117-p6"><a href="#FP_Q117_A4"> (4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 pr."><a name="33317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33317]
Iª q. 117 pr.</span></a> Postea considerandum est de his quae
pertinent ad actionem hominis, qui est compositus ex spirituali et
corporali creatura. Et primo considerandum est de actione hominis;
secundo, de propagatione hominis ex homine. Circa primum quaeruntur
quatuor. Primo, utrum unus homo possit docere alium, causando in
ipso scientiam. Secundo, utrum homo possit docere Angelum. Tertio,
utrum homo per virtutem suae animae possit immutare materiam
corporalem. Quarto, utrum anima hominis separata possit movere
corpora motu locali.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q117_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q117_A1-p0.1">Q. 117. A. 1. Whether one man can teach another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.8" target="asv">Mat. 22:8</a>): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God." Therefore to
                     be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is
                     proper to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33318] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod homo non possit alium docere. Dicit enim
dominus, Matth. XXIII, <i>nolite vocari Rabbi</i>; ubi dicit Glossa
Hieronymi, <i>ne divinum honorem hominibus tribuatis</i>. Esse ergo
magistrum pertinet proprie ad divinum honorem. Sed docere est
proprium magistri. Homo ergo non potest docere, sed hoc est
proprium Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge
                     in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows
                     that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33319] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
homo alium docet, hoc non est nisi inquantum agit per scientiam
suam ad causandum scientiam in alio. Sed qualitas per quam aliquis
agit ad faciendum sibi simile, est qualitas activa. Ergo sequitur
quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sicut et calor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either
                     of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33320] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad
scientiam requiritur lumen intelligibile, et species rei
intellectae. Sed neutrum istorum potest causare unus homo in alio.
Ergo unus homo non potest docendo causare scientiam in alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something
                     by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him.
                     For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he knows, he to whom
                     these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from
                     the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to
                     speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in
                     another by teaching him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33321] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
doctor nihil agit ad discipulum nisi quod proponit ei quaedam
signa, vel vocibus aliquid significando, vel nutibus. Sed
proponendo signa non potest aliquis alium docere, causando in eo
scientiam. Quia aut proponit signa rerum notarum; aut rerum
ignotarum. Si rerum notarum, ille ergo cui signa proponuntur, iam
habet scientiam, et eam non acquirit a magistro. Si autem rerum
ignotarum, per huiusmodi signa nihil addiscit, sicut si aliquis
proponeret alicui Latino verba Graeca, quorum significationem
ignoraret, per hoc eum docere non posset. Nullo ergo modo unus homo
potest, alium docendo, scientiam in eo causare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.7" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:7</a>): "Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33322] Iª q. 117 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. II, <i>in quo positus sum ego
praedicator et apostolus, doctor gentium in fide et
veritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have
                     one passive intellect in common, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q117_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>). From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause
                     another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which
                     he
                     has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension.
                     This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known:
                     for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect,
                     and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above
                     (
                     <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q117_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p8"> Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning,
                     through the participation of separate forms, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q84_A3" id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[84], AA[3]</a>,4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it
                     knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider
                     what he
                     knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose
                     (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved
                     above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q79_A2" id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[2]</a>;
                     <a href="#FP_Q84_A3" id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.3" shape="rect">Q[84], A[3]</a>) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima
                     iii, 4).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p9"> We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing
                     him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we must observe that of
                     effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused
                     to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes
                     from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical
                     art, sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things
                     must be noticed. First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection
                     of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not
                     as
                     principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle,
                     by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing
                     the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended
                     end.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p10"> Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research;
                     and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle
                     of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are
                     naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal
                     principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own
                     research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches,
                     leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what
                     the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p11"> Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing
                     to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he
                     may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous
                     knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or
                     something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly,
                     by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above
                     (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q117_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FP_Q117_A1-p11.2" shape="rect">Q[111], A[1]</a>) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes
                     to the disciple the order of principles to
                     conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles.
                     Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator
                     causes his hearer to know.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 co."><a name="33323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33323] Iª q. 117 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod circa hoc diversae fuerunt opiniones. Averroes enim, in
Comment. III de anima, posuit unum intellectum possibilem esse
omnium hominum, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod
eaedem species intelligibiles sint omnium hominum. Et secundum hoc,
ponit quod unus homo per doctrinam non causat aliam scientiam in
altero ab ea quam ipse habet; sed communicat ei eandem scientiam
quam ipse habet, per hoc quod movet eum ad ordinandum phantasmata
in anima sua, ad hoc quod sint disposita convenienter ad
intelligibilem apprehensionem. Quae quidem opinio quantum ad hoc
vera est, quod est eadem scientia in discipulo et magistro, si
consideretur identitas secundum unitatem rei scitae, eadem enim rei
veritas est quam cognoscit et discipulus et magister. Sed quantum
ad hoc quod ponit esse unum intellectum possibilem omnium hominum,
et easdem species intelligibiles, differentes solum secundum
diversa phantasmata; falsa est eius opinio, ut supra habitum est.
Alia est opinio Platonicorum, qui posuerunt quod scientia inest a
principio animabus nostris per participationem formarum
separatarum, sicut supra habitum est; sed anima ex unione corporis
impeditur ne possit considerare libere ea quorum scientiam habet.
Et secundum hoc, discipulus a magistro non acquirit scientiam de
novo, sed ab eo excitatur ad considerandum ea quorum scientiam
habet; ut sic addiscere nihil aliud sit quam reminisci. Sicut etiam
ponebant quod agentia naturalia solummodo disponunt ad susceptionem
formarum, quas acquirit materia corporalis per participationem
specierum separatarum. Sed contra hoc supra ostensum est quod
intellectus possibilis animae humanae est in potentia pura ad
intelligibilia, secundum quod Aristoteles dicit in III de anima. Et
ideo aliter dicendum est, quod docens causat scientiam in
addiscente, reducendo ipsum de potentia in actum, sicut dicitur in
VIII Physic. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod effectuum
qui sunt ab exteriori principio, aliquis est ab exteriori principio
tantum; sicut forma domus causatur in materia solum ab arte.
Aliquis autem effectus est quandoque quidem ab exteriori principio,
quandoque autem ab interiori; sicut sanitas causatur in infirmo
quandoque ab exteriori principio, scilicet ab arte medicinae;
quandoque autem ab interiori principio ut cum aliquis sanatur per
virtutem naturae. Et in talibus effectibus sunt duo attendenda.
