|
62
|
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.ii" class="div2">
|
|
|
2 <a href="summa.FP_Q1_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
3 <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4 <h2 id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2>
|
|
|
5 <div id="FP_Q2" class="div3">
|
|
|
6 <a href="summa.FP.ii.html"></a>
|
|
|
7 <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
8 <h3 id="FP_Q2-p0.1">THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
9 <p id="FP_Q2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
10 <p id="FP_Q2-p2"> Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is
|
|
|
11 the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said,
|
|
|
12 therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards
|
|
|
13 God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.
|
|
|
14 </p>
|
|
|
15 <p id="FP_Q2-p3"> In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2)
|
|
|
16 Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.
|
|
|
17 </p>
|
|
|
18 <p id="FP_Q2-p4"> Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what
|
|
|
19 is NOT the manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations---namely, His knowledge, will, power.
|
|
|
20 </p>
|
|
|
21 <p id="FP_Q2-p5"> Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
22 <p id="FP_Q2-p6"> (1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?</p>
|
|
|
23 <p id="FP_Q2-p7"> (2) Whether it is demonstrable?</p>
|
|
|
24 <p id="FP_Q2-p8"> (3) Whether God exists?</p>
|
|
|
25 <div id="FP_Q2_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
26 <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"></a>
|
|
|
27 <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
28 <h4 id="FP_Q2_A1-p0.1">Whether the existence of God is self-evident?</h4>
|
|
|
29 <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
30 <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p2">
|
|
|
31 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which
|
|
|
32 is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the
|
|
|
33 knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.
|
|
|
34 </p>
|
|
|
35 <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p3">
|
|
|
36 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1
|
|
|
37 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known,
|
|
|
38 it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is
|
|
|
39 understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than
|
|
|
40 which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only
|
|
|
41 mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually.
|
|
|
42 Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.
|
|
|
43 </p>
|
|
|
44 <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p4">
|
|
|
45 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist:
|
|
|
46 and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must
|
|
|
47 be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (
|
|
|
48 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.
|
|
|
49 </p>
|
|
|
50 <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p5">
|
|
|
51 <b>On the contrary,</b> No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning
|
|
|
52 the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said
|
|
|
53 in his heart, There is no God" (
|
|
|
54 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.52.1" target="asv">Ps. 52:1</a>). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.
|
|
|
55 </p>
|
|
|
56 <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p6">
|
|
|
57 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other,
|
|
|
58 self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject,
|
|
|
59 as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject
|
|
|
60 be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with
|
|
|
61 regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as
|
|
|
62 being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject
|
|
|
63 is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate
|
|
|
64 and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that
|
|
|
65 is,
|
|
|
66 is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in
|
|
|
67 space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the
|
|
|
68 subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (
|
|
|
69 <a id="FP_Q2_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated
|
|
|
70 by things that are more
|
|
|
71 known to us, though less known in their nature---namely, by effects.
|
|
|
72 </p>
|
|
|
73 <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p7">
|
|
|
74 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For
|
|
|
75 man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not
|
|
|
76 to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching,
|
|
|
77 even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who
|
|
|
78 imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.
|
|
|
79 </p>
|
|
|
80 <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p8">
|
|
|
81 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought,
|
|
|
82 seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified
|
|
|
83 something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what
|
|
|
84 the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can
|
|
|
85 it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater
|
|
|
86 can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.
|
|
|
87 </p>
|
|
|
88 <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p9">
|
|
|
89 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.
|
|
|
90 </p>
|
|
|
91 <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
92 <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
93 <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"></a>
|
|
|
94 <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
95 </div>
|
|
|
96 <div id="FP_Q2_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
97 <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
98 <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
99 <h4 id="FP_Q2_A2-p0.1">Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?</h4>
|
|
|
100 <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
101 <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p2">
|
|
|
102 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of
|
|
|
103 faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (
|
|
|
104 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.
|
|
|
105 </p>
|
|
|
106 <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p3">
|
|
|
107 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in
|
|
|
108 what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.
|
|
|
109 </p>
|
|
|
110 <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p4">
|
|
|
111 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate
|
|
|
112 to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore,
|
|
|
113 since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
|
|
|
114 </p>
|
|
|
115 <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p5">
|
|
|
116 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (
|
|
|
117 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first
|
|
|
118 thing we must know of anything is whether it exists.
|
|
|
119 </p>
|
|
|
120 <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p6">
|
|
|
121 <b>I answer that,</b> Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what
|
|
|
122 is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from
|
|
|
123 what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the
|
|
|
124 knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be
|
|
|
125 demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect
|
|
|
126 exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated
|
|
|
127 from those of His effects which are known to us.
|
|
|
128 </p>
|
|
|
129 <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p7">
|
|
|
130 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but
|
|
|
131 are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes
|
|
|
132 something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as
|
|
|
133 a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
|
|
|
134 known and demonstrated.
|
|
|
135 </p>
|
|
|
136 <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p8">
|
|
|
137 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause
|
|
|
138 in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence
|
|
|
139 of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of
|
|
|
140 its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are
|
|
|
141 derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle
|
|
|
142 term the meaning of the word "God".
|
|
|
143 </p>
|
|
|
144 <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p9">
|
|
|
145 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the
|
|
|
146 existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though
|
|
|
147 from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
|
|
|
148 </p>
|
|
|
149 <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
150 <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
151 <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
152 <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
153 </div>
|
|
|
154 <div id="FP_Q2_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
155 <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
156 <a href="summa.FP_Q3.html"></a>
|
|
|
157 <h4 id="FP_Q2_A3-p0.1">Whether God exists?</h4>
|
|
|
158 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
159 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p2">
|
|
|
160 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed.
|
|
|
161 But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but
|
|
|
162 there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.
|
|
|
163 </p>
|
|
|
164 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p3">
|
|
|
165 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it
|
|
|
166 seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural
|
|
|
167 things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is
|
|
|
168 human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.
|
|
|
169 </p>
|
|
|
170 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p4">
|
|
|
171 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (
|
|
|
172 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.14" target="asv">Ex. 3:14</a>)
|
|
|
173 </p>
|
|
|
174 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p5">
|
|
|
175 <b>I answer that,</b> The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
|
|
|
176 </p>
|
|
|
177 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p6"> The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world
|
|
|
178 some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is
|
|
|
179 in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing
|
|
|
180 else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality
|
|
|
181 to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is
|
|
|
182 potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be
|
|
|
183 at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot
|
|
|
184 simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same
|
|
|
185 respect
|
|
|
186 and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion
|
|
|
187 must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs
|
|
|
188 be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no
|
|
|
189 first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion
|
|
|
190 by the
|
|
|
191 first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first
|
|
|
192 mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
|
|
|
193 </p>
|
|
|
194 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p7"> The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes.
|
|
|
195 There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for
|
|
|
196 so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because
|
|
|
197 in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the
|
|
|
198 intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away
|
|
|
199 the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate,
|
|
|
200 nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient
|
|
|
201 cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false.
|
|
|
202 Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
|
|
|
203 </p>
|
|
|
204 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p8"> The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and
|
|
|
205 not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be.
|
|
|
206 But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything
|
|
|
207 is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true,
|
|
|
208 even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already
|
|
|
209 existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to
|
|
|
210 exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but
|
|
|
211 there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused
|
|
|
212 by
|
|
|
213 another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another,
|
|
|
214 as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having
|
|
|
215 of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men
|
|
|
216 speak of as God.
|
|
|
217 </p>
|
|
|
218 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p9"> The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true,
|
|
|
219 noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different
|
|
|
220 ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest;
|
|
|
221 so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,
|
|
|
222 something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in
|
|
|
223 Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause
|
|
|
224 of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every
|
|
|
225 other perfection; and this we call God.
|
|
|
226 </p>
|
|
|
227 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p10"> The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies,
|
|
|
228 act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best
|
|
|
229 result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence
|
|
|
230 cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the
|
|
|
231 arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to
|
|
|
232 their end; and this being we call God.
|
|
|
233 </p>
|
|
|
234 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p11">
|
|
|
235 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless
|
|
|
236 His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that
|
|
|
237 He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
|
|
|
238 </p>
|
|
|
239 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p12">
|
|
|
240 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be
|
|
|
241 traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause
|
|
|
242 other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect
|
|
|
243 must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown
|
|
|
244 in the body of the Article.
|
|
|
245 </p>
|
|
|
246 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
247 <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p14"></p>
|
|
|
248 <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
249 <a href="summa.FP_Q3.html"></a>
|
|
|
250 </div>
|
|
|
251 <a href="summa.FP.ii.html"></a>
|
|
|
252 <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
253 </div>
|
|
|
254 <div id="FP_Q3" class="div3">
|
|
|
255 <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
256 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
257 <h3 id="FP_Q3-p0.1">OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
258 <p id="FP_Q3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
259 <p id="FP_Q3-p2"> When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in
|
|
|
260 order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for
|
|
|
261 considering how God is, but rather how He is not.
|
|
|
262 </p>
|
|
|
263 <p id="FP_Q3-p3"> Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.</p>
|
|
|
264 <p id="FP_Q3-p4"> Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and
|
|
|
265 the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple
|
|
|
266 in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His
|
|
|
267 immutability; (5) His unity.
|
|
|
268 </p>
|
|
|
269 <p id="FP_Q3-p5"> Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
270 <p id="FP_Q3-p6"> (1) Whether God is a body?</p>
|
|
|
271 <p id="FP_Q3-p7"> (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?</p>
|
|
|
272 <p id="FP_Q3-p8"> (3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject?</p>
|
|
|
273 <p id="FP_Q3-p9"> (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?</p>
|
|
|
274 <p id="FP_Q3-p10"> (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?</p>
|
|
|
275 <p id="FP_Q3-p11"> (6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?</p>
|
|
|
276 <p id="FP_Q3-p12"> (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?</p>
|
|
|
277 <p id="FP_Q3-p13"> (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?</p>
|
|
|
278 <div id="FP_Q3_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
279 <a href="summa.FP_Q3.html"></a>
|
|
|
280 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
281 <h4 id="FP_Q3_A1-p0.1">Whether God is a body?</h4>
|
|
|
282 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
283 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p2">
|
|
|
284 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions
|
|
|
285 to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know?
|
|
|
286 The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (
|
|
|
287 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.11.8" target="asv">Job 11:8,9</a>). Therefore God is a body.
|
|
|
288 </p>
|
|
|
289 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p3">
|
|
|
290 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it
|
|
|
291 is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (
|
|
|
292 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the
|
|
|
293 image, "of His substance" (
|
|
|
294 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>). Therefore God is a body.
|
|
|
295 </p>
|
|
|
296 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p4">
|
|
|
297 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like
|
|
|
298 God?" (
|
|
|
299 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.40.4" target="asv">Job 40:4</a>); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (
|
|
|
300 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.16" target="asv">Ps. 33:16</a>); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (
|
|
|
301 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.117.16" target="asv">Ps. 117:16</a>). Therefore God is a body.
|
|
|
302 </p>
|
|
|
303 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p5">
|
|
|
304 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the
|
|
|
305 Lord sitting" (
|
|
|
306 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>), and "He standeth up to judge" (
|
|
|
307 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.13" target="asv">Is. 3:13</a>). Therefore God is a body.
|
|
|
308 </p>
|
|
|
309 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p6">
|
|
|
310 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term "wherefrom" or "whereto." But in the Scriptures God is spoken
|
|
|
311 of as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be enlightened" (
|
|
|
312 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.6" target="asv">Ps. 33:6</a>), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (
|
|
|
313 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.17.13" target="asv">Jer. 17:13</a>). Therefore God is a body.
|
|
|
314 </p>
|
|
|
315 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p7">
|
|
|
316 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the Gospel of St. John (
|
|
|
317 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>): "God is a spirit."
|
|
|
318 </p>
|
|
|
319 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p8">
|
|
|
320 <b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless
|
|
|
321 it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved (
|
|
|
322 <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the
|
|
|
323 first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any
|
|
|
324 single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless,
|
|
|
325 absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only
|
|
|
326 by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in
|
|
|
327 God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to
|
|
|
328 infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is
|
|
|
329 impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body
|
|
|
330 is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would
|
|
|
331 be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence
|
|
|
332 that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.
|
|
|
333 </p>
|
|
|
334 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p9">
|
|
|
335 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above (
|
|
|
336 <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q1_A9.html">Q[1], A[9]</a>), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes
|
|
|
337 to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it
|
|
|
338 signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration
|
|
|
339 of His existence; by
|
|
|
340 breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility
|
|
|
341 of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as
|
|
|
342 all things lie under His protection.
|
|
|
343 </p>
|
|
|
344 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p10">
|
|
|
345 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence,
|
|
|
346 when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the
|
|
|
347 sea" (
|
|
|
348 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which
|
|
|
349 are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of
|
|
|
350 God.
|
|
|
351 </p>
|
|
|
352 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p11">
|
|
|
353 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For
|
|
|
354 instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly;
|
|
|
355 and so on with the other parts.
|
|
|
356 </p>
|
|
|
357 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p12">
|
|
|
358 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account
|
|
|
359 of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.
|
|
|
360 </p>
|
|
|
361 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p13">
|
|
|
362 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions
|
|
|
363 of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on
|
|
|
364 the metaphor of local motion.
|
|
|
365 </p>
|
|
|
366 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p14"></p>
|
|
|
367 <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p15"></p>
|
|
|
368 <a href="summa.FP_Q3.html"></a>
|
|
|
369 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
370 </div>
|
|
|
371 <div id="FP_Q3_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
372 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
373 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
374 <h4 id="FP_Q3_A2-p0.1">Whether God is composed of matter and form?</h4>
|
|
|
375 <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
376 <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p2">
|
|
|
377 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul
|
|
|
378 is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (
|
|
|
379 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.38" target="asv">Heb. 10:38</a>), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God
|
|
|
380 is composed of matter and form.
|
|
|
381 </p>
|
|
|
382 <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p3">
|
|
|
383 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was
|
|
|
384 exceeding angry with His people" (
|
|
|
385 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.105.40" target="asv">Ps. 105:40</a>). Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
|
|
|
386 </p>
|
|
|
387 <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p4">
|
|
|
388 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.
|
|
|
389 Therefore He is composed of matter and form.
|
|
|
390 </p>
|
|
|
391 <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p5">
|
|
|
392 <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not
|
|
|
393 a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.
|
|
|
394 </p>
|
|
|
395 <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p6">
|
|
|
396 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (
|
|
|
397 <a id="FP_Q3_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly,
|
|
|
398 because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated,
|
|
|
399 inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the
|
|
|
400 first good and the best---viz. God---is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good.
|
|
|
401 Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence
|
|
|
402 the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially
|
|
|
403 an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is
|
|
|
404 therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.
|
|
|
405 </p>
|
|
|
406 <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p7">
|
|
|
407 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul.
|
|
|
408 Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.
|
|
|
409 </p>
|
|
|
410 <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p8">
|
|
|
411 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act
|
|
|
412 of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.
|
|
|
413 </p>
|
|
|
414 <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p9">
|
|
|
415 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is
|
|
|
416 the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that
|
|
|
417 form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received
|
|
|
418 in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in
|
|
|
419 God.
|
|
|
420 </p>
|
|
|
421 <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
422 <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
423 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
424 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
425 </div>
|
|
|
426 <div id="FP_Q3_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
427 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
428 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
429 <h4 id="FP_Q3_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?</h4>
|
|
|
430 <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
431 <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p2">
|
|
|
432 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of
|
|
|
433 God---i.e. the Godhead---is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.
|
|
|
434 </p>
|
|
|
435 <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p3">
|
|
|
436 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum"
|
|
|
437 is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
|
|
|
438 </p>
|
|
|
439 <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p4">
|
|
|
440 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life"
|
|
|
441 (
|
|
|
442 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is
|
|
|
443 His very Godhead.
|
|
|
444 </p>
|
|
|
445 <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p5">
|
|
|
446 <b>I answer that,</b> God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form,
|
|
|
447 the nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the
|
|
|
448 definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man
|
|
|
449 is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now
|
|
|
450 individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular
|
|
|
451 flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh,
|
|
|
452 these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they
|
|
|
453 are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity.
|
|
|
454 Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because
|
|
|
455 the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter.
|
|
|
456 On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter---that
|
|
|
457 is to say, to "this" matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is necessary the forms themselves should
|
|
|
458 be subsisting "supposita." Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter
|
|
|
459 and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.
|
|
|
460 </p>
|
|
|
461 <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p6">
|
|
|
462 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore
|
|
|
463 in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are
|
|
|
464 composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are
|
|
|
465 in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not
|
|
|
466 that there is any composition in God.
|
|
|
467 </p>
|
|
|
468 <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p7">
|
|
|
469 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely
|
|
|
470 because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them,
|
|
|
471 and therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature.
|
|
|
472 </p>
|
|
|
473 <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p8"></p>
|
|
|
474 <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p9"></p>
|
|
|
475 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
476 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
477 </div>
|
|
|
478 <div id="FP_Q3_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
479 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
480 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
481 <h4 id="FP_Q3_A4-p0.1">Whether essence and existence are the same in God?</h4>
|
|
|
482 <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
483 <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p2">
|
|
|
484 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to
|
|
|
485 it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that
|
|
|
486 God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to
|
|
|
487 stones and wood" (
|
|
|
488 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.21" target="asv">Wis. 14:21</a>). Therefore God's existence is not His
|
|
|
489 essence.
|
|
|
490 </p>
|
|
|
491 <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p3">
|
|
|
492 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above (
|
|
|
493 <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2], A[2]</a>); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or
|
|
|
494 nature.
|
|
|
495 </p>
|
|
|
496 <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p4">
|
|
|
497 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in
|
|
|
498 God is His existence.
|
|
|
499 </p>
|
|
|
500 <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p5">
|
|
|
501 <b>I answer that,</b> God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several
|
|
|
502 ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence
|
|
|
503 (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species---as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man---and is caused
|
|
|
504 by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent---as heat is caused
|
|
|
505 in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by
|
|
|
506 some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential
|
|
|
507 constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore
|
|
|
508 that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of
|
|
|
509 God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from
|
|
|
510 His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of
|
|
|
511 as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is
|
|
|
512 a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above
|
|
|
513
|
|
|
514 <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because,
|
|
|
515 just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence,
|
|
|
516 is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above
|
|
|
517 <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">(A[3])</a> if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not
|
|
|
518 therefore be the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.
|
|
|
519 </p>
|
|
|
520 <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p6">
|
|
|
521 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it
|
|
|
522 is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it,
|
|
|
523 inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because
|
|
|
524 it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to
|
|
|
525 lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added
|
|
|
526 to it in the second sense.
|
|
|
527 </p>
|
|
|
528 <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p7">
|
|
|
529 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected
|
|
|
530 by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor
|
|
|
531 His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is
|
|
|
532 true; and this we know from His effects (
|
|
|
533 <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2],
|
|
|
534 A[2]
|
|
|
535 </a>).
|
|
|
536 </p>
|
|
|
537 <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p8"></p>
|
|
|
538 <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p9"></p>
|
|
|
539 <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
540 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
541 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
542 </div>
|
|
|
543 <div id="FP_Q3_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
544 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
545 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
546 <h4 id="FP_Q3_A5-p0.1">Whether God is contained in a genus?</h4>
|
|
|
547 <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
548 <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p2">
|
|
|
549 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true
|
|
|
550 of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance.
|
|
|
551 </p>
|
|
|
552 <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p3">
|
|
|
553 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number.
|
|
|
554 But God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
|
|
|
555 </p>
|
|
|
556 <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p4">
|
|
|
557 <b>On the contrary,</b> In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is
|
|
|
558 not in any genus.
|
|
|
559 </p>
|
|
|
560 <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p5">
|
|
|
561 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being
|
|
|
562 reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its
|
|
|
563 principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus.
|
|
|
564 That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a
|
|
|
565 species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is
|
|
|
566 always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from
|
|
|
567 sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other
|
|
|
568 hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is
|
|
|
569 compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality
|
|
|
570 is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence
|
|
|
571 of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus is predicated as an essential
|
|
|
572 it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for
|
|
|
573 every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being
|
|
|
574 cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity
|
|
|
575 or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence
|
|
|
576 of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and
|
|
|
577 quiddity---i.e. essence---must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain
|
|
|
578 that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can
|
|
|
579 there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and
|
|
|
580 difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle,
|
|
|
581 is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle
|
|
|
582 of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is
|
|
|
583 not contained in any genus as its principle.
|
|
|
584 </p>
|
|
|
585 <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p6">
|
|
|
586 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself---for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the
|
|
|
587 body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way---namely, of existing
|
|
|
588 of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.
|
|
|
589 </p>
|
|
|
590 <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p7">
|
|
|
591 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure
|
|
|
592 proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only according
|
|
|
593 as it resembles Him.
|
|
|
594 </p>
|
|
|
595 <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p8"></p>
|
|
|
596 <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p9"></p>
|
|
|
597 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
598 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
599 </div>
|
|
|
600 <div id="FP_Q3_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
601 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
602 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
603 <h4 id="FP_Q3_A6-p0.1">Whether in God there are any accidents?</h4>
|
|
|
604 <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
605 <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p2">
|
|
|
606 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that
|
|
|
607 which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form
|
|
|
608 of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributes
|
|
|
609 of God. Therefore in God there are accidents.
|
|
|
610 </p>
|
|
|
611 <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p3">
|
|
|
612 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members
|
|
|
613 of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than God---which is absurd.
|
|
|
614 </p>
|
|
|
615 <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p4">
|
|
|
616 <b>On the contrary,</b> Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De
|
|
|
617 Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.
|
|
|
618 </p>
|
|
|
619 <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p5">
|
|
|
620 <b>I answer that,</b> From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents
|
|
|
621 as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality
|
|
|
622 in God, as was shown (
|
|
|
623 <a id="FP_Q3_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded
|
|
|
624 to it, this cannot apply to
|
|
|
625 absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute
|
|
|
626 heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is
|
|
|
627 absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability
|
|
|
628 of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the
|
|
|
629 subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in
|
|
|
630 God.
|
|
|
631 </p>
|
|
|
632 <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p6">
|
|
|
633 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God
|
|
|
634 as there are in us.
|
|
|
635 </p>
|
|
|
636 <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p7">
|
|
|
637 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as
|
|
|
638 to that which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to
|
|
|
639 all being, outside of every genus.
|
|
|
640 </p>
|
|
|
641 <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p8"></p>
|
|
|
642 <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p9"></p>
|
|
|
643 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
644 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
645 </div>
|
|
|
646 <div id="FP_Q3_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
647 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
648 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
649 <h4 id="FP_Q3_A7-p0.1">Whether God is altogether simple?</h4>
|
|
|
650 <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
651 <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p2">
|
|
|
652 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all
|
|
|
653 beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore
|
|
|
654 neither is God altogether simple.
|
|
|
655 </p>
|
|
|
656 <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p3">
|
|
|
657 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple;
|
|
|
658 thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot
|
|
|
659 be said that God is altogether simple.
|
|
|
660 </p>
|
|
|
661 <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p4">
|
|
|
662 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and absolutely simple."
|
|
|
663 </p>
|
|
|
664 <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p5">
|
|
|
665 <b>I answer that,</b> The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is
|
|
|
666 neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His
|
|
|
667 nature differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and
|
|
|
668 difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite,
|
|
|
669 but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them;
|
|
|
670 but God is the first being, as shown above (
|
|
|
671 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them
|
|
|
672 to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (
|
|
|
673 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must
|
|
|
674 be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all
|
|
|
675 the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts.
|
|
|
676 And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot,
|
|
|
677 a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a
|
|
|
678 part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which
|
|
|
679 cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two
|
|
|
680 cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has
|
|
|
681 a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to
|
|
|
682 the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form,
|
|
|
683 or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God,
|
|
|
684 Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim."
|
|
|
685 </p>
|
|
|
686 <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p6">
|
|
|
687 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in
|
|
|
688 some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (
|
|
|
689 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>).
|
|
|
690 </p>
|
|
|
691 <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p7">
|
|
|
692 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one
|
|
|
693 simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing (
|
|
|
694 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a> and
|
|
|
695 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
696 </p>
|
|
|
697 <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p8"></p>
|
|
|
698 <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p9"></p>
|
|
|
699 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
700 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
701 </div>
|
|
|
702 <div id="FP_Q3_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
703 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
704 <a href="summa.FP_Q4.html"></a>
|
|
|
705 <h4 id="FP_Q3_A8-p0.1">Whether God enters into the composition of other things?</h4>
|
|
|
706 <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
707 <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p2">
|
|
|
708 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things
|
|
|
709 is that which is above being---the Godhead." But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore
|
|
|
710 God enters into the composition of other things.
|
|
|
711 </p>
|
|
|
712 <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p3">
|
|
|
713 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., [*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an
|
|
|
714 uncreated form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound.
|
|
|
715 </p>
|
|
|
716 <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p4">
|
|
|
717 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and
|
|
|
718 in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition things.
|
|
|
719 Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must
|
|
|
720 be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ
|
|
|
721 from each other.
|
|
|
722 </p>
|
|
|
723 <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p5">
|
|
|
724 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part with
|
|
|
725 part."
|
|
|
726 </p>
|
|
|
727 <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p6"> Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).</p>
|
|
|
728 <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p7">
|
|
|
729 <b>I answer that,</b> On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De
|
|
|
730 Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven.
|
|
|
731 Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third
|
|
|
732 error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter.
|
|
|
733 Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either
|
|
|
734 as a formal or a material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical
|
|
|
735 numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither
|
|
|
736 numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is
|
|
|
737 actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that
|
|
|
738 which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for
|
|
|
739 the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly,
|
|
|
740 because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal
|
|
|
741 parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear
|
|
|
742 from the foregoing (
|
|
|
743 <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which
|
|
|
744 is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially
|
|
|
745 such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being (
|
|
|
746 <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>).
|
|
|
747 </p>
|
|
|
748 <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p8">
|
|
|
749 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.
|
|
|
750 </p>
|
|
|
751 <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p9">
|
|
|
752 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound.
|
|
|
753 </p>
|
|
|
754 <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p10">
|
|
|
755 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Simple things do not differ by added differences---for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their
|
|
|
756 differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence,
|
|
|
757 to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
|
|
|
758 x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are
|
|
|
759 different differ by something." Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very
|
|
|
760 being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.
|
|
|
761 </p>
|
|
|
762 <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p11"></p>
|
|
|
763 <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p12"></p>
|
|
|
764 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
765 <a href="summa.FP_Q4.html"></a>
|
|
|
766 </div>
|
|
|
767 <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
768 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
769 </div>
|
|
|
770 <div id="FP_Q4" class="div3">
|
|
|
771 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
772 <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
773 <h3 id="FP_Q4-p0.1">THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
774 <p id="FP_Q4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
775 <p id="FP_Q4-p2"> Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect
|
|
|
776 is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness.
|
|
|
777 </p>
|
|
|
778 <p id="FP_Q4-p3"> Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
779 <p id="FP_Q4-p4"> (1) Whether God is perfect?</p>
|
|
|
780 <p id="FP_Q4-p5"> (2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things?</p>
|
|
|
781 <p id="FP_Q4-p6"> (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?</p>
|
|
|
782 <div id="FP_Q4_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
783 <a href="summa.FP_Q4.html"></a>
|
|
|
784 <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
785 <h4 id="FP_Q4_A1-p0.1">Whether God is perfect?</h4>
|
|
|
786 <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
787 <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p2">
|
|
|
788 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not
|
|
|
789 befit God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.
|
|
|
790 </p>
|
|
|
791 <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p3">
|
|
|
792 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning
|
|
|
793 of animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.
|
|
|
794 </p>
|
|
|
795 <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p4">
|
|
|
796 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as shown above (
|
|
|
797 <a id="FP_Q4_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification.
|
|
|
798 Therefore God is imperfect.
|
|
|
799 </p>
|
|
|
800 <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p5">
|
|
|
801 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect" (
|
|
|
802 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.48" target="asv">Mat. 5:48</a>).
|
|
|
803 </p>
|
|
|
804 <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p6">
|
|
|
805 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate
|
|
|
806 "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material
|
|
|
807 principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle
|
|
|
808 must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle,
|
|
|
809 not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential,
|
|
|
810 an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore
|
|
|
811 most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing
|
|
|
812 of the mode of its perfection.
|
|
|
813 </p>
|
|
|
814 <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p7">
|
|
|
815 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that which
|
|
|
816 is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality
|
|
|
817 they are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way
|
|
|
818 of perfection or not.
|
|
|
819 </p>
|
|
|
820 <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p8">
|
|
|
821 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The material principle which with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by something
|
|
|
822 perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant
|
|
|
823 from which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is actual; since a potential being can
|
|
|
824 only be reduced into act by some being already actual.
|
|
|
825 </p>
|
|
|
826 <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p9">
|
|
|
827 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for
|
|
|
828 nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore
|
|
|
829 it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore
|
|
|
830 I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is
|
|
|
831 considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists.
|
|
|
832 </p>
|
|
|
833 <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
834 <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
835 <a href="summa.FP_Q4.html"></a>
|
|
|
836 <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
837 </div>
|
|
|
838 <div id="FP_Q4_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
839 <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
840 <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
841 <h4 id="FP_Q4_A2-p0.1">Whether the perfections of all things are in God?</h4>
|
|
|
842 <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
843 <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p2">
|
|
|
844 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above (
|
|
|
845 <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God.
|
|
|
846 </p>
|
|
|
847 <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p3">
|
|
|
848 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by
|
|
|
849 its specific difference. But the differences by which "genera" are divided, and "species" constituted, are opposed to each
|
|
|
850 other. Therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are not
|
|
|
851 in God.
|
|
|
852 </p>
|
|
|
853 <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p4">
|
|
|
854 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore
|
|
|
855 life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has
|
|
|
856 not the perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.
|
|
|
857 </p>
|
|
|
858 <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p5">
|
|
|
859 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one existence prepossesses all things."
|
|
|
860 </p>
|
|
|
861 <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p6">
|
|
|
862 <b>I answer that,</b> All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator,
|
|
|
863 Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever
|
|
|
864 perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent---as
|
|
|
865 when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal
|
|
|
866 agent---thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists
|
|
|
867 virtually in the efficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more
|
|
|
868 imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient
|
|
|
869 cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective
|
|
|
870 cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line
|
|
|
871 of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all."
|
|
|
872 Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (
|
|
|
873 <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has
|
|
|
874 not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting,
|
|
|
875 nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection
|
|
|
876 of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect,
|
|
|
877 precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one
|
|
|
878 thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists
|
|
|
879 not in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards
|
|
|
880 he adds that, "He is the very existence to subsisting things."
|
|
|
881 </p>
|
|
|
882 <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p7">
|
|
|
883 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself
|
|
|
884 first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; "a fortiori" should all things in a
|
|
|
885 kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other,
|
|
|
886 pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity.</p>
|
|
|
887 <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p7a">
|
|
|
888 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply
|
|
|
889 to the Second Objection.
|
|
|
890 </p>
|
|
|
891 <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p8">
|
|
|
892 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that, although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are
|
|
|
893 considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living
|
|
|
894 things also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom,
|
|
|
895 because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of
|
|
|
896 existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can
|
|
|
897 be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself.
|
|
|
898 </p>
|
|
|
899 <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p9"></p>
|
|
|
900 <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
901 <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
902 <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
903 </div>
|
|
|
904 <div id="FP_Q4_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
905 <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
906 <a href="summa.FP_Q5.html"></a>
|
|
|
907 <h4 id="FP_Q4_A3-p0.1">Whether any creature can be like God?</h4>
|
|
|
908 <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
909 <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p2">
|
|
|
910 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is written (
|
|
|
911 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.85.8" target="asv">Ps. 85:8</a>): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called
|
|
|
912 participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like God.
|
|
|
913 </p>
|
|
|
914 <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p3">
|
|
|
915 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore neither
|
|
|
916 can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as
|
|
|
917 God: since God is no "genus," as shown above (
|
|
|
918 <a id="FP_Q4_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore no creature is like God.
|
|
|
919 </p>
|
|
|
920 <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p4">
|
|
|
921 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone,
|
|
|
922 essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.
|
|
|
923 </p>
|
|
|
924 <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p5">
|
|
|
925 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God
|
|
|
926 will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To whom have you likened God?" (
|
|
|
927 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.18" target="asv">Is. 40:18</a>).
|
|
|
928 </p>
|
|
|
929 <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p6">
|
|
|
930 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (
|
|
|
931 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him" (
|
|
|
932 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>).
|
|
|
933 </p>
|
|
|
934 <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p7">
|
|
|
935 <b>I answer that,</b> Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in
|
|
|
936 form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to
|
|
|
937 the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said
|
|
|
938 to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of
|
|
|
939 things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according
|
|
|
940 to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a
|
|
|
941 third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as
|
|
|
942 we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts
|
|
|
943 according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is
|
|
|
944 contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made,
|
|
|
945 according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained
|
|
|
946 in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as things generated
|
|
|
947 by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific
|
|
|
948 likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any "genus," its effect will still
|
|
|
949 more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent's form according
|
|
|
950 to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all.
|
|
|
951 In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being.
|
|
|
952 </p>
|
|
|
953 <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p8">
|
|
|
954 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness
|
|
|
955 to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not
|
|
|
956 perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission,
|
|
|
957 as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because
|
|
|
958 they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.
|
|
|
959 </p>
|
|
|
960 <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p9">
|
|
|
961 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus," and as the
|
|
|
962 principle of all "genera."
|
|
|
963 </p>
|
|
|
964 <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p10">
|
|
|
965 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus
|
|
|
966 or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.
|
|
|
967 </p>
|
|
|
968 <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p11">
|
|
|
969 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures;
|
|
|
970 because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between
|
|
|
971 a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be
|
|
|
972 spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.
|
|
|
973 </p>
|
|
|
974 <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
975 <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
976 <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
977 <a href="summa.FP_Q5.html"></a>
|
|
|
978 </div>
|
|
|
979 <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
980 <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
981 </div>
|
|
|
982 <div id="FP_Q5" class="div3">
|
|
|
983 <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
984 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
985 <h3 id="FP_Q5-p0.1">OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
986 <p id="FP_Q5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
987 <p id="FP_Q5-p2"> We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God.</p>
|
|
|
988 <p id="FP_Q5-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
989 <p id="FP_Q5-p4"> (1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?</p>
|
|
|
990 <p id="FP_Q5-p5"> (2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?</p>
|
|
|
991 <p id="FP_Q5-p6"> (3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?</p>
|
|
|
992 <p id="FP_Q5-p7"> (4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?</p>
|
|
|
993 <p id="FP_Q5-p8"> (5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?</p>
|
|
|
994 <p id="FP_Q5-p9"> (6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?</p>
|
|
|
995 <div id="FP_Q5_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
996 <a href="summa.FP_Q5.html"></a>
|
|
|
997 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
998 <h4 id="FP_Q5_A1-p0.1">Whether goodness differs really from being?</h4>
|
|
|
999 <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1000 <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1001 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that
|
|
|
1002 things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really differ.
|
|
|
1003 </p>
|
|
|
1004 <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1005 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of being", according to the commentary
|
|
|
1006 on De Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
|
|
|
1007 </p>
|
|
|
1008 <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1009 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
|
|
|
1010 </p>
|
|
|
1011 <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1012 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that, "inasmuch as we exist we are good."
|
|
|
1013 </p>
|
|
|
1014 <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1015 <b>I answer that,</b> Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence
|
|
|
1016 of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all
|
|
|
1017 desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But
|
|
|
1018 everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect
|
|
|
1019 so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing (
|
|
|
1020 <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>;
|
|
|
1021 <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which
|
|
|
1022 being does not present.
|
|
|
1023 </p>
|
|
|
1024 <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p7">
|
|
|
1025 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a
|
|
|
1026 thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates
|
|
|
1027 to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from
|
|
|
1028 that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial
|
|
|
1029 being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to
|
|
|
1030 have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential
|
|
|
1031 being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which
|
|
|
1032 is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good;
|
|
|
1033 but
|
|
|
1034 that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection),
|
|
|
1035 is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e.
|
|
|
1036 substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in
|
|
|
1037 its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.),
|
|
|
1038 "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another," is to be referred to a thing's
|
|
|
1039 goodness simply, and having being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in
|
|
|
1040 its complete actuality, it is good simply---in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even
|
|
|
1041 in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.
|
|
|
1042 </p>
|
|
|
1043 <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p8">
|
|
|
1044 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality.
|
|
|
1045 </p>
|
|
|
1046 <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1047 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or
|
|
|
1048 virtue.
|
|
|
1049 </p>
|
|
|
1050 <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1051 <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1052 <a href="summa.FP_Q5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1053 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1054 </div>
|
|
|
1055 <div id="FP_Q5_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1056 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1057 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1058 <h4 id="FP_Q5_A2-p0.1">Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?</h4>
|
|
|
1059 <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1060 <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1061 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified
|
|
|
1062 by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather
|
|
|
1063 than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
|
|
|
1064 </p>
|
|
|
1065 <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1066 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius
|
|
|
1067 notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things
|
|
|
1068 alone." Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.
|
|
|
1069 </p>
|
|
|
1070 <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1071 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness
|
|
|
1072 has the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas: "It were better for him,
|
|
|
1073 if that man had not been born" (
|
|
|
1074 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.24" target="asv">Mat. 26:24</a>). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
|
|
|
1075 </p>
|
|
|
1076 <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1077 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence
|
|
|
1078 is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.
|
|
|
1079 </p>
|
|
|
1080 <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1081 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of created things is being."
|
|
|
1082 </p>
|
|
|
1083 <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p7">
|
|
|
1084 <b>I answer that,</b> In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of
|
|
|
1085 the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect.
|
|
|
1086 Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality.
|
|
|
1087 Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as
|
|
|
1088 sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.
|
|
|
1089 </p>
|
|
|
1090 <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1091 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says,
|
|
|
1092 from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final
|
|
|
1093 cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter
|
|
|
1094 is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus
|
|
|
1095 goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality,
|
|
|
1096 goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation,
|
|
|
1097 said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in goodness
|
|
|
1098 as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being.
|
|
|
1099 Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).
|
|
|
1100 </p>
|
|
|
1101 <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1102 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things,
|
|
|
1103 not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not
|
|
|
1104 simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the
|
|
|
1105 end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which
|
|
|
1106 tend even those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only,
|
|
|
1107 either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual.
|
|
|
1108 </p>
|
|
|
1109 <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p10">
|
|
|
1110 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively---i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed
|
|
|
1111 by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of
|
|
|
1112 some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being
|
|
|
1113 of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as
|
|
|
1114 relatively good.
|
|
|
1115 </p>
|
|
|
1116 <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p11">
|
|
|
1117 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is
|
|
|
1118 desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is good except being.
|
|
|
1119 </p>
|
|
|
1120 <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1121 <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
1122 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1123 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1124 </div>
|
|
|
1125 <div id="FP_Q5_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
1126 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1127 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1128 <h4 id="FP_Q5_A3-p0.1">Whether every being is good?</h4>
|
|
|
1129 <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1130 <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1131 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from A[1]. But whatever
|
|
|
1132 is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being
|
|
|
1133 is good.
|
|
|
1134 </p>
|
|
|
1135 <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1136 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" (
|
|
|
1137 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.20" target="asv">Is. 5:20</a>). But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good.
|
|
|
1138 </p>
|
|
|
1139 <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1140 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore
|
|
|
1141 primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is good.
|
|
|
1142 </p>
|
|
|
1143 <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1144 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities;
|
|
|
1145 otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.
|
|
|
1146 </p>
|
|
|
1147 <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1148 <b>On the contrary,</b> Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now every creature of God is good (
|
|
|
1149 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>): and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good.
|
|
|
1150 </p>
|
|
|
1151 <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p7">
|
|
|
1152 <b>I answer that,</b> Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies
|
|
|
1153 some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every
|
|
|
1154 being as such is good.
|
|
|
1155 </p>
|
|
|
1156 <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p8">
|
|
|
1157 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now
|
|
|
1158 in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper
|
|
|
1159 to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.
|
|
|
1160 </p>
|
|
|
1161 <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p9">
|
|
|
1162 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because
|
|
|
1163 he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well.
|
|
|
1164 </p>
|
|
|
1165 <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p10">
|
|
|
1166 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary
|
|
|
1167 matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain
|
|
|
1168 extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property,
|
|
|
1169 but to desire.
|
|
|
1170 </p>
|
|
|
1171 <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p11">
|
|
|
1172 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have
|
|
|
1173 only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end,
|
|
|
1174 which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness
|
|
|
1175 nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness,
|
|
|
1176 as was said in the preceding article.
|
|
|
1177 </p>
|
|
|
1178 <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1179 <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
1180 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1181 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1182 </div>
|
|
|
1183 <div id="FP_Q5_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
1184 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1185 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1186 <h4 id="FP_Q5_A4-p0.1">Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?</h4>
|
|
|
1187 <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1188 <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p2">
|
|
|
1189 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.
|
|
|
1190 Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect
|
|
|
1191 of a formal cause.
|
|
|
1192 </p>
|
|
|
1193 <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p3">
|
|
|
1194 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist,
|
|
|
1195 and are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient
|
|
|
1196 cause.
|
|
|
1197 </p>
|
|
|
1198 <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1199 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we exist because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as
|
|
|
1200 the efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
|
|
|
1201 </p>
|
|
|
1202 <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1203 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which
|
|
|
1204 something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause.
|
|
|
1205 </p>
|
|
|
1206 <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p6">
|
|
|
1207 <b>I answer that,</b> Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies
|
|
|
1208 the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal
|
|
|
1209 cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first of all before it reproduces
|
|
|
1210 the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in
|
|
|
1211 causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to
|
|
|
1212 the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be
|
|
|
1213 first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for
|
|
|
1214 a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality
|
|
|
1215 of
|
|
|
1216 goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.
|
|
|
1217 </p>
|
|
|
1218 <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p7">
|
|
|
1219 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and
|
|
|
1220 consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness
|
|
|
1221 being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a
|
|
|
1222 thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful
|
|
|
1223 things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned,
|
|
|
1224 as in what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since
|
|
|
1225 knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.
|
|
|
1226 </p>
|
|
|
1227 <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p8">
|
|
|
1228 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move.
|
|
|
1229 </p>
|
|
|
1230 <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p9">
|
|
|
1231 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers
|
|
|
1232 we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to
|
|
|
1233 the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good" has reference to the final cause.
|
|
|
1234 </p>
|
|
|
1235 <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1236 <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1237 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1238 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1239 </div>
|
|
|
1240 <div id="FP_Q5_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
1241 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1242 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1243 <h4 id="FP_Q5_A5-p0.1">Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?</h4>
|
|
|
1244 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1245 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p2">
|
|
|
1246 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically.
|
|
|
1247 But mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure,
|
|
|
1248 and number, and weight" (
|
|
|
1249 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the mode
|
|
|
1250 of everything, number gives it
|
|
|
1251 its species, and weight gives it rest and stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species
|
|
|
1252 and order.
|
|
|
1253 </p>
|
|
|
1254 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p3">
|
|
|
1255 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mode, species and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and
|
|
|
1256 order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless
|
|
|
1257 succession.
|
|
|
1258 </p>
|
|
|
1259 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p4">
|
|
|
1260 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence
|
|
|
1261 of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
|
|
|
1262 </p>
|
|
|
1263 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p5">
|
|
|
1264 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species
|
|
|
1265 and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
|
|
|
1266 </p>
|
|
|
1267 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p6">
|
|
|
1268 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight, number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine.
|
|
|
1269 But not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not
|
|
|
1270 to have been created in number, weight and measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and
|
|
|
1271 order.
|
|
|
1272 </p>
|
|
|
1273 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p7">
|
|
|
1274 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in everything God
|
|
|
1275 has made; thus, where these three abound the things are very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they
|
|
|
1276 do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore
|
|
|
1277 the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order.
|
|
|
1278 </p>
|
|
|
1279 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p8">
|
|
|
1280 <b>I answer that,</b> Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above
|
|
|
1281 <a id="FP_Q5_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is
|
|
|
1282 what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow),
|
|
|
1283 in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together
|
|
|
1284 with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles,
|
|
|
1285 whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the
|
|
|
1286 form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to
|
|
|
1287 give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a
|
|
|
1288 unit
|
|
|
1289 added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its species.
|
|
|
1290 Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so
|
|
|
1291 far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order.
|
|
|
1292 Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.
|
|
|
1293 </p>
|
|
|
1294 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p9">
|
|
|
1295 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.
|
|
|
1296 </p>
|
|
|
1297 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p10">
|
|
|
1298 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because
|
|
|
1299 it is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good:
|
|
|
1300 for they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but as formally constituting others
|
|
|
1301 good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything
|
|
|
1302 else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object that is white.
|
|
|
1303 </p>
|
|
|
1304 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p11">
|
|
|
1305 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has
|
|
|
1306 a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil
|
|
|
1307 deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every
|
|
|
1308 mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight.
|
|
|
1309 </p>
|
|
|
1310 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p12">
|
|
|
1311 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and order). "But
|
|
|
1312 an evil mode, species and order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they
|
|
|
1313 ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous."
|
|
|
1314 </p>
|
|
|
1315 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p13">
|
|
|
1316 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The nature of light is spoken of as being without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal
|
|
|
1317 things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body
|
|
|
1318 that causes change, i.e. the heavens.
|
|
|
1319 </p>
|
|
|
1320 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p14"></p>
|
|
|
1321 <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p15"></p>
|
|
|
1322 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1323 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1324 </div>
|
|
|
1325 <div id="FP_Q5_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
1326 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1327 <a href="summa.FP_Q6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1328 <h4 id="FP_Q5_A6-p0.1">Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and the pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good
|
|
|
1329 considered as fitting. (cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])]
|
|
|
1330 </h4>
|
|
|
1331 <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1332 <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p2">
|
|
|
1333 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by
|
|
|
1334 the ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under
|
|
|
1335 one predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.
|
|
|
1336 </p>
|
|
|
1337 <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p3">
|
|
|
1338 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing,
|
|
|
1339 and no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous
|
|
|
1340 and the useful would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is incorrect.
|
|
|
1341 </p>
|
|
|
1342 <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p4">
|
|
|
1343 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far
|
|
|
1344 as it is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the pleasant and the virtuous.
|
|
|
1345 </p>
|
|
|
1346 <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p5">
|
|
|
1347 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De Offic. i, 9)
|
|
|
1348 </p>
|
|
|
1349 <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p6">
|
|
|
1350 <b>I answer that,</b> This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal
|
|
|
1351 point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is
|
|
|
1352 desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the
|
|
|
1353 movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end
|
|
|
1354 absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called
|
|
|
1355 a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two
|
|
|
1356 ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in
|
|
|
1357 the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which
|
|
|
1358 something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the
|
|
|
1359 movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous
|
|
|
1360 is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the
|
|
|
1361 thing desired, is called the pleasant.
|
|
|
1362 </p>
|
|
|
1363 <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p7">
|
|
|
1364 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according
|
|
|
1365 to its proper formality.
