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            <h2 id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2>
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               <h3 id="FP_Q2-p0.1">THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q2-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q2-p2"> Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is
                  the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said,
                  therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards
                  God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q2-p3"> In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2)
                  Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q2-p4"> Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what
                  is NOT the manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations---namely, His knowledge, will, power.
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q2-p5"> Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q2-p6"> (1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q2-p7"> (2) Whether it is demonstrable?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q2-p8"> (3) Whether God exists?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q2_A1" class="div4">
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                  <h4 id="FP_Q2_A1-p0.1">Whether the existence of God is self-evident?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which
                     is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the
                     knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1
                     Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known,
                     it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is
                     understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than
                     which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only
                     mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually.
                     Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist:
                     and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must
                     be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning
                     the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said
                     in his heart, There is no God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.52.1" target="asv">Ps. 52:1</a>). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other,
                     self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject,
                     as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject
                     be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with
                     regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as
                     being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject
                     is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate
                     and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that
                     is,
                     is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in
                     space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the
                     subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (
                     <a id="FP_Q2_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated
                     by things that are more
                     known to us, though less known in their nature---namely, by effects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For
                     man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not
                     to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching,
                     even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who
                     imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought,
                     seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified
                     something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what
                     the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can
                     it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater
                     can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p10"></p>
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                  <h4 id="FP_Q2_A2-p0.1">Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of
                     faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in
                     what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate
                     to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore,
                     since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first
                     thing we must know of anything is whether it exists.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what
                     is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from
                     what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the
                     knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be
                     demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect
                     exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated
                     from those of His effects which are known to us.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but
                     are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes
                     something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as
                     a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
                     known and demonstrated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause
                     in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence
                     of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of
                     its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are
                     derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle
                     term the meaning of the word "God".
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the
                     existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though
                     from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
                  </p>
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                  <h4 id="FP_Q2_A3-p0.1">Whether God exists?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed.
                     But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but
                     there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it
                     seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural
                     things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is
                     human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.14" target="asv">Ex. 3:14</a>)
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p6"> The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world
                     some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is
                     in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing
                     else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality
                     to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is
                     potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be
                     at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot
                     simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same
                     respect
                     and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion
                     must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs
                     be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no
                     first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion
                     by the
                     first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first
                     mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p7"> The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes.
                     There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for
                     so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because
                     in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the
                     intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away
                     the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate,
                     nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient
                     cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false.
                     Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p8"> The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and
                     not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be.
                     But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything
                     is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true,
                     even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already
                     existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to
                     exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but
                     there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused
                     by
                     another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another,
                     as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having
                     of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men
                     speak of as God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p9"> The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true,
                     noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different
                     ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest;
                     so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,
                     something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in
                     Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause
                     of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every
                     other perfection; and this we call God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p10"> The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies,
                     act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best
                     result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence
                     cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the
                     arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to
                     their end; and this being we call God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless
                     His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that
                     He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be
                     traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause
                     other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect
                     must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown
                     in the body of the Article.
                  </p>
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               <h3 id="FP_Q3-p0.1">OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q3-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q3-p2"> When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in
                  order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for
                  considering how God is, but rather how He is not.
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q3-p3"> Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.</p>
               <p id="FP_Q3-p4"> Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and
                  the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple
                  in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His
                  immutability; (5) His unity.
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q3-p5"> Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q3-p6"> (1) Whether God is a body?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q3-p7"> (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q3-p8"> (3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q3-p9"> (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q3-p10"> (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q3-p11"> (6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q3-p12"> (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q3-p13"> (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q3_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="FP_Q3_A1-p0.1">Whether God is a body?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions
                     to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know?
                     The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.11.8" target="asv">Job 11:8,9</a>). Therefore God is a body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it
                     is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the
                     image, "of His substance" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>). Therefore God is a body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like
                     God?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.40.4" target="asv">Job 40:4</a>); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.16" target="asv">Ps. 33:16</a>); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.117.16" target="asv">Ps. 117:16</a>). Therefore God is a body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the
                     Lord sitting" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>), and "He standeth up to judge" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.13" target="asv">Is. 3:13</a>). Therefore God is a body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term "wherefrom" or "whereto." But in the Scriptures God is spoken
                     of as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be enlightened" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.6" target="asv">Ps. 33:6</a>), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.17.13" target="asv">Jer. 17:13</a>). Therefore God is a body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the Gospel of St. John (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>): "God is a spirit."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless
                     it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved (
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the
                     first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any
                     single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless,
                     absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only
                     by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in
                     God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to
                     infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is
                     impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body
                     is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would
                     be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence
                     that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q1_A9.html">Q[1], A[9]</a>), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes
                     to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it
                     signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration
                     of His existence; by
                     breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility
                     of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as
                     all things lie under His protection.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence,
                     when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the
                     sea" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which
                     are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of
                     God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For
                     instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly;
                     and so on with the other parts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account
                     of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions
                     of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on
                     the metaphor of local motion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q3_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q3_A2-p0.1">Whether God is composed of matter and form?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul
                     is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.38" target="asv">Heb. 10:38</a>), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God
                     is composed of matter and form.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was
                     exceeding angry with His people" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.105.40" target="asv">Ps. 105:40</a>). Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.
                     Therefore He is composed of matter and form.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not
                     a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly,
                     because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated,
                     inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the
                     first good and the best---viz. God---is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good.
                     Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence
                     the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially
                     an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is
                     therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul.
                     Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act
                     of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is
                     the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that
                     form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received
                     in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in
                     God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q3_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q3_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of
                     God---i.e. the Godhead---is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum"
                     is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is
                     His very Godhead.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form,
                     the nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the
                     definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man
                     is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now
                     individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular
                     flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh,
                     these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they
                     are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity.
                     Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because
                     the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter.
                     On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter---that
                     is to say, to "this" matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is necessary the forms themselves should
                     be subsisting "supposita." Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter
                     and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore
                     in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are
                     composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are
                     in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not
                     that there is any composition in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely
                     because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them,
                     and therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q3_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q3_A4-p0.1">Whether essence and existence are the same in God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to
                     it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that
                     God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to
                     stones and wood" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.21" target="asv">Wis. 14:21</a>). Therefore God's existence is not His
                     essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2], A[2]</a>); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or
                     nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in
                     God is His existence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several
                     ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence
                     (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species---as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man---and is caused
                     by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent---as heat is caused
                     in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by
                     some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential
                     constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore
                     that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of
                     God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from
                     His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of
                     as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is
                     a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above
                     
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because,
                     just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence,
                     is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above 
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">(A[3])</a> if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not
                     therefore be the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it
                     is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it,
                     inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because
                     it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to
                     lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added
                     to it in the second sense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected
                     by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor
                     His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is
                     true; and this we know from His effects (
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2],
                        A[2]
                     </a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p9"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p10"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q3_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q3_A5-p0.1">Whether God is contained in a genus?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true
                     of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number.
                     But God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is
                     not in any genus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being
                     reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its
                     principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus.
                     That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a
                     species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is
                     always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from
                     sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other
                     hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is
                     compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality
                     is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence
                     of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus is predicated as an essential
                     it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for
                     every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being
                     cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity
                     or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence
                     of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and
                     quiddity---i.e. essence---must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain
                     that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can
                     there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and
                     difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle,
                     is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle
                     of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is
                     not contained in any genus as its principle.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself---for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the
                     body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way---namely, of existing
                     of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure
                     proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only according
                     as it resembles Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q3_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q3_A6-p0.1">Whether in God there are any accidents?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that
                     which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form
                     of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributes
                     of God. Therefore in God there are accidents.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members
                     of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than God---which is absurd.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De
                     Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents
                     as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality
                     in God, as was shown (
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded
                     to it, this cannot apply to
                     absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute
                     heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is
                     absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability
                     of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the
                     subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in
                     God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God
                     as there are in us.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as
                     to that which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to
                     all being, outside of every genus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q3_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q3_A7-p0.1">Whether God is altogether simple?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all
                     beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore
                     neither is God altogether simple.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple;
                     thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot
                     be said that God is altogether simple.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and absolutely simple."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is
                     neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His
                     nature differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and
                     difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite,
                     but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them;
                     but God is the first being, as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them
                     to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must
                     be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all
                     the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts.
                     And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot,
                     a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a
                     part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which
                     cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two
                     cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has
                     a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to
                     the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form,
                     or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God,
                     Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in
                     some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one
                     simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing (
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a> and 
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], A[2]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q3_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q3_A8-p0.1">Whether God enters into the composition of other things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things
                     is that which is above being---the Godhead." But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore
                     God enters into the composition of other things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., [*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an
                     uncreated form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and
                     in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition things.
                     Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must
                     be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ
                     from each other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part with
                     part."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p6"> Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).</p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De
                     Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven.
                     Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third
                     error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter.
                     Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either
                     as a formal or a material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical
                     numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither
                     numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is
                     actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that
                     which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for
                     the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly,
                     because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal
                     parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear
                     from the foregoing (
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which
                     is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially
                     such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being (
                     <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Simple things do not differ by added differences---for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their
                     differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence,
                     to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
                     x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are
                     different differ by something." Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very
                     being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q4" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q4-p0.1">THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q4-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q4-p2"> Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect
                  is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness.
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q4-p3"> Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q4-p4"> (1) Whether God is perfect?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q4-p5"> (2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q4-p6"> (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q4_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q4_A1-p0.1">Whether God is perfect?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not
                     befit God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning
                     of animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q4_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification.
                     Therefore God is imperfect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.48" target="asv">Mat. 5:48</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate
                     "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material
                     principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle
                     must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle,
                     not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential,
                     an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore
                     most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing
                     of the mode of its perfection.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that which
                     is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality
                     they are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way
                     of perfection or not.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The material principle which with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by something
                     perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant
                     from which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is actual; since a potential being can
                     only be reduced into act by some being already actual.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for
                     nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore
                     it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore
                     I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is
                     considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q4_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q4_A2-p0.1">Whether the perfections of all things are in God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by
                     its specific difference. But the differences by which "genera" are divided, and "species" constituted, are opposed to each
                     other. Therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are not
                     in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore
                     life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has
                     not the perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one existence prepossesses all things."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator,
                     Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever
                     perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent---as
                     when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal
                     agent---thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists
                     virtually in the efficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more
                     imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient
                     cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective
                     cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line
                     of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all."
                     Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (
                     <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has
                     not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting,
                     nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection
                     of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect,
                     precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one
                     thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists
                     not in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards
                     he adds that, "He is the very existence to subsisting things."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself
                     first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; "a fortiori" should all things in a
                     kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other,
                     pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity.</p>
      <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p7a">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply
                     to the Second Objection.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that, although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are
                     considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living
                     things also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom,
                     because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of
                     existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can
                     be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p9"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p10"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q4_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q4_A3-p0.1">Whether any creature can be like God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.85.8" target="asv">Ps. 85:8</a>): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called
                     participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore neither
                     can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as
                     God: since God is no "genus," as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q4_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore no creature is like God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone,
                     essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God
                     will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To whom have you likened God?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.18" target="asv">Is. 40:18</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in
                     form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to
                     the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said
                     to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of
                     things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according
                     to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a
                     third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as
                     we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts
                     according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is
                     contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made,
                     according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained
                     in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as things generated
                     by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific
                     likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any "genus," its effect will still
                     more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent's form according
                     to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all.