Primo quidem, quod ars imitatur naturam in sua operatione, sicut
enim natura sanat infirmum alterando, digerendo, et expellendo
materiam quae causat morbum, ita et ars. Secundo attendendum est,
quod principium exterius, scilicet ars, non operatur sicut
principale agens, sed sicut coadiuvans agens principale, quod est
principium interius, confortando ipsum, et ministrando ei
instrumenta et auxilia, quibus utatur ad effectum producendum,
sicut medicus confortat naturam, et adhibet ei cibos et medicinas,
quibus natura utatur ad finem intentum. Scientia autem acquiritur
in homine et ab interiori principio, ut patet in eo qui per
inventionem propriam scientiam acquirit; et a principio exteriori,
ut patet in eo qui addiscit. Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam
principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod
cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia
principia omnium scientiarum. Cum autem aliquis huiusmodi
universalia principia applicat ad aliqua particularia, quorum
memoriam et experimentum per sensum accipit; per inventionem
propriam acquirit scientiam eorum quae nesciebat, ex notis ad
ignota procedens. Unde et quilibet docens, ex his quae discipulus
novit, ducit eum in cognitionem eorum quae ignorabat; secundum quod
dicitur in I Poster., quod <i>omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ex
praeexistenti fit cognitione</i>. Ducit autem magister discipulum
ex praecognitis in cognitionem ignotorum, dupliciter. Primo quidem,
proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta, quibus intellectus
eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam, puta cum proponit ei aliquas
propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis
discipulus diiudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia
exempla, vel similia, vel opposita, vel aliqua huiusmodi ex quibus
intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis
ignotae. Alio modo, cum confortat intellectum addiscentis; non
quidem aliqua virtute activa quasi superioris naturae, sicut supra
dictum est de Angelis illuminantibus, quia omnes humani intellectus
sunt unius gradus in ordine naturae; sed inquantum proponit
discipulo ordinem principiorum ad conclusiones, qui forte per
seipsum non haberet tantam virtutem collativam, ut ex principiis
posset conclusiones deducere. Et ideo dicitur in I Poster., quod
demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Et per hunc modum ille
qui demonstrat, auditorem scientem facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the
                     principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these
                     are from God. Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.3" target="asv">Ps. 102:3</a>); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.10" target="asv">Ps. 93:10</a>),
                     inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv">Ps. 4:7</a>), through which light all things are shown to us.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33324] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, homo docens solummodo exterius
ministerium adhibet, sicut medicus sanans, sed sicut natura
interior est principalis causa sanationis, ita et interius lumen
intellectus est principalis causa scientiae. Utrumque autem horum
est a Deo. Et ideo sicut de Deo dicitur, qui sanat omnes
infirmitates tuas; ita de eo dicitur, qui docet hominem scientiam,
inquantum lumen vultus eius super nos signatur, per quod nobis
omnia ostenduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore
                     knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle
                     by which one is directed in working.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33325] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod doctor non causat scientiam in discipulo per modum
agentis naturalis, ut Averroes obiicit. Unde non oportet quod
scientia sit qualitas activa, sed est principium quo aliquis
dirigitur in docendo, sicut ars est principium quo aliquis
dirigitur in operando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but
                     he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs
                     of which are proposed to him from without.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33326] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod magister non causat lumen intelligibile in discipulo,
nec directe species intelligibiles, sed movet discipulum per suam
doctrinam ad hoc, quod ipse per virtutem sui intellectus formet
intelligibiles conceptiones, quarum signa sibi proponit
exterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail
                     and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his
                     own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33327] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod signa quae magister discipulo proponit, sunt rerum
notarum in universali, et sub quadam confusione; sed ignotarum in
particulari, et sub quadam distinctione. Et ideo cum quisque per
seipsum scientiam acquirit, non potest dici docere seipsum, vel
esse sui ipsius magister, quia non praeexistit in eo scientia
completa, qualis requiritur in magistro.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q117_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q117_A2-p0.1">Q. 117. A. 2. Whether man can teach the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.10" target="asv">Eph. 3:10</a>): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the
                     Church." But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33328] Iª q. 117 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod homines possint docere Angelos. Dicit enim
apostolus, ad Ephes. III, <i>ut innotescat principibus et
potestatibus in caelestibus per Ecclesiam multiformis sapientia
Dei</i>. Sed Ecclesia est congregatio hominum fidelium. Ergo
Angelis per homines aliqua innotescunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior
                     angels, as stated above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q116_A1" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[116], A[1]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q112_A3" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[112], A[3]</a>). But some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God; as appears principally of the apostles
                     from
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.1" target="asv"> Heb. 1:1,2</a>: "Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son." Therefore
                     some men have been able to teach the angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33329] Iª q. 117 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Angeli superiores, qui immediate de divinis a Deo illuminantur,
inferiores Angelos instruere possunt, ut supra dictum est. Sed
aliqui homines immediate de divinis per Dei verbum sunt instructi;
sicut maxime patet de apostolis, secundum illud ad Heb. I,
<i>novissime, diebus istis, locutus est nobis in filio</i>. Ergo
aliqui homines aliquos Angelos docere potuerunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are
                     taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior
                     angels can be instructed by men concerning Divine things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33330] Iª q. 117 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
inferiores Angeli a superioribus instruuntur. Sed quidam homines
superiores sunt aliquibus Angelis, cum ad supremos ordines
Angelorum aliqui homines assumantur, ut Gregorius dicit in quadam
homilia. Ergo aliqui inferiores Angeli per aliquos homines de
divinis instrui possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine enlightenment to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to them;
                     but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same
                     way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from
                     Our Lord's words (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>): "There hath not risen among them
                     that are born of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he."
                     Therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to angels
                     the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33331] Iª q. 117 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod omnes divinae
illuminationes perferuntur ad homines mediantibus Angelis. Non ergo
Angeli instruuntur per homines de divinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the least
                     of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery
                     which hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities
                     and powers in the heavenly places---that is, through the Church." As
                     though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities
                     and powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection
                     this Church composed of men will be gathered together."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 co."><a name="33332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33332] Iª q. 117 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut supra habitum est, inferiores Angeli loqui quidem
possunt superioribus Angelis, manifestando eis suas cogitationes;
sed de rebus divinis superiores ab inferioribus nunquam
illuminantur. Manifestum est autem quod eo modo quo inferiores
Angeli superioribus subduntur, supremi homines subduntur etiam
infimis Angelorum. Quod patet per id quod dominus dicit, Matth. XI,
<i>inter natos mulierum non surrexit maior Ioanne Baptista; sed qui
minor est in regno caelorum, maior est illo</i>. Sic igitur de
rebus divinis ab hominibus Angeli nunquam illuminantur.
Cogitationes tamen suorum cordium homines Angelis per modum
locutionis manifestare possunt, quia secreta cordium scire solius
Dei est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p7"> It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here where when
                     it takes place and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and
                     the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were
                     hidden from them before. In this way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)---that from
                     the preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles,
                     the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which
                     mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33333] Iª q. 117 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Augustinus, V super Gen. ad Litt., sic exponit illam
apostoli auctoritatem. Praemiserat enim apostolus, <i>mihi, omnium
sanctorum minimo, data est gratia haec, illuminare omnes quae sit
dispensatio sacramenti absconditi a saeculis in Deo. Ita dico
absconditi, ut tamen innotesceret principibus et potestatibus in
caelestibus, per Ecclesiam scilicet, multiformis sapientia Dei</i>.
Quasi dicat, ita hoc sacramentum erat absconditum hominibus, ut
tamen Ecclesiae caelesti, quae continetur in principibus et
potestatibus, hoc sacramentum notum esset <i>a saeculis, non ante
saecula, quia ibi primitus Ecclesia fuit, quo post resurrectionem
et ista Ecclesia hominum congreganda est</i>. Potest tamen et
aliter dici, quod <i>illud quod absconditum est, non tantum in Deo
innotescit Angelis, verum etiam hic eis apparet, cum efficitur
atque propalatur</i>, ut Augustinus ibidem subdit. Et sic dum per
apostolos impleta sunt Christi et Ecclesiae mysteria, Angelis
aliqua apparuerunt de huiusmodi mysteriis, quae ante erant eis
occulta. Et per hunc modum potest intelligi quod Hieronymus dicit,
quod, apostolis praedicantibus, Angeli aliqua mysteria cognoverunt,
quia scilicet per praedicationem apostolorum huiusmodi mysteria
explebantur in rebus ipsis, sicut praedicante Paulo convertebantur
gentes; de quo apostolus ibi loquitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in
                     His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33334] Iª q. 117 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod apostoli instruebantur immediate a verbo Dei, non
secundum eius divinitatem, sed inquantum eius humanitas loquebatur.
Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such
                     great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might
                     say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33335] Iª q. 117 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod aliqui homines, etiam in statu viae, sunt maiores
aliquibus Angelis, non quidem actu, sed virtute; inquantum scilicet
habent caritatem tantae virtutis, ut possint mereri maiorem
beatitudinis gradum quam quidam Angeli habeant. Sicut si dicamus
semen alicuius magnae arboris esse maius virtute quam aliquam
parvam arborem, cum tamen multo minus sit in actu.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q117_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q117_A3-p0.1">Q. 117. A. 3. Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work
                     miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his
                     reproof delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira." But in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal
                     matter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33336] Iª q. 117 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod homo per virtutem animae possit corporalem
materiam immutare. Dicit enim Gregorius, II Dialog., quod <i>sancti
miracula aliquando ex prece faciunt, aliquando ex potestate, sicut
Petrus, qui Tabitham mortuam orando suscitavit, Ananiam et Saphiram
mentientes morti increpando tradidit</i>. Sed in operatione
miraculorum fit aliqua immutatio materiae corporalis. Ergo homines
virtute suae animae possunt materiam corporalem immutare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on these words (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.1" target="asv">Gal. 3:1</a>): "Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some have blazing eyes, who by a single
                     look bewitch others, especially children." But this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter.
                     Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33337] Iª q. 117 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
super illud ad Gal. III, <i>quis vos fascinavit veritati non
obedire?</i> Dicit Glossa quod <i>quidam habent</i> oculos urentes,
qui solo aspectu inficiunt alios, et maxime pueros. Sed hoc non
esset, nisi virtus animae posset materiam corporalem immutare. Ergo
homo per virtutem suae animae potest materiam corporalem
immutare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is
                     changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on
                     sickness and death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33338] Iª q. 117 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
corpus humanum est nobilius quam alia inferiora corpora. Sed per
apprehensionem animae humanae immutatur corpus humanum ad calorem
et frigus, ut patet in irascentibus et timentibus; et quandoque
etiam haec immutatio pervenit usque ad aegritudinem et mortem. Ergo
multo magis anima hominis potest sua virtute materiam corporalem
immutare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33339] Iª q. 117 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod <i>materia corporalis
soli Deo obedit ad nutum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q117_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or
                     by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the angels
                     also we have stated (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q117_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal
                     agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter,
                     except by means of bodies.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 co."><a name="33340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33340] Iª q. 117 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut supra dictum est materia corporalis non immutatur ad
formam, nisi vel ab agente aliquo composito ex materia et forma;
vel ab ipso Deo, in quo virtualiter et materia et forma
praeexistit, sicut in primordiali causa utriusque. Unde et de
Angelis supra dictum est quod materiam corporalem immutare non
possunt naturali virtute, nisi applicando corporalia agentia ad
effectus aliquos producendos. Multo igitur minus anima sua virtute
naturali potest immutare materiam corporalem, nisi mediantibus
aliquibus corporibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same
                     place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says---what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?"
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33341] Iª q. 117 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod sancti dicuntur miracula facere ex potestate gratiae,
non naturae. Quod patet per illud quod Gregorius ibidem dicit,
<i>qui filii Dei ex potestate sunt, ut dicit Ioannes, quid mirum si
signa facere ex potestate valeant?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q117_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance
                     rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This
                     he says is the cause of the "evil eye."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q117_A3-p9"> But it has been shown above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q117_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say,
                     that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits
                     takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact
                     with them to a certain distance: in the
                     same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.;
                     [*De Insomniis ii]).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q117_A3-p10"> Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation,
                     the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is
                     also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may
                     have some compact with them.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33342] Iª q. 117 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod fascinationis causam assignavit Avicenna ex hoc, quod
materia corporalis nata est obedire spirituali substantiae magis
quam contrariis agentibus in natura. Et ideo quando anima fuerit
fortis in sua imaginatione, corporalis materia immutatur secundum
eam. Et hanc dicit esse causam oculi fascinantis. Sed supra
ostensum est quod materia corporalis non obedit substantiae
spirituali ad nutum, nisi soli creatori. Et ideo melius dicendum
est, quod ex forti imaginatione animae immutantur spiritus corporis
coniuncti. Quae quidem immutatio spirituum maxime fit in oculis, ad
quos subtiliores spiritus perveniunt. Oculi autem inficiunt aerem
continuum usque ad determinatum spatium, per quem modum specula, si
fuerint nova et pura, contrahunt quandam impuritatem ex aspectu
mulieris menstruatae, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro de Somn. et
Vig. Sic igitur cum aliqua anima fuerit vehementer commota ad
malitiam, sicut maxime in vetulabus contingit, efficitur secundum
modum praedictum aspectus eius venenosus et noxius, et maxime
pueris, qui habent corpus tenerum, et de facili receptivum
impressionis. Possibile est etiam quod ex Dei permissione, vel
etiam ex aliquo facto occulto, cooperetur ad hoc malignitas
Daemonum, cum quibus vetulae sortilegae aliquod foedus habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul is united to the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated
                     above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q81_A3" id="FP_Q117_A3-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[3]</a>), it is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs
                     be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change
                     in exterior bodies, except by means of a
                     change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33343] Iª q. 117 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod anima corpori humano unitur ut forma, et appetitus
sensitivus, qui obedit aliqualiter rationi, ut supra dictum est,
est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Et ideo oportet quod ad
apprehensionem animae humanae, commoveatur appetitus sensitivus cum
aliqua operatione corporali. Ad exteriora vero corpora immutanda
apprehensio animae humanae non sufficit, nisi mediante immutatione
proprii corporis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q117_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q117_A4-p0.1">Q. 117. A. 4. Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance
                     as to local motion, as stated above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A5" id="FP_Q117_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[5]</a>). But the separate soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33344] Iª q. 117 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod anima hominis separata possit corpora
saltem localiter movere. Substantiae enim spirituali naturaliter
obedit corpus ad motum localem, ut supra dictum est. Sed anima
separata est substantia spiritualis. Ergo suo imperio potest
exteriora corpora movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained
                     power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not
                     have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33345] Iª q. 117 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
itinerario Clementis dicitur, narrante Niceta ad Petrum, quod Simon
magus per magicas artes pueri a se interfecti animam retinebat, per
quam magicas operationes efficiebat. Sed hoc esse non potuisset
sine aliqua corporum transmutatione, ad minus locali. Ergo anima
separata habet virtutem localiter movendi corpora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33346] Iª q. 117 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod philosophus dicit, in libro de anima quod anima non potest
movere quodcumque corpus, sed solummodo proprium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the
                     body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey
                     the soul as to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. Therefore within the
                     limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though,
                     by the power of God, it can exceed those limits.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 co."><a name="33347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33347] Iª q. 117 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod anima separata sua naturali virtute non potest movere aliquod
corpus. Manifestum est enim quod, cum anima est corpori unita, non
movet corpus nisi vivificatum, unde si aliquod membrum corporis
mortificetur, non obedit animae ad motum localem. Manifestum est
autem quod ab anima separata nullum corpus vivificatur. Unde nullum
corpus obedit ei ad motum localem, quantum est ex virtute suae
naturae, supra quam potest aliquid ei conferri virtute divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are naturally
                     unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance
                     is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only
                     one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower
                     heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it
                     is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33348] Iª q. 117 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod substantiae quaedam spirituales sunt, quarum virtutes
non determinantur ad aliqua corpora, sicut sunt Angeli, qui sunt
naturaliter a corporibus absoluti, et ideo diversa corpora eis
possunt obedire ad motum. Si tamen alicuius substantiae separatae
virtus motiva determinetur naturaliter ad movendum aliquod corpus,
non poterit illa substantia movere aliquod corpus maius, sed minus,
sicut, secundum philosophos, motor inferioris caeli non posset
movere caelum superius. Unde cum anima secundum suam naturam
determinetur ad movendum corpus cuius est forma, nullum aliud
corpus sua naturali virtute movere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the
                     dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some
                     demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33349] Iª q. 117 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus X de Civ. Dei, et
Chrysostomus super Matth., frequenter Daemones simulant se esse
animas mortuorum, ad confirmandum gentilium errorem, qui hoc
credebant. Et ideo credibile est quod Simon magus illudebatur ab
aliquo Daemone, qui simulabat se esse animam pueri quem ipse
occiderat.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q118" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q118-p0.1">Q. 118. OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q118-p2"> We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul; secondly, as to the body.</p><p id="FP_Q118-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q118-p4"><a href="#FP_Q118_A1"> (1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?</a></p><p id="FP_Q118-p5"><a href="#FP_Q118_A2"> (2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?</a></p><p id="FP_Q118-p6"><a href="#FP_Q118_A3"> (3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 pr."><a name="33350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33350]
Iª q. 118 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
traductione hominis ex homine. Et primo, quantum ad animam;
secundo, quantum ad corpus. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo,
utrum anima sensitiva traducatur cum semine. Secundo, utrum anima
intellectiva. Tertio, utrum omnes animae fuerint simul creatae.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q118_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q118_A1-p0.1">Q. 118. A. 1. Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance,
                     not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation: for nothing
                     is generated save from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body; and since
                     it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist
                     not by generation but by creation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33351] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod anima sensitiva non traducatur cum semine,
sed sit per creationem a Deo. Omnis enim substantia perfecta quae
non est composita ex materia et forma, si esse incipiat, hoc non
est per generationem, sed per creationem, quia nihil generatur nisi
ex materia. Sed anima sensitiva est substantia perfecta, alioquin
non posset movere corpus, et cum sit forma corporis, non est ex
materia et forma composita. Ergo non incipit esse per generationem,
sed per creationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the
                     vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive
                     soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33352] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
principium generationis in rebus viventibus est per potentiam
generativam; quae, cum numeretur inter vires animae vegetabilis,
est infra animam sensitivam. Nihil autem agit ultra suam speciem.