|
|
|
1366 </p>
|
|
|
1367 <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p8">
|
|
|
1368 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other
|
|
|
1369 formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the
|
|
|
1370 useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the
|
|
|
1371 taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable
|
|
|
1372 in themselves.
|
|
|
1373 </p>
|
|
|
1374 <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p9">
|
|
|
1375 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something analogical
|
|
|
1376 to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the
|
|
|
1377 pleasant; and lastly of the useful.
|
|
|
1378 </p>
|
|
|
1379 <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1380 <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1381 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1382 <a href="summa.FP_Q6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1383 </div>
|
|
|
1384 <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1385 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1386 </div>
|
|
|
1387 <div id="FP_Q6" class="div3">
|
|
|
1388 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1389 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1390 <h3 id="FP_Q6-p0.1">THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1391 <p id="FP_Q6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1392 <p id="FP_Q6-p2"> We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
1393 <p id="FP_Q6-p3"> (1) Whether goodness belongs to God?</p>
|
|
|
1394 <p id="FP_Q6-p4"> (2) Whether God is the supreme good?</p>
|
|
|
1395 <p id="FP_Q6-p5"> (3) Whether He alone is essentially good?</p>
|
|
|
1396 <p id="FP_Q6-p6"> (4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</p>
|
|
|
1397 <div id="FP_Q6_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
1398 <a href="summa.FP_Q6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1399 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1400 <h4 id="FP_Q6_A1-p0.1">Whether God is good?</h4>
|
|
|
1401 <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1402 <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1403 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem
|
|
|
1404 to belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
|
|
|
1405 </p>
|
|
|
1406 <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1407 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and nothing
|
|
|
1408 is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
|
|
|
1409 </p>
|
|
|
1410 <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1411 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
1412 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q6_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lam.3.25" target="asv">Lam. 3:25</a>): "The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him."
|
|
|
1413 </p>
|
|
|
1414 <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1415 <b>I answer that,</b> To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its
|
|
|
1416 own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes
|
|
|
1417 its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it
|
|
|
1418 is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of
|
|
|
1419 all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv)
|
|
|
1420 attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist."
|
|
|
1421 </p>
|
|
|
1422 <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1423 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To have mode, species and order belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs
|
|
|
1424 to Him to impose mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.
|
|
|
1425 </p>
|
|
|
1426 <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p7">
|
|
|
1427 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes
|
|
|
1428 of the divine being; as appears from what is said above (
|
|
|
1429 <a id="FP_Q6_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4] , A[3]</a>). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others
|
|
|
1430 know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a
|
|
|
1431 natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.
|
|
|
1432 </p>
|
|
|
1433 <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p8"></p>
|
|
|
1434 <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p9"></p>
|
|
|
1435 <a href="summa.FP_Q6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1436 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1437 </div>
|
|
|
1438 <div id="FP_Q6_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1439 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1440 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1441 <h4 id="FP_Q6_A2-p0.1">Whether God is the supreme good?</h4>
|
|
|
1442 <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1443 <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1444 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every
|
|
|
1445 good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound.
|
|
|
1446 But God is supremely simple; as was shown above (
|
|
|
1447 <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the supreme good.
|
|
|
1448 </p>
|
|
|
1449 <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1450 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is
|
|
|
1451 the end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said (
|
|
|
1452 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q6_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.19" target="asv">Lk. 18:19</a>): "None is good but God alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison
|
|
|
1453 with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good.
|
|
|
1454 </p>
|
|
|
1455 <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1456 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater
|
|
|
1457 or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above (
|
|
|
1458 <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>;
|
|
|
1459 <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.
|
|
|
1460 </p>
|
|
|
1461 <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1462 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds."
|
|
|
1463 </p>
|
|
|
1464 <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1465 <b>I answer that,</b> God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God,
|
|
|
1466 as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not,
|
|
|
1467 however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above (
|
|
|
1468 <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an
|
|
|
1469 effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the
|
|
|
1470 sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things,
|
|
|
1471 it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.
|
|
|
1472 </p>
|
|
|
1473 <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p7">
|
|
|
1474 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not
|
|
|
1475 a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation
|
|
|
1476 to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should
|
|
|
1477 be composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are deficient in
|
|
|
1478 comparison with it.
|
|
|
1479 </p>
|
|
|
1480 <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1481 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all; but
|
|
|
1482 that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood
|
|
|
1483 of essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.
|
|
|
1484 </p>
|
|
|
1485 <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1486 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that
|
|
|
1487 God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is
|
|
|
1488 the principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good
|
|
|
1489 implies.
|
|
|
1490 </p>
|
|
|
1491 <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1492 <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1493 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1494 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1495 </div>
|
|
|
1496 <div id="FP_Q6_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
1497 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1498 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1499 <h4 id="FP_Q6_A3-p0.1">Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?</h4>
|
|
|
1500 <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1501 <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1502 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good";
|
|
|
1503 as we said above (
|
|
|
1504 <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially.
|
|
|
1505 </p>
|
|
|
1506 <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1507 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good.
|
|
|
1508 But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good essentially.
|
|
|
1509 </p>
|
|
|
1510 <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1511 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary
|
|
|
1512 to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good
|
|
|
1513 by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or
|
|
|
1514 come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first
|
|
|
1515 supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.
|
|
|
1516 </p>
|
|
|
1517 <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1518 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially.
|
|
|
1519 </p>
|
|
|
1520 <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1521 <b>I answer that,</b> God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold:
|
|
|
1522 first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for
|
|
|
1523 its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the
|
|
|
1524 first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
|
|
|
1525 substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is
|
|
|
1526 to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom
|
|
|
1527 alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially;
|
|
|
1528 as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above (
|
|
|
1529 <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html">Q[3], A[6]</a>); and
|
|
|
1530 He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God
|
|
|
1531 alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially.
|
|
|
1532 </p>
|
|
|
1533 <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p7">
|
|
|
1534 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "One" does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence.
|
|
|
1535 Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided
|
|
|
1536 only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above.
|
|
|
1537 </p>
|
|
|
1538 <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p8">
|
|
|
1539 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does
|
|
|
1540 not follow that a creature is good essentially.
|
|
|
1541 </p>
|
|
|
1542 <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p9">
|
|
|
1543 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection,
|
|
|
1544 or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called
|
|
|
1545 being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being through something else: hence for this reason is
|
|
|
1546 it called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself
|
|
|
1547 has some other goodness whereby it is good.
|
|
|
1548 </p>
|
|
|
1549 <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1550 <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1551 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1552 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1553 </div>
|
|
|
1554 <div id="FP_Q6_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
1555 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1556 <a href="summa.FP_Q7.html"></a>
|
|
|
1557 <h4 id="FP_Q6_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</h4>
|
|
|
1558 <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1559 <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p2">
|
|
|
1560 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take
|
|
|
1561 away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good
|
|
|
1562 of every good." But everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is God.
|
|
|
1563 </p>
|
|
|
1564 <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p3">
|
|
|
1565 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is
|
|
|
1566 by reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the divine goodness.
|
|
|
1567 </p>
|
|
|
1568 <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1569 <b>On the contrary,</b> All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their
|
|
|
1570 own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness.
|
|
|
1571 </p>
|
|
|
1572 <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1573 <b>I answer that,</b> As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and "measured"
|
|
|
1574 from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (
|
|
|
1575 <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A4.html">Q[84], A[4]</a>) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that
|
|
|
1576 Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now
|
|
|
1577 just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid
|
|
|
1578 down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation
|
|
|
1579 of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme
|
|
|
1580 good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are
|
|
|
1581 called good by way of participation.
|
|
|
1582 </p>
|
|
|
1583 <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p6"> Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as
|
|
|
1584 Aristotle argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and
|
|
|
1585 essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above (
|
|
|
1586 <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and
|
|
|
1587 a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears
|
|
|
1588 from the above (
|
|
|
1589 <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>).
|
|
|
1590 </p>
|
|
|
1591 <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p7"> Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of
|
|
|
1592 all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it,
|
|
|
1593 which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many
|
|
|
1594 goodnesses.
|
|
|
1595 </p>
|
|
|
1596 <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p8"><b>Reply to objections.</b> This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.</p>
|
|
|
1597 <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p9"></p>
|
|
|
1598 <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1599 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1600 <a href="summa.FP_Q7.html"></a>
|
|
|
1601 </div>
|
|
|
1602 <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1603 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1604 </div>
|
|
|
1605 <div id="FP_Q7" class="div3">
|
|
|
1606 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1607 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1608 <h3 id="FP_Q7-p0.1">THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1609 <p id="FP_Q7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1610 <p id="FP_Q7-p2"> After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere,
|
|
|
1611 and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.
|
|
|
1612 </p>
|
|
|
1613 <p id="FP_Q7-p3"> Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
1614 <p id="FP_Q7-p4"> (1) Whether God is infinite?</p>
|
|
|
1615 <p id="FP_Q7-p5"> (2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?</p>
|
|
|
1616 <p id="FP_Q7-p6"> (3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?</p>
|
|
|
1617 <p id="FP_Q7-p7"> (4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</p>
|
|
|
1618 <div id="FP_Q7_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
1619 <a href="summa.FP_Q7.html"></a>
|
|
|
1620 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1621 <h4 id="FP_Q7_A1-p0.1">Whether God is infinite?</h4>
|
|
|
1622 <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1623 <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1624 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and
|
|
|
1625 matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite.
|
|
|
1626 </p>
|
|
|
1627 <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1628 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God,
|
|
|
1629 for He is not a body, as was shown above (
|
|
|
1630 <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.
|
|
|
1631 </p>
|
|
|
1632 <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1633 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing
|
|
|
1634 in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not
|
|
|
1635 a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.
|
|
|
1636 </p>
|
|
|
1637 <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1638 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is infinite and eternal, and boundless."
|
|
|
1639 </p>
|
|
|
1640 <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1641 <b>I answer that,</b> All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they
|
|
|
1642 considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the nature of the
|
|
|
1643 first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the
|
|
|
1644 first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to
|
|
|
1645 the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things.
|
|
|
1646 </p>
|
|
|
1647 <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p7"> We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by
|
|
|
1648 form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in
|
|
|
1649 potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch
|
|
|
1650 as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to
|
|
|
1651 this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed
|
|
|
1652 to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made
|
|
|
1653 perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined
|
|
|
1654 by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown
|
|
|
1655 above (
|
|
|
1656 <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>, OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was
|
|
|
1657 shown above (
|
|
|
1658 <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.
|
|
|
1659 </p>
|
|
|
1660 <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
|
|
|
1661 <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1662 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is
|
|
|
1663 a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed
|
|
|
1664 to God; as was said above, in this article.
|
|
|
1665 </p>
|
|
|
1666 <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p10">
|
|
|
1667 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be
|
|
|
1668 distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting
|
|
|
1669 whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing
|
|
|
1670 in a subject.
|
|
|
1671 </p>
|
|
|
1672 <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1673 <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1674 <a href="summa.FP_Q7.html"></a>
|
|
|
1675 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1676 </div>
|
|
|
1677 <div id="FP_Q7_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1678 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1679 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1680 <h4 id="FP_Q7_A2-p0.1">Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?</h4>
|
|
|
1681 <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1682 <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1683 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence.
|
|
|
1684 Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since
|
|
|
1685 the extent of a power is known by its effect.
|
|
|
1686 </p>
|
|
|
1687 <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1688 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends
|
|
|
1689 the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance
|
|
|
1690 is infinite.
|
|
|
1691 </p>
|
|
|
1692 <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1693 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above (
|
|
|
1694 <a id="FP_Q7_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite.
|
|
|
1695 </p>
|
|
|
1696 <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1697 <b>On the contrary,</b> The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle.
|
|
|
1698 Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.
|
|
|
1699 </p>
|
|
|
1700 <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1701 <b>I answer that,</b> Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to
|
|
|
1702 matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But
|
|
|
1703 because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which
|
|
|
1704 is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to
|
|
|
1705 its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But
|
|
|
1706 if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are
|
|
|
1707 absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting,
|
|
|
1708 as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated,
|
|
|
1709 nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows
|
|
|
1710 that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.
|
|
|
1711 </p>
|
|
|
1712 <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p7">
|
|
|
1713 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created being;
|
|
|
1714 hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power,
|
|
|
1715 cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise
|
|
|
1716 He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite.
|
|
|
1717 </p>
|
|
|
1718 <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1719 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form not
|
|
|
1720 in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which
|
|
|
1721 is not the act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.
|
|
|
1722 </p>
|
|
|
1723 <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1724 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is something
|
|
|
1725 concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively,
|
|
|
1726 because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.
|
|
|
1727 </p>
|
|
|
1728 <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1729 <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1730 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1731 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1732 </div>
|
|
|
1733 <div id="FP_Q7_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
1734 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1735 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1736 <h4 id="FP_Q7_A3-p0.1">Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?</h4>
|
|
|
1737 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1738 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1739 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is
|
|
|
1740 no lie in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the
|
|
|
1741 geometrician in his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite
|
|
|
1742 in magnitude.
|
|
|
1743 </p>
|
|
|
1744 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1745 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude;
|
|
|
1746 but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude
|
|
|
1747 to be infinite.
|
|
|
1748 </p>
|
|
|
1749 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1750 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear
|
|
|
1751 from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division,
|
|
|
1752 and increase opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude
|
|
|
1753 to be infinite.
|
|
|
1754 </p>
|
|
|
1755 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1756 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said
|
|
|
1757 in Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every determinate indivisible in
|
|
|
1758 time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.
|
|
|
1759 </p>
|
|
|
1760 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1761 <b>On the contrary,</b> Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore
|
|
|
1762 all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.
|
|
|
1763 </p>
|
|
|
1764 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p7">
|
|
|
1765 <b>I answer that,</b> It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite
|
|
|
1766 in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species
|
|
|
1767 by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in
|
|
|
1768 essence, it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in
|
|
|
1769 magnitude.
|
|
|
1770 </p>
|
|
|
1771 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p8"> We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect
|
|
|
1772 to its quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.
|
|
|
1773 </p>
|
|
|
1774 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p9"> Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial
|
|
|
1775 form. Since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow
|
|
|
1776 upon a determinate form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate
|
|
|
1777 quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because
|
|
|
1778 every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement; neither direct,
|
|
|
1779 because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infinite
|
|
|
1780 body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move circularly;
|
|
|
1781 forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by
|
|
|
1782 another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the
|
|
|
1783 farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would
|
|
|
1784 be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other.
|
|
|
1785 </p>
|
|
|
1786 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p10"> The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under
|
|
|
1787 some form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such is figure, such a body
|
|
|
1788 must have some figure, and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.
|
|
|
1789 </p>
|
|
|
1790 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p11">
|
|
|
1791 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts
|
|
|
1792 whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.
|
|
|
1793 </p>
|
|
|
1794 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p12">
|
|
|
1795 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species of
|
|
|
1796 it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and
|
|
|
1797 so on. Now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since
|
|
|
1798 no species of magnitude is infinite.
|
|
|
1799 </p>
|
|
|
1800 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p13">
|
|
|
1801 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch
|
|
|
1802 as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the
|
|
|
1803 infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.
|
|
|
1804 </p>
|
|
|
1805 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p14">
|
|
|
1806 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Movement and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude
|
|
|
1807 is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude;
|
|
|
1808 yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality.
|
|
|
1809 </p>
|
|
|
1810 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p15"></p>
|
|
|
1811 <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p16"></p>
|
|
|
1812 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1813 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1814 </div>
|
|
|
1815 <div id="FP_Q7_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
1816 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1817 <a href="summa.FP_Q8.html"></a>
|
|
|
1818 <h4 id="FP_Q7_A4-p0.1">Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</h4>
|
|
|
1819 <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1820 <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p2">
|
|
|
1821 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual.
|
|
|
1822 But number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist.
|
|
|
1823 </p>
|
|
|
1824 <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p3">
|
|
|
1825 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore
|
|
|
1826 an infinite number of actual figures is possible.
|
|
|
1827 </p>
|
|
|
1828 <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1829 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there
|
|
|
1830 can still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so
|
|
|
1831 on to infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.
|
|
|
1832 </p>
|
|
|
1833 <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1834 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" (
|
|
|
1835 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q7_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>).
|
|
|
1836 </p>
|
|
|
1837 <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p6">
|
|
|
1838 <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite
|
|
|
1839 multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite
|
|
|
1840 absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail
|
|
|
1841 something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation
|
|
|
1842 could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium.
|
|
|
1843 </p>
|
|
|
1844 <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p7"> A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be
|
|
|
1845 shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, the movement
|
|
|
1846 of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be
|
|
|
1847 finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as
|
|
|
1848 one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and
|
|
|
1849 it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time.
|
|
|
1850 In this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.
|
|
|
1851 </p>
|
|
|
1852 <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p8"> This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude
|
|
|
1853 are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured
|
|
|
1854 by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude
|
|
|
1855 in nature is created; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator;
|
|
|
1856 for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible
|
|
|
1857 for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite multitude is possible; because
|
|
|
1858 the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number of
|
|
|
1859 things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach
|
|
|
1860 matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition
|
|
|
1861 of multitude.
|
|
|
1862 </p>
|
|
|
1863 <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p9">
|
|
|
1864 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and
|
|
|
1865 not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude
|
|
|
1866 can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity.
|
|
|
1867 </p>
|
|
|
1868 <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p10">
|
|
|
1869 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral
|
|
|
1870 and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.
|
|
|
1871 </p>
|
|
|
1872 <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p11">
|
|
|
1873 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite
|
|
|
1874 number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.
|
|
|
1875 </p>
|
|
|
1876 <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1877 <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p13"></p>
|
|
|
1878 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1879 <a href="summa.FP_Q8.html"></a>
|
|
|
1880 </div>
|
|
|
1881 <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1882 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1883 </div>
|
|
|
1884 <div id="FP_Q8" class="div3">
|
|
|
1885 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1886 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1887 <h3 id="FP_Q8-p0.1">THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1888 <p id="FP_Q8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1889 <p id="FP_Q8-p2"> Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs
|
|
|
1890 to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:
|
|
|
1891 </p>
|
|
|
1892 <p id="FP_Q8-p3"> (1) Whether God is in all things?</p>
|
|
|
1893 <p id="FP_Q8-p4"> (2) Whether God is everywhere?</p>
|
|
|
1894 <p id="FP_Q8-p5"> (3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?</p>
|
|
|
1895 <p id="FP_Q8-p6"> (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</p>
|
|
|
1896 <div id="FP_Q8_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
1897 <a href="summa.FP_Q8.html"></a>
|
|
|
1898 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1899 <h4 id="FP_Q8_A1-p0.1">Whether God is in all things?</h4>
|
|
|
1900 <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1901 <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1902 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according
|
|
|
1903 to the Psalm (
|
|
|
1904 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.112.4" target="asv">Ps. 112:4</a>), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore God is not in all things.
|
|
|
1905 </p>
|
|
|
1906 <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1907 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore
|
|
|
1908 God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things
|
|
|
1909 are, rather than He is in any place."
|
|
|
1910 </p>
|
|
|
1911 <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1912 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore
|
|
|
1913 His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things.
|
|
|
1914 </p>
|
|
|
1915 <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1916 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (
|
|
|
1917 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:14</a>). Therefore God is not in all things.
|
|
|
1918 </p>
|
|
|
1919 <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1920 <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to
|
|
|
1921 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.12" target="asv"> Is. 26:12, </a> "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things.
|
|
|
1922 </p>
|
|
|
1923 <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p7">
|
|
|
1924 <b>I answer that,</b> God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon
|
|
|
1925 which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved
|
|
|
1926 in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created
|
|
|
1927 being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God
|
|
|
1928 causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is
|
|
|
1929 caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present
|
|
|
1930 to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things
|
|
|
1931 since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (
|
|
|
1932 <a id="FP_Q8_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Hence
|
|
|
1933 it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly.
|
|
|
1934 </p>
|
|
|
1935 <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p8">
|
|
|
1936 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all
|
|
|
1937 things; as was shown above in this article.
|
|
|
1938 </p>
|
|
|
1939 <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1940 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain
|
|
|
1941 those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless,
|
|
|
1942 by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.
|
|
|
1943 </p>
|
|
|
1944 <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p10">
|
|
|
1945 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great
|
|
|
1946 power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself.
|
|
|
1947 But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence
|
|
|
1948 of His own nature.
|
|
|
1949 </p>
|
|
|
1950 <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p11">
|
|
|
1951 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it
|
|
|
1952 is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But in
|
|
|
1953 things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is.
|
|
|
1954 </p>
|
|
|
1955 <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1956 <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p13"></p>
|
|
|
1957 <a href="summa.FP_Q8.html"></a>
|
|
|
1958 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1959 </div>
|
|
|
1960 <div id="FP_Q8_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1961 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1962 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1963 <h4 id="FP_Q8_A2-p0.1">Whether God is everywhere?</h4>
|
|
|
1964 <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1965 <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1966 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong
|
|
|
1967 to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not
|
|
|
1968 in a place." Therefore God is not everywhere.
|
|
|
1969 </p>
|
|
|
1970 <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1971 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part
|
|
|
1972 of action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent
|
|
|
1973 things be in every place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many places; and thus
|
|
|
1974 He is not everywhere.
|
|
|
1975 </p>
|
|
|
1976 <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1977 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He
|
|
|
1978 has no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere.
|
|
|
1979 </p>
|
|
|
1980 <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1981 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (
|
|
|
1982 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.23.24" target="asv">Jer. 23:24</a>).
|
|
|
1983 </p>
|
|
|
1984 <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1985 <b>I answer that,</b> Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things---i.e. as one
|
|
|
1986 thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place;
|
|
|
1987 and thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere.
|
|
|
1988 First, as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every
|
|
|
1989 place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills
|
|
|
1990 every place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another
|
|
|
1991 body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being
|
|
|
1992 to the things that fill every place, He Himself fills every place.
|
|
|
1993 </p>
|
|
|
1994 <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p7">
|
|
|
1995 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.
|
|
|
1996 </p>
|
|
|
1997 <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1998 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession;
|
|
|
1999 and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place,
|
|
|
2000 or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or
|
|
|
2001 action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is
|
|
|
2002 outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called
|
|
|
2003 indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power;
|
|
|
2004 hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is
|
|
|
2005 in one or in many places, and in a small or large place.
|
|
|
2006 </p>
|
|
|
2007 <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2008 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter
|
|
|
2009 are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity
|
|
|
2010 into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that
|
|
|
2011 place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of
|
|
|
2012 the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate
|
|
|
2013 to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at
|
|
|
2014 all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole
|
|
|
2015 in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it
|
|
|
2016 is
|
|
|
2017 found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally,
|
|
|
2018 then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves
|
|
|
2019 or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the
|
|
|
2020 body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.
|
|
|
2021 </p>
|
|
|
2022 <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2023 <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2024 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2025 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2026 </div>
|
|
|
2027 <div id="FP_Q8_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
2028 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2029 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2030 <h4 id="FP_Q8_A3-p0.1">Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?</h4>
|
|
|
2031 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2032 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p2">
|
|
|
2033 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power.
|
|
|
2034 For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to
|
|
|
2035 the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and power.
|
|
|
2036 </p>
|
|
|
2037 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p3">
|
|
|
2038 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His
|
|
|
2039 essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the
|
|
|
2040 same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power.
|
|
|
2041 </p>
|
|
|
2042 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p4">
|
|
|
2043 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it
|
|
|
2044 is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power.
|
|
|
2045 </p>
|
|
|
2046 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p5">
|
|
|
2047 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore
|
|
|
2048 if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought
|
|
|
2049 to be a special mode of God's existence in things.
|
|
|
2050 </p>
|
|
|
2051 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p6">
|
|
|
2052 <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that, "God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and substance;
|
|
|
2053 still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].
|
|
|
2054 </p>
|
|
|
2055 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p7">
|
|
|
2056 <b>I answer that,</b> God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things
|
|
|
2057 created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations
|
|
|
2058 of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second
|
|
|
2059 way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or
|
|
|
2060 habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later
|
|
|
2061 <a id="FP_Q8_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12.html">(Q[12])</a>. He is said to be thus in the saints by grace.
|
|
|
2062 </p>
|
|
|
2063 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p8"> But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in
|
|
|
2064 the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other
|
|
|
2065 things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not
|
|
|
2066 be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that
|
|
|
2067 place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were
|
|
|
2068 subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore
|
|
|
2069 against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.
|
|
|
2070 </p>
|
|
|
2071 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p9"> But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence
|
|
|
2072 extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and
|
|
|
2073 He doth not consider our things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]" (
|
|
|
2074 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Job.22.14" target="asv">Job 22:14</a>). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His presence.
|
|
|
2075 </p>
|
|
|
2076 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p10"> Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's providence, still all things are not immediately created
|
|
|
2077 by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to
|
|
|
2078 say that He is in all things by His essence.
|
|
|
2079 </p>
|
|
|
2080 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p11"> Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all
|
|
|
2081 things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all
|
|
|
2082 as the cause of their being.
|
|
|
2083 </p>
|
|
|
2084 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p12">
|
|
|
2085 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence;
|
|
|
2086 but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being.
|
|
|
2087 </p>
|
|
|
2088 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p13">
|
|
|
2089 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown
|
|
|
2090 in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.
|
|
|
2091 </p>
|
|
|
2092 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p14">
|
|
|
2093 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills.
|
|
|
2094 Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another;
|
|
|
2095 hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to
|
|
|
2096 another.
|
|
|
2097 </p>
|
|
|
2098 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p15">
|
|
|
2099 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore
|
|
|
2100 only grace constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's existence
|
|
|
2101 in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (TP).
|
|
|
2102 </p>
|
|
|
2103 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p16"></p>
|
|
|
2104 <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p17"></p>
|
|
|
2105 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2106 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2107 </div>
|
|
|
2108 <div id="FP_Q8_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
2109 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2110 <a href="summa.FP_Q9.html"></a>
|
|
|
2111 <h4 id="FP_Q8_A4-p0.1">Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</h4>
|
|
|
2112 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2113 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p2">
|
|
|
2114 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i),
|
|
|
2115 is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as
|
|
|
2116 appears from what is said above
|
|
|
2117 <a id="FP_Q8_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
|
|
|
2118 </p>
|
|
|
2119 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p3">
|
|
|
2120 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom
|
|
|
2121 (
|
|
|
2122 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere.
|
|
|
2123 </p>
|
|
|
2124 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p4">
|
|
|
2125 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body" (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because
|
|
|
2126 there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
|
|
|
2127 </p>
|
|
|
2128 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p5">
|
|
|
2129 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere
|
|
|
2130 does not appear to belong to God alone.
|
|
|
2131 </p>
|
|
|
2132 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p6">
|
|
|
2133 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts."
|
|
|
2134 Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong
|
|
|
2135 to God alone.
|
|
|
2136 </p>
|
|
|
2137 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p7">
|
|
|
2138 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, as Augustine says (
|
|
|
2139 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 137</a>), "The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as it were everywhere:
|
|
|
2140 for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere.
|
|
|
2141 </p>
|
|
|
2142 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p8">
|
|
|
2143 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and
|
|
|
2144 always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"
|
|
|
2145 </p>
|
|
|
2146 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p9">
|
|
|
2147 <b>I answer that,</b> To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its
|
|
|
2148 whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily
|
|
|
2149 everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white
|
|
|
2150 teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is
|
|
|
2151 everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as
|
|
|
2152 a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere
|
|
|
2153 absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of
|
|
|
2154 places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should
|
|
|
2155 be
|
|
|
2156 in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and
|
|
|
2157 is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of
|
|
|
2158 Him, but as to His very self.
|
|
|
2159 </p>
|
|
|
2160 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p10">
|
|
|
2161 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.
|
|
|
2162 </p>
|
|
|
2163 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p11">
|
|
|
2164 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part
|
|
|
2165 of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.
|
|
|
2166 </p>
|
|
|
2167 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p12">
|
|
|
2168 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according
|
|
|
2169 to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would
|
|
|
2170 not be in them.
|
|
|
2171 </p>
|
|
|
2172 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p13">
|
|
|
2173 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts.
|
|
|
2174 </p>
|
|
|
2175 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p14">
|
|
|
2176 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.
|
|
|
2177 </p>
|
|
|
2178 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p15">
|
|
|
2179 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere" determines
|
|
|
2180 the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens;
|
|
|
2181 and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live
|
|
|
2182 and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another
|
|
|
2183 sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it
|
|
|
2184 is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it
|
|
|
2185 does not follow that it is everywhere.
|
|
|
2186 </p>
|
|
|
2187 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p16"></p>
|
|
|
2188 <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p17"></p>
|
|
|
2189 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2190 <a href="summa.FP_Q9.html"></a>
|
|
|
2191 </div>
|
|
|
2192 <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2193 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2194 </div>
|
|
|
2195 <div id="FP_Q9" class="div3">
|
|
|
2196 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2197 <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2198 <h3 id="FP_Q9-p0.1">THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
2199 <p id="FP_Q9-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2200 <p id="FP_Q9-p2"> We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of God there are
|
|
|
2201 two points of inquiry:
|
|
|
2202 </p>
|
|
|
2203 <p id="FP_Q9-p3"> (1) Whether God is altogether immutable?</p>
|
|
|
2204 <p id="FP_Q9-p4"> (2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</p>
|
|
|
2205 <div id="FP_Q9_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
2206 <a href="summa.FP_Q9.html"></a>
|
|
|
2207 <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2208 <h4 id="FP_Q9_A1-p0.1">Whether God is altogether immutable?</h4>
|
|
|
2209 <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2210 <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p2">
|
|
|
2211 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen.
|
|
|
2212 ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable.
|
|
|
2213 </p>
|
|
|
2214 <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p3">
|
|
|
2215 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active [Vulg.'mobilior']" (
|
|
|
2216 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.24" target="asv">Wis. 7:24</a>). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.
|
|
|
2217 </p>
|
|
|
2218 <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p4">
|
|
|
2219 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will
|
|
|
2220 draw nigh to you" (
|
|
|
2221 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.8" target="asv">James 4:8</a>). Therefore God is mutable.
|
|
|
2222 </p>
|
|
|
2223 <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p5">
|
|
|
2224 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not" (
|
|
|
2225 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.3.6" target="asv">Malachi 3:6</a>).
|
|
|
2226 </p>
|
|
|
2227 <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p6">
|
|
|
2228 <b>I answer that,</b> From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first
|
|
|
2229 being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason
|
|
|
2230 that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality.
|
|
|
2231 Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.
|
|
|
2232 Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness
|
|
|
2233 to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be
|
|
|
2234 found. But it has been shown above (
|
|
|
2235 <a id="FP_Q9_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly,
|
|
|
2236 because everything which is moved acquires something
|
|
|
2237 by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all
|
|
|
2238 the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not
|
|
|
2239 extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth,
|
|
|
2240 decided that the first principle was immovable.
|
|
|
2241 </p>
|
|
|
2242 <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p7">
|
|
|
2243 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a
|
|
|
2244 movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands
|
|
|
2245 and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing
|
|
|
2246 existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.
|
|
|
2247 </p>
|
|
|
2248 <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p8">
|
|
|
2249 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for
|
|
|
2250 nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective
|
|
|
2251 and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the
|
|
|
2252 similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which
|
|
|
2253 participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to
|
|
|
2254 be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch
|
|
|
2255 as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of
|
|
|
2256 the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light.
|
|
|
2257 </p>
|
|
|
2258 <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p9">
|
|
|
2259 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according
|
|
|
2260 as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness,
|
|
|
2261 or decline from Him.
|
|
|
2262 </p>
|
|
|
2263 <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2264 <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2265 <a href="summa.FP_Q9.html"></a>
|
|
|
2266 <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2267 </div>
|
|
|
2268 <div id="FP_Q9_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
2269 <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2270 <a href="summa.FP_Q10.html"></a>
|
|
|
2271 <h4 id="FP_Q9_A2-p0.1">Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</h4>
|
|
|
2272 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2273 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p2">
|
|
|
2274 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in everything
|
|
|
2275 which is moved." But, according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be
|
|
|
2276 immutable does not belong to God alone.
|
|
|
2277 </p>
|
|
|
2278 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p3">
|
|
|
2279 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion.
|
|
|
2280 But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are
|
|
|
2281 immovable.
|
|
|
2282 </p>
|
|
|
2283 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p4">
|
|
|
2284 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is
|
|
|
2285 essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable.
|
|
|
2286 </p>
|
|
|
2287 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p5">
|
|
|
2288 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable."
|
|
|
2289 </p>
|
|
|
2290 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2291 <b>I answer that,</b> God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable thing
|
|
|
2292 can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed,
|
|
|
2293 were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could
|
|
|
2294 produce them into existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence
|
|
|
2295 depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them
|
|
|
2296 otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing,
|
|
|
2297 as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed
|
|
|
2298 in themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In
|
|
|
2299 this way therefore, by the power of another---namely, of God---they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing
|
|
|
2300 by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence.
|
|
|
2301 </p>
|
|
|
2302 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p7"> If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every
|
|
|
2303 creature has a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection
|
|
|
2304 either in being, or in attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being,
|
|
|
2305 in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent
|
|
|
2306 with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter
|
|
|
2307 can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist
|
|
|
2308 with privation of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with "not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed
|
|
|
2309 from white to not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject,
|
|
|
2310 then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that
|
|
|
2311 kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation
|
|
|
2312 of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial
|
|
|
2313 being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place. On the
|
|
|
2314 other hand incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality
|
|
|
2315 to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts
|
|
|
2316 except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of substances are
|
|
|
2317 immutable and invariable as regards their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual
|
|
|
2318 created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances."
|
|
|
2319 Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is
|
|
|
2320 in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place,
|
|
|
2321 inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills
|
|
|
2322 all places, as was shown above (
|
|
|
2323 <a id="FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html">Q[8], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
2324 </p>
|
|
|
2325 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p8"> Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible;
|
|
|
2326 or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application
|
|
|
2327 of their powers to divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by
|
|
|
2328 the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in
|
|
|
2329 none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable.
|
|
|
2330 </p>
|
|
|
2331 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2332 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such movement.
|
|
|
2333 </p>
|
|
|
2334 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p10">
|
|
|
2335 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine power;
|
|
|
2336 nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.
|
|
|
2337 </p>
|
|
|
2338 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p11">
|
|
|
2339 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation because
|
|
|
2340 by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings
|
|
|
2341 as though they were the subject of being, but because through them something has being.
|
|
|
2342 </p>
|
|
|
2343 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2344 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
2345 <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p14"></p>
|
|
|
2346 <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2347 <a href="summa.FP_Q10.html"></a>
|
|
|
2348 </div>
|
|
|
2349 <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2350 <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2351 </div>
|
|
|
2352 <div id="FP_Q10" class="div3">
|
|
|
2353 <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2354 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2355 <h3 id="FP_Q10-p0.1">THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
2356 <p id="FP_Q10-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2357 <p id="FP_Q10-p2"> We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
2358 <p id="FP_Q10-p3"> (1) What is eternity?</p>
|
|
|
2359 <p id="FP_Q10-p4"> (2) Whether God is eternal?</p>
|
|
|
2360 <p id="FP_Q10-p5"> (3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</p>
|
|
|
2361 <p id="FP_Q10-p6"> (4) Whether eternity differs from time?</p>
|
|
|
2362 <p id="FP_Q10-p7"> (5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity?</p>
|
|
|
2363 <p id="FP_Q10-p8"> (6) Whether there is only one aeviternity?</p>
|
|
|
2364 <div id="FP_Q10_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
2365 <a href="summa.FP_Q10.html"></a>
|
|
|
2366 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2367 <h4 id="FP_Q10_A1-p0.1">Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"?</h4>
|
|
|
2368 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2369 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p2">
|
|
|
2370 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole
|
|
|
2371 and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to
|
|
|
2372 what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought
|
|
|
2373 not to be found.
|
|
|
2374 </p>
|
|
|
2375 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p3">
|
|
|
2376 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word
|
|
|
2377 "life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word "existence."
|
|
|
2378 </p>
|
|
|
2379 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p4">
|
|
|
2380 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be
|
|
|
2381 "whole."
|
|
|
2382 </p>
|
|
|
2383 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p5">
|
|
|
2384 <b>Objection 4:</b> Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural,
|
|
|
2385 for it is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (
|
|
|
2386 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mic.5.2" target="asv">Micah 5:2</a>); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" (
|
|
|
2387 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.16.25" target="asv">Rom. 16:25</a>). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.
|
|
|
2388 </p>
|
|
|
2389 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p6">
|
|
|
2390 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described
|
|
|
2391 as "perfect."
|
|
|
2392 </p>
|
|
|
2393 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p7">
|
|
|
2394 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.
|
|
|
2395 </p>
|
|
|
2396 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p8">
|
|
|
2397 <b>I answer that,</b> As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by
|
|
|
2398 means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and "after." For since succession occurs in every
|
|
|
2399 movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time,
|
|
|
2400 which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft
|
|
|
2401 of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering
|
|
|
2402 of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists
|
|
|
2403 the idea of eternity.
|
|
|
2404 </p>
|
|
|
2405 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p9"> Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which
|
|
|
2406 is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has
|
|
|
2407 no beginning, and no end.
|
|
|
2408 </p>
|
|
|
2409 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p10"> Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end
|
|
|
2410 (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole.
|
|
|
2411 </p>
|
|
|
2412 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p11">
|
|
|
2413 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken
|
|
|
2414 as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain
|
|
|
2415 to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.
|
|
|
2416 </p>
|
|
|
2417 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p12">
|
|
|
2418 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now
|
|
|
2419 the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.
|
|
|
2420 </p>
|
|
|
2421 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p13">
|
|
|
2422 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.
|
|
|
2423 </p>
|
|
|
2424 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p14">
|
|
|
2425 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously
|
|
|
2426 whole, is called by names implying time and succession.
|
|
|
2427 </p>
|
|
|
2428 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p15">
|
|
|
2429 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence
|
|
|
2430 the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now"
|
|
|
2431 of time.
|
|
|
2432 </p>
|
|
|
2433 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p16">
|
|
|
2434 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we
|
|
|
2435 use the word "possession."
|
|
|
2436 </p>
|
|
|
2437 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p17"></p>
|
|
|
2438 <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p18"></p>
|
|
|
2439 <a href="summa.FP_Q10.html"></a>
|
|
|
2440 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2441 </div>
|
|
|
2442 <div id="FP_Q10_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
2443 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2444 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2445 <h4 id="FP_Q10_A2-p0.1">Whether God is eternal?</h4>
|
|
|
2446 <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2447 <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p2">
|
|
|
2448 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now
|
|
|
2449 that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that
|
|
|
2450 God is the author of eternity." Therefore God is not eternal.
|
|
|
2451 </p>
|
|
|
2452 <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p3">
|
|
|
2453 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God
|
|
|
2454 is before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay:
|
|
|
2455 'for ever and ever']" (
|
|
|
2456 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.18" target="asv">Ex. 15:18</a>). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.
|
|
|
2457 </p>
|
|
|
2458 <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p4">
|
|
|
2459 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be
|
|
|
2460 eternal.
|
|
|
2461 </p>
|
|
|
2462 <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p5">
|
|
|
2463 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding
|
|
|
2464 article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.
|
|
|
2465 </p>
|
|
|
2466 <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2467 <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal."
|
|
|
2468 </p>
|
|
|
2469 <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p7">
|
|
|
2470 <b>I answer that,</b> The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence,
|
|
|
2471 as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity;
|
|
|
2472 whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as
|
|
|
2473 He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity.
|
|
|
2474 </p>
|
|
|
2475 <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p8">
|
|
|
2476 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused
|
|
|
2477 in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending
|
|
|
2478 the "now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of eternity," this is to be understood of participated
|
|
|
2479 eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He
|
|
|
2480 communicates His immutability.
|
|
|
2481 </p>
|
|
|
2482 <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2483 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by
|
|
|
2484 immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that "intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of
|
|
|
2485 Exodus, "The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is
|
|
|
2486 said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age,
|
|
|
2487 i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo
|
|
|
2488 i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement
|
|
|
2489 of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously
|
|
|
2490 whole.
|
|
|
2491 </p>
|
|
|
2492 <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p10">
|
|
|
2493 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea
|
|
|
2494 of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone.
|
|
|
2495 </p>
|
|
|
2496 <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p11">
|
|
|
2497 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered
|
|
|
2498 through present, past and future.
|
|
|
2499 </p>
|
|
|
2500 <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2501 <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
2502 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2503 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2504 </div>
|
|
|
2505 <div id="FP_Q10_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
2506 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2507 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2508 <h4 id="FP_Q10_A3-p0.1">Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</h4>
|
|
|
2509 <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2510 <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p2">
|
|
|
2511 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice,"
|
|
|
2512 shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all eternity']" (
|
|
|
2513 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.12.3" target="asv">Dan. 12:3</a>). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.
|
|
|
2514 </p>
|
|
|
2515 <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p3">
|
|
|
2516 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" (
|
|
|
2517 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv">Mat. 25:41</a>). Therefore God is not the only eternal.
|
|
|
2518 </p>
|
|
|
2519 <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p4">
|
|
|
2520 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration
|
|
|
2521 and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal.
|
|
|
2522 </p>
|
|
|
2523 <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p5">
|
|
|
2524 <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal.
|
|
|
2525 Therefore God is the only one eternal.
|
|
|
2526 </p>
|
|
|
2527 <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p6">
|
|
|
2528 <b>I answer that,</b> Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first
|
|
|
2529 article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above (
|
|
|
2530 <a id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability
|
|
|
2531 from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever"
|
|
|
2532 (
|
|
|
2533 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.4" target="asv">Eccles. 1:4</a>). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature
|
|
|
2534 corruptible; thus (
|
|
|
2535 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.75.5" target="asv">Ps. 75:5</a>) the hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal hills." (
|
|
|
2536 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.33.15" target="asv">Dt. 33:15</a>). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in
|
|
|
2537 being or further still in operation; like the angels, and
|
|
|
2538 the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as
|
|
|
2539 Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, "This is eternal
|
|
|
2540 life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. (
|
|
|
2541 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.5" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>).
|
|
|
2542 </p>
|
|
|
2543 <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p7">
|
|
|
2544 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.
|
|
|
2545 </p>
|
|
|
2546 <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p8">
|
|
|
2547 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according
|
|
|
2548 to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters" (
|
|
|
2549 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.24.19" target="asv">Job 24:19</a>). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for
|
|
|
2550 ever" (
|
|
|
2551 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.80.16" target="asv">Ps. 80:16</a>).
|
|
|
2552 </p>
|
|
|
2553 <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p9">
|
|
|
2554 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore
|
|
|
2555 in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone;
|
|
|
2556 hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
|
|
|
2557 </p>
|
|
|
2558 <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2559 <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2560 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2561 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2562 </div>
|
|
|
2563 <div id="FP_Q10_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
2564 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2565 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2566 <h4 id="FP_Q10_A4-p0.1">Whether eternity differs from time?</h4>
|
|
|
2567 <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2568 <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p2">
|
|
|
2569 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part
|
|
|
2570 of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together,
|
|
|
2571 considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration.
|
|
|
2572 Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and
|
|
|
2573 includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.
|
|
|
2574 </p>
|
|
|
2575 <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p3">
|
|
|
2576 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature
|
|
|
2577 of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now"
|
|
|
2578 of time. But the "now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different
|
|
|
2579 from time.
|
|
|
2580 </p>
|
|
|
2581 <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p4">
|
|
|
2582 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that
|
|
|
2583 the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being---that is, of the divine
|
|
|
2584 being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore
|
|
|
2585 is either eternity or is a part of eternity.
|
|
|
2586 </p>
|
|
|
2587 <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p5">
|
|
|
2588 <b>On the contrary,</b> Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a "before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing.
|
|
|
2589 </p>
|
|
|
2590 <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p6">
|
|
|
2591 <b>I answer that,</b> It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither
|
|
|
2592 beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute
|
|
|
2593 difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement
|
|
|
2594 of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity
|
|
|
2595 and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied
|
|
|
2596 to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the
|
|
|
2597 aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some
|
|
|
2598 reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of
|
|
|
2599 the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not
|
|
|
2600 measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time.
|
|
|
2601 </p>
|
|
|
2602 <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p7"> Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities;
|
|
|
2603 because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering
|
|
|
2604 its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these
|
|
|
2605 differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is
|
|
|
2606 simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.
|
|
|
2607 </p>
|
|
|
2608 <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p8">
|
|
|
2609 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case
|
|
|
2610 when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity.
|
|
|
2611 </p>
|
|
|
2612 <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p9">
|
|
|
2613 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch
|
|
|
2614 as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject
|
|
|
2615 in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the "now"
|
|
|
2616 as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject
|
|
|
2617 and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.
|
|
|
2618 </p>
|
|
|
2619 <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p10">
|
|
|
2620 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as
|
|
|
2621 any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore
|
|
|
2622 the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not
|
|
|
2623 only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only
|
|
|
2624 measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.
|
|
|
2625 </p>
|
|
|
2626 <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2627 <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2628 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2629 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2630 </div>
|
|
|
2631 <div id="FP_Q10_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
2632 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2633 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
2634 <h4 id="FP_Q10_A5-p0.1">The difference of aeviternity and time</h4>
|
|
|
2635 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2636 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p2">
|
|
|
2637 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the spiritual
|
|
|
2638 through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
|
|
|
2639 </p>
|
|
|
2640 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p3">
|
|
|
2641 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and "after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole,
|
|
|
2642 as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (
|
|
|
2643 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:1</a>) that eternal "Wisdom is before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after"; and thus it
|
|
|
2644 is the same as time.
|
|
|
2645 </p>
|
|
|
2646 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p4">
|
|
|
2647 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference
|
|
|
2648 between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows
|
|
|
2649 that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.
|
|
|
2650 </p>
|
|
|
2651 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p5">
|
|
|
2652 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously
|
|
|
2653 whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from
|
|
|
2654 time.
|
|
|
2655 </p>
|
|
|
2656 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p6">
|
|
|
2657 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity."
|
|
|
2658 </p>
|
|
|
2659 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p7">
|
|
|
2660 <b>I answer that,</b> Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to
|
|
|
2661 consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning
|
|
|
2662 and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if
|
|
|
2663 aeviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they
|
|
|
2664 might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished
|
|
|
2665 from eternity, and from time.
|
|
|
2666 </p>
|
|
|
2667 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p8"> Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that
|
|
|
2668 time has both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has "before" and "after" without innovation and
|
|
|
2669 veteration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred
|
|
|
2670 to the measure itself. For since "before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity has
|
|
|
2671 "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity
|
|
|
2672 must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to the
|
|
|
2673 things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has
|
|
|
2674 a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure,
|
|
|
2675 as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes
|
|
|
2676 from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain "before" and "after." We say then that since eternity
|
|
|
2677 is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now
|
|
|
2678 some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these
|
|
|
2679 things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from
|
|
|
2680 permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they
|
|
|
2681 have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of
|
|
|
2682 which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels,
|
|
|
2683 who have
|
|
|
2684 an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of
|
|
|
2685 intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean
|
|
|
2686 between eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this
|
|
|
2687 way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no "before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it;
|
|
|
2688 while eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such at all.