                     In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness
                     to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not
                     perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission,
                     as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because
                     they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus," and as the
                     principle of all "genera."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus
                     or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures;
                     because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between
                     a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be
                     spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q5" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q5-p0.1">OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q5-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q5-p2"> We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God.</p>
               <p id="FP_Q5-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q5-p4"> (1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q5-p5"> (2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q5-p6"> (3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q5-p7"> (4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q5-p8"> (5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q5-p9"> (6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q5_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q5_A1-p0.1">Whether goodness differs really from being?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that
                     things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really differ.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of being", according to the commentary
                     on De Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that, "inasmuch as we exist we are good."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence
                     of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all
                     desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But
                     everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect
                     so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing (
                     <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>; 
                     <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which
                     being does not present.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a
                     thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates
                     to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from
                     that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial
                     being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to
                     have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential
                     being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which
                     is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good;
                     but
                     that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection),
                     is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e.
                     substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in
                     its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.),
                     "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another," is to be referred to a thing's
                     goodness simply, and having being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in
                     its complete actuality, it is good simply---in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even
                     in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or
                     virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q5_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q5_A2-p0.1">Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified
                     by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather
                     than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius
                     notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things
                     alone." Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness
                     has the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas: "It were better for him,
                     if that man had not been born" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.24" target="asv">Mat. 26:24</a>). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence
                     is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of created things is being."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of
                     the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect.
                     Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality.
                     Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as
                     sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says,
                     from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final
                     cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter
                     is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus
                     goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality,
                     goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation,
                     said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in goodness
                     as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being.
                     Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things,
                     not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not
                     simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the
                     end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which
                     tend even those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only,
                     either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively---i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed
                     by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of
                     some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being
                     of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as
                     relatively good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is
                     desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is good except being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q5_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q5_A3-p0.1">Whether every being is good?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from A[1]. But whatever
                     is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being
                     is good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.20" target="asv">Is. 5:20</a>). But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore
                     primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities;
                     otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now every creature of God is good (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>): and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies
                     some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every
                     being as such is good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now
                     in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper
                     to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because
                     he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary
                     matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain
                     extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property,
                     but to desire.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have
                     only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end,
                     which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness
                     nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness,
                     as was said in the preceding article.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q5_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q5_A4-p0.1">Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.
                     Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect
                     of a formal cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist,
                     and are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient
                     cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we exist because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as
                     the efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which
                     something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies
                     the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal
                     cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first of all before it reproduces
                     the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in
                     causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to
                     the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be
                     first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for
                     a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality
                     of
                     goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and
                     consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness
                     being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a
                     thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful
                     things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned,
                     as in what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since
                     knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers
                     we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to
                     the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good" has reference to the final cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q5_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q5_A5-p0.1">Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically.
                     But mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure,
                     and number, and weight" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the mode
                     of everything, number gives it
                     its species, and weight gives it rest and stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species
                     and order.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mode, species and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and
                     order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless
                     succession.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence
                     of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species
                     and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight, number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine.
                     But not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not
                     to have been created in number, weight and measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and
                     order.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in everything God
                     has made; thus, where these three abound the things are very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they
                     do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore
                     the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above 
                     <a id="FP_Q5_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is
                     what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow),
                     in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together
                     with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles,
                     whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the
                     form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to
                     give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a
                     unit
                     added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its species.
                     Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so
                     far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order.
                     Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because
                     it is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good:
                     for they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but as formally constituting others
                     good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything
                     else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object that is white.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has
                     a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil
                     deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every
                     mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and order). "But
                     an evil mode, species and order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they
                     ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The nature of light is spoken of as being without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal
                     things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body
                     that causes change, i.e. the heavens.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q5_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q5_A6-p0.1">Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and the pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good
                     considered as fitting. (cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])]
                  </h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by
                     the ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under
                     one predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing,
                     and no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous
                     and the useful would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is incorrect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far
                     as it is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the pleasant and the virtuous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De Offic. i, 9)
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal
                     point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is
                     desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the
                     movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end
                     absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called
                     a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two
                     ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in
                     the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which
                     something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the
                     movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous
                     is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the
                     thing desired, is called the pleasant.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according
                     to its proper formality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other
                     formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the
                     useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the
                     taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable
                     in themselves.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something analogical
                     to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the
                     pleasant; and lastly of the useful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q6" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q6-p0.1">THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q6-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q6-p2"> We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q6-p3"> (1) Whether goodness belongs to God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q6-p4"> (2) Whether God is the supreme good?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q6-p5"> (3) Whether He alone is essentially good?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q6-p6"> (4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q6_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q6_A1-p0.1">Whether God is good?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem
                     to belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and nothing
                     is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q6_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lam.3.25" target="asv">Lam. 3:25</a>): "The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its
                     own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes
                     its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it
                     is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of
                     all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv)
                     attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To have mode, species and order belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs
                     to Him to impose mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes
                     of the divine being; as appears from what is said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q6_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4] , A[3]</a>). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others
                     know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a
                     natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q6_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q6_A2-p0.1">Whether God is the supreme good?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every
                     good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound.
                     But God is supremely simple; as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the supreme good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is
                     the end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q6_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.19" target="asv">Lk. 18:19</a>): "None is good but God alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison
                     with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater
                     or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above (
                     <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>; 
                     <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God,
                     as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not,
                     however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an
                     effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the
                     sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things,
                     it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not
                     a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation
                     to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should
                     be composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are deficient in
                     comparison with it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all; but
                     that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood
                     of essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that
                     God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is
                     the principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good
                     implies.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q6_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q6_A3-p0.1">Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good";
                     as we said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good.
                     But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good essentially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary
                     to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good
                     by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or
                     come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first
                     supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold:
                     first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for
                     its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the
                     first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
                     substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is
                     to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom
                     alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially;
                     as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above (
                     <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html">Q[3], A[6]</a>); and
                     He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God
                     alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "One" does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence.
                     Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided
                     only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does
                     not follow that a creature is good essentially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection,
                     or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called
                     being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being through something else: hence for this reason is
                     it called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself
                     has some other goodness whereby it is good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q6_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q6_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take
                     away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good
                     of every good." But everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is
                     by reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the divine goodness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their
                     own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and "measured"
                     from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (
                     <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A4.html">Q[84], A[4]</a>) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that
                     Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now
                     just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid
                     down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation
                     of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme
                     good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are
                     called good by way of participation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p6"> Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as
                     Aristotle argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and
                     essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and
                     a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears
                     from the above (
                     <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p7"> Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of
                     all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it,
                     which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many
                     goodnesses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p8"><b>Reply to objections.</b> This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.</p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p9"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p10"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q7" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q7-p0.1">THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q7-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q7-p2"> After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere,
                  and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q7-p3"> Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q7-p4"> (1) Whether God is infinite?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q7-p5"> (2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q7-p6"> (3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q7-p7"> (4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q7_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q7_A1-p0.1">Whether God is infinite?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and
                     matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God,
                     for He is not a body, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing
                     in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not
                     a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is infinite and eternal, and boundless."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they
                     considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the nature of the
                     first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the
                     first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to
                     the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p7"> We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by
                     form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in
                     potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch
                     as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to
                     this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed
                     to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made
                     perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined
                     by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown
                     above (
                     <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>, OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was
                     shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is
                     a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed
                     to God; as was said above, in this article.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be
                     distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting
                     whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing
                     in a subject.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q7_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q7_A2-p0.1">Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence.
                     Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since
                     the extent of a power is known by its effect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends
                     the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance
                     is infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q7_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle.
                     Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to
                     matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But
                     because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which
                     is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to
                     its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But
                     if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are
                     absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting,
                     as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated,
                     nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows
                     that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created being;
                     hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power,
                     cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise
                     He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form not
                     in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which
                     is not the act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is something
                     concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively,
                     because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q7_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q7_A3-p0.1">Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is
                     no lie in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the
                     geometrician in his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite
                     in magnitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude;
                     but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude
                     to be infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear
                     from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division,
                     and increase opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude
                     to be infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said
                     in Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every determinate indivisible in
                     time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore
                     all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite
                     in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species
                     by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in
                     essence, it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in
                     magnitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p8"> We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect
                     to its quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p9"> Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial
                     form. Since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow
                     upon a determinate form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate
                     quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because
                     every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement; neither direct,
                     because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infinite
                     body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move circularly;
                     forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by
                     another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the
                     farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would
                     be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p10"> The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under
                     some form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such is figure, such a body
                     must have some figure, and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts
                     whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species of
                     it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and
                     so on. Now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since
                     no species of magnitude is infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch
                     as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the
                     infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Movement and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude
                     is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude;
                     yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p15"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p16"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q7_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q7_A4-p0.1">Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual.
                     But number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore
                     an infinite number of actual figures is possible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there
                     can still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so
                     on to infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q7_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite
                     multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite
                     absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail
                     something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation
                     could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p7"> A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be
                     shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, the movement
                     of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be
                     finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as
                     one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and
                     it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time.
                     In this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p8"> This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude
                     are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured
                     by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude
                     in nature is created; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator;
                     for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible
                     for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite multitude is possible; because
                     the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number of
                     things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach
                     matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition
                     of multitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and
                     not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude
                     can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral
                     and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite
                     number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q8" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q8-p0.1">THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q8-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q8-p2"> Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs
                  to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q8-p3"> (1) Whether God is in all things?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q8-p4"> (2) Whether God is everywhere?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q8-p5"> (3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q8-p6"> (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q8_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q8_A1-p0.1">Whether God is in all things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according
                     to the Psalm (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.112.4" target="asv">Ps. 112:4</a>), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore God is not in all things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore
                     God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things
                     are, rather than He is in any place."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore
                     His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:14</a>). Therefore God is not in all things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.12" target="asv"> Is. 26:12, </a> "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon
                     which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved
                     in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created
                     being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God
                     causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is
                     caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present
                     to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things
                     since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q8_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Hence
                     it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all
                     things; as was shown above in this article.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain
                     those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless,
                     by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great
                     power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself.
                     But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence
                     of His own nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it
                     is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But in
                     things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q8_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q8_A2-p0.1">Whether God is everywhere?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong
                     to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not
                     in a place." Therefore God is not everywhere.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part
                     of action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent
                     things be in every place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many places; and thus
                     He is not everywhere.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He
                     has no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.23.24" target="asv">Jer. 23:24</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things---i.e. as one
                     thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place;
                     and thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere.
                     First, as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every
                     place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills
                     every place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another
                     body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being
                     to the things that fill every place, He Himself fills every place.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession;
                     and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place,
                     or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or
                     action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is
                     outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called
                     indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power;
                     hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is
                     in one or in many places, and in a small or large place.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter
                     are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity
                     into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that
                     place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of
                     the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate
                     to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at
                     all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole
                     in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it
                     is
                     found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally,
                     then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves
                     or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the
                     body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q8_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q8_A3-p0.1">Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power.
                     For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to
                     the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His
                     essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the
                     same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it
                     is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore
                     if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought
                     to be a special mode of God's existence in things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that, "God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and substance;
                     still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things
                     created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations
                     of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second
                     way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or
                     habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later 
                     <a id="FP_Q8_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12.html">(Q[12])</a>. He is said to be thus in the saints by grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p8"> But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in
                     the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other
                     things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not
                     be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that
                     place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were
                     subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore
                     against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p9"> But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence
                     extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and
                     He doth not consider our things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Job.22.14" target="asv">Job 22:14</a>). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His presence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p10"> Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's providence, still all things are not immediately created
                     by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to
                     say that He is in all things by His essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p11"> Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all
                     things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all
                     as the cause of their being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence;
                     but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown
                     in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills.
                     Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another;
                     hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to
                     another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore
                     only grace constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's existence
                     in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (TP).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p16"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p17"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q8_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q9.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q8_A4-p0.1">Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i),
                     is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as
                     appears from what is said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q8_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body" (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because
                     there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere
                     does not appear to belong to God alone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts."