Ergo anima sensitiva non potest causari per vim generativam
animalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But
                     neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere
                     than in some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle
                     of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the
                     sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33353] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
generans generat sibi simile, et sic oportet quod forma generati
sit actu in causa generationis. Sed anima sensitiva non est actu in
semine, nec ipsa nec aliqua pars eius, quia nulla pars animae
sensitivae est nisi in aliqua parte corporis; in semine autem non
est aliqua corporis particula, quia nulla particula corporis est
quae non fiat ex semine, et per virtutem seminis. Ergo anima
sensitiva non causatur ex semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the
                     animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul
                     of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made:
                     or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above
                     (
                     <a href="#FP_Q76_A4" id="FP_Q118_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[4]</a>) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does
                     not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore
                     the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33354] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
in semine est aliquod principium activum animae sensitivae, aut
illud principium manet, generato iam animali; aut non manet. Sed
manere non potest. Quia vel esset idem cum anima sensitiva animalis
generati, et hoc est impossibile, quia sic esset idem generans et
generatum, faciens et factum. Vel esset aliquid aliud, et hoc etiam
est impossibile, quia supra ostensum est quod in uno animali non
est nisi unum principium formale, quod est una anima. Si autem non
manet, hoc etiam videtur impossibile, quia sic aliquod agens ageret
ad corruptionem sui ipsius, quod est impossibile. Non ergo anima
sensitiva potest generari ex semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced
                     from these elements---for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.20" target="asv"> Gn. 1:20</a>: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated
                     are produced by the seminal power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33355] Iª q. 118 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, ita
se habet virtus quae est in semine, ad animalia quae ex semine
generantur, sicut se habet virtus quae est in elementis mundi, ad
animalia quae ex elementis mundi producuntur, sicut quae ex
putrefactione generantur. Sed in huiusmodi animalibus animae
producuntur ex virtute quae est in elementis; secundum illud Gen.
I, <i>producant aquae reptile animae viventis</i>. Ergo et
animalium quae generantur ex semine, animae producuntur ex virtute
quae est in semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q118_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God (
                     <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A4" id="FP_Q118_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[4]</a>). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having
                     being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made
                     except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q118_A1-p8"> But this principle is false---namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above
                     (
                     <a href="#FP_Q75_A3" id="FP_Q118_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[3]</a>): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to
                     existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist
                     forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q118_A1-p9"> Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that
                     both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce
                     the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q118_A1-p10"> Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance
                     to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their
                     like, not through some medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as being more powerful,
                     act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium---in the work of
                     nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium---in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant
                     derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from
                     the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent,
                     so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by some
                     seminal power derived therefrom.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 co."><a name="33356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33356] Iª q. 118 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod quidam posuerunt animas sensitivas animalium a Deo creari.
Quae quidem positio conveniens esset, si anima sensitiva esset res
subsistens, habens per se esse et operationem. Sic enim, sicut per
se haberet esse et operationem, ita per se deberetur ei fieri. Et
cum res simplex et subsistens non possit fieri nisi per creationem,
sequeretur quod anima sensitiva procederet in esse per creationem.
Sed ista radix est falsa, scilicet quod anima sensitiva per se
habeat esse et operationem, ut ex superioribus patet, non enim
corrumperetur, corrupto corpore. Et ideo, cum non sit forma
subsistens, habet se in essendo ad modum aliarum formarum
corporalium, quibus per se non debetur esse, sed esse dicuntur
inquantum composita subsistentia per eas sunt. Unde et ipsis
compositis debetur fieri. Et quia generans est simile generato,
necesse est quod naturaliter tam anima sensitiva, quam aliae
huiusmodi formae, producantur in esse ab aliquibus corporalibus
agentibus transmutantibus materiam de potentia in actum, per
aliquam virtutem corpoream quae est in eis. Quanto autem aliquod
agens est potentius, tanto potest suam actionem diffundere ad magis
distans, sicut quanto aliquod corpus est magis calidum, tanto ad
remotius calefactionem producit. Corpora igitur non viventia, quae
sunt inferiora naturae ordine, generant quidem sibi simile, non per
aliquod medium, sed per seipsa; sicut ignis per seipsum generat
ignem. Sed corpora viventia, tanquam potentiora, agunt ad
generandum sibi simile et sine medio, et per medium. Sine medio
quidem, in opere nutritionis, in quo caro generat carnem, cum medio
vero, in actu generationis, quia ex anima generantis derivatur
quaedam virtus activa ad ipsum semen animalis vel plantae, sicut et
a principali agente derivatur quaedam vis motiva ad instrumentum.
Et sicut non refert dicere quod aliquid moveatur ab instrumento,
vel a principali agente; ita non refert dicere quod anima generati
causetur ab anima generantis, vel a virtute derivata ab ipsa, quae
est in semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q25_A3" id="FP_Q118_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[3]</a>) on this point, nor need we repeat it here.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33357] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod anima sensitiva non est substantia perfecta per se
subsistens. Et de hoc supra dictum est, nec oportet hic
iterare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the
                     generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to
                     so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33358] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod virtus generativa non generat solum in virtute
propria, sed in virtute totius animae, cuius est potentia. Et ideo
virtus generativa plantae generat plantam; virtus vero generativa
animalis generat animal. Quanto enim anima fuerit perfectior, tanto
virtus eius generativa ordinatur ad perfectiorem effectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement
                     of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or
                     the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ;
                     but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is
                     attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies,
                     by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q115_A3" id="FP_Q118_A1-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[115], A[3]</a>, ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been
                     said that "man and the sun generate man." Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's
                     power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33359] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod illa vis activa quae est in semine, ex anima
generantis derivata, est quasi quaedam motio ipsius animae
generantis, nec est anima, aut pars animae, nisi in virtute; sicut
in serra vel securi non est forma lecti, sed motio quaedam ad talem
formam. Et ideo non oportet quod ista vis activa habeat aliquod
organum in actu; sed fundatur in ipso spiritu incluso in semine,
quod est spumosum, ut attestatur eius albedo. In quo etiam spiritu
est quidam calor ex virtute caelestium corporum, quorum etiam
virtute agentia inferiora agunt ad speciem, ut supra dictum est. Et
quia in huiusmodi spiritu concurrit virtus animae cum virtute
caelesti, dicitur quod homo generat hominem, et sol. Calidum autem
elementare se habet instrumentaliter ad virtutem animae, sicut
etiam ad virtutem nutritivam, ut dicitur in II de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener.