|
|
|
2689 </p>
|
|
|
2690 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p9">
|
|
|
2691 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen.
|
|
|
2692 ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are
|
|
|
2693 measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity.
|
|
|
2694 </p>
|
|
|
2695 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p10">
|
|
|
2696 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.
|
|
|
2697 </p>
|
|
|
2698 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p11">
|
|
|
2699 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental
|
|
|
2700 change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation
|
|
|
2701 of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that
|
|
|
2702 an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not
|
|
|
2703 subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence
|
|
|
2704 and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel
|
|
|
2705 not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been.
|
|
|
2706 </p>
|
|
|
2707 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p12">
|
|
|
2708 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying
|
|
|
2709 that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature.
|
|
|
2710 </p>
|
|
|
2711 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p13"></p>
|
|
|
2712 <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p14"></p>
|
|
|
2713 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2714 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
2715 </div>
|
|
|
2716 <div id="FP_Q10_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
2717 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2718 <a href="summa.FP_Q11.html"></a>
|
|
|
2719 <h4 id="FP_Q10_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one aeviternity?</h4>
|
|
|
2720 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2721 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p2">
|
|
|
2722 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power
|
|
|
2723 of ages are with Thee, O Lord."
|
|
|
2724 </p>
|
|
|
2725 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p3">
|
|
|
2726 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly
|
|
|
2727 bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
|
|
|
2728 </p>
|
|
|
2729 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p4">
|
|
|
2730 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all
|
|
|
2731 aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls.
|
|
|
2732 Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
|
|
|
2733 </p>
|
|
|
2734 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p5">
|
|
|
2735 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time
|
|
|
2736 for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal
|
|
|
2737 things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
|
|
|
2738 </p>
|
|
|
2739 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p6">
|
|
|
2740 <b>On the contrary,</b> Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is aeviternity
|
|
|
2741 one only.
|
|
|
2742 </p>
|
|
|
2743 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p7">
|
|
|
2744 <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities.
|
|
|
2745 Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge
|
|
|
2746 of spiritual things.
|
|
|
2747 </p>
|
|
|
2748 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p8"> Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as
|
|
|
2749 time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not
|
|
|
2750 a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for
|
|
|
2751 ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it
|
|
|
2752 exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that
|
|
|
2753 the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that
|
|
|
2754 view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx
|
|
|
2755 of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first
|
|
|
2756 subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which
|
|
|
2757 are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason
|
|
|
2758 why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements
|
|
|
2759 are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as
|
|
|
2760 accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is
|
|
|
2761 to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured.
|
|
|
2762 </p>
|
|
|
2763 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p9"> This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all
|
|
|
2764 proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought.
|
|
|
2765 Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x)
|
|
|
2766 seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the
|
|
|
2767 last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as
|
|
|
2768 there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there
|
|
|
2769 is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the
|
|
|
2770 existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more
|
|
|
2771 simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later (
|
|
|
2772 <a id="FP_Q10_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.
|
|
|
2773 </p>
|
|
|
2774 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p10">
|
|
|
2775 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we
|
|
|
2776 mean ages.
|
|
|
2777 </p>
|
|
|
2778 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p11">
|
|
|
2779 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless
|
|
|
2780 being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.
|
|
|
2781 </p>
|
|
|
2782 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p12">
|
|
|
2783 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured
|
|
|
2784 by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.
|
|
|
2785 </p>
|
|
|
2786 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p13">
|
|
|
2787 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple
|
|
|
2788 than the rest.
|
|
|
2789 </p>
|
|
|
2790 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p14"></p>
|
|
|
2791 <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p15"></p>
|
|
|
2792 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2793 <a href="summa.FP_Q11.html"></a>
|
|
|
2794 </div>
|
|
|
2795 <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2796 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2797 </div>
|
|
|
2798 <div id="FP_Q11" class="div3">
|
|
|
2799 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
2800 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2801 <h3 id="FP_Q11-p0.1">THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
2802 <p id="FP_Q11-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2803 <p id="FP_Q11-p2"> After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
2804 <p id="FP_Q11-p3"> (1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</p>
|
|
|
2805 <p id="FP_Q11-p4"> (2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</p>
|
|
|
2806 <p id="FP_Q11-p5"> (3) Whether God is one?</p>
|
|
|
2807 <p id="FP_Q11-p6"> (4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?</p>
|
|
|
2808 <div id="FP_Q11_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
2809 <a href="summa.FP_Q11.html"></a>
|
|
|
2810 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2811 <h4 id="FP_Q11_A1-p0.1">Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</h4>
|
|
|
2812 <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2813 <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p2">
|
|
|
2814 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates
|
|
|
2815 all "genera." But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore
|
|
|
2816 "one" adds something to "being."
|
|
|
2817 </p>
|
|
|
2818 <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p3">
|
|
|
2819 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many." Therefore
|
|
|
2820 "one" is an addition to "being."
|
|
|
2821 </p>
|
|
|
2822 <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p4">
|
|
|
2823 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and "being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to
|
|
|
2824 call "being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so to call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one"
|
|
|
2825 is an addition to "being."
|
|
|
2826 </p>
|
|
|
2827 <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p5">
|
|
|
2828 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an
|
|
|
2829 addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is not an addition to "being."
|
|
|
2830 </p>
|
|
|
2831 <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p6">
|
|
|
2832 <b>I answer that,</b> "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is
|
|
|
2833 the very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided,
|
|
|
2834 both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up
|
|
|
2835 and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision;
|
|
|
2836 and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being.
|
|
|
2837 </p>
|
|
|
2838 <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p7">
|
|
|
2839 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were divided
|
|
|
2840 into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being,"
|
|
|
2841 but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same applied to the "one" which is the principle of
|
|
|
2842 number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers
|
|
|
2843 were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that "one" which is the principle of number,
|
|
|
2844 added a reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought
|
|
|
2845 that the "one" convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This, however, is
|
|
|
2846 manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its
|
|
|
2847 substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity.
|
|
|
2848 Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with "being," does
|
|
|
2849 not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging
|
|
|
2850 to the genus of quantity.
|
|
|
2851 </p>
|
|
|
2852 <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p8">
|
|
|
2853 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in
|
|
|
2854 number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if
|
|
|
2855 it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as
|
|
|
2856 regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents;
|
|
|
2857 or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such
|
|
|
2858 a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided
|
|
|
2859 absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely
|
|
|
2860 and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being
|
|
|
2861 is divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not
|
|
|
2862 be contained under "being," unless it were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that
|
|
|
2863 "there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what
|
|
|
2864 are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species,
|
|
|
2865 are
|
|
|
2866 one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle."
|
|
|
2867 </p>
|
|
|
2868 <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p9">
|
|
|
2869 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being."
|
|
|
2870 </p>
|
|
|
2871 <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2872 <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2873 <a href="summa.FP_Q11.html"></a>
|
|
|
2874 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2875 </div>
|
|
|
2876 <div id="FP_Q11_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
2877 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2878 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2879 <h4 id="FP_Q11_A2-p0.1">Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</h4>
|
|
|
2880 <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2881 <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p2">
|
|
|
2882 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every "multitude"
|
|
|
2883 is in a certain way "one," as appears from the preceding article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude."
|
|
|
2884 </p>
|
|
|
2885 <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p3">
|
|
|
2886 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But "multitude" is constituted by "one." Therefore it is not opposed
|
|
|
2887 to "multitude."
|
|
|
2888 </p>
|
|
|
2889 <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p4">
|
|
|
2890 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few" is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many."
|
|
|
2891 </p>
|
|
|
2892 <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p5">
|
|
|
2893 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it
|
|
|
2894 as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that "one" comes after "multitude,"
|
|
|
2895 and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence there would be a vicious circle in
|
|
|
2896 the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed.
|
|
|
2897 </p>
|
|
|
2898 <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2899 <b>On the contrary,</b> Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in indivisibility;
|
|
|
2900 and the idea of "multitude" contains division. Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.
|
|
|
2901 </p>
|
|
|
2902 <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p7">
|
|
|
2903 <b>I answer that,</b> "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The "one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which
|
|
|
2904 is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is "multitude"
|
|
|
2905 measured by "one," as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible with "being" is opposed to "multitude" by way
|
|
|
2906 of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided.
|
|
|
2907 </p>
|
|
|
2908 <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p8">
|
|
|
2909 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to
|
|
|
2910 the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality,
|
|
|
2911 the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or
|
|
|
2912 of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and
|
|
|
2913 to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity
|
|
|
2914 is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being
|
|
|
2915 is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is
|
|
|
2916 relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being
|
|
|
2917 in
|
|
|
2918 the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good
|
|
|
2919 is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely "one" is relatively "many," and vice versa.
|
|
|
2920 </p>
|
|
|
2921 <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2922 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A "whole" is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed
|
|
|
2923 of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance,
|
|
|
2924 every part of water is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous
|
|
|
2925 whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole;
|
|
|
2926 as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole.
|
|
|
2927 Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed
|
|
|
2928 of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided, in which way they are opposed
|
|
|
2929 to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings,
|
|
|
2930 not
|
|
|
2931 by the fact that they are not houses.
|
|
|
2932 </p>
|
|
|
2933 <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p10">
|
|
|
2934 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some kind
|
|
|
2935 of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first sense two are many but not in the second sense.
|
|
|
2936 </p>
|
|
|
2937 <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p11">
|
|
|
2938 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to
|
|
|
2939 unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things;
|
|
|
2940 and hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of a line." "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on
|
|
|
2941 "one"; because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude
|
|
|
2942 except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one" is placed in the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude"
|
|
|
2943 is not placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so what first
|
|
|
2944 comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly,
|
|
|
2945 comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.
|
|
|
2946 </p>
|
|
|
2947 <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2948 <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
2949 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2950 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2951 </div>
|
|
|
2952 <div id="FP_Q11_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
2953 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2954 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2955 <h4 id="FP_Q11_A3-p0.1">Whether God is one?</h4>
|
|
|
2956 <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2957 <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p2">
|
|
|
2958 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For there be many gods and many lords" (
|
|
|
2959 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q11_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:5</a>).
|
|
|
2960 </p>
|
|
|
2961 <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p3">
|
|
|
2962 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise,
|
|
|
2963 neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation
|
|
|
2964 is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.
|
|
|
2965 </p>
|
|
|
2966 <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p4">
|
|
|
2967 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord" (
|
|
|
2968 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q11_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.4" target="asv">Dt. 6:4</a>).
|
|
|
2969 </p>
|
|
|
2970 <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p5">
|
|
|
2971 <b>I answer that,</b> It can be shown from these three sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why
|
|
|
2972 any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is
|
|
|
2973 a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if
|
|
|
2974 Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many
|
|
|
2975 Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as
|
|
|
2976 was shown above (
|
|
|
2977 <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.
|
|
|
2978 </p>
|
|
|
2979 <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p6"> Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (
|
|
|
2980 <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ
|
|
|
2981 from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one
|
|
|
2982 of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible
|
|
|
2983 for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite
|
|
|
2984 principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle.
|
|
|
2985 </p>
|
|
|
2986 <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p7"> Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since
|
|
|
2987 some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one.
|
|
|
2988 For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the "per se" cause of one, and many are only
|
|
|
2989 the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect,
|
|
|
2990 and is so "per se" and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And
|
|
|
2991 this one is God.
|
|
|
2992 </p>
|
|
|
2993 <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p8">
|
|
|
2994 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars
|
|
|
2995 were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc.
|
|
|
2996 </p>
|
|
|
2997 <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p9">
|
|
|
2998 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "One" which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the principle of
|
|
|
2999 number belongs to the "genus" of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one"
|
|
|
3000 which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there
|
|
|
3001 is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to
|
|
|
3002 us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated
|
|
|
3003 of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one.
|
|
|
3004 </p>
|
|
|
3005 <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3006 <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3007 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3008 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3009 </div>
|
|
|
3010 <div id="FP_Q11_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
3011 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3012 <a href="summa.FP_Q12.html"></a>
|
|
|
3013 <h4 id="FP_Q11_A4-p0.1">Whether God is supremely one?</h4>
|
|
|
3014 <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3015 <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p2">
|
|
|
3016 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not supremely "one." For "one" is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be
|
|
|
3017 greater or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are called "one."
|
|
|
3018 </p>
|
|
|
3019 <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p3">
|
|
|
3020 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity.
|
|
|
3021 But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more "one" than unity is "one" and
|
|
|
3022 a point is "one."
|
|
|
3023 </p>
|
|
|
3024 <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p4">
|
|
|
3025 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially "one" is supremely "one." But every being
|
|
|
3026 is essentially "one," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely "one"; and therefore God is
|
|
|
3027 not "one" more than any other being is "one."
|
|
|
3028 </p>
|
|
|
3029 <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p5">
|
|
|
3030 <b>On the contrary,</b> Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place."
|
|
|
3031 </p>
|
|
|
3032 <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p6">
|
|
|
3033 <b>I answer that,</b> Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now
|
|
|
3034 both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it
|
|
|
3035 is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is
|
|
|
3036 divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether
|
|
|
3037 simple, as was shown above (
|
|
|
3038 <a id="FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme degree.
|
|
|
3039 </p>
|
|
|
3040 <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p7">
|
|
|
3041 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to
|
|
|
3042 more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more
|
|
|
3043 divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, "one."
|
|
|
3044 </p>
|
|
|
3045 <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p8">
|
|
|
3046 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject.
|
|
|
3047 Hence neither of them can be supremely "one." For as a subject cannot be supremely "one," because of the difference within
|
|
|
3048 it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.
|
|
|
3049 </p>
|
|
|
3050 <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p9">
|
|
|
3051 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every being is "one" by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance
|
|
|
3052 of some things is compound and of others simple.
|
|
|
3053 </p>
|
|
|
3054 <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3055 <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3056 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3057 <a href="summa.FP_Q12.html"></a>
|
|
|
3058 </div>
|
|
|
3059 <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
3060 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3061 </div>
|
|
|
3062 <div id="FP_Q12" class="div3">
|
|
|
3063 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3064 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3065 <h3 id="FP_Q12-p0.1">HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
3066 <p id="FP_Q12-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3067 <p id="FP_Q12-p2"> As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of
|
|
|
3068 creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry:
|
|
|
3069 </p>
|
|
|
3070 <p id="FP_Q12-p3"> (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</p>
|
|
|
3071 <p id="FP_Q12-p4"> (2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image?</p>
|
|
|
3072 <p id="FP_Q12-p5"> (3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?</p>
|
|
|
3073 <p id="FP_Q12-p6"> (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God?</p>
|
|
|
3074 <p id="FP_Q12-p7"> (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</p>
|
|
|
3075 <p id="FP_Q12-p8"> (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another?</p>
|
|
|
3076 <p id="FP_Q12-p9"> (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?</p>
|
|
|
3077 <p id="FP_Q12-p10"> (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it?</p>
|
|
|
3078 <p id="FP_Q12-p11"> (9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?</p>
|
|
|
3079 <p id="FP_Q12-p12"> (10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?</p>
|
|
|
3080 <p id="FP_Q12-p13"> (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God?</p>
|
|
|
3081 <p id="FP_Q12-p14"> (12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?</p>
|
|
|
3082 <p id="FP_Q12-p15"> (13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?</p>
|
|
|
3083 <div id="FP_Q12_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
3084 <a href="summa.FP_Q12.html"></a>
|
|
|
3085 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3086 <h4 id="FP_Q12_A1-p0.1">Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</h4>
|
|
|
3087 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3088 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p2">
|
|
|
3089 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on
|
|
|
3090 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv"> Jn. 1:18, </a> "No man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can
|
|
|
3091 a creature see what is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God: "Neither is there sense, nor image,
|
|
|
3092 nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him."
|
|
|
3093 </p>
|
|
|
3094 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p3">
|
|
|
3095 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above (
|
|
|
3096 <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore in Himself He is unknown.
|
|
|
3097 </p>
|
|
|
3098 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p4">
|
|
|
3099 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is
|
|
|
3100 being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God
|
|
|
3101 is not intelligible; but above all intellect.
|
|
|
3102 </p>
|
|
|
3103 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p5">
|
|
|
3104 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower.
|
|
|
3105 But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore
|
|
|
3106 the created intellect cannot see the essence of God.
|
|
|
3107 </p>
|
|
|
3108 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p6">
|
|
|
3109 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (
|
|
|
3110 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>).
|
|
|
3111 </p>
|
|
|
3112 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p7">
|
|
|
3113 <b>I answer that,</b> Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in
|
|
|
3114 Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account
|
|
|
3115 of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot
|
|
|
3116 be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light.
|
|
|
3117 </p>
|
|
|
3118 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p8"> Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is
|
|
|
3119 not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his
|
|
|
3120 intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its
|
|
|
3121 beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of
|
|
|
3122 the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains
|
|
|
3123 to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know
|
|
|
3124 the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could
|
|
|
3125 not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void.
|
|
|
3126 </p>
|
|
|
3127 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p9"> Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.</p>
|
|
|
3128 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p10">
|
|
|
3129 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited,
|
|
|
3130 "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most
|
|
|
3131 certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son."
|
|
|
3132 </p>
|
|
|
3133 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p11">
|
|
|
3134 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the
|
|
|
3135 infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first
|
|
|
3136 way: as appears from what was said above (
|
|
|
3137 <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>).
|
|
|
3138 </p>
|
|
|
3139 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p12">
|
|
|
3140 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as
|
|
|
3141 He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge;
|
|
|
3142 which means that He is not comprehended.
|
|
|
3143 </p>
|
|
|
3144 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p13">
|
|
|
3145 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and
|
|
|
3146 equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this
|
|
|
3147 sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as
|
|
|
3148 potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned
|
|
|
3149 to know God.
|
|
|
3150 </p>
|
|
|
3151 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p14"></p>
|
|
|
3152 <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p15"></p>
|
|
|
3153 <a href="summa.FP_Q12.html"></a>
|
|
|
3154 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3155 </div>
|
|
|
3156 <div id="FP_Q12_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
3157 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3158 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3159 <h4 id="FP_Q12_A2-p0.1">Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image?</h4>
|
|
|
3160 <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3161 <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p2">
|
|
|
3162 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when
|
|
|
3163 He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is" (
|
|
|
3164 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>).
|
|
|
3165 </p>
|
|
|
3166 <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p3">
|
|
|
3167 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us."
|
|
|
3168 </p>
|
|
|
3169 <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p4">
|
|
|
3170 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch
|
|
|
3171 as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood.
|
|
|
3172 Therefore, if God is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some similitude.
|
|
|
3173 </p>
|
|
|
3174 <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p5">
|
|
|
3175 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark manner'],"
|
|
|
3176 "by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God."
|
|
|
3177 But to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind.
|
|
|
3178 Therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude.
|
|
|
3179 </p>
|
|
|
3180 <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p6">
|
|
|
3181 <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision---viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen
|
|
|
3182 with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things
|
|
|
3183 it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone
|
|
|
3184 is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not
|
|
|
3185 there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow
|
|
|
3186 that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing.
|
|
|
3187 </p>
|
|
|
3188 <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p7"> Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellect power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since
|
|
|
3189 the intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness
|
|
|
3190 of Him who is the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it
|
|
|
3191 were, derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection
|
|
|
3192 superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual
|
|
|
3193 faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be
|
|
|
3194 united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
|
|
|
3195 i), "by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known;" as by the likeness of a
|
|
|
3196 body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created
|
|
|
3197 likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above (
|
|
|
3198 <a id="FP_Q12_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God
|
|
|
3199 to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever
|
|
|
3200 can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness;
|
|
|
3201 for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like
|
|
|
3202 thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false.
|
|
|
3203 </p>
|
|
|
3204 <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p8"> Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely,
|
|
|
3205 the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the
|
|
|
3206 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv"> Ps. 35:10, </a> "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the
|
|
|
3207 divine essence itself as it really is.
|
|
|
3208 </p>
|
|
|
3209 <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p9">
|
|
|
3210 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory.
|
|
|
3211 </p>
|
|
|
3212 <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p10">
|
|
|
3213 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.
|
|
|
3214 </p>
|
|
|
3215 <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p11">
|
|
|
3216 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to
|
|
|
3217 the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is
|
|
|
3218 united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of itself.
|
|
|
3219 </p>
|
|
|
3220 <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3221 <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3222 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3223 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3224 </div>
|
|
|
3225 <div id="FP_Q12_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
3226 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3227 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3228 <h4 id="FP_Q12_A3-p0.1">Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?</h4>
|
|
|
3229 <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3230 <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p2">
|
|
|
3231 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written (
|
|
|
3232 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.19.26" target="asv">Job 19:26</a>): "In my flesh I shall see . . . God," and (
|
|
|
3233 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Job.42.5" target="asv">Job 42:5</a>), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee."
|
|
|
3234 </p>
|
|
|
3235 <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p3">
|
|
|
3236 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those eyes" (namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power
|
|
|
3237 of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of
|
|
|
3238 vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things." Now whoever
|
|
|
3239 can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see
|
|
|
3240 God.
|
|
|
3241 </p>
|
|
|
3242 <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p4">
|
|
|
3243 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne,"
|
|
|
3244 etc. (
|
|
|
3245 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen
|
|
|
3246 by a vision of sense.
|
|
|
3247 </p>
|
|
|
3248 <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p5">
|
|
|
3249 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life,
|
|
|
3250 as visible things are seen by corporeal vision."
|
|
|
3251 </p>
|
|
|
3252 <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p6">
|
|
|
3253 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For
|
|
|
3254 every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later
|
|
|
3255 <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78.html">(Q[78])</a>. Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For
|
|
|
3256 God is incorporeal, as was shown above (
|
|
|
3257 <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Hence He cannot be seen by the
|
|
|
3258 sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect.
|
|
|
3259 </p>
|
|
|
3260 <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p7">
|
|
|
3261 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour," do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that
|
|
|
3262 man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood
|
|
|
3263 of the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the
|
|
|
3264 eyes of your heart" may be "enlightened" (
|
|
|
3265 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.17" target="asv">Eph.
|
|
|
3266 1:17,18
|
|
|
3267 </a>).
|
|
|
3268 </p>
|
|
|
3269 <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p8">
|
|
|
3270 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore they will have
|
|
|
3271 an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains
|
|
|
3272 this, saying: "It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see
|
|
|
3273 most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we
|
|
|
3274 now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising
|
|
|
3275 the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it." Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see
|
|
|
3276 God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but
|
|
|
3277 as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some
|
|
|
3278 other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal
|
|
|
3279 things, happens from two causes---viz. from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory
|
|
|
3280 infused into the body after its renovation.
|
|
|
3281 </p>
|
|
|
3282 <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p9">
|
|
|
3283 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God according
|
|
|
3284 to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.
|
|
|
3285 </p>
|
|
|
3286 <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3287 <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3288 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3289 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3290 </div>
|
|
|
3291 <div id="FP_Q12_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
3292 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3293 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
3294 <h4 id="FP_Q12_A4-p0.1">Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?</h4>
|
|
|
3295 <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3296 <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p2">
|
|
|
3297 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
|
|
|
3298 "An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection
|
|
|
3299 is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it seems that by his
|
|
|
3300 own natural power he understands the Divine essence.
|
|
|
3301 </p>
|
|
|
3302 <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p3">
|
|
|
3303 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight.
|
|
|
3304 But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in
|
|
|
3305 like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power,
|
|
|
3306 much more can he understand God.
|
|
|
3307 </p>
|
|
|
3308 <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p4">
|
|
|
3309 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if
|
|
|
3310 to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up
|
|
|
3311 to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above
|
|
|
3312 <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence.
|
|
|
3313 </p>
|
|
|
3314 <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p5">
|
|
|
3315 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting" (
|
|
|
3316 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that
|
|
|
3317 they may know Thee the only true God," etc. (
|
|
|
3318 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>). Therefore to see the essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature.
|
|
|
3319 </p>
|
|
|
3320 <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p6">
|
|
|
3321 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated
|
|
|
3322 according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence
|
|
|
3323 the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the
|
|
|
3324 mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of
|
|
|
3325 the knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being only in this one individual matter; as
|
|
|
3326 all bodies. But others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own existence,
|
|
|
3327 but receive it; and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent
|
|
|
3328 being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form
|
|
|
3329 of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows
|
|
|
3330 things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in
|
|
|
3331 the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures
|
|
|
3332 which exist only in individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted
|
|
|
3333 therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects
|
|
|
3334 as universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in
|
|
|
3335 matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the
|
|
|
3336 body. It follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond
|
|
|
3337 the
|
|
|
3338 natural power of any created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated.
|
|
|
3339 Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect,
|
|
|
3340 as an object made intelligible to it.
|
|
|
3341 </p>
|
|
|
3342 <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p7">
|
|
|
3343 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself.
|
|
|
3344 But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above
|
|
|
3345 <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.
|
|
|
3346 </p>
|
|
|
3347 <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p8">
|
|
|
3348 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought
|
|
|
3349 to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch
|
|
|
3350 as it does not possess the excellence which is in God.
|
|
|
3351 </p>
|
|
|
3352 <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p9">
|
|
|
3353 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic
|
|
|
3354 intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level
|
|
|
3355 by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive
|
|
|
3356 a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to
|
|
|
3357 consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it
|
|
|
3358 resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect
|
|
|
3359 of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect;
|
|
|
3360 since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the created
|
|
|
3361 intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of
|
|
|
3362 resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.
|
|
|
3363 </p>
|
|
|
3364 <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3365 <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3366 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3367 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
3368 </div>
|
|
|
3369 <div id="FP_Q12_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
3370 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3371 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
3372 <h4 id="FP_Q12_A5-p0.1">Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</h4>
|
|
|
3373 <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3374 <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p2">
|
|
|
3375 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself
|
|
|
3376 lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible
|
|
|
3377 things. Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created light.
|
|
|
3378 </p>
|
|
|
3379 <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p3">
|
|
|
3380 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through
|
|
|
3381 a medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.
|
|
|
3382 </p>
|
|
|
3383 <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p4">
|
|
|
3384 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is created can be natural to some creature. Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light,
|
|
|
3385 such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see God;
|
|
|
3386 which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the
|
|
|
3387 essence of God.
|
|
|
3388 </p>
|
|
|
3389 <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p5">
|
|
|
3390 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" (
|
|
|
3391 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>).
|
|
|
3392 </p>
|
|
|
3393 <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p6">
|
|
|
3394 <b>I answer that,</b> Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for
|
|
|
3395 example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created
|
|
|
3396 intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary
|
|
|
3397 that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it
|
|
|
3398 may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to
|
|
|
3399 enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding
|
|
|
3400 should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect,
|
|
|
3401 as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the
|
|
|
3402 Apocalypse (
|
|
|
3403 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.23" target="asv">Apoc. 21:23</a>): "The glory of God hath enlightened it"---viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are made
|
|
|
3404 "deiform"---i.e. like to God, according to the saying: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because']
|
|
|
3405 we shall see Him as He is" (
|
|
|
3406 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>).
|
|
|
3407 </p>
|
|
|
3408 <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p7">
|
|
|
3409 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is
|
|
|
3410 of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler
|
|
|
3411 to act. Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent,
|
|
|
3412 and susceptible of color.
|
|
|
3413 </p>
|
|
|
3414 <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p8">
|
|
|
3415 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect,
|
|
|
3416 strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen,
|
|
|
3417 but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God.
|
|
|
3418 </p>
|
|
|
3419 <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p9">
|
|
|
3420 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural
|
|
|
3421 to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is made
|
|
|
3422 deiform, as is said in this article.
|
|
|
3423 </p>
|
|
|
3424 <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3425 <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3426 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3427 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
3428 </div>
|
|
|
3429 <div id="FP_Q12_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
3430 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
3431 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
3432 <h4 id="FP_Q12_A6-p0.1">Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?</h4>
|
|
|
3433 <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3434 <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p2">
|
|
|
3435 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (
|
|
|
3436 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>): "We shall see Him as He is." But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore
|
|
|
3437 He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.
|
|
|
3438 </p>
|
|
|
3439 <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p3">
|
|
|
3440 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii): "One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than
|
|
|
3441 another." But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense,
|
|
|
3442 as was shown above (A[3] ). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one does not see more clearly than another.
|
|
|
3443 </p>
|
|
|
3444 <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p4">
|
|
|
3445 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object,
|
|
|
3446 or on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received
|
|
|
3447 more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does not apply to the
|
|
|
3448 present question, for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude,
|
|
|
3449 but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference
|
|
|
3450 of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly;
|
|
|
3451 and this is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude.
|
|
|
3452 </p>
|
|
|
3453 <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p5">
|
|
|
3454 <b>On the contrary,</b> Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according to
|
|
|
3455 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally
|
|
|
3456 in eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" (
|
|
|
3457 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41</a>).
|
|
|
3458 </p>
|
|
|
3459 <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p6">
|
|
|
3460 <b>I answer that,</b> Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one
|
|
|
3461 had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any similitude; but it will take
|
|
|
3462 place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty of seeing God, however,
|
|
|
3463 does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of
|
|
|
3464 glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article.
|
|
|
3465 </p>
|
|
|
3466 <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p7"> Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation
|
|
|
3467 of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire
|
|
|
3468 in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more
|
|
|
3469 charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.
|
|
|
3470 </p>
|
|
|
3471 <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p8">
|
|
|
3472 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the words,"We shall see Him as He is," the conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen,
|
|
|
3473 so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it
|
|
|
3474 does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will
|
|
|
3475 be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God's existence.
|
|
|
3476 </p>
|
|
|
3477 <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same
|
|
|
3478 thing better than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for whoever understands it
|
|
|
3479 otherwise than it really is, does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of understanding, for the understanding
|
|
|
3480 of one is more perfect than the understanding of another.
|
|
|
3481 </p>
|
|
|
3482 <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p10">
|
|
|
3483 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all---viz.
|
|
|
3484 the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will
|
|
|
3485 arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.
|
|
|
3486 </p>
|
|
|
3487 <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3488 <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3489 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
3490 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
3491 </div>
|
|
|
3492 <div id="FP_Q12_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
3493 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
3494 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
3495 <h4 id="FP_Q12_A7-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?</h4>
|
|
|
3496 <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3497 <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p2">
|
|
|
3498 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says (
|
|
|
3499 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.12" target="asv">Phil. 3:12</a>): "But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']." But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for
|
|
|
3500 he said (
|
|
|
3501 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.26" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:26</a>): "I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others also, whom he invites
|
|
|
3502 to do the same, saying: "So run that you may
|
|
|
3503 comprehend."
|
|
|
3504 </p>
|
|
|
3505 <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p3">
|
|
|
3506 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it
|
|
|
3507 is hidden from the seer." But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer,
|
|
|
3508 since God is simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.
|
|
|
3509 </p>
|
|
|
3510 <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p4">
|
|
|
3511 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not "wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either
|
|
|
3512 to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode
|
|
|
3513 of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the
|
|
|
3514 seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence.
|
|
|
3515 Therefore all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.
|
|
|
3516 </p>
|
|
|
3517 <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p5">
|
|
|
3518 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible
|
|
|
3519 in thought" (
|
|
|
3520 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.18" target="asv">Jer. 32:18,19</a>). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.
|
|
|
3521 </p>
|
|
|
3522 <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p6">
|
|
|
3523 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great
|
|
|
3524 beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii).
|
|
|
3525 </p>
|
|
|
3526 <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p7"> In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known
|
|
|
3527 so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting
|
|
|
3528 on a probably proof, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle
|
|
|
3529 has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a
|
|
|
3530 probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does
|
|
|
3531 not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to
|
|
|
3532 that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears---Everything
|
|
|
3533 is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above
|
|
|
3534 <a id="FP_Q12_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7.html">(Q[7])</a> is
|
|
|
3535 infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence
|
|
|
3536 more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light
|
|
|
3537 of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know
|
|
|
3538 God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.
|
|
|
3539 </p>
|
|
|
3540 <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p8">
|
|
|
3541 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one
|
|
|
3542 comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite
|
|
|
3543 and cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity.
|
|
|
3544 In this sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension"
|
|
|
3545 is taken more largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains
|
|
|
3546 to him. And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, "I held him, and I will not let him
|
|
|
3547 go" (
|
|
|
3548 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Song.3.4" target="asv">Cant 3:4</a>); in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way "comprehension"
|
|
|
3549 is one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision
|
|
|
3550 responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch
|
|
|
3551 as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy
|
|
|
3552 what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire,
|
|
|
3553 so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him,
|
|
|
3554 possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment
|
|
|
3555 of desire.
|
|
|
3556 </p>
|
|
|
3557 <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p9">
|
|
|
3558 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is
|
|
|
3559 capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any
|
|
|
3560 part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as
|
|
|
3561 it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says
|
|
|
3562 the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries
|
|
|
3563 can be completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge
|
|
|
3564 of it is attained.
|
|
|
3565 </p>
|
|
|
3566 <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p10">
|
|
|
3567 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode
|
|
|
3568 of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely,
|
|
|
3569 and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus,
|
|
|
3570 for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is
|
|
|
3571 demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.
|
|
|
3572 </p>
|
|
|
3573 <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3574 <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3575 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
3576 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
3577 </div>
|
|
|
3578 <div id="FP_Q12_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
3579 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
3580 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
3581 <h4 id="FP_Q12_A8-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?</h4>
|
|
|
3582 <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3583 <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p2">
|
|
|
3584 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see,
|
|
|
3585 who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore those who see God see all things.
|
|
|
3586 </p>
|
|
|
3587 <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p3">
|
|
|
3588 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God
|
|
|
3589 as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all
|
|
|
3590 possible things.
|
|
|
3591 </p>
|
|
|
3592 <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p4">
|
|
|
3593 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or
|
|
|
3594 can do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do.
|
|
|
3595 </p>
|
|
|
3596 <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p5">
|
|
|
3597 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things,
|
|
|
3598 its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore
|
|
|
3599 he who sees God knows all things.
|
|
|
3600 </p>
|
|
|
3601 <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p6">
|
|
|
3602 <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the inferior
|
|
|
3603 angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels." Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret
|
|
|
3604 thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the essence of God, does not know all things.
|
|
|
3605 </p>
|
|
|
3606 <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p7">
|
|
|
3607 <b>I answer that,</b> The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that
|
|
|
3608 things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore
|
|
|
3609 all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the
|
|
|
3610 more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon
|
|
|
3611 as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a
|
|
|
3612 weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a
|
|
|
3613 cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect
|
|
|
3614 can comprehend God wholly, as shown above
|
|
|
3615 <a id="FP_Q12_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know
|
|
|
3616 all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know
|
|
|
3617 the more, the more perfectly it sees God.
|
|
|
3618 </p>
|
|
|
3619 <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p8">
|
|
|
3620 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth
|
|
|
3621 all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.
|
|
|
3622 </p>
|
|
|
3623 <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p9">
|
|
|
3624 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror
|
|
|
3625 itself.
|
|
|
3626 </p>
|
|
|
3627 <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p10">
|
|
|
3628 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are
|
|
|
3629 known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been
|
|
|
3630 shown in this article that the more things are known in God according as He is seen more or less perfectly.
|
|
|
3631 </p>
|
|
|
3632 <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p11">
|
|
|
3633 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely,
|
|
|
3634 the species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But
|
|
|
3635 to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does
|
|
|
3636 its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know
|
|
|
3637 things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle
|
|
|
3638 of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the
|
|
|
3639 seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures)
|
|
|
3640 "and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is
|
|
|
3641 not the happier for them, but for Thee alone."
|
|
|
3642 </p>
|
|
|
3643 <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3644 <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3645 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
3646 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
3647 </div>
|
|
|
3648 <div id="FP_Q12_A9" class="div4">
|
|
|
3649 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
3650 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
3651 <h4 id="FP_Q12_A9-p0.1">Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?</h4>
|
|
|
3652 <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3653 <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p2">
|
|
|
3654 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind
|
|
|
3655 of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual
|
|
|
3656 intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the object,
|
|
|
3657 as the eye by the similitude of color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine
|
|
|
3658 essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their similitudes.
|
|
|
3659 </p>
|
|
|
3660 <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p3">
|
|
|
3661 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased
|
|
|
3662 to see the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture;
|
|
|
3663 hence he said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter" (
|
|
|
3664 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:4</a>). Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the same way,
|
|
|
3665 when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.
|
|
|
3666 </p>
|
|
|
3667 <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p4">
|
|
|
3668 <b>On the contrary,</b> A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror.
|
|
|
3669 Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by
|
|
|
3670 any similitudes or ideas.
|
|
|
3671 </p>
|
|
|
3672 <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p5">
|
|
|
3673 <b>I answer that,</b> Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to
|
|
|
3674 their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways.
|
|
|
3675 For as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any
|
|
|
3676 knowable object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is
|
|
|
3677 directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which
|
|
|
3678 resembles the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For
|
|
|
3679 the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know things thus by their likeness
|
|
|
3680 in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes
|
|
|
3681 pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according
|
|
|
3682 to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other
|
|
|
3683 similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God Himself is seen.
|
|
|
3684 </p>
|
|
|
3685 <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p6">
|
|
|
3686 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine essence,
|
|
|
3687 in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.
|
|
|
3688 </p>
|
|
|
3689 <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p7">
|
|
|
3690 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived
|
|
|
3691 images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas
|
|
|
3692 of genus and difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds
|
|
|
3693 the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees
|
|
|
3694 God, by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence,
|
|
|
3695 which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind of vision whereby things are seen
|
|
|
3696 by this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.
|
|
|
3697 </p>
|
|
|
3698 <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p8"></p>
|
|
|
3699 <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p9"></p>
|
|
|
3700 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
3701 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
3702 </div>
|
|
|
3703 <div id="FP_Q12_A10" class="div4">
|
|
|
3704 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
3705 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
3706 <h4 id="FP_Q12_A10-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?</h4>
|
|
|
3707 <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3708 <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p2">
|
|
|
3709 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to
|
|
|
3710 the Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood." But what is seen in God,
|
|
|
3711 is understood; for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in Him at the same time.
|
|
|
3712 </p>
|
|
|
3713 <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p3">
|
|
|
3714 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), "God moves the spiritual creature according to time"---i.e. by intelligence
|
|
|
3715 and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore those who see God understand and are affected
|
|
|
3716 successively; for time means succession.
|
|
|
3717 </p>
|
|
|
3718 <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p4">
|
|
|
3719 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall
|
|
|
3720 see all we know at one glance."
|
|
|
3721 </p>
|
|
|
3722 <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p5">
|
|
|
3723 <b>I answer that,</b> What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many
|
|
|
3724 things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed
|
|
|
3725 by many diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously.
|
|
|
3726 Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same
|
|
|
3727 time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all at the same time, if each one is understood by its
|
|
|
3728 own idea; whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. Now it was shown
|
|
|
3729 above that things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence
|
|
|
3730 they are seen simultaneously, and not successively.
|
|
|
3731 </p>
|
|
|
3732 <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p6">
|
|
|
3733 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously,
|
|
|
3734 as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and "rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof.
|
|
|
3735 </p>
|
|
|
3736 <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p7">
|
|
|
3737 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things
|
|
|
3738 simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God,
|
|
|
3739 they see all at the same time.
|
|
|
3740 </p>
|
|
|
3741 <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p8"></p>
|
|
|
3742 <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p9"></p>
|
|
|
3743 <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3744 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
3745 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
3746 </div>
|
|
|
3747 <div id="FP_Q12_A11" class="div4">
|
|
|
3748 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
3749 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
3750 <h4 id="FP_Q12_A11-p0.1">Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?</h4>
|
|
|
3751 <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3752 <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p2">
|
|
|
3753 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (
|
|
|
3754 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.30" target="asv">Gn. 32:30</a>). But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We see now in a glass and in a dark manner,
|
|
|
3755 but then face to face" (
|
|
|
3756 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>).
|
|
|
3757 </p>
|
|
|
3758 <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p3">
|
|
|
3759 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see
|
|
|
3760 the Lord" (
|
|
|
3761 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Num.12.8" target="asv">Num. 12:8</a>); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in this life.
|
|
|
3762 </p>
|
|
|
3763 <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p4">
|
|
|
3764 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even
|
|
|
3765 now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we both see that what you say is true, and we both
|
|
|
3766 see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable
|
|
|
3767 truth itself above our minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all
|
|
|
3768 things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things
|
|
|
3769 according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable." Therefore
|
|
|
3770 even in this life we see God Himself.
|
|
|
3771 </p>
|
|
|
3772 <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p5">
|
|
|
3773 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by
|
|
|
3774 intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as
|
|
|
3775 he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows that He is seen by
|
|
|
3776 us in His essence.
|
|
|
3777 </p>
|
|
|
3778 <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p6">
|
|
|
3779 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" (
|
|
|
3780 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.20" target="asv">Ex. 32:20</a>), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His
|
|
|
3781 own nature."
|
|
|
3782 </p>
|
|
|
3783 <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p7">
|
|
|
3784 <b>I answer that,</b> God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because,
|
|
|
3785 as was said above
|
|
|
3786 <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its
|
|
|
3787 being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now
|
|
|
3788 it is evident that the Divine essence
|
|
|
3789 cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above (
|
|
|
3790 <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible
|
|
|
3791 for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted
|
|
|
3792 from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of
|
|
|
3793 the bodily senses
|
|
|
3794 divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the
|
|
|
3795 soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence.
|
|
|
3796 </p>
|
|
|
3797 <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p8">
|
|
|
3798 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are
|
|
|
3799 formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I
|
|
|
3800 have seen God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred
|
|
|
3801 to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary
|
|
|
3802 vision; as will later be explained (SS,
|
|
|
3803 <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q174.html">Q[174])</a> in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation,
|
|
|
3804 above the ordinary state.
|
|
|
3805 </p>
|
|
|
3806 <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p9">
|
|
|
3807 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds
|
|
|
3808 of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad
|
|
|
3809 lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more
|
|
|
3810 fully in the question of rapture (SS,
|
|
|
3811 <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q175.html">Q[175])</a>.
|
|
|
3812 </p>
|
|
|
3813 <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p10">
|
|
|
3814 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things are said to be seen in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know
|
|
|
3815 and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said
|
|
|
3816 to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons
|
|
|
3817 of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As
|
|
|
3818 therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see
|
|
|
3819 any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God.
|
|
|
3820 </p>
|
|
|
3821 <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p11">
|
|
|
3822 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect.
|
|
|
3823 And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence and power.
|
|
|
3824 </p>
|
|
|
3825 <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3826 <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3827 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
3828 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
3829 </div>
|
|
|
3830 <div id="FP_Q12_A12" class="div4">
|
|
|
3831 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
3832 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A13.html"></a>
|
|
|
3833 <h4 id="FP_Q12_A12-p0.1">Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?</h4>
|
|
|
3834 <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3835 <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p2">
|
|
|
3836 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp
|
|
|
3837 simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above (
|
|
|
3838 <a id="FP_Q12_A12-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a> ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.
|
|
|
3839 </p>
|
|
|
3840 <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p3">
|
|
|
3841 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination
|
|
|
3842 of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge.
|
|
|
3843 </p>
|
|
|
3844 <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p4">
|
|
|
3845 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge
|
|
|
3846 of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent
|
|
|
3847 light unless purified by the justice of faith." Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason.
|
|
|
3848 </p>
|
|
|
3849 <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p5">
|
|
|
3850 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
3851 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A12-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv">Rom. 1:19</a>), "That which is known of God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest in them."
|
|
|
3852 </p>
|
|
|
3853 <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p6">
|
|
|
3854 <b>I answer that,</b> Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But
|
|
|
3855 our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the
|
|
|
3856 power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore
|
|
|
3857 can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we
|
|
|
3858 can be led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him,
|
|
|
3859 as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
|
|
|
3860 </p>
|
|
|
3861 <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p7"> Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from
|
|
|
3862 Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason
|
|
|
3863 of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all.
|
|
|
3864 </p>
|
|
|
3865 <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p8">
|
|
|
3866 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is."
|
|
|
3867 </p>
|
|
|
3868 <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p9">
|
|
|
3869 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects.
|
|
|
3870 </p>
|
|
|
3871 <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p10">
|
|
|
3872 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can
|
|
|
3873 belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve
|
|
|
3874 what I said in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.' For it can be answered that many who are not
|
|
|
3875 pure can know many truths," i.e. by natural reason.
|
|
|
3876 </p>
|
|
|
3877 <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3878 <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3879 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
3880 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A13.html"></a>
|
|
|
3881 </div>
|
|
|
3882 <div id="FP_Q12_A13" class="div4">
|
|
|
3883 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
3884 <a href="summa.FP_Q13.html"></a>
|
|
|
3885 <h4 id="FP_Q12_A13-p0.1">Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?</h4>
|
|
|
3886 <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3887 <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p2">
|
|
|
3888 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.
|
|
|
3889 i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses,
|
|
|
3890 who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring
|
|
|
3891 of Him "what He is," comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more
|
|
|
3892 known to us by grace than by natural reason.
|
|
|
3893 </p>
|
|
|
3894 <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p3">
|
|
|
3895 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies
|
|
|
3896 to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon
|
|
|
3897 us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than
|
|
|
3898 by natural reason.
|
|
|
3899 </p>
|
|
|
3900 <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p4">
|
|
|
3901 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom.
|
|
|
3902 xxvi in Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more
|
|
|
3903 excellent knowledge of God by grace.
|
|
|
3904 </p>
|
|
|
3905 <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p5">
|
|
|
3906 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (
|
|
|
3907 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A13-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.
|
|
|
3908 </p>
|
|
|
3909 <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p6">
|
|
|
3910 <b>I answer that,</b> We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have
|
|
|
3911 by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling
|
|
|
3912 us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions.
|
|
|
3913 </p>
|
|
|
3914 <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p7"> Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened
|
|
|
3915 by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to
|
|
|
3916 express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in prophetic visions; while
|
|
|
3917 sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the
|
|
|
3918 Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (
|
|
|
3919 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A13-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.17" target="asv">Mat. 3:17</a>).
|
|
|
3920 </p>
|
|
|
3921 <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p8">
|
|
|
3922 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one
|
|
|
3923 unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according
|
|
|
3924 as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that
|
|
|
3925 God is Three and One.
|
|
|
3926 </p>
|
|
|
3927 <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p9">
|
|
|
3928 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the
|
|
|
3929 more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given
|
|
|
3930 by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light.
|
|
|
3931 </p>
|
|
|
3932 <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p10">
|
|
|
3933 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination
|
|
|
3934 to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as
|
|
|
3935 faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect
|
|
|
3936 to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles.
|
|
|
3937 </p>
|
|
|
3938 <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3939 <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3940 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
3941 <a href="summa.FP_Q13.html"></a>
|
|
|
3942 </div>
|
|
|
3943 <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3944 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3945 </div>
|
|
|
3946 <div id="FP_Q13" class="div3">
|
|
|
3947 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A13.html"></a>
|
|
|
3948 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3949 <h3 id="FP_Q13-p0.1">THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
3950 <p id="FP_Q13-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3951 <p id="FP_Q13-p2"> After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the
|
|
|
3952 divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.
