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            <h2 id="FS.v-p0.1">TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ[55]-89) GOOD HABITS, i.e. VIRTUES (QQ[55]-70)</h2>
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               <h3 id="FS_Q55-p0.1">OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q55-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q55-p2"> We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since habits, as we have said (
                  <a id="FS_Q55-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html">Q[54], A[3]</a>), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters
                  connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins.
                  Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division
                  of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue.
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q55-p3"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q55-p4"> (1) Whether human virtue is a habit?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q55-p5"> (2) Whether it is an operative habit?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q55-p6"> (3) Whether it is a good habit?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q55-p7"> (4) Of the definition of virtue.</p>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q55_A1-p0.1">Whether human virtue is a habit?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit
                     of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore
                     virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will."
                     But use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But
                     we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue is the order of love," and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering
                     which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use." Now order, or ordering,
                     denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither
                     therefore are human virtues habits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and virtue are habits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But
                     the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p9"> Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And
                     therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not
                     determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of
                     habits, as is clear from what we have said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q55_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a> ). Therefore human virtues
                     are habits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act:
                     for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which
                     we believe. When therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest
                     point to which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a
                     man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say 'strength,' which is the original signification
                     of the Latin 'virtus': thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its 'strength'] is put at a hundredweight,
                     and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to which
                     virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus
                     we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run
                     by the motive power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love
                     is set in order by virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we
                     have said.
                  </p>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q55_A2-p0.1">Whether human virtue is an operative habit?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health
                     and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither
                     is virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from
                     the Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while some have a virtue to be not always, but at some
                     definite time. Now as natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational beings. Therefore also human virtue
                     is referred not only to act, but also to being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best."
                     Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3" target="asv">Eccl. 3</a>, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.6" target="asv">6</a>, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Eccl.14" target="asv">14</a>) to Whom the soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference
                     to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not,
                     therefore, an operative habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that "virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some perfection of power, as we have said above 
                     <a id="FS_Q55_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Wherefore, since power [*The one Latin word 'potentia' is rendered 'potentiality' in the first case, and 'power' in the
                     second] is of two kinds, namely, power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; the perfection of each of these
                     is called virtue. But power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is
                     potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything
                     acts in so far as it is in act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p7"> Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common
                     with other animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and body: and only those forces
                     which are proper to the soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human virtue, of which we are
                     speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human
                     virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative
                     habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue
                     is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding
                     disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so
                     far as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another,
                     and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty,
                     which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which
                     are proper to man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have
                     said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q55_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in
                     an operation.
                  </p>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q55_A3-p0.1">Whether human virtue is a good habit?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense.
                     But there is a virtue even of sin; according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.56" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:56</a>: "The virtue [Douay: 'strength'] of sin is the Law." Therefore virtue is not always a good habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only referred to good, but also to evil: according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5" target="asv">Is. 5</a>: "Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness." Therefore virtue also is referred to good and
                     evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:9</a>): "Virtue [Douay: 'power'] is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only
                     to good, but also to evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher says
                     (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above 
                     <a id="FS_Q55_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now
                     the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that every
                     evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue
                     which is an operative habit, is a
                     good habit, productive of good works.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief or
                     robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is
                     applied to evil things: so that the "virtue" of sin is said to be law, in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through
                     the law, so as to attain to the limit of its possibility.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, together
                     with this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in
                     direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But the perfection of that power, since it is compatible
                     with a falling away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of
                     the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be "made perfect in
                     infirmity," not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers.
                  </p>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q55_A4-p0.1">Whether virtue is suitably defined?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind,
                     by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness,
                     since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is
                     therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a "good quality."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than
                     quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference
                     of quality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the
                     field, it is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says
                     (Ethic. iii, 10). Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue.
                     It is therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue, when we say that virtue is that "by which we live
                     righteously."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule,
                     that "pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is untrue, therefore, "that no one can make bad use of
                     virtue."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.11" target="asv"> Jn. 15:11</a>: "He shall do greater things than these," says [*Tract. xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.11" target="asv">Ap. 11</a>]: "He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee." It is therefore unsuitable to say that "God works
                     virtue in us, without us."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> We have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii,
                     19.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is
                     gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue,
                     as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the
                     genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for
                     "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p10"> Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which"
                     it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object,
                     and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here
                     we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is
                     mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p11"> The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always
                     referred to evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred
                     both to the true and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and so the distinction of
                     virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live
                     righteously": and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words,
                     "of which no one makes bad use."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p12"> Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words
                     "which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general,
                     whether acquired or infused.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is first seized by the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently
                     as gone, and as good, which are convertible with being. Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and
                     that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness
                     and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with
                     the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings,
                     not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct
                     goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something
                     is good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends
                     further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of
                     the soul is to be in accord with reason."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13).
                     And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the
                     proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q[60], A[2]; 
                     <a id="FS_Q55_A4-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A8.html">SS, Q[58], A[8]</a>). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated
                     above (Q[19], A[4]), is common to all virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or
                     by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p18">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the
                     words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without
                     action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.
                  </p>
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               <h3 id="FS_Q56-p0.1">OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q56-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q56-p2"> We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q56-p3"> (1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q56-p4"> (2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q56-p5"> (3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q56-p6"> (4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q56-p7"> (5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q56-p8"> (6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?</p>
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                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q56_A1-p0.1">Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtue
                     is that by which we live righteously." But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue
                     is not a power, but in the essence of the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise."
                     But as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong
                     to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">Q[55], A[4]</a>): and quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "Virtue is the limit of power" (De Coelo ii). But the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in a
                     power of the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of
                     virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue
                     is an operative habit, as we have said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>): for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is
                     best: for
                     the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's
                     power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "To live" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it belongs
                     to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of existence in the living thing. But sometimes "to live" is taken for
                     the operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous
                     actions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good is either the end, or something referred to the end. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the work,
                     this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and consequently, to the power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One accident is said to be the subject of another, not as though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident
                     inheres to substance by means of another, as color to the body by means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the
                     subject of color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q56_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q56_A2-p0.1">Whether one virtue can be in several powers?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers. For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various
                     way from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive
                     power as executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three things are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to will, and to
                     work steadfastly." But "to know" belongs to the intellect, and "to will" belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several
                     powers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is in the reason since it is "the right reason of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in
                     the will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi, 12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue cannot
                     be in several powers of the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way
                     it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects,
                     while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is
                     diversity of habits; but not vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two or
                     more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in
                     one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one power is moved
                     by another, and one power receives from another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree; but only from different points of view, and in various
                     degrees.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To know" is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral virtue
                     is essentially in the appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall see further
                     on 
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html">(A[3];</a> Q[57], A[4]).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q56_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q56_A3-p0.1">Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is
                     love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what has been said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>). Now good is not the object of the intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect,
                     but the appetitive power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtue is that "which makes its possessor good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects
                     the intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said to be a good man on account of his science or his
                     art. Therefore the intellect is not the subject of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above given,
                     of virtue (
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore the intellect is the subject of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>), a virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as by
                     the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly.
                     But grammar does not make a man always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism:
                     and the case is the same
                     with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness:
                     for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p7"> And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of
                     what it is actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance,
                     because he is just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that "which makes
                     its possessor good, and his work good likewise," these latter habits are called virtuous simply: because they
                     make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply:
                     because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply.
                     For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian
                     or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times they are
                     called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p8"> Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical
                     intellect, but also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that
                     science, wisdom and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue
                     simply, can only be the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the reason of this is,
                     that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as we have said above (Q[9], A[1];
                     Q[17], AA[1],5; 
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html">FP, Q[82], A[4]</a>): and therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do
                     well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as moved
                     by the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p9"> Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the other powers: for a man considers something actually,
                     because he wills to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of
                     virtue absolutely so called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of Faith: for the intellect
                     is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith: for "no man believeth, unless he will"
                     [*Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right
                     reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason
                     of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just
                     as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And therefore
                     as the subject of science, which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its relation to
                     the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue simply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that it
                     depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first movement consists in love, as we have said above
                     (Q[25], AA[1],2,3; Q[27], A[4]; 
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html">FP, Q[20], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act
                     of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative
                     or practical, is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers virtue simply so called.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q56_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q56_A4-p0.1">Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common to
                     us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue.
                     It is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive
                     appetite, as we have said in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's
                     body: for the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q56_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>): "I know that good does not dwell in my flesh." Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body
                     is ruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his body: "For instance, if my
                     coachman, through obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; this is all due to me." But just as
                     the soul rules the body, so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the
                     irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers. Now "virtue is that by which
                     we live rightly," as we have said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the rational powers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "the principal act of moral virtue is choice" (Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible
                     powers, but of the rational power, as we have said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A2.html">Q[13], A[2]</a>). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but in the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
                     10) says that "these virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of
                     the sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered
                     as participating in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or
                     concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in so far as it participates in
                     the reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p8"> For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from
                     one power according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless both powers be well disposed to the act: for
                     instance, the act of a craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his instrument be well disposed to act.
                     Therefore in the matter of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they are moved
                     by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the irascible
                     and concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of the power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity
                     with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but
                     a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and
                     dumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man.
                     And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as being
                     moved by reason, we "yield our members to serve justice"; so also, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed,
                     have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the "fomes": whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason,
                     the good of reason is begotten in them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the body
                     obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul:
                     whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "soul rules the body with a despotic command" as the master rules his slave:
                     wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul. For this
                     reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly;
                     on the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher
                     says (Polit. i, 3) that the "reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command" such as that by which
                     free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues in
                     the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these powers are well disposed to act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In choice there are two things, namely, the intention of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the preferential
                     choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible
                     powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of these powers.
                     And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are
                     in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q56_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q56_A5-p0.1">Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive appetite
                     can be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason:
                     for the powers of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf. 
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>] act at the command of reason. Therefore in these powers there can be virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be hindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so
                     also can the intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above. As, therefore, there can be virtue in
                     the interior powers of appetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of apprehension.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent. Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the
                     power of memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive powers of apprehension.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> All virtues are either intellectual or moral (Ethic. ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while the intellectual
                     virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear from Ethic. vi, 1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive
                     powers of apprehension.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the
                     Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that "in remembering one thing after another, we become used to it; and use is a second
                     nature." Now a habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says
                     of virtue in his Rhetoric that "it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Yet,
                     in man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so
                     called, but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>, ad 3).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p7"> Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never
                     happens that anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power which consummates the good act. But the
                     knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such powers prepare the way to the intellective
                     knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know truth: these
                     are rather in the intellect or reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the
                     act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject
                     of virtue. Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason
                     that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight
                     (De Anima iii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive
                     virtues are in the intellect itself, or the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p9"> And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of
                     the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fashion, it is after the manner of an integral part.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q56_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q56_A6-p0.1">Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power
                     by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the
                     Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And to this good every virtue is
                     ordered, since everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his
                     Rhetoric, is a "habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic. i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the
                     intellect and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupiscible powers which
                     are rational by participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect
                     of some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there
                     will be no virtue in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore
                     the will cannot be the subject of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers.
                     Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concupiscible powers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which
                     habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not suffice for the purpose.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p7"> Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object. Since, therefore, as we have said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), the object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue
                     perfecting it. But if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species,
                     such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as
                     regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as
                     those which direct man's affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is true of those virtues which are ordained to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude, which
                     are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we have said (
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A6.html">Q[35], A[6]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are rational by participation but "the appetitive power altogether," i.e.
                     in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the
                     will must be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on (
                     <a id="FS_Q56_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases
                     there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need
                     exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q57" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q57-p0.1">OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q57-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q57-p2"> We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological
                  virtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q57-p3"> (1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q57-p4"> (2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q57-p5"> (3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q57-p6"> (4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q57-p7"> (5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q57-p8"> (6) Whether "eubulia," "synesis" and "gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q57_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q57_A1-p0.1">Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have
                     said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q57_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore
                     the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made happy or blessed: for "happiness is the reward of virtue" (Ethic.
                     i, 9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather
                     things pertaining to nature or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate,
                     as the Philosopher proves in Topic. iv. Therefore speculative habits are not virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The speculative habits alone consider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic.
                     vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise
                     than they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>), a habit, as we have already observed (
                     <a id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html">Q[56], A[3]</a>), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness,
                     it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated (
                     <a id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>), belongs to those habits alone which affect the
                     appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective
                     uses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p7"> Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only
                     the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration
                     of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they
                     conferred the right use of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does
                     not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has
                     scientific knowledge: that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue
                     which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this way too there
                     can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the
                     "contemplative life has greater merit than the active life."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior. Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative
                     faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior
                     act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues
                     are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in so far as the word "whereby" indicates the efficient
                     cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to
                     be about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those
                     things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because
                     they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated (
                     <a id="FS_Q57_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q57_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q57_A2-p0.1">Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding.
                     Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science
                     among the intellectual virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of
                     these objects, as we have already explained (
                     <a id="FS_Q57_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A3.html">FP, Q[77], A[3]</a>). Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now
                     the principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of
                     principles
                     should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of conclusions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason
                     employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science,
                     which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and understanding.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As already stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q57_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth:
                     for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration---as known in itself, and as known through another.
                     What is known in itself, is as a "principle," and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects
                     the intellect for the consideration
                     of such truth is called "understanding," which is the habit of principles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p7"> On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the
                     reason's inquiry, and is as a "term." This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus;
                     secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since "things that are knowable last from our standpoint,
                     are knowable first and chiefly in their nature" (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that which is last with
                     respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is "wisdom," which
                     considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order,
                     because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which
                     is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is "science" which perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the
                     different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions
                     from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all,
                     not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or
                     power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color,
                     and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand,
                     the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the
                     conclusion being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can
                     be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the
                     conclusions also: while to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p10"> Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues are distinct, not as being on a par with one another,
                     but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another; for
                     instance, the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that
                     science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as
                     obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions
                     of science, and of the principles on which they are based.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q57_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth,
                     and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and never
                     tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they
                     are not intellectual
                     virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q57_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q57_A3-p0.1">Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that "no one makes bad
                     use of virtue." But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore
                     art is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is a virtue of art," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore
                     art is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are
                     speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4) says that art is a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues,
                     which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Art is nothing else but "the right reason about certain works to be made." And yet the good of these things depends, not
                     on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as
                     such, is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly
                     speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative
                     habits: since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human
                     appetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his
                     appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we
                     have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither
                     art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects
                     the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary to the
                     art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto.
                     Wherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this
                     reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect
                     virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is requisite: although
                     there cannot be a good use without the art.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for
                     this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires
                     a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or
                     the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by
                     a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained
                     to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the
                     body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On the other hand, those sciences
                     which are not ordained to any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent,
                     does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q57_A4-p0.1">Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity
                     of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore
                     prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prudence has more in common with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters
                     that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore,
                     should prudence be called an art.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also,
                     as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct
                     from art.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic. vi, 5).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q57_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[56], A[3]) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while some habits
                     are virtues, not only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring the use. But art confers the
                     mere aptness for good work; since it does not regard the appetite; whereas
                     prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the
                     rectitude thereof.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p7"> The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right reason
                     of things to be done." Now "making" and "doing" differ, as stated in Metaph. ix, text. 16, in that "making" is an action passing
                     into outward matter, e.g. "to build," "to saw," and so forth; whereas "doing" is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. "to
                     see," "to will," and the like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human actions,
                     consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the things
                     with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which
                     reason argues; just as we have said above (A[2], ad 2) that science depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the
                     habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii,
                     8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with
                     regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue,
                     which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good
                     of those things themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that more
                     praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence
                     to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is
                     evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue. But
                     prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are
                     both in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues,
                     then art has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what has been said.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there
                     is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in
                     matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply
                     prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q57_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q57_A5-p0.1">Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which
                     it is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence
                     is the right reason about these things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary in things that are made, save
                     in order that they be made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is prudence
                     necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become
                     virtuous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good counsel," as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own,
                     but also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough
                     that he follow the counsels of prudent men.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem
                     to be the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done; since human actions
                     are about things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q57_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore it seems that prudence
                     should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human life, when it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q57_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>) of Divine Wisdom: "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have
                     nothing more profitable in life."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds,
                     it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from
                     impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely,
                     the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably
                     directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the
                     end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because
                     counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue
                     is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this
                     virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things
                     to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the thing
                     made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the
                     good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its
                     perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q57_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Consequently art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it
                     be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were
                     proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the
                     craftsman
                     needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence
                     is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as
                     regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply;
                     and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of
                     the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly
                     in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent
                     things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary
                     things. On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity
                     has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent matters which can be effected
                     by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters
                     that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and
                     prudence, as regards things to be done.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q57_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q57_A6-p0.1">Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence? [*{euboulia, synesis, gnome}]</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "{euboulia, synesis}, and {gnome}" are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For "{euboulia}"
                     is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it "belongs to prudence to take good counsel," as stated (Ethic.
                     vi, 9). Therefore "{euboulia}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence itself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is
                     judgment. Now "{synesis}" enables us to judge well. Therefore "{synesis}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather
                     is a principal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel.
                     But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there
                     is no need, besides "{synesis}" of the virtue of "{gnome}."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of
                     the present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility,"
                     and the like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now
                     there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the
                     third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel
                     is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, in so far
                     as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that
                     in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue
                     which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz.
                     "{eustochia}," which perfects counsel; and "{synesis}" and "{gnome}," which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment,
                     and of
                     whose distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it
                     perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. "{euboulia}."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man's
                     judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded
                     aright in the point of what has to be done.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles:
                     because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence
                     only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is
                     based not on common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative
                     matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce
                     judgment, differ according to their different objects. "{Synesis}" and "{gnome}" differ in respect of the different rules
                     on which judgment is based: for "{synesis}" judges of actions according to the common law; while "{gnome}" bases its judgment
                     on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (
                     <a id="FS_Q57_A6-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q51_A4.html">SS, Q[51], A[4]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but
                     are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective
                     parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion,
                     potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as
                     secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later (SS, Q[48], seqq.).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q58" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q58-p0.1">OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q58-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q58-p2"> We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their
                  distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues
                  and the others.
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q58-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q58-p4"> (1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q58-p5"> (2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q58-p6"> (3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q58-p7"> (4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q58-p8"> (5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q58_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q58_A1-p0.1">Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin "mos," i.e. custom. Now,
                     we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue
                     is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following
                     the rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on (
                     <a id="FS_Q58_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html">Q[64], AA[1]</a>,2,3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since
                     every human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees
                     with his reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13): "When we speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that
                     he is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="FS_Q58_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html">Q[57], A[2]</a>). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able
                     to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.1" target="asv">Acts 15:1</a>): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural
                     inclination to do some particular action, in which
                     sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.1.2" target="asv">2 Macc. 1:2</a>) that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them":
                     and the word is used in the same sense in 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.7" target="asv">Ps. 67:7</a>, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house." For both these significations there is but one
                     word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word "ethos" is written sometimes
                     with a long, and sometimes a short "e".
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p7"> Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action.
                     And the other meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination
                     similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose
                     function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above (
                     <a id="FS_Q58_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9],
                        A[1]
                     </a>). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes "mos" in the sense of "custom."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part
                     of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty (
                     <a id="FS_Q58_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects
                     the appetitive faculty: although the acts of other habits also may be a matter
                     of choice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii, text. 3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the
                     appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which
                     are in the appetitive faculty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q58_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q58_A2-p0.1">Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that virtue
                     is the art of right conduct." But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit regarding
                     those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and holiness as "a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his
                     duty to God." Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual
                     virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason." But this belongs to the
                     intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the
                     definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed
                     by reason as a prudent man would appoint it." Now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual
                     virtue, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from
                     intellectual.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that "there are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason
                     somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of
                     the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action.
                     Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e.
                     as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate
                     to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since
                     virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that
                     there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of
                     prudence," as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin;
                     and that every one who sins, does so through ignorance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p8"> Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain
                     power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic
                     power," whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a> (Serm. 8) that "sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all," in so
                     far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And
                     in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not
                     sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p9"> Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of
                     intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs
                     from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human
                     acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in
                     conformity with reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine usually applies the term "art" to any form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right
                     reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that "virtue
                     is the art of right conduct," this applies to prudence essentially; but to other virtues, by participation, for as much as
                     they are directed by prudence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we
                     have said about art (ad 1).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p12"> The same applies to the Third Objection.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence,
                     but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction
                     of prudence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q58_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q58_A3-p0.1">Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between
                     moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by
                     all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on (
                     <a id="FS_Q58_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A1.html">Q[61], A[1]</a>). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though there
                     were no mean between them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral
                     virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue
                     is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz.
                     science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q58_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html">Q[57], AA[2]</a> ,3,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue.
                     Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human
                     actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De
                     Anima iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if
                     it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it
                     will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that
                     every human virtue is either intellectual or moral.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with
                     the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q58_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html">Q[57], A[4]</a>). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Contingency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound
                     in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making
                     it conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the
                     passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since
                     intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the
                     end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this
                     is wanting in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless
                     each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing
                     an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive faculty,
                     which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action
                     will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting
                     from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the
                     Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q58_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q58_A4-p0.1">Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is
                     "a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves
                     it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of
                     knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining
                     him to consent to his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous
                     and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural
                     inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues."
                     But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q58_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html">Q[57], A[5]</a>). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding
                     and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now
                     in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done
                     by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with
                     reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot
                     do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as
                     stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q58_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html">Q[57], AA[5]</a>,6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can there be without understanding.
                     For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident
                     principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far
                     as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence,
                     which is the right reason about things to be done.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity
                     require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires
                     that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things
                     which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple,
                     through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.16" target="asv"> Mat. 10:16</a>: "Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents, and simple as doves."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger
                     this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice
                     of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall,
                     and the more grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be
                     not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which
                     is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be "joined with
                     right reason," as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q58_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q58_A5-p0.1">Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on
                     the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which
                     is a perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be
                     without it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper
                     matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues,
                     it seems most akin to the moral virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having
                     the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue.
                     Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly" (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the
                     right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions
                     are. Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases,
                     it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of
                     action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil;
                     or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For
                     it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a
                     particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire
                     seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding
                     or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be
                     rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits,
                     whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the
                     virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently
                     the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing
                     about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles
                     is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does,
                     when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone.
                     Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment
                     of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q59" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q59-p0.1">OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q59-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q59-p2"> We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another. And since those moral virtues which are about the passions,
                  differ accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different
                  kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q59-p3"> (1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q59-p4"> (2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q59-p5"> (3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q59-p6"> (4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q59-p7"> (5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q59_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q59_A1-p0.1">Whether moral virtue is a passion?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is
                     a mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices,
                     such as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's ills, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q59_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A8.html">Q[35], A[8]</a>). Now "Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. Therefore
                     a passion may be a moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are neither virtues nor vices."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive
                     appetite, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q59_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit.
                     Secondly, because passions are not in themselves good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to reason:
                     wherefore the passions,
                     considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason. Now
                     nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q59_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the movement
                     of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity
                     with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite,
                     inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit
                     of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes
                     the mean between passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean
                     sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act
                     of virtue; in so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in so far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to reason"; viz.
                     "when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven," as Augustine says
                     (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders
                     pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q59_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q59_A2-p0.1">Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that "a gentle man is one who
                     is not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give way." The same applies to all the moral virtues.
                     Therefore all moral virtues are without passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue
                     is a kind of health of the soul," as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul's passions are "the soul's diseases," as
                     he says in the same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is passion compatible with virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this:
                     for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence": and Sallust says (Catilin.) that
                     "when they," i.e. the soul's passions, "interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth." Therefore passion is incompatible
                     with moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but
                     if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy." But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral
                     virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the
                     soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine
                     says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p7"> This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics,
                     through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided
                     into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of
                     the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the
                     soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being,
                     as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose
                     deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus
                     Gellius [*Noct. Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions
                     of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man,
                     so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow," in so far as "these passions forestall the use of reason
                     without his approving of such things or consenting thereto."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p8"> Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them
                     deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can
                     be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe
                     virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should
                     be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and
                     time."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own mind,
                     but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the
                     Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however,
                     that when he says "a gentle man is not passionate," we are to understand this of
                     inordinate passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of reason's
                     command.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and
                     the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution
                     of reason's command.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q59_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q59_A3-p0.1">Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv"> Wis. 8:7</a>: "She," i.e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "conversation" of wisdom
                     "hath no bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is
                     incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue,
                     which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him, for He said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.38" target="asv">Mat. 26:38</a>): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three {eupatheiai}, i.e.
                     "three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy";
                     instead of fear, "caution." But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for
                     two reasons.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p7"> First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they
                     thought that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot
                     be in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve
                     the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently
                     the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous
                     man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in
                     a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to
                     
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:10</a>: "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily
                     sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions are when
                     moderated by reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p8"> Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even
                     as pleasure is about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire
                     to have good that one possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a
                     present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is
                     unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected
                     by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according
                     as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to reason, as stated above (A[1], ad
                     2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher
                     says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the
                     sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p9"> Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices
                     in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom.
                     Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the
                     present state of life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q59_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q59_A4-p0.1">Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue
                     is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html"> Q[31], A[1]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A1.html"> Q[35], AA[1]</a>, 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
                     i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q59_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some
                     are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about
                     the passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by
                     reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject
                     to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations
                     of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a
                     passion, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q59_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting
                     from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher,
                     after the words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and passions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure
                     or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows," viz. as
                     about something that results from virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where
                     there are no passions, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q59_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q59_A5-p0.1">Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the
                     passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the
                     passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) they are called "passions of sins." Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does
                     all things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot
                     be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue
                     is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues,
                     which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise
                     it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle:
                     whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make
                     them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to
                     their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p7"> Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue
                     is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act
                     of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of
                     justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the
                     higher, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q59_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A7.html">Q[17], A[7]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q59_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q24_A3.html"> Q[24], A[3]</a>). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as
                     there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is altogether without passion, as it is without a body:
                     whereas the good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the body's help.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q60" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q60-p0.1">HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q60-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q60-p2"> We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q60-p3"> (1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q60-p4"> (2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about passions?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q60-p5"> (3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q60-p6"> (4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q60-p7"> (5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q60_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q60_A1-p0.1">Whether there is only one moral virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which
                     is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral
                     virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one
                     moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now
                     the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore,
                     seemingly, there is but one moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite
                     in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive
                     part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q80_A2.html">FP, Q[80], A[2]</a>; 
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A1.html">Q[58], AA[1]</a>,2,3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences
                     of their objects, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">Q[54], A[2]</a>). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the
                     agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold
                     relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that
                     form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive
                     a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however,
                     the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with
                     non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are
                     not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance,
                     we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various
                     adaptability of matter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is
                     commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational,
                     not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong
                     to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of
                     various species and are not one only.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind
                     of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of
                     the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing
                     power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the
                     various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be
                     infinite in number, are not infinite in species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q60_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q60_A2-p0.1">Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about passions?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about passions.
                     For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of
                     pleasure or sorrow." Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">Q[31], A[1]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A1.html"> Q[35], A[1]</a>). Therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about
                     operations, since it is an operative habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions are principles of external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a
                     consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both passions and operations.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite
                     are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic.
                     ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has
                     some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are passions, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q59_A4.html">Q[59], A[4]</a>, ad 1).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p7"> Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those
                     moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions. The reason for this is that
                     good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected
                     towards them: viz. in so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In
                     operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling,
                     and all such operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its
                     parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only
                     on commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected
                     to
                     them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the
                     passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p8"> It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some
                     inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed:
                     while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure. Thus when through anger,
                     one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the
                     immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other
                     two consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations,
                     in others, about passions, for the reason given above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q60_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q60_A3-p0.1">Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems
                     to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the
                     other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says
                     (Ethic. v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue
                     which directs a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does
                     not cause a diversity of moral virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there are various moral virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity
                     of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations,
                     and again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different operations.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both of which are about operations.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something
                     due to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations,
                     the order of reason is established, as we have stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from
                     which
                     becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice
                     that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice.