                     Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very
                     beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it
                     begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore
                     is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as
                     though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would
                     be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after
                     the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of
                     the
                     thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body,
                     by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved
                     and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal
                     but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33360] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod in animalibus perfectis, quae generantur ex coitu,
virtus activa est in semine maris, secundum philosophum in libro de
Generat. Animal.; materia autem foetus est illud quod ministratur a
femina. In qua quidem materia statim a principio est anima
vegetabilis, non quidem secundum actum secundum, sed secundum actum
primum, sicut anima sensitiva est in dormientibus. Cum autem
incipit attrahere alimentum, tunc iam actu operatur. Huiusmodi
igitur materia transmutatur a virtute quae est in semine maris,
quousque perducatur in actum animae sensitivae, non ita quod
ipsamet vis quae erat in semine, fiat anima sensitiva; quia sic
idem esset generans et generatum; et hoc magis esset simile
nutritioni et augmento, quam generationi, ut philosophus dicit.
Postquam autem per virtutem principii activi quod erat in semine,
producta est anima sensitiva in generato quantum ad aliquam partem
eius principalem, tunc iam illa anima sensitiva prolis incipit
operari ad complementum proprii corporis, per modum nutritionis et
augmenti. Virtus autem activa quae erat in semine, esse desinit,
dissoluto semine, et evanescente spiritu qui inerat. Nec hoc est
inconveniens, quia vis ista non est principale agens, sed
instrumentale; motio autem instrumenti cessat, effectu iam producto
in esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q118_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q118_A2-p0.1">Q. 118. A. 2. Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.46.26" target="asv">Gn. 46:26</a>): "All the souls that came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from
                     the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33361] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva causetur ex semine.
Dicitur enim Gen. XLVI, <i>cunctae animae quae egressae sunt de
femore Iacob, sexaginta sex</i>. Sed nihil egreditur de femore
hominis, nisi inquantum causatur ex semine. Ergo anima intellectiva
causatur ex semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q76_A3" id="FP_Q118_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[3]</a>), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated
                     from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that the animal and the man
                     are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual
                     soul is produced from the
                     semen.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33362] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut supra ostensum est, in homine est una et eadem anima secundum
substantiam, intellectiva, sensitiva et nutritiva. Sed anima
sensitiva in homine generatur ex semine, sicut in aliis animalibus,
unde et philosophus dicit in libro de Generat. Animal., quod non
simul fit animal et homo, sed prius fit animal habens animam
sensitivam. Ergo et anima intellectiva causatur ex semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the
                     form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced
                     by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33363] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unum
et idem agens, est cuius actio terminatur ad formam, et materiam,
alioquin ex forma et materia non fieret unum simpliciter. Sed anima
intellectiva est forma corporis humani, quod formatur per virtutem
seminis. Ergo et anima intellectiva per virtutem seminis
causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man begets his like in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational
                     soul is from the begetter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="33364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33364] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, homo
generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Sed species humana
constituitur per animam rationalem. Ergo anima rationalis est a
generante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in
                     the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created
                     by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="33365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33365] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
inconveniens est dicere quod Deus cooperetur peccantibus. Sed si
animae rationales crearentur a Deo, Deus interdum cooperaretur
adulteris, de quorum illicito coitu proles interdum generatur. Non
ergo animae rationales creantur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the rational soul is not engendered by coition."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33366] Iª q. 118 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., quod <i>animae rationales
non seminantur per coitum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now
                     it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no
                     part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p9"> Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the
                     body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect.
                     Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (De
                     Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows that the intellect alone comes from without."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p10"> Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q118_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through
                     generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing
                     else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with
                     the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 co."><a name="33367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33367] Iª q. 118 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod impossibile est virtutem activam quae est in materia,
extendere suam actionem ad producendum immaterialem effectum.
Manifestum est autem quod principium intellectivum in homine est
principium transcendens materiam, habet enim operationem in qua non
communicat corpus. Et ideo impossibile est quod virtus quae est in
semine, sit productiva intellectivi principii. Similiter etiam quia
virtus quae est in semine agit in virtute animae generantis,
secundum quod anima generantis est actus corporis, utens ipso
corpore in sua operatione. In operatione autem intellectus non
communicat corpus. Unde virtus intellectivi principii, prout
intellectivum est, non potest ad semen pervenire. Et ideo
philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., dicit, <i>relinquitur
intellectus solus de foris advenire</i>. Similiter etiam anima
intellectiva, cum habeat operationem sine corpore, est subsistens,
ut supra habitum est, et ita sibi debetur esse et fieri. Et cum sit
immaterialis substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed
solum per creationem a Deo. Ponere ergo animam intellectivam a
generante causari, nihil est aliud quam ponere eam non
subsistentem; et per consequens corrumpi eam cum corpore. Et ideo
haereticum est dicere quod anima intellectiva traducatur cum
semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33368] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod in auctoritate illa ponitur per synecdochen pars pro
toto, idest anima pro toto homine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from
                     the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment,
                     and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive
                     soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p13"> Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes;
                     and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one
                     would be in potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q76_A3" id="FP_Q118_A2-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[3]</a>).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p14"> Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal
                     power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power,
                     but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason the Philosopher says
                     that the intellect comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no substantial form is
                     susceptible of more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity
                     constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species.
                     Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from
                     the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an
                     animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the
                     beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of further
                     perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called.
                     Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be
                     essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those
                     who held the existence of several souls in the body---or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul:
                     and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p15"> There is again another explanation, according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common: but this has
                     been disproved above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q118_A2-p15.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p16"> We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both
                     in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening
                     form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that through many generations
                     and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is
                     apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created
                     by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being
                     corrupted.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33369] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod aliqui dixerunt quod operationes vitae quae apparent
in embryone, non sunt ab anima eius, sed ab anima matris; vel a
virtute formativa quae est in semine. Quorum utrumque falsum est,
opera enim vitae non possunt esse a principio extrinseco, sicut
sentire, nutriri et augeri. Et ideo dicendum est quod anima
praeexistit in embryone a principio quidem nutritiva, postmodum
autem sensitiva, et tandem intellectiva. Dicunt ergo quidam quod
supra animam vegetabilem quae primo inerat, supervenit alia anima,
quae est sensitiva; et supra illam iterum alia, quae est
intellectiva. Et sic sunt in homine tres animae, quarum una est in
potentia ad aliam. Quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo alii dicunt
quod illa eadem anima quae primo fuit vegetativa tantum, postmodum,
per actionem virtutis quae est in semine, perducitur ad hoc quod
fiat etiam sensitiva; et tandem perducitur ad hoc ut ipsa eadem
fiat intellectiva, non quidem per virtutem activam seminis, sed per
virtutem superioris agentis, scilicet Dei deforis illustrantis. Et
propter hoc dicit philosophus quod intellectus venit ab extrinseco.
Sed hoc stare non potest. Primo quidem, quia nulla forma
substantialis recipit magis et minus; sed superadditio maioris
perfectionis facit aliam speciem, sicut additio unitatis facit
aliam speciem in numeris. Non est autem possibile ut una et eadem
forma numero sit diversarum specierum. Secundo, quia sequeretur
quod generatio animalis esset motus continuus, paulatim procedens
de imperfecto ad perfectum; sicut accidit in alteratione. Tertio,
quia sequeretur quod generatio hominis aut animalis non sit
generatio simpliciter, quia subiectum eius esset ens actu. Si enim
a principio in materia prolis est anima vegetabilis, et postmodum
usque ad perfectum paulatim perducitur; erit semper additio
perfectionis sequentis sine corruptione perfectionis praecedentis.