|
|
|
3953 </p>
|
|
|
3954 <p id="FP_Q13-p3"> Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
3955 <p id="FP_Q13-p4"> (1) Whether God can be named by us?</p>
|
|
|
3956 <p id="FP_Q13-p5"> (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially?</p>
|
|
|
3957 <p id="FP_Q13-p6"> (3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically?</p>
|
|
|
3958 <p id="FP_Q13-p7"> (4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?</p>
|
|
|
3959 <p id="FP_Q13-p8"> (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally?</p>
|
|
|
3960 <p id="FP_Q13-p9"> (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures?</p>
|
|
|
3961 <p id="FP_Q13-p10"> (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?</p>
|
|
|
3962 <p id="FP_Q13-p11"> (8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?</p>
|
|
|
3963 <p id="FP_Q13-p12"> (9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?</p>
|
|
|
3964 <p id="FP_Q13-p13"> (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion?</p>
|
|
|
3965 <p id="FP_Q13-p14"> (11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of God?</p>
|
|
|
3966 <p id="FP_Q13-p15"> (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</p>
|
|
|
3967 <div id="FP_Q13_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
3968 <a href="summa.FP_Q13.html"></a>
|
|
|
3969 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3970 <h4 id="FP_Q13_A1-p0.1">Whether a name can be given to God?</h4>
|
|
|
3971 <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3972 <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p2">
|
|
|
3973 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can
|
|
|
3974 one be found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?" (
|
|
|
3975 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.30.4" target="asv">Prov. 30:4</a>).
|
|
|
3976 </p>
|
|
|
3977 <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p3">
|
|
|
3978 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract
|
|
|
3979 names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.
|
|
|
3980 </p>
|
|
|
3981 <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p4">
|
|
|
3982 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the
|
|
|
3983 same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time;
|
|
|
3984 moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to
|
|
|
3985 recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore
|
|
|
3986 God cannot in any way be named by us.
|
|
|
3987 </p>
|
|
|
3988 <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p5">
|
|
|
3989 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
3990 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.3" target="asv">Ex. 15:3</a>): "The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name."
|
|
|
3991 </p>
|
|
|
3992 <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p6">
|
|
|
3993 <b>I answer that,</b> Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident
|
|
|
3994 that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore
|
|
|
3995 that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above (
|
|
|
3996 <a id="FP_Q13_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html">Q[12], AA[11]</a>,12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God
|
|
|
3997 from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us
|
|
|
3998 from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses
|
|
|
3999 the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed
|
|
|
4000 by the name is the definition.
|
|
|
4001 </p>
|
|
|
4002 <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p7">
|
|
|
4003 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand
|
|
|
4004 about God, and signify in word.
|
|
|
4005 </p>
|
|
|
4006 <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p8">
|
|
|
4007 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of
|
|
|
4008 which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas
|
|
|
4009 their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used
|
|
|
4010 by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as
|
|
|
4011 applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that
|
|
|
4012 whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting,
|
|
|
4013 we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection,
|
|
|
4014 although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this
|
|
|
4015 life
|
|
|
4016 as He is.
|
|
|
4017 </p>
|
|
|
4018 <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p9">
|
|
|
4019 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To signify substance with quality is to signify the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence,
|
|
|
4020 as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied
|
|
|
4021 to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His
|
|
|
4022 eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple
|
|
|
4023 subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things,
|
|
|
4024 because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God
|
|
|
4025 as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according
|
|
|
4026 as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative
|
|
|
4027 pronouns.
|
|
|
4028 </p>
|
|
|
4029 <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
4030 <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4031 <a href="summa.FP_Q13.html"></a>
|
|
|
4032 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4033 </div>
|
|
|
4034 <div id="FP_Q13_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
4035 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4036 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4037 <h4 id="FP_Q13_A2-p0.1">Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?</h4>
|
|
|
4038 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4039 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p2">
|
|
|
4040 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God
|
|
|
4041 signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from
|
|
|
4042 His nature or operation."
|
|
|
4043 </p>
|
|
|
4044 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p3">
|
|
|
4045 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly
|
|
|
4046 and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God." Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising
|
|
|
4047 God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does
|
|
|
4048 not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him
|
|
|
4049 substantially.
|
|
|
4050 </p>
|
|
|
4051 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p4">
|
|
|
4052 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance.
|
|
|
4053 Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.
|
|
|
4054 </p>
|
|
|
4055 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p5">
|
|
|
4056 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that
|
|
|
4057 simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance.
|
|
|
4058 </p>
|
|
|
4059 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p6">
|
|
|
4060 <b>I answer that,</b> Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but
|
|
|
4061 rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures
|
|
|
4062 to Himself.
|
|
|
4063 </p>
|
|
|
4064 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p7"> But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good," "wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been
|
|
|
4065 given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought
|
|
|
4066 into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they
|
|
|
4067 assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like
|
|
|
4068 manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His
|
|
|
4069 relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the
|
|
|
4070 same rule applies to other names.
|
|
|
4071 </p>
|
|
|
4072 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p8"> Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned
|
|
|
4073 why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause
|
|
|
4074 of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might
|
|
|
4075 in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He
|
|
|
4076 is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names
|
|
|
4077 applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine,
|
|
|
4078 forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this
|
|
|
4079 is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the
|
|
|
4080 He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.
|
|
|
4081 </p>
|
|
|
4082 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p9"> Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially
|
|
|
4083 of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far
|
|
|
4084 as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him.
|
|
|
4085 Now it is shown above (
|
|
|
4086 <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God prepossesses in Himself all the
|
|
|
4087 perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him
|
|
|
4088 so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling
|
|
|
4089 principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior
|
|
|
4090 bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (
|
|
|
4091 <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>), in treating
|
|
|
4092 of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as
|
|
|
4093 creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or
|
|
|
4094 "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent
|
|
|
4095 and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes
|
|
|
4096 goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we
|
|
|
4097 are."
|
|
|
4098 </p>
|
|
|
4099 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p10">
|
|
|
4100 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what
|
|
|
4101 He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.
|
|
|
4102 </p>
|
|
|
4103 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p11">
|
|
|
4104 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify,
|
|
|
4105 as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed
|
|
|
4106 to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot
|
|
|
4107 would be a stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis"
|
|
|
4108 which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for
|
|
|
4109 as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect
|
|
|
4110 manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are
|
|
|
4111 not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from
|
|
|
4112 Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in
|
|
|
4113 a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.
|
|
|
4114 </p>
|
|
|
4115 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p12">
|
|
|
4116 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented
|
|
|
4117 in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.
|
|
|
4118 </p>
|
|
|
4119 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
4120 <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p14"></p>
|
|
|
4121 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4122 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4123 </div>
|
|
|
4124 <div id="FP_Q13_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
4125 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4126 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4127 <h4 id="FP_Q13_A3-p0.1">Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?</h4>
|
|
|
4128 <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4129 <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p2">
|
|
|
4130 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained
|
|
|
4131 above
|
|
|
4132 <a id="FP_Q13_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore
|
|
|
4133 names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
|
|
|
4134 </p>
|
|
|
4135 <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p3">
|
|
|
4136 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such
|
|
|
4137 names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel.
|
|
|
4138 Hier. ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense.
|
|
|
4139 </p>
|
|
|
4140 <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p4">
|
|
|
4141 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply
|
|
|
4142 some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore
|
|
|
4143 all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
|
|
|
4144 </p>
|
|
|
4145 <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p5">
|
|
|
4146 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express
|
|
|
4147 the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude."
|
|
|
4148 Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal
|
|
|
4149 sense.
|
|
|
4150 </p>
|
|
|
4151 <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p6">
|
|
|
4152 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures,
|
|
|
4153 which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures,
|
|
|
4154 and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God---viz. the perfections which
|
|
|
4155 they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification.
|
|
|
4156 As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures,
|
|
|
4157 and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God;
|
|
|
4158 for their mode of signification applies to creatures.
|
|
|
4159 </p>
|
|
|
4160 <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p7">
|
|
|
4161 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in
|
|
|
4162 which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a
|
|
|
4163 material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these
|
|
|
4164 perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their
|
|
|
4165 signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God.
|
|
|
4166 </p>
|
|
|
4167 <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p8">
|
|
|
4168 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to
|
|
|
4169 Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all
|
|
|
4170 substance and all life.
|
|
|
4171 </p>
|
|
|
4172 <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p9">
|
|
|
4173 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their
|
|
|
4174 mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing
|
|
|
4175 signified.
|
|
|
4176 </p>
|
|
|
4177 <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
4178 <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4179 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4180 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4181 </div>
|
|
|
4182 <div id="FP_Q13_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
4183 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4184 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4185 <h4 id="FP_Q13_A4-p0.1">Whether names applied to God are synonymous?</h4>
|
|
|
4186 <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4187 <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p2">
|
|
|
4188 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same.
|
|
|
4189 But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it
|
|
|
4190 is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.
|
|
|
4191 </p>
|
|
|
4192 <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p3">
|
|
|
4193 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that
|
|
|
4194 an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems
|
|
|
4195 also that all these ideas are vain notions.
|
|
|
4196 </p>
|
|
|
4197 <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p4">
|
|
|
4198 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is
|
|
|
4199 supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not
|
|
|
4200 signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.
|
|
|
4201 </p>
|
|
|
4202 <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p5">
|
|
|
4203 <b>On the contrary,</b> All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to
|
|
|
4204 God are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful,
|
|
|
4205 the Lord of hosts is Thy name" (
|
|
|
4206 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.18" target="asv">Jer. 32:18</a>).
|
|
|
4207 </p>
|
|
|
4208 <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p6">
|
|
|
4209 <b>I answer that,</b> These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove,
|
|
|
4210 or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse
|
|
|
4211 things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above
|
|
|
4212 <a id="FP_Q13_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, that these names signify the divine substance, although in an
|
|
|
4213 imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified
|
|
|
4214 by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from
|
|
|
4215 creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which
|
|
|
4216 perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As
|
|
|
4217 therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections
|
|
|
4218 of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds
|
|
|
4219 one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied
|
|
|
4220 to God signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not
|
|
|
4221 synonymous.
|
|
|
4222 </p>
|
|
|
4223 <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p7"> Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which
|
|
|
4224 signify different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies
|
|
|
4225 the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.
|
|
|
4226 </p>
|
|
|
4227 <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p8">
|
|
|
4228 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented
|
|
|
4229 by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.
|
|
|
4230 </p>
|
|
|
4231 <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p9">
|
|
|
4232 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus
|
|
|
4233 it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner,
|
|
|
4234 as things represent Him.
|
|
|
4235 </p>
|
|
|
4236 <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
4237 <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4238 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4239 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4240 </div>
|
|
|
4241 <div id="FP_Q13_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
4242 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4243 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
4244 <h4 id="FP_Q13_A5-p0.1">Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?</h4>
|
|
|
4245 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4246 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p2">
|
|
|
4247 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal,
|
|
|
4248 as many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said
|
|
|
4249 of some univocally---viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which
|
|
|
4250 agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some
|
|
|
4251 agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it
|
|
|
4252 seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures,
|
|
|
4253 is predicated univocally.
|
|
|
4254 </p>
|
|
|
4255 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p3">
|
|
|
4256 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according
|
|
|
4257 to the word of Genesis (
|
|
|
4258 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>), "Let us make man to our image and likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally.
|
|
|
4259 </p>
|
|
|
4260 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p4">
|
|
|
4261 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous
|
|
|
4262 with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures.
|
|
|
4263 </p>
|
|
|
4264 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p5">
|
|
|
4265 <b>On the contrary,</b> whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no
|
|
|
4266 name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not
|
|
|
4267 in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other
|
|
|
4268 things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
|
|
|
4269 </p>
|
|
|
4270 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p6"> Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes
|
|
|
4271 any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much
|
|
|
4272 less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.
|
|
|
4273 </p>
|
|
|
4274 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p7">
|
|
|
4275 <b>I answer that,</b> Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate
|
|
|
4276 result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure
|
|
|
4277 that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner;
|
|
|
4278 as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms
|
|
|
4279 in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and
|
|
|
4280 multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that
|
|
|
4281 perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection
|
|
|
4282 distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we
|
|
|
4283 apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term
|
|
|
4284 "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when
|
|
|
4285 it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name.
|
|
|
4286 Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other
|
|
|
4287 terms.
|
|
|
4288 Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
|
|
|
4289 </p>
|
|
|
4290 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p8"> Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because
|
|
|
4291 if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning
|
|
|
4292 would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about
|
|
|
4293 God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by
|
|
|
4294 the things that are made" (
|
|
|
4295 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.
|
|
|
4296 </p>
|
|
|
4297 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p9"> Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy"
|
|
|
4298 predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the
|
|
|
4299 latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since
|
|
|
4300 medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures
|
|
|
4301 analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures
|
|
|
4302 <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and
|
|
|
4303 cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure
|
|
|
4304 equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the
|
|
|
4305 same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various
|
|
|
4306 proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine
|
|
|
4307 signifies the cause of the same health.
|
|
|
4308 </p>
|
|
|
4309 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p10">
|
|
|
4310 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal
|
|
|
4311 agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the
|
|
|
4312 generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it
|
|
|
4313 would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a
|
|
|
4314 particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause
|
|
|
4315 of the whole species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal
|
|
|
4316 agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness,
|
|
|
4317 but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal
|
|
|
4318 analogical predication, which is being.
|
|
|
4319 </p>
|
|
|
4320 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p11">
|
|
|
4321 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing (
|
|
|
4322 <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>).
|
|
|
4323 </p>
|
|
|
4324 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p12">
|
|
|
4325 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the
|
|
|
4326 same genus.
|
|
|
4327 </p>
|
|
|
4328 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p13"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures;
|
|
|
4329 yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.
|
|
|
4330 </p>
|
|
|
4331 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p14"></p>
|
|
|
4332 <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p15"></p>
|
|
|
4333 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4334 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
4335 </div>
|
|
|
4336 <div id="FP_Q13_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
4337 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4338 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
4339 <h4 id="FP_Q13_A6-p0.1">Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?</h4>
|
|
|
4340 <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4341 <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p2">
|
|
|
4342 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know
|
|
|
4343 it, since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the
|
|
|
4344 names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.
|
|
|
4345 </p>
|
|
|
4346 <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p3">
|
|
|
4347 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said
|
|
|
4348 primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures
|
|
|
4349 are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God.
|
|
|
4350 </p>
|
|
|
4351 <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p4">
|
|
|
4352 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says
|
|
|
4353 (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily
|
|
|
4354 predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures
|
|
|
4355 rather than of God.
|
|
|
4356 </p>
|
|
|
4357 <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p5">
|
|
|
4358 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named"
|
|
|
4359 (
|
|
|
4360 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.14" target="asv">Eph. 3:14,15</a>); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God
|
|
|
4361 rather than to creatures.
|
|
|
4362 </p>
|
|
|
4363 <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p6">
|
|
|
4364 <b>I answer that,</b> In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and
|
|
|
4365 this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the
|
|
|
4366 Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other
|
|
|
4367 things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first.
|
|
|
4368 Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called
|
|
|
4369 healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which
|
|
|
4370 is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied
|
|
|
4371 to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For
|
|
|
4372 as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile
|
|
|
4373 by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a
|
|
|
4374 lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures.
|
|
|
4375 But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as
|
|
|
4376 the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the
|
|
|
4377 creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good"
|
|
|
4378 would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above
|
|
|
4379 <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify
|
|
|
4380 not only that
|
|
|
4381 He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name
|
|
|
4382 signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures;
|
|
|
4383 but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they
|
|
|
4384 have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above
|
|
|
4385 <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">(A[3])</a>.
|
|
|
4386 </p>
|
|
|
4387 <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p7">
|
|
|
4388 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection refers to the imposition of the name.
|
|
|
4389 </p>
|
|
|
4390 <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p8">
|
|
|
4391 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.
|
|
|
4392 </p>
|
|
|
4393 <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p9">
|
|
|
4394 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as
|
|
|
4395 "healthy" is applied to medicine.
|
|
|
4396 </p>
|
|
|
4397 <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p10"></p>
|
|
|
4398 <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4399 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4400 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
4401 </div>
|
|
|
4402 <div id="FP_Q13_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
4403 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
4404 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
4405 <h4 id="FP_Q13_A7-p0.1">Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?</h4>
|
|
|
4406 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4407 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p2">
|
|
|
4408 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the
|
|
|
4409 divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which
|
|
|
4410 is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not
|
|
|
4411 temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but
|
|
|
4412 eternally.
|
|
|
4413 </p>
|
|
|
4414 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p3">
|
|
|
4415 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white.
|
|
|
4416 But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally.
|
|
|
4417 </p>
|
|
|
4418 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p4">
|
|
|
4419 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things
|
|
|
4420 that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for
|
|
|
4421 from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" (
|
|
|
4422 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.3" target="asv">Jer. 31:3</a>). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as
|
|
|
4423 "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from eternity.
|
|
|
4424 </p>
|
|
|
4425 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p5">
|
|
|
4426 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only.
|
|
|
4427 But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite
|
|
|
4428 relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also.
|
|
|
4429 But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied
|
|
|
4430 to God temporally.
|
|
|
4431 </p>
|
|
|
4432 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p6">
|
|
|
4433 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if
|
|
|
4434 the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly
|
|
|
4435 false.
|
|
|
4436 </p>
|
|
|
4437 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p7">
|
|
|
4438 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can
|
|
|
4439 exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures
|
|
|
4440 are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of
|
|
|
4441 the creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from
|
|
|
4442 eternity, and not temporally.
|
|
|
4443 </p>
|
|
|
4444 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p8">
|
|
|
4445 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.
|
|
|
4446 </p>
|
|
|
4447 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p9">
|
|
|
4448 <b>I answer that,</b> The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.
|
|
|
4449 </p>
|
|
|
4450 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p10"> To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen
|
|
|
4451 to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary
|
|
|
4452 to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from
|
|
|
4453 both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension
|
|
|
4454 of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it
|
|
|
4455 apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between "being" and "non-being" formed
|
|
|
4456 by reason, apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus
|
|
|
4457 and species, and the like.
|
|
|
4458 </p>
|
|
|
4459 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p11"> Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between
|
|
|
4460 two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great
|
|
|
4461 and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent
|
|
|
4462 upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.
|
|
|
4463 </p>
|
|
|
4464 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p12"> Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens
|
|
|
4465 whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual
|
|
|
4466 things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence.
|
|
|
4467 Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge
|
|
|
4468 or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them
|
|
|
4469 there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the
|
|
|
4470 relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they
|
|
|
4471 are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a
|
|
|
4472 column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.
|
|
|
4473 </p>
|
|
|
4474 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p13"> Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it
|
|
|
4475 is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a
|
|
|
4476 relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import
|
|
|
4477 relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason
|
|
|
4478 of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.
|
|
|
4479 </p>
|
|
|
4480 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p14">
|
|
|
4481 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and "son,"
|
|
|
4482 and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from
|
|
|
4483 which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and
|
|
|
4484 these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the
|
|
|
4485 same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not
|
|
|
4486 signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes
|
|
|
4487 power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes,
|
|
|
4488 as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are
|
|
|
4489 said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence,
|
|
|
4490 either directly or indirectly.
|
|
|
4491 </p>
|
|
|
4492 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p15">
|
|
|
4493 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only
|
|
|
4494 in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (
|
|
|
4495 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A7-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.89.1" target="asv">Ps. 89:1</a>).
|
|
|
4496 </p>
|
|
|
4497 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p16">
|
|
|
4498 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action
|
|
|
4499 of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according
|
|
|
4500 to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like.
|
|
|
4501 </p>
|
|
|
4502 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p17">
|
|
|
4503 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations
|
|
|
4504 in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet
|
|
|
4505 so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of
|
|
|
4506 relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the
|
|
|
4507 Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it.
|
|
|
4508 </p>
|
|
|
4509 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p18">
|
|
|
4510 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection
|
|
|
4511 is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to
|
|
|
4512 the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.
|
|
|
4513 </p>
|
|
|
4514 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p19">
|
|
|
4515 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to
|
|
|
4516 which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then
|
|
|
4517 they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another,
|
|
|
4518 and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science
|
|
|
4519 and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the
|
|
|
4520 knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is
|
|
|
4521 simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to
|
|
|
4522 the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms,
|
|
|
4523 "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself.
|
|
|
4524 </p>
|
|
|
4525 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p20"></p>
|
|
|
4526 <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p21"></p>
|
|
|
4527 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
4528 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
4529 </div>
|
|
|
4530 <div id="FP_Q13_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
4531 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
4532 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
4533 <h4 id="FP_Q13_A8-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?</h4>
|
|
|
4534 <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4535 <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p2">
|
|
|
4536 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God {Theos} is so
|
|
|
4537 called from the {theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the {aithein}, that is to burn, for our
|
|
|
4538 God is a fire consuming all malice; or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all things." But all these names belong to
|
|
|
4539 operation. Therefore this name "God" signifies His operation and not His nature.
|
|
|
4540 </p>
|
|
|
4541 <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p3">
|
|
|
4542 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not
|
|
|
4543 signify the divine nature.
|
|
|
4544 </p>
|
|
|
4545 <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p4">
|
|
|
4546 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the nature.
|
|
|
4547 </p>
|
|
|
4548 <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p5">
|
|
|
4549 <b>I answer that,</b> Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties
|
|
|
4550 and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from
|
|
|
4551 its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular
|
|
|
4552 action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in
|
|
|
4553 themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the
|
|
|
4554 meaning of the name and its source are the same.
|
|
|
4555 </p>
|
|
|
4556 <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p6"> Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him
|
|
|
4557 from these, as said in A[1]; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning.
|
|
|
4558 For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising
|
|
|
4559 providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect
|
|
|
4560 providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name "God" is imposed to signify the divine nature.
|
|
|
4561 </p>
|
|
|
4562 <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p7">
|
|
|
4563 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name "God."
|
|
|
4564 </p>
|
|
|
4565 <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p8">
|
|
|
4566 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can
|
|
|
4567 know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone" signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies
|
|
|
4568 the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said
|
|
|
4569 in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in
|
|
|
4570 itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above (
|
|
|
4571 <a id="FP_Q13_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things,
|
|
|
4572 the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this.
|
|
|
4573 </p>
|
|
|
4574 <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p9"></p>
|
|
|
4575 <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p10"></p>
|
|
|
4576 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
4577 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
4578 </div>
|
|
|
4579 <div id="FP_Q13_A9" class="div4">
|
|
|
4580 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
4581 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
4582 <h4 id="FP_Q13_A9-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is communicable?</h4>
|
|
|
4583 <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4584 <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p2">
|
|
|
4585 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself.
|
|
|
4586 But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us
|
|
|
4587 great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature"
|
|
|
4588 (
|
|
|
4589 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.4" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:4</a>). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to
|
|
|
4590 others.
|
|
|
4591 </p>
|
|
|
4592 <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p3">
|
|
|
4593 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears
|
|
|
4594 from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (
|
|
|
4595 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.6" target="asv">Ps. 81:6</a>). Therefore this name "God" is communicable.
|
|
|
4596 </p>
|
|
|
4597 <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p4">
|
|
|
4598 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects
|
|
|
4599 are communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is communicable.
|
|
|
4600 </p>
|
|
|
4601 <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p5">
|
|
|
4602 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones" (
|
|
|
4603 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.21" target="asv">Wis. 14:21</a>), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.
|
|
|
4604 </p>
|
|
|
4605 <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p6">
|
|
|
4606 <b>I answer that,</b> A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole
|
|
|
4607 signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name.
|
|
|
4608 For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable
|
|
|
4609 to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or
|
|
|
4610 strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable,
|
|
|
4611 we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either
|
|
|
4612 in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common
|
|
|
4613 to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the
|
|
|
4614 reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular
|
|
|
4615 subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood
|
|
|
4616 as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name
|
|
|
4617 imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing
|
|
|
4618 cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many,
|
|
|
4619 but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess
|
|
|
4620 something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum,"
|
|
|
4621 but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be
|
|
|
4622 communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as
|
|
|
4623 we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having
|
|
|
4624 forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in
|
|
|
4625 some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound
|
|
|
4626 things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.
|
|
|
4627 </p>
|
|
|
4628 <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p7"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above
|
|
|
4629 <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (
|
|
|
4630 <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this
|
|
|
4631 name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written:
|
|
|
4632 "You served them who
|
|
|
4633 by nature are not gods," (
|
|
|
4634 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.8" target="asv">Gal. 4:8</a>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its
|
|
|
4635 whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness,
|
|
|
4636 according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (
|
|
|
4637 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.6" target="asv">Ps. 81:6</a>).
|
|
|
4638 </p>
|
|
|
4639 <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p8"> But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered
|
|
|
4640 as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the
|
|
|
4641 Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.
|
|
|
4642 </p>
|
|
|
4643 <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p9">
|
|
|
4644 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude.
|
|
|
4645 </p>
|
|
|
4646 <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p10">
|
|
|
4647 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although
|
|
|
4648 God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but
|
|
|
4649 upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said
|
|
|
4650 above concerning the name "sun."
|
|
|
4651 </p>
|
|
|
4652 <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p11">
|
|
|
4653 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do
|
|
|
4654 not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable
|
|
|
4655 to many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the
|
|
|
4656 divine nature.
|
|
|
4657 </p>
|
|
|
4658 <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p12"></p>
|
|
|
4659 <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p13"></p>
|
|
|
4660 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
4661 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
4662 </div>
|
|
|
4663 <div id="FP_Q13_A10" class="div4">
|
|
|
4664 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
4665 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
4666 <h4 id="FP_Q13_A10-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?</h4>
|
|
|
4667 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4668 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p2">
|
|
|
4669 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where
|
|
|
4670 a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction.
|
|
|
4671 But a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is God." Therefore GOD in both senses
|
|
|
4672 is spoken of univocally.
|
|
|
4673 </p>
|
|
|
4674 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p3">
|
|
|
4675 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion,
|
|
|
4676 and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness.
|
|
|
4677 Therefore also this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion.
|
|
|
4678 </p>
|
|
|
4679 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p4">
|
|
|
4680 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands
|
|
|
4681 by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: "An
|
|
|
4682 idol is God." Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both.
|
|
|
4683 </p>
|
|
|
4684 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p5">
|
|
|
4685 <b>On the contrary,</b> The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied
|
|
|
4686 to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion
|
|
|
4687 is applied equivocally.
|
|
|
4688 </p>
|
|
|
4689 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p6"> Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol
|
|
|
4690 is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there
|
|
|
4691 is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to
|
|
|
4692 opinion.
|
|
|
4693 </p>
|
|
|
4694 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p7">
|
|
|
4695 <b>I answer that,</b> This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This
|
|
|
4696 is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas
|
|
|
4697 in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses;
|
|
|
4698 as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition
|
|
|
4699 of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine
|
|
|
4700 and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.
|
|
|
4701 </p>
|
|
|
4702 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p8"> The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when
|
|
|
4703 it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the
|
|
|
4704 name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify
|
|
|
4705 something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
|
|
|
4706 comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.
|
|
|
4707 </p>
|
|
|
4708 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p9">
|
|
|
4709 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man,"
|
|
|
4710 of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the
|
|
|
4711 name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really
|
|
|
4712 is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it
|
|
|
4713 is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of
|
|
|
4714 them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning
|
|
|
4715 God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm,
|
|
|
4716 "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" (
|
|
|
4717 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A10-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.95.5" target="asv">Ps. 95:5</a>).
|
|
|
4718 </p>
|
|
|
4719 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p10"><b>Reply to Objections 2 and 3:</b> The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the
|
|
|
4720 name, and not from its various significations.
|
|
|
4721 </p>
|
|
|
4722 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p11">
|
|
|
4723 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names
|
|
|
4724 in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be
|
|
|
4725 predicated equivocally of different predicaments.
|
|
|
4726 </p>
|
|
|
4727 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p12">
|
|
|
4728 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea
|
|
|
4729 of causality, or excellence, or remotion (
|
|
|
4730 <a id="FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol
|
|
|
4731 is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
|
|
|
4732 names the meaning of which we know not.
|
|
|
4733 </p>
|
|
|
4734 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p13"></p>
|
|
|
4735 <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p14"></p>
|
|
|
4736 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
4737 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
4738 </div>
|
|
|
4739 <div id="FP_Q13_A11" class="div4">
|
|
|
4740 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
4741 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
4742 <h4 id="FP_Q13_A11-p0.1">Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?</h4>
|
|
|
4743 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4744 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p2">
|
|
|
4745 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But
|
|
|
4746 this name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.
|
|
|
4747 </p>
|
|
|
4748 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p3">
|
|
|
4749 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it
|
|
|
4750 especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God,
|
|
|
4751 and not this name HE WHO IS.
|
|
|
4752 </p>
|
|
|
4753 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p4">
|
|
|
4754 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this
|
|
|
4755 name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God.
|
|
|
4756 </p>
|
|
|
4757 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p5">
|
|
|
4758 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered
|
|
|
4759 him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" (
|
|
|
4760 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.13" target="asv">Ex. 3:13,14</a>). Therefor this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God.
|
|
|
4761 </p>
|
|
|
4762 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p6">
|
|
|
4763 <b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:
|
|
|
4764 </p>
|
|
|
4765 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p7"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence
|
|
|
4766 of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (
|
|
|
4767 <a id="FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.
|
|
|
4768 </p>
|
|
|
4769 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p8"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add
|
|
|
4770 something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the
|
|
|
4771 essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about
|
|
|
4772 God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the
|
|
|
4773 more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that,
|
|
|
4774 "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as
|
|
|
4775 an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this
|
|
|
4776 name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean
|
|
|
4777 of
|
|
|
4778 substance."
|
|
|
4779 </p>
|
|
|
4780 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p9"> Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose
|
|
|
4781 existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).
|
|
|
4782 </p>
|
|
|
4783 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p10">
|
|
|
4784 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and
|
|
|
4785 as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name,
|
|
|
4786 this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton,
|
|
|
4787 imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak,
|
|
|
4788 singular.
|
|
|
4789 </p>
|
|
|
4790 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p11">
|
|
|
4791 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely
|
|
|
4792 comes before the idea of cause.
|
|
|
4793 </p>
|
|
|
4794 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p12">
|
|
|
4795 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from
|
|
|
4796 some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.
|
|
|
4797 </p>
|
|
|
4798 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p13"></p>
|
|
|
4799 <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p14"></p>
|
|
|
4800 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
4801 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
4802 </div>
|
|
|
4803 <div id="FP_Q13_A12" class="div4">
|
|
|
4804 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
4805 <a href="summa.FP_Q14.html"></a>
|
|
|
4806 <h4 id="FP_Q13_A12-p0.1">Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</h4>
|
|
|
4807 <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4808 <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p2">
|
|
|
4809 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about
|
|
|
4810 God are true; but affirmations are vague."
|
|
|
4811 </p>
|
|
|
4812 <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p3">
|
|
|
4813 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form,
|
|
|
4814 as shown (Q[3] ): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken
|
|
|
4815 as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.
|
|
|
4816 </p>
|
|
|
4817 <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p4">
|
|
|
4818 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition
|
|
|
4819 as shown above (
|
|
|
4820 <a id="FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition
|
|
|
4821 about God cannot be made.
|
|
|
4822 </p>
|
|
|
4823 <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p5">
|
|
|
4824 <b>On the contrary,</b> What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that
|
|
|
4825 He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God.
|
|
|
4826 </p>
|
|
|
4827 <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p6">
|
|
|
4828 <b>I answer that,</b> True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition
|
|
|
4829 the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears
|
|
|
4830 to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For
|
|
|
4831 it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for
|
|
|
4832 the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the
|
|
|
4833 same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called
|
|
|
4834 animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as
|
|
|
4835 to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule
|
|
|
4836 in
|
|
|
4837 some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in
|
|
|
4838 the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are
|
|
|
4839 to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject,
|
|
|
4840 while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.
|
|
|
4841 </p>
|
|
|
4842 <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p7"> God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions
|
|
|
4843 because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows
|
|
|
4844 that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents
|
|
|
4845 the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.
|
|
|
4846 </p>
|
|
|
4847 <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p8">
|
|
|
4848 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as
|
|
|
4849 no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.
|
|
|
4850 </p>
|
|
|
4851 <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p9">
|
|
|
4852 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound
|
|
|
4853 things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form
|
|
|
4854 as a subject, and attributes something else to it.
|
|
|
4855 </p>
|
|
|
4856 <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p10">
|
|
|
4857 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly
|
|
|
4858 as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the
|
|
|
4859 one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect
|
|
|
4860 which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this
|
|
|
4861 does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is
|
|
|
4862 composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode
|
|
|
4863 of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect
|
|
|
4864 understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but
|
|
|
4865 its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according
|
|
|
4866 to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect
|
|
|
4867 is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.
|
|
|
4868 </p>
|
|
|
4869 <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4870 <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p12"></p>
|
|
|
4871 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
4872 <a href="summa.FP_Q14.html"></a>
|
|
|
4873 </div>
|
|
|
4874 <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A13.html"></a>
|
|
|
4875 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4876 </div>
|
|
|
4877 <div id="FP_Q14" class="div3">
|
|
|
4878 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
4879 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4880 <h3 id="FP_Q14-p0.1">OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
4881 <p id="FP_Q14-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4882 <p id="FP_Q14-p2"> Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation
|
|
|
4883 is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding
|
|
|
4884 abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the
|
|
|
4885 divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of
|
|
|
4886 life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower,
|
|
|
4887 and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added
|
|
|
4888 the treatment of ideas.
|
|
|
4889 </p>
|
|
|
4890 <p id="FP_Q14-p3"> Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
4891 <p id="FP_Q14-p4"> (1) Whether there is knowledge in God?</p>
|
|
|
4892 <p id="FP_Q14-p5"> (2) Whether God understands Himself?</p>
|
|
|
4893 <p id="FP_Q14-p6"> (3) Whether He comprehends Himself?</p>
|
|
|
4894 <p id="FP_Q14-p7"> (4) Whether His understanding is His substance?</p>
|
|
|
4895 <p id="FP_Q14-p8"> (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?</p>
|
|
|
4896 <p id="FP_Q14-p9"> (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?</p>
|
|
|
4897 <p id="FP_Q14-p10"> (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</p>
|
|
|
4898 <p id="FP_Q14-p11"> (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</p>
|
|
|
4899 <p id="FP_Q14-p12"> (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?</p>
|
|
|
4900 <p id="FP_Q14-p13"> (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?</p>
|
|
|
4901 <p id="FP_Q14-p14"> (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?</p>
|
|
|
4902 <p id="FP_Q14-p15"> (12) Whether He knows the infinite?</p>
|
|
|
4903 <p id="FP_Q14-p16"> (13) Whether He knows future contingent things?</p>
|
|
|
4904 <p id="FP_Q14-p17"> (14) Whether He knows enunciable things?</p>
|
|
|
4905 <p id="FP_Q14-p18"> (15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</p>
|
|
|
4906 <p id="FP_Q14-p19"> (16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?</p>
|
|
|
4907 <div id="FP_Q14_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
4908 <a href="summa.FP_Q14.html"></a>
|
|
|
4909 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4910 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A1-p0.1">Whether there is knowledge [*Scientia]?</h4>
|
|
|
4911 <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4912 <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p2">
|
|
|
4913 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the
|
|
|
4914 mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.
|
|
|
4915 </p>
|
|
|
4916 <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p3">
|
|
|
4917 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of
|
|
|
4918 principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God.
|
|
|
4919 </p>
|
|
|
4920 <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p4">
|
|
|
4921 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular (
|
|
|
4922 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.
|
|
|
4923 </p>
|
|
|
4924 <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p5">
|
|
|
4925 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (
|
|
|
4926 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.33" target="asv">Rom. 11:33</a>).
|
|
|
4927 </p>
|
|
|
4928 <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p6">
|
|
|
4929 <b>I answer that,</b> In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from
|
|
|
4930 non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted
|
|
|
4931 to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the
|
|
|
4932 nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of
|
|
|
4933 intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is
|
|
|
4934 in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (
|
|
|
4935 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that
|
|
|
4936 the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is
|
|
|
4937 the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense
|
|
|
4938 is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more
|
|
|
4939 separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality
|
|
|
4940 as stated above (
|
|
|
4941 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.
|
|
|
4942 </p>
|
|
|
4943 <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p7">
|
|
|
4944 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself (
|
|
|
4945 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from
|
|
|
4946 anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but
|
|
|
4947 substance and pure act.
|
|
|
4948 </p>
|
|
|
4949 <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p8">
|
|
|
4950 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (
|
|
|
4951 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as
|
|
|
4952 regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he
|
|
|
4953 knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to
|
|
|
4954 be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown
|
|
|
4955 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from
|
|
|
4956 each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses
|
|
|
4957 perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding"
|
|
|
4958 (
|
|
|
4959 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Job.12.13" target="asv">Job 12:13</a>).
|
|
|
4960 </p>
|
|
|
4961 <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p9">
|
|
|
4962 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the
|
|
|
4963 knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God
|
|
|
4964 after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according
|
|
|
4965 to any such mode.
|
|
|
4966 </p>
|
|
|
4967 <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
4968 <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4969 <a href="summa.FP_Q14.html"></a>
|
|
|
4970 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4971 </div>
|
|
|
4972 <div id="FP_Q14_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
4973 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4974 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4975 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A2-p0.1">Whether God understands Himself?</h4>
|
|
|
4976 <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4977 <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p2">
|
|
|
4978 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his
|
|
|
4979 own essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all;
|
|
|
4980 thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.
|
|
|
4981 </p>
|
|
|
4982 <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p3">
|
|
|
4983 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a
|
|
|
4984 kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers,
|
|
|
4985 or is made perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing its own likeness." Therefore God does not
|
|
|
4986 understand Himself.
|
|
|
4987 </p>
|
|
|
4988 <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p4">
|
|
|
4989 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen.
|
|
|
4990 ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in De Anima iii. Therefore
|
|
|
4991 God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things.
|
|
|
4992 </p>
|
|
|
4993 <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p5">
|
|
|
4994 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (
|
|
|
4995 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>).
|
|
|
4996 </p>
|
|
|
4997 <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p6">
|
|
|
4998 <b>I answer that,</b> God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external
|
|
|
4999 effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that
|
|
|
5000 remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in
|
|
|
5001 the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii)
|
|
|
5002 that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act." For the reason why we actually
|
|
|
5003 feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because
|
|
|
5004 of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality.
|
|
|
5005 </p>
|
|
|
5006 <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p7"> Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the
|
|
|
5007 same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially;
|
|
|
5008 nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it
|
|
|
5009 understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God
|
|
|
5010 understands Himself through Himself.
|
|
|
5011 </p>
|
|
|
5012 <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p8">
|
|
|
5013 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving
|
|
|
5014 it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore
|
|
|
5015 those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of
|
|
|
5016 each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know
|
|
|
5017 themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, "whoever knows his essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God
|
|
|
5018 to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.
|
|
|
5019 </p>
|
|
|
5020 <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p9">
|
|
|
5021 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as
|
|
|
5022 stated in De Anima iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another,
|
|
|
5023 but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible
|
|
|
5024 object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is
|
|
|
5025 sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible
|
|
|
5026 object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes
|
|
|
5027 it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way
|
|
|
5028 in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own perfection, and
|
|
|
5029 its
|
|
|
5030 own intelligible object.
|
|
|
5031 </p>
|
|
|
5032 <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p10">
|
|
|
5033 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now
|
|
|
5034 our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in
|
|
|
5035 potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can
|
|
|
5036 be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the
|
|
|
5037 intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other
|
|
|
5038 things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by
|
|
|
5039 this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible
|
|
|
5040 objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.
|
|
|
5041 </p>
|
|
|
5042 <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5043 <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5044 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5045 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5046 </div>
|
|
|
5047 <div id="FP_Q14_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
5048 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5049 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5050 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A3-p0.1">Whether God comprehends Himself?</h4>
|
|
|
5051 <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5052 <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p2">
|
|
|
5053 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends itself
|
|
|
5054 is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.
|
|
|
5055 </p>
|
|
|
5056 <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p3">
|
|
|
5057 <b>Objection 2:</b> If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God
|
|
|
5058 is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite;
|
|
|
5059 which is against what was laid down above (
|
|
|
5060 <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself.
|
|
|
5061 </p>
|
|
|
5062 <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p4">
|
|
|
5063 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God understands
|
|
|
5064 Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.
|
|
|
5065 </p>
|
|
|
5066 <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p5">
|
|
|
5067 <b>I answer that,</b> God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge
|
|
|
5068 of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable
|
|
|
5069 proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is
|
|
|
5070 manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything
|
|
|
5071 is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but
|
|
|
5072 in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing;
|
|
|
5073 because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above
|
|
|
5074 (
|
|
|
5075 <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that
|
|
|
5076 reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.
|
|
|
5077 </p>
|
|
|
5078 <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p6">
|
|
|
5079 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended
|
|
|
5080 is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as
|
|
|
5081 if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are
|
|
|
5082 to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself,
|
|
|
5083 forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as
|
|
|
5084 nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is comprehended when seen,
|
|
|
5085 if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer."
|
|
|
5086 </p>
|
|
|
5087 <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p7">
|
|
|
5088 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because
|
|
|
5089 He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God
|
|
|
5090 is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite.
|
|
|
5091 </p>
|
|
|
5092 <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p8"></p>
|
|
|
5093 <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p9"></p>
|
|
|
5094 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5095 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5096 </div>
|
|
|
5097 <div id="FP_Q14_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
5098 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5099 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5100 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A4-p0.1">Whether the act of God's intellect is His substance?</h4>
|
|
|
5101 <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5102 <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p2">
|
|
|
5103 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies
|
|
|
5104 something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance.
|
|
|
5105 </p>
|
|
|
5106 <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p3">
|
|
|
5107 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood,
|
|
|
5108 and but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when
|
|
|
5109 we understand our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not be something great.
|
|
|
5110 </p>
|
|
|
5111 <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p4">
|
|
|
5112 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself
|
|
|
5113 is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore
|
|
|
5114 the act of God's intellect is not His substance.
|
|
|
5115 </p>
|
|
|
5116 <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p5">
|
|
|
5117 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand.
|
|
|
5118 Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above (
|
|
|
5119 <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance.
|
|
|
5120 </p>
|
|
|
5121 <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p6">
|
|
|
5122 <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance,
|
|
|
5123 then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which
|
|
|
5124 the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding
|
|
|
5125 is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how
|
|
|
5126 this is. As was laid down above
|
|
|
5127 <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection;
|
|
|
5128 as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand
|
|
|
5129 follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above
|
|
|
5130
|
|
|
5131 <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Hence as His essence itself is also
|
|
|
5132 His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence.
|
|
|
5133 </p>
|
|
|
5134 <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p7"> Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and
|
|
|
5135 His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity
|
|
|
5136 is attached to His substance.
|
|
|
5137 </p>
|
|
|
5138 <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p8">
|
|
|
5139 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in him.
|
|
|
5140 </p>
|
|
|
5141 <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p9">
|
|
|
5142 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand
|
|
|
5143 our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.
|
|
|
5144 </p>
|
|
|
5145 <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its
|
|
|
5146 very self and is not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.
|
|
|
5147 </p>
|
|
|
5148 <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5149 <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5150 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5151 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5152 </div>
|
|
|
5153 <div id="FP_Q14_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
5154 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5155 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5156 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself?</h4>
|
|
|
5157 <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5158 <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p2">
|
|
|
5159 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says
|
|
|
5160 (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other
|
|
|
5161 than Himself.
|
|
|
5162 </p>
|
|
|
5163 <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p3">
|
|
|
5164 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides
|
|
|
5165 Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible.
|
|
|
5166 </p>
|
|
|
5167 <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p4">
|
|
|
5168 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence
|
|
|
5169 the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore
|
|
|
5170 God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be.
|
|
|
5171 Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself.
|
|
|
5172 </p>
|
|
|
5173 <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p5">
|
|
|
5174 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "All things are naked and open to His eyes" (
|
|
|
5175 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.13" target="asv">Heb. 4:13</a>).
|
|
|
5176 </p>
|
|
|
5177 <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p6">
|
|
|
5178 <b>I answer that,</b> God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His
|
|
|
5179 existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows
|
|
|
5180 of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its
|
|
|
5181 power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact
|
|
|
5182 that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (
|
|
|
5183 <a id="FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence
|
|
|
5184 of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in
|
|
|
5185 the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for
|
|
|
5186 everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.
|
|
|
5187 </p>
|
|
|
5188 <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p7"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself,
|
|
|
5189 and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when
|
|
|
5190 the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as
|
|
|
5191 when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the
|
|
|
5192 mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.
|
|
|
5193 </p>
|
|
|
5194 <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p8"> So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in
|
|
|
5195 themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.
|
|
|
5196 </p>
|
|
|
5197 <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p9">
|
|
|
5198 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as
|
|
|
5199 if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above
|
|
|
5200 explained.
|
|
|
5201 </p>
|
|
|
5202 <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p10">
|
|
|
5203 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which
|
|
|
5204 it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image."
|
|
|
5205 Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above
|
|
|
5206 explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the
|
|
|
5207 divine intellect other than the divine essence.
|
|
|
5208 </p>
|
|
|
5209 <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p11">
|
|
|
5210 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other
|
|
|
5211 things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle
|
|
|
5212 of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating
|
|
|
5213 by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible
|
|
|
5214 form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but
|
|
|
5215 His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act,
|
|
|
5216 or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself.
|
|
|
5217 </p>
|
|
|
5218 <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5219 <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p13"></p>
|
|
|
5220 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5221 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5222 </div>
|
|
|
5223 <div id="FP_Q14_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
5224 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5225 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
5226 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4>
|
|
|
5227 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5228 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p2">
|
|
|
5229 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown
|
|
|
5230 <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and
|
|
|
5231 universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper
|
|
|
5232 knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper
|
|
|
5233 knowledge.
|
|
|
5234 </p>
|
|
|
5235 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p3">
|
|
|
5236 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence.
|
|
|
5237 But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created
|
|
|
5238 essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature
|
|
|
5239 is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge
|
|
|
5240 of it.
|
|
|
5241 </p>
|
|
|
5242 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p4">
|
|
|
5243 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence,
|
|
|
5244 it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse
|
|
|
5245 things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by
|
|
|
5246 their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.
|
|
|
5247 </p>
|
|
|
5248 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p5">
|
|
|
5249 <b>On the contrary,</b> To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God
|
|
|
5250 knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the
|
|
|
5251 joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible
|
|
|
5252 in His sight" (
|
|
|
5253 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.12" target="asv">Heb. 4:12,13</a>).
|
|
|
5254 </p>
|
|
|
5255 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p6">
|
|
|
5256 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings.