                     But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior,
                     in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a
                     contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues:
                     e.g. "Religion" whereby we pay our debt to God; "Piety," whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; "Gratitude,"
                     whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But
                     the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special
                     virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual:
                     wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs
                     man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act
                     of command: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the
                     common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue
                     does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active
                     of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue
                     of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative
                     justice; but about this we shall inquire later on (
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q61_A1.html">SS, Q[61], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q60_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q60_A4-p0.1">Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions. For there is but one habit about things
                     that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one
                     source, viz. love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], AA[1]</a>,2,4;
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A4-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A4.html"> Q[27], A[4]</a>). Therefore there is but one moral
                     virtue about all the passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if there were different moral virtues about different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues
                     as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude,
                     about fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about
                     different passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different species, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues about
                     different passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power
                     as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p7"> On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First,
                     because some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About
                     such passions as are thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists
                     in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural
                     order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly, because there are different passions
                     contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that
                     which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral
                     virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the
                     attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure;
                     and it is the same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the
                     other hand, the irascible passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are
                     about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary
                     which
                     has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible
                     passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions concur in one common principle and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not suffice
                     for the unity of moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as in the natural order the same principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in
                     the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which,
                     like a second nature, consents to reason's dictates.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those three passions are directed to the same object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same
                     virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q60_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q61.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q60_A5-p0.1">Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects
                     of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according
                     to the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue
                     of justice. Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ
                     according to the objects of those passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate
                     habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral
                     virtue: so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies to the other passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less
                     pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful
                     objects, and the same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But there are various virtues about the desires for good things:
                     thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] about pleasures in games. Therefore
                     there should be different virtues about fears of evils.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in games.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite.
                     Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their
                     relation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite,
                     cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason,
                     they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite.
                     Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues,
                     as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A4.html">(A[4])</a>; and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference of passions, since several
                     virtues are directed about one
                     passion, e.g. pleasure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p8"> And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q60_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A4.html">(A[4])</a>; therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues---for
                     instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover
                     since the reason rules man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to
                     outward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason,
                     and again, according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently
                     is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure,
                     may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed
                     to man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every such difference,
                     being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p9"> Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep
                     of human life either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse, it
                     will belong to the virtue of "temperance." As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not intense, and so do not
                     present much difficulty to the reason: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is
                     about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p10"> On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money
                     and honor; the former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body, while the latter is based on the apprehension
                     of the mind. These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty, or
                     as being difficult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction,
                     however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far
                     as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely,
                     as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is "liberality": but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as
                     being the object of our hope, there is "magnificence" [*{megaloprepeia}]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken
                     absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia" [*{philotimia}], i.e. "love of honor": while if we
                     consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity." Wherefore liberality and "philotimia"
                     seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p11"> As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object
                     of the concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another either in some serious
                     matter, in actions, to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure,
                     and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards
                     another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs
                     to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" [*{philia}], and may be rendered "affability." Secondly, one
                     man behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv,
                     7) he calls "truthfulness" [*{aletheia}]. For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters than
                     play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic.
                     iv, 8).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p12"> It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance,
                     liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which
                     differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add "justice," which is about operations, there
                     will be eleven in all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific
                     passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless they bear different relations to reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div.
                     Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being,
                     seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of
                     anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the
                     other hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion.
                     Consequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p17"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p18"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q61.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q61" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q61-p0.1">OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q61-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q61-p2"> We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q61-p3"> (1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q61-p4"> (2) Of their number;</p>
               <p id="FS_Q61-p5"> (3) Which are they?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q61-p6"> (4) Whether they differ from one another?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q61-p7"> (5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q61_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q61.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q61_A1-p0.1">Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division
                     are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite
                     members of the division of the genus "virtue." Therefore none of them should be called principal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues
                     are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual
                     virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q61_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html">Q[58] , A[3]</a>). Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv">Lk. 6:20</a>) says: "We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these are moral
                     virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q61_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html">Q[56], A[3]</a>), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only
                     confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one
                     that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not
                     require rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed to be
                     done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude
                     of the appetite are called principal virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues,
                     for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q61_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html">Q[57], A[4]</a>). Consequently,
                     those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea;
                     although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of
                     other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to
                     another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of
                     the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such is the division
                     of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The theological virtues are above man, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q61_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but "super-human" or godlike virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they
                     do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q61.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q61_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q61_A2-p0.1">Whether there are four cardinal virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues,
                     as is clear from what has been said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q61_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html">Q[58], A[4]</a>). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason,
                     and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not
                     to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and
                     either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p7"> For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two
                     ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly, according
                     as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have "Justice"; or into passions, and
                     then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their
                     thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to something against reason, and then the passions
                     need a curb, which we call "Temperance." Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g.
                     through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and
                     to this end there is "Fortitude."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p8"> In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue
                     we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational
                     by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance," and
                     the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as
                     to the formal principle.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p13"></p>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q61_A3-p0.1">Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that other virtues should be called principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the principal
                     in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more
                     than any be called a principal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for
                     Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that "he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against
                     the wind." Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal. But this applies to patience, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv"> James 1:4</a>: "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q61_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as we understand it now.
                     These principles are found chiefly in certain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found
                     chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined
                     by reason and put into our operations as
                     something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of
                     equality. The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the
                     pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found
                     chiefly in perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p7"> Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways. First, in respect of their common formal principles. In
                     this way they are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance,
                     any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of
                     right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called
                     temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy
                     doctors, as also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this way the other virtues are contained under
                     them. Wherefore all the objections fail.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p8"> Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective
                     matter, and thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal in comparison with the
                     other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue
                     which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the
                     pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail:
                     because the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called principal by reason of their matter, as
                     stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p9"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p10"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q61_A4-p0.1">Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another? </h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1):
                     "There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent;
                     no sound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence, fortitude and temperance."
                     But this would not be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the
                     different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among things distinct from one another the function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance
                     is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself,
                     and is not weakened and bent by any enticement." And of temperance he says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the
                     manner and order in all things that we decide to do and say." Therefore it seems that
                     these virtues are not distinct from one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should
                     have knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and
                     act with firmness and steadfastness." But the first of these seems to belong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things
                     to be done; the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his
                     passions on the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end,
                     implies a certain rectitude, which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness, belongs
                     to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from
                     one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he
                     applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four virtues are distinct from one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q61_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, these four virtues are understood differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain general conditions
                     of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in
                     any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any matters;
                     temperance, a disposition of the mind,
                     moderating any passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is
                     strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations.
                     To distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous
                     habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a
                     certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as
                     it is a "virtue," it is directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice.
                     Again, owing to the fact that it is a "moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, and
                     does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion,
                     which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially
                     to reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind of application (of reason) to passions
                     or operations. According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the other three virtues: but these
                     would not be distinct from one another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit, and virtue, and
                     moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p7"> Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according as they have their special determinate matter; each
                     of its own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken
                     as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q61_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues qualify
                     one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed
                     by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what
                     is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures
                     of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his
                     daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate.
                     Again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose
                     mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to
                     remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be
                     unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered
                     by toil."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p9"> From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps
                     the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions
                     of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however,
                     be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p12"></p>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q61_A5-p0.1">Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues,
                     and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the "exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God."
                     Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God."
                     Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in
                     a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows
                     nothing about the passions; it does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q61_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q59_A5.html">Q[59], A[5]</a>) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. Therefore there is no such thing as
                     "perfect" virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human
                     affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i):
                     "I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz.
                     power and office." Therefore there are no "perfecting" virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good
                     of their country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the
                     Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The four
                     kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social* virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes
                     purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect [*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues
                     of the clean soul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" [*Cf.
                     Chrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not
                     shut up his good deeds within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of
                     the truth, lives for the common weal."]
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something
                     is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just
                     as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus
                     we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called
                     prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to
                     reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus
                     states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p8"> Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in
                     him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves
                     himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p9"> But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in
                     Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us---for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.48" target="asv">Mat. 5:48</a>), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these
                     virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are
                     virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called "perfecting" virtues.
                     Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts
                     of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul
                     from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted
                     consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine
                     similitude: these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows
                     no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by
                     an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of
                     perfection.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying
                     and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those
                     who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the
                     social virtues check the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; "the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues,
                     "uproot them"; "the third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while
                     it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said
                     that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier:
                     "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning;
                     as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when
                     such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with
                     what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a hollowed leisure; charity necessitates good works.
                     If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid
                     on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service
                     of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as
                     we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards
                     the household, or even towards one individual.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A4.html"></a>
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               </div>
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            <div id="FS_Q62" class="div3">
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               <h3 id="FS_Q62-p0.1">OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q62-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q62-p2"> We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q62-p3"> (1) Whether there are any theological virtues?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q62-p4"> (2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q62-p5"> (3) How many, and which are they?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q62-p6"> (4) Of their order.</p>
               <div id="FS_Q62_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q62.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q62_A1-p0.1">Whether there are any theological virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition
                     of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which
                     is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q62_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A5.html">Q[61], A[5]</a>), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of
                     all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore
                     there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and
                     charity: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.2.8" target="asv">Ecclus. 2:8, </a> seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." Therefore faith, hope, and
                     charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above (
                     <a id="FS_Q62_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A7.html">Q[5], A[7]</a>). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q62_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html">Q[5], A[5]</a>). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The
                     other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a
                     kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers of the
                     Divine nature." And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him
                     to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man
                     to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed
                     to his
                     connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called
                     "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they
                     are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained
                     in Holy Writ.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass
                     the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion,
                     man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of
                     the Nature of which he is made a partaker.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous,
                     and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to
                     nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object
                     of supernatural happiness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q62.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q62_A2-p0.1">Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological
                     virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now
                     the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part,
                     are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and
                     intellectual virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which
                     directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological
                     virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity,
                     which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is above man's nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are
                     above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q62_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], A[3]</a>). Therefore they are distinct from one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q62_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">Q[54], A[2]</a>, ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object
                     of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other
                     hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological
                     virtues are specifically
                     distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological
                     virtues, supernaturally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they
                     are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they
                     surpass human reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love,
                     this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly
                     so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions;
                     and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4];
                     Q[28], A[6], ad 2; Q[41], A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other
                     virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Q[65],
                     AA[2],5; 
                     <a id="FS_Q62_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A7.html">SS, Q[23], A[7]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q62_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q62_A3-p0.1">Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological
                     virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among
                     the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore
                     there should be but one theological virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among
                     the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned
                     among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned
                     as theological virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God. Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective
                     part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect,
                     the other, the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q62_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed
                     to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so
                     far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are
                     reason's starting-point, both in
                     speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined
                     by reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p7"> But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for
                     them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural
                     to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which
                     are
                     held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to
                     this end, both as to that end as something attainable---and this pertains to hope---and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby
                     the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end---and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is moved and
                     tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition
                     to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention
                     of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects,
                     for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there
                     was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith
                     and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which
                     are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.25" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:25</a>: "The weakness of God is stronger than men."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must
                     needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q62_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q62_A4-p0.1">Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes
                     that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Being rooted and founded in charity." Therefore charity precedes the others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "A man cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and
                     loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping." Therefore it seems that faith precedes charity, and charity hope.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it
                     is a passion, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q62_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle enumerates them thus (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes
                     form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts:
                     because habits are all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving,
                     unless that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith
                     that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity.
                     In like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able
                     to obtain some good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason
                     that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards
                     their respective acts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p7"> But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and
                     receive from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch
                     as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on (
                     <a id="FS_Q62_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A8.html">SS, Q[23], A[8]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs
                     to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not
                     already possessed, but which he hopes to possess.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q62_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A7.html">Q[40], A[7]</a>), in treating of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz. the good hoped for. With regard
                     to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also regards the person
                     from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though afterwards
                     hope is increased by love.
                     Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact
                     that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q63" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q63-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q63-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q63-p2"> We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q63-p3"> (1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q63-p4"> (2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q63-p5"> (3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q63-p6"> (4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as infused virtue?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q63_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q63_A1-p0.1">Whether virtue is in us by nature? </h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us and
                     are equally in all of us." And Antony says in his sermon to the monks: "If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if
                     it follow nature it is virtuous." Moreover, a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.23" target="asv"> Mat. 4:23, </a> "Jesus went about," etc., says: "He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, justice, humility, which man possesses naturally."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as was clearly shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">Q[55], A[4]</a>, ad 2). But that which accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's nature. Therefore virtue is in
                     man by nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.31.18" target="asv">Job 31:18</a>): "From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my mother's womb." Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remain,
                     as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance,
                     who upheld the theory of "latent forms" [*Anaxagoras; Cf. 
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html">FP, Q[45], A[8]</a>; Q[65], A[4]]. Others held that forms are entirely from without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated
                     from some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as they
                     pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p7"> In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences
                     would pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed
                     down by the body, are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being polished. This was the opinion of
                     the Platonists. Others said that they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active
                     intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences and virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted
                     to them, but not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p8"> To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man; one is
                     according to his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And, since each thing derives its species
                     from its form, and its individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational soul, while his matter is his
                     body, whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific
                     nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of
                     his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part of his species, is to be
                     referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p9"> In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's
                     reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the
                     nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance
                     with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in
                     the body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain
                     parts of the body, according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts,
                     and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a natural
                     aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual and moral
                     virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while
                     the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in respect of the
                     various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various circumstances.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p10"> It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to
                     perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p11"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by
                     nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition
                     which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q63_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q63_A2-p0.1">Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi
                     cvi.] commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv"> Rom. 14:23, </a> "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good without the Sovereign
                     Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people." Now faith cannot be acquired
                     by means of works, but is
                     caused in us by God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "By grace you are saved through faith." Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.21" target="asv"> Wis. 8:21</a>: "I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us
                     by habituation, but only by the gift of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause.
                     Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much more,
                     therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We have spoken above (
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], AA[2]</a>,3) in a general way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation
                     to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4), man's virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode, species, and order," as
                     Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in "number, weight, and
                     measure," as expressed in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv"> Wis. 11:21, </a> man's good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], AA[3]</a>,4), viz. human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever
                     is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p7"> It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by
                     human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established. On the other
                     hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts,
                     the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in
                     giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, "which God works in us without us" (Super 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>, Serm. xxvi). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual
                     sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as
                     stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html">Q[49], A[3]</a>): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary
                     to a habit. Wherefore, though
                     man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue,
                     whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason. There are also certain
                     mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological virtues,
                     which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will be more fully explained later (
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A4.html">Q[109], A[4]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[51], A[1]), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent
                     than the virtues acquired through them: thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science
                     of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which results
                     through the appetite partaking
                     of reason, which rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher principles,
                     can cause acquired human virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q63_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q63_A3-p0.1">Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself,
                     save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv),
                     "it is God's rule to bring about extremes through the mean." Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our
                     acts, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it is not reasonable that
                     they should be caused in us by infusion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to
                     direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our
                     souls, according to a gloss on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1" target="asv">Heb. 1</a> [*Cf. Jerome on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.1.15" target="asv"> Gal. 1: 15,16</a>]. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>): "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired
                     by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[51], A[1]): instead of which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to
                     a supernatural end, as stated (Q[62], A[1]). Wherefore we need to receive from God other
                     habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the
                     moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological
                     virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But
                     the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in
                     addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q63_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q63_A4-p0.1">Whether virtue by habituation belongs to the same species as infused virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues,
                     according to what has been said 
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but
                     by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires
                     of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a
                     creature. But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the
                     man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to
                     the same species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition
                     of infused virtue contains the words, "which God works in us without us," as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">Q[54], A[2]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A2.html"> Q[56], A[2]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html"> Q[60], A[1]</a>), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as
                     in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence
                     of touch. The
                     formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something
                     on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according
                     to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance,
                     in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body,
                     nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body, and bring it into
                     subjection" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.27" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:27</a>), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species;
                     and the same applies to the other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p7"> The other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man's health and a
                     horse's are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are
                     directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are
                     well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men
                     behave well in respect of their being "fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of God"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.19" target="asv">Eph. 2:19</a>), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects,
                     as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore
                     their respective acts are not identical.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it
                     was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired
                     by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q64" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q64-p0.1">OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q64-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q64-p2"> We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality
                  of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q64-p3"> (1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q64-p4"> (2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q64-p5"> (3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q64-p6"> (4) Whether the theological virtues do?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q64_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q64_A1-p0.1">Whether moral virtues observe the mean?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme.
                     Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo i that "virtue is the limit of power." Therefore
                     moral virtue does not observe the mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors,
                     and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2,3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the
                     contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme;
                     thus virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give
                     all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is
                     not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As already explained (
                     <a id="FS_Q64_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>), the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive
                     part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of appetible
                     objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule: thus the
                     good things made by art is
                     that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure.
                     Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things
                     ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now it
                     is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral
                     virtue observes the mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore
                     we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which is has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme,
                     viz. conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral
                     virtue in respect of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes
                     the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue, as to its essence, is a
                     mean state," in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: "but it is an extreme in reference to the 'best'
                     and the 'excellent,'" viz. as to its conformity with reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from being
                     extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through
                     being in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity
                     of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and
                     a maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since
                     these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e. "where" it is right, "when" it is right, and
                     for an "end" that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum "when" it is not right, or "where" it is not
                     right, or for an undue "end"; and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto "where" one ought, and "when" one
                     aught.
                     This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity,
                     but the mean in the right mode of his action."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty
                     from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e. according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But
                     if this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if
                     it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a
                     vice by deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q64_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q64_A2-p0.1">Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists
                     in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral
                     virtue is a real mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather
                     a mean between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean
                     of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The rational mean can be understood in two ways. First, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as
                     though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason,
                     but the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be
                     considered as that which the reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense every
                     mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q64_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity with right reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p7"> But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real
                     mean, for instance, in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean is not the real mean, but is considered in
                     relation to us: and such is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is about operations,
                     which deal with external things, wherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely, as stated above
                     (
                     <a id="FS_Q64_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html">Q[60], A[2]</a>): wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each one his
                     due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions wherein the right cannot be established
                     in the same way, since men are variously situated in relation to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established
                     in the passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the
                     passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very
                     act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p9"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p10"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q64_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q64_A3-p0.1">Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming
                     to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore
                     the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6, that "virtue observes
                     the mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it." If therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean,
                     this mean will have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would be an indefinite series of virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22,23). But there
                     seems to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, as they are in the intellect, are not in opposition
                     to one another, but are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick. Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual
                     virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a mean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue observes
                     the mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The good of anything consists in its observing the mean, by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may
                     happen to be excessive or deficient, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q64_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above (Q[56], A[3]). Hence the good of an
                     intellectual virtue consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a measure. Now the good of intellectual
                     virtue is
                     the true; in the case of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi, 2); in the case of practical virtue,
                     it is the true in conformity with a right appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p7"> Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is measured by things; since things are the measure
                     of our intellect, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we think or say, according as the thing
                     is so or not. Accordingly the good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way of conformity with
                     things themselves, in so far as the intellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what they are
                     not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists. There will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though something
                     were, which in reality it is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas
                     in reality it is.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p8"> The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in relation to things, is by way of that which is measured;
                     so that both in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean consists in conformity with things. But if we
                     consider it in relation to the appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the rectitude of reason
                     is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of prudence---of prudence as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as
                     ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the difference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that measure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no need for an indefinite series of virtues: because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another
                     kind of virtue, but things themselves.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The things themselves that are contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the other:
                     nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end
                     of Peri Hermenias. For though "to be" and "not to be" are not in contrary, but in contradictory opposition to one another,
                     so long as we consider their signification in things themselves, for on the one hand we
                     have "being" and on the other we have simply "non-being"; yet if we refer them to the act of the mind, there is something
                     positive in both cases. Hence "to be" and "not to be" are contradictory: but the opinion stating that "good is good" is contrary
                     to the opinion stating that "good is not good": and between two such contraries intellectual virtue observes the mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A2.html"></a>
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               </div>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q64_A4-p0.1">Whether the theological virtues observe the mean?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean.
                     Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore much more does theological virtue observe the mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists
                     in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q64_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course
                     between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii): thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ,
                     we observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence of two persons and two natures, and the
                     heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue
                     observes the mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by excess
                     against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q64_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.43.33" target="asv">Ecclus. 43:33</a>): "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He is above all praise." Therefore theological virtue does not observe
                     the mean.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q64_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that
                     rule. Now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the measure
                     and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to
                     His goodness; hope, according to the
                     immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human power: so that never can we love God as
                     much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore can there be excess in
                     such things. Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p7"> The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as
                     much as we ought, yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the measure of our condition.
                     Consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded:
                     whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the
                     theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. Wherefore the comparison fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope observes the mean between presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous,
                     through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which
                     according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is
                     infinite. In like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary
                     heresies, not by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too much; but in so far as human opinion
                     itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions, as was explained above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A3.html"></a>
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            <div id="FS_Q65" class="div3">
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               <h3 id="FS_Q65-p0.1">OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q65-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q65-p2"> We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q65-p3"> (1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q65-p4"> (2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q65-p5"> (3) Whether charity can be without them?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q65-p6"> (4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q65-p7"> (5) Whether charity can be without them?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q65_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q65_A1-p0.1">Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the
                     exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising
                     himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence
                     or magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that "a poor man cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have other
                     virtues; and (Ethic. iv) that "he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous."
                     Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective
                     part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we may have one science, without having another. Neither,
                     therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can only be because they are united together in prudence. But
                     this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in
                     relation to one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one may have the art of making
                     certain things, without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about
                     things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Lk. 6:20</a>: "The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several": and Augustine says (De
                     Trin. vi, 4) that "the virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another": and Gregory says (Moral.
                     xxii, 1) that "one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect": and Cicero says (Quaest.
                     Tusc. ii): "If you confess to not having
                     one particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or
                     fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or
                     by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we find men who, by natural temperament
                     or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in
                     doing deeds of chastity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p8"> But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way,
                     we must say that they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, corresponding
                     to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q65_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">Q[61], AA[3]</a>,4), some distinguish them according to certain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by
                     saying that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude,
                     in whatever matter we consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident: for strength
                     of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth. This, too, is
                     the reason assigned for the connection by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be perfect" as a virtue,
                     "if
                     isolated from the others: for there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he continues to
                     speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf.
                     <a id="FS_Q65_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A4.html"> Q[61], A[4]</a>, OBJ[1]). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p9"> Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the
                     reason for their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q65_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html">Q[58], A[4]</a>), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective
                     habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue,
                     but also correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands
                     in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since
                     prudence is "right reason about things to be done," and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to
                     which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the
                     understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly
                     that the moral virtues are connected with one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be
                     done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues.
                     And if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if
                     he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to
                     another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a
                     certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence, which
                     is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue,
                     if prudence be lacking.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p11"> But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity;
                     and since it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is possible for a man to have
                     the other moral virtues, without actually having the habits of these virtues---provided we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless,
                     when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because
                     when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of
                     money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study,
                     acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having
                     a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): "That which
                     is
                     scarcely lacking is not lacking at all."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p12"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various
                     sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about
                     passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial
                     passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure
                     and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the passions.
                     Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p14"> Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend
                     on the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal
                     principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions, which are
                     the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, because the
                     appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q65_A1-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q65_A1-p14.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A5.html"> Q[58], A[5]</a>, ad 1).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the
                     principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in
                     another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong
                     about the principle, "A whole is greater than its part," he cannot acquire the
                     science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover, things "done" are related
                     to one another, but not things "made," as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things
                     to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p16"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p17"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65.html"></a>
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               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q65_A2-p0.1">Whether moral virtues can be without charity?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that "every
                     virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad." But "charity can be in none except the good," as stated in the same
                     book. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had
                     otherwise than by infusion, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5</a>: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is possible to have
                     the other virtues without charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence;
                     indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.19" target="asv"> Eph. 3:19</a>: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity, and
                     can be without it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.14" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:14</a>): "He that loveth not, abideth in death." Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is "by them" that
                     "we lead a good life," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[63], A[2]), it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce
                     good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can
                     be without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a
                     supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot
                     be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated
                     above 
                     <a id="FS_Q65_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[58], AA[4],5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues,
                     because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now
                     for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed
                     towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is
                     the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle,
                     that "contradictories cannot both be true at the same time." It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be
                     without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p7"> It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues
                     simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues
                     in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action,
                     but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on
                     the words, "All that is not of faith is sin" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv">Rom. 14:23</a>), says: "He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, "it makes its possessor
                     good," and consequently cannot be in the wicked.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the
                     infused moral virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A2.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q65_A3-p0.1">Whether charity can be without moral virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is
                     superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4, </a> seqq.: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for
                     their own sake: hence "pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from
                     mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake,
                     but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says
                     (on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.10" target="asv"> Lk. 17:10</a>) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have.
                     Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.8" target="asv">Rom. 13:8</a>): "He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law." Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all
                     the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that
                     has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis. clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi
                     de Temp.] that charity contains all the cardinal virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works
                     of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain
                     works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the
                     actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as
                     it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the
                     moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind
                     of good work.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p7"> It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity:
                     and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower
                     power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well
                     disposed. Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him
                     well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is
                     referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that
                     are referred to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently
                     feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a
                     habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of
                     moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary
                     dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the
                     repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues,
                     for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q65_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q65_A4-p0.1">Whether faith and hope can be without charity?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be
                     more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore
                     can faith and hope be without charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection
                     thereof, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q65_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore faith cannot be without charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "there can be no hope without love." But love is charity: for it is of this
                     love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv"> Mat. 1:2 </a>says that "faith begets hope, and hope, charity." Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore
                     faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete
                     virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing
                     a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done
                     is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that
                     is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does
                     is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result
                     of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p7"> Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue
                     without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to someone of one's own
                     free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which
                     perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De
                     Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be
                     without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act
                     is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through
                     merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is
                     possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues
                     properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we
                     should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves
                     the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not
                     depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity,
                     as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this
                     is not without charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q65_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q65_A5-p0.1">Whether charity can be without faith and hope?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love
                     God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without
                     faith and hope, and the other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor,
                     as we shall explain further on (
                     <a id="FS_Q65_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q7_A3.html">TP, Q[7], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>): "Without faith it is impossible to please God"; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.17" target="asv"> Prov. 8:17</a>: "I love them that love me." Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html">Q[62], A[4]</a>). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain
                     mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident
                     from 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him," and from 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:9, </a> where it is written: "God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the
                     fellowship of His Son." Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun
                     here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and
                     hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility
                     of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as
                     to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite
                     impossible without faith and hope.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object
                     we are directed by faith and hope.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are
                     the precursors of charity, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q65_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html">Q[62], A[4]</a>), and so charity is impossible without them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest
                     vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See above
                     <a id="FS_Q65_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q4_A3.html">, Q[4], A[3]</a>]: so that in Him was perfect charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q66" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q66-p0.1">OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q66-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q66-p2"> We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q66-p3"> (1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q66-p4"> (2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q66-p5"> (3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;</p>
               <p id="FS_Q66-p6"> (4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;</p>
               <p id="FS_Q66-p7"> (5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;</p>
               <p id="FS_Q66-p8"> (6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.</p>
               <div id="FS_Q66_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q66_A1-p0.1">Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.16" target="asv">Apoc. 21:16</a>) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues. Therefore all virtues
                     are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater than another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in
                     a maximum, for virtue is "the limit of power," as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib.