Quod est contra rationem generationis simpliciter. Quarto, quia aut
id quod causatur ex actione Dei, est aliquid subsistens, et ita
oportet quod sit aliud per essentiam a forma praeexistente, quae
non erat subsistens; et sic redibit opinio ponentium plures animas
in corpore. Aut non est aliquid subsistens, sed quaedam perfectio
animae praeexistentis, et sic ex necessitate sequitur quod anima
intellectiva corrumpatur, corrupto corpore; quod est impossibile.
Est autem et alius modus dicendi, secundum eos qui ponunt unum
intellectum in omnibus. Quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo dicendum
est quod, cum generatio unius semper sit corruptio alterius,
necesse est dicere quod tam in homine quam in animalibus aliis,
quando perfectior forma advenit, fit corruptio prioris, ita tamen
quod sequens forma habet quidquid habebat prima, et adhuc amplius.
Et sic per multas generationes et corruptiones pervenitur ad
ultimam formam substantialem, tam in homine quam in aliis
animalibus. Et hoc ad sensum apparet in animalibus ex putrefactione
generatis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod anima intellectiva creatur
a Deo in fine generationis humanae, quae simul est et sensitiva et
nutritiva, corruptis formis praeexistentibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to
                     one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior
                     agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter,
                     but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has been
                     said above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A5" id="FP_Q118_A2-p17.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[5]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q118_A2-p17.2" shape="rect">Q[110], A[1]</a>) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders
                     the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33370] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ratio illa locum habet in diversis agentibus non
ordinatis ad invicem. Sed si sint multa agentia ordinata, nihil
prohibet virtutem superioris agentis pertingere ad ultimam formam;
virtutes autem inferiorum agentium pertingere solum ad aliquam
materiae dispositionem; sicut virtus seminis disponit materiam,
virtus autem animae dat formam, in generatione animalis. Manifestum
est autem ex praemissis quod tota natura corporalis agit ut
instrumentum spiritualis virtutis; et praecipue Dei. Et ideo nihil
prohibet quin formatio corporis sit ab aliqua virtute corporali,
anima autem intellectiva sit a solo Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p18">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33371] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod homo generat sibi simile, inquantum per virtutem
seminis eius disponitur materia ad susceptionem talis formae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p19">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil;
                     in this God does not concur.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="33372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33372] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod in actione adulterorum, illud quod est naturae, bonum
est, et huic cooperatur Deus. Quod vero est inordinatae voluptatis,
malum est, et huic Deus non cooperatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q118_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q118_A3-p0.1">Q. 118. A. 3. Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv">Gn. 2:2</a>): "God rested Him from all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore
                     all souls were created at the same time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33373] Iª q. 118 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod animae humanae fuerint creatae simul a
principio mundi. Dicitur enim Gen. II, <i>requievit Deus ab omni
opere quod patrarat</i>. Hoc autem non esset, si quotidie novas
animas crearet. Ergo omnes animae sunt simul creatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created
                     with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently
                     at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv"> Gn. 2:2, </a> where it is said that "God ended" all "His work."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33374] Iª q. 118 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad
perfectionem universi maxime pertinent substantiae spirituales. Si
igitur animae simul crearentur cum corporibus, quotidie
innumerabiles spirituales substantiae perfectioni universi
adderentur, et sic universum a principio fuisset imperfectum. Quod
est contra illud quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>Deum omne opus suum
complesse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore
                     it began to exist before the body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33375] Iª q. 118 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
finis rei respondet eius principio. Sed anima intellectiva remanet,
destructo corpore. Ergo incoepit esse ante corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the soul is created together with the body."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33376] Iª q. 118 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., quod <i>simul anima
creatur cum corpore</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q118_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is
                     of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of
                     men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false. Firstly, in the very principle on
                     which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would
                     follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above
                     (
                     <a href="#FP_Q75_A4" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[4]</a>). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding,
                     as shown above (
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>;
                     <a href="#FP_Q85_A1" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[85], A[1]</a> ): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q84_A6" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[84], AA[6]</a>,7;
                     <a href="#FP_Q85_A1" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.5" shape="rect">Q[85], A[1]</a>). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part:
                     whereas this cannot be said of an angel.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q118_A3-p7"> Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body,
                     it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection.
                     Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without
                     a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q118_A3-p8"> But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united
                     to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed
                     it---this seems incongruous. First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did
                     not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not
                     fail in what is necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the
                     world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above
                     time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance:
                     since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur---to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the
                     begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of
                     some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion
                     of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable,
                     we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into
                     them.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 co."><a name="33377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33377] Iª q. 118 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod quidam posuerunt quod animae intellectivae accidat uniri
corpori, ponentes eam esse eiusdem conditionis cum substantiis
spiritualibus quae corpori non uniuntur. Et ideo posuerunt animas
hominum simul a principio cum Angelis creatas. Sed haec opinio
falsa est. Primo quidem, quantum ad radicem. Si enim accidentaliter
conveniret animae corpori uniri, sequeretur quod homo, qui ex ista
unione constituitur, esset ens per accidens; vel quod anima esset
homo, quod falsum est, ut supra ostensum est. Quod etiam anima
humana non sit eiusdem naturae cum Angelis, ipse diversus modus
intelligendi ostendit, ut supra ostensum est, homo enim intelligit
a sensibus accipiendo, et convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra
ostensum est. Et ideo indiget uniri corpori, quo indiget ad
operationem sensitivae partis. Quod de Angelo dici non potest.
Secundo apparet falsitas in ipsa positione. Si enim animae naturale
est corpori uniri, esse sine corpore est sibi contra naturam, et
sine corpore existens non habet suae naturae perfectionem. Non fuit
autem conveniens ut Deus ab imperfectis suum opus inchoaret, et ab
his quae sunt praeter naturam, non enim fecit hominem sine manu aut
sine pede, quae sunt partes naturales hominis. Multo igitur minus
fecit animam sine corpore. Si vero aliquis dicat quod non est
naturale animae corpori uniri, oportet inquirere causam quare sint
corporibus unitae. Oportet autem dicere quod aut hoc sit factum ex
eius voluntate; aut ex alia causa. Si ex eius voluntate, videtur
hoc esse inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec voluntas
irrationabilis esset, si non indigeret corpore, et vellet ei uniri,
si enim eo indigeret, naturale esset ei quod corpori uniretur, quia
natura non deficit in necessariis. Secundo, quia nulla ratio esset
quare animae a principio mundi creatae, post tot tempora voluntas
accesserit ut nunc corpori uniatur. Est enim substantia spiritualis
supra tempus, utpote revolutiones caeli excedens. Tertio quia
videretur a casu esse quod haec anima huic corpori uniretur, cum ad
hoc requiratur concursus duarum voluntatum, scilicet animae
advenientis, et hominis generantis. Si autem praeter voluntatem
ipsius corpori unitur, et praeter eius naturam; oportet quod hoc
sit ex causa violentiam inferente, et sic erit ei poenale et
triste. Quod est secundum errorem Origenis, qui posuit animas
incorporari propter poenam peccati. Unde cum haec omnia sint
inconvenientia, simpliciter confitendum est quod animae non sunt
creatae ante corpora, sed simul creantur cum corporibus
infunduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.17" target="asv">Jn. 5:17</a>): "My Father worketh until now"; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed
                     in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species,
                     in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's soul.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33378] Iª q. 118 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Deus dicitur cessasse die septimo, non quidem ab omni
opere, cum dicatur Ioan. V, <i>pater meus usque modo operatur</i>;
sed a novis rerum generibus et speciebus condendis, quae in
operibus primis non aliquo modo praeextiterint. Sic enim animae
quae nunc creantur, praeextiterunt secundum similitudinem speciei
in primis operibus, in quibus anima Adae creata fuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number
                     of species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33379] Iª q. 118 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod perfectioni universi, quantum ad numerum
individuorum, quotidie potest addi aliquid, non autem quantum ad
numerum specierum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was
                     not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>,
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.16" target="asv">16</a>): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33380] Iª q. 118 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod hoc quod anima remanet sine corpore, contingit per
corporis corruptionem, quae consecuta est ex peccato. Unde non fuit
conveniens quod ab hoc inciperent Dei opera, quia, sicut scriptum
est Sap. I, <i>Deus mortem non fecit, sed impii manibus et verbis
accersierunt eam</i>.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q119" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q119-p0.1">Q. 119. OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q119-p2"> We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q119-p3"><a href="#FP_Q119_A1"> (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?</a></p><p id="FP_Q119-p4"><a href="#FP_Q119_A2"> (2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 pr."><a name="33381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33381]
Iª q. 119 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
propagatione hominis quantum ad corpus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur
duo. Primo, utrum aliquid de alimento convertatur in veritatem
humanae naturae. Secundo, utrum semen, quod est humanae
generationis principium, sit de superfluo alimenti.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q119_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q119_A1-p0.1">Q. 119. A. 1. Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q119_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.17" target="asv">Mat. 15:17</a>): "Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy." But what is cast out is not
                     changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33382] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod nihil de alimento transeat in veritatem
humanae naturae. Dicitur enim Matth. XV, <i>omne quod in os intrat,
in ventrem vadit, et per secessum emittitur</i>. Sed quod
emittitur, non transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Ergo nihil de
alimento in veritatem humanae naturae transit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the "species" from flesh belonging to "matter";
                     and says that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food
                     is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore
                     the food is not changed into true human nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33383] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus, in I de Generat., distinguit carnem secundum speciem,
et secundum materiam; et dicit quod caro secundum materiam advenit
et recedit. Quod autem ex alimento generatur, advenit et recedit.