|
|
|
5257 For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself
|
|
|
5258 as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.
|
|
|
5259 </p>
|
|
|
5260 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p7"> But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect,
|
|
|
5261 when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows
|
|
|
5262 them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge
|
|
|
5263 of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His
|
|
|
5264 understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was
|
|
|
5265 said above (
|
|
|
5266 <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is
|
|
|
5267 common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to
|
|
|
5268 show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for
|
|
|
5269 instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it
|
|
|
5270 would know all colors.
|
|
|
5271 </p>
|
|
|
5272 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p8"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this
|
|
|
5273 respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle
|
|
|
5274 of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light
|
|
|
5275 only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity
|
|
|
5276 of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known
|
|
|
5277 in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above
|
|
|
5278 (
|
|
|
5279 <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not
|
|
|
5280 only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes
|
|
|
5281 them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from
|
|
|
5282 the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its
|
|
|
5283 own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as
|
|
|
5284 regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of
|
|
|
5285 God
|
|
|
5286 is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of
|
|
|
5287 a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect
|
|
|
5288 number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known
|
|
|
5289 not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge;
|
|
|
5290 and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.
|
|
|
5291 </p>
|
|
|
5292 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p9"> As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far
|
|
|
5293 more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree
|
|
|
5294 of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways
|
|
|
5295 in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly,
|
|
|
5296 unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction
|
|
|
5297 from each other.
|
|
|
5298 </p>
|
|
|
5299 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p10">
|
|
|
5300 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of
|
|
|
5301 knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known
|
|
|
5302 according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in
|
|
|
5303 the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone
|
|
|
5304 according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of)
|
|
|
5305 existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower;
|
|
|
5306 thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that
|
|
|
5307 it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to
|
|
|
5308 import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the
|
|
|
5309 object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode
|
|
|
5310 of knowledge.
|
|
|
5311 </p>
|
|
|
5312 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p11"> We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows
|
|
|
5313 them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.
|
|
|
5314 </p>
|
|
|
5315 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p12">
|
|
|
5316 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence
|
|
|
5317 cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse.
|
|
|
5318 </p>
|
|
|
5319 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p13">
|
|
|
5320 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures.
|
|
|
5321 Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate
|
|
|
5322 in, and imitate it.
|
|
|
5323 </p>
|
|
|
5324 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p14"></p>
|
|
|
5325 <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p15"></p>
|
|
|
5326 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5327 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
5328 </div>
|
|
|
5329 <div id="FP_Q14_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
5330 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5331 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
5332 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A7-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</h4>
|
|
|
5333 <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5334 <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p2">
|
|
|
5335 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge.
|
|
|
5336 Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards
|
|
|
5337 only one thing at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (AA 2,5), it seems that
|
|
|
5338 He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another.
|
|
|
5339 </p>
|
|
|
5340 <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p3">
|
|
|
5341 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect
|
|
|
5342 (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.
|
|
|
5343 </p>
|
|
|
5344 <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p4">
|
|
|
5345 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus
|
|
|
5346 we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.
|
|
|
5347 </p>
|
|
|
5348 <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p5">
|
|
|
5349 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately
|
|
|
5350 here and there; but He sees all things together at once."
|
|
|
5351 </p>
|
|
|
5352 <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p6">
|
|
|
5353 <b>I answer that,</b> In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion:
|
|
|
5354 one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something
|
|
|
5355 else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge
|
|
|
5356 of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things,
|
|
|
5357 which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one
|
|
|
5358 thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things
|
|
|
5359 in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of
|
|
|
5360 discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever
|
|
|
5361 proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed
|
|
|
5362 from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the
|
|
|
5363 second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen
|
|
|
5364 in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in
|
|
|
5365 Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.
|
|
|
5366 </p>
|
|
|
5367 <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p7">
|
|
|
5368 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Altogether there is only one act of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium),
|
|
|
5369 as shown above.
|
|
|
5370 </p>
|
|
|
5371 <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p8">
|
|
|
5372 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and
|
|
|
5373 hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.
|
|
|
5374 </p>
|
|
|
5375 <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p9">
|
|
|
5376 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner
|
|
|
5377 that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence
|
|
|
5378 His knowledge is not discursive.
|
|
|
5379 </p>
|
|
|
5380 <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p10"></p>
|
|
|
5381 <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5382 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5383 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
5384 </div>
|
|
|
5385 <div id="FP_Q14_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
5386 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
5387 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
5388 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A8-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</h4>
|
|
|
5389 <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5390 <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p2">
|
|
|
5391 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on
|
|
|
5392 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv"> Rom. 8:30, </a> "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is
|
|
|
5393 future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists."
|
|
|
5394 </p>
|
|
|
5395 <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p3">
|
|
|
5396 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the
|
|
|
5397 cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.
|
|
|
5398 </p>
|
|
|
5399 <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p4">
|
|
|
5400 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior
|
|
|
5401 and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things.
|
|
|
5402 </p>
|
|
|
5403 <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p5">
|
|
|
5404 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows
|
|
|
5405 them, therefore they are."
|
|
|
5406 </p>
|
|
|
5407 <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p6">
|
|
|
5408 <b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer
|
|
|
5409 is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact
|
|
|
5410 that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the
|
|
|
5411 principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that
|
|
|
5412 remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect;
|
|
|
5413 and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands
|
|
|
5414 unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible
|
|
|
5415 form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a
|
|
|
5416 determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is
|
|
|
5417 manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must
|
|
|
5418 be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually
|
|
|
5419 called the "knowledge of approbation."
|
|
|
5420 </p>
|
|
|
5421 <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p7">
|
|
|
5422 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined
|
|
|
5423 to it, as is said above.
|
|
|
5424 </p>
|
|
|
5425 <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p8"> But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to
|
|
|
5426 the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God
|
|
|
5427 knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.
|
|
|
5428 </p>
|
|
|
5429 <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p9">
|
|
|
5430 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was
|
|
|
5431 not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.
|
|
|
5432 </p>
|
|
|
5433 <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p10">
|
|
|
5434 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of
|
|
|
5435 which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its
|
|
|
5436 measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway
|
|
|
5437 between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who
|
|
|
5438 gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.
|
|
|
5439 </p>
|
|
|
5440 <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5441 <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5442 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
5443 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
5444 </div>
|
|
|
5445 <div id="FP_Q14_A9" class="div4">
|
|
|
5446 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
5447 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
5448 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A9-p0.1">Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?</h4>
|
|
|
5449 <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5450 <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p2">
|
|
|
5451 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and "being"
|
|
|
5452 are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not.
|
|
|
5453 </p>
|
|
|
5454 <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p3">
|
|
|
5455 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any
|
|
|
5456 likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God.
|
|
|
5457 </p>
|
|
|
5458 <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p4">
|
|
|
5459 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because
|
|
|
5460 a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not.
|
|
|
5461 </p>
|
|
|
5462 <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p5">
|
|
|
5463 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" (
|
|
|
5464 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.17" target="asv">Rom. 4:17</a>).
|
|
|
5465 </p>
|
|
|
5466 <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p6">
|
|
|
5467 <b>I answer that,</b> God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in
|
|
|
5468 a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either
|
|
|
5469 of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of
|
|
|
5470 any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by
|
|
|
5471 the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can
|
|
|
5472 be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.
|
|
|
5473 </p>
|
|
|
5474 <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p7"> Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them
|
|
|
5475 may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for
|
|
|
5476 since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending
|
|
|
5477 all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time,
|
|
|
5478 as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor
|
|
|
5479 will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so
|
|
|
5480 called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.
|
|
|
5481 </p>
|
|
|
5482 <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p8">
|
|
|
5483 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality;
|
|
|
5484 and as such they are known by God.
|
|
|
5485 </p>
|
|
|
5486 <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p9">
|
|
|
5487 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far
|
|
|
5488 as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act.
|
|
|
5489 </p>
|
|
|
5490 <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p10">
|
|
|
5491 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is,
|
|
|
5492 or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge
|
|
|
5493 of God not that they be, but that they be possible.
|
|
|
5494 </p>
|
|
|
5495 <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5496 <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5497 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
5498 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
5499 </div>
|
|
|
5500 <div id="FP_Q14_A10" class="div4">
|
|
|
5501 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
5502 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
5503 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A10-p0.1">Whether God knows evil things?</h4>
|
|
|
5504 <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5505 <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p2">
|
|
|
5506 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality
|
|
|
5507 does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect
|
|
|
5508 of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A[2] ), it seems that God does not
|
|
|
5509 know evil things.
|
|
|
5510 </p>
|
|
|
5511 <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p3">
|
|
|
5512 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause
|
|
|
5513 of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things.
|
|
|
5514 </p>
|
|
|
5515 <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p4">
|
|
|
5516 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His
|
|
|
5517 essence, as is clear from the foregoing
|
|
|
5518 <a id="FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no
|
|
|
5519 contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.
|
|
|
5520 </p>
|
|
|
5521 <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p5">
|
|
|
5522 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the
|
|
|
5523 thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by
|
|
|
5524 Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.
|
|
|
5525 </p>
|
|
|
5526 <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p6">
|
|
|
5527 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
5528 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.11" target="asv">Prov. 15:11</a>), "Hell and destruction are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."
|
|
|
5529 </p>
|
|
|
5530 <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p7">
|
|
|
5531 <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption
|
|
|
5532 by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is
|
|
|
5533 knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact
|
|
|
5534 that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness.
|
|
|
5535 Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness
|
|
|
5536 except through light."
|
|
|
5537 </p>
|
|
|
5538 <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p8">
|
|
|
5539 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know
|
|
|
5540 privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing
|
|
|
5541 are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only
|
|
|
5542 potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by
|
|
|
5543 privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing
|
|
|
5544 in Himself, but by the opposite good.
|
|
|
5545 </p>
|
|
|
5546 <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p9">
|
|
|
5547 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.
|
|
|
5548 </p>
|
|
|
5549 <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p10">
|
|
|
5550 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God,
|
|
|
5551 which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.
|
|
|
5552 </p>
|
|
|
5553 <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p11">
|
|
|
5554 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is
|
|
|
5555 not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined
|
|
|
5556 nor known except by good.
|
|
|
5557 </p>
|
|
|
5558 <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5559 <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p13"></p>
|
|
|
5560 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
5561 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
5562 </div>
|
|
|
5563 <div id="FP_Q14_A11" class="div4">
|
|
|
5564 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
5565 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
5566 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A11-p0.1">Whether God knows singular things?</h4>
|
|
|
5567 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5568 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p2">
|
|
|
5569 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now
|
|
|
5570 the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii),
|
|
|
5571 "reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not know singular things.
|
|
|
5572 </p>
|
|
|
5573 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p3">
|
|
|
5574 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions.
|
|
|
5575 But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things.
|
|
|
5576 </p>
|
|
|
5577 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p4">
|
|
|
5578 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as
|
|
|
5579 they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality
|
|
|
5580 only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.
|
|
|
5581 </p>
|
|
|
5582 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p5">
|
|
|
5583 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
5584 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>), "All the ways of a man are open to His eyes."
|
|
|
5585 </p>
|
|
|
5586 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p6">
|
|
|
5587 <b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the
|
|
|
5588 foregoing (
|
|
|
5589 <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers
|
|
|
5590 it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph.
|
|
|
5591 iii) that God would be most ignorant if
|
|
|
5592 He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence,
|
|
|
5593 although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless
|
|
|
5594 God knows both by His simple intellect.
|
|
|
5595 </p>
|
|
|
5596 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p7"> Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in
|
|
|
5597 any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the
|
|
|
5598 universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for
|
|
|
5599 singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined
|
|
|
5600 together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because
|
|
|
5601 he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular
|
|
|
5602 man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know
|
|
|
5603 </p>
|
|
|
5604 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p8"> singular things in their singularity.</p>
|
|
|
5605 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p9"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects.
|
|
|
5606 But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said
|
|
|
5607 application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.
|
|
|
5608 </p>
|
|
|
5609 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p10"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above
|
|
|
5610 <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which
|
|
|
5611 are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (
|
|
|
5612 <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since
|
|
|
5613 He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence
|
|
|
5614 must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The
|
|
|
5615 same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.
|
|
|
5616 </p>
|
|
|
5617 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p11">
|
|
|
5618 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our
|
|
|
5619 intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular.
|
|
|
5620 But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of
|
|
|
5621 itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition
|
|
|
5622 of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but
|
|
|
5623 also singular things.
|
|
|
5624 </p>
|
|
|
5625 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p12">
|
|
|
5626 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in
|
|
|
5627 the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things.
|
|
|
5628 </p>
|
|
|
5629 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p13">
|
|
|
5630 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise,
|
|
|
5631 it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.
|
|
|
5632 </p>
|
|
|
5633 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p14"></p>
|
|
|
5634 <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p15"></p>
|
|
|
5635 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
5636 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
5637 </div>
|
|
|
5638 <div id="FP_Q14_A12" class="div4">
|
|
|
5639 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
5640 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html"></a>
|
|
|
5641 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A12-p0.1">Whether God can know infinite things?</h4>
|
|
|
5642 <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5643 <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p2">
|
|
|
5644 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to
|
|
|
5645 those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine
|
|
|
5646 says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite
|
|
|
5647 things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of
|
|
|
5648 God.
|
|
|
5649 </p>
|
|
|
5650 <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p3">
|
|
|
5651 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the
|
|
|
5652 essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the
|
|
|
5653 infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot
|
|
|
5654 be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in
|
|
|
5655 God's knowledge, which is infinite.
|
|
|
5656 </p>
|
|
|
5657 <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p4">
|
|
|
5658 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it
|
|
|
5659 be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.
|
|
|
5660 </p>
|
|
|
5661 <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p5">
|
|
|
5662 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose
|
|
|
5663 knowledge has no bounds."
|
|
|
5664 </p>
|
|
|
5665 <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p6">
|
|
|
5666 <b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above
|
|
|
5667 <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has
|
|
|
5668 relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the
|
|
|
5669 world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so
|
|
|
5670 that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things
|
|
|
5671 even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity
|
|
|
5672 as rational creatures go on for ever.
|
|
|
5673 </p>
|
|
|
5674 <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p7"> The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which
|
|
|
5675 is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give
|
|
|
5676 the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards
|
|
|
5677 its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible
|
|
|
5678 species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in
|
|
|
5679 the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not
|
|
|
5680 as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the
|
|
|
5681 divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal
|
|
|
5682 principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of
|
|
|
5683 God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.
|
|
|
5684 </p>
|
|
|
5685 <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p8">
|
|
|
5686 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order
|
|
|
5687 of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way
|
|
|
5688 the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But
|
|
|
5689 God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after
|
|
|
5690 part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above
|
|
|
5691 <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.
|
|
|
5692 </p>
|
|
|
5693 <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p9">
|
|
|
5694 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor
|
|
|
5695 by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside
|
|
|
5696 the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite
|
|
|
5697 in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not
|
|
|
5698 as if it were traversable.
|
|
|
5699 </p>
|
|
|
5700 <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p10">
|
|
|
5701 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure;
|
|
|
5702 but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which
|
|
|
5703 it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number
|
|
|
5704 of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous
|
|
|
5705 quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and
|
|
|
5706 finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the
|
|
|
5707 knowledge of God.
|
|
|
5708 </p>
|
|
|
5709 <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5710 <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5711 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
5712 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html"></a>
|
|
|
5713 </div>
|
|
|
5714 <div id="FP_Q14_A13" class="div4">
|
|
|
5715 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
5716 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A14.html"></a>
|
|
|
5717 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4>
|
|
|
5718 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5719 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p2">
|
|
|
5720 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect.
|
|
|
5721 But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above
|
|
|
5722 <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
|
|
|
5723 of contingent things.
|
|
|
5724 </p>
|
|
|
5725 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p3">
|
|
|
5726 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary
|
|
|
5727 consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only
|
|
|
5728 a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that
|
|
|
5729 this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the
|
|
|
5730 antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore
|
|
|
5731 the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not
|
|
|
5732 of contingent things.
|
|
|
5733 </p>
|
|
|
5734 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p4">
|
|
|
5735 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course,
|
|
|
5736 the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent
|
|
|
5737 future thing is known by God.
|
|
|
5738 </p>
|
|
|
5739 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p5">
|
|
|
5740 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
5741 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A13-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.15" target="asv">Ps. 32:15</a>), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men
|
|
|
5742 are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.
|
|
|
5743 </p>
|
|
|
5744 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p6">
|
|
|
5745 <b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above
|
|
|
5746 <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future
|
|
|
5747 contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.
|
|
|
5748 </p>
|
|
|
5749 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p7"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far
|
|
|
5750 as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent
|
|
|
5751 (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object
|
|
|
5752 of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
|
|
|
5753 another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as
|
|
|
5754 a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this
|
|
|
5755 sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only,
|
|
|
5756 has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also
|
|
|
5757 as
|
|
|
5758 each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows
|
|
|
5759 contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His
|
|
|
5760 knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said
|
|
|
5761 above (
|
|
|
5762 <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only
|
|
|
5763 because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all
|
|
|
5764 things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch
|
|
|
5765 as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their
|
|
|
5766 own causes.
|
|
|
5767 </p>
|
|
|
5768 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p8">
|
|
|
5769 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as
|
|
|
5770 the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which
|
|
|
5771 is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while
|
|
|
5772 the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.
|
|
|
5773 </p>
|
|
|
5774 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p9">
|
|
|
5775 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although
|
|
|
5776 it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had
|
|
|
5777 relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this
|
|
|
5778 antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as
|
|
|
5779 this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent
|
|
|
5780 to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence
|
|
|
5781 its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or
|
|
|
5782 false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies
|
|
|
5783 to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some
|
|
|
5784 say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent
|
|
|
5785 by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote
|
|
|
5786 necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass
|
|
|
5787 will grow."
|
|
|
5788 </p>
|
|
|
5789 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p10"> Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent
|
|
|
5790 must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the
|
|
|
5791 existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood
|
|
|
5792 that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew
|
|
|
5793 anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality.
|
|
|
5794 And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the
|
|
|
5795 Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.
|
|
|
5796 </p>
|
|
|
5797 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p11">
|
|
|
5798 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time.
|
|
|
5799 Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God
|
|
|
5800 alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after
|
|
|
5801 him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling
|
|
|
5802 by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself,
|
|
|
5803 cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the
|
|
|
5804 divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything
|
|
|
5805 known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it
|
|
|
5806 refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of
|
|
|
5807 the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."
|
|
|
5808 </p>
|
|
|
5809 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p12"> Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject;
|
|
|
5810 thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied
|
|
|
5811 to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true.
|
|
|
5812 But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,
|
|
|
5813 "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what
|
|
|
5814 is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition
|
|
|
5815 inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself
|
|
|
5816 (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus
|
|
|
5817 material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.
|
|
|
5818 </p>
|
|
|
5819 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p13"></p>
|
|
|
5820 <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p14"></p>
|
|
|
5821 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
5822 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A14.html"></a>
|
|
|
5823 </div>
|
|
|
5824 <div id="FP_Q14_A14" class="div4">
|
|
|
5825 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html"></a>
|
|
|
5826 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html"></a>
|
|
|
5827 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A14-p0.1">Whether God knows enunciable things?</h4>
|
|
|
5828 <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5829 <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p2">
|
|
|
5830 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes
|
|
|
5831 and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
|
|
|
5832 </p>
|
|
|
5833 <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p3">
|
|
|
5834 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since
|
|
|
5835 He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
|
|
|
5836 </p>
|
|
|
5837 <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p4">
|
|
|
5838 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men" (
|
|
|
5839 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A14-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.11" target="asv">Ps. 93:11</a>). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable things.
|
|
|
5840 </p>
|
|
|
5841 <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p5">
|
|
|
5842 <b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that
|
|
|
5843 of creatures, as said above
|
|
|
5844 <a id="FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.
|
|
|
5845 </p>
|
|
|
5846 <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p6"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not
|
|
|
5847 after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows
|
|
|
5848 each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand
|
|
|
5849 what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our
|
|
|
5850 intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such
|
|
|
5851 a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which
|
|
|
5852 belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand
|
|
|
5853 as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine
|
|
|
5854 intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences
|
|
|
5855 of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.
|
|
|
5856 </p>
|
|
|
5857 <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p7">
|
|
|
5858 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection would avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things.
|
|
|
5859 </p>
|
|
|
5860 <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p8">
|
|
|
5861 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the
|
|
|
5862 similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.
|
|
|
5863 </p>
|
|
|
5864 <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p9"></p>
|
|
|
5865 <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p10"></p>
|
|
|
5866 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html"></a>
|
|
|
5867 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html"></a>
|
|
|
5868 </div>
|
|
|
5869 <div id="FP_Q14_A15" class="div4">
|
|
|
5870 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A14.html"></a>
|
|
|
5871 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A16.html"></a>
|
|
|
5872 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A15-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</h4>
|
|
|
5873 <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5874 <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p2">
|
|
|
5875 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation
|
|
|
5876 to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of
|
|
|
5877 God is variable according to the variation of creatures.
|
|
|
5878 </p>
|
|
|
5879 <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p3">
|
|
|
5880 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows.
|
|
|
5881 Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.
|
|
|
5882 </p>
|
|
|
5883 <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p4">
|
|
|
5884 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to
|
|
|
5885 be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.
|
|
|
5886 </p>
|
|
|
5887 <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p5">
|
|
|
5888 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, that in God "there is no change nor shadow of alteration" (
|
|
|
5889 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A15-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.17" target="asv">James 1:17</a>).
|
|
|
5890 </p>
|
|
|
5891 <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p6">
|
|
|
5892 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing
|
|
|
5893 <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (
|
|
|
5894 <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.
|
|
|
5895 </p>
|
|
|
5896 <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p7">
|
|
|
5897 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God
|
|
|
5898 imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in
|
|
|
5899 the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We
|
|
|
5900 may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent
|
|
|
5901 upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations
|
|
|
5902 are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import
|
|
|
5903 relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable
|
|
|
5904 manner.
|
|
|
5905 </p>
|
|
|
5906 <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p8">
|
|
|
5907 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not
|
|
|
5908 follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said
|
|
|
5909 to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are
|
|
|
5910 not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His
|
|
|
5911 knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not
|
|
|
5912 previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can
|
|
|
5913 be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time,
|
|
|
5914 it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because
|
|
|
5915 such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew.
|
|
|
5916 </p>
|
|
|
5917 <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p9">
|
|
|
5918 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because
|
|
|
5919 the same thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God
|
|
|
5920 knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion,
|
|
|
5921 however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes
|
|
|
5922 a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which
|
|
|
5923 is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when
|
|
|
5924 he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God
|
|
|
5925 knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God
|
|
|
5926 is
|
|
|
5927 variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and
|
|
|
5928 sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime
|
|
|
5929 true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation,
|
|
|
5930 by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for
|
|
|
5931 example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion
|
|
|
5932 about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was
|
|
|
5933 not sitting; neither of which can be in God.
|
|
|
5934 </p>
|
|
|
5935 <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p10"></p>
|
|
|
5936 <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5937 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A14.html"></a>
|
|
|
5938 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A16.html"></a>
|
|
|
5939 </div>
|
|
|
5940 <div id="FP_Q14_A16" class="div4">
|
|
|
5941 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html"></a>
|
|
|
5942 <a href="summa.FP_Q15.html"></a>
|
|
|
5943 <h4 id="FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4>
|
|
|
5944 <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5945 <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p2">
|
|
|
5946 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above
|
|
|
5947
|
|
|
5948 <a id="FP_Q14_A16-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.
|
|
|
5949 </p>
|
|
|
5950 <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p3">
|
|
|
5951 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore
|
|
|
5952 the knowledge of God is not speculative.
|
|
|
5953 </p>
|
|
|
5954 <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p4">
|
|
|
5955 <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge,
|
|
|
5956 as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.
|
|
|
5957 </p>
|
|
|
5958 <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p5">
|
|
|
5959 <b>I answer that,</b> Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof
|
|
|
5960 whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known,
|
|
|
5961 which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the
|
|
|
5962 manner of knowing---as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing,
|
|
|
5963 and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as
|
|
|
5964 practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its
|
|
|
5965 universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative,"
|
|
|
5966 as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the
|
|
|
5967 end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made,
|
|
|
5968 not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations
|
|
|
5969 as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing
|
|
|
5970 itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative
|
|
|
5971 and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.
|
|
|
5972 </p>
|
|
|
5973 <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p6"> In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself
|
|
|
5974 is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as
|
|
|
5975 regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.
|
|
|
5976 </p>
|
|
|
5977 <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p7"> Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge
|
|
|
5978 is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards
|
|
|
5979 evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch
|
|
|
5980 as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the
|
|
|
5981 physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.
|
|
|
5982 </p>
|
|
|
5983 <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p8">
|
|
|
5984 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is,
|
|
|
5985 of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can
|
|
|
5986 make, and which nevertheless are never made.
|
|
|
5987 </p>
|
|
|
5988 <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p9">
|
|
|
5989 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally
|
|
|
5990 in so far as it is human.
|
|
|
5991 </p>
|
|
|
5992 <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p10"><b>Reply to Objections:</b>
|
|
|
5993 In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if
|
|
|
5994 they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know
|
|
|
5995 what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair
|
|
|
5996 the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He
|
|
|
5997 knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge
|
|
|
5998 of all other things.
|
|
|
5999 </p>
|
|
|
6000 <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p11"></p>
|
|
|
6001 <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p12"></p>
|
|
|
6002 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html"></a>
|
|
|
6003 <a href="summa.FP_Q15.html"></a>
|
|
|
6004 </div>
|
|
|
6005 <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
6006 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
6007 </div>
|
|
|
6008 <div id="FP_Q15" class="div3">
|
|
|
6009 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A16.html"></a>
|
|
|
6010 <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
6011 <h3 id="FP_Q15-p0.1">OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
6012 <p id="FP_Q15-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6013 <p id="FP_Q15-p2"> After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
6014 <p id="FP_Q15-p3"> (1) Whether there are ideas?</p>
|
|
|
6015 <p id="FP_Q15-p4"> (2) Whether they are many, or one only?</p>
|
|
|
6016 <p id="FP_Q15-p5"> (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?</p>
|
|
|
6017 <div id="FP_Q15_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
6018 <a href="summa.FP_Q15.html"></a>
|
|
|
6019 <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
6020 <h4 id="FP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Whether there are ideas?</h4>
|
|
|
6021 <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6022 <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p2">
|
|
|
6023 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are
|
|
|
6024 for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas.
|
|
|
6025 </p>
|
|
|
6026 <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p3">
|
|
|
6027 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (
|
|
|
6028 <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.
|
|
|
6029 </p>
|
|
|
6030 <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p4">
|
|
|
6031 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle
|
|
|
6032 of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.
|
|
|
6033 </p>
|
|
|
6034 <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p5">
|
|
|
6035 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are
|
|
|
6036 understood."
|
|
|
6037 </p>
|
|
|
6038 <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p6">
|
|
|
6039 <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood
|
|
|
6040 the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself
|
|
|
6041 can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge
|
|
|
6042 of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in
|
|
|
6043 him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:
|
|
|
6044 </p>
|
|
|
6045 <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p7"> In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on
|
|
|
6046 account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some
|
|
|
6047 agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as
|
|
|
6048 a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made
|
|
|
6049 pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists
|
|
|
6050 in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like
|
|
|
6051 to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear
|
|
|
6052 later (
|
|
|
6053 <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the
|
|
|
6054 world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.
|
|
|
6055 </p>
|
|
|
6056 <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p8">
|
|
|
6057 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion
|
|
|
6058 of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.
|
|
|
6059 </p>
|
|
|
6060 <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p9">
|
|
|
6061 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except
|
|
|
6062 of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.
|
|
|
6063 </p>
|
|
|
6064 <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p10">
|
|
|
6065 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.
|
|
|
6066 </p>
|
|
|
6067 <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
6068 <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
6069 <a href="summa.FP_Q15.html"></a>
|
|
|
6070 <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
6071 </div>
|
|
|
6072 <div id="FP_Q15_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
6073 <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
6074 <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
6075 <h4 id="FP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Whether ideas are many?</h4>
|
|
|
6076 <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6077 <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p2">
|
|
|
6078 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only
|
|
|
6079 one idea.
|
|
|
6080 </p>
|
|
|
6081 <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p3">
|
|
|
6082 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts
|
|
|
6083 or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
|
|
|
6084 </p>
|
|
|
6085 <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p4">
|
|
|
6086 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on
|
|
|
6087 the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must
|
|
|
6088 be the cause of the eternal.
|
|
|
6089 </p>
|
|
|
6090 <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p5">
|
|
|
6091 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not
|
|
|
6092 from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations.
|
|
|
6093 But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this
|
|
|
6094 is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one,
|
|
|
6095 except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many.
|
|
|
6096 </p>
|
|
|
6097 <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p6">
|
|
|
6098 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things,
|
|
|
6099 they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the
|
|
|
6100 divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with
|
|
|
6101 them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so."
|
|
|
6102 </p>
|
|
|
6103 <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p7">
|
|
|
6104 <b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate
|
|
|
6105 end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now
|
|
|
6106 the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph.
|
|
|
6107 xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the
|
|
|
6108 accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first
|
|
|
6109 creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced.
|
|
|
6110 According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe
|
|
|
6111 was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot
|
|
|
6112 be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot
|
|
|
6113 conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind
|
|
|
6114 there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created
|
|
|
6115 by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily
|
|
|
6116 be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator
|
|
|
6117 as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act.
|
|
|
6118 For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the
|
|
|
6119 house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it
|
|
|
6120 would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist
|
|
|
6121 in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He
|
|
|
6122 knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can
|
|
|
6123 be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according
|
|
|
6124 to
|
|
|
6125 which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable
|
|
|
6126 of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards
|
|
|
6127 other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.
|
|
|
6128 </p>
|
|
|
6129 <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p8">
|
|
|
6130 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type
|
|
|
6131 of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.
|
|
|
6132 </p>
|
|
|
6133 <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p9">
|
|
|
6134 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands
|
|
|
6135 many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this
|
|
|
6136 is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands
|
|
|
6137 the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house,
|
|
|
6138 as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of
|
|
|
6139 the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things
|
|
|
6140 by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as
|
|
|
6141 understood by Him.
|
|
|
6142 </p>
|
|
|
6143 <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p10">
|
|
|
6144 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing
|
|
|
6145 its own essence with these things.
|
|
|
6146 </p>
|
|
|
6147 <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p11">
|
|
|
6148 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby
|
|
|
6149 the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.
|
|
|
6150 </p>
|
|
|
6151 <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
6152 <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
6153 <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
6154 <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
6155 </div>
|
|
|
6156 <div id="FP_Q15_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
6157 <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
6158 <a href="summa.FP_Q16.html"></a>
|
|
|
6159 <h4 id="FP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?</h4>
|
|
|
6160 <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6161 <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p2">
|
|
|
6162 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would
|
|
|
6163 follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.
|
|
|
6164 </p>
|
|
|
6165 <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p3">
|
|
|
6166 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above
|
|
|
6167 <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining
|
|
|
6168 and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
|
|
|
6169 </p>
|
|
|
6170 <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p4">
|
|
|
6171 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
|
|
|
6172 </p>
|
|
|
6173 <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p5">
|
|
|
6174 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas
|
|
|
6175 of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore
|
|
|
6176 there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.
|
|
|
6177 </p>
|
|
|
6178 <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p6">
|
|
|
6179 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper
|
|
|
6180 types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.
|
|
|
6181 </p>
|
|
|
6182 <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p7">
|
|
|
6183 <b>I answer that,</b> As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold
|
|
|
6184 office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an
|
|
|
6185 "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type,"
|
|
|
6186 and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to
|
|
|
6187 everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God,
|
|
|
6188 even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they
|
|
|
6189 are known by Him in a speculative manner.
|
|
|
6190 </p>
|
|
|
6191 <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p8">
|
|
|
6192 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither
|
|
|
6193 in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."
|
|
|
6194 </p>
|
|
|
6195 <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p9">
|
|
|
6196 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect
|
|
|
6197 to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."
|
|
|
6198 </p>
|
|
|
6199 <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p10">
|
|
|
6200 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause
|
|
|
6201 with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God;
|
|
|
6202 but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.
|
|
|
6203 </p>
|
|
|
6204 <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p11">
|
|
|
6205 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except
|
|
|
6206 in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being
|
|
|
6207 along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces
|
|
|
6208 through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;
|
|
|
6209 whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through
|
|
|
6210 some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular
|
|
|
6211 things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because
|
|
|
6212 the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved.
|
|
|
6213 However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (
|
|
|
6214 <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a> ).
|
|
|
6215 </p>
|
|
|
6216 <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
6217 <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
6218 <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
6219 <a href="summa.FP_Q16.html"></a>
|
|
|
6220 </div>
|
|
|
6221 <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A16.html"></a>
|
|
|
6222 <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
6223 </div>
|
|
|
6224 <div id="FP_Q16" class="div3">
|
|
|
6225 <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
6226 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
6227 <h3 id="FP_Q16-p0.1">OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
6228 <p id="FP_Q16-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6229 <p id="FP_Q16-p2"> Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth.
|
|
|
6230 About this there are eight points of inquiry:
|
|
|
6231 </p>
|
|
|
6232 <p id="FP_Q16-p3"> (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?</p>
|
|
|
6233 <p id="FP_Q16-p4"> (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</p>
|
|
|
6234 <p id="FP_Q16-p5"> (3) On the comparison of the true to being.</p>
|
|
|
6235 <p id="FP_Q16-p6"> (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.</p>
|
|
|
6236 <p id="FP_Q16-p7"> (5) Whether God is truth?</p>
|
|
|
6237 <p id="FP_Q16-p8"> (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?</p>
|
|
|
6238 <p id="FP_Q16-p9"> (7) On the eternity of truth.</p>
|
|
|
6239 <p id="FP_Q16-p10"> (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.</p>
|
|
|
6240 <div id="FP_Q16_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
6241 <a href="summa.FP_Q16.html"></a>
|
|
|
6242 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
6243 <h4 id="FP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect?</h4>
|
|
|
6244 <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6245 <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p2">
|
|
|
6246 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns
|
|
|
6247 this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth
|
|
|
6248 would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the
|
|
|
6249 knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true,
|
|
|
6250 unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides
|
|
|
6251 in things, and not in the intellect.
|
|
|
6252 </p>
|
|
|
6253 <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p3">
|
|
|
6254 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except
|
|
|
6255 in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true
|
|
|
6256 is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.
|
|
|
6257 </p>
|
|
|
6258 <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p4">
|
|
|
6259 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But
|
|
|
6260 it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam.
|
|
|
6261 iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.
|
|
|
6262 </p>
|
|
|
6263 <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p5">
|
|
|
6264 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect."
|
|
|
6265 </p>
|
|
|
6266 <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p6">
|
|
|
6267 <b>I answer that,</b> As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now
|
|
|
6268 there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according
|
|
|
6269 as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the
|
|
|
6270 term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect,
|
|
|
6271 namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite---and
|
|
|
6272 hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good
|
|
|
6273 if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect
|
|
|
6274 of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be
|
|
|
6275 true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either
|
|
|
6276 essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally
|
|
|
6277 to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect,
|
|
|
6278 but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.
|
|
|
6279 </p>
|
|
|
6280 <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p7"> Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said
|
|
|
6281 to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things
|
|
|
6282 are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form
|
|
|
6283 in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
|
|
|
6284 intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are
|
|
|
6285 in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception
|
|
|
6286 in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they
|
|
|
6287 are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera
|
|
|
6288 Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being
|
|
|
6289 clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as
|
|
|
6290 they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without
|
|
|
6291 any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone";
|
|
|
6292 for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each
|
|
|
6293 thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought
|
|
|
6294 and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.
|
|
|
6295 </p>
|
|
|
6296 <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p8">
|
|
|
6297 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for
|
|
|
6298 what is accidental is excluded from every definition.
|
|
|
6299 </p>
|
|
|
6300 <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p9">
|
|
|
6301 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by
|
|
|
6302 chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their
|
|
|
6303 relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph.
|
|
|
6304 iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their
|
|
|
6305 relation to the divine intellect.
|
|
|
6306 </p>
|
|
|
6307 <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p10">
|
|
|
6308 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily,
|
|
|
6309 any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not
|
|
|
6310 its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth,
|
|
|
6311 is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought
|
|
|
6312 or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true."
|
|
|
6313 </p>
|
|
|
6314 <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
6315 <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
6316 <a href="summa.FP_Q16.html"></a>
|
|
|
6317 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
6318 </div>
|
|
|
6319 <div id="FP_Q16_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
6320 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
6321 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
6322 <h4 id="FP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</h4>
|
|
|
6323 <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6324 <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p2">
|
|
|
6325 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii)
|
|
|
6326 that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing
|
|
|
6327 is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth
|
|
|
6328 does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.
|
|
|
6329 </p>
|
|
|
6330 <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p3">
|
|
|
6331 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect
|
|
|
6332 with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense
|
|
|
6333 apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.
|
|
|
6334 </p>
|
|
|
6335 <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p4">
|
|
|
6336 <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the
|
|
|
6337 intellect nor in things."
|
|
|
6338 </p>
|
|
|
6339 <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p5">
|
|
|
6340 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has
|
|
|
6341 the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the
|
|
|
6342 thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and
|
|
|
6343 hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For
|
|
|
6344 although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen
|
|
|
6345 and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing;
|
|
|
6346 yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to
|
|
|
6347 the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing:
|
|
|
6348 for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by
|
|
|
6349 the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a
|
|
|
6350 thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words.
|
|
|
6351 Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not
|
|
|
6352 as the
|
|
|
6353 thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore,
|
|
|
6354 properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing
|
|
|
6355 "what a thing is."
|
|
|
6356 </p>
|
|
|
6357 <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p6"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p>
|
|
|
6358 <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p7"></p>
|
|
|
6359 <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p8"></p>
|
|
|
6360 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
6361 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
6362 </div>
|
|
|
6363 <div id="FP_Q16_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
6364 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
6365 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
6366 <h4 id="FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4>
|
|
|
6367 <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6368 <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p2">
|
|
|
6369 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated
|
|
|
6370 <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.
|
|
|
6371 </p>
|
|
|
6372 <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p3">
|
|
|
6373 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being;
|
|
|
6374 for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.
|
|
|
6375 </p>
|
|
|
6376 <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p4">
|
|
|
6377 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true
|
|
|
6378 appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are
|
|
|
6379 not convertible.
|
|
|
6380 </p>
|
|
|
6381 <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p5">
|
|
|
6382 <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.
|
|
|
6383 </p>
|
|
|
6384 <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p6">
|
|
|
6385 <b>I answer that,</b> As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being,
|
|
|
6386 so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses
|
|
|
6387 and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion
|
|
|
6388 of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.
|
|
|
6389 </p>
|
|
|
6390 <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p7">
|
|
|
6391 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before
|
|
|
6392 <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible
|
|
|
6393 with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already
|
|
|
6394 <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the
|
|
|
6395 intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.
|
|
|
6396 </p>
|
|
|
6397 <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p8">
|
|
|
6398 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable.
|
|
|
6399 Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.
|
|
|
6400 </p>
|
|
|
6401 <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p9">
|
|
|
6402 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways.
|
|
|
6403 In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and
|
|
|
6404 this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended
|
|
|
6405 also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be
|
|
|
6406 apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object
|
|
|
6407 with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility
|
|
|
6408 is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.
|
|
|
6409 </p>
|
|
|
6410 <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
6411 <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
6412 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
6413 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
6414 </div>
|
|
|
6415 <div id="FP_Q16_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
6416 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
6417 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
6418 <h4 id="FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Whether good is logically prior to the true?</h4>
|
|
|
6419 <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6420 <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p2">
|
|
|
6421 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys.
|
|
|
6422 i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the
|
|
|
6423 good is logically prior to the true.
|
|
|
6424 </p>
|
|
|
6425 <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p3">
|
|
|
6426 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above
|
|
|
6427 <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.
|
|
|
6428 </p>
|
|
|
6429 <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p4">
|
|
|
6430 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine
|
|
|
6431 says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.
|
|
|
6432 </p>
|
|
|
6433 <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p5">
|
|
|
6434 <b>On the contrary,</b> What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics.
|
|
|
6435 Therefore the true is prior to good.
|
|
|
6436 </p>
|
|
|
6437 <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p6">
|
|
|
6438 <b>I answer that,</b> Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner
|
|
|
6439 the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related
|
|
|
6440 to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in
|
|
|
6441 so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident
|
|
|
6442 from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the
|
|
|
6443 appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good.
|
|
|
6444 </p>
|
|
|
6445 <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p7">
|
|
|
6446 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect
|
|
|
6447 to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect;
|
|
|
6448 and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas
|
|
|
6449 in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the
|
|
|
6450 fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that
|
|
|
6451 it is prior absolutely.
|
|
|
6452 </p>
|
|
|
6453 <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p8">
|
|
|
6454 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself;
|
|
|
6455 secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being
|
|
|
6456 is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.
|
|
|
6457 </p>
|
|
|
6458 <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p9">
|
|
|
6459 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself
|
|
|
6460 in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills
|
|
|
6461 in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things
|
|
|
6462 <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he
|
|
|
6463 fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.
|
|
|
6464 </p>
|
|
|
6465 <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
6466 <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
6467 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
6468 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
6469 </div>
|
|
|
6470 <div id="FP_Q16_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
6471 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
6472 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
6473 <h4 id="FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Whether God is truth?</h4>
|
|
|
6474 <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6475 <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p2">
|
|
|
6476 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition
|
|
|
6477 and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.
|
|
|
6478 </p>
|
|
|
6479 <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p3">
|
|
|
6480 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness
|
|
|
6481 to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.
|
|
|
6482 </p>
|
|
|
6483 <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p4">
|
|
|
6484 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause
|
|
|
6485 of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But
|
|
|
6486 it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.
|
|
|
6487 </p>
|
|
|
6488 <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p5">
|
|
|
6489 <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (
|
|
|
6490 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>).
|
|
|
6491 </p>
|
|
|
6492 <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p6">
|
|
|
6493 <b>I answer that,</b> As said above
|
|
|
6494 <a id="FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being
|
|
|
6495 conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect,
|
|
|
6496 but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of
|
|
|
6497 every other intellect, and He Himself is His
|
|
|
6498 own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and
|
|
|
6499 the sovereign and first truth.
|
|
|
6500 </p>
|
|
|
6501 <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p7">
|
|
|
6502 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges
|
|
|
6503 of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.
|
|
|
6504 </p>
|
|
|
6505 <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p8">
|
|
|
6506 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it
|
|
|
6507 receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect.
|
|
|
6508 Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son,
|
|
|
6509 Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot
|
|
|
6510 understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because
|
|
|
6511 He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence
|
|
|
6512 is not dissimilar to His intellect.
|
|
|
6513 </p>
|
|
|
6514 <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p9">
|
|
|
6515 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension
|
|
|
6516 of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is
|
|
|
6517 entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident.
|
|
|
6518 </p>
|
|
|
6519 <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p10"></p>
|
|
|
6520 <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p11"></p>
|
|
|
6521 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
6522 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
6523 </div>
|
|
|
6524 <div id="FP_Q16_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
6525 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
6526 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
6527 <h4 id="FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?</h4>
|
|
|
6528 <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6529 <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p2">
|
|
|
6530 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1),
|
|
|
6531 "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would
|
|
|
6532 be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore
|
|
|
6533 God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God.
|
|
|
6534 </p>
|
|
|
6535 <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p3">
|
|
|
6536 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things."
|
|
|
6537 But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.
|
|
|
6538 </p>
|
|
|
6539 <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p4">
|
|
|
6540 <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written (
|
|
|
6541 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men."
|
|
|
6542 </p>
|
|
|
6543 <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p5">
|
|
|
6544 <b>I answer that,</b> In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider
|
|
|
6545 that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as
|
|
|
6546 animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only
|
|
|
6547 one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So
|
|
|
6548 healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health
|
|
|
6549 of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far
|
|
|
6550 as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby
|
|
|
6551 the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said
|
|
|
6552 <a id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the
|
|
|
6553 intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth,
|
|
|
6554 as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and
|
|
|
6555 even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on
|
|
|
6556 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv"> Ps. 11:2, </a> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror,
|
|
|
6557 so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are
|
|
|
6558 true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or
|
|
|
6559 forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.
|
|
|
6560 </p>
|
|
|
6561 <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p6">
|
|
|
6562 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected
|
|
|
6563 in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary
|
|
|
6564 truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not
|
|
|
6565 simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
|
|
|
6566 science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul,
|
|
|
6567 except God.
|
|
|
6568 </p>
|
|
|
6569 <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p7">
|
|
|
6570 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.
|
|
|
6571 </p>
|
|
|
6572 <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p8"></p>
|
|
|
6573 <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p9"></p>
|
|
|
6574 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
6575 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
6576 </div>
|
|
|
6577 <div id="FP_Q16_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
6578 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
6579 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
6580 <h4 id="FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Whether created truth is eternal?</h4>
|
|
|
6581 <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6582 <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p2">
|
|
|
6583 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature
|
|
|
6584 of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is
|
|
|
6585 eternal.
|
|
|
6586 </p>
|
|
|
6587 <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p3">
|
|
|
6588 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore
|
|
|
6589 is truth, which is the most universal.
|
|
|
6590 </p>
|
|
|
6591 <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p4">
|
|
|
6592 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding
|
|
|
6593 the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.
|
|
|
6594 </p>
|
|
|
6595 <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p5">
|
|
|
6596 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for
|
|
|
6597 if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of
|
|
|
6598 truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is
|
|
|
6599 after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is
|
|
|
6600 eternal.
|
|
|
6601 </p>
|
|
|
6602 <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p6">
|
|
|
6603 <b>On the contrary,</b> God alone is eternal, as laid down before (
|
|
|
6604 <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html">Q[10], A[3]</a>).
|
|
|
6605 </p>
|
|
|
6606 <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p7">
|
|
|
6607 <b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in
|
|
|
6608 speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable
|
|
|
6609 truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as
|
|
|
6610 though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but
|
|
|
6611 from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from
|
|
|
6612 the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect
|
|
|
6613 is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the
|
|
|
6614 truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already
|
|
|
6615 <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html">(A[5])</a>.
|
|
|
6616 </p>
|
|
|
6617 <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p8">
|
|
|
6618 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.
|
|
|
6619 </p>
|
|
|
6620 <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p9">
|
|
|
6621 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension
|
|
|
6622 to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself
|
|
|
6623 determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of
|
|
|
6624 all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere
|
|
|
6625 and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are
|
|
|
6626 eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.
|
|
|
6627 </p>
|
|
|
6628 <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p10">
|
|
|
6629 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause
|
|
|
6630 were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that
|
|
|
6631 it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone
|
|
|
6632 is such a cause.