                     Arb. ii, 19) that "virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose." Therefore it seems that one virtue
                     cannot be greater or less than another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God
                     Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and
                     increase: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20</a>): "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven":
                     and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.5" target="asv">Prov. 15:5</a>): "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength [virtus]." Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or
                     less than another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying
                     to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always
                     more excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from
                     what has been said (
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">Q[18], A[5]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html"> Q[61],
                        A[2]
                     </a>) that the cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the
                     other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better
                     than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining
                     moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the
                     concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p7"> The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to what was
                     said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">Q[52], A[1]</a> ), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself;
                     secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it greater or little,
                     according to the things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a
                     virtue, e.g. temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and art:
                     for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius
                     states in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the nature
                     of virtue consists in a maximum.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p8"> If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different
                     times, or in different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined
                     by right reason; and this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning
                     judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the measure of
                     the giving of Christ," as stated in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.9" target="asv"> Eph. 4:9.</a> And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed
                     to virtue. Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were
                     an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6.
                     Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly
                     and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when several arches aim at a fixed target.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we
                     shall see further on 
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A2.html">(A[2])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can have the character of something "more" or "less" good, in the ways explained above:
                     since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures
                     of virtue, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.7" target="asv"> Eph. 4:7</a>: "To every one of you [Vulg.: 'us'] is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q66_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q66_A2-p0.1">Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:7</a>): "Everyone hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that." Now one gift would not be more
                     proper than another to a man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that the virtues are
                     not all equal in one and the same man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another
                     in one virtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case: since various saints are specially praised
                     for different virtues; e.g. Abraham for faith (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4" target="asv">Rom. 4</a>), Moses for his meekness (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Num.7.3" target="asv">Num. 7:3</a>), Job for his patience (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Tob.2.12" target="asv">Tob. 2:12</a>). This is why of each Confessor the Church sings:
                     "There was not found his like in keeping the law of the most High," [*See Lesson in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal)],
                     since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one's pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows
                     that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in
                     one and the same man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance," and so on.
                     Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above 
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the comparative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to their specific nature: and in
                     this way there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than faith and hope. Secondly,
                     it may be taken as referring to the degree of participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or remiss
                     in its subject. In this sense all
                     the virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers
                     are unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p7"> Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues
                     is their connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], A[1]</a>) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according to the opinion of those who understood these
                     four virtues to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found together with the other in any matter. In this
                     way
                     virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this kind
                     of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: "If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is more prudent than
                     the other; it follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in fortitude,
                     since the former's fortitude is more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all
                     in
                     the same way."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p8"> The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper
                     respective matters (
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65] , AA[1]</a>,2). In this way the connection among moral virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and
                     not from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], A[1]</a>). Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can
                     also be considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues: for in one and the
                     same man, so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined according to right
                     reason in each matter of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p9"> But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier
                     to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habituation, or again
                     by the grace of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all
                     of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of
                     which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account of his greater abundance of prudence,
                     or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness
                     for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p12"> This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q66_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q66_A3-p0.1">Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting,
                     is better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the sciences" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and,
                     moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its possessor good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue,
                     and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual
                     virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according to Ethic. vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right intention of
                     the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means." Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which
                     is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the essentially
                     rational part, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation. Therefore
                     intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something
                     from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and yet not better relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [*Aristotle,
                     Topic. iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes
                     its species from its object, as explained above (
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">Q[54], A[2]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html"> Q[60], A[1]</a>). Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the
                     object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends things in the universal,
                     while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking simply,
                     the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues,
                     which perfect the appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p7"> But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to
                     move the other powers to act, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>), is more excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power,
                     it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues
                     are more excellent
                     habits, simply speaking.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the
                     life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting
                     than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more necessary
                     for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively.
                     Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a useful
                     thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness
                     which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A6.html">Q[3], A[6]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because
                     the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html">Q[56], A[3]</a>). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each
                     moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling
                     of prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q66_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q66_A4-p0.1">Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what
                     is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than
                     justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv"> Jam. 1:4, </a> "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue," as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice.
                     Therefore it is greater than justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is the most excellent of the virtues."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply,
                     whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by
                     considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appetite,
                     as stated above (Q[8], A[1]; Q[26], A[1]): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order
                     not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence "justice is the most excellent of virtues" (Ethic. v, 1). Among
                     the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected
                     to reason, so much the more does the rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is
                     life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters
                     of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice.
                     Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue
                     is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; because the former," i.e.
                     fortitude, "is useful in war, and the latter," i.e. justice, "both in war and in peace." After fortitude comes temperance,
                     which subjects the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species,
                     viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in excellence
                     also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p7"> A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is
                     more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far
                     as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his
                     own" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas
                     justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being
                     its foundation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and
                     an addition to justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also
                     excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness;
                     but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking
                     up the root in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues
                     simply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence
                     whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their ornament,
                     so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A3.html"></a>
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               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q66_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q66_A5-p0.1">Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one
                     commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to
                     prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should
                     devote himself, and to what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that
                     prudence is greater than wisdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing
                     to that which is best," as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is "right reason about things to be done," whereby
                     man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence
                     is a greater virtue than wisdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs,
                     which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by
                     Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.26.26" target="asv"> Job 26:26</a>: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." Therefore science is a greater virtue than
                     wisdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable
                     principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater
                     virtue than wisdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is "the head" among "the intellectual virtues."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of
                     all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the
                     Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects;
                     hence it is that wisdom exercises
                     judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater
                     virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, "man were the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say,
                     as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because "the spiritual man
                     judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor.
                        2:15
                     </a>). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed
                     to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom;
                     for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme
                     Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness
                     in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God,
                     it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future
                     happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), "one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher
                     object, or because it is more certain." Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which
                     possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that
                     which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the
                     Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that "it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though
                     it be based on weak and probable reasoning"; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that "it is better to know a little about sublime
                     things, than much about mean things." Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man,
                     especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this "belongs to God alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this
                     little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is
                     a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and
                     non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles
                     are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper
                     effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding,
                     not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating
                     them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q66_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q66_A6-p0.1">Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while
                     hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral
                     virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above (
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added
                     to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward
                     to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.3" target="asv"> Mat. 1:3 </a>says that "faith begets hope, and hope charity." Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues look at
                     God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater
                     object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than
                     the others. Because the others, in their
                     very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed.
                     But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again,
                     the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>): "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because
                     the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things
                     beneath man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected
                     by the known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being
                     drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according
                     to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence moderates the
                     appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God,
                     which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive movement towards its
                     object surpasses human knowledge, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.19" target="asv"> Eph. 3:19</a>: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires
                     good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led
                     by hope, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q66_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html">Q[62], A[4]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more
                     noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in
                     the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q67" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q67-p0.1">OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q67-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q67-p2"> We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q67-p3"> (1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q67-p4"> (2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q67-p5"> (3) Whether faith remains?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q67-p6"> (4) Whether hope remains?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q67-p7"> (5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q67-p8"> (6) Whether charity remains?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q67_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q67_A1-p0.1">Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues doe not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv"> Mat. 22:30.</a> But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels [*"Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods"
                     (Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But the active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says
                     (Moral. iv, 18): "The works of the active life pass away from the body." Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this
                     life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states
                     (Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily
                     organs. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.15" target="asv">Wis. 1:15</a>) that "justice is perpetual and immortal."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as Augustine
                     says (De Trin. xiv, 9), "in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is
                     better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others." Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain
                     in the future life, but after a different manner.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p7"> In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element.
                     The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions and operations according
                     to a certain mode: and since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely this order of reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p8"> Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life, as regards their material element. For
                     in the future life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers
                     of death; nor distributions and commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as regards the formal element,
                     they will remain most perfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one's reason will have most
                     perfect rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his appetitive power will be moved
                     entirely according to the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9)
                     that "prudence will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance,
                     without the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere
                     to
                     Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no imperfection." As to justice, it is yet more evident
                     what will be its act in that life, viz. "to be subject to God": because even in this life subjection to a superior is part
                     of justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards
                     "commutations and distributions"; of fortitude, as to "matters of terror and danger"; of temperance, in respect of "lewd desires."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p10"> The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of
                     the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold state after this life; one before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the body;
                     the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational
                     powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible,
                     and temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be
                     perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the
                     soul actually, but only radically in its essence, as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A8.html">FP, Q[77], A[8]</a>. Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually, but only in their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein are certain
                     nurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Q[63], A[1]). Justice, however, will remain because it is in the will. Hence
                     of justice it is
                     specially said that it is "perpetual and immortal"; both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because
                     its act will not change, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q67_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q67_A2-p0.1">Whether the intellectual virtues remain after this life?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8,9</a>) that "knowledge shall be destroyed," and he states the reason to be because "we know in part." Now just as the knowledge
                     of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts.
                     Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is
                     not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore
                     science and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be
                     no act of the intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30);
                     and, after this life, the phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the body. Therefore the intellectual
                     virtues do not remain after this life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the
                     knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered,
                     according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv"> Lk. 16:25</a>: "Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much more, therefore,
                     does the knowledge of universal and
                     necessary things remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A6.html">FP, Q[79], A[6]</a> some have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect except when it actually understands;
                     and that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts
                     of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the body is corrupted: and consequently,
                     according to this opinion,
                     neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after this life when once the body is corrupted.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p7"> But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De Anima iii, text. 8) that "the possible intellect is
                     in act when it is identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to consider it actually."
                     It is also contrary to reason, because intelligible species are contained by the "possible" intellect immovably, according
                     to the mode of their container. Hence the "possible" intellect is called "the abode of the species" (De Anima
                     iii) because it preserves the intelligible species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p8"> And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this life, by applying the intelligible species to them as
                     stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>; 
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">FP, Q[85], A[1]</a>, ad 5, cease as soon as the body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi-material
                     element in the intellectual virtues, these latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the intelligible species,
                     which are in the
                     "possible" intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal element of the intellectual virtues.
                     Therefore these remain after this life, as regards their formal element, just as we have stated concerning the moral virtues
                     
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of understanding;
                     because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the
                     phantasms.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible species,
                     which are in the "possible" intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html">FP, Q[89], A[1]</a> the separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to the phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet
                     not as to the same mode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues 
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A2-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q67_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q67_A3-p0.1">Whether faith remains after this life?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains after
                     this life, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore faith remains also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:11</a>): "Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus," i.e. faith in Jesus Christ. Now if the
                     foundation is removed, that which is built upon it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this life, no other
                     virtue remains.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differ as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is compatible
                     with perfect knowledge: thus in an angel there can be "evening" and "morning" knowledge [*Cf. 
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A6.html">FP, Q[58], A[6]</a>]; and a man can have science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through a probable syllogism, about
                     one same conclusion. Therefore after this life faith also is compatible with
                     the knowledge of glory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6,7</a>): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by sight." But those who are in glory
                     are not absent from the Lord, but present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the life of glory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two things
                     are opposite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation and negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect
                     of contrary forms; thus in colors we find white and black. In others we find opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection:
                     wherefore in alterations, more and less are considered to be contraries, as when
                     a thing from being less hot is made more hot (Phys. v, text. 19). And since perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another,
                     it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the same time.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p7"> Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a thing's very nature, and belongs to its species: even as lack
                     of reason belongs to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so long as it remains the same identically,
                     cannot pass from one species to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be removed, the species of that thing is
                     changed: even as it would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be rational. Sometimes, however, the
                     imperfection does not belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the individual by reason of something else; even
                     as sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a man, because he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like reason;
                     and it is evident, that if such an imperfection be removed, the thing remains substantially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p8"> Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is included in its definition; faith
                     being defined as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Where is faith? Believing without seeing." But it is an imperfect knowledge
                     that is of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of
                     faith: therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the same.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p9"> But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect
                     knowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three
                     ways: first, on the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium; thirdly, on the part of the subject.
                     The difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the
                     "morning" and "evening" knowledge of the angels: for the "morning" knowledge is about things according to the being which
                     they have in the Word, while the "evening" knowledge is about things according as they have being in their own natures, which
                     being is imperfect in comparison with the First Being. On the part of the medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge are exemplified
                     in the knowledge of a conclusion through a demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium. On the part of the
                     subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science. For it is essential to opinion
                     that we assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that our adhesion is not firm: to science it is
                     essential to have firm adhesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude which results from the understanding
                     of principles: while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls
                     short of science in so far as it lacks vision.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p10"> Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the same respect; yet the things which differ as perfect
                     and imperfect can be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing. Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect
                     on the part of the object is quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; but they are compatible with
                     one another in respect of the same medium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a man from having at one and
                     the same time, through one and the same medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect,
                     e.g. about health and sickness, good and evil. In like manner knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is incompatible
                     with imperfect knowledge through one and the same medium: but nothing hinders them being about the same subject or in the
                     same subject: for one man can know the same conclusions through a probable and through a demonstrative medium.
                     Again, knowledge that is perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect knowledge in the same subject.
                     Now faith, of its very nature, contains an imperfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the believer sees not what he
                     believes: whereas bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the Blessed see that
                     which makes them happy, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>). Hence it is manifest that faith and bliss are
                     incompatible in one and the same subject.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of the object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a
                     more perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible with vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the
                     mode of faith is incompatible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will
                     be perfected also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p13"> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q67_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q67_A4-p0.1">Whether hope remains after death, in the state of glory?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent
                     manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9).
                     Much more then does hope remain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever---in
                     the lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory
                     of the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the
                     soul, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:29</a>: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall yet thirst," and 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.12" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:12</a>: "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore it seems that
                     there can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>): "What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" But the Blessed see that which is the object of hope, viz. God. Therefore they
                     do not hope.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, that which, in its very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the opposite perfection in that
                     subject. Thus it is evident that movement of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is "the act of
                     that which is in potentiality as such" (Phys. iii): so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement
                     ceases; for a thing does not continue to
                     become white, when once it is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed, as is clear from
                     what we have said above about the passion of hope (Q[40], AA[1],2). Therefore when we possess that which we hope for, viz.
                     the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with
                     the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not
                     remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something
                     which is in our actual possession.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state further on (
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A2.html">SS, Q[19], A[2]</a>). Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer be possibility
                     of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the
                     other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it does not remain.
                     Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.1.33" target="asv"> Prov. 1:33</a>: "He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils." Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated
                     above (Q[23], A[2]; Q[40], A[1] ), and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there
                     can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a
                     succession of punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of fear: but the glory
                     of the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past
                     nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q[42],
                     A[2]), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no such hope. Consequently neither will there be fear
                     in
                     them; except speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the
                     reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason
                     desire is said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints,
                     but not hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object
                     is God, and not a created good; nor in its general signification. Because the object of hope is something difficult, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html">Q[40], A[1]</a>): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money
                     is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once. In like manner those who have the glory of the soul are
                     not, properly speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to
                     desire it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q67_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q67_A5-p0.1">Whether anything of faith or hope remains in glory?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there
                     remains what is common; thus it is stated in De Causis that "if you take away rational, there remains living, and when you
                     remove living, there remains being." Now in faith there is something that it has in common with beatitude, viz. knowledge:
                     and there is something proper to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner.
                     Therefore, the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.17" target="asv"> Eph. 1:17,18</a>: "The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the knowledge of God"; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the light
                     of glory, of which it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>): "In Thy light we shall see light." Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light supervenes: for a candle is not
                     extinguished when the sun's rays appear. Therefore it
                     seems that the light of faith itself remains with the light of glory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of
                     liberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen.
                     Therefore when this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still remain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith does
                     not remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A5-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, it seems that it is withdrawn entirely.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and remains
                     in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if this be understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically
                     but generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same genus, viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other
                     hand, hope is not of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is compared to
                     the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the term of movement.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p7"> But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible.
                     Because when you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus does not remain identically the same: thus if you
                     remove the difference constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not remain identically the same, as though the identical
                     color were at one time whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not
                     related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the genus remains identically the same, when the difference
                     is removed, as the substance of matter remains identically the same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference are
                     not the parts of a species, else they would not be predicated of the species. But even as the species denotes the whole, i.e.
                     the compound of matter and form in material things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the genus denotes the
                     whole by signifying that which is material; the difference, by signifying that which is formal; the species, by signifying
                     both. Thus, in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal is predicated of that which has
                     a sensitive nature, rational of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So that the one same
                     whole is denoted by these three, but not under the same aspect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p8"> It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference is confined to the genus if the difference be removed,
                     the substance of the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal nature does not remain, if another kind of soul constitute
                     the animal. Hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure, to become clear vision. It is
                     therefore evident that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically or specifically the
                     same, but only generically.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If "rational" be withdrawn, the remaining "living" thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to the perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject:
                     whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently
                     they are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the air.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that loses his money does not therefore lose the possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the habit
                     of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually,
                     but even its possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss: and so such a habit would remain to no purpose.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q67_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q67_A6-p0.1">Whether charity remains after this life, in glory?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity does not remain after this life, in glory. Because according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10, </a> "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part," i.e. that which is imperfect, "shall be done away." Now the
                     charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their objects. But the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore
                     the apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it seems that charity is not the same
                     in both cases.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things of the same kind can advance from imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of the
                     wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the
                     charity of the wayfarer does not remain in heaven.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>): "Charity never falleth away."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q67_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, when the imperfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to hinder the identical thing
                     passing from imperfection to perfection, even as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love,
                     the nature of which does not include imperfection, since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, either
                     seen or not seen. Therefore charity is
                     not done away by the perfection of glory, but remains identically the same.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The imperfection of charity is accidental to it; because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now although
                     that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away,
                     charity itself is not done away.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of charity is not knowledge itself; if it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the charity
                     of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on the part
                     of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in Ethic. ix, 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly
                     we love Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68.html"></a>
               </div>
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               <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q68" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q68-p0.1">OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q68-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q68-p2"> We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q68-p3"> (1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q68-p4"> (2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q68-p5"> (3) Whether the Gifts are habits?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q68-p6"> (4) Which, and how many are they?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q68-p7"> (5) Whether the Gifts are connected?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q68-p8"> (6) Whether they remain in heaven?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q68-p9"> (7) Of their comparison with one another;</p>
               <p id="FS_Q68-p10"> (8) Of their comparison with the virtues.</p>
               <div id="FS_Q68_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q68_A1-p0.1">Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For Gregory commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.1.2" target="asv"> Job 1:2, </a> "There were born to him seven sons," says (Moral. i, 12): "Seven sons were born to us, when through the conception of heavenly
                     thought, the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost take birth in us": and he quotes the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3</a>: "And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc. where the seven gifts of
                     the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.45" target="asv"> Mat. 12:45, </a> "Then he goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits," etc., says (De Quaest. Evang. i, qu. 8): "The seven vices are opposed
                     to the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost," i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues, commonly
                     so called. Therefore the gifts do not differ from the virtues commonly so called.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things whose definitions are the same, are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts;
                     for each gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life," etc. [*Cf.
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html"> Q[55], A[4]</a>]. Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable giving," according to
                     the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ from one
                     another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues: for, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html">Q[57], A[2]</a>), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind of justice,
                     and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three
                     theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's three daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same
                     seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four corners of the house.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between
                     them. Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers
                     to the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect
                     another in well-doing: especially as we have already stated (
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A3.html">Q[63],
                        A[3]
                     </a>) that some virtues are infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently
                     some have held that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But there remains no less a difficulty for them
                     to solve; for they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear,
                     for instance, that are not reckoned virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p8"> Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned
                     a suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the
                     gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding
                     and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the
                     free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will: since they observed
                     only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the appetitive power or the affections.
                     If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p9"> Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with
                     prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of temptation by His
                     sevenfold gift," said that the virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist temptation.
                     But neither is this distinction sufficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the
                     sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists its contrary: which is especially clear with regard
                     to charity, of which it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Song.8.7" target="asv">Cant 8:7</a>): "Many waters cannot quench charity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p10"> Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as having been in Christ, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3, </a> said that the virtues are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to conform us to Christ, chiefly
                     with regard to His Passion, for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet neither does this appear
                     to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly
                     in humility and meekness, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.29" target="asv"> Mat. 11:29</a>: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart," and in charity, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.3" href="./asv.html#John.15.12" target="asv"> Jn. 15:12</a>: "Love one another, as I have loved you." Moreover, these virtues were especially resplendent in Christ's Passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p11"> Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses
                     itself, for we find there that the term employed is "spirit" rather than "gift." For thus it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2,3</a>): "The spirit . . . of wisdom and of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.: from which words we are clearly given
                     to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now
                     inspiration denotes motion from without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within
                     him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to him, viz. God, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A1-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A4.html">Q[9], AA[4]</a>,6): moreover the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p12"> Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists
                     in a disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence the more exalted the mover, the more perfect
                     must be the disposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect
                     disposition in order to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues
                     perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently
                     man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only
                     because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.50.5" target="asv"> Is. 50:5</a>: "The Lord . . . hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back." Even the
                     Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there
                     is no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they are moved by a
                     principle higher than human reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher
                     than acts of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above
                     the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the
                     Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of "heroic" or "divine virtue [*{arete heroike
                     kai theia}]," in respect of which some men are called "divine."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed
                     to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason,
                     whose light flows from God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This definition applies to virtue taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished
                     from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured
                     by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation
                     to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the
                     promptings of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, according
                     as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p17"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p18"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q68_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q68_A2-p0.1">Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing
                     the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing
                     the ordinary standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the
                     gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now
                     man's behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues.
                     Therefore gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel
                     against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against
                     pride." But a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary
                     to man for salvation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since
                     of wisdom it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.28" target="asv">Wis. 7:28</a>): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.28" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:28</a>): "He that is without fear cannot be justified." Therefore the other gifts that are placed between these are also necessary
                     for salvation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of God. Wherefore in those
                     matters where the prompting of reason is not sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, there is,
                     in consequence, need for a gift.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p7"> Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason;
                     secondly, with a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html">Q[62], A[1]</a>). And, though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner
                     than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter
                     imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue
                     perfectly, can of itself work according to them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every
                     nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work,
                     unless it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has
                     the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can
                     work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions
                     from him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p8"> Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's connatural end, man can work through the judgment
                     of his reason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special promptings from God, this will be
                     out of God's superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired moral virtues,
                     had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason
                     moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does
                     not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv">Rom. 8:14</a>, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.17" target="asv">17</a>: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.142.10" target="asv"> Ps. 142:10</a>: "Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of that
                     land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it
                     is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the commandments),
                     but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man being moved by a higher principle.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual need
                     of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already given.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does
                     not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in
                     the objection. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly,
                     ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the
                     gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A2.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q68_A3-p0.1">Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined
                     as "a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts
                     of the Holy Ghost rest in Him, as stated in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3</a>: "He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth"; on which words Gregory
                     comments as
                     follows (Moral. ii, 27): "The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in the Mediator."
                     Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected
                     by a habit is befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a
                     habit: for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither,
                     therefore, are the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His disciples (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.17" target="asv">Jn. 14:17</a>): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you." Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts
                     abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but abiding habits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it is evident from
                     what has been already said (Q[56], A[4]; Q[58], A[2]), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it
                     partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason. Accordingly
                     the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as
                     compared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, are related
                     to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly.
                     Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by saying that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy
                     Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts." Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated
                     above 
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy men.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is
                     not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has
                     a free-will. Therefore he needs a habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence the
                     comparison fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q68_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q68_A4-p0.1">Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding
                     to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing
                     is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to
                     justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of
                     fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore
                     justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is
                     moved by God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues, should have been included.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided
                     with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the other three.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore,
                     some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably
                     enumerated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Holy Writ (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2,3</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, the gifts are habits perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues
                     perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved
                     by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior
                     power. Therefore whatever powers in man
                     can be the principles of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers are the
                     reason and appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p9"> Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery
                     of truth), and judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected
                     by "understanding"; the practical reason, by "counsel." In order to judge aright, the speculative reason is perfected by "wisdom";
                     the practical reason by "knowledge." The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's relations to
                     another, is perfected by "piety"; in matters touching himself, it is perfected by "fortitude" against the fear of dangers;
                     and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by "fear," according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.27" target="asv"> Prov. 15:27</a>: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil," and
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.120" target="asv"> Ps. 118:120</a>: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments." Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all
                     those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and
                     moral, extend.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, but
                     to external things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made
                     (Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost,
                     Who is the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He
                     moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking,
                     to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to
                     withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name
                     of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship
                     of God is also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for
                     God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved
                     by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is
                     by faith, hope and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore
                     all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derived therefrom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are transferred
                     to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to
                     God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does
                     not give its name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws
                     us from evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their
                     directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear.
                     Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p15"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p16"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q68_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q68_A5-p0.1">Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:8</a>): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same
                     Spirit." Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are
                     given to divers men, and are not connected together in the same man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith." But some
                     of the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected
                     together in one and the same man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless
                     if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude
                     is very weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is
                     very useless if it lack the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it
                     has these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action": from which it seems that it is possible to
                     have one gift without another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons,
                     that by turns they fed one another." Now the sons of Job, of whom he is speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore
                     the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The true answer to this question is easily gathered from what has been already set down. For it has been stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html">(A[3])</a> that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as regards the governance of reason, so all the powers
                     of the soul are disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5</a>: "The charity of God is
                     poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore,
                     just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity:
                     so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the knowledge
                     of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense
                     that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and
                     the "word" of knowledge. They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the
                     Holy Ghost: and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the
                     promptings of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in
                     all who are possessed of charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is referring
                     to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it
                     is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the blissful life, which is no other than eternal life;
                     and another, to know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it
                     against the ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of knowledge."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by
                     another, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], A[1]</a>); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one cannot be perfect without
                     the other. Hence he had already observed that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless one virtue lend
                     its support to
                     another." We are therefore not to understand that one gift can be without another; but that if understanding were without
                     wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q68_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q68_A6-p0.1">Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of
                     His sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all temptations." Now there will be no temptations in heaven,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.9" target="asv"> Is. 11:9</a>: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy mountain." Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in
                     heaven.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But habits are of no use, where their acts are impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for Gregory
                     says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly
                     . . . fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of
                     which are incompatible with the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of glory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life, e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life,
                     e.g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of
                     the Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly
                     river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who, proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more
                     abundantly in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may
                     be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human
                     mind amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in heaven, where God will be "all in all"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:28</a>), and man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they may
                     be considered as regards the matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an operation
                     about a matter, in respect of which they will have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not
                     remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues (
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html">Q[67], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they
                     afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected
                     in good by the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in
                     the future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two,
                     hope passes, and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates the truths heard, refreshing the heart and
                     enlightening its darkness," of which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach
                     no more every man . . . his brother" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.3" target="asv">Jer. 31:3,4</a>); but the enlightening of the mind remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous," which is necessary
                     in the present life; and also that "it makes the mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of fortitude
                     he says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in the present life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands
                     of confidence," which remains also in the
                     future life. With regard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void of ignorance," which refers
                     to the present state. When, however, he adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowledge,
                     which belongs to the future state. Of piety he says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy." These words
                     taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified by "the inmost
                     heart," belongs also to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. Of fear he say
                     that "it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things," which refers to the present state, and that "it strengthens
                     it with the meat of hope for the future," which also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer to
                     the future state, as regards being "strengthened" for things we hope are here, and obtain there.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life;
                     but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of
                     heavenly bliss.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q68_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q68_A7-p0.1">Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly,
                     that which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is
                     written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.12" target="asv">Dt. 10:12</a>): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?" and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.6" target="asv">Malachi 1:6</a>): "If . . . I be a master, where is My
                     fear?" Therefore it seems that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8</a>): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to all things." Now a common good is preferable to particular goods. Therefore
                     piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the most excellent gift.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry.
