--- a/summa/english/FS_v.html	Tue May 11 17:31:18 2021 +0000
+++ b/summa/english/FS_v.html	Sat Oct 30 14:35:05 2021 +0000
@@ -1303,7 +1303,7 @@
                      <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we
                      have said about art (ad 1).
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p12"> The same applies to the Third Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b>  The same applies to the Third Objection.</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p13">
                      <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence,
                      but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction
@@ -1949,7 +1949,7 @@
                      one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the
                      immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other
+                  <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b>  This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other
                      two consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations,
                      in others, about passions, for the reason given above.
                   </p>
@@ -2368,11 +2368,10 @@
                      matter, and thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal in comparison with the
                      other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue
                      which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the
-                     pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail:
+                     pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> Thus again do the objections fail:
                      because the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called principal by reason of their matter, as
-                     stated above.
-                  </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p9"></p>
+                     stated above.</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p10"></p>
                   <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html"></a>
                   <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A4.html"></a>
@@ -2448,7 +2447,7 @@
                      unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered
                      by toil."
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p9"> From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps
+                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b>  From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps
                      the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions
                      of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.
                   </p>
@@ -2797,7 +2796,7 @@
                      as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on (
                      <a id="FS_Q62_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A8.html">SS, Q[23], A[8]</a>).
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b>  This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p9">
                      <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs
                      to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not
@@ -2892,7 +2891,7 @@
                   <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p10"> It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to
                      perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p11"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by
+                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objections:</b>  This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by
                      nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition
                      which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue.
                   </p>
@@ -3218,7 +3217,7 @@
                      in the passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the
                      passions.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very
+                  <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objections:</b>  This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very
                      act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice.
                   </p>
                   <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p9"></p>
@@ -3459,7 +3458,7 @@
                      is
                      scarcely lacking is not lacking at all."
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p12"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b>  This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p13">
                      <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various
                      sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about
@@ -3912,7 +3911,7 @@
                      <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness
                      for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p12"> This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b>  This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p13"></p>
                   <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p14"></p>
                   <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html"></a>
@@ -4268,7 +4267,7 @@
                      <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards
                      "commutations and distributions"; of fortitude, as to "matters of terror and danger"; of temperance, in respect of "lewd desires."
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p10"> The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of
+                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of
                      the virtues.
                   </p>
                   <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p11">
@@ -4452,7 +4451,8 @@
                      <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will
                      be perfected also.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p13"> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p13"> 
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p14"></p>
                   <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p15"></p>
                   <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A2.html"></a>
@@ -5983,7 +5983,7 @@
                      <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices
                      are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p10"> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p11"></p>
                   <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p12"></p>
                   <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A3.html"></a>
@@ -6568,7 +6568,7 @@
                      but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says
                      (De Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p10"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p11">
                      <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are
                      named, is carnal pleasure.
@@ -9051,7 +9051,7 @@
                   <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p9">
                      <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p10"> The Third Objection is solved in like manner.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Third Objection is solved in like manner.</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p11"></p>
                   <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p12"></p>
                   <a href="summa.FS_Q77.html"></a>
@@ -10283,7 +10283,7 @@
                      <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according
                      to local movement, as explained above.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p11"> Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p12"></p>
                   <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p13"></p>
                   <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html"></a>
@@ -11427,7 +11427,7 @@
                      from this point of view, covetousness is said to be the "root" of all evils, as stated above 
                      <a id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p9">
                      <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from the
                      fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things.
@@ -11897,7 +11897,7 @@
                      which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes
                      mode, species and order.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1&amp;2:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p9">
                      <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together.
                   </p>
@@ -12044,7 +12044,7 @@
                      and by the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the 
                      <a id="FS_Q85_A6-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. It is in this sense that it is said that "God made not death," and that death is the punishment of sin.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p11"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1--3:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p12"></p>
                   <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p13"></p>
                   <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html"></a>
@@ -13008,6 +13008,13 @@
                      <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated 
                      <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
                   </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p5a">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b>
+Those which differ infinitely, are not be transformed one to another.  But a mortal sin
+differs infinitely from a venial sin, as is apparent from the above <a
+id="FS_Q88_A4-p5a" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html">(Q[87] A[5])</a>.
+Therefore venial [sin] cannot become mortal. [HST translation, missing
+from original]</p>
                   <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p6">
                      <b>I answer that,</b> The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be
                      at first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act
@@ -13613,4 +13620,4 @@
             <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A4.html"></a>
             <a href="summa.FS_Q55.html"></a>
          `
-     </div>
\ No newline at end of file
+     </div>