|
|
|
6633 </p>
|
|
|
6634 <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p11">
|
|
|
6635 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but
|
|
|
6636 it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason
|
|
|
6637 of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and
|
|
|
6638 this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by
|
|
|
6639 reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only
|
|
|
6640 so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being
|
|
|
6641 as preceding its being.
|
|
|
6642 </p>
|
|
|
6643 <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p12"></p>
|
|
|
6644 <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p13"></p>
|
|
|
6645 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
6646 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
6647 </div>
|
|
|
6648 <div id="FP_Q16_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
6649 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
6650 <a href="summa.FP_Q17.html"></a>
|
|
|
6651 <h4 id="FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Whether truth is immutable?</h4>
|
|
|
6652 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6653 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p2">
|
|
|
6654 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals,
|
|
|
6655 otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."
|
|
|
6656 </p>
|
|
|
6657 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p3">
|
|
|
6658 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains
|
|
|
6659 after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing
|
|
|
6660 is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable.
|
|
|
6661 </p>
|
|
|
6662 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p4">
|
|
|
6663 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change.
|
|
|
6664 For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in
|
|
|
6665 the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification
|
|
|
6666 that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit.
|
|
|
6667 Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.
|
|
|
6668 </p>
|
|
|
6669 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p5">
|
|
|
6670 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three
|
|
|
6671 propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the
|
|
|
6672 true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other.
|
|
|
6673 </p>
|
|
|
6674 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p6">
|
|
|
6675 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
6676 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men."
|
|
|
6677 </p>
|
|
|
6678 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p7">
|
|
|
6679 <b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before
|
|
|
6680 <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded
|
|
|
6681 from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity
|
|
|
6682 may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in
|
|
|
6683 one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself
|
|
|
6684 has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change
|
|
|
6685 from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of
|
|
|
6686 which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said
|
|
|
6687 before (
|
|
|
6688 <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself
|
|
|
6689 the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable.
|
|
|
6690 Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether
|
|
|
6691 immutable.
|
|
|
6692 </p>
|
|
|
6693 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p8">
|
|
|
6694 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of divine truth.
|
|
|
6695 </p>
|
|
|
6696 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p9">
|
|
|
6697 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally,
|
|
|
6698 in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no
|
|
|
6699 truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before.
|
|
|
6700 </p>
|
|
|
6701 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p10">
|
|
|
6702 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which
|
|
|
6703 is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates
|
|
|
6704 the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth
|
|
|
6705 of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore
|
|
|
6706 this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression
|
|
|
6707 is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the
|
|
|
6708 first truth remains, but the second is changed.
|
|
|
6709 </p>
|
|
|
6710 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p11">
|
|
|
6711 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when
|
|
|
6712 Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these
|
|
|
6713 propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that
|
|
|
6714 the same truth remains invariable.
|
|
|
6715 </p>
|
|
|
6716 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p12"></p>
|
|
|
6717 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p13"></p>
|
|
|
6718 <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p14"></p>
|
|
|
6719 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
6720 <a href="summa.FP_Q17.html"></a>
|
|
|
6721 </div>
|
|
|
6722 <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
6723 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
6724 </div>
|
|
|
6725 <div id="FP_Q17" class="div3">
|
|
|
6726 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
6727 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
6728 <h3 id="FP_Q17-p0.1">CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
6729 <p id="FP_Q17-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6730 <p id="FP_Q17-p2"> We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:</p>
|
|
|
6731 <p id="FP_Q17-p3"> (1) Whether falsity exists in things?</p>
|
|
|
6732 <p id="FP_Q17-p4"> (2) Whether it exists in the sense?</p>
|
|
|
6733 <p id="FP_Q17-p5"> (3) Whether it exists in the intellect?</p>
|
|
|
6734 <p id="FP_Q17-p6"> (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.</p>
|
|
|
6735 <div id="FP_Q17_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
6736 <a href="summa.FP_Q17.html"></a>
|
|
|
6737 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
6738 <h4 id="FP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether falsity exists in things?</h4>
|
|
|
6739 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6740 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p2">
|
|
|
6741 <b>Objection 1:</b> It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it
|
|
|
6742 will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary."
|
|
|
6743 </p>
|
|
|
6744 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p3">
|
|
|
6745 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
|
|
|
6746 33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things.
|
|
|
6747 </p>
|
|
|
6748 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p4">
|
|
|
6749 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above
|
|
|
6750 <a id="FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16.html">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus
|
|
|
6751 nothing is false.
|
|
|
6752 </p>
|
|
|
6753 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p5">
|
|
|
6754 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity."
|
|
|
6755 But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.
|
|
|
6756 </p>
|
|
|
6757 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p6">
|
|
|
6758 <b>I answer that,</b> Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where
|
|
|
6759 primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation
|
|
|
6760 to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively
|
|
|
6761 by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when
|
|
|
6762 compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as
|
|
|
6763 directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as
|
|
|
6764 artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they
|
|
|
6765 fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper
|
|
|
6766 operation of his art.
|
|
|
6767 </p>
|
|
|
6768 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p7"> In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since
|
|
|
6769 whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents
|
|
|
6770 only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins
|
|
|
6771 themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love
|
|
|
6772 vanity, and seek after lying?" (
|
|
|
6773 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.3" target="asv">Ps. 4:3</a>): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect.
|
|
|
6774 Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" (
|
|
|
6775 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.3.21" target="asv">Jn. 3:21</a>).
|
|
|
6776 </p>
|
|
|
6777 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p8"> But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply,
|
|
|
6778 but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as
|
|
|
6779 being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards
|
|
|
6780 any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the
|
|
|
6781 Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even
|
|
|
6782 as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be
|
|
|
6783 called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it
|
|
|
6784 is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally
|
|
|
6785 and
|
|
|
6786 naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves,
|
|
|
6787 are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine
|
|
|
6788 says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says
|
|
|
6789 (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In
|
|
|
6790 this
|
|
|
6791 way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many
|
|
|
6792 wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.
|
|
|
6793 </p>
|
|
|
6794 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p9">
|
|
|
6795 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not.
|
|
|
6796 Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain
|
|
|
6797 non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.
|
|
|
6798 </p>
|
|
|
6799 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p10">
|
|
|
6800 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear
|
|
|
6801 to things which they actually are not.
|
|
|
6802 </p>
|
|
|
6803 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p11">
|
|
|
6804 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as
|
|
|
6805 compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.
|
|
|
6806 </p>
|
|
71
|
6807 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p12"><b>Reply to further objection:</b> To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity
|
|
62
|
6808 except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles
|
|
|
6809 another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in
|
|
|
6810 the majority of instances.
|
|
|
6811 </p>
|
|
|
6812 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p13"></p>
|
|
|
6813 <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p14"></p>
|
|
|
6814 <a href="summa.FP_Q17.html"></a>
|
|
|
6815 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
6816 </div>
|
|
|
6817 <div id="FP_Q17_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
6818 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
6819 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
6820 <h4 id="FP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether there is falsity in the senses?</h4>
|
|
|
6821 <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6822 <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p2">
|
|
|
6823 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they
|
|
|
6824 are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and
|
|
|
6825 therefore that falsity is not in them.
|
|
|
6826 </p>
|
|
|
6827 <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p3">
|
|
|
6828 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.
|
|
|
6829 </p>
|
|
|
6830 <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p4">
|
|
|
6831 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation
|
|
|
6832 do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.
|
|
|
6833 </p>
|
|
|
6834 <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p5">
|
|
|
6835 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."
|
|
|
6836 </p>
|
|
|
6837 <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p6">
|
|
|
6838 <b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the
|
|
|
6839 senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (
|
|
|
6840 <a id="FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the
|
|
|
6841 senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really
|
|
|
6842 are.
|
|
|
6843 </p>
|
|
|
6844 <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p7"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness
|
|
|
6845 of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is
|
|
|
6846 the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as
|
|
|
6847 in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly,
|
|
|
6848 neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in
|
|
|
6849 so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.
|
|
|
6850 </p>
|
|
|
6851 <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p8"> Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound
|
|
|
6852 organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive
|
|
|
6853 defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems
|
|
|
6854 bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed
|
|
|
6855 sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being
|
|
|
6856 directed to other things.
|
|
|
6857 </p>
|
|
|
6858 <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p9">
|
|
|
6859 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that
|
|
|
6860 we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected
|
|
|
6861 erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense
|
|
|
6862 about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.
|
|
|
6863 </p>
|
|
|
6864 <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p10">
|
|
|
6865 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation
|
|
|
6866 it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it
|
|
|
6867 represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were
|
|
|
6868 the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason
|
|
|
6869 the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness
|
|
|
6870 of things that are not present in substance.
|
|
|
6871 </p>
|
|
|
6872 <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p11">
|
|
|
6873 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.
|
|
|
6874 </p>
|
|
|
6875 <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
6876 <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
6877 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
6878 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
6879 </div>
|
|
|
6880 <div id="FP_Q17_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
6881 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
6882 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
6883 <h4 id="FP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether falsity is in the intellect?</h4>
|
|
|
6884 <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6885 <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p2">
|
|
|
6886 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands
|
|
|
6887 not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore
|
|
|
6888 falsity does not exist in the intellect.
|
|
|
6889 </p>
|
|
|
6890 <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p3">
|
|
|
6891 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the
|
|
|
6892 intellect.
|
|
|
6893 </p>
|
|
|
6894 <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p4">
|
|
|
6895 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood."
|
|
|
6896 But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.
|
|
|
6897 </p>
|
|
|
6898 <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p5">
|
|
|
6899 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence,
|
|
|
6900 as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent
|
|
|
6901 qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in
|
|
|
6902 knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail
|
|
|
6903 with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said
|
|
|
6904 <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about
|
|
|
6905 accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect
|
|
|
6906 by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the
|
|
|
6907 sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of
|
|
|
6908 which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in
|
|
|
6909 the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects.
|
|
|
6910 There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (
|
|
|
6911 <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can
|
|
|
6912 exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas
|
|
|
6913 in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above
|
|
|
6914 <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a>.
|
|
|
6915 </p>
|
|
|
6916 <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p6"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs
|
|
|
6917 also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of
|
|
|
6918 the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition
|
|
|
6919 proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another.
|
|
|
6920 In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false
|
|
|
6921 of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the
|
|
|
6922 intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this
|
|
|
6923 reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing
|
|
|
6924 at
|
|
|
6925 all.
|
|
|
6926 </p>
|
|
|
6927 <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p7">
|
|
|
6928 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we
|
|
|
6929 reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this
|
|
|
6930 sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not
|
|
|
6931 in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.
|
|
|
6932 </p>
|
|
|
6933 <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p8">
|
|
|
6934 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it
|
|
|
6935 is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood,
|
|
|
6936 from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.
|
|
|
6937 </p>
|
|
|
6938 <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p9"></p>
|
|
|
6939 <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
6940 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
6941 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
6942 </div>
|
|
|
6943 <div id="FP_Q17_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
6944 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
6945 <a href="summa.FP_Q18.html"></a>
|
|
|
6946 <h4 id="FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Whether true and false are contraries?</h4>
|
|
|
6947 <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6948 <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p2">
|
|
|
6949 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for
|
|
|
6950 "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as
|
|
|
6951 contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.
|
|
|
6952 </p>
|
|
|
6953 <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p3">
|
|
|
6954 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10),
|
|
|
6955 "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.
|
|
|
6956 </p>
|
|
|
6957 <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p4">
|
|
|
6958 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
|
|
|
6959 xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (
|
|
|
6960 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.8.5" target="asv">Jer. 8:5</a>), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.
|
|
|
6961 </p>
|
|
|
6962 <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p5">
|
|
|
6963 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.
|
|
|
6964 </p>
|
|
|
6965 <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p6">
|
|
|
6966 <b>I answer that,</b> True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must
|
|
|
6967 be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of
|
|
|
6968 not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it
|
|
|
6969 is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said
|
|
|
6970 except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness
|
|
|
6971 is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch
|
|
|
6972 as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate
|
|
|
6973 apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.
|
|
|
6974 </p>
|
|
|
6975 <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p7">
|
|
|
6976 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily
|
|
|
6977 resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for,
|
|
|
6978 as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good."
|
|
|
6979 </p>
|
|
|
6980 <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p8">
|
|
|
6981 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to
|
|
|
6982 it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible
|
|
|
6983 with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and
|
|
|
6984 every falsity in some truth.
|
|
|
6985 </p>
|
|
|
6986 <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p9">
|
|
|
6987 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing
|
|
|
6988 contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be
|
|
|
6989 nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true.
|
|
|
6990 So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false
|
|
|
6991 opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.
|
|
|
6992 </p>
|
|
|
6993 <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
6994 <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
6995 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
6996 <a href="summa.FP_Q18.html"></a>
|
|
|
6997 </div>
|
|
|
6998 <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
6999 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
7000 </div>
|
|
|
7001 <div id="FP_Q18" class="div3">
|
|
|
7002 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
7003 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
7004 <h3 id="FP_Q18-p0.1">THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
7005 <p id="FP_Q18-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7006 <p id="FP_Q18-p2"> Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the
|
|
|
7007 divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise:
|
|
|
7008 </p>
|
|
|
7009 <p id="FP_Q18-p3"> (1) To whom does it belong to live?</p>
|
|
|
7010 <p id="FP_Q18-p4"> (2) What is life?</p>
|
|
|
7011 <p id="FP_Q18-p5"> (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?</p>
|
|
|
7012 <p id="FP_Q18-p6"> (4) Whether all things in God are life?</p>
|
|
|
7013 <div id="FP_Q18_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
7014 <a href="summa.FP_Q18.html"></a>
|
|
|
7015 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
7016 <h4 id="FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether to live belongs to all natural things?</h4>
|
|
|
7017 <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7018 <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p2">
|
|
|
7019 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind
|
|
|
7020 of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural
|
|
|
7021 things partake of life.
|
|
|
7022 </p>
|
|
|
7023 <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p3">
|
|
|
7024 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement
|
|
|
7025 is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57).
|
|
|
7026 Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.
|
|
|
7027 </p>
|
|
|
7028 <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p4">
|
|
|
7029 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living
|
|
|
7030 waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.
|
|
|
7031 </p>
|
|
|
7032 <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p5">
|
|
|
7033 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life
|
|
|
7034 is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.
|
|
|
7035 </p>
|
|
|
7036 <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p6">
|
|
|
7037 <b>I answer that,</b> We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life
|
|
|
7038 manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must,
|
|
|
7039 therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live:
|
|
|
7040 and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal
|
|
|
7041 begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to
|
|
|
7042 be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail,
|
|
|
7043 and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind
|
|
|
7044 of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality,
|
|
|
7045 is
|
|
|
7046 called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling
|
|
|
7047 are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any
|
|
|
7048 kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude.
|
|
|
7049 </p>
|
|
|
7050 <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p7">
|
|
|
7051 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of
|
|
|
7052 the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a
|
|
|
7053 similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal
|
|
|
7054 natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals.
|
|
|
7055 Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence,
|
|
|
7056 if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact
|
|
|
7057 have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.
|
|
|
7058 </p>
|
|
|
7059 <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p8">
|
|
|
7060 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions,
|
|
|
7061 and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest.
|
|
|
7062 Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching
|
|
|
7063 thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from
|
|
|
7064 such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force,
|
|
|
7065 either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves,
|
|
|
7066 as do living bodies.
|
|
|
7067 </p>
|
|
|
7068 <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p9">
|
|
|
7069 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing
|
|
|
7070 source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to
|
|
|
7071 possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs
|
|
|
7072 is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the
|
|
|
7073 case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.
|
|
|
7074 </p>
|
|
|
7075 <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
7076 <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
7077 <a href="summa.FP_Q18.html"></a>
|
|
|
7078 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
7079 </div>
|
|
|
7080 <div id="FP_Q18_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
7081 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
7082 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
7083 <h4 id="FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether life is an operation?</h4>
|
|
|
7084 <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7085 <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p2">
|
|
|
7086 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain
|
|
|
7087 operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment,
|
|
|
7088 sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.
|
|
|
7089 </p>
|
|
|
7090 <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p3">
|
|
|
7091 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from
|
|
|
7092 the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.
|
|
|
7093 </p>
|
|
|
7094 <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p4">
|
|
|
7095 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of
|
|
|
7096 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.18.3" target="asv"> Jn. 18:3, </a> "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation.
|
|
|
7097 </p>
|
|
|
7098 <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p5">
|
|
|
7099 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be."
|
|
|
7100 </p>
|
|
|
7101 <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p6">
|
|
|
7102 <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said (
|
|
|
7103 <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which
|
|
|
7104 the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things.
|
|
|
7105 And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (
|
|
|
7106 <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly
|
|
|
7107 to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote
|
|
|
7108 the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances
|
|
|
7109 from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the
|
|
|
7110 dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is
|
|
|
7111 given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance
|
|
|
7112 to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is
|
|
|
7113 nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running"
|
|
|
7114 denotes "to run" in the abstract.
|
|
|
7115 </p>
|
|
|
7116 <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p7"> Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations
|
|
|
7117 from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.
|
|
|
7118 </p>
|
|
|
7119 <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p8">
|
|
|
7120 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence
|
|
|
7121 and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic.
|
|
|
7122 ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding.
|
|
|
7123 Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in
|
|
|
7124 this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking
|
|
|
7125 nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case
|
|
|
7126 of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals,
|
|
|
7127 such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.
|
|
|
7128 </p>
|
|
|
7129 <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p9">
|
|
|
7130 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces
|
|
|
7131 such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as
|
|
|
7132 are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular
|
|
|
7133 kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by
|
|
|
7134 a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his
|
|
|
7135 whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence,
|
|
|
7136 others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said
|
|
|
7137 to be life eternal.
|
|
|
7138 </p>
|
|
71
|
7139 <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p>
|
|
62
|
7140 <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
7141 <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
7142 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
7143 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
7144 </div>
|
|
|
7145 <div id="FP_Q18_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
7146 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
7147 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
7148 <h4 id="FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4>
|
|
|
7149 <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7150 <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p2">
|
|
|
7151 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously
|
|
|
7152 stated
|
|
|
7153 <a id="FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life.
|
|
|
7154 </p>
|
|
|
7155 <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p3">
|
|
|
7156 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima
|
|
|
7157 ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed
|
|
|
7158 to Him.
|
|
|
7159 </p>
|
|
|
7160 <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p4">
|
|
|
7161 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal
|
|
|
7162 things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.
|
|
|
7163 </p>
|
|
|
7164 <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p5">
|
|
|
7165 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
7166 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv">Ps. 83:3</a>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God."
|
|
|
7167 </p>
|
|
|
7168 <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p6">
|
|
|
7169 <b>I answer that,</b> Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live
|
|
|
7170 in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more
|
|
|
7171 perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the
|
|
|
7172 end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and
|
|
|
7173 sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does
|
|
|
7174 no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally
|
|
|
7175 inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action
|
|
|
7176 being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their
|
|
|
7177 inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.
|
|
|
7178 </p>
|
|
|
7179 <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p7"> Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as
|
|
|
7180 regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which
|
|
|
7181 the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their
|
|
|
7182 sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move
|
|
|
7183 only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as
|
|
|
7184 have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves,
|
|
|
7185 can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the
|
|
|
7186 form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of
|
|
|
7187 their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any
|
|
|
7188 action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose
|
|
|
7189 are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between
|
|
|
7190 the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible
|
|
|
7191 beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual
|
|
|
7192 faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the
|
|
|
7193 art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that
|
|
|
7194 is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.
|
|
|
7195 </p>
|
|
|
7196 <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p8"> But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which
|
|
|
7197 it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself,
|
|
|
7198 yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature,
|
|
|
7199 and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect
|
|
|
7200 degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing
|
|
|
7201 God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.
|
|
|
7202 </p>
|
|
|
7203 <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p9">
|
|
|
7204 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst
|
|
|
7205 actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this,
|
|
|
7206 that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is
|
|
|
7207 the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in
|
|
|
7208 movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that
|
|
|
7209 as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the
|
|
|
7210 imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is
|
|
|
7211 in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands
|
|
|
7212 itself
|
|
|
7213 is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement
|
|
|
7214 is an act of the imperfect.
|
|
|
7215 </p>
|
|
|
7216 <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p10">
|
|
|
7217 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle
|
|
|
7218 of life.
|
|
|
7219 </p>
|
|
|
7220 <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p11">
|
|
|
7221 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment
|
|
|
7222 to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold
|
|
|
7223 good with incorruptible natures.
|
|
|
7224 </p>
|
|
|
7225 <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
7226 <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
7227 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
7228 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
7229 </div>
|
|
|
7230 <div id="FP_Q18_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
7231 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
7232 <a href="summa.FP_Q19.html"></a>
|
|
|
7233 <h4 id="FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are life in God?</h4>
|
|
|
7234 <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7235 <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p2">
|
|
|
7236 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said (
|
|
|
7237 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.28" target="asv">Acts 17:28</a>), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.
|
|
|
7238 </p>
|
|
|
7239 <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p3">
|
|
|
7240 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not
|
|
|
7241 all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God.
|
|
|
7242 </p>
|
|
|
7243 <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p4">
|
|
|
7244 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore,
|
|
|
7245 things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But
|
|
|
7246 this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.
|
|
|
7247 </p>
|
|
|
7248 <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p5">
|
|
|
7249 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but
|
|
|
7250 never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and
|
|
|
7251 things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.
|
|
|
7252 </p>
|
|
|
7253 <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p6">
|
|
|
7254 <b>On the contrary,</b> (
|
|
|
7255 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3,4</a>), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God.
|
|
|
7256 </p>
|
|
|
7257 <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p7">
|
|
|
7258 <b>I answer that,</b> In God to live is to understand, as before stated
|
|
|
7259 <a id="FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as
|
|
|
7260 understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things
|
|
|
7261 understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.
|
|
|
7262 </p>
|
|
|
7263 <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p8">
|
|
|
7264 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine
|
|
|
7265 power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they
|
|
|
7266 exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move,
|
|
|
7267 and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In
|
|
|
7268 another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper
|
|
|
7269 ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And
|
|
|
7270 since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement,
|
|
|
7271 but life.
|
|
|
7272 </p>
|
|
|
7273 <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p9">
|
|
|
7274 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being
|
|
|
7275 of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the
|
|
|
7276 architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence
|
|
|
7277 the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind,
|
|
|
7278 as having a divine existence in that mind.
|
|
|
7279 </p>
|
|
|
7280 <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p10">
|
|
|
7281 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the
|
|
|
7282 divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the
|
|
|
7283 true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural
|
|
|
7284 things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more
|
|
|
7285 truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this
|
|
|
7286 particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because
|
|
|
7287 it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being
|
|
|
7288 in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the
|
|
|
7289 mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.
|
|
|
7290 </p>
|
|
|
7291 <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p11">
|
|
|
7292 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by
|
|
|
7293 Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it
|
|
|
7294 cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life
|
|
|
7295 means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so
|
|
|
7296 far as life implies a principle of operation.
|
|
|
7297 </p>
|
|
|
7298 <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p12"></p>
|
|
|
7299 <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p13"></p>
|
|
|
7300 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
7301 <a href="summa.FP_Q19.html"></a>
|
|
|
7302 </div>
|
|
|
7303 <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
7304 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
7305 </div>
|
|
|
7306 <div id="FP_Q19" class="div3">
|
|
|
7307 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
7308 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
7309 <h3 id="FP_Q19-p0.1">THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
7310 <p id="FP_Q19-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7311 <p id="FP_Q19-p2"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration
|
|
|
7312 is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect
|
|
|
7313 in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:
|
|
|
7314 </p>
|
|
|
7315 <p id="FP_Q19-p3"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p>
|
|
|
7316 <p id="FP_Q19-p4"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p>
|
|
|
7317 <p id="FP_Q19-p5"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p>
|
|
|
7318 <p id="FP_Q19-p6"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p>
|
|
|
7319 <p id="FP_Q19-p7"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p>
|
|
|
7320 <p id="FP_Q19-p8"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p>
|
|
|
7321 <p id="FP_Q19-p9"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p>
|
|
|
7322 <p id="FP_Q19-p10"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p>
|
|
|
7323 <p id="FP_Q19-p11"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p>
|
|
|
7324 <p id="FP_Q19-p12"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p>
|
|
|
7325 <p id="FP_Q19-p13"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p>
|
|
|
7326 <p id="FP_Q19-p14"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p>
|
|
|
7327 <div id="FP_Q19_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
7328 <a href="summa.FP_Q19.html"></a>
|
|
|
7329 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
7330 <h4 id="FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether there is will in God?</h4>
|
|
|
7331 <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7332 <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p2">
|
|
|
7333 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end.
|
|
|
7334 Therefore there is not will in God.
|
|
|
7335 </p>
|
|
|
7336 <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p3">
|
|
|
7337 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which
|
|
|
7338 cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.
|
|
|
7339 </p>
|
|
|
7340 <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p4">
|
|
|
7341 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement,
|
|
|
7342 and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.
|
|
|
7343 </p>
|
|
|
7344 <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p5">
|
|
|
7345 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
|
|
|
7346 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.2" target="asv">Rom. 12:2</a>): "That you may prove what is the will of God."
|
|
|
7347 </p>
|
|
|
7348 <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p6">
|
|
|
7349 <b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence
|
|
|
7350 by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards
|
|
|
7351 its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same
|
|
|
7352 with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
|
|
|
7353 without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through
|
|
|
7354 its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain
|
|
|
7355 to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And
|
|
|
7356 so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
|
|
|
7357 will.
|
|
|
7358 </p>
|
|
|
7359 <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p7">
|
|
|
7360 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by
|
|
|
7361 His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (
|
|
|
7362 <a id="FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good.
|
|
|
7363 </p>
|
|
|
7364 <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p8">
|
|
|
7365 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what
|
|
|
7366 it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in
|
|
|
7367 God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence.
|
|
|
7368 </p>
|
|
|
7369 <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p9">
|
|
|
7370 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will
|
|
|
7371 is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself,
|
|
|
7372 but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when
|
|
|
7373 he said that the first mover moves itself.
|
|
|
7374 </p>
|
|
|
7375 <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
7376 <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
7377 <a href="summa.FP_Q19.html"></a>
|
|
|
7378 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
7379 </div>
|
|
|
7380 <div id="FP_Q19_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
7381 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
7382 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
7383 <h4 id="FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</h4>
|
|
|
7384 <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7385 <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p2">
|
|
|
7386 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other
|
|
|
7387 than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.
|
|
|
7388 </p>
|
|
|
7389 <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p3">
|
|
|
7390 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills
|
|
|
7391 anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible.
|
|
|
7392 </p>
|
|
|
7393 <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p4">
|
|
|
7394 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely
|
|
|
7395 satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.
|
|
|
7396 </p>
|
|
|
7397 <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p5">
|
|
|
7398 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things
|
|
|
7399 apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But
|
|
|
7400 this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
|
|
|
7401 </p>
|
|
|
7402 <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p6">
|
|
|
7403 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
|
|
|
7404 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.3" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:3</a>): "This is the will of God, your sanctification."
|
|
|
7405 </p>
|
|
|
7406 <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p7">
|
|
|
7407 <b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above
|
|
|
7408 <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and,
|
|
|
7409 if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that
|
|
|
7410 every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces
|
|
|
7411 its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed;
|
|
|
7412 and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence,
|
|
|
7413 if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine
|
|
|
7414 will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other
|
|
|
7415 things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness
|
|
|
7416 that other things should be partakers therein.
|
|
|
7417 </p>
|
|
|
7418 <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p8">
|
|
|
7419 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding
|
|
|
7420 them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (
|
|
|
7421 <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills.
|
|
|
7422 Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from
|
|
|
7423 Himself.
|
|
|
7424 </p>
|
|
|
7425 <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p9">
|
|
|
7426 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the
|
|
|
7427 will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing
|
|
|
7428 so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant,
|
|
|
7429 which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its
|
|
|
7430 own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it
|
|
|
7431 does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by
|
|
|
7432 understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.
|
|
|
7433 </p>
|
|
|
7434 <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p10">
|
|
|
7435 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself,
|
|
|
7436 but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
|
|
|
7437 consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things.
|
|
|
7438 </p>
|
|
|
7439 <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p11">
|
|
|
7440 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as
|
|
|
7441 willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.
|
|
|
7442 </p>
|
|
|
7443 <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
7444 <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
7445 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
7446 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
7447 </div>
|
|
|
7448 <div id="FP_Q19_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
7449 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
7450 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
7451 <h4 id="FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?</h4>
|
|
|
7452 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7453 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p2">
|
|
|
7454 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills
|
|
|
7455 from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
|
|
|
7456 </p>
|
|
|
7457 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p3">
|
|
|
7458 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily.
|
|
|
7459 Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
|
|
|
7460 </p>
|
|
|
7461 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p4">
|
|
|
7462 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of
|
|
|
7463 all necessity, as above shown (
|
|
|
7464 <a id="FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as
|
|
|
7465 stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
|
|
|
7466 </p>
|
|
|
7467 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p5">
|
|
|
7468 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God
|
|
|
7469 does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to
|
|
|
7470 will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since
|
|
|
7471 everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.
|
|
|
7472 </p>
|
|
|
7473 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p6">
|
|
|
7474 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined
|
|
|
7475 to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent
|
|
|
7476 with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to
|
|
|
7477 Himself.
|
|
|
7478 </p>
|
|
|
7479 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p7">
|
|
|
7480 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore
|
|
|
7481 whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
|
|
|
7482 </p>
|
|
|
7483 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p8">
|
|
|
7484 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
|
|
|
7485 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will,
|
|
|
7486 we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
|
|
|
7487 </p>
|
|
|
7488 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p9">
|
|
|
7489 <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to
|
|
|
7490 be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject:
|
|
|
7491 thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate;
|
|
|
7492 thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not
|
|
|
7493 necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that
|
|
|
7494 he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe
|
|
|
7495 that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary
|
|
|
7496 relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we
|
|
|
7497 will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for
|
|
|
7498 instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as
|
|
|
7499 they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to
|
|
|
7500 it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take
|
|
|
7501 ship
|
|
|
7502 in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for
|
|
|
7503 a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since
|
|
|
7504 the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them,
|
|
|
7505 it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition,
|
|
|
7506 for
|
|
|
7507 supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.
|
|
|
7508 </p>
|
|
|
7509 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p10">
|
|
|
7510 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by
|
|
|
7511 supposition.
|
|
|
7512 </p>
|
|
|
7513 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p11">
|
|
|
7514 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for
|
|
|
7515 it can exist without other things.
|
|
|
7516 </p>
|
|
|
7517 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p12">
|
|
|
7518 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural
|
|
|
7519 or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
|
|
|
7520 </p>
|
|
|
7521 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p13">
|
|
|
7522 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the
|
|
|
7523 cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not
|
|
|
7524 in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily
|
|
|
7525 will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the
|
|
|
7526 divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be
|
|
|
7527 without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.
|
|
|
7528 </p>
|
|
|
7529 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p14">
|
|
|
7530 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary,
|
|
|
7531 determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.
|
|
|
7532 </p>
|
|
|
7533 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p15">
|
|
|
7534 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has
|
|
|
7535 a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is
|
|
|
7536 of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other
|
|
|
7537 things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute
|
|
|
7538 necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily
|
|
|
7539 whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
|
|
|
7540 </p>
|
|
|
7541 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p16"></p>
|
|
|
7542 <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p17"></p>
|
|
|
7543 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
7544 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
7545 </div>
|
|
|
7546 <div id="FP_Q19_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
7547 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
7548 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
7549 <h4 id="FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4>
|
|
|
7550 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7551 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p2">
|
|
|
7552 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason
|
|
|
7553 nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by
|
|
|
7554 its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election.
|
|
|
7555 Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things.
|
|
|
7556 </p>
|
|
|
7557 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p3">
|
|
|
7558 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which
|
|
|
7559 is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then
|
|
|
7560 by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.
|
|
|
7561 </p>
|
|
|
7562 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p4">
|
|
|
7563 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire
|
|
|
7564 is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now
|
|
|
7565 Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature,
|
|
|
7566 and not by His will.
|
|
|
7567 </p>
|
|
|
7568 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p5">
|
|
|
7569 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before (
|
|
|
7570 <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.
|
|
|
7571 </p>
|
|
|
7572 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p6">
|
|
|
7573 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
7574 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?"
|
|
|
7575 </p>
|
|
|
7576 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p7">
|
|
|
7577 <b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by
|
|
|
7578 a necessity of His nature.
|
|
|
7579 </p>
|
|
|
7580 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p8"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an
|
|
|
7581 end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher
|
|
|
7582 intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary
|
|
|
7583 agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He
|
|
|
7584 must act by intellect and will.
|
|
|
7585 </p>
|
|
|
7586 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p9"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect;
|
|
|
7587 for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to
|
|
|
7588 the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every
|
|
|
7589 natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
|
|
|
7590 the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined
|
|
|
7591 and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (
|
|
|
7592 <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection
|
|
|
7593 according to the determination of His will and intellect.
|
|
|
7594 </p>
|
|
|
7595 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p10"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so
|
|
|
7596 far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode
|
|
|
7597 of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect,
|
|
|
7598 and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
|
|
|
7599 for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the
|
|
|
7600 cause of things.
|
|
|
7601 </p>
|
|
|
7602 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p11">
|
|
|
7603 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far,
|
|
|
7604 that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.
|
|
|
7605 </p>
|
|
|
7606 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p12">
|
|
|
7607 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts
|
|
|
7608 after the mode of intellect and will.
|
|
|
7609 </p>
|
|
|
7610 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p13">
|
|
|
7611 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness
|
|
|
7612 is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).
|
|
|
7613 </p>
|
|
|
7614 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p14">
|
|
|
7615 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived,
|
|
|
7616 and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the
|
|
|
7617 effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing
|
|
|
7618 the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God
|
|
|
7619 all these things are one.
|
|
|
7620 </p>
|
|
|
7621 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p15"></p>
|
|
|
7622 <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p16"></p>
|
|
|
7623 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
7624 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
7625 </div>
|
|
|
7626 <div id="FP_Q19_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
7627 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
7628 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
7629 <h4 id="FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4>
|
|
|
7630 <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7631 <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p2">
|
|
|
7632 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to
|
|
|
7633 say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing.
|
|
|
7634 Therefore the will of God has some cause.
|
|
|
7635 </p>
|
|
|
7636 <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p3">
|
|
|
7637 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned
|
|
|
7638 except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown
|
|
|
7639 <a id="FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus
|
|
|
7640 all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes
|
|
|
7641 to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will.
|
|
|
7642 </p>
|
|
|
7643 <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p4">
|
|
|
7644 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has
|
|
|
7645 no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.
|
|
|
7646 </p>
|
|
|
7647 <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p5">
|
|
|
7648 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than
|
|
|
7649 the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.
|
|
|
7650 </p>
|
|
|
7651 <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p6">
|
|
|
7652 <b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect,
|
|
|
7653 there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person
|
|
|
7654 that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately
|
|
|
7655 from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known.
|
|
|
7656 If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance,
|
|
|
7657 in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its
|
|
|
7658 own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It
|
|
|
7659 is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
|
|
|
7660 premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.
|
|
|
7661 </p>
|
|
|
7662 <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p7"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause
|
|
|
7663 of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own
|
|
|
7664 cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands
|
|
|
7665 all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the
|
|
|
7666 cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an
|
|
|
7667 end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this
|
|
|
7668 to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.
|
|
|
7669 </p>
|
|
|
7670 <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p8">
|
|
|
7671 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to
|
|
|
7672 be on account of another.
|
|
|
7673 </p>
|
|
|
7674 <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p9">
|
|
|
7675 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable
|
|
|
7676 to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary,
|
|
|
7677 and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have
|
|
|
7678 thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly
|
|
|
7679 unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God."
|
|
|
7680 </p>
|
|
|
7681 <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p10">
|
|
|
7682 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will
|
|
|
7683 of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say
|
|
|
7684 that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him
|
|
|
7685 to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this
|
|
|
7686 cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the
|
|
|
7687 order of other causes.
|
|
|
7688 </p>
|
|
|
7689 <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p11"></p>
|
|
|
7690 <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p12"></p>
|
|
|
7691 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
7692 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
7693 </div>
|
|
|
7694 <div id="FP_Q19_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
7695 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
7696 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
7697 <h4 id="FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4>
|
|
|
7698 <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7699 <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p2">
|
|
|
7700 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (
|
|
|
7701 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the
|
|
|
7702 will of God is not always fulfilled.
|
|
|
7703 </p>
|
|
|
7704 <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p3">
|
|
|
7705 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He
|
|
|
7706 wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always
|
|
|
7707 fulfilled.
|
|
|
7708 </p>
|
|
|
7709 <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p4">
|
|
|
7710 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause
|
|
|
7711 may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the
|
|
|
7712 limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore,
|
|
|
7713 is not always fulfilled.
|
|
|
7714 </p>
|
|
|
7715 <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p5">
|
|
|
7716 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
7717 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.113.11" target="asv">Ps. 113:11</a>): "God hath done all things, whatsoever He would."
|
|
|
7718 </p>
|
|
|
7719 <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p6">
|
|
|
7720 <b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the
|
|
|
7721 agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that
|
|
|
7722 although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may
|
|
|
7723 fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence
|
|
|
7724 the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside
|
|
|
7725 the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its
|
|
|
7726 effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause.
|
|
|
7727 Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
|
|
|
7728 For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things,
|
|
|
7729 from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first
|
|
|
7730 heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not
|
|
|
7731 produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order;
|
|
|
7732 as
|
|
|
7733 does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that
|
|
|
7734 will, when by its justice he is punished.
|
|
|
7735 </p>
|
|
|
7736 <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p7">
|
|
|
7737 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted
|
|
|
7738 application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men
|
|
|
7739 to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose
|
|
|
7740 salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every
|
|
|
7741 class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class
|
|
|
7742 and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly,
|
|
|
7743 according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will.
|
|
|
7744 This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent,
|
|
|
7745 but to the things willed.
|
|
|
7746 </p>
|
|
|
7747 <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p8"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary
|
|
|
7748 sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account,
|
|
|
7749 by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should
|
|
|
7750 be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or
|
|
|
7751 dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently
|
|
|
7752 he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men
|
|
|
7753 to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently,
|
|
|
7754 but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in
|
|
|
7755 themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular
|
|
|
7756 circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills
|
|
|
7757 simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such
|
|
|
7758 a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills
|
|
|
7759 takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
|
|
|
7760 </p>
|
|
|
7761 <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p9">
|
|
|
7762 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is
|
|
|
7763 directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God,
|
|
|
7764 though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far
|
|
|
7765 as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.
|
|
|
7766 </p>
|
|
|
7767 <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p10">
|
|
|
7768 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause,
|
|
|
7769 including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of
|
|
|
7770 God, as said above.
|
|
|
7771 </p>
|
|
|
7772 <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p11"></p>
|
|
|
7773 <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p12"></p>
|
|
|
7774 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
7775 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
7776 </div>
|
|
|
7777 <div id="FP_Q19_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
7778 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
7779 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
7780 <h4 id="FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4>
|
|
|
7781 <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7782 <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p2">
|
|
|
7783 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (
|
|
|
7784 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.6.7" target="asv">Gn. 6:7</a>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has
|
|
|
7785 a changeable will.
|
|
|
7786 </p>
|
|
|
7787 <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p3">
|
|
|
7788 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to
|
|
|
7789 pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought
|
|
|
7790 to do to them" (
|
|
|
7791 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.18.7" target="asv">Jer. 18:7,8</a>) Therefore God has a changeable will.
|
|
|
7792 </p>
|
|
|
7793 <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p4">
|
|
|
7794 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the
|
|
|
7795 law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.
|
|
|
7796 </p>
|
|
|
7797 <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p5">
|
|
|
7798 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before
|
|
|
7799 <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable
|
|
|
7800 substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable
|
|
|
7801 as regards His will.
|
|
|
7802 </p>
|
|
|
7803 <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p6">
|
|
|
7804 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (
|
|
|
7805 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Num.23.19" target="asv">Num. 23:19</a>).
|
|
|
7806 </p>
|
|
|
7807 <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p7">
|
|
|
7808 <b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that
|
|
|
7809 certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and
|
|
|
7810 yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before
|
|
|
7811 he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless
|
|
|
7812 we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards
|
|
|
7813 good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not
|
|
|
7814 take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not
|
|
|
7815 so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
|
|
|
7816 hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and
|
|
|
7817 His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (
|
|
|
7818 <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>;
|
|
|
7819 <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.
|
|
|
7820 </p>
|
|
|
7821 <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p8">
|
|
|
7822 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent,
|
|
|
7823 we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at
|
|
|
7824 the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of
|
|
|
7825 acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
|
|
|
7826 He had made.
|
|
|
7827 </p>
|
|
|
7828 <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p9">
|
|
|
7829 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce
|
|
|
7830 certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in
|
|
|
7831 the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising
|
|
|
7832 of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
|
|
|
7833 rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is,
|
|
|
7834 that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen;
|
|
|
7835 or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under
|
|
|
7836 the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
|
|
|
7837 and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (
|
|
|
7838 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv">Is. 38:1</a>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable.
|
|
|
7839 Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His
|
|
|
7840 will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For
|
|
|
7841 men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.
|
|
|
7842 </p>
|
|
|
7843 <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p10">
|
|
|
7844 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.
|
|
|
7845 </p>
|
|
|
7846 <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p11">
|
|
|
7847 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness
|
|
|
7848 of the divine will, as has been said above
|
|
|
7849 <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>.
|
|
|
7850 </p>
|
|
|
7851 <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p12"></p>
|
|
|
7852 <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p13"></p>
|
|
|
7853 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
7854 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
7855 </div>
|
|
|
7856 <div id="FP_Q19_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
7857 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
7858 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
7859 <h4 id="FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4>
|
|
|
7860 <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7861 <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p2">
|
|
|
7862 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved,
|
|
|
7863 except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."
|
|
|
7864 </p>
|
|
|
7865 <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p3">
|
|
|
7866 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii,
|
|
|
7867 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the
|
|
|
7868 Apostle says (
|
|
|
7869 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.19" target="asv">Rom. 9:19</a>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.
|
|
|
7870 </p>
|
|
|
7871 <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p4">
|
|
|
7872 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should
|
|
|
7873 die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause,
|
|
|
7874 whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every
|
|
|
7875 true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
|
|
|
7876 necessary absolutely.
|
|
|
7877 </p>
|
|
|
7878 <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p5">
|
|
|
7879 <b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all
|
|
|
7880 good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.
|
|
|
7881 </p>
|
|
|
7882 <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p6">
|
|
|
7883 <b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to
|
|
|
7884 intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes
|
|
|
7885 contingent.
|
|
|
7886 </p>
|
|
|
7887 <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p7"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent
|
|
|
7888 on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second
|
|
|
7889 cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from
|
|
|
7890 producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
|
|
|
7891 referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is
|
|
|
7892 better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to
|
|
|
7893 act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being.
|
|
|
7894 Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that
|
|
|
7895 belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done,
|
|
|
7896 which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily,
|
|
|
7897 some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has
|
|
|
7898 attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise
|
|
|
7899 contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently,
|
|
|
7900 but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.
|
|
|
7901 </p>
|
|
|
7902 <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p8">
|
|
|
7903 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For
|
|
|
7904 the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.
|
|
|
7905 </p>
|
|
|
7906 <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p9">
|
|
|
7907 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen,
|
|
|
7908 but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.
|
|
|
7909 </p>
|
|
|
7910 <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p10">
|
|
|
7911 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the
|
|
|
7912 divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore,
|
|
|
7913 are absolute necessities.
|
|
|
7914 </p>
|
|
|
7915 <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p11"></p>
|
|
|
7916 <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p12"></p>
|
|
|
7917 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
7918 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
7919 </div>
|
|
|
7920 <div id="FP_Q19_A9" class="div4">
|
|
|
7921 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
7922 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
7923 <h4 id="FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4>
|
|
|
7924 <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7925 <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p2">
|
|
|
7926 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine
|
|
|
7927 says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should
|
|
|
7928 exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.
|
|
|
7929 </p>
|
|
|
7930 <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p3">
|
|
|
7931 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And
|
|
|
7932 Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that
|
|
|
7933 which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy
|
|
|
7934 when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and
|
|
|
7935 beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.
|
|
|
7936 </p>
|
|
|
7937 <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p4">
|
|
|
7938 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should
|
|
|
7939 not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil
|
|
|
7940 should exist.
|
|
|
7941 </p>
|
|
|
7942 <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p5">
|
|
|
7943 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom.
|
|
|
7944 Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to
|
|
|
7945 will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore
|
|
|
7946 God wills not evil things.
|
|
|
7947 </p>
|
|
|
7948 <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p6">
|
|
|
7949 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (
|
|
|
7950 <a id="FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either
|
|
|
7951 natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far
|
|
|
7952 as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
|
|
|
7953 corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies
|
|
|
7954 the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is
|
|
|
7955 only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment.
|
|
|
7956 Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not
|
|
|
7957 even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation.
|
|
|
7958 Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills
|
|
|
7959 the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment,
|
|
|
7960 He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
|
|
|
7961 willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.
|
|
|
7962 </p>
|
|
|
7963 <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p7">
|
|
|
7964 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil
|
|
|
7965 is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered
|
|
|
7966 to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however,
|
|
|
7967 is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is
|
|
|
7968 beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that
|
|
|
7969 the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering
|
|
|
7970 to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by
|
|
|
7971 that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.
|
|
|
7972 </p>
|
|
|
7973 <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p8">
|
|
|
7974 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore
|
|
|
7975 Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.
|
|
|
7976 </p>
|
|
|
7977 <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p9">
|
|
|
7978 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone
|
|
|
7979 wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither
|
|
|
7980 wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.
|
|
|
7981 </p>
|
|
|
7982 <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p10"></p>
|
|
|
7983 <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p11"></p>
|
|
|
7984 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
7985 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
7986 </div>
|
|
|
7987 <div id="FP_Q19_A10" class="div4">
|
|
|
7988 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
7989 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
7990 <h4 id="FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4>
|
|
|
7991 <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p1"></p>
|
|
|
7992 <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p2">
|
|
|
7993 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is
|
|
|
7994 He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."
|
|
|
7995 </p>
|
|
|
7996 <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p3">
|
|
|
7997 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil,
|
|
|
7998 as has been said
|
|
|
7999 <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.
|
|
|
8000 </p>
|
|
|
8001 <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p4">
|
|
|
8002 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of
|
|
|
8003 the will, not in obedience to necessity."
|
|
|
8004 </p>
|
|
|
8005 <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p5">
|
|
|
8006 <b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not
|
|
|
8007 appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said
|
|
|
8008 to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above
|
|
|
8009
|
|
|
8010 <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
|
|
|
8011 necessarily will.
|
|
|
8012 </p>
|
|
|
8013 <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p6">
|
|
|
8014 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.