                     Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is set down as being below it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power
                     than the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence.
                     Therefore the gifts are not set down in their order of dignity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which Isaias
                     speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we read in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.3" target="asv"> Mat. 5:3</a>]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz. in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here,
                     with the lower gifts."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding
                     from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts
                     simply, they follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with another; because the gifts perfect man for
                     all the acts of the soul's powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above
                     
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative
                     are preferable to the active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that wisdom stands before
                     understanding, and understanding before science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom,
                     understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than piety, fortitude, and
                     fear; and among the latter, piety excels fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and fortitude
                     temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel
                     are concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of
                     the gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are given the preference
                     to the others, their excellence is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are preferred to knowledge and
                     piety, it is considered with regard to their matter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the
                     Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.10" target="asv">Ps. 110:10</a>;
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.16" target="asv"> Ecclus. 1:16</a>), and not as though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation, man departs from evil on
                     account of fear (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.16" target="asv">Prov. 16:16</a>), before doing good works, and which result from the other
                     gifts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of which
                     he had said it "is profitable to little."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter:
                     for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation
                     to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled.
                     But on the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the executive, and so is knowledge
                     united to piety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of
                     difficulty, while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together with fortitude, by reason
                     of their matter, are given the preference to knowledge and piety.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A6.html"></a>
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               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q68_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A7.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q68_A8-p0.1">Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of
                     charity: "No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from
                     the children of eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but, without charity, they avail nothing."
                     But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy
                     Ghost.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost;
                     for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence,
                     fortitude, temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues" [viz. the gifts], so "as against folly
                     to bestow wisdom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against
                     fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of heart, piety; against piety, fear." Therefore the virtues
                     are more excellent than the gifts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible to make
                     evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift;
                     or understanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion;
                     that fortitude, while it gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while
                     it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted; and
                     lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than
                     the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so
                     that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], A[3]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q68_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html"> Q[62], A[1]</a>), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues
                     are those whereby man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and
                     the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other hand the gifts of
                     the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p7"> Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover,
                     in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle
                     of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so
                     the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory
                     says (Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i.e. the seven gifts, "never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all
                     they do be done in faith, hope, and charity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p8"> But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues.
                     Because the gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either
                     the reason itself, or the other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more exalted the mover, the more
                     excellent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect
                     than the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes
                     love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues.
                     The other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act:
                     and in this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man,
                     through being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which "dealeth
                     not perversely" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A8-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4</a>). Consequently wisdom and understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the Holy
                     Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory means to say.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A7.html"></a>
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               </div>
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            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q69" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q69-p0.1">OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q69-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q69-p2"> We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q69-p3"> (1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q69-p4"> (2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q69-p5"> (3) Of the number of the beatitudes;</p>
               <p id="FS_Q69-p6"> (4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.</p>
               <div id="FS_Q69_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q69.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q69_A1-p0.1">Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns
                     the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Luke 6:20, </a> seqq., ascribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from
                     the virtues and gifts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the reason and the eternal law, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q21_A1.html"> Q[21], A[1]</a>). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy
                     Ghost, as is clear from what has been said (
                     <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">Q[68], AA[1]</a>,3, seqq.). Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of
                     the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes
                     do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and peace.
                     Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html">Q[2], A[7]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html"> Q[3], A[1]</a>), happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore
                     the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are full of hope"; and the Apostle says
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>): "We are saved by hope." Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved
                     towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action. And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy
                     end by works of virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which our reason is
                     not sufficient, since we need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may obey and follow
                     him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are more
                     excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A8.html">Q[68], A[8]</a>). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas
                     Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more
                     perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument proves that no other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these might
                     seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues
                     perfect him, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A2.html">Q[68], A[2]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q69.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q69_A2-p0.1">Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because
                     they hope for a reward, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q69_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now the object of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to the beatitudes,
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.25" target="asv"> Lk. 6:25, </a> where we read: "Woe to you that are filled; for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep."
                     Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.21.13" target="asv"> Job 21:13</a>: "They spend their days in wealth." Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes
                     refer to this life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De
                     Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.16.15" target="asv"> Ps. 16:15</a>: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall appear." Again, it is only in the future life that we shall
                     see God, and that our Divine sonship will be made
                     manifest, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>: "We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall
                     be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Therefore these rewards refer to the future life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been
                     fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised
                     to us after this life."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all
                     these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present
                     life; and Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and some to the present life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p7"> In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by
                     reason of our having a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by way of merit; secondly, by a
                     kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope that the tree
                     will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the fruit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p8"> Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to
                     happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards, may be either perfect happiness, so as to
                     refer to the future life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained perfection, in which
                     case they refer to the present life. Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and
                     gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that
                     end, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.27.7" target="asv"> Ps. 27:7</a>: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been helped."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence
                     Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so, Lord---that the disordered mind should be its own punishment."
                     The Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul is divided against itself . . . one part pulls this
                     way, another that"; and afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a
                     man so miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice." In like manner, although, on the other hand, the good sometimes
                     do not receive material rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in this life, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.29" target="asv"> Mat. 19:29, </a> and
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.10.30" target="asv"> Mk. 10:30</a>: "Ye shall receive a hundred times as much" even "in this time."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this
                     life. Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv; *Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1), can denote
                     the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" begins to reign in men. The "possession" of the land denotes the
                     well-ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation
                     of the eternal inheritance, signified by "the land." They are "comforted" in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is
                     called the "Paraclete," i.e. the Comforter. They "have their fill," even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.34" target="asv">Jn. 4:34</a>): "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me." Again, in this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy." Again, the eye being
                     cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, "see God." Likewise, in this life, those
                     who are the "peacemakers" of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and are called "the children of God." Nevertheless
                     these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in heaven.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q69_A3-p0.1">Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above
                     (A[1], ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is
                     assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes
                     are insufficiently enumerated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge
                     and counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the
                     beatitudes are insufficiently indicated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety
                     seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes
                     are insufficiently enumerated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ. Thus, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.17" target="asv">Job 5:17</a>): "Blessed is the man whom God correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the
                     ungodly"; and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.13" target="asv">Prov. 3:13</a>): "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom." Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned. For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes
                     are indicated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Matthew 5</a> are too many.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to consist
                     in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative
                     life [*See Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which
                     we are said to be happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason,
                     is an obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative
                     happiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is a beginning thereof.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p9"> And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life
                     of pleasure consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honors; from which man is
                     withdrawn---by a virtue so that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent way, so that he despises them
                     altogether. Hence the first beatitude is: "Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the
                     contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following
                     the bent of one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the irascible passions man is withdrawn---by
                     a virtue, so that they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a gift, in a more excellent manner,
                     so that man, according to God's will, is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is: "Blessed are
                     the meek." From following the concupiscible passions, man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in moderation---and
                     by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice
                     of sorrow [*Cf.
                     <a id="FS_Q69_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A3.html"> Q[35], A[3]</a>]; hence the third beatitude is: "Blessed are they that mourn."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p10"> Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity.
                     To the former we are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and
                     by a gift, so that we do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry
                     and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are
                     they that hunger and thirst after justice." With regard to spontaneous favors we are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give
                     where reason dictates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality--and
                     by a gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty:
                     hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.12" target="asv">Lk. 14:12,13</a>): "When thou makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends,
                     nor thy brethren," etc . . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth
                     beatitude is: "Blessed are the merciful."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p11"> Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore
                     they are included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, which dispose man
                     for the contemplative life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards those virtues and
                     gifts whereby man is perfected in himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by the
                     passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of heart." But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man
                     is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.32.17" target="asv"> Is. 32:17</a>: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining to
                     the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift
                     of understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God," corresponds to the gift of wisdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as even
                     the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include
                     the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to
                     counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but, on the
                     other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g. mourning in respect of knowledge,
                     and mercy in respect of counsel.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the first
                     five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed
                     among the executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects
                     man in his relations to others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.22" target="asv">
                        Lk. 6:22
                     </a>: "It is the business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation," fortitude being about the irascible passions:
                     poverty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of the world.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p15"> Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this way, some of them will have to be assigned differently.
                     Because the principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge,
                     whereby man knows his failings and those of worldly things, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.18" target="asv"> Eccles. 1:18</a>: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]." The principal motive for hungering after the works of
                     justice is fortitude of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.4.24" target="asv">Dan. 4:24</a>: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities
                     with works of mercy to the poor." It is thus that Augustine assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because
                     they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life. Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom
                     the Lord correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked
                     in the counsel of the ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we
                     read, "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies
                     to all others that can be adduced.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is
                     confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence
                     the eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p18">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to the multitude (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.17" target="asv">Lk. 6:17</a>). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure,
                     temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness.
                     The first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by saying: "Blessed are ye poor." The
                     second is that man be well off as to his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying in the second place:
                     "Blessed are ye that hunger." The third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts aside
                     by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now." The fourth is the outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly:
                     "Blessed shall you be, when men shall hate you." And as Ambrose says on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Lk. 6:20, </a> "poverty corresponds
                     to temperance, which is unmoved by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through compassion
                     gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p19"></p>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q69_A4-p0.1">Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal
                     life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward, both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the
                     same ground it should have been assigned to all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas
                     the rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of
                     heaven." Therefore these rewards are unsuitably enumerated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these rewards.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of happiness
                     indicated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q69_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual happiness consists: which
                     happiness man desires by seeking the object of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in temporal
                     and perishable things. Wherefore the
                     rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness. For men
                     seek in external things, viz. riches and honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied in the kingdom
                     of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven
                     to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain
                     security for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living, whereby
                     the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts
                     and pleasures of the world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those that mourn.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p7"> Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are the works of virtues directing man in his relations
                     to his neighbor: from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns
                     to these beatitudes rewards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For there are some who recede
                     from acts of justice, and instead of rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may
                     abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some,
                     again, recede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that
                     they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all misery.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p8"> The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence
                     with the dispositions included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly: hence the clean of heart
                     are promised that they shall see God. Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be a follower
                     of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship,
                     consisting in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), all these rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human intellect
                     cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion
                     to the merits to which those rewards are assigned.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes. Hence
                     it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according
                     to Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but
                     to those who suffer persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the
                     glory of the body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply
                     to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in
                     the kingdom than to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by sorrow. Again,
                     it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies
                     abundance of comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire. And
                     yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance.
                     Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p13"></p>
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               <h3 id="FS_Q70-p0.1">OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q70-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q70-p2"> We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q70-p3"> (1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q70-p4"> (2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q70-p5"> (3) Of their number?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q70-p6"> (4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.</p>
               <div id="FS_Q70_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q70.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q70_A1-p0.1">Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p0.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5" target="asv">Gal. 5</a>) are acts?
                  </h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22,23</a>), are not acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our
                     actions bear fruit: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.3.15" target="asv">Wis. 3:15</a>): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#John.4.36" target="asv">Jn. 4:36</a>): "He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting."
                     Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy [*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the English
                     'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing in them." But our will should not rest in our actions for their
                     own sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity.
                     Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q70_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A1.html">Q[55], A[1]</a>). Therefore the fruits are not actions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.33" target="asv">Mat. 12:33</a>): "By the fruit the tree is known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain the passage. Therefore
                     human actions are called fruits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the
                     product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree
                     that produces it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word
                     "fruit" in two ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that
                     which he produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p7"> Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree,
                     and yet these are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which man intends to derive from the field
                     and from the tree. In this sense man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p8"> If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human actions are called fruits: because operation is the
                     second act of the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's operation proceeds from man in virtue
                     of his reason, it is said to be the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a higher power, which is
                     the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine
                     seed, for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.9" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:9</a>): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since fruit is something last and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate
                     to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as
                     they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called flowers: hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:23</a>): "My flowers are the fruits of honor and riches."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the expression
                     "for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except
                     the last end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way, a man may delight in anything that is delightful
                     by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health,
                     for its own sake, as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and in a nasty medicine,
                     nowise for its own sake, but only for the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must delight in God for
                     His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent goodness
                     which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because "they
                     refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Faith is to
                     believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our
                     neighbor." It is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q70.html"></a>
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               </div>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q70_A2-p0.1">Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="FS_Q70_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html">Q[69], A[1]</a>, ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits
                     of the Holy Ghost.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the
                     present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with
                     future beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above
                     (
                     <a id="FS_Q70_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q70_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q4_A1.html"> Q[4], A[1]</a>). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Things divided into different species, differ from one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts,
                     as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful;
                     whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not
                     vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works,
                     and which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to
                     the virtues, as already stated (
                     <a id="FS_Q70_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html">Q[69], A[1]</a>, ad 1).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other hand
                     the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q70_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q70_A3-p0.1">Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22,23</a>). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is only one fruit of the present life; according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.22" target="asv"> Rom. 6:22</a>: "You have your fruit unto sanctification." Moreover it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.9" target="asv">Is. 27:9</a>): "This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away." Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated (A[1] ). But Our Lord mentions (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.23" target="asv">Mat. 13:23</a>) a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold, sixtyfold," and "thirtyfold." Therefore
                     one should not reckon twelve fruits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned
                     by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but
                     rather something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumerated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q70_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q70_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the
                     acts of wisdom, and of many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insufficiently enumerated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the twelve
                     fruits of which it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.2" target="asv">Apoc. 22:2</a>): "On both sides of the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits." Since, however, a fruit is something that proceeds from
                     a source as from a seed or root, the difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways in which the Holy
                     Ghost proceeds in us:
                     which process consists in this, that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in regard
                     to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that are below it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p7"> Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has a good disposition towards good things and towards
                     evil things. Now the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by love, which is the first of our emotions
                     and the root of them all, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A4.html">Q[27], A[4]</a>). Wherefore among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, we reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a special manner,
                     as in His own likeness,
                     since He Himself is love. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." The necessary result of the love
                     of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence in
                     God Whom it loves, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him": wherefore the sequel of charity is "joy." Now the perfection
                     of joy
                     is peace in two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in
                     the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is perfectly set at peace in one
                     object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.165" target="asv">Ps. 118:165</a>): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no stumbling-block," because, to wit, external
                     things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the restless desire: for he does not
                     perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things, namely, that we be
                     not disturbed by external things, and that our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and joy, "peace"
                     is given the third place. In evil things the mind has a good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being
                     disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to "patience"; secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are
                     delayed; which belongs to "long suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of evil" (Ethic. v, 3).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p8"> Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this
                     belongs "goodness." Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this belongs "benignity," for the benign are those
                     in whom the salutary flame [bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his
                     suffering with equanimity the evils his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs "meekness," which curbs anger.
                     Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or
                     deceit. To this pertains "faith," if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in
                     God, then man is directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect and, consequently, all that
                     is his, to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p9"> Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards external action, by "modesty," whereby we observe
                     the "mode" in all our words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by "contingency" and "chastity": whether these two differ
                     because chastity withdraws man from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because the continent man is
                     subject to concupiscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from
                     them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there in
                     the singular, on account of its being generically one, though divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various degrees
                     of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit;
                     the contingency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency, by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other
                     ways in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the
                     three degrees of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of anything is considered with respect to
                     its beginning, its middle, and its end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the foundation,
                     it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith,
                     which is certainly about the unseen."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22,23, </a> "the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or fruits of the Spirit] there are; but
                     to show how the former should be avoided, and the latter sought after." Hence either more or fewer fruits might have been
                     mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of fittingness, in
                     so far as all the virtues and
                     gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of wisdom and of any gifts directing
                     to good, are reduced to charity, joy and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that these imply either
                     enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils, which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q70_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q70_A4-p0.1">Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19, </a> seqq.). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits
                     of the Spirit are not contrary to them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore
                     the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication, uncleanness,
                     and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary
                     to the works of the flesh.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv">Gal. 5:17</a>) that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits
                     of the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind
                     to that which is in accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive,
                     appetite draws man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and
                     downward are contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits
                     of the Spirit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p7"> Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered singly, each according to its specific nature. And
                     in this they are not of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (A[3], ad 4), the Apostle did not intend
                     to enumerate all the works, whether spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine, commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22,23, </a> contrasts the fruits with the carnal works, each to each. Thus "to fornication, which
                     is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is wedded to God: wherein
                     also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these the joy
                     of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against
                     witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels, there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils
                     inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those evils; and goodness, to forgive them.
                     In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which proceeds from a tree against the tree's nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since
                     works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue
                     are called fruits, but not so works of vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices
                     are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p10"> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q71" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q71-p0.1">EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q71-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q71-p2">OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)</p>
               <p id="FS_Q71-p3"> We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered
                  in themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin;
                  (6) the effect of sin.
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q71-p4"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q71-p5"> (1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q71-p6"> (2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q71-p7"> (3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q71-p8"> (4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q71-p9"> (5) Whether every sin includes action?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q71-p10"> (6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii): "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal
                  law."
               </p>
               <div id="FS_Q71_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q71_A1-p0.1">Whether vice is contrary to virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now
                     sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition
                     of bodily members or of any things whatever.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice
                     is not contrary to virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that "virtue is the soul's health." Now sickness or disease, rather than vice,
                     is opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil." But "virtue is a quality
                     which makes its subject good," as was shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in virtue---the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue
                     we may consider something directly, and we may consider something consequently. Virtue implies "directly" a disposition whereby
                     the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that
                     "virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I
                     mean that which is disposed according to its nature." That which virtue implies "consequently" is that it is a kind of goodness:
                     because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue
                     is directed is a good act, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html">Q[56], A[3]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p7"> Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is "sin," which is opposed to virtue in respect
                     of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is
                     an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary
                     of virtue is "malice": while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary
                     is "vice": because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine
                     says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be called a vice."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the latter
                     is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly
                     as such.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason
                     for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce
                     a good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "disease and sickness are vicious qualities," for in speaking of the body "he calls
                     it" disease "when the whole body is infected," for instance, with fever or the like; he calls it sickness "when the disease
                     is attended with weakness"; and vice "when the parts of the body are not well compacted together." And although at times there
                     may be disease in the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden
                     complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; "yet, in the soul," as he says, "these two things
                     are indistinguishable, except in thought." For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection,
                     he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since "a tree is known by its fruit," i.e. man by his works, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.33" target="asv"> Mat. 12:33.</a> But "vice of the soul," as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "is a habit or affection of
                     the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through life": and this is to be found even without disease and sickness,
                     e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as virtue
                     extends to more things than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice
                     is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or disease.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q71_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q71_A2-p0.1">Whether vice is contrary to nature?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above (Q[63], AA[1] ,2,3). Therefore vice is
                     not contrary to nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated
                     to upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice
                     is found in the greater number of men; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.13" target="asv">Mat. 7:13</a>): "Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat." Therefore vice is not contrary to
                     nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27).
                     But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature,
                     as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason is
                     that thing "vituperated," which word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p8"> But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man
                     derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking,
                     contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man.
                     Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states
                     (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as
                     much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords
                     with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason,
                     like a second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that
                     vice is contrary to nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being
                     from nature": and not in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being in accord with nature," in which latter sense
                     virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his
                     senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than
                     who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence
                     of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his
                     sensitive nature against the order of his reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared
                     to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the
                     order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every
                     nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the
                     Divine art whereby it was made."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q71_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q71_A3-p0.1">Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better
                     it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith.
                     Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore
                     a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their
                     badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action
                     is worse than a vicious habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated
                     in Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do
                     evil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between
                     power and act, so that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding
                     power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that
                     a habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or
                     bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since "the
                     cause of a thing being such, is yet more so."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above another
                     simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses
                     it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses
                     habit both in goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more
                     lasting than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature such that it cannot always
                     be in action, and whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply excels in goodness and badness, but
                     habit excels in a certain respect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit precedes
                     act simply, both in goodness and in badness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider
                     the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q71_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q71_A4-p0.1">Whether sin is compatible with virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject.
                     Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither,
                     therefore, can sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural
                     things, except through some corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in
                     the seed, as stated in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the corruption of some virtue
                     in the soul: so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that "virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes." Now one virtuous act
                     does not cause a virtue, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html">Q[51], A[3]</a>): and, consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in the same subject.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of
                     a form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore
                     a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness
                     with downward movement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover):
                     whereas the habit that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills.
                     Consequently man, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a contrary act; and so a man having
                     a virtue may produce an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare
                     the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by
                     one
                     act as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html">Q[63], A[2]</a>, ad 2). But if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed
                     by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as virtues;
                     and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled "as
                     virtues." And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain
                     unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary
                     to charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are
                     not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p7"> Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin
                     is compatible with virtues, whether infused or acquired.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the act, but
                     not with the habit, of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts
                     of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the
                     other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; hence the comparison fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q71_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q71_A5-p0.1">Whether every sin includes an action?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice.
                     Now there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without action.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that,
                     unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now nothing can be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every
                     sin implies an act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who
                     never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually;
                     and this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv">James 4:17</a>): "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Now "not to do" does not imply an act. Therefore
                     sin can be without act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The reason for urging this question has reference to the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For
                     some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or exterior---interior, as when a man wills "not
                     to go to church," when he is bound to go---exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is bound to go to church (or
                     even before), occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a
                     way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently,
                     to go without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that
                     which he is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin
                     of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p7"> Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which the essence
                     of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills "not to go to church":
                     while sometimes it will be without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at the time that he is bound
                     to go to church, does not think of going or not going to church.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p8"> If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission
                     must of necessity include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not do: and that we
                     turn aside so as not to do what we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either united with the omission
                     or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone
                     omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful;
                     and such cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the interior act of the will: which
                     act sometimes bears directly on the omission, as when a man wills "not to go to church," because it is too much trouble; and
                     in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of
                     itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears directly on something
                     else which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as when a man wills
                     to play at the time he ought to go to church---or, precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night, the
                     result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to
                     the omission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and that which is outside the intention is said to be accidental
                     (Phys. ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding
                     the omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p9"> Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and
                     consequently it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential
                     to other actual sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> More things are required for good than for evil, since "good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results
                     from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or
                     by his not doing what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there
                     can be no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The term "voluntary" is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which
                     we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far
                     as man has it in his power to will, and not to will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to act,
                     a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q71_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q71_A6-p0.1">Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: "Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law." Because
                     "Word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore this definition does not include every sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): "Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids." Now will is comprised
                     under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. Therefore it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary
                     to the eternal law," nor was there need to add "word" or "deed."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard
                     to the end as explained above (
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6;
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A2.html"> Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to the end, by saying that "sin is nothing else than to
                     neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things": and again he
                     says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should
                     use." Now the definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due end: therefore it is an insufficient definition
                     of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden,
                     but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained above 
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now man's evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say that
                     sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust. xxii, 27).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above 
                     <a id="FS_Q71_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above
                     (Q[1], A[1]), whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by
                     the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its
                     due measure: and conformity of measure in a
                     thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will:
                     one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God's
                     reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining
                     to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says "word," "deed," or "desire";
                     the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, "contrary to the eternal
                     law."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the
                     genus "relation," as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so "word" and "deed" denote equally what is said and what is
                     not said, what is done and what is not done.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it
                     is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance
                     of sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external
                     action.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to
                     things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, "contrary to the eternal law," he includes aversion from the end
                     and all other forms of inordinateness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that not every sin is evil through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive law.
                     If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily
                     in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural
                     law, precisely because it is inordinate.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason.
                     Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being "contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference
                     to its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g.
                     in matters of faith.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q72" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q72-p0.1">OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q72-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q72-p2"> We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q72-p3"> (1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q72-p4"> (2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;</p>
               <p id="FS_Q72-p5"> (3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q72-p6"> (4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q72-p7"> (5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q72-p8"> (6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q72-p9"> (7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q72-p10"> (8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q72-p11"> (9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q72_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q72_A1-p0.1">Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins do not differ in species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in relation,
                     chiefly, to their end, as shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">Q[71], A[1]</a>), it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil
                     in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their
                     objects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sins differed specifically according to their objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with
                     diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral.
                     xxxiv, 18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not differ in species according to their objects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's law." Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their various
                     objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">Q[18], A[2]</a> ). Therefore sins, also differ in species according to their objects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>), two things concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness, which consists in departing from
                     God's law. Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such matter;
                     while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for "no one
                     acts intending evil," as Dionysius
                     declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not from that
                     which is accidental: because what is accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the
                     part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species according
                     to their objects, as was proved above (
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">Q[18], A[2]</a>). Therefore it follows that sins are properly
                     distinguished in species by their objects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the
                     will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their
                     ends.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to their objects
                     of their acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their opposite
                     virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ specifically according to their objects, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html">Q[60], A[5]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In various things, differing in species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which
                     aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference to various things; and avarice seeks
                     abundance of things adapted to human use.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q72_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q72_A2-p0.1">Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19</a>): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc.
                     from which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore
                     carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as stated in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.13" target="asv"> Rom. 8:13</a>: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live."
                     Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not
                     be distinguished from spiritual sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.23" target="asv"> Eph. 4:23</a>: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind," where spirit stands for reason, according to a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed
                     in accordance with the flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason,
                     as we shall state further on (
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html">Q[74], A[7]</a>).
                     Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against
                     his own body. But, according to the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:18</a>), "every sin that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body." Therefore
                     fornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.3" target="asv">Eph. 5:3</a>) reckons covetousness with the carnal
                     sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that "of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, sins take their species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable good, for which man has
                     an inordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (Q[31], A[3]), pleasure
                     is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire;
                     this can also be called spiritual
                     pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized
                     in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal pleasure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p8"> Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal
                     pleasure, are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of the table; and lust, which consists in
                     sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.1" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:1</a>): "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure;
                     but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says
                     (De Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p10"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are
                     named, is carnal pleasure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the gloss says, "in the sin of fornication the soul is the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of sinning
                     it can think of nothing else": whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It
                     may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin
                     alone is man said specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness,
                     which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another's wife. Again,
                     it may be said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this respect covetousness
                     is numbered with the carnal sins: but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit, wherefore Gregory
                     says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q72_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q72_A3-p0.1">Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence
                     it derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore
                     they differ specifically in reference to their causes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like
                     its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it seems that much more do they
                     differ in reference to their other causes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine, commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.79.17" target="asv"> Ps. 79:17, </a> "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love enkindling
                     us to undue ardor." For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>) that "all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the concupiscence of the eyes, or [Vulg.:
                     'and'] the pride of life." Now a thing is said to be in the world on
                     account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in Joan.). Gregory,
                     too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes
                     of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were the case all sins would belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>) that "the desire of money is the root of all evils." Now it is evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore
                     sins do not differ specifically according to their different causes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since there are four kinds of causes, they are attributed to various things in various ways. Because the "formal" and the
                     "material" cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and
                     form, both in species and in genus. The "agent" and the "end" regard directly movement and operation: wherefore movements
                     and operations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however,
                     because the natural active principles are always determined to the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts
                     are taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also from their active principles: thus
                     heating and cooling are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active principles in
                     voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active or
                     motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft,
                     or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue
                     ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or motive causes, but only
                     in respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6) that human acts take their species from the end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The active principles in voluntary acts, not being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human acts,
                     unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and
                     consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior act of
                     the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered
                     as the matter "about which," they have the character of term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic.
                     x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has
                     the character of end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q72_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q72_A4-p0.1">Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one's neighbor?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that
                     which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against
                     God: for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A6.html">Q[66], A[6]</a>). Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of
                     sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed
                     to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly
                     divided into these three.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, specification is not taken from things external. But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are
                     not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and
                     against his neighbor."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">Q[71], AA[1]</a>,6), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so
                     far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the rule
                     of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold
                     order would suffice. But since man is
                     naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed
                     in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever
                     things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things are comprised
                     under the order of God, which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he
                     that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In like manner, the
                     first order includes the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor,
                     we need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation
                     to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against
                     himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he
                     is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to God,
                     his neighbor, and himself are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which
                     the species of sins are diversified: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins:
                     because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from
                     what has been said (
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html">Q[62], AA[1]</a>,2,3) that by the theological virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself; and by justice to his
                     neighbor.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order
                     to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer,
                     not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers
                     and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in
                     respect of that in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the
                     numbers three and four.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although God and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related
                     to it as to its object.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q72_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q72_A5-p0.1">Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when
                     sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even
                     to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal
                     punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity
                     of the fault, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be." Therefore venial and mortal sins are
                     not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*"Ex genere," genus in this case denoting the species], as murder
                     and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial
                     and mortal sins differ specifically.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward
                     is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their
                     ends, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Those things that constitute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as
                     the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to
                     be found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational," "animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is
                     consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to specific diversity, yet, in others, it
                     may be found within the same species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific
                     diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p7"> We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of
                     punishment, cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never constitutes a species; and
                     what is outside the agent's intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the
                     intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it
                     is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to
                     the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific
                     diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p8"> Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes
                     the notion of sin. For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying
                     the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animal's body, the frame
                     may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while,
                     on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now
                     the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable
                     principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away
                     from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without
                     turning away from God, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction
                     of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of
                     the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible
                     to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the
                     truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider
                     the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas
                     when a man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle
                     of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to
                     deserve to be punished eternally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they "turn away from," not as regards what they "turn to," viz.
                     the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance,
                     in the species "adultery" the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may
                     even be a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that
                     this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may
                     be found even in things of the same species, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on
                     the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q72_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q72_A6-p0.1">Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For "offense" and "sin" are condivided with one another
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.1" target="asv">Eph. 2:1</a>), where it is written: "When you were dead in your offenses and sins," which words a gloss explains, saying: "'Offenses,'
                     by omitting to do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by doing what was forbidden." Whence it is evident that "offenses" here
                     denotes sins of omission; while "sin" denotes sins of
                     commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to sin to be against God's law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been
                     said (
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Now in God's law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts,
                     against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species,
                     since negation has no species; for "there is neither species nor difference of non-being," as the Philosopher states (Phys.
                     iv, text. 67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which
                     is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and
                     commission do not differ specifically.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold difference in sins; a material difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be observed
                     in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which
                     is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference, which
                     are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed
                     to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves
                     differ specifically according to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the material species in sins of omission
                     and commission, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species.