Ergo id in quod alimentum convertitur, est caro secundum materiam,
non autem caro secundum speciem. Sed hoc pertinet ad veritatem
humanae naturae, quod pertinet ad speciem eius. Ergo alimentum non
transit in veritatem humanae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according
                     to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true
                     human nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33384] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad
veritatem humanae naturae pertinere videtur humidum radicale; quod
si deperdatur, restitui non potest, ut medici dicunt. Posset autem
restitui, si alimentum converteretur in ipsum humidum. Ergo
nutrimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due
                     only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33385] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
alimentum transiret in veritatem humanae naturae, quidquid in
homine deperditur, restaurari posset. Sed mors hominis non accidit
nisi per deperditionem alicuius. Posset igitur homo per sumptionem
alimenti in perpetuum se contra mortem tueri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for
                     what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow
                     that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically
                     the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same,
                     identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="33386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33386] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, si
alimentum in veritatem humanae naturae transiret, nihil esset in
homine quod non posset recedere et reparari, quia id quod in homine
generatur ex alimento, et recedere et reparari potest. Si ergo homo
diu viveret, sequeretur quod nihil quod in eo fuit materialiter in
principio suae generationis, finaliter remaneret in ipso. Et sic
non esset idem homo numero per totam vitam suam, cum ad hoc quod
aliquid sit idem numero, requiratur identitas materiae. Hoc autem
est inconveniens. Non ergo alimentum transit in veritatem humanae
naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture
                     of the members." But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality
                     of human nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33387] Iª q. 119 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., <i>alimenta carnis
corrupta, idest amittentia formam suam, in membrorum fabricam
migrant</i>. Sed fabrica membrorum pertinet ad veritatem humanae
naturae. Ergo alimenta transeunt in veritatem humanae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore
                     that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered
                     in two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common
                     matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate
                     matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus
                     a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul
                     and this body.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p9"> Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist
                     save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain
                     individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have
                     been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human
                     nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p10"> But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in
                     this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed
                     into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent
                     the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed
                     by fire.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p11"> But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter,
                     or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely.
                     Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human
                     body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be
                     changed into true human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is
                     only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one
                     individual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect
                     of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the
                     substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied;
                     for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. Therefore
                     some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently
                     no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other
                     things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of
                     matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect
                     than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things
                     were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form." Consequently the multiplication of
                     the
                     human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, since man does
                     not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants
                     do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which
                     multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does
                     anything
                     increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of
                     generation and nourishment, which are called "natural forces," would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p12"> Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature
                     in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain
                     determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter
                     until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true
                     human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through
                     the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase
                     required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary
                     existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does
                     not
                     belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of
                     living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not
                     the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore,
                     would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly,
                     because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above (
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A1" id="FP_Q119_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[118], A[1]</a>). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power
                     a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true
                     form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for
                     growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of
                     natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore
                     just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p13"> Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its
                     assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food
                     nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 co."><a name="33388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33388] Iª q. 119 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, secundum philosophum, II Metaphys., <i>hoc modo se habet
unumquodque ad veritatem, sicut se habet ad esse</i>. Illud ergo
pertinet ad veritatem naturae alicuius, quod est de constitutione
naturae ipsius. Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo,
in communi, secundum rationem speciei; alio modo, secundum quod est
in hoc individuo. Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi
consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in communi accepta, ad
veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet
materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam
individuata. Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est
anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et
Martino, est haec anima et hoc corpus. Sunt autem quaedam, quorum
formae non possunt salvari nisi in una materia signata, sicut forma
solis non potest salvari nisi in materia quae actu sub ea
continetur. Et secundum hunc modum, aliqui posuerunt quod forma
humana non potest salvari nisi in materia quadam signata, quae
scilicet a principio fuit tali forma formata in primo homine. Ita
quod quidquid aliud praeter illud quod ex primo parente in posteros
derivatur, additum fuerit, non pertinet ad veritatem humanae
naturae, quasi non vere accipiat formam humanae naturae. Sed illa
materia quae in primo homine formae humanae fuit subiecta, in
seipsa multiplicatur, et hoc modo multitudo humanorum corporum a
corpore primi hominis derivatur. Et secundum hos, alimentum non
convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, sed dicunt quod alimentum
accipitur ut quoddam fomentum naturae, idest ut resistat actioni
caloris naturalis, ne consumat humidum radicale; sicut plumbum vel
stannum adiungitur argento, ne consumatur per ignem. Sed haec
positio est multipliciter irrationabilis. Primo quidem, quia
eiusdem rationis est quod aliqua forma possit fieri in alia
materia, et quod possit propriam materiam deserere, et ideo omnia
generabilia sunt corruptibilia, et e converso. Manifestum est autem
quod forma humana potest deficere ab hac materia quae ei
subiicitur, alioquin corpus humanum corruptibile non esset. Unde
relinquitur quod et alii materiae advenire possit, aliquo alio in
veritatem humanae naturae transeunte. Secundo, quia in omnibus
quorum materia invenitur tota sub uno individuo, non est nisi unum
individuum in una specie, sicut patet in sole et luna, et
huiusmodi. Sic igitur non esset nisi unum individuum humanae
speciei. Tertio, quia non est possibile quod multiplicatio materiae
attendatur nisi vel secundum quantitatem tantum, sicut accidit in
rarefactis, quorum materia suscipit maiores dimensiones; vel etiam
secundum substantiam materiae. Sola autem eadem substantia materiae
manente, non potest dici quod sit multiplicata, quia idem ad
seipsum non constituit multitudinem, cum necesse sit omnem
multitudinem ex aliqua divisione causari. Unde oportet quod aliqua
alia substantia materiae adveniat, vel per creationem, vel per
conversionem alterius in ipsam. Unde relinquitur quod non potest