|
|
|
8015 </p>
|
|
|
8016 <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p7">
|
|
|
8017 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De
|
|
|
8018 Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites,
|
|
|
8019 inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and
|
|
|
8020 not will to sit down.
|
|
|
8021 </p>
|
|
|
8022 <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p8"></p>
|
|
|
8023 <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p9"></p>
|
|
|
8024 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html"></a>
|
|
|
8025 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
8026 </div>
|
|
|
8027 <div id="FP_Q19_A11" class="div4">
|
|
|
8028 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
8029 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
8030 <h4 id="FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4>
|
|
|
8031 <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8032 <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p2">
|
|
|
8033 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so
|
|
|
8034 is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the
|
|
|
8035 divine will.
|
|
|
8036 </p>
|
|
|
8037 <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p3">
|
|
|
8038 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the
|
|
|
8039 expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are
|
|
|
8040 superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.
|
|
|
8041 </p>
|
|
|
8042 <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p4">
|
|
|
8043 <b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of
|
|
|
8044 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.2" target="asv"> Ps. 110:2</a>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for
|
|
|
8045 the will.
|
|
|
8046 </p>
|
|
|
8047 <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p5">
|
|
|
8048 <b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (
|
|
|
8049 <a id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect.
|
|
|
8050 Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus
|
|
|
8051 with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
|
|
|
8052 punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed
|
|
|
8053 to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just
|
|
|
8054 as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called
|
|
|
8055 by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (
|
|
|
8056 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.10" target="asv">Mat.
|
|
|
8057 6:10
|
|
|
8058 </a>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its
|
|
|
8059 primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished
|
|
|
8060 will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure;
|
|
|
8061 and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called
|
|
|
8062 will.
|
|
|
8063 </p>
|
|
|
8064 <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p6">
|
|
|
8065 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless
|
|
|
8066 we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.
|
|
|
8067 </p>
|
|
|
8068 <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p7">
|
|
|
8069 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual
|
|
|
8070 expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it
|
|
|
8071 is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.
|
|
|
8072 </p>
|
|
|
8073 <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p8"></p>
|
|
|
8074 <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p9"></p>
|
|
|
8075 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
8076 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
8077 </div>
|
|
|
8078 <div id="FP_Q19_A12" class="div4">
|
|
|
8079 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
8080 <a href="summa.FP_Q20.html"></a>
|
|
|
8081 <h4 id="FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
|
|
|
8082 <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8083 <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p2">
|
|
|
8084 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly
|
|
|
8085 assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates
|
|
|
8086 in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.
|
|
|
8087 </p>
|
|
|
8088 <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p3">
|
|
|
8089 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (
|
|
|
8090 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A12-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended
|
|
|
8091 in the will of expression.
|
|
|
8092 </p>
|
|
|
8093 <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p4">
|
|
|
8094 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action
|
|
|
8095 in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under
|
|
|
8096 one division, not being of one order.
|
|
|
8097 </p>
|
|
|
8098 <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p5">
|
|
|
8099 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared
|
|
|
8100 by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only
|
|
|
8101 in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good.
|
|
|
8102 </p>
|
|
|
8103 <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p6">
|
|
|
8104 <b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that
|
|
|
8105 he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly,
|
|
|
8106 or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will
|
|
|
8107 is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for
|
|
|
8108 what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares
|
|
|
8109 his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept,
|
|
|
8110 and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself
|
|
|
8111 known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept,
|
|
|
8112 counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of
|
|
|
8113 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.10" target="asv">Mat. 6:10</a>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine
|
|
|
8114 (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually
|
|
|
8115 doing it."
|
|
|
8116 </p>
|
|
|
8117 <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p7"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with
|
|
|
8118 regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel
|
|
|
8119 to good that is of supererogation.
|
|
|
8120 </p>
|
|
|
8121 <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p8">
|
|
|
8122 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that
|
|
|
8123 mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel;
|
|
|
8124 or of prohibition or permission.
|
|
|
8125 </p>
|
|
|
8126 <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p9">
|
|
|
8127 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to
|
|
|
8128 will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will
|
|
|
8129 of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept
|
|
|
8130 and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter
|
|
|
8131 the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.
|
|
|
8132 </p>
|
|
|
8133 <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p10">
|
|
|
8134 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are
|
|
|
8135 assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act
|
|
|
8136 only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.
|
|
|
8137 </p>
|
|
|
8138 <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p11">
|
|
|
8139 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to
|
|
|
8140 evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine
|
|
|
8141 goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject
|
|
|
8142 of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and
|
|
|
8143 these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good;
|
|
|
8144 but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.
|
|
|
8145 </p>
|
|
|
8146 <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p12"></p>
|
|
|
8147 <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p13"></p>
|
|
|
8148 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html"></a>
|
|
|
8149 <a href="summa.FP_Q20.html"></a>
|
|
|
8150 </div>
|
|
|
8151 <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
8152 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
8153 </div>
|
|
|
8154 <div id="FP_Q20" class="div3">
|
|
|
8155 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
8156 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
8157 <h3 id="FP_Q20-p0.1">GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
8158 <p id="FP_Q20-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8159 <p id="FP_Q20-p2"> We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found
|
|
|
8160 in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude
|
|
|
8161 and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are
|
|
|
8162 four points of inquiry:
|
|
|
8163 </p>
|
|
|
8164 <p id="FP_Q20-p3"> (1) Whether love exists in God?</p>
|
|
|
8165 <p id="FP_Q20-p4"> (2) Whether He loves all things?</p>
|
|
|
8166 <p id="FP_Q20-p5"> (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?</p>
|
|
|
8167 <p id="FP_Q20-p6"> (4) Whether He loves more the better things?</p>
|
|
|
8168 <div id="FP_Q20_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
8169 <a href="summa.FP_Q20.html"></a>
|
|
|
8170 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
8171 <h4 id="FP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Whether love exists in God?</h4>
|
|
|
8172 <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8173 <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p2">
|
|
|
8174 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not
|
|
|
8175 in God.
|
|
|
8176 </p>
|
|
|
8177 <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p3">
|
|
|
8178 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed
|
|
|
8179 to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.
|
|
|
8180 </p>
|
|
|
8181 <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p4">
|
|
|
8182 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He
|
|
|
8183 is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.
|
|
|
8184 </p>
|
|
|
8185 <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p5">
|
|
|
8186 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "God is love" (
|
|
|
8187 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.16" target="asv">Jn. 4:16</a>).
|
|
|
8188 </p>
|
|
|
8189 <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p6">
|
|
|
8190 <b>I answer that,</b> We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty.
|
|
|
8191 For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and
|
|
|
8192 since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily
|
|
|
8193 and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite
|
|
|
8194 that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate:
|
|
|
8195 because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally
|
|
|
8196 prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular
|
|
|
8197 and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as
|
|
|
8198 joy
|
|
|
8199 and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards
|
|
|
8200 good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason
|
|
|
8201 all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything,
|
|
|
8202 except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love.
|
|
|
8203 Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence,
|
|
|
8204 in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also
|
|
|
8205 wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (
|
|
|
8206 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him.
|
|
|
8207 </p>
|
|
|
8208 <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p7">
|
|
|
8209 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason
|
|
|
8210 moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite,
|
|
|
8211 or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the
|
|
|
8212 proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always
|
|
|
8213 accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says
|
|
|
8214 (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch
|
|
|
8215 as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore,
|
|
|
8216 and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It
|
|
|
8217 is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that
|
|
|
8218 is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion.
|
|
|
8219 </p>
|
|
|
8220 <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p8">
|
|
|
8221 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily change---and
|
|
|
8222 a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64),
|
|
|
8223 the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards
|
|
|
8224 the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is
|
|
|
8225 implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also
|
|
|
8226 to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore
|
|
|
8227 none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their
|
|
|
8228 formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show
|
|
|
8229 (
|
|
|
8230 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2;
|
|
|
8231 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without
|
|
|
8232 attributing passion to Him, as said before (
|
|
|
8233 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>).
|
|
|
8234 </p>
|
|
|
8235 <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p9">
|
|
|
8236 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since
|
|
|
8237 to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as
|
|
|
8238 possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the
|
|
|
8239 good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence,
|
|
|
8240 as above shown (
|
|
|
8241 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place
|
|
|
8242 of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another
|
|
|
8243 to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good
|
|
|
8244 to others; yet it implies no composition in God.
|
|
|
8245 </p>
|
|
|
8246 <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
8247 <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
8248 <a href="summa.FP_Q20.html"></a>
|
|
|
8249 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
8250 </div>
|
|
|
8251 <div id="FP_Q20_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
8252 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
8253 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
8254 <h4 id="FP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Whether God loves all things?</h4>
|
|
|
8255 <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8256 <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p2">
|
|
|
8257 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself,
|
|
|
8258 and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside
|
|
|
8259 of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.
|
|
|
8260 </p>
|
|
|
8261 <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p3">
|
|
|
8262 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not
|
|
|
8263 love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not
|
|
|
8264 love things other than Himself.
|
|
|
8265 </p>
|
|
|
8266 <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p4">
|
|
|
8267 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures
|
|
|
8268 with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no
|
|
|
8269 friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things.
|
|
|
8270 </p>
|
|
|
8271 <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p5">
|
|
|
8272 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (
|
|
|
8273 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.5.7" target="asv">Ps. 5:7</a>): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love
|
|
|
8274 all things.
|
|
|
8275 </p>
|
|
|
8276 <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p6">
|
|
|
8277 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
8278 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."
|
|
|
8279 </p>
|
|
|
8280 <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p7">
|
|
|
8281 <b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing
|
|
|
8282 is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (
|
|
|
8283 <a id="FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good,
|
|
|
8284 only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some
|
|
|
8285 good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything
|
|
|
8286 that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as
|
|
|
8287 by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness,
|
|
|
8288 whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides
|
|
|
8289 the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.
|
|
|
8290 </p>
|
|
|
8291 <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p8">
|
|
|
8292 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved;
|
|
|
8293 and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf
|
|
|
8294 of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness,
|
|
|
8295 is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things."
|
|
|
8296 </p>
|
|
|
8297 <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p9">
|
|
|
8298 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has
|
|
|
8299 known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within
|
|
|
8300 us, know things existing in themselves.
|
|
|
8301 </p>
|
|
|
8302 <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p10">
|
|
|
8303 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with
|
|
|
8304 another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even
|
|
|
8305 as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share
|
|
|
8306 in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore,
|
|
|
8307 God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He
|
|
|
8308 orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account
|
|
|
8309 of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.
|
|
|
8310 </p>
|
|
|
8311 <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p11">
|
|
|
8312 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners
|
|
|
8313 in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they
|
|
|
8314 have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated
|
|
|
8315 by Him.
|
|
|
8316 </p>
|
|
|
8317 <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
8318 <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
8319 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
8320 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
8321 </div>
|
|
|
8322 <div id="FP_Q20_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
8323 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
8324 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
8325 <h4 id="FP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Whether God loves all things equally?</h4>
|
|
|
8326 <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8327 <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p2">
|
|
|
8328 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" (
|
|
|
8329 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.8" target="asv">Wis. 6:8</a>). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally.
|
|
|
8330 </p>
|
|
|
8331 <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p3">
|
|
|
8332 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He
|
|
|
8333 does not therefore love some things more than others.
|
|
|
8334 </p>
|
|
|
8335 <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p4">
|
|
|
8336 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things
|
|
|
8337 more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others.
|
|
|
8338 </p>
|
|
|
8339 <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p5">
|
|
|
8340 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and
|
|
|
8341 of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself."
|
|
|
8342 </p>
|
|
|
8343 <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p6">
|
|
|
8344 <b>I answer that,</b> Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of
|
|
|
8345 the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because
|
|
|
8346 He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good
|
|
|
8347 itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more
|
|
|
8348 than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God
|
|
|
8349 loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said
|
|
|
8350 <a id="FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.
|
|
|
8351 </p>
|
|
|
8352 <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p7">
|
|
|
8353 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers
|
|
|
8354 all things with a like wisdom and goodness.
|
|
|
8355 </p>
|
|
|
8356 <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p8">
|
|
|
8357 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the
|
|
|
8358 good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.
|
|
|
8359 </p>
|
|
|
8360 <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p9">
|
|
|
8361 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God
|
|
|
8362 may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love.
|
|
|
8363 </p>
|
|
|
8364 <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
8365 <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
8366 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
8367 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
8368 </div>
|
|
|
8369 <div id="FP_Q20_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
8370 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
8371 <a href="summa.FP_Q21.html"></a>
|
|
|
8372 <h4 id="FP_Q20_A4-p0.1">Whether God always loves more the better things?</h4>
|
|
|
8373 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8374 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p2">
|
|
|
8375 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human
|
|
|
8376 race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son,
|
|
|
8377 but delivered Him up for us all" (
|
|
|
8378 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.32" target="asv">Rom. 8:32</a>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
|
|
|
8379 </p>
|
|
|
8380 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p3">
|
|
|
8381 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (
|
|
|
8382 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.6" target="asv">Ps. 8:6</a>). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed
|
|
|
8383 of Abraham He taketh hold" (
|
|
|
8384 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.16" target="asv">Heb. 2:16</a>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
|
|
|
8385 </p>
|
|
|
8386 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p4">
|
|
|
8387 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying:
|
|
|
8388 "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says,
|
|
|
8389 commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples,
|
|
|
8390 not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore
|
|
|
8391 God does not always love more the better things.
|
|
|
8392 </p>
|
|
|
8393 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p5">
|
|
|
8394 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank
|
|
|
8395 after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said:
|
|
|
8396 "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who
|
|
|
8397 need not penance" (
|
|
|
8398 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.7" target="asv">Lk. 15:7</a>). Therefore God does not always love more
|
|
|
8399 the better things.
|
|
|
8400 </p>
|
|
|
8401 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p6">
|
|
|
8402 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner,
|
|
|
8403 since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
|
|
|
8404 </p>
|
|
|
8405 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p7">
|
|
|
8406 <b>On the contrary,</b> Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (
|
|
|
8407 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:19</a>): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more
|
|
|
8408 loved by God.
|
|
|
8409 </p>
|
|
|
8410 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p8">
|
|
|
8411 <b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown (
|
|
|
8412 <a id="FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because
|
|
|
8413 God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for
|
|
|
8414 them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the
|
|
|
8415 better things.
|
|
|
8416 </p>
|
|
|
8417 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p9">
|
|
|
8418 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because
|
|
|
8419 He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything
|
|
|
8420 of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby
|
|
|
8421 a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder,"
|
|
|
8422 according to
|
|
|
8423 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.9.6" target="asv"> Is. 9:6.</a>
|
|
|
8424 </p>
|
|
|
8425 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p10">
|
|
|
8426 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that
|
|
|
8427 nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing
|
|
|
8428 it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to
|
|
|
8429 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.17" target="asv"> Rev 21:17, </a> the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this
|
|
|
8430 respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an
|
|
|
8431 angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but
|
|
|
8432 because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that
|
|
|
8433 he does not give to his own son in sound health.
|
|
|
8434 </p>
|
|
|
8435 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p11">
|
|
|
8436 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the
|
|
|
8437 active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious
|
|
|
8438 of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God,
|
|
|
8439 he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For
|
|
|
8440 it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.
|
|
|
8441 </p>
|
|
|
8442 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p12"> Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave
|
|
|
8443 him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ
|
|
|
8444 commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity,
|
|
|
8445 and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life.
|
|
|
8446 Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect
|
|
|
8447 to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While
|
|
|
8448 others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect.
|
|
|
8449 Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was
|
|
|
8450 loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the
|
|
|
8451 weigher of spirits" (
|
|
|
8452 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>).
|
|
|
8453 </p>
|
|
|
8454 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p13">
|
|
|
8455 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better
|
|
|
8456 and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is
|
|
|
8457 said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble,
|
|
|
8458 and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In
|
|
|
8459 battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled,
|
|
|
8460 but has never done a brave deed."
|
|
|
8461 </p>
|
|
|
8462 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p14"> Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment,
|
|
|
8463 than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to
|
|
|
8464 a poor man than to a king.
|
|
|
8465 </p>
|
|
|
8466 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p15">
|
|
|
8467 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according
|
|
|
8468 to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be
|
|
|
8469 given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other
|
|
|
8470 time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.
|
|
|
8471 </p>
|
|
|
8472 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p16"></p>
|
|
|
8473 <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p17"></p>
|
|
|
8474 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
8475 <a href="summa.FP_Q21.html"></a>
|
|
|
8476 </div>
|
|
|
8477 <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A12.html"></a>
|
|
|
8478 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
8479 </div>
|
|
|
8480 <div id="FP_Q21" class="div3">
|
|
|
8481 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
8482 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
8483 <h3 id="FP_Q21-p0.1">THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
8484 <p id="FP_Q21-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8485 <p id="FP_Q21-p2"> After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
8486 <p id="FP_Q21-p3"> (1) Whether there is justice in God?</p>
|
|
|
8487 <p id="FP_Q21-p4"> (2) Whether His justice can be called truth?</p>
|
|
|
8488 <p id="FP_Q21-p5"> (3) Whether there is mercy in God?</p>
|
|
|
8489 <p id="FP_Q21-p6"> (4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?</p>
|
|
|
8490 <div id="FP_Q21_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
8491 <a href="summa.FP_Q21.html"></a>
|
|
|
8492 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
8493 <h4 id="FP_Q21_A1-p0.1">Whether there is justice in God?</h4>
|
|
|
8494 <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8495 <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p2">
|
|
|
8496 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God:
|
|
|
8497 neither therefore does justice.
|
|
|
8498 </p>
|
|
|
8499 <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p3">
|
|
|
8500 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh
|
|
|
8501 all things according to the counsel of His will" (
|
|
|
8502 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.
|
|
|
8503 </p>
|
|
|
8504 <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p4">
|
|
|
8505 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.
|
|
|
8506 </p>
|
|
|
8507 <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p5">
|
|
|
8508 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards
|
|
|
8509 the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to God.
|
|
|
8510 </p>
|
|
|
8511 <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p6">
|
|
|
8512 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
8513 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.8" target="asv">Ps. 10:8</a>): "The Lord is just, and hath loved justice."
|
|
|
8514 </p>
|
|
|
8515 <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p7">
|
|
|
8516 <b>I answer that,</b> There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds
|
|
|
8517 of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse
|
|
|
8518 of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be
|
|
|
8519 made him?" (
|
|
|
8520 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.35" target="asv">Rom. 11:35</a>). The other consists in distribution, and
|
|
|
8521 is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order
|
|
|
8522 displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe,
|
|
|
8523 which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div.
|
|
|
8524 Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to
|
|
|
8525 the
|
|
|
8526 condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it."
|
|
|
8527 </p>
|
|
|
8528 <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p8">
|
|
|
8529 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring,
|
|
|
8530 meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (
|
|
|
8531 <a id="FP_Q21_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html">Q[20], A[1]</a> ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject
|
|
|
8532 of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral
|
|
|
8533 virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside
|
|
|
8534 not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although
|
|
|
8535 not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would
|
|
|
8536 be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.
|
|
|
8537 </p>
|
|
|
8538 <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p9">
|
|
|
8539 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom
|
|
|
8540 approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does
|
|
|
8541 according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher
|
|
|
8542 power, God is a law unto Himself.
|
|
|
8543 </p>
|
|
|
8544 <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p10">
|
|
|
8545 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant,
|
|
|
8546 and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or
|
|
|
8547 necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created
|
|
|
8548 thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to
|
|
|
8549 substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine
|
|
|
8550 operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due.
|
|
|
8551 It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness.
|
|
|
8552 In this respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is
|
|
|
8553 also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other
|
|
|
8554 animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and
|
|
|
8555 condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according
|
|
|
8556 to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is
|
|
|
8557 not directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting
|
|
|
8558 accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10):
|
|
|
8559 "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it
|
|
|
8560 is also just; since it befits Thy goodness."
|
|
|
8561 </p>
|
|
|
8562 <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p11">
|
|
|
8563 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence
|
|
|
8564 of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with
|
|
|
8565 respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related
|
|
|
8566 to the just, as the general to the special.
|
|
|
8567 </p>
|
|
|
8568 <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
8569 <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p13"></p>
|
|
|
8570 <a href="summa.FP_Q21.html"></a>
|
|
|
8571 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
8572 </div>
|
|
|
8573 <div id="FP_Q21_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
8574 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
8575 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
8576 <h4 id="FP_Q21_A2-p0.1">Whether the justice of God is truth?</h4>
|
|
|
8577 <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8578 <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p2">
|
|
|
8579 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13),
|
|
|
8580 it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6).
|
|
|
8581 Therefore justice does not appertain to truth.
|
|
|
8582 </p>
|
|
|
8583 <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p3">
|
|
|
8584 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain
|
|
|
8585 to the idea of justice.
|
|
|
8586 </p>
|
|
|
8587 <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p4">
|
|
|
8588 <b>On the contrary,</b> it is said (
|
|
|
8589 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.84.11" target="asv">Ps. 84:11</a>): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice.
|
|
|
8590 </p>
|
|
|
8591 <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p5">
|
|
|
8592 <b>I answer that,</b> Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above (
|
|
|
8593 <a id="FP_Q21_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case
|
|
|
8594 with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists
|
|
|
8595 in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not,
|
|
|
8596 our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in
|
|
|
8597 the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his
|
|
|
8598 art.
|
|
|
8599 </p>
|
|
|
8600 <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p6"> Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's
|
|
|
8601 justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is
|
|
|
8602 suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.
|
|
|
8603 </p>
|
|
|
8604 <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p7">
|
|
|
8605 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed
|
|
|
8606 according to the law, it resides in the will.
|
|
|
8607 </p>
|
|
|
8608 <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p8">
|
|
|
8609 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed
|
|
|
8610 such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect
|
|
|
8611 with its cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.
|
|
|
8612 </p>
|
|
|
8613 <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p9"></p>
|
|
|
8614 <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
8615 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
8616 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
8617 </div>
|
|
|
8618 <div id="FP_Q21_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
8619 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
8620 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
8621 <h4 id="FP_Q21_A3-p0.1">Whether mercy can be attributed to God?</h4>
|
|
|
8622 <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8623 <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p2">
|
|
|
8624 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14).
|
|
|
8625 But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.
|
|
|
8626 </p>
|
|
|
8627 <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p3">
|
|
|
8628 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (
|
|
|
8629 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13</a>): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He
|
|
|
8630 should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.
|
|
|
8631 </p>
|
|
|
8632 <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p4">
|
|
|
8633 <b>On the contrary,</b> it is said (
|
|
|
8634 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.4" target="asv">Ps. 110:4</a>): "He is a merciful and gracious Lord."
|
|
|
8635 </p>
|
|
|
8636 <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p5">
|
|
|
8637 <b>I answer that,</b> Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which
|
|
|
8638 it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum
|
|
|
8639 cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to
|
|
|
8640 dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To
|
|
|
8641 sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery,
|
|
|
8642 whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness;
|
|
|
8643 and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (
|
|
|
8644 <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6] , A[4]</a>). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His
|
|
|
8645 justice, liberality, and
|
|
|
8646 mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown
|
|
|
8647 above (
|
|
|
8648 <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already
|
|
|
8649 said
|
|
|
8650 <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in
|
|
|
8651 so far as perfections given to things by God
|
|
|
8652 expel defects, it belongs to mercy.
|
|
|
8653 </p>
|
|
|
8654 <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p6">
|
|
|
8655 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion.
|
|
|
8656 </p>
|
|
|
8657 <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p7">
|
|
|
8658 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays
|
|
|
8659 another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or
|
|
|
8660 mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said
|
|
|
8661 to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one
|
|
|
8662 another, as Christ has forgiven you" (
|
|
|
8663 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.32" target="asv">Eph. 4:32</a>). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy
|
|
|
8664 exalteth itself above judgement" (
|
|
|
8665 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>).
|
|
|
8666 </p>
|
|
|
8667 <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p8"></p>
|
|
|
8668 <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p9"></p>
|
|
|
8669 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
8670 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
8671 </div>
|
|
|
8672 <div id="FP_Q21_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
8673 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
8674 <a href="summa.FP_Q22.html"></a>
|
|
|
8675 <h4 id="FP_Q21_A4-p0.1">Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?</h4>
|
|
|
8676 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8677 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p2">
|
|
|
8678 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification
|
|
|
8679 of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that
|
|
|
8680 hath not done mercy" (
|
|
|
8681 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear.
|
|
|
8682 </p>
|
|
|
8683 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p3">
|
|
|
8684 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (
|
|
|
8685 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.15" target="asv">Rom. 15</a>). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.
|
|
|
8686 </p>
|
|
|
8687 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p4">
|
|
|
8688 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and
|
|
|
8689 mercy.
|
|
|
8690 </p>
|
|
|
8691 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p5">
|
|
|
8692 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose
|
|
|
8693 something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.
|
|
|
8694 </p>
|
|
|
8695 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p6">
|
|
|
8696 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
8697 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.24.10" target="asv">Ps. 24:10</a>): "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth."
|
|
|
8698 </p>
|
|
|
8699 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p7">
|
|
|
8700 <b>I answer that,</b> Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not
|
|
|
8701 every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for
|
|
|
8702 misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice
|
|
|
8703 is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be
|
|
|
8704 lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this
|
|
|
8705 sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according
|
|
|
8706 to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work
|
|
|
8707 of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except
|
|
|
8708 for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something
|
|
|
8709 that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine
|
|
|
8710 will---which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational
|
|
|
8711 soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So
|
|
|
8712 in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains,
|
|
|
8713 and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes.
|
|
|
8714 For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than
|
|
|
8715 is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness
|
|
|
8716 confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion.
|
|
|
8717 </p>
|
|
|
8718 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p8">
|
|
|
8719 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in
|
|
|
8720 others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat
|
|
|
8721 alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.
|
|
|
8722 </p>
|
|
|
8723 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p9"> In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully
|
|
|
8724 infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" (
|
|
|
8725 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.7.47" target="asv">Lk. 7:47</a>).
|
|
|
8726 </p>
|
|
|
8727 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p10">
|
|
|
8728 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in
|
|
|
8729 the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account
|
|
|
8730 of the promises made to the fathers.
|
|
|
8731 </p>
|
|
|
8732 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p11">
|
|
|
8733 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in
|
|
|
8734 them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils
|
|
|
8735 that press on us in this world force us to go to God."
|
|
|
8736 </p>
|
|
|
8737 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p12">
|
|
|
8738 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this
|
|
|
8739 way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine
|
|
|
8740 wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence.
|
|
|
8741 </p>
|
|
|
8742 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p13"></p>
|
|
|
8743 <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p14"></p>
|
|
|
8744 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
8745 <a href="summa.FP_Q22.html"></a>
|
|
|
8746 </div>
|
|
|
8747 <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
8748 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
8749 </div>
|
|
|
8750 <div id="FP_Q22" class="div3">
|
|
|
8751 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
8752 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
8753 <h3 id="FP_Q22-p0.1">THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
8754 <p id="FP_Q22-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8755 <p id="FP_Q22-p2"> Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both
|
|
|
8756 the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that
|
|
|
8757 is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals,
|
|
|
8758 after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong.
|
|
|
8759 Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry:
|
|
|
8760 </p>
|
|
|
8761 <p id="FP_Q22-p3"> (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?</p>
|
|
|
8762 <p id="FP_Q22-p4"> (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?</p>
|
|
|
8763 <p id="FP_Q22-p5"> (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?</p>
|
|
|
8764 <p id="FP_Q22-p6"> (4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?</p>
|
|
|
8765 <div id="FP_Q22_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
8766 <a href="summa.FP_Q22.html"></a>
|
|
|
8767 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
8768 <h4 id="FP_Q22_A1-p0.1">Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?</h4>
|
|
|
8769 <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8770 <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p2">
|
|
|
8771 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence.
|
|
|
8772 But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never
|
|
|
8773 has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God.
|
|
|
8774 </p>
|
|
|
8775 <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p3">
|
|
|
8776 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things
|
|
|
8777 that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is no providence in God.
|
|
|
8778 </p>
|
|
|
8779 <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p4">
|
|
|
8780 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the
|
|
|
8781 intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.
|
|
|
8782 </p>
|
|
|
8783 <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p5">
|
|
|
8784 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
8785 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.3" target="asv">Wis. 14:3</a>): "But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.']."
|
|
|
8786 </p>
|
|
|
8787 <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p6">
|
|
|
8788 <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was
|
|
|
8789 shown above (
|
|
|
8790 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and
|
|
|
8791 especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (
|
|
|
8792 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21], A[4]</a>). This good of order existing in things created, is
|
|
|
8793 itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of
|
|
|
8794 every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (
|
|
|
8795 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type
|
|
|
8796 of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other
|
|
|
8797 parts are
|
|
|
8798 directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is
|
|
|
8799 past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according
|
|
|
8800 to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself---as for instance,
|
|
|
8801 a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a
|
|
|
8802 family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said (
|
|
|
8803 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.45" target="asv">Mat. 24:45</a>), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way prudence or providence may suitably
|
|
|
8804 be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type
|
|
|
8805 of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence
|
|
|
8806 is the divine type itself, seated in
|
|
|
8807 the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards
|
|
|
8808 an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole.
|
|
|
8809 </p>
|
|
|
8810 <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p7">
|
|
|
8811 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly
|
|
|
8812 counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf.
|
|
|
8813 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are
|
|
|
8814 doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He
|
|
|
8815 possesses, does belong to God, according to
|
|
|
8816 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.6" target="asv"> Ps. 148:6</a>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although
|
|
|
8817 at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry
|
|
|
8818 necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said:
|
|
|
8819 "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of
|
|
|
8820 His will" (
|
|
|
8821 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>).
|
|
|
8822 </p>
|
|
|
8823 <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p8">
|
|
|
8824 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things pertain to the care of providence---namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition;
|
|
|
8825 and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal.
|
|
|
8826 </p>
|
|
|
8827 <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p9">
|
|
|
8828 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done
|
|
|
8829 for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty
|
|
|
8830 is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally,
|
|
|
8831 this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect
|
|
|
8832 are one and the same thing, as we have said above
|
|
|
8833 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19.html">(Q[19])</a>.
|
|
|
8834 </p>
|
|
|
8835 <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
8836 <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
8837 <a href="summa.FP_Q22.html"></a>
|
|
|
8838 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
8839 </div>
|
|
|
8840 <div id="FP_Q22_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
8841 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
8842 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
8843 <h4 id="FP_Q22_A2-p0.1">Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?</h4>
|
|
|
8844 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8845 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p2">
|
|
|
8846 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything
|
|
|
8847 was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.
|
|
|
8848 </p>
|
|
|
8849 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p3">
|
|
|
8850 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many
|
|
|
8851 evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.
|
|
|
8852 </p>
|
|
|
8853 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p4">
|
|
|
8854 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
|
|
|
8855 vi, 5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since,
|
|
|
8856 then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence.
|
|
|
8857 </p>
|
|
|
8858 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p5">
|
|
|
8859 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by
|
|
|
8860 God in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel" (
|
|
|
8861 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>). And particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart" (
|
|
|
8862 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.80.13" target="asv">Ps. 80:13</a>). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine
|
|
|
8863 providence.
|
|
|
8864 </p>
|
|
|
8865 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p6">
|
|
|
8866 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
|
|
|
8867 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>): "God doth not care for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the same of other irrational creatures.
|
|
|
8868 Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence.
|
|
|
8869 </p>
|
|
|
8870 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p7">
|
|
|
8871 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (
|
|
|
8872 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>).
|
|
|
8873 </p>
|
|
|
8874 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p8">
|
|
|
8875 <b>I answer that,</b> Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world
|
|
|
8876 was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in
|
|
|
8877 their individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented
|
|
|
8878 as saying (
|
|
|
8879 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.22.14" target="asv">Job 22:14</a>): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not
|
|
|
8880 consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of
|
|
|
8881 things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers
|
|
|
8882 corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others.
|
|
|
8883 </p>
|
|
|
8884 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p9"> We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual
|
|
|
8885 selves. This is mad evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends
|
|
|
8886 as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place
|
|
|
8887 which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the
|
|
|
8888 intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent
|
|
|
8889 principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things
|
|
|
8890 corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle
|
|
|
8891 says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.'Those powers that are, are ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt,
|
|
|
8892 a
|
|
|
8893 Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" (
|
|
|
8894 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have
|
|
|
8895 said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine
|
|
|
8896 providence. It has also been shown (
|
|
|
8897 <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html">Q[14], AA[6]</a>,11) that God knows all
|
|
|
8898 things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge
|
|
|
8899 of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject
|
|
|
8900 to the ordering of that art.
|
|
|
8901 </p>
|
|
|
8902 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p10">
|
|
|
8903 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not
|
|
|
8904 the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance
|
|
|
8905 of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then,
|
|
|
8906 all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be
|
|
|
8907 that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of
|
|
|
8908 a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause,
|
|
|
8909 outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although
|
|
|
8910 to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one
|
|
|
8911 place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other.
|
|
|
8912 </p>
|
|
|
8913 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p11">
|
|
|
8914 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular
|
|
|
8915 provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows
|
|
|
8916 some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things
|
|
|
8917 are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the
|
|
|
8918 plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good:
|
|
|
8919 for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since
|
|
|
8920 God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects,
|
|
|
8921 that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from
|
|
|
8922 the
|
|
|
8923 universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there
|
|
|
8924 were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in
|
|
|
8925 His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account
|
|
|
8926 of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things---e.g. casual
|
|
|
8927 and evil things---as removed from the care of divine providence.
|
|
|
8928 </p>
|
|
|
8929 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p12">
|
|
|
8930 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence
|
|
|
8931 does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the
|
|
|
8932 author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine
|
|
|
8933 providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and
|
|
|
8934 others of the ancients.
|
|
|
8935 </p>
|
|
|
8936 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p13">
|
|
|
8937 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that
|
|
|
8938 he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only
|
|
|
8939 acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards
|
|
|
8940 an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which
|
|
|
8941 these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since
|
|
|
8942 the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise
|
|
|
8943 of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular
|
|
|
8944 under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over
|
|
|
8945 the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that love God,
|
|
|
8946 all things work together unto good" (
|
|
|
8947 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether
|
|
|
8948 withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His
|
|
|
8949 providence. This was the reason that had weight with
|
|
|
8950 Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel.
|
|
|
8951 </p>
|
|
|
8952 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p14">
|
|
|
8953 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (
|
|
|
8954 <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html">Q[19], A[10]</a>), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit;
|
|
|
8955 and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the
|
|
|
8956 care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape
|
|
|
8957 the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.
|
|
|
8958 </p>
|
|
|
8959 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p15"></p>
|
|
|
8960 <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p16"></p>
|
|
|
8961 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
8962 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
8963 </div>
|
|
|
8964 <div id="FP_Q22_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
8965 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
8966 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
8967 <h4 id="FP_Q22_A3-p0.1">Whether God has immediate providence over everything?</h4>
|
|
|
8968 <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
8969 <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p2">
|
|
|
8970 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must
|
|
|
8971 be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides
|
|
|
8972 for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things.
|
|
|
8973 </p>
|
|
|
8974 <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p3">
|
|
|
8975 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good.
|
|
|
8976 But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence.
|
|
|
8977 If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn.
|
|
|
8978 </p>
|
|
|
8979 <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p4">
|
|
|
8980 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example,
|
|
|
8981 vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore
|
|
|
8982 He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things.
|
|
|
8983 </p>
|
|
|
8984 <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p5">
|
|
|
8985 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
8986 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.13" target="asv">Job 34:13</a>): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On which passage Gregory
|
|
|
8987 says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made."
|
|
|
8988 </p>
|
|
|
8989 <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p6">
|
|
|
8990 <b>I answer that,</b> Two things belong to providence---namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution
|
|
|
8991 of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because
|
|
|
8992 He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He
|
|
|
8993 gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand
|
|
|
8994 the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs
|
|
|
8995 things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so
|
|
|
8996 that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid.
|
|
|
8997 viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and
|
|
|
8998 foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes.
|
|
|
8999 The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities
|
|
|
9000 who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The
|
|
|
9001 third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the
|
|
|
9002 gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14).
|
|
|
9003 </p>
|
|
|
9004 <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p7">
|
|
|
9005 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those
|
|
|
9006 things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more
|
|
|
9007 it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.
|
|
|
9008 </p>
|
|
|
9009 <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p8">
|
|
|
9010 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His
|
|
|
9011 order, as was said above (
|
|
|
9012 <a id="FP_Q22_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], AA[5]</a>,8).
|
|
|
9013 </p>
|
|
|
9014 <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p9">
|
|
|
9015 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and
|
|
|
9016 higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards
|
|
|
9017 evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction
|
|
|
9018 of evil.
|
|
|
9019 </p>
|
|
|
9020 <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
9021 <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
9022 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
9023 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
9024 </div>
|
|
|
9025 <div id="FP_Q22_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
9026 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
9027 <a href="summa.FP_Q23.html"></a>
|
|
|
9028 <h4 id="FP_Q22_A4-p0.1">Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?</h4>
|
|
|
9029 <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9030 <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p2">
|
|
|
9031 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a "per se" cause, either
|
|
|
9032 present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the
|
|
|
9033 providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot
|
|
|
9034 be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.
|
|
|
9035 </p>
|
|
|
9036 <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p3">
|
|
|
9037 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns
|
|
|
9038 the stability of necessity to things provided.
|
|
|
9039 </p>
|
|
|
9040 <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p4">
|
|
|
9041 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes
|
|
|
9042 by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.
|
|
|
9043 </p>
|
|
|
9044 <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p5">
|
|
|
9045 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some
|
|
|
9046 things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.
|
|
|
9047 </p>
|
|
|
9048 <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p6">
|
|
|
9049 <b>I answer that,</b> Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs
|
|
|
9050 to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good
|
|
|
9051 in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things.
|
|
|
9052 Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has
|
|
|
9053 prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen
|
|
|
9054 by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes.
|
|
|
9055 </p>
|
|
|
9056 <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p7">
|
|
|
9057 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity
|
|
|
9058 or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly
|
|
|
9059 and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.
|
|
|
9060 </p>
|
|
|
9061 <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p8">
|
|
|
9062 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen,
|
|
|
9063 whether from necessity or from contingency.
|
|
|
9064 </p>
|
|
|
9065 <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p9">
|
|
|
9066 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not
|
|
|
9067 to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember
|
|
|
9068 that properly speaking 'necessary' and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and
|
|
|
9069 of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for
|
|
|
9070 all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.
|
|
|
9071 </p>
|
|
|
9072 <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
9073 <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
9074 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
9075 <a href="summa.FP_Q23.html"></a>
|
|
|
9076 </div>
|
|
|
9077 <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
9078 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
9079 </div>
|
|
|
9080 <div id="FP_Q23" class="div3">
|
|
|
9081 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
9082 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
9083 <h3 id="FP_Q23-p0.1">OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
9084 <p id="FP_Q23-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9085 <p id="FP_Q23-p2"> After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination
|
|
|
9086 there are eight points of inquiry:
|
|
|
9087 </p>
|
|
|
9088 <p id="FP_Q23-p3"> (1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?</p>
|
|
|
9089 <p id="FP_Q23-p4"> (2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?</p>
|
|
|
9090 <p id="FP_Q23-p5"> (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?</p>
|
|
|
9091 <p id="FP_Q23-p6"> (4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?</p>
|
|
|
9092 <p id="FP_Q23-p7"> (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?</p>
|
|
|
9093 <p id="FP_Q23-p8"> (6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?</p>
|
|
|
9094 <p id="FP_Q23-p9"> (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</p>
|
|
|
9095 <p id="FP_Q23-p10"> (8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</p>
|
|
|
9096 <div id="FP_Q23_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
9097 <a href="summa.FP_Q23.html"></a>
|
|
|
9098 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
9099 <h4 id="FP_Q23_A1-p0.1">Whether men are predestined by God?</h4>
|
|
|
9100 <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9101 <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p2">
|
|
|
9102 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God
|
|
|
9103 foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But
|
|
|
9104 human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore
|
|
|
9105 to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done
|
|
|
9106 away.
|
|
|
9107 </p>
|
|
|
9108 <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p3">
|
|
|
9109 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (
|
|
|
9110 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.
|
|
|
9111 </p>
|
|
|
9112 <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p4">
|
|
|
9113 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them
|
|
|
9114 there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose
|
|
|
9115 to take pity [miserendi]" [*See
|
|
|
9116 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>]. Therefore men are not predestined.
|
|
|
9117 </p>
|
|
|
9118 <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p5">
|
|
|
9119 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle
|
|
|
9120 (
|
|
|
9121 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:12</a>): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are
|
|
|
9122 given us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination
|
|
|
9123 would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.
|
|
|
9124 </p>
|
|
|
9125 <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p6">
|
|
|
9126 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
9127 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called."
|
|
|
9128 </p>
|
|
|
9129 <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p7">
|
|
|
9130 <b>I answer that,</b> It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (
|
|
|
9131 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (
|
|
|
9132 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of
|
|
|
9133 created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing
|
|
|
9134 God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (
|
|
|
9135 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power
|
|
|
9136 of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another;
|
|
|
9137 thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal
|
|
|
9138 life, is led towards it,
|
|
|
9139 directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things
|
|
|
9140 towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a
|
|
|
9141 kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards
|
|
|
9142 the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that
|
|
|
9143 predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.
|
|
|
9144 </p>
|
|
|
9145 <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p8">
|
|
|
9146 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards
|
|
|
9147 one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not
|
|
|
9148 excluded by Him.
|
|
|
9149 </p>
|
|
|
9150 <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p9">
|
|
|
9151 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly
|
|
|
9152 said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.
|
|
|
9153 </p>
|
|
|
9154 <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p10">
|
|
|
9155 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take
|
|
|
9156 its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of
|
|
|
9157 making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the
|
|
|
9158 notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of
|
|
|
9159 misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown
|
|
|
9160 previously (
|
|
|
9161 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html">Q[21], AA[3]</a>,4).
|
|
|
9162 </p>
|
|
|
9163 <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p11">
|
|
|
9164 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to
|
|
|
9165 everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.
|
|
|
9166 </p>
|
|
|
9167 <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
9168 <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p13"></p>
|
|
|
9169 <a href="summa.FP_Q23.html"></a>
|
|
|
9170 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
9171 </div>
|
|
|
9172 <div id="FP_Q23_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
9173 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
9174 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
9175 <h4 id="FP_Q23_A2-p0.1">Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?</h4>
|
|
|
9176 <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9177 <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p2">
|
|
|
9178 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore
|
|
|
9179 predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined.
|
|
|
9180 </p>
|
|
|
9181 <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p3">
|
|
|
9182 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc. (
|
|
|
9183 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.4" target="asv">Rom. 1:4</a>): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination
|
|
|
9184 but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something
|
|
|
9185 in the predestined.
|
|
|
9186 </p>
|
|
|
9187 <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p4">
|
|
|
9188 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine
|
|
|
9189 says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined.
|
|
|
9190 </p>
|
|
|
9191 <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p5">
|
|
|
9192 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the
|
|
|
9193 definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore
|
|
|
9194 predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is
|
|
|
9195 in Him is eternal.
|
|
|
9196 </p>
|
|
|
9197 <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p6">
|
|
|
9198 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge
|
|
|
9199 is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines,
|
|
|
9200 and not in the predestined.
|
|
|
9201 </p>
|
|
|
9202 <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p7">
|
|
|
9203 <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination
|
|
|
9204 is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider,
|
|
|
9205 as was proved above (
|
|
|
9206 <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active
|
|
|
9207 way in the governor.
|
|
|
9208 Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing
|
|
|
9209 in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The
|
|
|
9210 execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (
|
|
|
9211 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."
|
|
|
9212 </p>
|
|
|
9213 <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p8">
|
|
|
9214 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but
|
|
|
9215 not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (
|
|
|
9216 <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
9217 <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">Q[18], A[3]</a>, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its
|
|
|
9218 execution, which passes out to external things, has
|
|
|
9219 an effect in them.
|
|
|
9220 </p>
|
|
|
9221 <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p9">
|
|
|
9222 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually
|
|
|
9223 existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we
|
|
|
9224 are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not
|
|
|
9225 to do any unlawful things for the love of life" (
|
|
|
9226 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.6.20" target="asv">2 Macc.
|
|
|
9227 6:20
|
|
|
9228 </a>). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it
|
|
|
9229 implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.
|
|
|
9230 </p>
|
|
|
9231 <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p10">
|
|
|
9232 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action,
|
|
|
9233 and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to
|
|
|
9234 act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination,
|
|
|
9235 conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.
|
|
|
9236 </p>
|
|
|
9237 <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p11">
|
|
|
9238 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination
|
|
|
9239 implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination
|
|
|
9240 is anything temporal.
|
|
|
9241 </p>
|
|
|
9242 <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
9243 <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
9244 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
9245 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
9246 </div>
|
|
|
9247 <div id="FP_Q23_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
9248 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
9249 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
9250 <h4 id="FP_Q23_A3-p0.1">Whether God reprobates any man?</h4>
|
|
|
9251 <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9252 <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p2">
|
|
|
9253 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (
|
|
|
9254 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man.
|
|
|
9255 </p>
|
|
|
9256 <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p3">
|
|
|
9257 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as
|
|
|
9258 predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation
|
|
|
9259 will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said (
|
|
|
9260 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.9" target="asv">Osee 13:9</a>): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate
|
|
|
9261 any man.
|
|
|
9262 </p>
|
|
|
9263 <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p4">
|
|
|
9264 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For
|
|
|
9265 it is said (
|
|
|
9266 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.14" target="asv">Eccles. 7:14</a>): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man,
|
|
|
9267 were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.
|
|
|
9268 </p>
|
|
|
9269 <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p5">
|
|
|
9270 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
9271 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.2" target="asv">Malachi 1:2,3</a>): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau."
|
|
|
9272 </p>
|
|
|
9273 <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p6">
|
|
|
9274 <b>I answer that,</b> God does reprobate some. For it was said above
|
|
|
9275 <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things
|
|
|
9276 which are subject to providence, as was said above (
|
|
|
9277 <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit
|
|
|
9278 some to fall away from that end; this is called
|
|
|
9279 reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation
|
|
|
9280 is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge,
|
|
|
9281 but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (
|
|
|
9282 <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit
|
|
|
9283 a person to fall into
|
|
|
9284 sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.
|
|
|
9285 </p>
|
|
|
9286 <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p7">
|
|
|
9287 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all.
|
|
|
9288 So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good---namely, eternal life---He is said to hate or reprobated them.
|
|
|
9289 </p>
|
|
|
9290 <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p8">
|
|
|
9291 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future
|
|
|
9292 life by the predestined---namely, glory---and of what is received in this life---namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not
|
|
|
9293 the cause of what is in the present---namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of
|
|
|
9294 what is assigned in the future---namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from
|
|
|
9295 the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true---namely,
|
|
|
9296 "Destruction is thy own, O Israel."