                     But if we refer to the formal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because
                     they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs,
                     and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the
                     prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner,
                     is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not
                     give forth cold.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to
                     material species, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue,
                     first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are
                     induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but
                     to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not of necessity, opposed
                     to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is
                     a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Consequently sins do not differ specifically
                     according to the various precepts of the Law.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking,
                     negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q72_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q72_A7-p0.1">Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes
                     three stages of sin, of which the first is "when the carnal sense offers a bait," which is the sin of thought; the second
                     stage is reached "when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought"; and the third stage, "when consent is given to
                     the deed." Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to
                     reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the first of which is "a fault hidden in the heart"; the second,
                     "when it is done openly"; the third, "when it is formed into a habit"; and the fourth, "when man goes so far as to presume
                     on God's mercy or to give himself up to despair": where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and
                     two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically.
                     Therefore they should not be condivided with one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome in commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.43.23" target="asv"> Ezech. 43:23</a>: "The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically:
                     secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is
                     the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species,
                     as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the
                     generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various
                     complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first
                     beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as
                     man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the
                     deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three
                     belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance,
                     is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the
                     same applies to lust and to any other sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided
                     into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas
                     Jerome (in commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.43.23" target="asv"> Ezech. 43:23</a>) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended principally; while
                     in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward manifestation
                     is by way of sequel.
                     Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation
                     of a man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each
                     is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous,
                     but only when there is a break in the movement.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q72_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A9.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q72_A8-p0.1">Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect
                     of more and less. Now "more" and "less" do not diversify a species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species
                     of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative
                     matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more
                     or less than the reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rectitude
                     of reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one species cannot be made out of two," as Porphyry declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i]. Now excess and deficiency
                     are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and wasteful---illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality,
                     by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Contraries differ specifically, for "contrariety is a difference of form," as stated in Metaph. x, text. 13,14. Now vices
                     that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they
                     differ specifically.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order
                     of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention,
                     as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is directed. Consequently
                     wherever we find a
                     different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive
                     for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary
                     to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of
                     insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although "more" and "less" do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in
                     so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says
                     (Ethic. viii, 1) that "those who held that there are no different species of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree,
                     were led by insufficient proof." In this way to exceed reason or to fall short
                     thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through
                     departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth,
                     wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside
                     the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to
                     tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the "boaster," who exceeds
                     in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the "cheat," who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his
                     debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. 
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A8-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q119_A1.html">SS, Q[119], A[1]</a>, ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A9.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q72_A9" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q72_A9-p0.1">Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil
                     results from each single defect." Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption
                     of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A9-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A10.html">Q[18], A[10]</a>). Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse:
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p5"> 'Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.' Now these pertain to various circumstances, for "hastily" means sooner
                     than is right; "too much," more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according
                     to the various circumstances.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that "every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not";
                     and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A9-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the
                     end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted, there is but one motive:
                     thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on
                     with the circumstances, since he does
                     this through an inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of different circumstances does not
                     diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p8"> Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises from different motives: for instance that a man eat
                     hastily, may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive
                     humors; and that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice meats, is due
                     to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different circumstances
                     entails different species of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even
                     as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q72_A9-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, but from turning to the object of the act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q73" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A9.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q73-p0.1">OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q73-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q73-p2"> We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q73-p3"> (1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q73-p4"> (2) Whether all are equal?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q73-p5"> (3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q73-p6"> (4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q73-p7"> (5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q73-p8"> (6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q73-p9"> (7) Whether it depends on their circumstances?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q73-p10"> (8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q73-p11"> (9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q73-p12"> (10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q73_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q73_A1-p0.1">Whether all sins are connected with one another?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.10" target="asv">James 2:10</a>): "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all." Now to be guilty of transgressing
                     all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), "sin is a transgression
                     of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of
                     all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], A[1]</a>). Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues. Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all
                     sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a principle in common, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], AA[1]</a>,2). Now as the virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which builds the city of God,
                     is the beginning and root of all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as
                     Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore all vices and sins are also connected
                     so that whoever has one, has them all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Some vices are contrary to one another, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together in the
                     same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the
                     sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule
                     of reason, wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together
                     in the right reason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], A[1]</a>). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed
                     to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner's intention is directed
                     when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they are sometimes contrary to one
                     another. Since, therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is
                     evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not
                     consist in passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in forsaking the
                     one for the many.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">Q[72] , A[1]</a>), but as regards that from which sin turns away, in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. Now
                     all the commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same God is despised
                     in every sin; and in this sense he
                     says that whoever "offends in one point, is become guilty of all," for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt
                     of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A4.html">Q[71], A[4]</a>), the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys
                     infused virtue, by turning man away from God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue;
                     though if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the destruction
                     of which entails
                     the loss of prudence, since when man acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral virtue
                     is possible, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html">Q[58], A[4]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html"> Q[65], A[1]</a>). Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far
                     as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however, are not virtues.
                     Nevertheless it
                     does not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of sins---first, because several vices are opposed to one virtue,
                     so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed
                     to virtue, as regards the virtue's inclination to act, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">Q[71], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws man's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which
                     flow from the love of God, are connected together. But self-love disunites man's affections among different things, in so
                     far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins,
                     which arise from self-love, are not connected together.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q73_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q73_A2-p0.1">Whether all sins are equal?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one
                     and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things.
                     Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one
                     go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. Therefore all sins are equal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are
                     equal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said to Pilate (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.11" target="asv">Jn. 19:11</a>): "He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin," and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore
                     one sin is greater than another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: from
                     which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the
                     pains of hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through
                     looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from
                     reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if
                     we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is a simple and pure privation,
                     which consists, so to speak, in "being" corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light. Such
                     like privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead
                     on
                     the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and,
                     in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade
                     shutting out all the light. There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite
                     habit; it consists in "becoming" corrupted rather than in "being" corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due
                     commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and
                     the same applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the contrary
                     habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors
                     or members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such
                     as
                     not to destroy the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. For the substance
                     of the act, or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of reason. Therefore it
                     matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we must
                     say that sins are not all equal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To commit sin is lawful on account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness
                     are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to
                     its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same species of virtue, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html">Q[66], AA[1]</a>,2). Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices
                     or sins are not.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q73_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q73_A3-p0.1">Whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to
                     its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to
                     their various objects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to
                     which it turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of
                     sins does not vary according to their various objects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins that have different objects are of different kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one
                     another, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference
                     of objects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Sins take their species from their objects, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">Q[72], A[1]</a>). But some sins are graver than others in respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity
                     of sins varies according to their objects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html">Q[71], A[5]</a>), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than another: for just as the good of health consists
                     in a certain commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal's nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain
                     commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the higher the principle the disorder
                     of which
                     causes the disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on the human body from the heart,
                     which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be so much the
                     graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the reason
                     directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin.
                     Now the object of an act is its end, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A3.html">Q[72], A[3]</a>, ad 2); and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is clear that external things
                     are directed to man as their end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very
                     substance of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin
                     committed directly against God, e.g.
                     unbelief, blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than another according as it
                     is about a higher or lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their objects, the difference of gravity
                     which is derived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting from the species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the object is the matter about which an act is concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the intention
                     of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A3.html">Q[72], A[3]</a>, ad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A6.html">Q[72], A[6]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html"> Q[18], A[6]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which
                     aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those
                     things to which man turns.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the objects of human acts are related to one another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far as
                     they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being compared with one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q73_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q73_A4-p0.1">Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed,
                     so that, to wit, the graver the sin is opposed to the greater virtue. For, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.5" target="asv"> Prov. 15:5, </a> "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength." Now, as Our Lord says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20, </a> seqq.) abundant justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder, which less abundant justice
                     restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "virtue is about the difficult and the good": whence it seems to follow that the
                     greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what
                     is less difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope.
                     Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the "worst is opposed to the best." Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue;
                     and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first, principally and directly; that sin, to with, which is about the same object:
                     because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue:
                     because, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both
                     sin and virtue take their species from the object, as shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html">Q[60], A[5]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html"> Q[72], A[1]</a>). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in
                     the same genus. Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue
                     in checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not
                     only from that sin, but also from whatever leads to it.
                     And thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins: even as the more
                     perfect health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the
                     greater virtue, on the part of the latter's effect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor
                     sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil.
                     For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more intent on good or evil, through not
                     being overcome by the difficulty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God: hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred
                     of God, which is the most grievous of all sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q73_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q73_A5-p0.1">Whether carnal sins are of less guilt than spiritual sins?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft:
                     for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.30" target="asv">Prov. 6:30</a>, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.32" target="asv">32</a>): "The fault is not so great when a man has stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy
                     his own soul." Now theft belongs to covetousness, which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is a carnal
                     sin. Therefore carnal sins are
                     of greater guilt than spiritual sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus [*The quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that "the devil
                     rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry." But he rejoices more in the greater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it
                     seems that the carnal sins are of most guilt.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that "it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger." But anger
                     is a spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more
                     grievous than spiritual sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt
                     than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous
                     than carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the subject:
                     because spiritual sins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and to
                     turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it chiefly belongs
                     to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a "turning to" something, and for that reason, implies
                     a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a "turning from" something, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for
                     this reason it involves greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is
                     committed: because carnal sin, as such, is against the sinner's own body, which he ought to love less, in the order of charity,
                     than God and his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual sins, and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater
                     guilt. A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we
                     shall state further on 
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Now carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz. our innate
                     concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under
                     the head of covetousness, as a gloss observes on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.5" target="asv"> Eph. 5:5.</a> "No fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person," etc.; so that adultery is so much more grievous than theft, as a man loves
                     his wife more than his chattels.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with difficulty
                     be withdrawn from it. "For the desire of pleasure is insatiable," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6), the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger,
                     is that lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "sins of intemperance are most worthy
                     of reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational minds": hence, by these sins man
                     is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
                     17) that they are more shameful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q73_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q73_A6-p0.1">Whether the gravity of a sin depends on its cause?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly
                     it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist;
                     for it denotes weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous.
                     Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.7" target="asv"> Rom. 7:7, </a> "For I had not known concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils." Now
                     the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished
                     by the greatness of its cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin.
                     Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether
                     excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased
                     by the greatness of its cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> If the cause be increased, the effect is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin,
                     and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv"> Mat. 7:18, </a> "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit": and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the
                     greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p7"> The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these
                     causes we must make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will: such
                     is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins
                     more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will
                     to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with
                     the judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free
                     movement of the will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its
                     voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes
                     the sin, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is
                     a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater
                     concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins,
                     being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous
                     temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment
                     of reason, and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement
                     of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q73_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q73_A7-p0.1">Whether a circumstance aggravates a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance
                     does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil,
                     it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away (from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the
                     object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven
                     (Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin
                     more grievous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue (Ethic. ii, 1,2), "it is natural for a thing to be increased by that
                     which causes it." Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs
                     from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action. Wherefore it is evident that it
                     is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in
                     three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of
                     a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin
                     is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this respect adultery is
                     a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus, but
                     only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give,
                     he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason
                     his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox.
                     iii) that "in taking his father's life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who
                     educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the republic." Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin
                     by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, taking another's property constitutes the
                     sin of theft; but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's property, the sin will be more grievous;
                     although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A10.html">Q[18], A[10]</a>). Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing
                     is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured,
                     not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's species;
                     because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate
                     a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may
                     turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one
                     ought not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside
                     from the rule of reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man
                     ought to be united by right reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q73_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A9.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q73_A8-p0.1">Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent
                     to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A5.html">Q[20], A[5]</a>). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor. Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God,
                     according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.35.6" target="asv">Job 35:6</a>, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.35.8" target="asv">8</a>: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee."
                     If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous
                     than sins against God or oneself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life;
                     because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose
                     the life of grace. Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace
                     by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its
                     causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is
                     evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes
                     the integrity of nature." Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as
                     it does more harm.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when
                     a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates
                     the sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin. Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended;
                     for instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he
                     knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case
                     again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will
                     being strongly inclined to sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not
                     wish simply. Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with the sin
                     accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue,
                     a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow directly
                     from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is directly
                     consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious
                     fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen
                     by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p7"> But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected
                     with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity
                     of the sin: for instance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly
                     consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not
                     make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has
                     heard nothing about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of theft: but
                     his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a believer,
                     who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire
                     to
                     sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have already stated (
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A5.html">Q[20], A[5]</a>), in treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action if foreseen and intended adds to the
                     goodness and malice of an act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is inordinateness
                     which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the
                     act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such
                     sins are the most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to
                     be found against which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against himself. Moreover we might say that although
                     no man can do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith,
                     by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself,
                     as in the case of suicide, though this be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from some
                     anxiety.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors;
                     whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not to harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and
                     sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, because
                     no man dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A9.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q73_A9" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A10.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q73_A9-p0.1">Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this
                     were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate
                     a sin: because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through
                     being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against
                     whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin,
                     because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): "The man who kills his slave sins once: he that takes his father's life sins many
                     times." But the kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every man is most akin to
                     himself; and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one's own, than
                     another's horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate
                     the sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.7" target="asv"> Wis. 6:7</a>: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented," and
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47</a>: "The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Therefore, in
                     like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position
                     and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a
                     poor man, since "there is no respect of persons with God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Col.3.25" target="asv">Col. 3:25</a>), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does
                     not aggravate the sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19:14</a>): "They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the sword." Moreover much blame is attached to the sin
                     committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Mic.7.6" target="asv"> Micah 7:6</a>: "the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother." Furthermore
                     sins committed against persons of rank are expressly condemned: thus it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Job.34.18" target="asv">Job 34:18</a>): "Who saith to the king: 'Thou art an apostate'; who calleth rulers ungodly." Therefore the condition of the person sinned
                     against aggravates the sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q73_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html">(A[3])</a> that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave, as its
                     object is a more principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his neighbor: for whatever
                     we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate
                     to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered
                     on the part of these three.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p7"> First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that
                     an injury inflicted on such a person redounds on to God according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.2.8" target="asv"> Zech. 2:8</a>: "He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye." Wherefore a sin is the more grievous, according as it is committed
                     against a person more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official station. On the part of man himself,
                     it is evident
                     that he sins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more united to him, either through
                     natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and,
                     for this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.14.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 14:5</a>: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously, according
                     as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin
                     committed against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous
                     than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.28" target="asv">Ex. 22:28</a>): "The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse." In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence,
                     is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that
                     the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance his
                     possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things
                     that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury
                     on oneself: for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since,
                     however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect
                     of injuries done to such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing,
                     or give his approval.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no respect for persons if God punishes more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is
                     done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A10.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q73_A10" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q73_A10-p0.1">Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving
                     to God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.25.13" target="asv"> Ecclus. 25:13</a>: "How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord." Now the more a man
                     cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iiChr.30.18" target="asv">2 Paral. 30: 18,19</a>): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all
                     them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not
                     sanctified." Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "there is no respect of persons with God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.11" target="asv">Rom. 2:11</a>). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by
                     the excellence of the person sinning.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his
                     goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): "A sin is deemed so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent
                     person."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like sins are
                     less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human
                     weakness does not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from deliberation: and these sins
                     are all the more imputed to man according as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned
                     for this. First, because a more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin;
                     hence Our Lord said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv">Lk. 12:47</a>) that the "servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Secondly,
                     on account of ingratitude, because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins:
                     and in this respect any excellence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a
                     sin, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.7" target="asv"> Wis. 6:7</a>: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented." Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence
                     of the person sinning: for instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice,
                     or if a priest were to be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal;
                     because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): "Sin becomes much more
                     scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his position": and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men are wont
                     to bear them with more indignation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their
                     sin, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A9.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q74" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A10.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q74-p0.1">OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q74-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q74-p2"> We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q74-p3"> (1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q74-p4"> (2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q74-p5"> (3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q74-p6"> (4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q74-p7"> (5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q74-p8"> (6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q74-p9"> (7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q74-p10"> (8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q74-p11"> (9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q74-p12"> (10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q74_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q74_A1-p0.1">Whether the will is a subject of sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will
                     and the intention." But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does
                     not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than
                     in the will. Therefore sin is nowise in the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause
                     do not coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the
                     will, as Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the subject of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is an act, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">Q[71], AA[1]</a>,6). Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. "to cut" and "to burn": and such acts have for their matter and subject,
                     the thing into which the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that "movement is the act of the
                     thing moved, caused by a mover." On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the
                     agent, e.g. "to
                     desire" and "to know": and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must
                     needs be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a> ;
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html"> Q[18], A[6]</a>), it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the
                     principle of sins. Therefore it follows that
                     sin is in the will as its subject.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is
                     an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is in the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in
                     the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in
                     the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument applies to those efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves,
                     but move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q74_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q74_A2-p0.1">Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that "no one sins except
                     by the will." Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore
                     the will alone is the subject of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], "so
                     true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now the acts of the other powers
                     are not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the subject
                     of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will,
                     would be a subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are
                     the subject of virtues, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56.html">Q[56])</a>. Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above 
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, whatever is the a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited
                     by the will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q[6], A[4]) in treating of voluntariness.
                     Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained
                     from their acts, by the will; and
                     these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same subject.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by
                     reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves
                     them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason
                     as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external
                     members are actions that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow
                     that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q74_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q74_A3-p0.1">Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions.
                     Now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the movement
                     of the sensuality from being inordinate, since "the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life;
                     wherefore it is signified by the serpent," as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement
                     of the sensuality is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which
                     we do with the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality,
                     which is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q74_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv">Rom. 7:19</a>): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": which words Augustine explains (Contra Julian.
                     iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality.
                     Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is
                     evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. Wherefore it
                     follows that sin can be in the sensuality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have
                     a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as
                     we have the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>. In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain
                     excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary
                     action, and, consequently, the subject of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely destroyed
                     in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the "fomes"
                     does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for
                     instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his
                     thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements
                     of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated
                     movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption:
                     but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing
                     therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but
                     is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin,
                     which is something imperfect in the genus of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q74_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q74_A4-p0.1">Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to
                     commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality
                     can be a mortal sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of
                     the irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about
                     the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial
                     sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), mortal sin can be there also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): "The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even
                     be in those who are in a state of grace," in whom, however, mortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement
                     of the sensuality is not a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which destroys
                     the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal sin, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">Q[72], A[5]</a>). Now it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything to the end: and disorder in respect of
                     the end can only belong to the power whose function it is to
                     order others to the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being
                     an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal
                     sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an
                     act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice:
                     wherefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which
                     perfects the rational power; and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A disposition may be related in three ways to that to which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the
                     same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the
                     same thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject,
                     as in those things which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can
                     arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the intellect. In
                     this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q74_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q74_A5-p0.1">Whether sin can be in the reason?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason
                     is not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot
                     be in the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not
                     among those things which are under our control: since by nature some are mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore
                     no sin is in the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have clearly shown (
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2,3). Now reason has a twofold act: one is its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of knowing
                     the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing the other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the
                     reason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when
                     it is in ignorance or error about what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it either commands the inordinate movements
                     of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the
                     case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a
                     sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about
                     something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin,
                     and the defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers, is always
                     imputed to reason as a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html">Q[17], A[1]</a>), when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason
                     moves and precedes the will in another: so that both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason,
                     voluntary. Accordingly sin is found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the reason, or through the reason
                     being the
                     principle of the will's act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p9"> The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad 1).</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q74_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q74_A6-p0.1">Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive
                     power, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">Q[31], A[1]</a>). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose delectation is not
                     in the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object.
                     Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose
                     delectation is not in the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin 'mora'---delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time
                     is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of
                     the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit." Now "the woman" denotes
                     the lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, sin may be in the reason, not only in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its directing human actions.
                     Now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails
                     in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions.
                     Now it fails, in two ways, in directing
                     internal passions: first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a
                     movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man,
                     having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur]
                     upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in
                     accordance with what has been stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, viz. that actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower
                     powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction
                     of reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur] thereon,
                     and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched
                     the mind," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q74_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q74_A7-p0.1">Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q15_A1.html">Q[15], A[1]</a>): whereas the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii,
                     7). [*'Rationes aeternae,' cf. 
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A7-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html">FP, Q[15], AA[2]</a>,[3] where as in similar passages 'ratio' has been rendered by the English 'type,' because St. Thomas was speaking of the
                     Divine 'idea' as the archetype of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal
                     law, (cf. A[8],
                     OBJ[1]; A[9])]. But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think
                     about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures
                     or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine
                     states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds
                     to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation,
                     he moves his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher
                     reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses,
                     so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has
                     offered the forbidden fruit to her husband."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and delivers
                     its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now
                     we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see
                     that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by
                     referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted
                     to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that
                     human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally;
                     and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>).
                     Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment
                     is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced
                     on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last,
                     and the delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent to an action
                     belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower
                     reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever
                     is subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not conversely.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q15_A3.html">Q[15], A[3]</a>). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which
                     the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine law,
                     whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it
                     neglects it by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason: because,
                     as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the
                     commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining
                     them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct
                     or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while
                     deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation: and then the consent
                     to the delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the
                     eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher
                     or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which
                     the higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly
                     by imputed to it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q74_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A9.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q74_A8-p0.1">Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which
                     does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal
                     sin consists in turning away from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above (
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being
                     such is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than
                     his consent. But delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. Therefore neither is the consent to
                     the delectation a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states
                     (Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation
                     consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward
                     thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference
                     of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither
                     is the consent to the delectation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found
                     also in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does
                     not, for this reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin mortally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation
                     resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from
                     the thought of fornication.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii).
                     Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin.
                     xii, 12) that "this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon
                     for such thoughts also, and we should strike our breasts and say: 'Forgive us our
                     trespasses.'" Therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine adds after a few words: "Man will be altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be forgiven
                     those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them."
                     But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to delectation is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There have been various opinions on this point, for some have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only
                     a venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and more probable. For we must
                     take note that since every delectation results from some action, as stated in Ethic. x, 4, and again, that since every delectation
                     may be compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which it results, and to
                     the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because
                     the action itself can be considered as a good and an end, in which the person who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action
                     itself, which results in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to which it belongs
                     to take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for instance, when a man thinks and
                     delights in his thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other times the delight consequent to an action, e.g.
                     a thought, has for its object another action, as being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclination
                     of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of fornication,
                     may delight in either of two things: first, in the thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the
                     delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not
                     in itself a mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and
                     sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may wish to preach or dispute
                     about it. Consequently such affection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue
                     of
                     its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such
                     a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p10"> But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this
                     act. Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts to nothing less than a consent to the inclination
                     of his appetite to fornication: for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his appetite. Now it
                     is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin.
                     Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A8-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating
                     according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as being regulated according to them:
                     and by turning from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even
                     the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins, in so far as the direction of the higher reason
                     fails in directing them according to the eternal types.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to
                     take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is,
                     in its genus, a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is accidental, viz. on account of the
                     incompleteness of the act: which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent
                     has been given, so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the delectation which has the thought for its object.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The delectation which has an external act for its object, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, even
                     though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate,
                     and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the
                     consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p17"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p18"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A9.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q74_A9" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A10.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q74_A9-p0.1">Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a
                     sinful act. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7) that the "higher reason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal
                     law." But mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore it seems that there can be no other than mortal
                     sin in the higher reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual life, as the heart is of the body's life. But the diseases of
                     the heart are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial
                     sin, deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration
                     of the eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on account of the contempt of the Divine law.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q74_A9-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. But consent to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), the higher reason "is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law"; it contemplates
                     it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging and directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the
                     fact that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to an act or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the
                     inordinateness of the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law,
                     in the same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion from the last end, but is beside that law, as an act
                     of venial sin is. Therefore when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does not turn away from the eternal
                     law: wherefore it sins, not mortally, but venially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Disease of the heart is twofold: one which is in the very substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency, and
                     such a disease is always mortal: the other is a disease of the heart consisting in some disorder either of the movement or
                     of the parts surrounding the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In like manner there is mortal sin in the higher
                     reason whenever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is
                     the eternal law, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but venial.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the
                     Divine law.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A10.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q74_A10" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q74_A10-p0.1">Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of
                     a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher
                     reason is the eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial
                     sin in the higher reason as such.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate
                     movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason
                     as such.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin,
                     through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously;
                     just as when the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is contrary to the law of God,
                     it sins more grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is contrary to
                     moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement
                     that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly
                     false. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial
                     sin in the higher reason as such.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason.
                     For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so
                     it does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself
                     a mortal sin; and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of
                     the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p7"> With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple "intuition," and "deliberation," in respect of which it again
                     consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about
                     Divine things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin,
                     yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the
                     law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other
                     aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when
                     a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended
                     it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine
                     law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements,
                     the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin
                     mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things
                     which are mortal sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the incompleteness
                     of a sudden action, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In matters of action, the simple intuition of the principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as
                     well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions:
                     consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One and the same thing may be the subject of different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the existence
                     of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation,
                     which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime,
                     yet it is reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that
                     which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into
                     the light of a higher consideration, as was explained above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A10.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q75" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A10.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q75-p0.1">OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
               <p id="FS_Q75-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q75-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in particular. Under the first head there are four points of
                  inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q75-p3"> (1) Whether sin has a cause?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q75-p4"> (2) Whether it has an internal cause?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q75-p5"> (3) Whether it has an external cause?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q75-p6"> (4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q75_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q75_A1-p0.1">Whether sin has a cause?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of evil, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q75_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a cause is that from which something follows of necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for
                     every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good,
                     for "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>). Likewise neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt
                     is the same as sin. Therefore sin has no cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.6" target="asv">Job 5:6</a>, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." But sin is something done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the
                     law of God." Therefore sin has a cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but,
                     so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may
                     be assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself,
                     is the cause of the negation in itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the
                     removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation,
                     of which a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of
                     its principal tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple negation. But,
                     since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought
                     naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought
                     to be in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that evil,
                     which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause
                     is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and
                     on
                     the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act.