                     Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong
                     to God alone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, as Augustine says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 137</a>), "The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as it were everywhere:
                     for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and
                     always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its
                     whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily
                     everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white
                     teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is
                     everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as
                     a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere
                     absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of
                     places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should
                     be
                     in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and
                     is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of
                     Him, but as to His very self.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part
                     of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according
                     to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would
                     not be in them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere" determines
                     the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens;
                     and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live
                     and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another
                     sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it
                     is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it
                     does not follow that it is everywhere.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p16"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p17"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q9.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q9" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q9-p0.1">THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q9-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q9-p2"> We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of God there are
                  two points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q9-p3"> (1) Whether God is altogether immutable?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q9-p4"> (2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q9_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q9_A1-p0.1">Whether God is altogether immutable?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen.
                     ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active [Vulg.'mobilior']" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.24" target="asv">Wis. 7:24</a>). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will
                     draw nigh to you" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.8" target="asv">James 4:8</a>). Therefore God is mutable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.3.6" target="asv">Malachi 3:6</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first
                     being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason
                     that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality.
                     Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.
                     Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness
                     to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be
                     found. But it has been shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q9_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly,
                     because everything which is moved acquires something
                     by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all
                     the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not
                     extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth,
                     decided that the first principle was immovable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a
                     movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands
                     and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing
                     existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for
                     nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective
                     and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the
                     similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which
                     participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to
                     be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch
                     as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of
                     the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according
                     as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness,
                     or decline from Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q9_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q9_A2-p0.1">Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in everything
                     which is moved." But, according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be
                     immutable does not belong to God alone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion.
                     But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are
                     immovable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is
                     essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable thing
                     can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed,
                     were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could
                     produce them into existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence
                     depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them
                     otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing,
                     as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed
                     in themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In
                     this way therefore, by the power of another---namely, of God---they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing
                     by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p7"> If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every
                     creature has a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection
                     either in being, or in attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being,
                     in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent
                     with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter
                     can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist
                     with privation of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with "not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed
                     from white to not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject,
                     then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that
                     kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation
                     of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial
                     being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place. On the
                     other hand incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality
                     to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts
                     except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of substances are
                     immutable and invariable as regards their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual
                     created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances."
                     Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is
                     in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place,
                     inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills
                     all places, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html">Q[8], A[2]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p8"> Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible;
                     or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application
                     of their powers to divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by
                     the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in
                     none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such movement.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine power;
                     nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation because
                     by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings
                     as though they were the subject of being, but because through them something has being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q10" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q10-p0.1">THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q10-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q10-p2"> We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q10-p3"> (1) What is eternity?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q10-p4"> (2) Whether God is eternal?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q10-p5"> (3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q10-p6"> (4) Whether eternity differs from time?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q10-p7"> (5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q10-p8"> (6) Whether there is only one aeviternity?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q10_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q10_A1-p0.1">Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole
                     and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to
                     what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought
                     not to be found.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word
                     "life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word "existence."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be
                     "whole."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural,
                     for it is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mic.5.2" target="asv">Micah 5:2</a>); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.16.25" target="asv">Rom. 16:25</a>). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described
                     as "perfect."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by
                     means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and "after." For since succession occurs in every
                     movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time,
                     which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft
                     of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering
                     of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists
                     the idea of eternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p9"> Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which
                     is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has
                     no beginning, and no end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p10"> Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end
                     (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken
                     as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain
                     to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now
                     the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously
                     whole, is called by names implying time and succession.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence
                     the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now"
                     of time.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we
                     use the word "possession."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p17"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p18"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q10_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q10_A2-p0.1">Whether God is eternal?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now
                     that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that
                     God is the author of eternity." Therefore God is not eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God
                     is before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay:
                     'for ever and ever']" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.18" target="asv">Ex. 15:18</a>). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be
                     eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding
                     article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence,
                     as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity;
                     whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as
                     He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused
                     in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending
                     the "now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of eternity," this is to be understood of participated
                     eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He
                     communicates His immutability.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by
                     immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that "intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of
                     Exodus, "The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is
                     said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age,
                     i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo
                     i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement
                     of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously
                     whole.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea
                     of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered
                     through present, past and future.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q10_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q10_A3-p0.1">Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice,"
                     shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all eternity']" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.12.3" target="asv">Dan. 12:3</a>). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv">Mat. 25:41</a>). Therefore God is not the only eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration
                     and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal.
                     Therefore God is the only one eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first
                     article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability
                     from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.4" target="asv">Eccles. 1:4</a>). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature
                     corruptible; thus (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.75.5" target="asv">Ps. 75:5</a>) the hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal hills." (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.33.15" target="asv">Dt. 33:15</a>). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in
                     being or further still in operation; like the angels, and
                     the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as
                     Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, "This is eternal
                     life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.5" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according
                     to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.24.19" target="asv">Job 24:19</a>). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for
                     ever" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.80.16" target="asv">Ps. 80:16</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore
                     in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone;
                     hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q10_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q10_A4-p0.1">Whether eternity differs from time?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part
                     of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together,
                     considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration.
                     Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and
                     includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature
                     of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now"
                     of time. But the "now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different
                     from time.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that
                     the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being---that is, of the divine
                     being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore
                     is either eternity or is a part of eternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a "before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither
                     beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute
                     difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement
                     of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity
                     and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied
                     to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the
                     aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some
                     reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of
                     the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not
                     measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p7"> Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities;
                     because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering
                     its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these
                     differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is
                     simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case
                     when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch
                     as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject
                     in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the "now"
                     as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject
                     and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as
                     any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore
                     the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not
                     only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only
                     measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q10_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q10_A5-p0.1">The difference of aeviternity and time</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the spiritual
                     through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and "after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole,
                     as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:1</a>) that eternal "Wisdom is before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after"; and thus it
                     is the same as time.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference
                     between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows
                     that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously
                     whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from
                     time.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to
                     consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning
                     and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if
                     aeviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they
                     might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished
                     from eternity, and from time.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p8"> Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that
                     time has both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has "before" and "after" without innovation and
                     veteration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred
                     to the measure itself. For since "before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity has
                     "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity
                     must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to the
                     things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has
                     a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure,
                     as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes
                     from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain "before" and "after." We say then that since eternity
                     is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now
                     some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these
                     things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from
                     permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they
                     have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of
                     which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels,
                     who have
                     an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of
                     intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean
                     between eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this
                     way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no "before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it;
                     while eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such at all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen.
                     ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are
                     measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental
                     change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation
                     of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that
                     an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not
                     subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence
                     and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel
                     not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying
                     that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q10_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q10_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one aeviternity?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power
                     of ages are with Thee, O Lord."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly
                     bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all
                     aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls.
                     Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time
                     for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal
                     things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is aeviternity
                     one only.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities.
                     Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge
                     of spiritual things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p8"> Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as
                     time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not
                     a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for
                     ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it
                     exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that
                     the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that
                     view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx
                     of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first
                     subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which
                     are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason
                     why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements
                     are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as
                     accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is
                     to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p9"> This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all
                     proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought.
                     Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x)
                     seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the
                     last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as
                     there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there
                     is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the
                     existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more
                     simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later (
                     <a id="FP_Q10_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we
                     mean ages.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless
                     being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured
                     by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple
                     than the rest.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q11" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q11-p0.1">THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q11-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q11-p2"> After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q11-p3"> (1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q11-p4"> (2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q11-p5"> (3) Whether God is one?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q11-p6"> (4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q11_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q11_A1-p0.1">Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates
                     all "genera." But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore
                     "one" adds something to "being."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many." Therefore
                     "one" is an addition to "being."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and "being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to
                     call "being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so to call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one"
                     is an addition to "being."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an
                     addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is not an addition to "being."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is
                     the very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided,
                     both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up
                     and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision;
                     and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were divided
                     into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being,"
                     but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same applied to the "one" which is the principle of
                     number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers
                     were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that "one" which is the principle of number,
                     added a reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought
                     that the "one" convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This, however, is
                     manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its
                     substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity.
                     Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with "being," does
                     not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging
                     to the genus of quantity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in
                     number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if
                     it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as
                     regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents;
                     or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such
                     a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided
                     absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely
                     and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being
                     is divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not
                     be contained under "being," unless it were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that
                     "there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what
                     are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species,
                     are
                     one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q11_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q11_A2-p0.1">Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every "multitude"
                     is in a certain way "one," as appears from the preceding article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But "multitude" is constituted by "one." Therefore it is not opposed
                     to "multitude."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few" is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it
                     as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that "one" comes after "multitude,"
                     and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence there would be a vicious circle in
                     the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in indivisibility;
                     and the idea of "multitude" contains division. Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The "one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which
                     is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is "multitude"
                     measured by "one," as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible with "being" is opposed to "multitude" by way
                     of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to
                     the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality,
                     the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or
                     of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and
                     to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity
                     is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being
                     is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is
                     relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being
                     in
                     the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good
                     is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely "one" is relatively "many," and vice versa.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A "whole" is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed
                     of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance,
                     every part of water is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous
                     whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole;
                     as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole.
                     Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed
                     of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided, in which way they are opposed
                     to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings,
                     not
                     by the fact that they are not houses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some kind
                     of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first sense two are many but not in the second sense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to
                     unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things;
                     and hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of a line." "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on
                     "one"; because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude
                     except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one" is placed in the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude"
                     is not placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so what first
                     comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly,
                     comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q11_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q11_A3-p0.1">Whether God is one?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For there be many gods and many lords" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q11_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:5</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise,
                     neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation
                     is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q11_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.4" target="asv">Dt. 6:4</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It can be shown from these three sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why
                     any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is
                     a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if
                     Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many
                     Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as
                     was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p6"> Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ
                     from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one
                     of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible
                     for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite
                     principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p7"> Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since
                     some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one.
                     For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the "per se" cause of one, and many are only
                     the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect,
                     and is so "per se" and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And
                     this one is God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars
                     were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "One" which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the principle of
                     number belongs to the "genus" of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one"
                     which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there
                     is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to
                     us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated
                     of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q11_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q11_A4-p0.1">Whether God is supremely one?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not supremely "one." For "one" is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be
                     greater or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are called "one."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity.
                     But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more "one" than unity is "one" and
                     a point is "one."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially "one" is supremely "one." But every being
                     is essentially "one," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely "one"; and therefore God is
                     not "one" more than any other being is "one."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now
                     both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it
                     is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is
                     divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether
                     simple, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme degree.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to
                     more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more
                     divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, "one."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject.
                     Hence neither of them can be supremely "one." For as a subject cannot be supremely "one," because of the difference within
                     it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every being is "one" by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance
                     of some things is compound and of others simple.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q12" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q12-p0.1">HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p2"> As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of
                  creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p3"> (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p4"> (2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p5"> (3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p6"> (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p7"> (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p8"> (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p9"> (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p10"> (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p11"> (9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p12"> (10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p13"> (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p14"> (12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q12-p15"> (13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q12_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q12_A1-p0.1">Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv"> Jn. 1:18, </a> "No man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can
                     a creature see what is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God: "Neither is there sense, nor image,
                     nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore in Himself He is unknown.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is
                     being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God
                     is not intelligible; but above all intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower.
                     But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore
                     the created intellect cannot see the essence of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in
                     Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account
                     of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot
                     be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p8"> Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is
                     not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his
                     intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its
                     beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of
                     the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains
                     to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know
                     the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could
                     not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p9"> Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.</p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited,
                     "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most
                     certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the
                     infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first
                     way: as appears from what was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as
                     He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge;
                     which means that He is not comprehended.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and
                     equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this
                     sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as
                     potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned
                     to know God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q12_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q12_A2-p0.1">Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when
                     He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch
                     as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood.
                     Therefore, if God is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some similitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark manner'],"
                     "by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God."
                     But to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind.