aliqua materia multiplicari, nisi vel per rarefactionem, sicut cum
ex aqua fit aer; vel per conversionem alterius rei, sicut
multiplicatur ignis per additionem lignorum; vel per creationem
materiae. Sed manifestum est multiplicationem materiae in humanis
corporibus non accidere per rarefactionem, quia sic corpora hominum
perfectae aetatis essent imperfectiora quam corpora puerorum. Nec
iterum per creationem novae materiae, quia secundum Gregorium,
<i>omnia sunt simul creata secundum substantiam materiae, licet non
secundum speciem formae</i>. Unde relinquitur quod multiplicatio
corporis humani non fit nisi per hoc, quod alimentum convertitur in
veritatem humani corporis. Quarto, quia cum homo non differat ab
animalibus et plantis secundum animam vegetabilem, sequeretur quod
etiam corpora animalium et plantarum non multiplicarentur per
conversionem alimenti in corpus nutritum, sed per quandam
multiplicationem. Quae non potest esse naturalis, cum materia
secundum naturam non extendatur nisi usque ad certam quantitatem;
nec iterum inveniatur aliquid naturaliter crescere, nisi per
rarefactionem, vel conversionem alterius in ipsum. Et sic totum
opus generativae et nutritivae, quae dicuntur vires naturales,
esset miraculosum. Quod est omnino inconveniens. Unde alii dixerunt
quod forma humana potest quidem fieri de novo in aliqua alia
materia, si consideretur natura humana in communi, non autem si
accipiatur prout est in hoc individuo, in quo forma humana fixa
manet in quadam materia determinata, cui primo imprimitur in
generatione huius individui, ita quod illam materiam nunquam
deserit usque ad ultimam individui corruptionem. Et hanc materiam
dicunt principaliter pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae. Sed
quia huiusmodi materia non sufficit ad quantitatem debitam,
requiritur ut adveniat alia materia per conversionem alimenti in
substantiam nutriti, quantum sufficiat ad debitum augmentum. Et
hanc materiam dicunt secundario pertinere ad veritatem humanae
naturae, quia non requiritur ad primum esse individui, sed ad
quantitatem eius. Iam vero si quid aliud advenit ex alimento, non
pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, proprie loquendo. Sed hoc
etiam est inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec opinio iudicat de
materia corporum viventium, ad modum corporum inanimatorum; in
quibus etsi sit virtus ad generandum simile in specie, non tamen
est virtus in eis ad generandum aliquid sibi simile secundum
individuum; quae quidem virtus in corporibus viventibus est virtus
nutritiva. Nihil ergo per virtutem nutritivam adderetur corporibus
viventibus, si alimentum in veritatem naturae ipsorum non
converteretur. Secundo quia virtus activa quae est in semine, est
quaedam impressio derivata ab anima generantis, sicut supra dictum
est. Unde non potest esse maioris virtutis in agendo, quam ipsa
anima a qua derivatur. Si ergo ex virtute seminis vere assumit
aliqua materia formam naturae humanae, multo magis anima in
nutrimentum coniunctum poterit veram formam naturae humanae
imprimere per potentiam nutritivam. Tertio, quia nutrimento
indigetur non solum ad augmentum, alioquin terminato augmento
necessarium non esset, sed etiam ad restaurandum illud quod
deperditur per actionem caloris naturalis. Non autem esset
restauratio, nisi id quod ex alimento generatur, succederet in
locum deperditi. Unde sicut id quod primo inerat, est de veritate
humanae naturae, ita et id quod ex alimento generatur. Et ideo,
secundum alios, dicendum est quod alimentum vere convertitur in
veritatem humanae naturae, inquantum vere accipit speciem carnis et
ossis et huiusmodi partium. Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus in II
de anima, quod <i>alimentum nutrit inquantum est potentia
caro</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters into the mouth, but "all"---because something from every kind of food
                     is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and
                     be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33389] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod dominus non dicit quod totum quod in os intrat, per
secessum emittatur, sed omne, quia de quolibet cibo aliquid impurum
per secessum emittitur. Vel potest dici quod quidquid ex alimento
generatur, potest etiam per calorem naturalem resolvi, et per poros
quosdam occultos emitti, ut Hieronymus exponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from
                     the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what
                     is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the
                     mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that "just as in things which have their
                     species in matter"---for instance, wood or stone---"so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something
                     belonging to matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally,
                     or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water
                     is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added,
                     cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying
                     that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p16"> It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh
                     considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that
                     which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition.
                     But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and
                     renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is
                     substituted in its place.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33390] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod aliqui per carnem secundum speciem intellexerunt id
quod primo accipit speciem humanam, quod sumitur a generante, et
hoc dicunt semper manere, quousque individuum durat. Carnem vero
secundum materiam dicunt esse quae generatur ex alimento, et hanc
dicunt non semper permanere, sed quod sicut advenit, ita abscedit.
Sed hoc est contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim ibi quod,
sicut in unoquoque habentium speciem in materia, puta in ligno et
lapide, <i>ita et in carne hoc est secundum speciem, et illud
secundum materiam</i>. Manifestum est autem quod praedicta
distinctio locum non habet in rebus inanimatis, quae non generantur
ex semine, nec nutriuntur. Et iterum, cum id quod ex alimento
generatur, adiungatur corpori nutrito per modum mixtionis, sicut
aqua miscetur vino, ut ponit exemplum ibidem philosophus; non
potest alia esse natura eius quod advenit, et eius cui advenit, cum
iam sit factum unum per veram mixtionem. Unde nulla ratio est quod
unum consumatur per calorem naturalem, et alterum maneat. Et ideo
aliter dicendum est, quod haec distinctio philosophi non est
secundum diversas carnes, sed est eiusdem carnis secundum diversam
considerationem. Si enim consideretur caro secundum speciem, idest
secundum id quod est formale in ipsa, sic semper manet, quia semper
manet natura carnis, et dispositio naturalis ipsius. Sed si
consideretur caro secundum materiam, sic non manet, sed paulatim
consumitur et restauratur, sicut patet in igne fornacis, cuius
forma manet, sed materia paulatim consumitur, et alia in locum eius
substituitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot
                     be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the "nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly
                     the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue
                     of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33391] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ad humidum radicale intelligitur pertinere totum id
in quo fundatur virtus speciei. Quod si subtrahatur, restitui non
potest, sicut si amputetur manus aut pes, vel aliquid huiusmodi.
Sed humidum nutrimentale est quod nondum pervenit ad suscipiendum
perfecte naturam speciei, sed est in via ad hoc; sicut est sanguis,
et alia huiusmodi. Unde si talia subtrahantur, remanet adhuc virtus
speciei in radice, quae non tollitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p18">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming
                     virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth.
                     Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this;
                     and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether,
                     the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water,
                     so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33392] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod omnis virtus in corpore passibili per continuam
actionem debilitatur, quia huiusmodi agentia etiam patiuntur. Et
ideo virtus conversiva in principio quidem tam fortis est, ut
possit convertere non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem
deperditi, sed etiam ad augmentum. Postea vero non potest
convertere nisi quantum sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, et
tunc cessat augmentum. Demum nec hoc potest, et tunc fit diminutio.
Deinde, deficiente huiusmodi virtute totaliter, animal moritur.
Sicut virtus vini convertentis aquam admixtam, paulatim per
admixtionem aquae debilitatur, ut tandem totum fiat aquosum, ut
philosophus exemplificat in I de Generat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p19">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be
                     generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the
                     entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire.
                     But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until
                     the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes
                     into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed
                     by natural heat.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="33393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33393] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I de Generat. quando
aliqua materia per se convertitur in ignem, tunc dicitur ignis de
novo generari, quando vero aliqua materia convertitur in ignem
praeexistentem, dicitur ignis nutriri. Unde si tota materia simul
amittat speciem ignis, et alia materia convertatur in ignem, erit
alius ignis numero. Si vero, paulatim combusto uno ligno, aliud
substituatur, et sic deinceps quousque omnia prima consumantur,
semper remanet idem ignis numero, quia semper quod additur, transit
in praeexistens. Et similiter est intelligendum in corporibus
viventibus, in quibus ex nutrimento restauratur id quod per calorem
naturalem consumitur.</p></div></div></div></div>


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author	ht
date	Sun, 23 Mar 2014 09:02:04 +0000
parents	f5ba56cfd1ca
children	30f7e2119f52