                     Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good,
                     causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order
                     in the act results from the lack of direction in the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the subject
                     of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a cause, has been explained.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not
                     impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity,
                     on account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph.
                     vi, text. 5. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that
                     this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact
                     of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of
                     guilt, before it is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking
                     some other good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q75_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q75_A2-p0.1">Whether sin has an internal cause?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an internal
                     cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of
                     sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for
                     sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate,
                     is already a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i, 9) that "the will is the cause of sin."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q75_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the direct cause of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human
                     acts, one remote, the other proximate. The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will, in respect of
                     which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite.
                     For just as it is due to the judgment of
                     reason, that the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the
                     sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall explain
                     further on (Q[77], A[1]). Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason
                     and will; and the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p7"> But since we have said above (A[1], ad 3) that the cause of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive,
                     viz. the rule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good, appertains to the apprehension of the senses
                     and to the appetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to consider this rule; and
                     the completeness of the voluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the
                     conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is within a thing as its natural power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the
                     appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made
                     actual by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is
                     because a thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is
                     inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore
                     the movements that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the
                     will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which
                     sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being
                     unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with his nature, ought to observe.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q75_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q75_A3-p0.1">Whether sin has an external cause?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are
                     within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal
                     cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order,
                     sin can arise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements
                     to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.21.16" target="asv">Num. 21:16</a>): "Are not these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the
                     Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore something external can be a cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q75_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q75_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the internal cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as lacking the due rule, and the
                     appetite, as inclining to sin. Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the
                     will itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q[9], A[6]; Q[10],
                     A[4]), none can move the will inwardly
                     save God alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q[79], A[1]). Hence it follows that nothing external
                     can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite,
                     as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in matters of action,
                     nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto
                     in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore something external
                     can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient completive
                     cause of sin being accomplished.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that
                     it remains in our power to sin or not to sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of
                     sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful
                     act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on
                     the act being voluntary and in our power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q75_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q75_A4-p0.1">Whether one sin is a cause of another?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with
                     one sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which is inconsistent with sin, which has the character
                     of evil. In like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since "evil is not an efficient cause, but is weak and powerless,"
                     as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have
                     no place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a
                     formal cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing," as stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [*Cf. De Anima ii.]. But sin is essentially
                     something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus
                     we go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the
                     same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of
                     the four kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly,
                     as that which removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for when man,
                     by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into
                     another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed
                     to commit more readily another like act: because acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after
                     the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the
                     matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause,
                     one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a man is guilty
                     of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral matters,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q75_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q75_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), it follows that one sin is
                     also the formal cause of another: because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is material
                     while the latter is formal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least
                     apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of
                     another sin. A sin has matter, not "of which" but "about which" it is: and it has its form from its end. Consequently one
                     sin can be the cause of another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated
                     above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act
                     it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is
                     not caused by another sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A10.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q76" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q76-p0.1">OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q76-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q76-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3)
                  sins which are the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above 
                  <a id="FS_Q76-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of
                  sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite;
                  thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q76-p3"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q76-p4"> (1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q76-p5"> (2) Whether ignorance is a sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q76-p6"> (3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q76-p7"> (4) Whether it diminishes sin?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q76_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q76_A1-p0.1">Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is
                     a non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being a "turning to" something, as was stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q76_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html">Q[75], A[1]</a>). Now ignorance seems to savor of "turning away" from something. Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the
                     good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some sin through ignorance."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that
                     moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that
                     removes an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this way that ignorance can be the cause of a
                     sinful act; because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act
                     of sin, in so far as it directs human acts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p7"> Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular:
                     because in conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or
                     of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular
                     proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except through the medium of
                     a particular proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one's
                     father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle
                     which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not
                     every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful
                     act. Consequently if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he
                     recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with
                     the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not "through ignorance" but "in ignorance," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this respect
                     of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another,
                     the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing
                     is a man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q76_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q76_A2-p0.1">Whether ignorance is a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a word, deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q76_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html">Q[71], A[5]</a>). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment resulting
                     from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary,
                     it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will
                     not be a sin, but rather a result of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain
                     in act. Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore
                     ignorance is not a sin, unless perchance it be original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual
                     in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance
                     would be a most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.38" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:38</a>: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge
                     about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii).
                     On the other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge of those things that one has a natural
                     aptitude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without
                     the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles
                     of faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state.
                     Meanwhile there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such as
                     the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects
                     to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one
                     is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently
                     ignorance of such like things is called "invincible," because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance,
                     not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no
                     invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know;
                     but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q76_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>, ad 1), when we say that sin is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite negations, by reason of which omissions
                     have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above definition of sin;
                     in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the
                     knowledge which we ought to
                     have.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have
                     the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by
                     his acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is
                     commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as
                     it is in some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of consideration is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although when the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge,
                     nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the ignorance is said to be a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is
                     it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring
                     the knowledge that he ought to have.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q76_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q76_A3-p0.1">Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary.
                     Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q76_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A8.html">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown.
                     Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what is accidental does not give the species.
                     Therefore nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed sinful or virtuous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which
                     perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some things done through ignorance are rightly reproved." Now those things alone
                     are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether
                     excuse from sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated (
                     <a id="FS_Q76_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2) that ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge
                     were to hand, would be contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If, however, the knowledge, which
                     is removed by ignorance, would not have prevented the act, on account of
                     the inclination of the will thereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing, as stated
                     in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not make
                     the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or
                     accompanies the sinful act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p7"> On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses
                     from sin, because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and this for two reasons.
                     First, on the part of the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in so far as something is not known
                     to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which
                     circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge
                     is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man
                     (which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting
                     another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and
                     that if he had known this, he would not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though
                     this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin.
                     Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly,
                     as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when
                     a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For
                     such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able
                     to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely
                     involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance
                     excuses from sin altogether.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q76_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A8.html">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his
                     sin is not accidental.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen
                     and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q76_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q76_A4-p0.1">Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance
                     is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that "every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does
                     not diminish sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q76_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it does not diminish a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.4" target="asv"> Rom. 2:4, </a> "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?" says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not."
                     Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which
                     removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher
                     says (Ethic. iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.13" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:13</a>: "I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly." Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not
                     render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether
                     (through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance
                     which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it,
                     neither diminishes nor increases the sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p8"> Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does
                     not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary,
                     as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more
                     voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the
                     hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being
                     committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies,
                     the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk
                     and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not
                     known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case
                     there is less contempt, and therefore less sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ignorance whereby "every evil man is ignorant," is not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from
                     that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One sin is added to another makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do
                     not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same
                     gravity as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed
                     by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are two sins: because
                     drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species
                     of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they
                     may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The drunken man deserves a "double punishment" for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results
                     from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin,
                     and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (ad 2). It might also be said that the words
                     quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered
                     drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might
                     claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q77" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q77-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q77-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q77-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be
                  a cause of sin: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q77-p3"> (1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q77-p4"> (2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q77-p5"> (3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q77-p6"> (4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q77-p7"> (5) Of three causes mentioned in 
                  <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>: "Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life."
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q77-p8"> (6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q77-p9"> (7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q77-p10"> (8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q77_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q77_A1-p0.1">Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by
                     its object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of
                     the appetitive power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive
                     appetite, but good defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive
                     appetite does not move the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational
                     appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text.
                     57) that "the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another."
                     Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does
                     not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite
                     is a material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move
                     the intellective appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv">Dan. 13:56</a>): "Lust hath perverted thy heart."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways.
                     First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows
                     of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its
                     act, both because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the
                     contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in the operations of
                     the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another.
                     In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of any passion whatever,
                     the proper movement of the rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p7"> Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and
                     apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of
                     the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination
                     and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of
                     the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do
                     not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason
                     often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it also, since it has a
                     natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in
                     the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p10"> The Third Objection is solved in like manner.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q77_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q77_A2-p0.1">Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by
                     the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a
                     passion, which is weak and soon passes away.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which
                     is really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good apparently,
                     but not really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of
                     the reason. Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about
                     a particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction,
                     e.g. "Every man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated
                     in Peri Herm. ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were
                     to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who
                     knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear
                     from Poster. i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that "no fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition
                     to contain, for example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of
                     fornication." Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens that
                     man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he
                     has knowledge, even in particular.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p7"> Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for
                     it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin." Now the law
                     that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a passion,
                     it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion; wherefore
                     he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because,
                     since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear
                     good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil,
                     unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>): "They err that work evil."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p10"> Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority,
                     according to the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47</a>: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv"> James 4:17</a>: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Consequently he was not altogether right, and
                     it is necessary, with the
                     Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge,
                     viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as
                     stated above (Q[76], A[1]). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful,
                     and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will
                     not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known
                     habitually from not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general
                     but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for
                     a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what
                     he
                     knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to the
                     consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually
                     what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity;
                     and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so far
                     as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained
                     above 
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly,
                     by way of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely;
                     even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body,
                     fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions
                     are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or
                     anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge,
                     since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal
                     knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that something appears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this
                     particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at
                     the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has
                     true habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion about a particular negative:
                     because an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to
                     draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws
                     his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions,
                     two particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g.
                     No fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and
                     hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the passions lasts, the reason argues and
                     concludes under the second.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge,
                     his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do
                     so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p16"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p17"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q77_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q77_A3-p0.1">Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement
                     of the sensitive appetite, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore a sin committed through passion, should
                     not be called a sin of weakness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.77.39" target="asv">Ps. 77:39</a>): "He remembered that they are flesh." Therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, rather
                     than those which are due to a passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will,
                     whether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.7" target="asv">Gn. 4:7</a>: "Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg.: 'The lust thereof shall be under thee.'], and thou shalt have dominion over it."
                     Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease. Therefore
                     a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of weakness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way
                     of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution
                     of its proper action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humors and members of the human body cease to
                     be subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when
                     it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (De
                     Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account
                     of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the order
                     of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for
                     the reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by
                     any passion contrary to the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due
                     action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to an
                     epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger
                     the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may
                     have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul
                     is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the
                     passions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our
                     appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the way already explained 
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q77_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q77_A4-p0.1">Whether self-love is the source of every sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper
                     cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv">Lev. 19:18</a>). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.8" target="asv">Rom. 7:8</a>): "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which words a gloss says that "the
                     law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils," the reason for which is that concupiscence is the cause
                     of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct passion from love, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html"> Q[23], A[4]</a>).
                     Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine in commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.79.17" target="asv"> Ps. 79:17, </a> "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing
                     false humility." Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor.
                     Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon." Now every
                     sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html">Q[75], A[1]</a>), the proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect
                     every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good
                     inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore
                     it is evident that inordinate love of
                     self is the cause of every sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love,
                     leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed
                     to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance
                     of evil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But
                     each of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man
                     either desires good things, or avoids evil things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be committed
                     through self-love.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q77_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q77_A5-p0.1">Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life are fittingly described as causes of sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described as
                     causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>), "covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Now pride of life is not included in covetousness.
                     Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv"> Dan. 13:56</a>: "Beauty hath deceived thee." Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a>). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore "concupiscence of
                     the hearing" and of the other senses should also have been mentioned.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance
                     of evil things, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the
                     causes of sin are insufficiently described.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>): "All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] pride of life." Now a thing is said to be "in
                     the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.19" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:19</a>): "The whole world is seated in wickedness." Therefore these three are causes of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: for a man desires good
                     for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways,
                     the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as
                     it is the object of the concupiscible part;
                     secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]).
                     Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above (Q[30], A[3]). One is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain
                     the nature of the body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or as regards
                     the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called
                     "concupiscence of the flesh." The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation
                     or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar
                     mode of perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called "concupiscence of the
                     eyes," whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote
                     curiosity according to Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly
                     to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p8"> The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence,
                     as we shall state further on (Q[84], A[2]; 
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html">SS, Q[162], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p9"> It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the passions of
                     the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not divided
                     into two because all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Pride of life" is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How
                     covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of "avarice," is the root of all sins, shall be explained further
                     on (
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html">Q[84], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only for
                     such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so its
                     name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm.
                     xxxiii).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A5-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A5-p13.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q39_A2.html"> Q[39], A[2]</a>); and so those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately
                     the avoidance of evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q77_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q77_A6-p0.1">Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing
                     causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases
                     merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil
                     passion also increases rather than diminishes a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels
                     the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion aggravates a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the
                     less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement
                     of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently,
                     according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2; Q[10], A[3]); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the
                     higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a
                     passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p7"> Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so
                     far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and
                     therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more
                     is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its
                     voluntariness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p8"> On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity,
                     in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure
                     or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part
                     of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to something else---accidentally, i.e. beside his
                     intention. Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well,
                     rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his
                     action.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the movement of the will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement,
                     as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q77_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q77_A7-p0.1">Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether.
                     But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involuntary, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv"> Gal. 5:17</a>: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would." Therefore passion excuses from
                     sin altogether.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A7-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[76], A[3]). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]). Therefore passion
                     excuses from sin altogether.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the
                     case of mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) speaks of the passions as "passions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: which would not be the case
                     if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary.
                     Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin;
                     otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be
                     voluntary either "in itself," as when the will tends towards it directly; or "in its cause,"
                     when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in
                     that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a thing
                     is said to be voluntary "directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could
                     have prevented it, but did not.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p7"> Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason
                     altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion were voluntary from the
                     beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness.
                     If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause
                     fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely
                     excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason
                     can drive the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members
                     are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A9.html">Q[17], A[9]</a>): wherefore such a
                     passion does not excuse from sin altogether.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "So that you do not the things that you would" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement
                     of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense we are to understand the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv"> Rom. 7:19</a>: "The evil which I will not, that I do." Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the passion, as is the case
                     with the incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on
                     account of their concupiscence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after
                     taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being
                     applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness,
                     which is a kind of bodily disease.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q77_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q77_A8-p0.1">Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now
                     sin committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through
                     passion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the
                     sensuality, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html">Q[74], A[4]</a>). Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above (
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A8-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore
                     a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) that "the passions of the sins . . . work [Vulg.: 'did work'] in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now it is
                     proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Mortal sin, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q77_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">Q[72], A[5]</a>), consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function
                     it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin,
                     only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone
                     proceeds from passion to a
                     sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue
                     here, since it can drive the passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above: wherefore if it
                     does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are committed
                     through passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens
                     the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus
                     every sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon [veniam]. Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This
                     is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection
                     regards the first kind.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which follows
                     accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A[6], ad 1): hence the argument does not prove.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Passion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will,
                     so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer
                     either mortal or venial.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q78" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q78-p0.1">OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q78-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q78-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice: and under this head there are four points of
                  inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q78-p3"> (1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q78-p4"> (2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q78-p5"> (3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q78-p6"> (4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through passion?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q78_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q78_A1-p0.1">Whether anyone sins through certain malice?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice.
                     Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>): "They err that work evil." Therefore no one sins through certain malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to denote the
                     intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of "malitia" (malice) from "malum" (evil)] in sinning, because an act
                     is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins through malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely,
                     which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.27" target="asv">Job 34:27</a>): "[Who] as it were on purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: 'Him'], and would not understand all His ways." Now to revolt
                     from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely or through certain malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due
                     to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things.
                     Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore
                     even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when
                     anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion,
                     so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more
                     the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order
                     to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life
                     which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the
                     order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of
                     some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good;
                     and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order
                     to
                     possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through ignorance:
                     sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through passion:
                     and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular
                     good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that
                     a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining
                     another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering
                     loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before
                     him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's
                     anger, to being deprived of the pleasure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic.
                     v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to
                     sin through malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also denote actual malice, whether by malice we
                     mean the choice itself of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so
                     far as he sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent
                     fault, as when anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this imply that a thing is its own cause: for
                     the interior act is the cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not indefinitely, however, since we
                     can trace it back to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above (
                     <a id="FS_Q78_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q75_A4.html">Q[75], A[4]</a>, ad 3).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q78_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q78_A2-p0.1">Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every one who sins through habit, sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain
                     malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters
                     an idle word. Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through certain malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by which those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts
                     which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed
                     through certain malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is glad after having done it, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv"> Prov. 2:14</a>: "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and this, because it is pleasant to obtain what
                     we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful
                     after committing a sin: because "bad men," i.e. those who have a vicious
                     habit, "are full of remorse" (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A sin committed through certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to
                     which we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from
                     habit is committed through certain malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not necessary
                     to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something
                     we use when we will," as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q78_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html">Q[50], A[1]</a>). And thus, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act, because a bad habit
                     does not
                     corrupt reason altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some works which are
                     generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through
                     the uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain
                     malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of something
                     lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the
                     very thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result being
                     that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in respect of that habit: and this is
                     to sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through certain malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply,
                     but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple but a relative evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from them
                     as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that sins through habit is always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is able
                     not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen
                     that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit. And so it often happens that such a man
                     is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on
                     account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q78_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q78_A3-p0.1">Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that "an
                     unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it," i.e. through choice, "unless it be done through habit." Now to sin through
                     certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q78_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q78_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that "a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little."
                     But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain
                     malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But
                     by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good. Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something
                     supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through
                     weakness, as stated (
                     <a id="FS_Q78_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html">Q[77], A[3]</a>). Therefore whenever anyone
                     sins through certain malice, he sins through habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something evil.
                     But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue.
                     Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The will is related differently to good and to evil. Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational
                     good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice,
                     to some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the
                     reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the
                     impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain
                     malice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may
                     happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition,
                     some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will
                     tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt
                     disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who
                     is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of its own accord,
                     may tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not
                     through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair,
                     or fear to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the bridle, as it were.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p7"> It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice, always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which,
                     however, is not always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins through certain malice, that he sins
                     through habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with
                     pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something
                     is not always a habit, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a habit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there
                     is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good
                     can be perfect without the evil of fault.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q78_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q78_A4-p0.1">Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses
                     from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins
                     through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the
                     Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the
                     end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice,
                     than for one who sins through passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong
                     into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which
                     is stronger than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil.
                     Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.26" target="asv"> Job 34:26</a>: "He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted from Him." Now punishment
                     is not increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose, i.e. through certain
                     malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because,
                     as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous,
                     according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through malice, the movement of
                     sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is
                     committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated
                     by the very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is
                     diminished by being committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is stronger. Secondly, because the passion
                     which incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions;
                     whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides longer in
                     his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick
                     man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers
                     intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is
                     the
                     principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion,
                     whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion, for the time being. Now
                     the worst of all defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous
                     than one committed through passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q78_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76_A4.html">Q[76], A[4]</a>). Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined
                     from within. Hence the comparison fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while
                     choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced
                     through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through
                     certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained (
                     <a id="FS_Q78_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q78_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin
                     "through" choosing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q79" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q79-p0.1">OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q79-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q79-p2"> We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part
                  of man.
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q79-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q79-p4"> (1) Whether God is a cause of sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q79-p5"> (2) Whether the act of sin is from God?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q79-p6"> (3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q79-p7"> (4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q79_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q79_A1-p0.1">Whether God is a cause of sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.28" target="asv">Rom. 1:28</a>): "God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: 'convenient']," and a gloss
                     comments on this by saying that "God works in men's hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good
                     or to evil." Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore
                     God is to man a cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.11" target="asv">Wis. 14:11</a>): "The creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men." But a temptation usually denotes
                     a provocation to sin. Since therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q79_A1-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">FP, Q[44], A[1]</a>, it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause
                     of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment;
                     since of this evil it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.45.7" target="asv">Is. 45:7</a>) that God creates evil, and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.6" target="asv">Amos 3:6</a>): "Shall there be evil in the city which God [Vulg.: 'the Lord'] hath not done?" Therefore it is not incompatible with God's
                     goodness that He should cause the evil of fault.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou . . . hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." Now God hates sin, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.9" target="asv">Wis. 14:9</a>: "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful." Therefore God is not a cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of another's sin. First, directly, namely be inclining his or another's
                     will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely be not preventing someone from sinning. Hence (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.3.18" target="asv">Ezech. 3:18</a>) it is said to the watchman: "If thou say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [*Vulg.: "If, when I say to the wicked,
                     'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it not to him."] . . . I will require his blood at thy
                     hand." Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from the
                     order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius
                     states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from
                     the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin
                     indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He
                     to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom
                     and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is
                     not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to
                     steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it
                     follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up
                     to a reprobate sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose
                     a person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et
                     Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that "God inclines men's wills to good and evil," is to be
                     understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated
                     above. And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said the "creatures of God are turned 'to' an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men," the preposition
                     "to" does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin "factae sunt in abominationem"
                     admits of the translation "were made to be an abomination," which might imply causality.]; for God did not make the creatures
                     that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly,
                     wherefore the text goes on to say, "and a snare to the feet of the unwise," who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for
                     a purpose other than that for which they were made.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first
                     cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced
                     to that first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though
                     he were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits
                     against the commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is opposed
                     to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison
                     between fault and punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q79_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q79_A2-p0.1">Whether the act of sin is from God?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "the act of sin is not
                     a thing." Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works, intending
                     evil," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q79_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, as was shown above (Q[18], AA[2],8). Now whatever is the cause
                     of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the
                     cause of sin, which is false, as was proved above 
                     <a id="FS_Q79_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now "the will of God is the cause of every movement," as Augustine declares
                     (De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God's will is the cause of the act of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of
                     its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something
                     existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the
                     First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the
                     cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect
                     is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this
                     defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg
                     as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly
                     God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this passage Augustine calls by the name of "thing," that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the
                     act of sin is not a thing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to
                     Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally. Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the
                     cause of the act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause
                     of the sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q79_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">Q[72], A[1]</a>), acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some
                     object, to which that privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to the species
                     of the act consequently, and not as a specific difference.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q79_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q79_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
                     3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
                     Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): "God does not punish what He causes." Now God punishes the hardened
                     heart, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.3.27" target="asv"> Ecclus. 3:27</a>: "A hard heart shall fear evil at the last." Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice
                     of man, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.21" target="asv"> Wis. 2:21</a>: "For their own malice blinded them," and again, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:4</a>: "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers": which causes seem to be opposed to God. Therefore God is
                     not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.10" target="asv">Is. 6:10</a>): "Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy," and
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.18" target="asv"> Rom. 9:18</a>: "He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and
                     turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart,
                     just as He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not
                     enlightened by God to see aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as
                     regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p7"> Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv"> Jn. 1:9</a>: "That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," even as the sun is the universal cause
                     of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas God works
                     freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all
                     bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters
                     are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in
                     failing to light up the interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand,
                     God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being
                     withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In this
                     way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p8"> These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom,
                     and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect,
                     viz. sight and hearing, of which the former assists "discovery," and the latter, "teaching," hence it is that spiritual "blindness"
                     corresponds to sight, "heaviness of the ears" to hearing, and "hardness of heart" to the affections.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they
                     make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is
                     said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q79_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q79_A4-p0.1">Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened.
                     For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as God is supremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could
                     draw some good from every evil." Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the evil of which He Himself is the cause.
                     Now God is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above
                     
                     <a id="FS_Q79_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>) that "God hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg.: 'God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the
                     destruction of the living.']." Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn their blindness
                     to their profit: just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal the
                     invalid when he prescribes a bitter
                     medicine for him. Therefore God turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "God is not a respecter of persons" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv">Acts 10:34</a>). Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not
                     to believe in Christ, and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized with compunction, and converted,
                     as related by Augustine (De Quaest. Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those who are
                     blinded.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.8" target="asv"> Rom. 3:8, </a> evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God does not blind some for the sake of
                     their welfare.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a twofold relation---to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's damnation---to
                     another, by reason of God's mercy or providence, viz. that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall
                     into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii).
                     Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those who
                     are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God's mercy, temporary blindness is directed
                     medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are
                     blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom "all things work together unto good" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their damnation; as Augustine
                     says
                     (De Quaest. Evang. iii).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom the
                     evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of
                     the martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that
                     ensues from the loss.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That God directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of others
                     is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God
                     a respecter of persons, as explained in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q79_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html">FP, Q[23], A[5]</a>, ad 3.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue; but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q80" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q80-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q80-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q80-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q80-p3"> (1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q80-p4"> (2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q80-p5"> (3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q80-p6"> (4) Whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q80_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q80_A1-p0.1">Whether the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite.
                     Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his friends with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.3" target="asv"> Acts 5:3, </a> says that the devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil "fills
                     men's hearts with secret lusts." Therefore the devil is directly the
                     cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that "as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil."
                     But God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemein Ethics (vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic principle
                     of human counsel." Now human counsel is not only about good things but also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man
                     to take good counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly
                     the cause of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that "nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire." Now
                     man does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man's
                     own will alone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an
                     action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action
                     is the will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin, except that which can move
                     the will to act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p7"> Now the will, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A3.html">Q[9], AA[3]</a>,4,6), can be moved by two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite:
                     secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or God, as was shown
                     above (
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A3.html">Q[9], AA[3]</a>,4,6). Now God cannot be the cause of sin, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html">Q[79], A[1]</a>). Therefore it follows that
                     in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p8"> As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed
                     to the will: thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes or offers this object. Thirdly,
                     he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fashion, offers the will
                     its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible
                     things, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may
                     incite to sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three
                     ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q10_A1.html">Q[10], AA[1]</a>,2). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that
                     proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin,
                     neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man
                     to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the cause
                     of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly,
                     whereas the devil cannot move us in this way.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the universal principle of all inward movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel,
                     is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q80_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q80_A2-p0.1">Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul
                     are vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal
                     soul, which are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his internal movements.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God
                     alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html">FP, Q[110], A[4]</a>. Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are perceived
                     by the external senses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with
                     either of these, because, as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html">FP, Q[111], AA[2]</a>,3, ad 2, the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possible for him to produce imaginary
                     species, since imaginary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless,
                     the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we have said in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">FP, Q[110], A[2]</a>; 
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html">FP, Q[111], AA[2]</a>,3, ad 2. Therefore the devil cannot through man's internal movements induce him to sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will.
                     As regards the will, we have already stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html">(A[1];</a> 
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the
                     knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he
                     darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently
                     the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can
                     induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the
                     sensitive appetite to some passion or other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p7"> The reason of this is, that as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html">FP, Q[110], A[3]</a>, the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all
                     those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power.
                     Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno
                     et Vigil.) [*De Insomn.
                     iii, iv.] that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend
                     with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible
                     species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were
                     being affected by them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be procured by the demons,
                     whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p8"> In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and
                     the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive
                     appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained,
                     before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn.
                     iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing
                     of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is
                     held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as
                     external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be more easily digested.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according
                     to local movement, as explained above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p11"> Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q80_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q80_A3-p0.1">Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said
                     of the devil (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.41.24" target="asv">Job 41:24</a>) that "there is no power on earth that can compare with him." Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the
                     earth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented
                     to the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima
                     iii, text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html">(A[2])</a>; and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that "this evil," of which,
                     to wit, the devil is the cause, "extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends
                     with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor." Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit." Now the
                     devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained above 
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8</a>): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour." Now it would be useless to admonish
                     thus, if it were true that man were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin
                     of necessity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p6"> Further, it is likewise written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.7" target="asv">Jam. 4:7</a>): "Be subject . . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said neither rightly nor truly,
                     if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor
                     would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin;
                     but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves
                     him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the
                     sensitive appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being
                     thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered,
                     then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A7.html">Q[77], A[7]</a>). It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every power that is greater than man, can move man's will; God alone can do this, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q80_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A6.html">Q[9], A[6]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use
                     of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise
                     of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q80_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q80_A4-p0.1">Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd
                     of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.34" target="asv"> Jn. 8:34</a>: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave [Douay: 'servant'] of sin." Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is
                     the slave" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiPet.2.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 2:19</a>). Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore,
                     if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which
                     is clearly false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a movement
                     of the free-will."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of
                     whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man
                     who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though
                     each were the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from
                     the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which
                     desire might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the free-will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man becomes another's slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it
                     is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not already
                     prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin of man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q81" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q81-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q81-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q81-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin,
                  by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Wherefore we must speak about original
                  sin, the consideration of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence; (3) of its subject.