                     Therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision---viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen
                     with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things
                     it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone
                     is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not
                     there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow
                     that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p7"> Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellect power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since
                     the intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness
                     of Him who is the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it
                     were, derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection
                     superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual
                     faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be
                     united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
                     i), "by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known;" as by the likeness of a
                     body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created
                     likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God
                     to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever
                     can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness;
                     for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like
                     thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p8"> Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely,
                     the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv"> Ps. 35:10, </a> "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the
                     divine essence itself as it really is.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to
                     the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is
                     united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of itself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q12_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q12_A3-p0.1">Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.19.26" target="asv">Job 19:26</a>): "In my flesh I shall see . . . God," and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Job.42.5" target="asv">Job 42:5</a>), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those eyes" (namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power
                     of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of
                     vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things." Now whoever
                     can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see
                     God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne,"
                     etc. (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen
                     by a vision of sense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life,
                     as visible things are seen by corporeal vision."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For
                     every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later 
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78.html">(Q[78])</a>. Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For
                     God is incorporeal, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Hence He cannot be seen by the
                     sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour," do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that
                     man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood
                     of the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the
                     eyes of your heart" may be "enlightened" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.17" target="asv">Eph.
                        1:17,18
                     </a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore they will have
                     an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains
                     this, saying: "It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see
                     most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we
                     now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising
                     the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it." Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see
                     God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but
                     as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some
                     other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal
                     things, happens from two causes---viz. from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory
                     infused into the body after its renovation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God according
                     to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q12_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q12_A4-p0.1">Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
                     "An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection
                     is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it seems that by his
                     own natural power he understands the Divine essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight.
                     But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in
                     like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power,
                     much more can he understand God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if
                     to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up
                     to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that
                     they may know Thee the only true God," etc. (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>). Therefore to see the essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated
                     according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence
                     the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the
                     mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of
                     the knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being only in this one individual matter; as
                     all bodies. But others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own existence,
                     but receive it; and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent
                     being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form
                     of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows
                     things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in
                     the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures
                     which exist only in individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted
                     therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects
                     as universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in
                     matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the
                     body. It follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond
                     the
                     natural power of any created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated.
                     Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect,
                     as an object made intelligible to it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself.
                     But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above 
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought
                     to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch
                     as it does not possess the excellence which is in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic
                     intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level
                     by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive
                     a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to
                     consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it
                     resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect
                     of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect;
                     since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the created
                     intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of
                     resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q12_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q12_A5-p0.1">Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself
                     lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible
                     things. Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created light.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through
                     a medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is created can be natural to some creature. Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light,
                     such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see God;
                     which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the
                     essence of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for
                     example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created
                     intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary
                     that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it
                     may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to
                     enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding
                     should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect,
                     as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the
                     Apocalypse (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.23" target="asv">Apoc. 21:23</a>): "The glory of God hath enlightened it"---viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are made
                     "deiform"---i.e. like to God, according to the saying: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because']
                     we shall see Him as He is" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is
                     of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler
                     to act. Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent,
                     and susceptible of color.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect,
                     strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen,
                     but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural
                     to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is made
                     deiform, as is said in this article.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q12_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q12_A6-p0.1">Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>): "We shall see Him as He is." But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore
                     He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii): "One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than
                     another." But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense,
                     as was shown above (A[3] ). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one does not see more clearly than another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object,
                     or on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received
                     more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does not apply to the
                     present question, for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude,
                     but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference
                     of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly;
                     and this is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally
                     in eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one
                     had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any similitude; but it will take
                     place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty of seeing God, however,
                     does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of
                     glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p7"> Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation
                     of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire
                     in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more
                     charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the words,"We shall see Him as He is," the conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen,
                     so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it
                     does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will
                     be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God's existence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same
                     thing better than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for whoever understands it
                     otherwise than it really is, does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of understanding, for the understanding
                     of one is more perfect than the understanding of another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all---viz.
                     the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will
                     arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q12_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q12_A7-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.12" target="asv">Phil. 3:12</a>): "But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']." But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for
                     he said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.26" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:26</a>): "I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others also, whom he invites
                     to do the same, saying: "So run that you may
                     comprehend."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it
                     is hidden from the seer." But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer,
                     since God is simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not "wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either
                     to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode
                     of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the
                     seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence.
                     Therefore all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible
                     in thought" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.18" target="asv">Jer. 32:18,19</a>). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great
                     beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p7"> In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known
                     so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting
                     on a probably proof, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle
                     has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a
                     probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does
                     not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to
                     that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears---Everything
                     is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above 
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7.html">(Q[7])</a> is
                     infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence
                     more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light
                     of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know
                     God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one
                     comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite
                     and cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity.
                     In this sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension"
                     is taken more largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains
                     to him. And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, "I held him, and I will not let him
                     go" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Song.3.4" target="asv">Cant 3:4</a>); in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way "comprehension"
                     is one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision
                     responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch
                     as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy
                     what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire,
                     so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him,
                     possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment
                     of desire.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is
                     capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any
                     part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as
                     it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says
                     the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries
                     can be completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge
                     of it is attained.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode
                     of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely,
                     and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus,
                     for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is
                     demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q12_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A9.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q12_A8-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see,
                     who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore those who see God see all things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God
                     as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all
                     possible things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or
                     can do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things,
                     its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore
                     he who sees God knows all things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the inferior
                     angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels." Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret
                     thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the essence of God, does not know all things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that
                     things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore
                     all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the
                     more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon
                     as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a
                     weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a
                     cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect
                     can comprehend God wholly, as shown above 
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know
                     all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know
                     the more, the more perfectly it sees God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth
                     all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror
                     itself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are
                     known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been
                     shown in this article that the more things are known in God according as He is seen more or less perfectly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely,
                     the species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But
                     to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does
                     its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know
                     things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle
                     of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the
                     seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures)
                     "and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is
                     not the happier for them, but for Thee alone."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A9.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q12_A9" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A10.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q12_A9-p0.1">Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind
                     of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual
                     intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the object,
                     as the eye by the similitude of color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine
                     essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their similitudes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased
                     to see the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture;
                     hence he said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:4</a>). Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the same way,
                     when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror.
                     Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by
                     any similitudes or ideas.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to
                     their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways.
                     For as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any
                     knowable object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is
                     directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which
                     resembles the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For
                     the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know things thus by their likeness
                     in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes
                     pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according
                     to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other
                     similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God Himself is seen.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine essence,
                     in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived
                     images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas
                     of genus and difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds
                     the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees
                     God, by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence,
                     which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind of vision whereby things are seen
                     by this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A10.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q12_A10" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q12_A10-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to
                     the Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood." But what is seen in God,
                     is understood; for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in Him at the same time.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), "God moves the spiritual creature according to time"---i.e. by intelligence
                     and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore those who see God understand and are affected
                     successively; for time means succession.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall
                     see all we know at one glance."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many
                     things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed
                     by many diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously.
                     Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same
                     time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all at the same time, if each one is understood by its
                     own idea; whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. Now it was shown
                     above that things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence
                     they are seen simultaneously, and not successively.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously,
                     as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and "rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things
                     simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God,
                     they see all at the same time.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p9"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p10"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q12_A11" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q12_A11-p0.1">Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.30" target="asv">Gn. 32:30</a>). But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We see now in a glass and in a dark manner,
                     but then face to face" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see
                     the Lord" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Num.12.8" target="asv">Num. 12:8</a>); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in this life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even
                     now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we both see that what you say is true, and we both
                     see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable
                     truth itself above our minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all
                     things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things
                     according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable." Therefore
                     even in this life we see God Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by
                     intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as
                     he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows that He is seen by
                     us in His essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.20" target="asv">Ex. 32:20</a>), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His
                     own nature."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because,
                     as was said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its
                     being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now
                     it is evident that the Divine essence
                     cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible
                     for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted
                     from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of
                     the bodily senses
                     divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the
                     soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are
                     formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I
                     have seen God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred
                     to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary
                     vision; as will later be explained (SS, 
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q174.html">Q[174])</a> in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation,
                     above the ordinary state.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds
                     of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad
                     lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more
                     fully in the question of rapture (SS, 
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q175.html">Q[175])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things are said to be seen in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know
                     and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said
                     to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons
                     of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As
                     therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see
                     any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect.
                     And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence and power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q12_A12" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A13.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q12_A12-p0.1">Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp
                     simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q12_A12-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a> ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination
                     of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge
                     of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent
                     light unless purified by the justice of faith." Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A12-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv">Rom. 1:19</a>), "That which is known of God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest in them."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But
                     our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the
                     power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore
                     can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we
                     can be led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him,
                     as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p7"> Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from
                     Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason
                     of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can
                     belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve
                     what I said in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.' For it can be answered that many who are not
                     pure can know many truths," i.e. by natural reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A13.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q12_A13" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q12_A13-p0.1">Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.
                     i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses,
                     who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring
                     of Him "what He is," comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more
                     known to us by grace than by natural reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies
                     to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon
                     us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than
                     by natural reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom.
                     xxvi in Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more
                     excellent knowledge of God by grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A13-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have
                     by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling
                     us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p7"> Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened
                     by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to
                     express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in prophetic visions; while
                     sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the
                     Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A13-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.17" target="asv">Mat. 3:17</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one
                     unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according
                     as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that
                     God is Three and One.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the
                     more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given
                     by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination
                     to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as
                     faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect
                     to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q13" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A13.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q13-p0.1">THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p2"> After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the
                  divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p3"> Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p4"> (1) Whether God can be named by us?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p5"> (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p6"> (3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p7"> (4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p8"> (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p9"> (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p10"> (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p11"> (8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p12"> (9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p13"> (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p14"> (11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q13-p15"> (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q13_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q13_A1-p0.1">Whether a name can be given to God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can
                     one be found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.30.4" target="asv">Prov. 30:4</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract
                     names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the
                     same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time;
                     moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to
                     recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore
                     God cannot in any way be named by us.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.3" target="asv">Ex. 15:3</a>): "The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident
                     that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore
                     that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html">Q[12], AA[11]</a>,12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God
                     from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us
                     from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses
                     the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed
                     by the name is the definition.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand
                     about God, and signify in word.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of
                     which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas
                     their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used
                     by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as
                     applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that
                     whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting,
                     we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection,
                     although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this
                     life
                     as He is.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To signify substance with quality is to signify the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence,
                     as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied
                     to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His
                     eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple
                     subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things,
                     because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God
                     as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according
                     as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative
                     pronouns.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q13_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q13_A2-p0.1">Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God
                     signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from
                     His nature or operation."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly
                     and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God." Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising
                     God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does
                     not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him
                     substantially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance.
                     Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that
                     simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but
                     rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures
                     to Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p7"> But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good," "wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been
                     given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought
                     into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they
                     assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like
                     manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His
                     relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the
                     same rule applies to other names.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p8"> Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned
                     why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause
                     of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might
                     in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He
                     is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names
                     applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine,
                     forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this
                     is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the
                     He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p9"> Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially
                     of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far
                     as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him.
                     Now it is shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God prepossesses in Himself all the
                     perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him
                     so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling
                     principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior
                     bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>), in treating
                     of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as
                     creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or
                     "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent
                     and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes
                     goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we
                     are."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what
                     He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify,
                     as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed
                     to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot
                     would be a stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis"
                     which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for
                     as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect
                     manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are
                     not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from
                     Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in
                     a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented
                     in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q13_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q13_A3-p0.1">Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained
                     above 
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore
                     names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such
                     names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel.
                     Hier. ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply
                     some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore
                     all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express
                     the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude."
                     Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal
                     sense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures,
                     which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures,
                     and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God---viz. the perfections which
                     they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification.
                     As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures,
                     and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God;
                     for their mode of signification applies to creatures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in
                     which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a
                     material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these
                     perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their
                     signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to
                     Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all
                     substance and all life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their
                     mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing
                     signified.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q13_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q13_A4-p0.1">Whether names applied to God are synonymous?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same.
