Aquinas: summa/english/FS_v.html comparison

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date	Sat, 30 Oct 2021 14:35:05 +0000
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 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p11">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we
 have said about art (ad 1).
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q58_A2-p12"> The same applies to the Third Objection.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q58_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b>  The same applies to the Third Objection.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p13">
 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence,
 but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction
 of prudence.
 </p>
 inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed:
 while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure. Thus when through anger,
 one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the
 immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q60_A2-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other
+<p id="FS_Q60_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b>  This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other
 two consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations,
 in others, about passions, for the reason given above.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p10"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p11"></p>
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p8"> Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective
 matter, and thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal in comparison with the
 other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue
 which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the
-pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail:
+pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q61_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> Thus again do the objections fail:
 because the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called principal by reason of their matter, as
-stated above.
+stated above.</p>
-</p>
-<p id="FS_Q61_A3-p9"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p10"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A4.html"></a>
 </div>
 <div id="FS_Q61_A4" class="div4">
 mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to
 remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be
 unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered
 by toil."
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q61_A4-p9"> From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps
+<p id="FS_Q61_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b>  From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps
 the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions
 of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p10">
 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however,
 <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p7"> But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and
 receive from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch
 as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on (
 <a id="FS_Q62_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A8.html">SS, Q[23], A[8]</a>).
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q62_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q62_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b>  This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs
 to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not
 already possessed, but which he hopes to possess.
 </p>
 various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various circumstances.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p10"> It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to
 perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q63_A1-p11"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by
+<p id="FS_Q63_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objections:</b>  This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by
 nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition
 which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p12"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p13"></p>
 due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions wherein the right cannot be established
 in the same way, since men are variously situated in relation to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established
 in the passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the
 passions.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q64_A2-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very
+<p id="FS_Q64_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objections:</b>  This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very
 act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p9"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p10"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html"></a>
 acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having
 a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): "That which
 is
 scarcely lacking is not lacking at all."
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q65_A1-p12"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q65_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b>  This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p13">
 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various
 sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about
 passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial
 passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p11">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness
 for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q66_A2-p12"> This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q66_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b>  This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p13"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p14"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A3.html"></a>
 </div>
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards
 "commutations and distributions"; of fortitude, as to "matters of terror and danger"; of temperance, in respect of "lewd desires."
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q67_A1-p10"> The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of
+<p id="FS_Q67_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of
 the virtues.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p11">
 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold state after this life; one before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the body;
 the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p12">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will
 be perfected also.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q67_A3-p13"> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q67_A3-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p14"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p15"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A2.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A4.html"></a>
 </div>
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices
 are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q70_A4-p10"> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q70_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p11"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p12"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A3.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q71.html"></a>
 </div>
 <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure;
 but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says
 (De Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q72_A2-p10"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q72_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p11">
 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are
 named, is carnal pleasure.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p12">
 the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q77_A1-p10"> The Third Objection is solved in like manner.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q77_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Third Objection is solved in like manner.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p11"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p12"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q77.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A2.html"></a>
 </div>
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p10">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according
 to local movement, as explained above.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q80_A2-p11"> Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q80_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p12"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p13"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A3.html"></a>
 </div>
 said to be the "beginning" of every sin. On the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which
 by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that,
 from this point of view, covetousness is said to be the "root" of all evils, as stated above
 <a id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q84_A2-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q84_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from the
 fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things.
 Wherefore, in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special sin, but rather that general condition of
 every sin, consisting in its turning away from God. It may also be said that
 Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin.
 Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of
 which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes
 mode, species and order.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q85_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q85_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1&amp;2:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p10"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p11"></p>
 that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an
 incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of nature,
 and by the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the
 <a id="FS_Q85_A6-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. It is in this sense that it is said that "God made not death," and that death is the punishment of sin.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q85_A6-p11"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q85_A6-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1--3:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p12"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p13"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q86.html"></a>
 </div>
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p5">
 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated
 <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
 </p>
+<p id="FS_Q88_A4-p5a">
+<b>On the contrary,</b>
+Those which differ infinitely, are not be transformed one to another.  But a mortal sin
+differs infinitely from a venial sin, as is apparent from the above <a
+id="FS_Q88_A4-p5a" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html">(Q[87] A[5])</a>.
+Therefore venial [sin] cannot become mortal. [HST translation, missing
+from original]</p>
 <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p6">
 <b>I answer that,</b> The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be
 at first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act
 of the will: so that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be continuous physically. If, however,
 the will be not changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal.

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