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q81-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q81-p4"> (1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his descendants?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q81-p5"> (2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way
                  of origin?
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q81-p6"> (3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of Adam by way of seminal generation?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q81-p7"> (4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from some part of the human body?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q81-p8"> (5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and not the man, had sinned?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q81_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q81_A1-p0.1">Whether the first sin of our first parent is contracted by his descendants, by way of origin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore
                     no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not
                     pass from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin,
                     as was shown in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q81_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html">FP, Q[118], A[2]</a>. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because
                     it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united
                     to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can
                     the semen infect the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who
                     are so through want of exercise and through carelessness." Now those are said to be "naturally ugly," who are so from their
                     origin. Therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or suggestion,
                     since it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.24" target="asv">Wis. 2:24</a>): "By the envy of the devil, death came into this world." It follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin
                     entered into the world.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants,
                     by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed
                     from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books [*For
                     instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono
                     Persev. xi, xii.]
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p9"> In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various
                     writers have gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul, maintained
                     that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls.
                     Others, rejecting this as erroneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be
                     transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted
                     from parent to child---thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son, on account of some
                     seminal corruption, although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportionate to the soul, and
                     since the soul's defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is
                     passed
                     on to the child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p10"> But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from
                     parent to child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on account of a defect in
                     the bodily habit, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by the way of origin
                     seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the
                     rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to
                     be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), "no one reproaches a man
                     born blind; one rather takes pity on him."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p11"> Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch
                     as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members
                     of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that
                     "by sharing the same species, many men are one man." Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so
                     many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will
                     of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would
                     not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging
                     to man and moved by man's first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is
                     voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate
                     from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first
                     parent to his descendants is called "original," just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called
                     "actual." And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except
                     inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a "human sin"; so original sin is not the sin
                     of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the
                     "sin of nature," according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.3" target="asv"> Eph. 2:3</a>: "We . . . were by nature children of wrath."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share
                     in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even
                     as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless
                     the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits
                     the human nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it: for he that is born is associated
                     with his first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature
                     from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The semen is the principle of generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the
                     soul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect, and already affixed to a certain person.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider him
                     as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on
                     account of a crime committed by one of his forbears.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p17"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p18"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q81_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q81_A2-p0.1">Whether also other sins of the first parent or of nearer ancestors are transmitted to their descendants?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants.
                     For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate
                     parents, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>: "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation."
                     Furthermore, according to human law, the children of those
                     who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which he has of himself, than that which he has received from another:
                     thus fire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the way, of origin, the sin which he has
                     from Adam. Much more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our
                     nature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in principles of our nature, which however it
                     be corrupt, can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.11" target="asv"> Apoc. 22:11</a>: "He that is filthy, let him be filthier still." Therefore children contract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer
                     ancestors, even as they contract the sin of their first parent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the merits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Much
                     less therefore are their sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Augustine puts this question in the Enchiridion xlvi, xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter carefully
                     we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first
                     parent to be transmitted by way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently
                     those things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions and
                     matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to their children: for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the
                     knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the
                     species, are transmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son
                     having eyes, unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural
                     disposition, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those
                     that are purely personal, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p7"> Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong
                     to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In
                     this way original justice, as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q81_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q100_A1.html">FP, Q[100], A[1]</a>, was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first
                     sin. Wherefore as that
                     original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual
                     sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that
                     person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus [*Ep. ad Auxilium ccl.], children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment
                     on account of their parents, unless they share in their guilt, either in their origin, or by imitation, because every soul
                     is God's immediate property, as stated in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.4" target="asv"> Ezech. 18:4.</a> Sometimes, however, by Divine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on their parents' account, inasmuch as
                     the
                     child, as to its body, is part of its father.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man can more easily transmit that which he has of himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our nearer
                     ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely personal, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The first sin infects nature with a human corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption
                     pertaining only to the person.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q81_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q81_A3-p0.1">Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a punishment
                     consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are born of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still
                     living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be gathered from 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.14" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:14</a>: "We who are alive . . . unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have
                     slept." Therefore they do not contract original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now a man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he
                     does not transmit it to his children.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as the Apostle declares (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.15" target="asv">Rom. 5:15, </a> seqq). But the gift of Christ is not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "Death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly believe that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam contract
                     original sin from him; else all would not need redemption [*Cf. Translator's note inserted before TP, Q[27]] which is through
                     Christ; and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what has been stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q81_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, viz. that original sin, in virtue of the sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his
                     posterity, just as, from the soul's will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body, through their being moved
                     by the will. Now it is evident that actual sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude to be moved
                     by the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is held with greater probability and more commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will die,
                     and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the TP (
                     <a id="FS_Q81_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q78_A1.html">XP, Q[78], A[1]</a>, OBJ[1]). If, however, it be true, as others hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions among others
                     in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of the Body---Ep. cxix), then we must say in reply to the
                     objection, that although they are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in them, and that the punishment of death
                     will be remitted by God, since He can also forgive the punishment due for actual sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind. Nevertheless
                     original sin remains in its effect as regards the "fomes," which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the
                     body itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of generation. Consequently those who are baptized
                     transmit original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism,
                     but as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are born of Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all that
                     are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not only unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but
                     also unto the removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q81_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q81_A4-p0.1">Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.1" target="asv"> Gn. 4:1 </a>says that "Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because they were not severed from him in the place of life,
                     before he sinned, but in the place of exile after he had sinned." But if a man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner,
                     his flesh would be severed in the place of exile. Therefore it would
                     contract original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being infected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted.
                     Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of the flesh it was formed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, original sin comes upon all from our first parent, in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who
                     might be formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they would contract original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> They would not have been in Adam "according to seminal virtue," which alone is the cause of the transmission of original
                     sin, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq.).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q81_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3), original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they are moved by him through generation,
                     even as the members are moved by the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except by the active power
                     of generation: so that those alone contract original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of generation
                     originally derived from Adam, i.e. who
                     are descended from him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than the active power of generation. But
                     if anyone were to be formed by God out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not be derived from Adam.
                     Consequently he would not contract original sin: even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were moved, not by
                     the man's will, but by some external power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin. Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but on account
                     of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation extends.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would have been in Adam, "by way of bodily substance" [*The expression is
                     St. Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica 
                     <a id="FS_Q81_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q31_A6.html">TP, Q[31], A[6]</a>, Reply to OBJ[1]], but not according to seminal virtue, as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q81_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q81_A5-p0.1">Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract
                     original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them, according to the word of the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "In whom all have sinned." Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father. Therefore a man would have contracted
                     original sin from his mother's sin as well as from his father's.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is
                     "the mother" that "provides the matter in generation" as the Philosopher states (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and
                     liability to suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments
                     of original sin. Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would
                     contract original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that "the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin," (of whom Christ was to be born
                     without original sin) "purifying her." But this purification would not have been necessary, if the infection of original sin
                     were not contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother: so that if Eve
                     had sinned, her children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world." Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin to her children, he should
                     have said that it entered by two, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned first.
                     Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by the mother, but by the father.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The solution of this question is made clear by what has been said. For it has been stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q81_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children: wherefore
                     it has been said 
                     <a id="FS_Q81_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A4.html">(A[4])</a> that if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not contract original sin. Now it is evident that
                     in the opinion of philosophers, the active
                     principle of generation is from the father, while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin, is contracted, not
                     from the mother, but from the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not contract
                     original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would contract it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive principle.
                     Consequently the comparison fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject
                     to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the
                     mother, not as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems unreasonable. Because, as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q81_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html">FP, Q[97], AA[1]</a>, 2, ad 4, immortality and impassibility, in the
                     original state, were a result, not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the body was subjected to
                     the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing
                     Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it is evident that
                     the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer
                     and subject to the necessity of dying.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because
                     it behooved the Mother of God "to shine with the greatest purity" [*Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.]. For nothing is worthy
                     to receive God unless it be pure, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.92.5" target="asv"> Ps. 92:5</a>: "Holiness becometh Thy House, O Lord."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q82" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q82-p0.1">OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q82-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q82-p2"> We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q82-p3"> (1) Whether original sin is a habit?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q82-p4"> (2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q82-p5"> (3) Whether original sin is concupiscence?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q82-p6"> (4) Whether original sin is equally in all?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q82_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q82_A1-p0.1">Whether original sin is a habit?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De
                     Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin
                     is not a habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of actual
                     sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original
                     habit has the nature of a fault.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is
                     not preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of original sin little
                     children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore
                     original sin is a habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"> Q[50], A[1]</a>), habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act: thus science and virtue are called habits.
                     In this way original sin is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a complex nature, whereby that nature
                     is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second nature, as in the case of
                     sickness or health. In this sense original sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction
                     of the harmony which was essential to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body,
                     by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to health. Hence it is that original sin is called the
                     "languor of nature" [*Cf. Augustine, In 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>, serm. iii].
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly
                     something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original
                     justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but
                     a corrupt habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act: whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition of
                     nature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted from our first parent, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and
                     for this reason original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin
                     cannot.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers the habit which inclines a power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless
                     a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal
                     of the obstacle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements
                     results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to says that
                     original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act):
                     but it is a habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q82_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q82_A2-p0.1">Whether there are several original sins in one man?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are many original sins in one man. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.1.7" target="asv">Ps. 1:7</a>): "Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me." But the sin in which a man is conceived
                     is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of
                     nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original
                     sin is not one habit; but several.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin,
                     as shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74.html">Q[74])</a>. Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.29" target="asv">Jn. 1:29</a>): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for the employment of the singular
                     is that the "sin of the world" is original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original
                     sin. For it has been stated (
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A2.html">Q[81], A[2]</a>), that the first sin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in one man original sin is one
                     in number; and in all men, it is one in proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason may be taken
                     from the very essence of
                     original sin. Because in every inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while the unity of number is
                     derived from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different causes, e.g.
                     from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in
                     number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of original
                     justice, removing the subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is specifically one, and, in one man, can
                     be only one in number; while, in different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is numerically many.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The employment of the plural---"in sins"---may be explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of
                     the plural for the singular, e.g. "They are dead that sought the life of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually
                     pre-exist in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by the fact of there being many deformities
                     in the sin of our first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so
                     forth; or by several parts of the soul being infected by original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason
                     why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed
                     body is destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the harmony of original justice is destroyed,
                     the various powers of the soul have various opposite tendencies.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Original sin infects the different parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original justice
                     held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one
                     man, although the various parts of the body are affected.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q82_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q82_A3-p0.1">Whether original sin is concupiscence?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide
                     Orth. ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which
                     is a natural power. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are in us, according to the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>). Now there are several other passions besides concupiscence, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is
                     the highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7). Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than
                     concupiscence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the guilt of original sin."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Everything takes its species from its form: and it has been stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be considered
                     in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be
                     considered with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it. Now the whole order of original
                     justice consists in man's will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function
                     it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (Q[9], A[1] ), so that the will being turned away from God,
                     all the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will was made
                     subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder of the soul's powers, is a kind of material
                     element in respect of original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning
                     inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin
                     is concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, formally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man,
                     as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man,
                     contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], A[1]</a>), all the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the principle place: and of these, concupiscence
                     is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt most, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>, ad 1). Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief passion, and as including all the others,
                     in a fashion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As, in good things, the intellect and reason stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul is found
                     to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">Q[77], AA[1]</a>,2;
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A3-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html"> Q[80], A[2]</a>). Hence original sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance is comprised among the material defects
                     of original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q82_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q82_A4-p0.1">Whether original sin is equally in all?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above
                     
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is not equally in all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body.
                     But sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to degrees.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that "lust transmits original sin to the child." But the act of generation
                     may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater in one than in another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">Q[81], A[1]</a>). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin is too.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are two things in original sin: one is the privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this privation
                     to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin
                     has no degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and privations that remove something entirely,
                     such as death and darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q82_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A2.html">Q[73], A[2]</a>). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are related equally to the first principle of our
                     corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently
                     it is evident that original sin cannot be more in one than in another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Through the bond of original justice being broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order, each
                     power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some
                     of the soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of the different bodily temperaments. Consequently
                     if one man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to
                     original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all,
                     left to themselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be caused
                     by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the
                     cause of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust
                     in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive
                     appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. This lust is equally in all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q83" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q83-p0.1">OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q83-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q83-p2"> We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q83-p3"> (1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q83-p4"> (2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through its powers?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q83-p5"> (3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q83-p6"> (4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible part, and the
                  sense of touch?
               </p>
               <div id="FS_Q83_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q83_A1-p0.1">Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind
                     arises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the
                     flesh.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect: thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now
                     the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather
                     than in the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our
                     souls were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul, but in the flesh.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin,
                     it would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God would be the cause of sin, since He is the
                     author of the soul's creation and fusion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational
                     soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection
                     of original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is
                     not corrupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the
                     flesh.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of
                     virtue: for the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.18" target="asv">Rom. 7:18</a>): "I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." Therefore the flesh cannot be
                     the subject of original sin, but only the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject.
                     Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power
                     of the semen that original sin together with human
                     nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p9"> The reason for this is that, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q83_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">Q[81], A[1]</a>), original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this posterity by a certain movement of generation, in
                     the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to be observed,
                     that whatever accrues from the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way share in that
                     guilt, either as its
                     subject or as its instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues
                     to the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are moved
                     by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal
                     members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p10"> Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever
                     accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh,
                     has the character, not of guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original sin, and not the
                     flesh.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed,
                     who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh."
                     Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental
                     cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in
                     him it had the nature of actual sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but
                     as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce
                     the rational soul, but disposes the matter for it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The corruption of original sin is nowise caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation.
                     And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being
                     created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused.
                     And so, with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained
                     through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The common good takes precedence of private good. Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general order
                     of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the
                     more that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the body, as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q83_A1-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q90_A4.html">FP, Q[90], A[4]</a>; 
                     <a id="FS_Q83_A1-p15.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html">FP, Q[118], A[3]</a>.
                     And it is better for the soul to be thus, according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can avoid damnation,
                     by means of grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p16"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p17"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q83_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q83_A2-p0.1">Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt
                     to be the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not
                     as to its essence but only as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according to its essence, but only
                     according to the powers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the
                     subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence.
                     But original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers than in the essence of the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated (
                     <a id="FS_Q83_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html">Q[82], A[3]</a>). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body,
                     in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q83_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A6.html">FP, Q[76], A[6]</a>. Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the
                     motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows
                     that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evident that original sin is caused through our
                     origin. Consequently that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the
                     primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, according as it is the form of
                     the body: and this belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q83_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A6.html">FP, Q[76], A[6]</a>. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence, is the primary subject of original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will
                     of the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even original justice pertained radically to the essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to which
                     the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the
                     principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are the sins of the person.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is related to the soul as matter to form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless comes
                     first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper
                     accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison
                     fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the position of matter and effect, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q83_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html">Q[82], A[3]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q83_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q83_A3-p0.1">Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin does not infect the will before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power
                     by whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to
                     the generative power more than to the others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh
                     than the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin
                     is in them more than in the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin
                     infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as preceding the others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Original justice has a prior relation to the will, because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg.
                     iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things must be considered in the infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect
                     it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q83_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q83_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must
                     therefore regard first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as
                     stated
                     above (Q[74], AA[1],2). Therefore original sin regards first of all the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power.
                     Consequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is the subject of original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former
                     follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive
                     powers, are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul,
                     the infection of original sin reaches it first.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the intellect,
                     in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q83_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q83_A4-p0.1">Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to
                     pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the
                     will. Therefore that power is most infected by original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot
                     obey reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is not the most infected by original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number
                     of things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected
                     than touch.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24) that the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the
                     members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes,
                     wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection
                     of original sin regards these three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the
                     concupiscible faculty and the sense of touch.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious, which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject
                     to another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption
                     of original sin is transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q83_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves
                     the generative power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch, which is the most
                     powerful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original
                     sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and infected.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q83_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q83_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of original
                     sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power.
                     Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sight is not related to the act of generation except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species
                     is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to
                     the touch rather than to the sight.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q84" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q84-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q84-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q84-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the cause of another. Under this head there are four points
                  of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q84-p3"> (1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q84-p4"> (2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q84-p5"> (3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides pride and covetousness?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q84-p6"> (4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q84_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q84_A1-p0.1">Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is
                     opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root
                     of all sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness,
                     are not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all
                     sins, but proceeds from some deeper root.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another name for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires
                     money through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is not the root of all sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>): "The desire of money is the root of all evil."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to some, covetousness may be understood in different ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and
                     thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for any temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising
                     all sins, because every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q84_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A2.html">Q[72], A[2]</a>). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods
                     inordinately: and they say that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins, comparing it to the root of a tree, which
                     draws its sustenance from earth, just as every sin grows out of the love of temporal things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p7"> Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the
                     root of all sins. For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they "will become rich, fall into temptation,
                     and into the snare of the devil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils." Hence it is evident that he is speaking
                     of covetousness as denoting the inordinate desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as
                     denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the
                     whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating his desire for
                     any sin whatever, since money helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.19" target="asv"> Eccles. 10:19</a>: "All things obey money": so that in this desire for riches is the root of all sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the desire
                     of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire
                     for the immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is called the root of the virtues, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last
                     end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than
                     a particular good, they move the appetite more than any individual goods, which along with many others can be procured by
                     means of money.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in natural things we do not ask what always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that the nature
                     of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to act in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what
                     happens in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason that the will does not act of necessity. So
                     when we say that covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no
                     other evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise therefrom, for the reason given.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q84_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q84_A2-p0.1">Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning
                     of a sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the root of every sin, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q84_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it is also the beginning of every sin, and not pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:14</a>): "The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God." But apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore
                     another sin is the beginning of pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which,
                     according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore self-love and not pride, is the beginning
                     of every sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin.
                     Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not being subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it
                     is a generic sin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the corruption of nature; and in this sense
                     they say that it is the beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness,
                     because covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered,
                     for which reason covetousness is called the "root"; whereas pride regards sin as turning away from God, to Whose commandment
                     man refuses to be subject, for which reason it is called the "beginning," because the beginning of evil consists in turning
                     away from God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p7"> Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the mind of the wise man who said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." For it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting inordinate desire to excel,
                     as is clear from what follows (verse 17): "God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes"; indeed this is the point of
                     nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the
                     beginning of every sin. For we must take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention,
                     and of execution. In the former order, the principle is the end, as we have stated many times before (Q[1], A[1], ad 1; Q[18],
                     A[7], ad 2; Q[15], A[1], ad 2; Q[25], A[2]). Now man's end in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he
                     may have some perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is
                     said to be the "beginning" of every sin. On the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which
                     by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that,
                     from this point of view, covetousness is said to be the "root" of all evils, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from the
                     fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things.
                     Wherefore, in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special sin, but rather that general condition of
                     every sin, consisting in its turning away from God. It may also be said that
                     apostasy from God is said to be the beginning of pride, because it is the first species of pride. For it is characteristic
                     of pride to be unwilling to be subject to any superior, and especially to God; the result being that a man is unduly lifted
                     up, in respect of the other species of pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself. Consequently
                     it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of every evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q84_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q84_A3-p0.1">Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to
                     be to an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore
                     covetousness is called the "root of all evils," it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from
                     the head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head: so that no sins should be called
                     capital.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished
                     thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain special vices under the name of capital.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The word capital is derived from "caput" [a head]. Now the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which
                     is the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even
                     men who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so called, in the first place, from "head"
                     taken in the proper sense, and thus the name "capital" is given to a sin for which
                     capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in another sense, in
                     which the term "capital" is derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of others. In this way a capital
                     vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q84_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A6.html">Q[72], A[6]</a>). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their director
                     and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander
                     in matters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital vices to the "leaders of an army."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The term "capital" is taken from "caput" and applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some
                     property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which have
                     the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the "root," and pride which is called the beginning, but
                     also those which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine
                     (De Natura Boni iv), is "the privation of mode, species and order." But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it
                     regards some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers capital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q84_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q84_A4-p0.1">Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony,
                     lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html">Q[61], A[2]</a>). Therefore there are only four principal or capital vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77.html">Q[77])</a>. But there are four principal passions of the soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins,
                     whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and
                     sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance,
                     or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently
                     enumerated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this kind of origin may take
                     place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for
                     one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come
                     under the consideration of art, because man's
                     particular dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another:
                     and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration
                     of art.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p9"> Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite;
                     and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite
                     in two ways. First, directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the same reason,
                     moves the appetite to avoid it. Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus one
                     seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p10"> Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of
                     appetibility, merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is sought inordinately
                     by "vainglory." Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation of the individual, e.g.
                     meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by "gluttony," or the preservation of the species, e.g. sexual
                     intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by "lust." Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which "covetousness"
                     is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p11"> Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now
                     in the first place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to which belongs excellence or renown,
                     which is desired by "pride" or "vainglory." Secondly, it implies satiety, which "covetousness" seeks in riches that give promise
                     thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x,
                     6,7,[8] and this "gluttony" and "lust" pursue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p12"> On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect
                     of one's own good, and thus we have "sloth," which is sadness about one's spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily
                     labor: or else it happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to "envy," which
                     is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination
                     with a view to vengeance, it is "anger." Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason,
                     or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need
                     for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible
                     part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among
                     the capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A4.html">Q[25], A[4]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special
                     kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e.
                     of the right to vengeance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html">(A[2])</a>: and it is in the same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore pride, like a universal
                     vice, is not counted along with the others, but is reckoned as the "queen of them all," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 27).
                     But covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view, as stated above
                     (
                     <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p16.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> These vices are called capital because others, most frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from
                     arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth,
                     to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor; for the
                     ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p17.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>). That a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should
                     not be done that good may come of it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p18"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p19"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85.html"></a>
               </div>
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            <div id="FS_Q85" class="div3">
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               <h3 id="FS_Q85-p0.1">OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q85-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q85-p2"> We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the
                  debt of punishment.
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q85-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q85-p4"> (1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q85-p5"> (2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q85-p6"> (3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is stricken in consequence of sin.</p>
               <p id="FS_Q85-p7"> (4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q85-p8"> (5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q85-p9"> (6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q85_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q85_A1-p0.1">Whether sin diminishes the good of nature?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good
                     remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of
                     human nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when
                     its accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary
                     act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although
                     it is possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin,
                     diminish the good of his nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected
                     to an accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a
                     subject. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.30" target="asv">Lk. 10:30</a>), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts, and wounded in his nature," as Bede [*The quotation is from the
                     Glossa Ordinaria of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the good of nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties
                     that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html">Q[60], A[1]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html"> Q[63], A[1]</a>), this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of
                     human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p8"> Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was
                     entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz. the natural inclination to virtue,
                     is diminished by sin. Because human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html">Q[50], A[1]</a>). Now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the
                     other contrary must needs be diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there
                     results a diminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," as anyone
                     may see who reads the context.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not
                     changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is the inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed
                     to its term.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active and passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something
                     is caused or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treating of the production of habits (
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness
                     makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as
                     sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness
                     of the agent, we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the
                     fact that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive
                     appetite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">Q[77], AA[1]</a>, 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as though an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the object
                     acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it out of order.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q85_A2-p0.1">Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since
                     human nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore
                     the good of nature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and
                     all bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away
                     by sin, it seems that the whole can also be taken away by sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in
                     some on account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can
                     take away the good of nature entirely.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does not exist except in some good." But the evil of sin cannot be in the good
                     of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does
                     not destroy it entirely.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the good of nature, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the
                     very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act
                     virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be
                     capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible
                     for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p7"> Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made
                     use of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely destroyed. For the Philosopher
                     says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it will at
                     last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If,
                     however, the subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same quantity, it may go on indefinitely,
                     as, for instance, if a quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely,
                     provided that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted before. But this does not apply to the question
                     at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it
                     be a more grievous sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p8"> We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle
                     term between two others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends to the good of virtue, as to its
                     term and end. Consequently its diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its rood, secondly, on the
                     part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated
                     above 
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were
                     diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed.
                     Since, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is place against its attaining its term, it is evident
                     that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely,
                     inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this
                     inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light,
                     from the very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of supervening clouds,
                     although it always remains rooted in the nature of the body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection avails when diminution is made by subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and this
                     neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term,
                     in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and not on the other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not
                     reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains
                     in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced
                     to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ
                     requisite for sight.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A2.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q85_A3-p0.1">Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent
                     upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as
                     appears from what has been said above (
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76_A1.html">Q[76], A[1]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html"> Q[77], AA[3]</a>,5;
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q78_A1.html"> Q[78], A[1]</a>). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of
                     sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should
                     not be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it has been stated (
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html">Q[77], A[3]</a>) that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should not be
                     condivided with weakness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons "two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner,
                     viz. ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," which four do not coincide with the four in question.
                     Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known].
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected
                     by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already
                     stated (
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A2.html">Q[81], A[2]</a>); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed
                     to virtue; which destitution is
                     called a wounding of nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p9"> Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html">Q[61], A[2]</a>), viz. the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible,
                     the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance;
                     in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in
                     so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible
                     is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p10"> Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since
                     the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above (
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html">AA[1]</a>, 2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in
                     practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult
                     and concupiscence more impetuous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once,
                     is more easily inclined to sin again.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.8.21" target="asv"> Gn. 8:21</a>: "Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil
                     from his youth.'].
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html">Q[82], A[3]</a>, ad 1), concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond the
                     bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs
                     the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers,
                     viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the
                     good. "Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects
                     of his concupiscence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p16"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p17"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q85_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q85_A4-p0.1">Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii)
                     that "where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no
                     good at all." But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species and order.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the "privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De
                     Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding
                     privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species
                     and order is not the effect of each sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.6.3" target="asv"> Ps. 6:3, </a> "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html">FP, Q[5], A[5]</a>, mode, species and order are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every being. Because every being
                     and every good as such depends on its form from which it derives its "species." Again, any kind of form, whether substantial
                     or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that "the forms
                     of things are like numbers," so that
                     a form has a certain "mode" corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a relation of "order" to
                     something else.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p7"> Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there
                     is a good belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, species and order, and is neither destroyed
                     nor diminished by sin. There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and
                     this is diminished by sin, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html">AA[1]</a> ,2), but is not entirely destroyed.
                     Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin.
                     Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of
                     which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes
                     mode, species and order.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q85_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q85_A5-p0.1">Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now
                     these defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others, whereas original sin, from which especially these
                     defects seem to result, is equal in all, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A4.html">Q[82], A[4]</a>). Therefore death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism
                     or Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of
                     the body by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects
                     are not the result of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>), "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing
                     is the cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its nature or form, the result being that the
                     effect is directly intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such like defects are beside the intention of the sinner,
                     it is evident that sin is not, of itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one
                     thing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle: thus it is stated in Phys. viii, text. 32, that "by
                     displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting thereon." In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause
                     of death and all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken
                     away, whereby not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder
                     whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the
                     soul by the disorder among the powers, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A3.html">(A[3];</a> Q[82], A[3]), so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p7"> Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently,
                     death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although the defects are not intended by the
                     sinner, nevertheless they are ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if equal, produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or diminished,
                     the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing
                     a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it does not follow that the movements of the stones resting on them will
                     be equal; but that one will move with greater velocity, which has the
                     greater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly,
                     when original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments,
                     some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.11" target="asv">Rom. 8:11</a>): "He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you": but each is done according
                     to the order of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of all be conformed to Christ's
                     sufferings, before attaining to the immortality and impassibility
                     of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain, for a time,
                     subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things may be considered in actual sin, the substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of
                     the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault,
                     it deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects
                     of the body, as original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those
                     defects, as original sin does.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q85_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q86.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q85_A6-p0.1">Whether death and other defects are natural to man?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death and such like defects are natural to man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically"
                     (Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally
                     corruptible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But
                     such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore
                     the vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death and
                     such like defects are natural to man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now "God made not death" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>). Therefore death is not natural to man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p6"> (2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable
                     to it. But death and such like defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore they are not natural to man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p7"> (3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated
                     above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[5] , AA[3],4): and the form of the human body is the rational soul, as was proved in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A6.html">FP, Q[75], A[6]</a>. Therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways; first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its particular
                     nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of action and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every
                     corruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii, text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation
                     of the thing to which it belongs.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p9"> On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly
                     body; or again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be "the Nature Who makes nature."