                     But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it
                     is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that
                     an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems
                     also that all these ideas are vain notions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is
                     supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not
                     signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to
                     God are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful,
                     the Lord of hosts is Thy name" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.18" target="asv">Jer. 32:18</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove,
                     or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse
                     things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, that these names signify the divine substance, although in an
                     imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified
                     by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from
                     creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which
                     perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As
                     therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections
                     of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds
                     one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied
                     to God signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not
                     synonymous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p7"> Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which
                     signify different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies
                     the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented
                     by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus
                     it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner,
                     as things represent Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q13_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q13_A5-p0.1">Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal,
                     as many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said
                     of some univocally---viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which
                     agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some
                     agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it
                     seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures,
                     is predicated univocally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according
                     to the word of Genesis (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>), "Let us make man to our image and likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous
                     with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no
                     name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not
                     in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other
                     things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p6"> Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes
                     any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much
                     less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate
                     result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure
                     that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner;
                     as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms
                     in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and
                     multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that
                     perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection
                     distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we
                     apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term
                     "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when
                     it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name.
                     Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other
                     terms.
                     Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p8"> Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because
                     if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning
                     would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about
                     God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by
                     the things that are made" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p9"> Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy"
                     predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the
                     latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since
                     medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures
                     analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures 
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and
                     cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure
                     equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the
                     same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various
                     proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine
                     signifies the cause of the same health.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal
                     agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the
                     generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it
                     would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a
                     particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause
                     of the whole species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal
                     agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness,
                     but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal
                     analogical predication, which is being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing (
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the
                     same genus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p13"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures;
                     yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q13_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q13_A6-p0.1">Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know
                     it, since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the
                     names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said
                     primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures
                     are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says
                     (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily
                     predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures
                     rather than of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.14" target="asv">Eph. 3:14,15</a>); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God
                     rather than to creatures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and
                     this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the
                     Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other
                     things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first.
                     Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called
                     healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which
                     is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied
                     to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For
                     as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile
                     by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a
                     lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures.
                     But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as
                     the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the
                     creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good"
                     would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above 
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify
                     not only that
                     He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name
                     signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures;
                     but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they
                     have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">(A[3])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection refers to the imposition of the name.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as
                     "healthy" is applied to medicine.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q13_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q13_A7-p0.1">Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the
                     divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which
                     is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not
                     temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but
                     eternally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white.
                     But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things
                     that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for
                     from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.3" target="asv">Jer. 31:3</a>). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as
                     "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from eternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only.
                     But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite
                     relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also.
                     But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied
                     to God temporally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if
                     the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly
                     false.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can
                     exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures
                     are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of
                     the creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from
                     eternity, and not temporally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p10"> To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen
                     to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary
                     to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from
                     both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension
                     of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it
                     apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between "being" and "non-being" formed
                     by reason, apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus
                     and species, and the like.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p11"> Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between
                     two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great
                     and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent
                     upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p12"> Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens
                     whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual
                     things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence.
                     Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge
                     or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them
                     there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the
                     relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they
                     are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a
                     column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p13"> Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it
                     is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a
                     relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import
                     relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason
                     of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and "son,"
                     and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from
                     which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and
                     these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the
                     same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not
                     signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes
                     power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes,
                     as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are
                     said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence,
                     either directly or indirectly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only
                     in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A7-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.89.1" target="asv">Ps. 89:1</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action
                     of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according
                     to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations
                     in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet
                     so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of
                     relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the
                     Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p18">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection
                     is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to
                     the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p19">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to
                     which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then
                     they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another,
                     and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science
                     and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the
                     knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is
                     simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to
                     the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms,
                     "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p20"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p21"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q13_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A9.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q13_A8-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God {Theos} is so
                     called from the {theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the {aithein}, that is to burn, for our
                     God is a fire consuming all malice; or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all things." But all these names belong to
                     operation. Therefore this name "God" signifies His operation and not His nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not
                     signify the divine nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties
                     and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from
                     its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular
                     action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in
                     themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the
                     meaning of the name and its source are the same.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p6"> Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him
                     from these, as said in A[1]; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning.
                     For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising
                     providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect
                     providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name "God" is imposed to signify the divine nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name "God."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can
                     know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone" signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies
                     the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said
                     in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in
                     itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above (
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things,
                     the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p9"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p10"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A9.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q13_A9" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A10.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q13_A9-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is communicable?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself.
                     But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us
                     great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.4" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:4</a>). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to
                     others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears
                     from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.6" target="asv">Ps. 81:6</a>). Therefore this name "God" is communicable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects
                     are communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is communicable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.21" target="asv">Wis. 14:21</a>), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole
                     signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name.
                     For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable
                     to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or
                     strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable,
                     we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either
                     in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common
                     to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the
                     reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular
                     subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood
                     as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name
                     imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing
                     cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many,
                     but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess
                     something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum,"
                     but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be
                     communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as
                     we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having
                     forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in
                     some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound
                     things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p7"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above 
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this
                     name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written:
                     "You served them who
                     by nature are not gods," (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.8" target="asv">Gal. 4:8</a>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its
                     whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness,
                     according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.6" target="asv">Ps. 81:6</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p8"> But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered
                     as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the
                     Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although
                     God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but
                     upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said
                     above concerning the name "sun."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do
                     not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable
                     to many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the
                     divine nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A10.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q13_A10" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q13_A10-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where
                     a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction.
                     But a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is God." Therefore GOD in both senses
                     is spoken of univocally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion,
                     and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness.
                     Therefore also this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands
                     by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: "An
                     idol is God." Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied
                     to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion
                     is applied equivocally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p6"> Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol
                     is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there
                     is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to
                     opinion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This
                     is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas
                     in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses;
                     as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition
                     of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine
                     and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p8"> The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when
                     it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the
                     name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify
                     something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
                     comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man,"
                     of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the
                     name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really
                     is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it
                     is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of
                     them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning
                     God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm,
                     "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A10-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.95.5" target="asv">Ps. 95:5</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p10"><b>Reply to Objections 2 and 3:</b> The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the
                     name, and not from its various significations.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names
                     in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be
                     predicated equivocally of different predicaments.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea
                     of causality, or excellence, or remotion (
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol
                     is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
                     names the meaning of which we know not.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q13_A11" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A12.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q13_A11-p0.1">Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But
                     this name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it
                     especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God,
                     and not this name HE WHO IS.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this
                     name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered
                     him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.13" target="asv">Ex. 3:13,14</a>). Therefor this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p7"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence
                     of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p8"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add
                     something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the
                     essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about
                     God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the
                     more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that,
                     "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as
                     an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this
                     name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean
                     of
                     substance."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p9"> Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose
                     existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and
                     as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name,
                     this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton,
                     imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak,
                     singular.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely
                     comes before the idea of cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from
                     some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A12.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q13_A12" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q13_A12-p0.1">Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about
                     God are true; but affirmations are vague."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form,
                     as shown (Q[3] ): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken
                     as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition
                     as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition
                     about God cannot be made.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that
                     He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition
                     the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears
                     to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For
                     it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for
                     the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the
                     same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called
                     animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as
                     to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule
                     in
                     some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in
                     the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are
                     to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject,
                     while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p7"> God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions
                     because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows
                     that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents
                     the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as
                     no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound
                     things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form
                     as a subject, and attributes something else to it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly
                     as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the
                     one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect
                     which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this
                     does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is
                     composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode
                     of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect
                     understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but
                     its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according
                     to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect
                     is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A13.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q14" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A12.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q14-p0.1">OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p2"> Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation
                  is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding
                  abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the
                  divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of
                  life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower,
                  and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added
                  the treatment of ideas.
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p3"> Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p4"> (1) Whether there is knowledge in God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p5"> (2) Whether God understands Himself?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p6"> (3) Whether He comprehends Himself?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p7"> (4) Whether His understanding is His substance?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p8"> (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p9"> (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p10"> (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p11"> (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p12"> (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p13"> (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p14"> (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p15"> (12) Whether He knows the infinite?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p16"> (13) Whether He knows future contingent things?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p17"> (14) Whether He knows enunciable things?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p18"> (15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q14-p19"> (16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A1-p0.1">Whether there is knowledge [*Scientia]?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the
                     mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of
                     principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.33" target="asv">Rom. 11:33</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from
                     non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted
                     to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the
                     nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of
                     intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is
                     in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that
                     the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is
                     the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense
                     is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more
                     separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from
                     anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but
                     substance and pure act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as
                     regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he
                     knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to
                     be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown 
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from
                     each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses
                     perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Job.12.13" target="asv">Job 12:13</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the
                     knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God
                     after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according
                     to any such mode.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A2-p0.1">Whether God understands Himself?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his
                     own essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all;
                     thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a
                     kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers,
                     or is made perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing its own likeness." Therefore God does not
                     understand Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen.
                     ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in De Anima iii. Therefore
                     God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external
                     effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that
                     remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in
                     the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii)
                     that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act." For the reason why we actually
                     feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because
                     of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p7"> Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the
                     same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially;
                     nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it
                     understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God
                     understands Himself through Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving
                     it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore
                     those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of
                     each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know
                     themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, "whoever knows his essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God
                     to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as
                     stated in De Anima iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another,
                     but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible
                     object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is
                     sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible
                     object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes
                     it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way
                     in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own perfection, and
                     its
                     own intelligible object.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now
                     our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in
                     potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can
                     be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the
                     intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other
                     things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by
                     this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible
                     objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A3-p0.1">Whether God comprehends Himself?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends itself
                     is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God
                     is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite;
                     which is against what was laid down above (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God understands
                     Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge
                     of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable
                     proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is
                     manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything
                     is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but
                     in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing;
                     because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above
                     (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that
                     reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended
                     is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as
                     if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are
                     to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself,
                     forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as
                     nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is comprehended when seen,
                     if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because
                     He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God
                     is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A4-p0.1">Whether the act of God's intellect is His substance?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies
                     something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood,
                     and but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when
                     we understand our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not be something great.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself
                     is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore
                     the act of God's intellect is not His substance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand.
                     Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance,
                     then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which
                     the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding
                     is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how
                     this is. As was laid down above 
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection;
                     as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand
                     follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above
                     
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Hence as His essence itself is also
                     His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p7"> Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and
                     His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity
                     is attached to His substance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand
                     our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its
                     very self and is not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says
                     (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other
                     than Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides
                     Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence
                     the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore
                     God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be.
                     Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "All things are naked and open to His eyes" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.13" target="asv">Heb. 4:13</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His
                     existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows
                     of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its
                     power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact
                     that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence
                     of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in
                     the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for
                     everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p7"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself,
                     and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when
                     the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as
                     when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the
                     mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p8"> So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in
                     themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as
                     if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above
                     explained.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which
                     it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image."
                     Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above
                     explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the
                     divine intellect other than the divine essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other
                     things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle
                     of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating
                     by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible
                     form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but
                     His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act,
                     or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown 
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and
                     universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper
                     knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper
                     knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence.
                     But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created
                     essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature
                     is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge
                     of it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence,
                     it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse
                     things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by
                     their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God
                     knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the
                     joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible
                     in His sight" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.12" target="asv">Heb. 4:12,13</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings.