|
|
|
9297 </p>
|
|
|
9298 <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p9">
|
|
|
9299 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated
|
|
|
9300 cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as
|
|
|
9301 was said above (
|
|
|
9302 <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of
|
|
|
9303 choice. Whence, although
|
|
|
9304 anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the
|
|
|
9305 use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.
|
|
|
9306 </p>
|
|
|
9307 <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
9308 <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
9309 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
9310 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
9311 </div>
|
|
|
9312 <div id="FP_Q23_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
9313 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
9314 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
9315 <h4 id="FP_Q23_A4-p0.1">Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]</h4>
|
|
|
9316 <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9317 <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p2">
|
|
|
9318 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends
|
|
|
9319 his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial
|
|
|
9320 manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and
|
|
|
9321 this belongs to predestination.
|
|
|
9322 </p>
|
|
|
9323 <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p3">
|
|
|
9324 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore,
|
|
|
9325 some are predestined without election.
|
|
|
9326 </p>
|
|
|
9327 <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p4">
|
|
|
9328 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" (
|
|
|
9329 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.
|
|
|
9330 </p>
|
|
|
9331 <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p5">
|
|
|
9332 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
9333 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.4" target="asv">Eph. 1:4</a>): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world."
|
|
|
9334 </p>
|
|
|
9335 <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p6">
|
|
|
9336 <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination,
|
|
|
9337 as stated above
|
|
|
9338 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering
|
|
|
9339 of some things towards an end; as was proved above (
|
|
|
9340 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end
|
|
|
9341 already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills
|
|
|
9342 their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal
|
|
|
9343 salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (
|
|
|
9344 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above
|
|
|
9345
|
|
|
9346 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not
|
|
|
9347 cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election
|
|
|
9348 in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the
|
|
|
9349 cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love
|
|
|
9350 precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of
|
|
|
9351 election and love.
|
|
|
9352 </p>
|
|
|
9353 <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p7">
|
|
|
9354 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch
|
|
|
9355 as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (
|
|
|
9356 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives
|
|
|
9357 certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the
|
|
|
9358 conferring of grace and glory election is implied.
|
|
|
9359 </p>
|
|
|
9360 <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p8">
|
|
|
9361 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the
|
|
|
9362 choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above
|
|
|
9363 (
|
|
|
9364 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], A[2]</a>). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His
|
|
|
9365 choice."
|
|
|
9366 </p>
|
|
|
9367 <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p9">
|
|
|
9368 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent
|
|
|
9369 will, which is to will simply.
|
|
|
9370 </p>
|
|
|
9371 <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
9372 <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
9373 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
9374 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
9375 </div>
|
|
|
9376 <div id="FP_Q23_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
9377 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
9378 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
9379 <h4 id="FP_Q23_A5-p0.1">Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?</h4>
|
|
|
9380 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9381 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p2">
|
|
|
9382 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (
|
|
|
9383 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv">Rom. 8:29</a>): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on
|
|
|
9384 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.15" target="asv"> Rom. 9:15</a>: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his
|
|
|
9385 whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.
|
|
|
9386 </p>
|
|
|
9387 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p3">
|
|
|
9388 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the
|
|
|
9389 purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than
|
|
|
9390 the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination.
|
|
|
9391 </p>
|
|
|
9392 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p4">
|
|
|
9393 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "There is no injustice in God" (
|
|
|
9394 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.14" target="asv">Rom. 9:14</a>). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original
|
|
|
9395 sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things
|
|
|
9396 for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.
|
|
|
9397 </p>
|
|
|
9398 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p5">
|
|
|
9399 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
|
|
|
9400 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.3.5" target="asv">Titus 3:5</a>): "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He saved us, so He predestined
|
|
|
9401 that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.
|
|
|
9402 </p>
|
|
|
9403 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p6">
|
|
|
9404 <b>I answer that,</b> Since predestination includes will, as was said above
|
|
|
9405 <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above
|
|
|
9406 (
|
|
|
9407 <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], A[5]</a> ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the
|
|
|
9408 part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else.
|
|
|
9409 Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator.
|
|
|
9410 But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether
|
|
|
9411 God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.
|
|
|
9412 </p>
|
|
|
9413 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p7"> Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing
|
|
|
9414 merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning,
|
|
|
9415 and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body.
|
|
|
9416 The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (
|
|
|
9417 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.11" target="asv">Rom. 9:11,12</a>): "For when they were
|
|
|
9418 not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall
|
|
|
9419 serve the younger."
|
|
|
9420 </p>
|
|
|
9421 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p8"> Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians
|
|
|
9422 taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect
|
|
|
9423 of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other
|
|
|
9424 did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (
|
|
|
9425 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:5</a>), that "we are not
|
|
|
9426 sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act
|
|
|
9427 of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.
|
|
|
9428 </p>
|
|
|
9429 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p9"> And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand
|
|
|
9430 that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good
|
|
|
9431 use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these
|
|
|
9432 seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as
|
|
|
9433 if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and
|
|
|
9434 this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore,
|
|
|
9435 if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction
|
|
|
9436 between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a
|
|
|
9437 secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes,
|
|
|
9438 as was above shown (
|
|
|
9439 <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination
|
|
|
9440 may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination
|
|
|
9441 should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent
|
|
|
9442 effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent
|
|
|
9443 as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give
|
|
|
9444 glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination
|
|
|
9445 may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have
|
|
|
9446 any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect
|
|
|
9447 of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to
|
|
|
9448 the prophet Jeremias (
|
|
|
9449 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Lam.5.21" target="asv">Lam. 5:21</a>): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect,
|
|
|
9450 the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of
|
|
|
9451 predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.
|
|
|
9452 </p>
|
|
|
9453 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p10">
|
|
|
9454 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was
|
|
|
9455 explained above.
|
|
|
9456 </p>
|
|
|
9457 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p11">
|
|
|
9458 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular
|
|
|
9459 effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated.
|
|
|
9460 </p>
|
|
|
9461 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p12">
|
|
|
9462 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He
|
|
|
9463 is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is
|
|
|
9464 necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because
|
|
|
9465 creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that
|
|
|
9466 for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low
|
|
|
9467 place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good
|
|
|
9468 things should never happen, as was said above (
|
|
|
9469 <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness
|
|
|
9470 in men; in respect to those whom He predestines,
|
|
|
9471 by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing
|
|
|
9472 them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (
|
|
|
9473 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.22" target="asv">Rom. 9:22,23</a>): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that
|
|
|
9474 is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His
|
|
|
9475 glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (
|
|
|
9476 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.3" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.20" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:20</a>): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto
|
|
|
9477 honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine
|
|
|
9478 will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou
|
|
|
9479 dost not wish to err."
|
|
|
9480 Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it
|
|
|
9481 was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity
|
|
|
9482 of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another,
|
|
|
9483 depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of
|
|
|
9484 the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place.
|
|
|
9485 Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This
|
|
|
9486 would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously.
|
|
|
9487 In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody
|
|
|
9488 of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy
|
|
|
9489 way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (
|
|
|
9490 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.14" target="asv">Mat. 20:14,15</a>).
|
|
|
9491 </p>
|
|
|
9492 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p13"></p>
|
|
|
9493 <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p14"></p>
|
|
|
9494 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
9495 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
9496 </div>
|
|
|
9497 <div id="FP_Q23_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
9498 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
9499 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
9500 <h4 id="FP_Q23_A6-p0.1">Whether predestination is certain?</h4>
|
|
|
9501 <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9502 <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p2">
|
|
|
9503 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown,"
|
|
|
9504 (
|
|
|
9505 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.11" target="asv">Rev 3:11</a>), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which
|
|
|
9506 is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain.
|
|
|
9507 </p>
|
|
|
9508 <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p3">
|
|
|
9509 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e.g. Peter---may
|
|
|
9510 sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then,
|
|
|
9511 is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.
|
|
|
9512 </p>
|
|
|
9513 <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p4">
|
|
|
9514 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore
|
|
|
9515 now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain.
|
|
|
9516 </p>
|
|
|
9517 <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p5">
|
|
|
9518 <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
|
|
|
9519 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv"> Rom. 8:29</a>: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of
|
|
|
9520 God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed."
|
|
|
9521 </p>
|
|
|
9522 <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p6">
|
|
|
9523 <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect
|
|
|
9524 should take place from necessity. For it was said above
|
|
|
9525 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening
|
|
|
9526 from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects.
|
|
|
9527 Yet
|
|
|
9528 the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above (
|
|
|
9529 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html">Q[22], A[4]</a>). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has
|
|
|
9530 its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will (
|
|
|
9531 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">Q[14], A[13]</a>;
|
|
|
9532 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are
|
|
|
9533 most certain and infallible.
|
|
|
9534 </p>
|
|
|
9535 <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p7">
|
|
|
9536 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown:
|
|
|
9537 secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal
|
|
|
9538 sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to
|
|
|
9539 fall, without raising others; according to
|
|
|
9540 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.24" target="asv"> Job 34:24</a>: "He shall
|
|
|
9541 break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the
|
|
|
9542 fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives
|
|
|
9543 the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice
|
|
|
9544 at all good whether done by himself or by others.
|
|
|
9545 </p>
|
|
|
9546 <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p8">
|
|
|
9547 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible,
|
|
|
9548 supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short
|
|
|
9549 of its effect.
|
|
|
9550 </p>
|
|
|
9551 <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p9">
|
|
|
9552 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above
|
|
|
9553 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>: and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability
|
|
|
9554 of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to
|
|
|
9555 say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense,
|
|
|
9556 thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.
|
|
|
9557 </p>
|
|
|
9558 <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p10"></p>
|
|
|
9559 <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p11"></p>
|
|
|
9560 <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p12"></p>
|
|
|
9561 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
9562 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
9563 </div>
|
|
|
9564 <div id="FP_Q23_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
9565 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
9566 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
9567 <h4 id="FP_Q23_A7-p0.1">Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</h4>
|
|
|
9568 <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9569 <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p2">
|
|
|
9570 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain.
|
|
|
9571 But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written (
|
|
|
9572 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.11" target="asv">Dt. 1:11</a>): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him."
|
|
|
9573 Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.
|
|
|
9574 </p>
|
|
|
9575 <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p3">
|
|
|
9576 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged
|
|
|
9577 by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by God cannot be certain.
|
|
|
9578 </p>
|
|
|
9579 <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p4">
|
|
|
9580 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority
|
|
|
9581 of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there
|
|
|
9582 would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from
|
|
|
9583 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.13" target="asv"> Mat. 7:13,14</a>: "For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow
|
|
|
9584 is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number of those pre-ordained
|
|
|
9585 by God to be saved is not certain.
|
|
|
9586 </p>
|
|
|
9587 <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p5">
|
|
|
9588 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished."
|
|
|
9589 </p>
|
|
|
9590 <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p6">
|
|
|
9591 <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were
|
|
|
9592 to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys
|
|
|
9593 the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above
|
|
|
9594 <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It
|
|
|
9595 must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge,
|
|
|
9596 because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the
|
|
|
9597 sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must
|
|
|
9598 remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the
|
|
|
9599 infinite (
|
|
|
9600 <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which
|
|
|
9601 are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally,
|
|
|
9602 but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such
|
|
|
9603 numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder
|
|
|
9604 thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house;
|
|
|
9605 and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and
|
|
|
9606 uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in
|
|
|
9607 regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and
|
|
|
9608 what
|
|
|
9609 number would befit the essential parts of that universe---that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity;
|
|
|
9610 how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption,
|
|
|
9611 are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species
|
|
|
9612 is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such
|
|
|
9613 like, is not pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation
|
|
|
9614 of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such
|
|
|
9615 incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end.
|
|
|
9616 Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal
|
|
|
9617 pre-ordination.
|
|
|
9618 </p>
|
|
|
9619 <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p7"> It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for
|
|
|
9620 the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (
|
|
|
9621 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as
|
|
|
9622 there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God
|
|
|
9623 alone is
|
|
|
9624 known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']"
|
|
|
9625 </p>
|
|
|
9626 <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p8">
|
|
|
9627 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness.
|
|
|
9628 For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined.
|
|
|
9629 </p>
|
|
|
9630 <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p9">
|
|
|
9631 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the
|
|
|
9632 reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion
|
|
|
9633 of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe.
|
|
|
9634 </p>
|
|
|
9635 <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p10">
|
|
|
9636 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority.
|
|
|
9637 The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is
|
|
|
9638 clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge
|
|
|
9639 are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge
|
|
|
9640 of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the
|
|
|
9641 vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption
|
|
|
9642 of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has
|
|
|
9643 chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall
|
|
|
9644 short.
|
|
|
9645 </p>
|
|
|
9646 <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p11"></p>
|
|
|
9647 <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p12"></p>
|
|
|
9648 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
9649 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
9650 </div>
|
|
|
9651 <div id="FP_Q23_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
9652 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
9653 <a href="summa.FP_Q24.html"></a>
|
|
|
9654 <h4 id="FP_Q23_A8-p0.1">Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</h4>
|
|
|
9655 <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9656 <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p2">
|
|
|
9657 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything
|
|
|
9658 temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal.
|
|
|
9659 Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination
|
|
|
9660 therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints.
|
|
|
9661 </p>
|
|
|
9662 <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p3">
|
|
|
9663 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through
|
|
|
9664 defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the
|
|
|
9665 Spirit of the Lord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been His counsellor?" (
|
|
|
9666 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.34" target="asv">Rom. 11:34</a>). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints.
|
|
|
9667 </p>
|
|
|
9668 <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p4">
|
|
|
9669 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore
|
|
|
9670 it cannot be furthered by anything.
|
|
|
9671 </p>
|
|
|
9672 <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p5">
|
|
|
9673 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive"
|
|
|
9674 (
|
|
|
9675 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.25.21" target="asv">Gn. 25:21</a>). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had
|
|
|
9676 never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints.
|
|
|
9677 </p>
|
|
|
9678 <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p6">
|
|
|
9679 <b>I answer that,</b> Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that
|
|
|
9680 prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the
|
|
|
9681 predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings
|
|
|
9682 of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.
|
|
|
9683 </p>
|
|
|
9684 <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p7"> Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians,
|
|
|
9685 who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against
|
|
|
9686 this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved
|
|
|
9687 to repentance" (
|
|
|
9688 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.15.29" target="asv">1 Kings 15:29</a>); and that "the gifts and the calling of God are
|
|
|
9689 without repentance" (
|
|
|
9690 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.29" target="asv">Rom. 11:29</a>).
|
|
|
9691 </p>
|
|
|
9692 <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p8"> Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and
|
|
|
9693 its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it
|
|
|
9694 is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped
|
|
|
9695 by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does
|
|
|
9696 not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence.
|
|
|
9697 So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects,
|
|
|
9698 without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever
|
|
|
9699 helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of
|
|
|
9700 another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must
|
|
|
9701 strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason
|
|
|
9702 it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" (
|
|
|
9703 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.10" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:10</a>).
|
|
|
9704 </p>
|
|
|
9705 <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p9">
|
|
|
9706 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.
|
|
|
9707 </p>
|
|
|
9708 <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p10">
|
|
|
9709 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus
|
|
|
9710 belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?"
|
|
|
9711 In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In
|
|
|
9712 this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to
|
|
|
9713
|
|
|
9714 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:9</a>: "We are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary
|
|
|
9715 causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures
|
|
|
9716 the dignity of causality.
|
|
|
9717 </p>
|
|
|
9718 <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p11">
|
|
|
9719 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above (
|
|
|
9720 <a id="FP_Q23_A8-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html">Q[19], A[6]</a>), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by
|
|
|
9721 them.
|
|
|
9722 </p>
|
|
|
9723 <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p12"></p>
|
|
|
9724 <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p13"></p>
|
|
|
9725 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
9726 <a href="summa.FP_Q24.html"></a>
|
|
|
9727 </div>
|
|
|
9728 <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
9729 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
9730 </div>
|
|
|
9731 <div id="FP_Q24" class="div3">
|
|
|
9732 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
9733 <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
9734 <h3 id="FP_Q24-p0.1">THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
9735 <p id="FP_Q24-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9736 <p id="FP_Q24-p2"> We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
9737 <p id="FP_Q24-p3"> (1) What is the book of life?</p>
|
|
|
9738 <p id="FP_Q24-p4"> (2) Of what life is it the book?</p>
|
|
|
9739 <p id="FP_Q24-p5"> (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?</p>
|
|
|
9740 <div id="FP_Q24_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
9741 <a href="summa.FP_Q24.html"></a>
|
|
|
9742 <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
9743 <h4 id="FP_Q24_A1-p0.1">Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?</h4>
|
|
|
9744 <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9745 <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p2">
|
|
|
9746 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life"
|
|
|
9747 (
|
|
|
9748 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.4.32" target="asv">Ecclus. 4:32</a>)---i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life
|
|
|
9749 is not predestination.
|
|
|
9750 </p>
|
|
|
9751 <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p3">
|
|
|
9752 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that
|
|
|
9753 to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but
|
|
|
9754 rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination.
|
|
|
9755 </p>
|
|
|
9756 <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p4">
|
|
|
9757 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the book of life were the same as predestination, there should
|
|
|
9758 also be a book of death, as there is a book of life.
|
|
|
9759 </p>
|
|
|
9760 <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p5">
|
|
|
9761 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in a gloss upon
|
|
|
9762 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.29" target="asv"> Ps. 68:29, </a> "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life
|
|
|
9763 those whom He foreknew."
|
|
|
9764 </p>
|
|
|
9765 <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p6">
|
|
|
9766 <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among
|
|
|
9767 men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who
|
|
|
9768 formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding (
|
|
|
9769 <a id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore,
|
|
|
9770 of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it
|
|
|
9771 is firmly held in the memory, according to
|
|
|
9772 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.3" target="asv"> Prov. 3:3</a>: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For
|
|
|
9773 things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that
|
|
|
9774 He has predestined some to eternal life, is called
|
|
|
9775 the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him
|
|
|
9776 of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to
|
|
|
9777 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iiTim.11.19" target="asv">2 Tim. 11:19</a>: "The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His."
|
|
|
9778 </p>
|
|
|
9779 <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p7">
|
|
|
9780 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we
|
|
|
9781 now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book
|
|
|
9782 of life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of
|
|
|
9783 life; or of things already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens
|
|
|
9784 that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the
|
|
|
9785 book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare,
|
|
|
9786 or relates the deeds of soldiers.
|
|
|
9787 </p>
|
|
|
9788 <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p8"> Hence the solution of the Second Objection.</p>
|
|
|
9789 <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p9">
|
|
|
9790 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding
|
|
|
9791 to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.
|
|
|
9792 </p>
|
|
|
9793 <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p10">
|
|
|
9794 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of predestination;
|
|
|
9795 as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.
|
|
|
9796 </p>
|
|
|
9797 <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
9798 <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
9799 <a href="summa.FP_Q24.html"></a>
|
|
|
9800 <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
9801 </div>
|
|
|
9802 <div id="FP_Q24_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
9803 <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
9804 <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
9805 <h4 id="FP_Q24_A2-p0.1">Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?</h4>
|
|
|
9806 <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9807 <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p2">
|
|
|
9808 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge
|
|
|
9809 of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine
|
|
|
9810 life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined.
|
|
|
9811 </p>
|
|
|
9812 <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p3">
|
|
|
9813 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of
|
|
|
9814 glory is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called.
|
|
|
9815 </p>
|
|
|
9816 <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p4">
|
|
|
9817 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said:
|
|
|
9818 "Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" (
|
|
|
9819 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.71" target="asv">Jn. 6:71</a>). But the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the
|
|
|
9820 life of grace.
|
|
|
9821 </p>
|
|
|
9822 <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p5">
|
|
|
9823 <b>On the contrary,</b> The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above
|
|
|
9824 <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined
|
|
|
9825 who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.
|
|
|
9826 </p>
|
|
|
9827 <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p6">
|
|
|
9828 <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life, as stated above
|
|
|
9829 <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to
|
|
|
9830 him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed
|
|
|
9831 merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of
|
|
|
9832 glory is an end exceeding
|
|
|
9833 human nature, as said above (
|
|
|
9834 <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory.
|
|
|
9835 </p>
|
|
|
9836 <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p7">
|
|
|
9837 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in
|
|
|
9838 consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things
|
|
|
9839 that are consequent on nature.
|
|
|
9840 </p>
|
|
|
9841 <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p8"> From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life
|
|
|
9842 of nature.
|
|
|
9843 </p>
|
|
|
9844 <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p9">
|
|
|
9845 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen
|
|
|
9846 to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace,
|
|
|
9847 fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book
|
|
|
9848 of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and
|
|
|
9849 knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace.
|
|
|
9850 </p>
|
|
|
9851 <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
9852 <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
9853 <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
9854 <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
9855 </div>
|
|
|
9856 <div id="FP_Q24_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
9857 <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
9858 <a href="summa.FP_Q25.html"></a>
|
|
|
9859 <h4 id="FP_Q24_A3-p0.1">Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?</h4>
|
|
|
9860 <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9861 <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p2">
|
|
|
9862 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge,
|
|
|
9863 which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination.
|
|
|
9864 Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.
|
|
|
9865 </p>
|
|
|
9866 <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p3">
|
|
|
9867 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal
|
|
|
9868 and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.
|
|
|
9869 </p>
|
|
|
9870 <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p4">
|
|
|
9871 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither
|
|
|
9872 therefore can he be blotted out.
|
|
|
9873 </p>
|
|
|
9874 <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p5">
|
|
|
9875 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of the living" (
|
|
|
9876 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.29" target="asv">Ps. 68:29</a>).
|
|
|
9877 </p>
|
|
|
9878 <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p6">
|
|
|
9879 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For
|
|
|
9880 it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in
|
|
|
9881 the book of life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present righteousness they see in them;
|
|
|
9882 but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from
|
|
|
9883 that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted
|
|
|
9884 out of the book of the living." But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just,
|
|
|
9885 according to the text, "He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out
|
|
|
9886 of the book of life" (
|
|
|
9887 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.5" target="asv">Apoc. 3:5</a>) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the
|
|
|
9888 opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to
|
|
|
9889 be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained
|
|
|
9890 to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and
|
|
|
9891 from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because
|
|
|
9892 some
|
|
|
9893 are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore those who
|
|
|
9894 are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because they
|
|
|
9895 are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who
|
|
|
9896 are ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of
|
|
|
9897 life
|
|
|
9898 not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though
|
|
|
9899 these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew
|
|
|
9900 a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life,
|
|
|
9901 and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace.
|
|
|
9902 </p>
|
|
|
9903 <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p7">
|
|
|
9904 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change;
|
|
|
9905 but as regards things foreknown, which can change.
|
|
|
9906 </p>
|
|
|
9907 <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p8">
|
|
|
9908 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of
|
|
|
9909 the book of life refers.
|
|
|
9910 </p>
|
|
|
9911 <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p9">
|
|
|
9912 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew;
|
|
|
9913 either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is
|
|
|
9914 included in the knowledge of God, although not anew.
|
|
|
9915 </p>
|
|
|
9916 <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
9917 <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
9918 <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
9919 <a href="summa.FP_Q25.html"></a>
|
|
|
9920 </div>
|
|
|
9921 <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
9922 <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
9923 </div>
|
|
|
9924 <div id="FP_Q25" class="div3">
|
|
|
9925 <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
9926 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
9927 <h3 id="FP_Q25-p0.1">THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
9928 <p id="FP_Q25-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9929 <p id="FP_Q25-p2"> After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the
|
|
|
9930 power of God. About this are six points of inquiry:
|
|
|
9931 </p>
|
|
|
9932 <p id="FP_Q25-p3"> (1) Whether there is power in God?</p>
|
|
|
9933 <p id="FP_Q25-p4"> (2) Whether His power is infinite?</p>
|
|
|
9934 <p id="FP_Q25-p5"> (3) Whether He is almighty?</p>
|
|
|
9935 <p id="FP_Q25-p6"> (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?</p>
|
|
|
9936 <p id="FP_Q25-p7"> (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?</p>
|
|
|
9937 <p id="FP_Q25-p8"> (6) Whether what He makes He could make better?</p>
|
|
|
9938 <div id="FP_Q25_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
9939 <a href="summa.FP_Q25.html"></a>
|
|
|
9940 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
9941 <h4 id="FP_Q25_A1-p0.1">Whether there is power in God?</h4>
|
|
|
9942 <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
9943 <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p2">
|
|
|
9944 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary
|
|
|
9945 matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power.
|
|
|
9946 </p>
|
|
|
9947 <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p3">
|
|
|
9948 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter;
|
|
|
9949 and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God,
|
|
|
9950 is God, as was shown above (
|
|
|
9951 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3] , A[3]</a>). Therefore, there is no power in God.
|
|
|
9952 </p>
|
|
|
9953 <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p4">
|
|
|
9954 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in
|
|
|
9955 God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God.
|
|
|
9956 </p>
|
|
|
9957 <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p5">
|
|
|
9958 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it was shown above (
|
|
|
9959 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>;
|
|
|
9960 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not,
|
|
|
9961 therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.
|
|
|
9962 </p>
|
|
|
9963 <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p6">
|
|
|
9964 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee" (
|
|
|
9965 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.88.9" target="asv">Ps. 88:9</a>).
|
|
|
9966 </p>
|
|
|
9967 <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p7">
|
|
|
9968 <b>I answer that,</b> Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest
|
|
|
9969 degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something:
|
|
|
9970 whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above (
|
|
|
9971 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
9972 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], AA[1]</a>, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all
|
|
|
9973 ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle,
|
|
|
9974 and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power.
|
|
|
9975 For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon
|
|
|
9976 by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the
|
|
|
9977 highest degree.
|
|
|
9978 </p>
|
|
|
9979 <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p8">
|
|
|
9980 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive power
|
|
|
9981 is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only
|
|
|
9982 active power.
|
|
|
9983 </p>
|
|
|
9984 <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p9">
|
|
|
9985 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for
|
|
|
9986 both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence. Hence it does not follow that there should
|
|
|
9987 be anything in God nobler than His power.
|
|
|
9988 </p>
|
|
|
9989 <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p10">
|
|
|
9990 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In creatures, power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained,
|
|
|
9991 inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence
|
|
|
9992 itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself
|
|
|
9993 all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the
|
|
|
9994 notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of "suppositum" possessing nature, and
|
|
|
9995 under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle of an effect.
|
|
|
9996 </p>
|
|
|
9997 <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p11">
|
|
|
9998 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically;
|
|
|
9999 inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs,
|
|
|
10000 which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective
|
|
|
10001 principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of
|
|
|
10002 the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.
|
|
|
10003 </p>
|
|
|
10004 <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
10005 <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p13"></p>
|
|
|
10006 <a href="summa.FP_Q25.html"></a>
|
|
|
10007 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
10008 </div>
|
|
|
10009 <div id="FP_Q25_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
10010 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
10011 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
10012 <h4 id="FP_Q25_A2-p0.1">Whether the power of God is infinite?</h4>
|
|
|
10013 <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
10014 <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p2">
|
|
|
10015 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher
|
|
|
10016 (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite.
|
|
|
10017 </p>
|
|
|
10018 <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p3">
|
|
|
10019 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite,
|
|
|
10020 it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.
|
|
|
10021 </p>
|
|
|
10022 <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p4">
|
|
|
10023 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous
|
|
|
10024 movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal
|
|
|
10025 creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23). Therefore, His power is not infinite.
|
|
|
10026 </p>
|
|
|
10027 <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p5">
|
|
|
10028 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is immeasurable
|
|
|
10029 is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.
|
|
|
10030 </p>
|
|
|
10031 <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p6">
|
|
|
10032 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
|
|
|
10033 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it
|
|
|
10034 is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine
|
|
|
10035 essence (
|
|
|
10036 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the
|
|
|
10037 more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the
|
|
|
10038 greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence,
|
|
|
10039 since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above (
|
|
|
10040 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.
|
|
|
10041 </p>
|
|
|
10042 <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p7">
|
|
|
10043 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to
|
|
|
10044 quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above (
|
|
|
10045 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.
|
|
|
10046 </p>
|
|
|
10047 <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p8">
|
|
|
10048 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to
|
|
|
10049 do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect:
|
|
|
10050 as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction.
|
|
|
10051 Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with
|
|
|
10052 Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above (
|
|
|
10053 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>;
|
|
|
10054 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power
|
|
|
10055 of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God
|
|
|
10056 would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But
|
|
|
10057 the
|
|
|
10058 power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it.
|
|
|
10059 </p>
|
|
|
10060 <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p9">
|
|
|
10061 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he
|
|
|
10062 shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according
|
|
|
10063 to his reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time; not, however, the power of
|
|
|
10064 an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one body moving another is a
|
|
|
10065 univocal agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then the greater
|
|
|
10066 the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite, it
|
|
|
10067 would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent;
|
|
|
10068 whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and
|
|
|
10069 especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.
|
|
|
10070 </p>
|
|
|
10071 <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
10072 <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
10073 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
10074 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
10075 </div>
|
|
|
10076 <div id="FP_Q25_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
10077 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
10078 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
10079 <h4 id="FP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Whether God is omnipotent?</h4>
|
|
|
10080 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
10081 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p2">
|
|
|
10082 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God,
|
|
|
10083 for He is immovable, as was said above (
|
|
|
10084 <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore He is not omnipotent.
|
|
|
10085 </p>
|
|
|
10086 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p3">
|
|
|
10087 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in
|
|
|
10088 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13.</a> Therefore He is not omnipotent.
|
|
|
10089 </p>
|
|
|
10090 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p4">
|
|
|
10091 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday
|
|
|
10092 after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much
|
|
|
10093 greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not
|
|
|
10094 omnipotent.
|
|
|
10095 </p>
|
|
|
10096 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p5">
|
|
|
10097 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world" (
|
|
|
10098 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:20</a>), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those things to
|
|
|
10099 be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in
|
|
|
10100 reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If
|
|
|
10101 God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible,
|
|
|
10102 then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing
|
|
|
10103 at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
|
|
|
10104 </p>
|
|
|
10105 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p6">
|
|
|
10106 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God" (
|
|
|
10107 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.1.37" target="asv">Lk. 1:37</a>).
|
|
|
10108 </p>
|
|
|
10109 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p7">
|
|
|
10110 <b>I answer that,</b> All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there
|
|
|
10111 may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider
|
|
|
10112 the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood
|
|
|
10113 to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said
|
|
|
10114 to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation
|
|
|
10115 to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the
|
|
|
10116 relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all
|
|
|
10117 things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say
|
|
|
10118 that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining
|
|
|
10119 the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is
|
|
|
10120 able to do.
|
|
|
10121 </p>
|
|
|
10122 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p8"> It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the
|
|
|
10123 second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation
|
|
|
10124 in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates
|
|
|
10125 sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for
|
|
|
10126 instance, that a man is a donkey.
|
|
|
10127 </p>
|
|
|
10128 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p9"> It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds
|
|
|
10129 a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance,
|
|
|
10130 the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence,
|
|
|
10131 however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
|
|
|
10132 being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is
|
|
|
10133 numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the
|
|
|
10134 idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea
|
|
|
10135 of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence,
|
|
|
10136 not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore,
|
|
|
10137 everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God
|
|
|
10138 is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because
|
|
|
10139 it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot
|
|
|
10140 do
|
|
|
10141 them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies
|
|
|
10142 a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
|
|
|
10143 </p>
|
|
|
10144 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p10">
|
|
|
10145 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above
|
|
|
10146 <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence.
|
|
|
10147 </p>
|
|
|
10148 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p11">
|
|
|
10149 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant
|
|
|
10150 to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic.
|
|
|
10151 iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which
|
|
|
10152 is impossible---as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things
|
|
|
10153 if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent
|
|
|
10154 are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God can
|
|
|
10155 do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking
|
|
|
10156 after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.
|
|
|
10157 </p>
|
|
|
10158 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p12">
|
|
|
10159 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme
|
|
|
10160 power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free
|
|
|
10161 will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is
|
|
|
10162 the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (
|
|
|
10163 <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21],
|
|
|
10164 A[4]
|
|
|
10165 </a>), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account
|
|
|
10166 of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because
|
|
|
10167 to it pertains the first foundation of all good things.
|
|
|
10168 </p>
|
|
|
10169 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p13">
|
|
|
10170 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself.
|
|
|
10171 But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which
|
|
|
10172 it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible
|
|
|
10173 in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as
|
|
|
10174 to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition
|
|
|
10175 of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above (
|
|
|
10176 <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">Q[14], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be
|
|
|
10177 impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and
|
|
|
10178 necessity.
|
|
|
10179 </p>
|
|
|
10180 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p14"></p>
|
|
|
10181 <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p15"></p>
|
|
|
10182 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
10183 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
10184 </div>
|
|
|
10185 <div id="FP_Q25_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
10186 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
10187 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
10188 <h4 id="FP_Q25_A4-p0.1">Whether God can make the past not to have been?</h4>
|
|
|
10189 <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
10190 <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p2">
|
|
|
10191 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that
|
|
|
10192 which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise
|
|
|
10193 the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible
|
|
|
10194 accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from
|
|
|
10195 the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been.
|
|
|
10196 </p>
|
|
|
10197 <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p3">
|
|
|
10198 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates
|
|
|
10199 ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run.
|
|
|
10200 </p>
|
|
|
10201 <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p4">
|
|
|
10202 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost
|
|
|
10203 virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt.
|
|
|
10204 </p>
|
|
|
10205 <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p5">
|
|
|
10206 <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (
|
|
|
10207 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 22</a> ad Eustoch.): "Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted." Therefore,
|
|
|
10208 for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been.
|
|
|
10209 </p>
|
|
|
10210 <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p6">
|
|
|
10211 <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (
|
|
|
10212 <a id="FP_Q25_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should
|
|
|
10213 not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting,
|
|
|
10214 so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say
|
|
|
10215 that he did not sit, is to say that
|
|
|
10216 it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what
|
|
|
10217 Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if
|
|
|
10218 it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact
|
|
|
10219 that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely, to
|
|
|
10220 make
|
|
|
10221 undone the things that have been done."
|
|
|
10222 </p>
|
|
|
10223 <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p7">
|
|
|
10224 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance,
|
|
|
10225 the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible,
|
|
|
10226 not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead;
|
|
|
10227 in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible
|
|
|
10228 in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine
|
|
|
10229 power.
|
|
|
10230 </p>
|
|
|
10231 <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p8">
|
|
|
10232 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to
|
|
|
10233 His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever
|
|
|
10234 God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to
|
|
|
10235 be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So
|
|
|
10236 is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.
|
|
|
10237 </p>
|
|
|
10238 <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p9">
|
|
|
10239 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot
|
|
|
10240 be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed
|
|
|
10241 from the sinner.
|
|
|
10242 </p>
|
|
|
10243 <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
10244 <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
10245 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
10246 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
10247 </div>
|
|
|
10248 <div id="FP_Q25_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
10249 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
10250 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
10251 <h4 id="FP_Q25_A5-p0.1">Whether God can do what He does not?</h4>
|
|
|
10252 <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
10253 <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p2">
|
|
|
10254 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He
|
|
|
10255 would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except
|
|
|
10256 what He does.
|
|
|
10257 </p>
|
|
|
10258 <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p3">
|
|
|
10259 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not;
|
|
|
10260 nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.
|
|
|
10261 </p>
|
|
|
10262 <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p4">
|
|
|
10263 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them
|
|
|
10264 to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does.
|
|
|
10265 </p>
|
|
|
10266 <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p5">
|
|
|
10267 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?"
|
|
|
10268 (
|
|
|
10269 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.53" target="asv">Mat. 26:53</a>). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not.
|
|
|
10270 </p>
|
|
|
10271 <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p6">
|
|
|
10272 <b>I answer that,</b> In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that
|
|
|
10273 as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of
|
|
|
10274 man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things,
|
|
|
10275 nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above (
|
|
|
10276 <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and
|
|
|
10277 from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from
|
|
|
10278 any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present
|
|
|
10279 course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God
|
|
|
10280 does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly
|
|
|
10281 said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes
|
|
|
10282 the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His
|
|
|
10283 justice consists, as said above (
|
|
|
10284 <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html">Q[21], A[2]</a>), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine
|
|
|
10285 wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man
|
|
|
10286 puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the
|
|
|
10287 wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion
|
|
|
10288 things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could
|
|
|
10289 happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done.
|
|
|
10290 </p>
|
|
|
10291 <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p7">
|
|
|
10292 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from
|
|
|
10293 justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and
|
|
|
10294 essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which
|
|
|
10295 cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because
|
|
|
10296 His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above (
|
|
|
10297 <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there
|
|
|
10298 being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things.
|
|
|
10299 Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the
|
|
|
10300 intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance
|
|
|
10301 with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above
|
|
|
10302 <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God
|
|
|
10303 is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by
|
|
|
10304 His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything
|
|
|
10305 which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge
|
|
|
10306 and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the
|
|
|
10307 power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.
|
|
|
10308 </p>
|
|
|
10309 <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p8">
|
|
|
10310 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this
|
|
|
10311 than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood
|
|
|
10312 in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things;
|
|
|
10313 and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is false;
|
|
|
10314 for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the
|
|
|
10315 verb "can" (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the present will be signified, but
|
|
|
10316 in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything except that which, if
|
|
|
10317 He did it, would be suitable and just."
|
|
|
10318 </p>
|
|
|
10319 <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p9">
|
|
|
10320 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence,
|
|
|
10321 although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon
|
|
|
10322 them another order.
|
|
|
10323 </p>
|
|
|
10324 <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p10"></p>
|
|
|
10325 <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p11"></p>
|
|
|
10326 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
10327 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
10328 </div>
|
|
|
10329 <div id="FP_Q25_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
10330 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
10331 <a href="summa.FP_Q26.html"></a>
|
|
|
10332 <h4 id="FP_Q25_A6-p0.1">Whether God can do better than what He does?</h4>
|
|
|
10333 <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
10334 <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p2">
|
|
|
10335 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing
|
|
|
10336 is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.
|
|
|
10337 </p>
|
|
|
10338 <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p3">
|
|
|
10339 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): "If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have
|
|
|
10340 been envious." For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He
|
|
|
10341 would have been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore
|
|
|
10342 make anything better than He does.
|
|
|
10343 </p>
|
|
|
10344 <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p4">
|
|
|
10345 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine
|
|
|
10346 says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them
|
|
|
10347 all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God.
|
|
|
10348 </p>
|
|
|
10349 <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p5">
|
|
|
10350 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again
|
|
|
10351 created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above
|
|
|
10352 all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made
|
|
|
10353 them.
|
|
|
10354 </p>
|
|
|
10355 <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p6">
|
|
|
10356 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
10357 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.20" target="asv">Eph. 3:20</a>): "God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand."
|
|
|
10358 </p>
|
|
|
10359 <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p7">
|
|
|
10360 <b>I answer that,</b> The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to
|
|
|
10361 the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing
|
|
|
10362 better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be
|
|
|
10363 four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is
|
|
|
10364 after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and
|
|
|
10365 above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better
|
|
|
10366 the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him.
|
|
|
10367 </p>
|
|
|
10368 <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p8">
|
|
|
10369 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is
|
|
|
10370 true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better
|
|
|
10371 than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, "better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner
|
|
|
10372 of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because
|
|
|
10373 He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something
|
|
|
10374 better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards
|
|
|
10375 the substance.
|
|
|
10376 </p>
|
|
|
10377 <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p9">
|
|
|
10378 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature
|
|
|
10379 of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails.
|
|
|
10380 </p>
|
|
|
10381 <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p10">
|
|
|
10382 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things
|
|
|
10383 by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed;
|
|
|
10384 as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other
|
|
|
10385 things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be
|
|
|
10386 another and a better universe.
|
|
|
10387 </p>
|
|
|
10388 <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p11">
|
|
|
10389 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the
|
|
|
10390 fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from
|
|
|
10391 the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything
|
|
|
10392 better than God.
|
|
|
10393 </p>
|
|
|
10394 <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p12"></p>
|
|
|
10395 <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p13"></p>
|
|
|
10396 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
10397 <a href="summa.FP_Q26.html"></a>
|
|
|
10398 </div>
|
|
|
10399 <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
10400 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
10401 </div>
|
|
|
10402 <div id="FP_Q26" class="div3">
|
|
|
10403 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
10404 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
10405 <h3 id="FP_Q26-p0.1">OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
|
|
|
10406 <p id="FP_Q26-p1"></p>
|
|
|
10407 <p id="FP_Q26-p2"> After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning
|
|
|
10408 this, there are four points of inquiry:
|
|
|
10409 </p>
|
|
|
10410 <p id="FP_Q26-p3"> (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?</p>
|
|
|
10411 <p id="FP_Q26-p4"> (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect?</p>
|
|
|
10412 <p id="FP_Q26-p5"> (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?</p>
|
|
|
10413 <p id="FP_Q26-p6"> (4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?</p>
|
|
|
10414 <div id="FP_Q26_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
10415 <a href="summa.FP_Q26.html"></a>
|
|
|
10416 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
10417 <h4 id="FP_Q26_A1-p0.1">Whether beatitude belongs to God?</h4>
|
|
|
10418 <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
10419 <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p2">
|
|
|
10420 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect
|
|
|
10421 by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude
|
|
|
10422 does not belong to God.
|
|
|
10423 </p>
|
|
|
10424 <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p3">
|
|
|
10425 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not
|
|
|
10426 apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.
|
|
|
10427 </p>
|
|
|
10428 <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p4">
|
|
|
10429 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of
|
|
|
10430 Lords." (
|
|
|
10431 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q26_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.15" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:15</a>).
|
|
|
10432 </p>
|
|
|
10433 <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p5">
|
|
|
10434 <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than
|
|
|
10435 the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses,
|
|
|
10436 to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in
|
|
|
10437 a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence.
|
|
|
10438 Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.
|
|
|
10439 </p>
|
|
|
10440 <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p6">
|
|
|
10441 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures
|
|
|
10442 is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (
|
|
|
10443 <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
10444 <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>), in simplicity and unity.
|
|
|
10445 </p>
|
|
|
10446 <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p7">
|
|
|
10447 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even
|
|
|
10448 as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God
|
|
|
10449 has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit.
|
|
|
10450 </p>
|
|
|
10451 <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p8"></p>
|
|
|
10452 <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p9"></p>
|
|
|
10453 <a href="summa.FP_Q26.html"></a>
|
|
|
10454 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
10455 </div>
|
|
|
10456 <div id="FP_Q26_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
10457 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
10458 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
10459 <h4 id="FP_Q26_A2-p0.1">Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?</h4>
|
|
|
10460 <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
10461 <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p2">
|
|
|
10462 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said
|
|
|
10463 to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius
|
|
|
10464 (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect.
|
|
|
10465 </p>
|
|
|
10466 <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p3">
|
|
|
10467 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude
|
|
|
10468 is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect.
|
|
|
10469 </p>
|
|
|
10470 <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p4">
|
|
|
10471 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in glory,
|
|
|
10472 however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole
|
|
|
10473 of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His
|
|
|
10474 intellect.
|
|
|
10475 </p>
|
|
|
10476 <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p5">
|
|
|
10477 <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude, as stated above
|
|
|
10478 <a id="FP_Q26_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual
|
|
|
10479 nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation,
|
|
|
10480 by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding.
|
|
|
10481 Now in God, to be and to
|
|
|
10482 understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be
|
|
|
10483 assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation
|
|
|
10484 to His beatitude.
|
|
|
10485 </p>
|
|
|
10486 <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p6">
|
|
|
10487 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His
|
|
|
10488 essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.
|
|
|
10489 </p>
|
|
|
10490 <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p7">
|
|
|
10491 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence
|
|
|
10492 in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the
|
|
|
10493 act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect.
|
|
|
10494 </p>
|
|
|
10495 <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p8"></p>
|
|
|
10496 <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p9"></p>
|
|
|
10497 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
10498 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
10499 </div>
|
|
|
10500 <div id="FP_Q26_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
10501 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
10502 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
10503 <h4 id="FP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?</h4>
|
|
|
10504 <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
10505 <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p2">
|
|
|
10506 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (
|
|
|
10507 <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (
|
|
|
10508 <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing
|
|
|
10509 else but God Himself.
|
|
|
10510 </p>
|
|
|
10511 <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p3">
|
|
|
10512 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to
|
|
|
10513 God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.
|
|
|
10514 </p>
|
|
|
10515 <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p4">
|
|
|
10516 <b>On the contrary,</b> The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to
|
|
|
10517 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q26_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41</a>: "Star differeth from star in glory." But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God.
|
|
|
10518 </p>
|
|
|
10519 <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p5">
|
|
|
10520 <b>I answer that,</b> The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely,
|
|
|
10521 the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered
|
|
|
10522 on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God,
|
|
|
10523 in accordance with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth
|
|
|
10524 Thee, though he know nought else." But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures;
|
|
|
10525 but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.
|
|
|
10526 </p>
|
|
|
10527 <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p6">
|
|
|
10528 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their
|
|
|
10529 supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate.
|
|
|
10530 </p>
|
|
|
10531 <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p7">
|
|
|
10532 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> End is twofold, namely, "objective" and "subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing itself"
|
|
|
10533 and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational
|
|
|
10534 creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing.
|
|
|
10535 </p>
|
|
|
10536 <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p8"></p>
|
|
|
10537 <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p9"></p>
|
|
|
10538 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
10539 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
10540 </div>
|
|
|
10541 <div id="FP_Q26_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
10542 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
10543 <a href="summa.FP.iii.html"></a>
|
|
|
10544 <h4 id="FP_Q26_A4-p0.1">Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?</h4>
|
|
|
10545 <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
10546 <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p2">
|
|
|
10547 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing
|
|
|
10548 false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
|
|
|
10549 </p>
|
|
|
10550 <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p3">
|
|
|
10551 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now
|
|
|
10552 none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
|
|
|
10553 </p>
|
|
|
10554 <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p4">
|
|
|
10555 <b>On the contrary,</b> Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above (
|
|
|
10556 <a id="FP_Q26_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a> ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes.
|
|
|
10557 </p>
|
|
|
10558 <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p5">
|
|
|
10559 <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the
|
|
|
10560 divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of
|
|
|
10561 all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which
|
|
|
10562 consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol.
|
|
|
10563 iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency,
|
|
|
10564 which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place
|
|
|
10565 of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures.
|
|
|
10566 </p>
|
|
|
10567 <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p6">
|
|
|
10568 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in
|
|
|
10569 God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.
|
|
|
10570 </p>
|
|
|
10571 <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p7">
|
|
|
10572 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.
|
|
|
10573 </p>
|
|
|
10574 <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p8"> We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.</p>
|
|
|
10575 <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p9"></p>
|
|
|
10576 <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
10577 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
10578 <a href="summa.FP.iii.html"></a>
|
|
|
10579 </div>
|
|
|
10580 <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
10581 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
10582 </div>
|
|
|
10583 <a href="summa.FP_Q1_A10.html"></a>
|
|
|
10584 <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"></a>
|
|
|
10585 `
|
|
|
10586 </div>
|