                     This force intends the good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and corruption in things
                     are requisite: and in this respect corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the
                     inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection, but as regards the inclination of matter which is
                     allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of the universal agent. And although every form
                     intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational
                     soul; for the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial
                     operation of its own, as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>. Consequently as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But since that very
                     form has a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In
                     this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature
                     of his form.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p10"> The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore
                     in order to solve them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul, in respect of its incorruptibility
                     is adapted to its end, which is everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible, considered in respect
                     of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form, and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold
                     condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition
                     of matter. Thus, a smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to
                     be useful for cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but that iron be breakable and
                     inclined to rust, results from the natural disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he
                     would do without it if he could: wherefore this disposition of matter is not adapted to the workman's intention, nor to the
                     purpose of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament,
                     in order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers. Whereas the fact
                     that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an
                     incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of nature,
                     and by the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q85_A6-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. It is in this sense that it is said that "God made not death," and that death is the punishment of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p11"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q86.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q86" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q86-p0.1">OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q86-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q86-p2"> We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q86-p3"> (1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q86-p4"> (2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q86_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q86.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q86_A1-p0.1">Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature:
                     hence the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the
                     human soul is of a much higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it does not contract a
                     stain from them by sinning.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q86_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">Q[74], AA[1]</a>,2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering
                     anything whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is the will stained by sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive,
                     it can only be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither
                     disposition nor habit: for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit; for instance,
                     in a man who after committing a mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin
                     of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it a pure privation.
                     Because all sins agree on the part of aversion and privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain
                     caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It was said to Solomon (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.47.22" target="asv">Ecclus. 47:22</a>): "Thou hast stained thy glory": and it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.27" target="asv">Eph. 5:27</a>): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle": and in each case it is question of
                     the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the effect of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body,
                     e.g. a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's
                     soul has a twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions;
                     the other, from the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby
                     man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there
                     is a kind of contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason and of the
                     Divine law, as shown above (
                     <a id="FS_Q86_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Wherefore the loss of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the soul,
                     by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The action of the intellect is accomplished by the intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of the
                     intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. On the other hand, the act of the will consists in
                     a movement towards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained,
                     when it cleaves inordinately, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.10" target="asv"> Osee 9:10</a>: "They .
                     . . became abominable as those things were which they loved."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul's
                     brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which
                     is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed
                     bodies.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q86.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q86_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q86_A2-p0.1">Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the
                     soul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Therefore the
                     stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the shadow does not remain
                     when the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the act of sin is past.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of the stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is
                     no longer there, neither is the stain in the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.22.17" target="asv">Jos. 22:17</a>): "Is it a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remaineth in you [Vulg.: 'us']
                     to this day?"
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated above
                     (A[1] ), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the
                     Divine law. And therefore so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in him: but as soon as, moved
                     by grace, he returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed.
                     For although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Divine law, man does not at once
                     return to the state in which he was before, and it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous
                     movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as
                     the movement ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him and to return by a contrary movement.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something
                     private, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards the illuminating
                     body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and
                     so there is no comparison.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes the defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local parting.
                     Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain
                     removed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q87" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q87-p0.1">OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q87-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q87-p2"> We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ
                  in respect of the punishment due to them.
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q87-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q87-p4"> (1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q87-p5"> (2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q87-p6"> (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q87-p7"> (4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q87-p8"> (5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q87-p9"> (6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q87-p10"> (7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q87-p11"> (8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q87_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q87_A1-p0.1">Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does
                     not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention
                     of the sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an
                     effect of sin, which is evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every inordinate affection is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur
                     a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely. Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.9" target="asv">Rom. 2:9</a>): "Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil." But to work evil is to sin. Therefore sin incurs a
                     punishment which is signified by the words "tribulation and anguish."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It has passed from natural things to human affairs that whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment
                     therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which
                     reason "hot water freezes more rapidly," as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man
                     is to repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident that all things
                     contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up
                     against an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident
                     that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which
                     repression is punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p7"> Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is
                     subject. In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order
                     of another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the state or of the household;
                     thirdly, it is subjected to the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is
                     disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold
                     punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental
                     to the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt of punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin,
                     not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div.
                     Nom. iv) that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." Consequently the debt of punishment is considered
                     to be directly the effect of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This punishment of the "inordinate affection" is due to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a
                     further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q87_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q87_A2-p0.1">Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of
                     virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in
                     the opposite direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice.
                     Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above
                     (
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">Q[74], AA[1]</a> ,2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins are punishments of others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as
                     such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will,
                     for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially something against the will,
                     as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>. Consequently it is evident that sin
                     regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p7"> On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another,
                     by removing an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded
                     by the help of Divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment,
                     and is from God, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A3.html">Q[79], A[3]</a>), the result is that the sin which ensues
                     from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.24" target="asv">Rom. 1:24</a>) when he says: "Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart," i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, when
                     men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the
                     punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it
                     be an
                     interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with one who endures considerable
                     trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.7" target="asv"> Wis. 5:7</a>: "We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity." Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment
                     by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with
                     regard to itself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed
                     it is for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise from sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always
                     for the amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning. With regard to the
                     other two ways, it is evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's
                     amendment, since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to withdraw man from sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection considers sin essentially as such: and the same answer applies to the Third Objection.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q87_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q87_A3-p0.1">Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice
                     is equality: wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.8" target="asv">Is. 27:8</a>): "In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now sin is temporal. Therefore it does not
                     incur a debt of eternal punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed
                     to an end, and "what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment
                     should be infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction
                     of men" [Vulg.: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal punishment on man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished.
                     Therefore it cannot be of infinite duration.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.46" target="asv">Mat. 25:46</a>): "These shall go into everlasting punishment"; and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.3.29" target="asv">Mk. 3:29</a>): "He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, sin incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore
                     so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order
                     is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the
                     principle be saved, defects can be
                     repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except
                     by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight,
                     these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently
                     if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to
                     be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the principle of this
                     order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity,
                     considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however,
                     as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that
                     adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes
                     by imprisonment or banishment for life---sometimes even by death; wherein account is
                     not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the
                     living, so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now according to
                     Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity.
                     A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also
                     because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial.
                     iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished,
                     but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others,
                     that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.19.25" target="asv">Prov. 19:25</a>: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser." Accordingly the eternal punishments
                     inflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.59.6" target="asv"> Ps. 59:6</a>: "Thou hast given a warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be delivered."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order,
                     and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the punishment endures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q87_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q87_A4-p0.1">Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.24" target="asv">Jer. 10:24</a>): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing." Now God's anger or fury
                     signifies metaphorically the vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment, even as
                     to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore according to God's vengeance,
                     sin is awarded a punishment infinite in quantity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of fault, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now a sin which is committed against God,
                     is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases according to the greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a
                     more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a private individual), and God's greatness is infinite.
                     Therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration, and in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore
                     it is infinite in quantity also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good,
                     which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good.
                     In this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement of turning towards
                     it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin
                     consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment is the "pain of loss," which also is infinite, because
                     it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment
                     is the "pain of sense," which is also finite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible
                     with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. The expression "to be brought to nothing" is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>: "If I . . . have not charity, I am nothing."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers sin as turning away from something, for it is thus that man sins against God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault, not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for
                     as long as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punishment corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And
                     a fault which is irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment. But
                     it is not infinite as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it
                     does not incur punishment of infinite quantity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q87_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q87_A5-p0.1">Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. Because punishment, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, is proportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently,
                     differs infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur
                     a debt of everlasting punishment, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A5-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment
                     is incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But original sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children
                     who have died in original sin through not being baptized, will never see the kingdom of God, as shown by our Lord's words
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.3" target="asv">Jn. 3:3</a>): " Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of
                     God." Much more, therefore, will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its
                     punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because
                     in hell there is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment
                     is not due for any sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished
                     eternally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, a sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order of Divine justice,
                     through being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is
                     disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things referable
                     to the end, in so far as one is too much or
                     too little intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some
                     temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. Consequently such sins do not
                     incur everlasting, but only temporal punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance
                     of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turning away from something. Because some sins consist
                     in turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things referable to the end: and the last end differs
                     infinitely from the things that are referred to it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject,
                     viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p9"> The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. Because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the
                     quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html">(A[3])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q87_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q87_A6-p0.1">Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But
                     sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when
                     sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease.
                     Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.12.13" target="asv">2 Kings xii. 13,14</a>): "David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away thy sin;
                     thou shalt not die. Nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme . . . the child
                     that is born to thee shall die." Therefore a man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of punishment
                     remains, when the sin has been removed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins,
                     when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as
                     he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which
                     restores him to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he
                     who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something
                     contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in
                     injuries done to one's fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still
                     remains the debt of punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p7"> But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul,
                     without the soul being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that it suffered the loss of its brightness,
                     in which the stain consists, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q86_A1.html">Q[86], A[1]</a>). Now man is united to God by his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will accept the
                     order of Divine justice,
                     that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the
                     punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory,
                     it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory
                     punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular
                     purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained
                     when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary (
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A6-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A6.html">Q[6], A[6]</a>). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed
                     of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q86_A2.html">Q[86], A[2]</a>), so the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not remain
                     in the same way, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands
                     that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that
                     the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder
                     may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality
                     of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that those who were
                     scandalized at the sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q87_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q87_A7-p0.1">Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.9.3" target="asv">Jn. 9:3</a>, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#John.9.2" target="asv">2</a>) about the man born blind: "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born blind." In like manner
                     we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical
                     possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover
                     before they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore
                     not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of
                     these is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.5" target="asv">Ps. 72:5</a>): "They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be scourged like other men"; and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.21.7" target="asv">Job 21:7</a>): "[Why then do] the wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches" (?)[*The words in
                     brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Hab.1.13" target="asv">Hab. 1:13</a>): "Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: 'them that do unjust things'], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man
                     oppresseth [Vulg.: 'devoureth'], the man that is more just than himself?" Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for
                     a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written of Christ (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.22" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:22</a>) that "He did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth." And yet it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.21" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:21</a>) that "He suffered for us." Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by God for sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.4.7" target="asv">Job 4:7, </a> seqq.): "Who ever perished innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen those who work iniquity
                     . . . perishing by the blast of God"; and Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and is inflicted for
                     a sin."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As already stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, punishment can be considered in two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary.
                     And since those who differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who
                     has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another
                     upon themselves. If, however, we
                     speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished.
                     Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes
                     it is a relation to original sin: and this, either principally or consequently---principally, the punishment of original sin
                     is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result
                     from
                     this defect in human nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p7"> Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species
                     of evil, as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>. Now evil is privation of good. And since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods,
                     it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers
                     loss of money for the sake of bodily health,
                     or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man,
                     not simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because
                     a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to health. And since such like are not punishments
                     properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact
                     that human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment
                     of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue;
                     so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of
                     original sin, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html">Q[85], A[5]</a>); and they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html">Q[85], A[5]</a>, ad 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above
                     (
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html">Q[85], A[5]</a>, ad
                     1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others
                     who are admonished by their means---and also to the glory of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief
                     goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal
                     goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude
                     of the virtuous man, by material gifts." The very fact that others receive
                     temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore pride hath
                     held them fast."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for our sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q87_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q87_A8-p0.1">Whether anyone is punished for another's sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation
                     of them that hate Me"; and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.35" target="asv">Mat. 23:35</a>): "That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for
                     their parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his
                     father's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those
                     whose crimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their own sins, but for those of their
                     parents.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment,
                     in so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is penal, then each one is punished for
                     his own sin only, because the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment that is medicinal, in this
                     way it
                     does happen that one is punished for another's sin. For it has been stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q87_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A7.html">(A[7])</a> that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the health of the
                     soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for another's sin, either
                     by God or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their property
                     so to speak; in such a
                     way, however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punishment in
                     regard to both the one punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the character
                     of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely
                     medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he
                     bears it patiently.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p7"> With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet
                     higher good. Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine
                     says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep. ad Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for another's sin, because, as
                     regards the soul, the son is not the father's property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying
                     (Ezech. 18:4): "All souls are Mine."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the
                     property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must
                     be understood in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words are added, "Of them that hate Me," and
                     in the chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: "Fill ye up then the measure
                     of your fathers." The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are the more prone
                     to sin through being brought up amid their parents' crimes, both by becoming accustomed to them, and by imitating their parents'
                     example, conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of their
                     parents, they fail to mend their ways. The text adds, "to the third and fourth generation," because men are wont to live
                     long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to imitate
                     them, and the parents can see their children's punishments so as to grieve for them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or
                     medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the punishment
                     of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so far as the child is the father's property, and
                     because the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought
                     up amid the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he is
                     not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88.html"></a>
               </div>
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            </div>
            <div id="FS_Q88" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FS_Q88-p0.1">OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q88-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q88-p2"> In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First,
                  we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself.
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q88-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q88-p4"> (1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q88-p5"> (2) Whether they differ generically?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q88-p6"> (3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q88-p7"> (4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q88-p8"> (5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q88-p9"> (6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q88_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q88_A1-p0.1">Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin
                     is a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal.
                     Consequently every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:31</a>): "Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God." Now whoever sins breaks this commandment,
                     because sin is not done for God's glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it seems that
                     whoever sins, sins mortally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr.
                     Christ. i, 3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: because he does not refer it to that good
                     which gives us happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore
                     whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now "to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness,"
                     as Augustine again says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since "perverseness" [*The Latin 'pervertere' means to overthrow,
                     to destroy, hence 'perversion' of God's law is a mortal sin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable
                     good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly
                     condivided with mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that "a crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not." But
                     a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken metaphorically:
                     thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and
                     fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of
                     the body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus.
                     But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p8"> For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">Q[71], A[1]</a>, ad 3;
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html"> Q[72], A[5]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A9.html"> Q[74], A[9]</a>, ad 2), is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an irreparable defect
                     consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">Q[72], A[5]</a>). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is
                     the order to the last end, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">Q[72], A[5]</a>;
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.6" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html"> Q[87], A[3]</a>): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.7" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html">Q[87], A[3]</a>), because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be
                     repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the last end
                     cannot be repaired through something else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such
                     sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end,
                     the order to the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its acquittal
                     [veniam] when the debt of punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as explained above (
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.8" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html">Q[87], A[6]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p9"> Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic
                     principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial
                     sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the
                     generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and
                     of the other afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other
                     hand, venial sin is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in
                     relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion
                     of being. For it is not "against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids, nor omits what the
                     law prescribes to be done; but he acts "beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not actually
                     refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal
                     sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has
                     to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human
                     act to God's glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to God habitually. Therefore
                     it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins mortally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using
                     it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mutable good is not considered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed therein: because
                     what is referred to the end has not the character of finality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q88_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q88_A2-p0.1">Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some generically
                     venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above
                     (
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">Q[18], A[2]</a>). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good,
                     either less than God, which may be a venial
                     sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. Now irreparability
                     belongs to sin committed out of malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins committed
                     through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice
                     differs from sin committed
                     through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause, as stated above (Q[77], A[8],
                     ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A3.html">Q[74], A[3]</a>, ad 3; A[10]) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial sins. But sudden movements occur
                     in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generically venial.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic
                     mortal sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon]. Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has been
                     pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial": and this is called venial "from the result." Secondly,
                     a sin is called venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially,
                     as when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through
                     weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause": totally, through not destroying the order to the last end,
                     wherefore it deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p7"> For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense,
                     can have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, according as the
                     genus or species of an act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing that is in itself contrary
                     to charity, whereby man is directed to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently
                     it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against
                     the love of one's neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus.
                     Sometimes, however, the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary
                     to the love of God and one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason
                     of their genus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p8"> Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but also from
                     some disposition of the agent, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html">Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), it happens sometimes that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal on the part of the
                     agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own
                     genus; for example, if a man
                     direct an idle word to the commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin generically
                     mortal because venial, by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle
                     of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of unbelief.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The very fact that anyone chooses something that is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of
                     God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves
                     contrary to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers those sins which are venial from their cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers those sins which are venial by reason of the imperfection of the act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q88_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q88_A3-p0.1">Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial
                     and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an act disposes to something of like species, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like
                     dispositions and habits are engendered." But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or species, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is
                     a venial sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies
                     in wait for good works that it may destroy them." Therefore even good works would be venial sins, which is absurd.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 19:1</a>): "He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little." Now he that sins venially seems to contemn small things.
                     Therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition.
                     For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which
                     moves indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly
                     an act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it
                     disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to
                     a sin generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of
                     consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened
                     by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin: since the end
                     for one
                     who has a habit, as such, is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often venially,
                     he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this
                     way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial, turns
                     aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is
                     disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated
                     above (A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial
                     form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit
                     in different ways, as stated (
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally;
                     whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q88_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q88_A4-p0.1">Whether a venial sin can become mortal?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. For Augustine in explaining the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.36" target="asv"> Jn. 3:36</a>: "He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan.): "The slightest," i.e. venial, "sins kill
                     if we make little of them." Now a sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore a venial
                     sin can become mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A8.html">Q[74], A[8]</a>, ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable disease, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But a curable disease may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated 
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be
                     at first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act
                     of the will: so that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be continuous physically. If, however,
                     the will be not changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p7"> Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may
                     fix one's end in that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html">(A[2])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p8"> Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning
                     that many venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the world cannot incur
                     a debt of punishment equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the punishment, since mortal
                     sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html">Q[87], AA[3]</a>,5). It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing
                     God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as regards
                     the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate
                     to one another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p9"> If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above
                     
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html">(A[3])</a> with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin dispositively.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement
                     of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo
                     change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison
                     fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected,
                     becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident which
                     disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q88_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q88_A5-p0.1">Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis,
                     serm. xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they become mortal sins." But anger and
                     drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes
                     a venial sin to be mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that delectation, if morose [*See
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A6.html"> Q[74], A[6]</a>], is a mortal sin, but that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance
                     makes a venial sin to be mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes
                     a good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus, because
                     the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by
                     reason of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what
                     has been said (
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A5-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">Q[72], A[5]</a>, ad 1;
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A5-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html"> Q[87],
                        A[5]
                     </a>, ad 1).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; 
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A10.html">AA[10]</a> ,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance
                     may happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes
                     the species of the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another genus; thus when a man
                     has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be another
                     man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly
                     this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p7"> It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another
                     species. For it has been stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the deformity
                     of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial
                     sin to be mortal, so long as it
                     remains a circumstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference
                     of the moral act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something
                     accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance
                     something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p9"> We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's
                     neighbor, if the angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder or robbery, that anger will
                     be a mortal sin generically: and if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as it is
                     a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through
                     the consent of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a sin generically venial, for
                     instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little, the
                     anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to
                     great scandal or something of the kind.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p10"> With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and
                     through the mere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to God and avoids committing
                     many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or weakness, as when a
                     man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk,
                     for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk
                     frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than
                     to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its specific nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the
                     delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad
                     1): because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account of the approval of the deliberating reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">Q[18], A[5]</a> , ad 4).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q88_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q88_A6-p0.1">Whether a mortal sin can become venial?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from
                     venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while
                     he who sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that a person in committing a sin generically mortal,
                     loves a creature less than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary
                     to the love of God, commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love
                     of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the love of God. Therefore his
                     will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is
                     evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much
                     more therefore can a mortal sin become venial.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal
                     punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can
                     become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity
                     pertaining to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of fornication. On the other hand,
                     the perfect cannot become imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become
                     venial, by the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not diminished if a man commit
                     fornication in order to utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p7"> Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, because then
                     it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident
                     from what we have said above 
                     <a id="FS_Q88_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate
                     reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the
                     species of the act is destroyed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man and not
                     vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that commits fornication
                     in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance
                     itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things
                     whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good end."
                     Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5),
                     the judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal, are not murderers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p12"></p>
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            <div id="FS_Q89" class="div3">
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               <h3 id="FS_Q89-p0.1">OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FS_Q89-p1"></p>
               <p id="FS_Q89-p2"> We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FS_Q89-p3"> (1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q89-p4"> (2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay," "stubble" (
                  <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>);
               </p>
               <p id="FS_Q89-p5"> (3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q89-p6"> (4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q89-p7"> (5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?</p>
               <p id="FS_Q89-p8"> (6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?</p>
               <div id="FS_Q89_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q89_A1-p0.1">Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that
                     if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse.
                     But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections.
                     But, in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the
                     soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q89_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q86_A1.html">Q[86], A[1]</a>). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings
                     a stain on the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written, (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.27" target="asv">Eph. 5:27</a>): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the gloss says: "i.e., some
                     grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p6"> I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something, as may be
                     seen in corporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude. Now, just as in the
                     body there is a twofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the other resulting
                     from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to
                     speak, intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but
                     not to habitual comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, as we
                     shall show further on (
                     <a id="FS_Q89_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A10.html">SS, Q[24], A[10]</a>; Q[133], A[1], ad 2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained,
                     wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual
                     rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however,
                     we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness
                     that results from acts of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would
                     not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which
                     accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man
                     does not cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p11"></p>
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                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q89_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A1.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q89_A2-p0.1">Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as "wood," "hay," and "stubble." Because wood hay and stubble are
                     said ( 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions
                     are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:15</a>). But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in mortal sin to
                     which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>) those who build "gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our neighbor, and good works, are others from those
                     who build wood, hay, and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good works, commit venial sins: for
                     it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>): "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins are not suitably
                     designated by these three.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under
                     these three.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:15</a>) that the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that he will suffer punishment,
                     but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q89_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html">Q[87], A[5]</a>). Therefore these three signify venial sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and
                     precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine
                     disapproves of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.21" target="asv">Gal. 5:21</a>), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the
                     Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by fire." Consequently wood, hay, stubble
                     cannot be understood to denote mortal sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p8"> Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed
                     with venial sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good thing, excessive love of his wife or
                     of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that, to wit, for the sake of
                     these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be
                     reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are
                     designated by "gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by "wood," "hay," and "stubble."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p9"> We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things,
                     are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the substance of the
                     house, and can be burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while the spiritual edifice
                     remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life,
                     and yet he is saved for ever.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because
                     they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.136.1" target="asv">Ps. 136:1</a>): "Upon the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters": because venial sins do not destroy the edifice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon"
                     the "foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble,
                     but not built upon the spiritual edifice; and
                     consequently he will not be saved so as by fire.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial
                     sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these
                     do not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly remain longer, because they are unable
                     to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove
                     them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), "all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the end."
                     Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to "wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble,"
                     which is burnt up at once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly,
                     according as man is more or less attached to them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p15"></p>
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                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A2.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q89_A3-p0.1">Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. Because on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14, </a> "Adam was not seduced," a gloss says: "Having had no experience of God's severity, it was possible for him to be so mistaken
                     as to think that what he had done was a venial sin." But he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial
                     sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first
                     of all there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should have been checked." Now the vainglory which preceded
                     man's defeat, which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more than a venial sin. In like
                     manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5) that "man was allured by a certain desire of
                     making the experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden fruit." Again there seems to
                     have been a certain movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.3" target="asv">Gn. 3:3</a>): "Lest perhaps we die." Now these apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed
                     a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally
                     notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ.
                     Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not
                     change man's state. Therefore he could not sin venially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is generally admitted that man could not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be understood
                     as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he
                     had committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another
                     species, unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or vow
                     or the like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into
                     mortal by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin
                     venially, because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of the
                     original state by sinning mortally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p7"> The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden
                     movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the end, the due order
                     of the end being safeguarded. Now each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the lower powers
                     not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the
                     sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the
                     fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good,
                     as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order
                     of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the
                     end,
                     which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Q[10],
                     AA[1],2, ad 3; Q[72], A[5]). Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q89_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html">FP, Q[95], A[1]</a>, there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained
                     subject to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all
                     the
                     highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of
                     innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily
                     forgiven.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into
                     the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by
                     doubt, for she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be
                     held in check by the precept.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin
                     cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is
                     that the first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A3.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="FS_Q89_A4-p0.1">Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially. Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul
                     which is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that "man understands in common with the angels."
                     But man can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial sin also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally.
                     Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning venially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like
                     frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial as stated above 
                     <a id="FS_Q89_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q89_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, unless there is a special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive
                     state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> An angel's intellect, as stated above in the 
                     <a id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html">FP, Q[58], A[3]</a>; 
                     <a id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A8.html">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>, is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do.
                     Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its principles.
                     Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8], A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72],
                     A[5]), ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed to the means,
                     except as they stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness in
                     respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin.
                     Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts
                     are
                     acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination
                     to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will. This does
                     not apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them (
                     <a id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A4.html">FP, Q[63], A[4]</a>; Q[64], A[2], ad 5).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel could not love a creature less than God, without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end,
                     or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The demons incite man to all such things which seem venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to mortal
                     sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end they have in view.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q89_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q89_A5-p0.1">Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.1" target="asv">Rom. 8:1</a>) that "there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh": and he is speaking
                     there of the concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not according to the
                     flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus.
                     Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow
                     the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh." But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore,
                     since man feels the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence
                     in unbelievers are mortal sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence." Now this
                     liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence
                     in an unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts against his duty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv"> Acts 10:34 </a>that "God is not a respecter of persons." Therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute to
                     another. But he does not impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He impute them to
                     unbelievers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This
                     is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A4.html">Q[79], A[4]</a>). Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements
                     of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins.
                     Secondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary,
                     increases it, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A10.html">Q[73], A[10]</a>). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever
                     are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.13" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:13</a>: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in
                     my unbelief": whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.29" target="asv"> Heb. 10:29</a>: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean,
                     by which he was sanctified?"
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ,
                     although the "fomes" of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them
                     a sign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p8"> In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.</p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability
                     pertains, not to actual but to original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A4.html"></a>
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               </div>
               <div id="FS_Q89_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FS.vi.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FS_Q89_A6-p0.1">Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?</h4>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is
                     a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above (
                     <a id="FS_Q89_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html">Q[88], A[3]</a>). Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes
                     unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an
                     unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing another. Therefore he can also commit
                     a venial sin without committing a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes
                     to that time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because this happens in the worst criminals.
                     Now it is possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be. Therefore venial sin
                     can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is punished for original sin in the children's limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on (
                     <a id="FS_Q89_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q69_A6.html">SS, Q[69], A[6]</a>): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished
                     for venial sin with no other than original sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is because
                     before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin,
                     wherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically. But when he begins
                     to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal
                     sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself
                     to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself
                     to the due end, and as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for through not doing
                     that which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until
                     afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes disposes
                     to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on
                     account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from
                     the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has
                     discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing
                     in the intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's
                     affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.3" target="asv">Zech. 1:3</a>): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you."
                  </p>
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                  <a href="summa.FS.vi.html"></a>
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