                     For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself
                     as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p7"> But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect,
                     when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows
                     them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge
                     of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His
                     understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was
                     said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is
                     common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to
                     show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for
                     instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it
                     would know all colors.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p8"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this
                     respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle
                     of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light
                     only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity
                     of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known
                     in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above
                     (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not
                     only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes
                     them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from
                     the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its
                     own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as
                     regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of
                     God
                     is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of
                     a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect
                     number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known
                     not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge;
                     and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p9"> As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far
                     more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree
                     of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways
                     in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly,
                     unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction
                     from each other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of
                     knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known
                     according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in
                     the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone
                     according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of)
                     existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower;
                     thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that
                     it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to
                     import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the
                     object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode
                     of knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p11"> We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows
                     them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence
                     cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures.
                     Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate
                     in, and imitate it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A7-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge.
                     Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards
                     only one thing at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (AA 2,5), it seems that
                     He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect
                     (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus
                     we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately
                     here and there; but He sees all things together at once."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion:
                     one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something
                     else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge
                     of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things,
                     which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one
                     thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things
                     in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of
                     discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever
                     proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed
                     from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the
                     second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen
                     in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in
                     Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Altogether there is only one act of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium),
                     as shown above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and
                     hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner
                     that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence
                     His knowledge is not discursive.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A8-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv"> Rom. 8:30, </a> "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is
                     future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the
                     cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior
                     and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows
                     them, therefore they are."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer
                     is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact
                     that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the
                     principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that
                     remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect;
                     and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands
                     unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible
                     form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a
                     determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is
                     manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must
                     be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually
                     called the "knowledge of approbation."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined
                     to it, as is said above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p8"> But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to
                     the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God
                     knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was
                     not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of
                     which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its
                     measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway
                     between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who
                     gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A9" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A10.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A9-p0.1">Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and "being"
                     are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any
                     likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because
                     a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.17" target="asv">Rom. 4:17</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in
                     a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either
                     of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of
                     any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by
                     the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can
                     be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p7"> Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them
                     may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for
                     since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending
                     all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time,
                     as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor
                     will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so
                     called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality;
                     and as such they are known by God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far
                     as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is,
                     or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge
                     of God not that they be, but that they be possible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A10.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A10" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A11.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A10-p0.1">Whether God knows evil things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality
                     does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect
                     of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A[2] ), it seems that God does not
                     know evil things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause
                     of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His
                     essence, as is clear from the foregoing 
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no
                     contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the
                     thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by
                     Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.11" target="asv">Prov. 15:11</a>), "Hell and destruction are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption
                     by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is
                     knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact
                     that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness.
                     Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness
                     except through light."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know
                     privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing
                     are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only
                     potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by
                     privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing
                     in Himself, but by the opposite good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God,
                     which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is
                     not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined
                     nor known except by good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A11.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A11" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A11-p0.1">Whether God knows singular things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now
                     the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii),
                     "reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not know singular things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions.
                     But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as
                     they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality
                     only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>), "All the ways of a man are open to His eyes."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the
                     foregoing (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers
                     it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph.
                     iii) that God would be most ignorant if
                     He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence,
                     although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless
                     God knows both by His simple intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p7"> Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in
                     any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the
                     universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for
                     singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined
                     together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because
                     he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular
                     man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p8"> singular things in their singularity.</p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p9"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects.
                     But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said
                     application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p10"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above 
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which
                     are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since
                     He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence
                     must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The
                     same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our
                     intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular.
                     But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of
                     itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition
                     of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but
                     also singular things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in
                     the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise,
                     it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A12" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A11.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A12-p0.1">Whether God can know infinite things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to
                     those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine
                     says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite
                     things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of
                     God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the
                     essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the
                     infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot
                     be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in
                     God's knowledge, which is infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it
                     be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose
                     knowledge has no bounds."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above 
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has
                     relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the
                     world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so
                     that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things
                     even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity
                     as rational creatures go on for ever.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p7"> The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which
                     is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give
                     the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards
                     its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible
                     species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in
                     the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not
                     as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the
                     divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal
                     principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of
                     God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order
                     of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way
                     the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But
                     God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after
                     part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor
                     by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside
                     the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite
                     in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not
                     as if it were traversable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure;
                     but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which
                     it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number
                     of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous
                     quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and
                     finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the
                     knowledge of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A11.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A13" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A14.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect.
                     But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
                     of contingent things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary
                     consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only
                     a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that
                     this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the
                     antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore
                     the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not
                     of contingent things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course,
                     the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent
                     future thing is known by God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A13-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.15" target="asv">Ps. 32:15</a>), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men
                     are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above 
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future
                     contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p7"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far
                     as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent
                     (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object
                     of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
                     another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as
                     a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this
                     sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only,
                     has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also
                     as
                     each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows
                     contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His
                     knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said
                     above (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only
                     because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all
                     things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch
                     as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their
                     own causes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as
                     the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which
                     is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while
                     the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although
                     it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had
                     relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this
                     antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as
                     this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent
                     to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence
                     its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or
                     false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies
                     to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some
                     say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent
                     by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote
                     necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass
                     will grow."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p10"> Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent
                     must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the
                     existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood
                     that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew
                     anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality.
                     And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the
                     Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time.
                     Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God
                     alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after
                     him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling
                     by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself,
                     cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the
                     divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything
                     known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it
                     refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of
                     the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p12"> Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject;
                     thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied
                     to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true.
                     But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,
                     "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what
                     is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition
                     inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself
                     (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus
                     material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A14.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A14" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A14-p0.1">Whether God knows enunciable things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes
                     and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since
                     He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A14-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.11" target="asv">Ps. 93:11</a>). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that
                     of creatures, as said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p6"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not
                     after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows
                     each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand
                     what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our
                     intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such
                     a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which
                     belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand
                     as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine
                     intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences
                     of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection would avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the
                     similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p9"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p10"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A15" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A14.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A16.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A15-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation
                     to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of
                     God is variable according to the variation of creatures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows.
                     Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to
                     be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, that in God "there is no change nor shadow of alteration" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A15-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.17" target="asv">James 1:17</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing 
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God
                     imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in
                     the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We
                     may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent
                     upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations
                     are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import
                     relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable
                     manner.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not
                     follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said
                     to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are
                     not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His
                     knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not
                     previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can
                     be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time,
                     it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because
                     such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because
                     the same thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God
                     knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion,
                     however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes
                     a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which
                     is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when
                     he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God
                     knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God
                     is
                     variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and
                     sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime
                     true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation,
                     by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for
                     example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion
                     about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was
                     not sitting; neither of which can be in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A14.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A16.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q14_A16" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q15.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above
                     
                     <a id="FP_Q14_A16-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore
                     the knowledge of God is not speculative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge,
                     as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof
                     whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known,
                     which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the
                     manner of knowing---as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing,
                     and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as
                     practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its
                     universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative,"
                     as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the
                     end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made,
                     not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations
                     as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing
                     itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative
                     and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p6"> In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself
                     is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as
                     regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p7"> Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge
                     is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards
                     evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch
                     as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the
                     physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is,
                     of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can
                     make, and which nevertheless are never made.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally
                     in so far as it is human.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p10"><b>Reply to Objections:</b>
	In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if
                     they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know
                     what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair
                     the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He
                     knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge
                     of all other things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q15.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A12.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q15" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A16.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q15-p0.1">OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q15-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q15-p2"> After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q15-p3"> (1) Whether there are ideas?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q15-p4"> (2) Whether they are many, or one only?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q15-p5"> (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q15_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q15.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Whether there are ideas?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are
                     for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (
                     <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle
                     of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are
                     understood."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood
                     the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself
                     can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge
                     of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in
                     him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p7"> In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on
                     account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some
                     agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as
                     a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made
                     pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists
                     in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like
                     to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear
                     later (
                     <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the
                     world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion
                     of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except
                     of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q15.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q15_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Whether ideas are many?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only
                     one idea.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts
                     or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on
                     the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must
                     be the cause of the eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not
                     from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations.
                     But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this
                     is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one,
                     except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things,
                     they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the
                     divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with
                     them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate
                     end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now
                     the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph.
                     xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the
                     accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first
                     creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced.
                     According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe
                     was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot
                     be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot
                     conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind
                     there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created
                     by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily
                     be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator
                     as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act.
                     For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the
                     house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it
                     would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist
                     in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He
                     knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can
                     be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according
                     to
                     which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable
                     of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards
                     other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type
                     of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands
                     many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this
                     is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands
                     the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house,
                     as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of
                     the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things
                     by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as
                     understood by Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing
                     its own essence with these things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby
                     the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q15_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would
                     follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining
                     and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas
                     of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore
                     there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper
                     types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold
                     office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an
                     "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type,"
                     and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to
                     everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God,
                     even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they
                     are known by Him in a speculative manner.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither
                     in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect
                     to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause
                     with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God;
                     but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except
                     in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being
                     along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces
                     through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;
                     whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through
                     some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular
                     things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because
                     the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved.
                     However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (
                     <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a> ).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A16.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q16" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q16-p0.1">OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q16-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q16-p2"> Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth.
                  About this there are eight points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q16-p3"> (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q16-p4"> (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q16-p5"> (3) On the comparison of the true to being.</p>
               <p id="FP_Q16-p6"> (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.</p>
               <p id="FP_Q16-p7"> (5) Whether God is truth?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q16-p8"> (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q16-p9"> (7) On the eternity of truth.</p>
               <p id="FP_Q16-p10"> (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.</p>
               <div id="FP_Q16_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns
                     this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth
                     would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the
                     knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true,
                     unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides
                     in things, and not in the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except
                     in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true
                     is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But
                     it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam.
                     iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now
                     there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according
                     as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the
                     term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect,
                     namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite---and
                     hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good
                     if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect
                     of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be
                     true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either
                     essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally
                     to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect,
                     but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p7"> Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said
                     to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things
                     are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form
                     in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
                     intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are
                     in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception
                     in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they
                     are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera
                     Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being
                     clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as
                     they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without
                     any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone";
                     for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each
                     thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought
                     and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for
                     what is accidental is excluded from every definition.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by
                     chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their
                     relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph.
                     iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their
                     relation to the divine intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily,
                     any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not
                     its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth,
                     is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought
                     or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q16_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii)
                     that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing
                     is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth
                     does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect
                     with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense
                     apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the
                     intellect nor in things."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has
                     the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the
                     thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and
                     hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For
                     although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen
                     and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing;
                     yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to
                     the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing:
                     for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by
                     the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a
                     thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words.
                     Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not
                     as the
                     thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore,
                     properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing
                     "what a thing is."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p6"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p7"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p8"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q16_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated 
                     <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being;
                     for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true
                     appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are
                     not convertible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being,
                     so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses
                     and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion
                     of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before 
                     <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible
                     with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already 
                     <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the
                     intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable.
                     Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways.
                     In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and
                     this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended
                     also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be
                     apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object
                     with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility
                     is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q16_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Whether good is logically prior to the true?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys.
                     i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the
                     good is logically prior to the true.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine
                     says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics.
                     Therefore the true is prior to good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner
                     the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related
                     to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in
                     so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident
                     from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the
                     appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect
                     to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect;
                     and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas
                     in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the
                     fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that
                     it is prior absolutely.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself;
                     secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being
                     is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself
                     in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills
                     in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things 
                     <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he
                     fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q16_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Whether God is truth?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition
                     and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness
                     to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause
                     of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But
                     it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being
                     conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect,
                     but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of
                     every other intellect, and He Himself is His
                     own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and
                     the sovereign and first truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges
                     of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it
                     receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect.
                     Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son,
                     Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot
                     understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because
                     He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence
                     is not dissimilar to His intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension
                     of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is
                     entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q16_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1),
                     "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would
                     be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore
                     God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things."
                     But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider
                     that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as
                     animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only
                     one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So
                     healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health
                     of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far
                     as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby
                     the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said 
                     <a id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the
                     intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth,
                     as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and
                     even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv"> Ps. 11:2, </a> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror,
                     so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are
                     true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or
                     forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected
                     in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary
                     truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not
                     simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
                     science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul,
                     except God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q16_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Whether created truth is eternal?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature
                     of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is
                     eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore
                     is truth, which is the most universal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding
                     the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for
                     if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of
                     truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is
                     after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is
                     eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> God alone is eternal, as laid down before (
                     <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html">Q[10], A[3]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in
                     speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable
                     truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as
                     though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but
                     from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from
                     the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect
                     is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the
                     truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already 
                     <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html">(A[5])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension
                     to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself
                     determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of
                     all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere
                     and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are
                     eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause
                     were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that
                     it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone
                     is such a cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but
                     it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason
                     of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and
                     this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by
                     reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only
                     so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being
                     as preceding its being.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q16_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Whether truth is immutable?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals,
                     otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains
                     after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing
                     is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change.
                     For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in
                     the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification
                     that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit.
                     Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three
                     propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the
                     true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before 
                     <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded
                     from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity
                     may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in
                     one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself
                     has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change
                     from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of
                     which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said
                     before (
                     <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself
                     the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable.
                     Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether
                     immutable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of divine truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally,
                     in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no
                     truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which
                     is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates
                     the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth
                     of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore
                     this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression
                     is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the
                     first truth remains, but the second is changed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when
                     Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these
                     propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that
                     the same truth remains invariable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q17" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q17-p0.1">CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q17-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q17-p2"> We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q17-p3"> (1) Whether falsity exists in things?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q17-p4"> (2) Whether it exists in the sense?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q17-p5"> (3) Whether it exists in the intellect?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q17-p6"> (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.</p>
               <div id="FP_Q17_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether falsity exists in things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it
                     will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
                     33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above 
                     <a id="FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16.html">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus
                     nothing is false.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity."
                     But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where
                     primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation
                     to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively
                     by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when
                     compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as
                     directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as
                     artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they
                     fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper
                     operation of his art.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p7"> In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since
                     whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents
                     only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins
                     themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love
                     vanity, and seek after lying?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.3" target="asv">Ps. 4:3</a>): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect.
                     Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.3.21" target="asv">Jn. 3:21</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p8"> But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply,
                     but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as
                     being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards
                     any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the
                     Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even
                     as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be
                     called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it
                     is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally
                     and
                     naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves,
                     are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine
                     says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says
                     (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In
                     this
                     way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many
                     wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not.
                     Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain
                     non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear
                     to things which they actually are not.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as
                     compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p12"><b>Reply to further objection:</b> To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity
                     except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles
                     another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in
                     the majority of instances.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q17_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether there is falsity in the senses?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they
                     are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and
                     therefore that falsity is not in them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation
                     do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the
                     senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the
                     senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really
                     are.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p7"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness
                     of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is
                     the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as
                     in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly,
                     neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in
                     so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p8"> Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound
                     organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive
                     defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems
                     bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed
                     sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being
                     directed to other things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that
                     we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected
                     erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense
                     about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation
                     it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it
                     represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were
                     the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason
                     the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness
                     of things that are not present in substance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q17_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether falsity is in the intellect?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands
                     not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore
                     falsity does not exist in the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the
                     intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood."
                     But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence,
                     as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent
                     qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in
                     knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail
                     with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said 
                     <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about
                     accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect
                     by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the
                     sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of
                     which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in
                     the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects.
                     There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (
                     <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can
                     exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas
                     in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above 
                     <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p6"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs
                     also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of
                     the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition
                     proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another.
                     In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false
                     of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the
                     intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this
                     reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing
                     at
                     all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we
                     reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this
                     sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not
                     in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it
                     is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood,
                     from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p9"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p10"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q17_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Whether true and false are contraries?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for
                     "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as
                     contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10),
                     "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
                     xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.8.5" target="asv">Jer. 8:5</a>), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must
                     be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of
                     not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it
                     is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said
                     except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness
                     is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch
                     as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate
                     apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily
                     resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for,
                     as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to
                     it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible
                     with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and
                     every falsity in some truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing
                     contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be
                     nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true.
                     So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false
                     opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q18" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q18-p0.1">THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q18-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q18-p2"> Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the
                  divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise:
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q18-p3"> (1) To whom does it belong to live?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q18-p4"> (2) What is life?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q18-p5"> (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q18-p6"> (4) Whether all things in God are life?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q18_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether to live belongs to all natural things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind
                     of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural
                     things partake of life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement
                     is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57).
                     Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living
                     waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life
                     is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life
                     manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must,
                     therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live:
                     and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal
                     begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to
                     be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail,
                     and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind
                     of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality,
                     is
                     called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling
                     are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any
                     kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of
                     the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a
                     similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal
                     natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals.
                     Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence,
                     if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact
                     have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions,
                     and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest.
                     Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching
                     thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from
                     such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force,
                     either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves,
                     as do living bodies.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing
                     source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to
                     possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs
                     is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the
                     case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q18_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether life is an operation?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain
                     operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment,
                     sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from
                     the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.18.3" target="asv"> Jn. 18:3, </a> "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said (
                     <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which
                     the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things.
                     And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (
                     <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly
                     to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote
                     the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances
                     from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the
                     dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is
                     given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance
                     to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is
                     nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running"
                     denotes "to run" in the abstract.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p7"> Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations
                     from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence
                     and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic.
                     ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding.
                     Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in
                     this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking
                     nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case
                     of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals,
                     such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces
                     such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as
                     are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular
                     kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by
                     a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his
                     whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence,
                     others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said
                     to be life eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q18_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously
                     stated 
                     <a id="FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima
                     ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed
                     to Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal
                     things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv">Ps. 83:3</a>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live
                     in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more
                     perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the
                     end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and
                     sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does
                     no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally
                     inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action
                     being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their
                     inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p7"> Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as
                     regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which
                     the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their
                     sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move
                     only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as
                     have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves,
                     can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the
                     form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of
                     their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any
                     action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose
                     are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between
                     the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible
                     beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual
                     faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the
                     art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that
                     is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p8"> But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which
                     it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself,
                     yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature,
                     and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect
                     degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing
                     God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst
                     actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this,
                     that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is
                     the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in
                     movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that
                     as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the
                     imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is
                     in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands
                     itself
                     is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement
                     is an act of the imperfect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle
                     of life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment
                     to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold
                     good with incorruptible natures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q18_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are life in God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.28" target="asv">Acts 17:28</a>), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not
                     all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore,
                     things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But
                     this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but
                     never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and
                     things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3,4</a>), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In God to live is to understand, as before stated 
                     <a id="FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as
                     understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things
                     understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine
                     power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they
                     exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move,
                     and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In
                     another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper
                     ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And
                     since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement,
                     but life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being
                     of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the
                     architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence
                     the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind,
                     as having a divine existence in that mind.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the
                     divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the
                     true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural
                     things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more
                     truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this
                     particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because
                     it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being
                     in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the
                     mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by
                     Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it
                     cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life
                     means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so
                     far as life implies a principle of operation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q19" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q19-p0.1">THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p2"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration
                  is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect
                  in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p3"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p4"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p5"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p6"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p7"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p8"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p9"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p10"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p11"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p12"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p13"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q19-p14"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q19_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether there is will in God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end.
                     Therefore there is not will in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which
                     cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement,
                     and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.2" target="asv">Rom. 12:2</a>): "That you may prove what is the will of God."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence
                     by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards
                     its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same
                     with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
                     without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through
                     its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain
                     to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And
                     so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
                     will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by
                     His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what
                     it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in
                     God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will
                     is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself,
                     but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when
                     he said that the first mover moves itself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q19_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other
                     than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills
                     anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely
                     satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things
                     apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But
                     this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.3" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:3</a>): "This is the will of God, your sanctification."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above 
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and,
                     if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that
                     every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces
                     its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed;
                     and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence,
                     if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine
                     will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other
                     things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness
                     that other things should be partakers therein.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding
                     them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills.
                     Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from
                     Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the
                     will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing
                     so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant,
                     which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its
                     own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it
                     does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by
                     understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself,
                     but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
                     consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as
                     willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q19_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills
                     from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily.
                     Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of
                     all necessity, as above shown (
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as
                     stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God
                     does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to
                     will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since
                     everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined
                     to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent
                     with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to
                     Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore
                     whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will,
                     we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to
                     be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject:
                     thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate;
                     thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not
                     necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that
                     he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe
                     that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary
                     relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we
                     will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for
                     instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as
                     they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to
                     it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take
                     ship
                     in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for
                     a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since
                     the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them,
                     it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition,
                     for
                     supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by
                     supposition.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for
                     it can exist without other things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural
                     or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the
                     cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not
                     in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily
                     will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the
                     divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be
                     without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary,
                     determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has
                     a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is
                     of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other
                     things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute
                     necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily
                     whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p16"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p17"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q19_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason
                     nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by
                     its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election.
                     Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which
                     is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then
                     by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire
                     is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now
                     Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature,
                     and not by His will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before (
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?"
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by
                     a necessity of His nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p8"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an
                     end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher
                     intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary
                     agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He
                     must act by intellect and will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p9"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect;
                     for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to
                     the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every
                     natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
                     the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined
                     and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection
                     according to the determination of His will and intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p10"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so
                     far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode
                     of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect,
                     and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
                     for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the
                     cause of things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far,
                     that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts
                     after the mode of intellect and will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness
                     is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived,
                     and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the
                     effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing
                     the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God
                     all these things are one.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p15"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p16"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q19_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to
                     say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing.
                     Therefore the will of God has some cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned
                     except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown 
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus
                     all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes
                     to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has
                     no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than
                     the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect,
                     there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person
                     that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately
                     from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known.
                     If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance,
                     in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its
                     own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It
                     is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
                     premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p7"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause
                     of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own
                     cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands
                     all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the
                     cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an
                     end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this
                     to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to
                     be on account of another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable
                     to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary,
                     and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have
                     thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly
                     unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will
                     of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say
                     that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him
                     to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this
                     cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the
                     order of other causes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q19_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the
                     will of God is not always fulfilled.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He
                     wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always
                     fulfilled.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause
                     may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the
                     limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore,
                     is not always fulfilled.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.113.11" target="asv">Ps. 113:11</a>): "God hath done all things, whatsoever He would."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the
                     agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that
                     although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may
                     fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence
                     the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside
                     the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its
                     effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause.
                     Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
                     For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things,
                     from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first
                     heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not
                     produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order;
                     as
                     does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that
                     will, when by its justice he is punished.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted
                     application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men
                     to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose
                     salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every
                     class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class
                     and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly,
                     according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will.
                     This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent,
                     but to the things willed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p8"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary
                     sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account,
                     by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should
                     be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or
                     dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently
                     he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men
                     to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently,
                     but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in
                     themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular
                     circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills
                     simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such
                     a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills
                     takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is
                     directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God,
                     though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far
                     as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause,
                     including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of
                     God, as said above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q19_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.6.7" target="asv">Gn. 6:7</a>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has
                     a changeable will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to
                     pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought
                     to do to them" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.18.7" target="asv">Jer. 18:7,8</a>) Therefore God has a changeable will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the
                     law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before 
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable
                     substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable
                     as regards His will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Num.23.19" target="asv">Num. 23:19</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that
                     certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and
                     yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before
                     he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless
                     we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards
                     good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not
                     take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not
                     so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
                     hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and
                     His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>; 
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent,
                     we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at
                     the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of
                     acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
                     He had made.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce
                     certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in
                     the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising
                     of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
                     rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is,
                     that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen;
                     or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under
                     the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
                     and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv">Is. 38:1</a>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable.
                     Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His
                     will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For
                     men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness
                     of the divine will, as has been said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q19_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved,
                     except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii,
                     84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the
                     Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.19" target="asv">Rom. 9:19</a>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should
                     die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause,
                     whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every
                     true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
                     necessary absolutely.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all
                     good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to
                     intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes
                     contingent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p7"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent
                     on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second
                     cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from
                     producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
                     referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is
                     better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to
                     act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being.
                     Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that
                     belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done,
                     which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily,
                     some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has
                     attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise
                     contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently,
                     but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For
                     the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen,
                     but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the
                     divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore,
                     are absolute necessities.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q19_A9" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine
                     says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should
                     exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And
                     Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that
                     which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy
                     when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and
                     beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should
                     not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil
                     should exist.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom.
                     Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to
                     will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore
                     God wills not evil things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either
                     natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far
                     as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
                     corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies
                     the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is
                     only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment.
                     Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not
                     even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation.
                     Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills
                     the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment,
                     He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
                     willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil
                     is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered
                     to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however,
                     is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is
                     beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that
                     the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering
                     to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by
                     that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore
                     Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone
                     wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither
                     wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q19_A10" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is
                     He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil,
                     as has been said 
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of
                     the will, not in obedience to necessity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not
                     appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said
                     to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above
                     
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
                     necessarily will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De
                     Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites,
                     inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and
                     not will to sit down.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q19_A11" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A12.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so
                     is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the
                     divine will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the
                     expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are
                     superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.2" target="asv"> Ps. 110:2</a>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for
                     the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (
                     <a id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect.
                     Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus
                     with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
                     punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed
                     to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just
                     as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called
                     by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.10" target="asv">Mat.
                        6:10
                     </a>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its
                     primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished
                     will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure;
                     and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called
                     will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless
                     we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual
                     expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it
                     is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A12.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q19_A12" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly
                     assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates
                     in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A12-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended
                     in the will of expression.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action
                     in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under
                     one division, not being of one order.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared
                     by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only
                     in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that
                     he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly,
                     or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will
                     is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for
                     what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares
                     his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept,
                     and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself
                     known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept,
                     counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.10" target="asv">Mat. 6:10</a>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine
                     (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually
                     doing it."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p7"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with
                     regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel
                     to good that is of supererogation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that
                     mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel;
                     or of prohibition or permission.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to
                     will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will
                     of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept
                     and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter
                     the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are
                     assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act
                     only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to
                     evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine
                     goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject
                     of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and
                     these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good;
                     but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q20" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A12.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q20-p0.1">GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q20-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q20-p2"> We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found
                  in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude
                  and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are
                  four points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q20-p3"> (1) Whether love exists in God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q20-p4"> (2) Whether He loves all things?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q20-p5"> (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q20-p6"> (4) Whether He loves more the better things?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q20_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Whether love exists in God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not
                     in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed
                     to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He
                     is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "God is love" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.16" target="asv">Jn. 4:16</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty.
                     For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and
                     since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily
                     and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite
                     that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate:
                     because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally
                     prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular
                     and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as
                     joy
                     and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards
                     good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason
                     all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything,
                     except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love.
                     Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence,
                     in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also
                     wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (
                     <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason
                     moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite,
                     or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the
                     proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always
                     accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says
                     (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch
                     as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore,
                     and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It
                     is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that
                     is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily change---and
                     a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64),
                     the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards
                     the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is
                     implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also
                     to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore
                     none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their
                     formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show
                     (
                     <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2; 
                     <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without
                     attributing passion to Him, as said before (
                     <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since
                     to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as
                     possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the
                     good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence,
                     as above shown (
                     <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place
                     of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another
                     to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good
                     to others; yet it implies no composition in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q20_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Whether God loves all things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself,
                     and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside
                     of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not
                     love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not
                     love things other than Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures
                     with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no
                     friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.5.7" target="asv">Ps. 5:7</a>): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love
                     all things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing
                     is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good,
                     only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some
                     good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything
                     that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as
                     by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness,
                     whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides
                     the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved;
                     and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf
                     of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness,
                     is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has
                     known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within
                     us, know things existing in themselves.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with
                     another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even
                     as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share
                     in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore,
                     God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He
                     orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account
                     of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners
                     in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they
                     have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated
                     by Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q20_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Whether God loves all things equally?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.8" target="asv">Wis. 6:8</a>). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He
                     does not therefore love some things more than others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things
                     more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and
                     of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of
                     the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because
                     He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good
                     itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more
                     than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God
                     loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said 
                     <a id="FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers
                     all things with a like wisdom and goodness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the
                     good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God
                     may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q20_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q20_A4-p0.1">Whether God always loves more the better things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human
                     race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son,
                     but delivered Him up for us all" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.32" target="asv">Rom. 8:32</a>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.6" target="asv">Ps. 8:6</a>). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed
                     of Abraham He taketh hold" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.16" target="asv">Heb. 2:16</a>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying:
                     "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says,
                     commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples,
                     not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore
                     God does not always love more the better things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank
                     after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said:
                     "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who
                     need not penance" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.7" target="asv">Lk. 15:7</a>). Therefore God does not always love more
                     the better things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner,
                     since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:19</a>): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more
                     loved by God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown (
                     <a id="FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because
                     God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for
                     them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the
                     better things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because
                     He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything
                     of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby
                     a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder,"
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.9.6" target="asv"> Is. 9:6.</a>
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that
                     nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing
                     it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.17" target="asv"> Rev 21:17, </a> the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this
                     respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an
                     angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but
                     because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that
                     he does not give to his own son in sound health.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the
                     active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious
                     of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God,
                     he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For
                     it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p12"> Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave
                     him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ
                     commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity,
                     and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life.
                     Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect
                     to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While
                     others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect.
                     Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was
                     loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the
                     weigher of spirits" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better
                     and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is
                     said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble,
                     and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In
                     battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled,
                     but has never done a brave deed."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p14"> Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment,
                     than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to
                     a poor man than to a king.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according
                     to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be
                     given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other
                     time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p16"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p17"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A12.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q21" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q21-p0.1">THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q21-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q21-p2"> After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q21-p3"> (1) Whether there is justice in God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q21-p4"> (2) Whether His justice can be called truth?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q21-p5"> (3) Whether there is mercy in God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q21-p6"> (4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q21_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q21_A1-p0.1">Whether there is justice in God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God:
                     neither therefore does justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh
                     all things according to the counsel of His will" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards
                     the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.8" target="asv">Ps. 10:8</a>): "The Lord is just, and hath loved justice."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds
                     of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse
                     of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be
                     made him?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.35" target="asv">Rom. 11:35</a>). The other consists in distribution, and
                     is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order
                     displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe,
                     which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div.
                     Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to
                     the
                     condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring,
                     meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (
                     <a id="FP_Q21_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html">Q[20], A[1]</a> ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject
                     of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral
                     virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside
                     not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although
                     not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would
                     be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom
                     approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does
                     according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher
                     power, God is a law unto Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant,
                     and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or
                     necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created
                     thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to
                     substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine
                     operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due.
                     It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness.
                     In this respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is
                     also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other
                     animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and
                     condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according
                     to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is
                     not directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting
                     accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10):
                     "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it
                     is also just; since it befits Thy goodness."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence
                     of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with
                     respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related
                     to the just, as the general to the special.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q21_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q21_A2-p0.1">Whether the justice of God is truth?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13),
                     it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6).
                     Therefore justice does not appertain to truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain
                     to the idea of justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.84.11" target="asv">Ps. 84:11</a>): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q21_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case
                     with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists
                     in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not,
                     our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in
                     the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his
                     art.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p6"> Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's
                     justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is
                     suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed
                     according to the law, it resides in the will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed
                     such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect
                     with its cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p9"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p10"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q21_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q21_A3-p0.1">Whether mercy can be attributed to God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14).
                     But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13</a>): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He
                     should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.4" target="asv">Ps. 110:4</a>): "He is a merciful and gracious Lord."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which
                     it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum
                     cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to
                     dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To
                     sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery,
                     whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness;
                     and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6] , A[4]</a>). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His
                     justice, liberality, and
                     mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown
                     above (
                     <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already
                     said 
                     <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in
                     so far as perfections given to things by God
                     expel defects, it belongs to mercy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays
                     another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or
                     mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said
                     to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one
                     another, as Christ has forgiven you" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.32" target="asv">Eph. 4:32</a>). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy
                     exalteth itself above judgement" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q21_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q21_A4-p0.1">Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification
                     of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that
                     hath not done mercy" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.15" target="asv">Rom. 15</a>). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and
                     mercy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose
                     something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.24.10" target="asv">Ps. 24:10</a>): "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not
                     every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for
                     misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice
                     is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be
                     lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this
                     sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according
                     to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work
                     of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except
                     for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something
                     that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine
                     will---which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational
                     soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So
                     in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains,
                     and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes.
                     For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than
                     is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness
                     confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in
                     others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat
                     alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p9"> In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully
                     infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.7.47" target="asv">Lk. 7:47</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in
                     the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account
                     of the promises made to the fathers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in
                     them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils
                     that press on us in this world force us to go to God."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this
                     way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine
                     wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q22" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q22-p0.1">THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q22-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q22-p2"> Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both
                  the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that
                  is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals,
                  after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong.
                  Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q22-p3"> (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q22-p4"> (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q22-p5"> (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q22-p6"> (4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q22_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q22_A1-p0.1">Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence.
                     But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never
                     has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things
                     that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is no providence in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the
                     intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.3" target="asv">Wis. 14:3</a>): "But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.']."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was
                     shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and
                     especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (
                     <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21], A[4]</a>). This good of order existing in things created, is
                     itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of
                     every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (
                     <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type
                     of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other
                     parts are
                     directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is
                     past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according
                     to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself---as for instance,
                     a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a
                     family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.45" target="asv">Mat. 24:45</a>), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way prudence or providence may suitably
                     be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type
                     of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence
                     is the divine type itself, seated in
                     the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards
                     an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly
                     counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. 
                     <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are
                     doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He
                     possesses, does belong to God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.6" target="asv"> Ps. 148:6</a>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although
                     at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry
                     necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said:
                     "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of
                     His will" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things pertain to the care of providence---namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition;
                     and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done
                     for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty
                     is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally,
                     this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect
                     are one and the same thing, as we have said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19.html">(Q[19])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q22_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q22_A2-p0.1">Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything
                     was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many
                     evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
                     vi, 5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since,
                     then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by
                     God in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>). And particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.80.13" target="asv">Ps. 80:13</a>). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine
                     providence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>): "God doth not care for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the same of other irrational creatures.
                     Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world
                     was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in
                     their individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented
                     as saying (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.22.14" target="asv">Job 22:14</a>): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not
                     consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of
                     things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers
                     corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p9"> We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual
                     selves. This is mad evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends
                     as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place
                     which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the
                     intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent
                     principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things
                     corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle
                     says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.'Those powers that are, are ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt,
                     a
                     Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have
                     said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine
                     providence. It has also been shown (
                     <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html">Q[14], AA[6]</a>,11) that God knows all
                     things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge
                     of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject
                     to the ordering of that art.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not
                     the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance
                     of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then,
                     all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be
                     that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of
                     a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause,
                     outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although
                     to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one
                     place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular
                     provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows
                     some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things
                     are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the
                     plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good:
                     for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since
                     God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects,
                     that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from
                     the
                     universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there
                     were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in
                     His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account
                     of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things---e.g. casual
                     and evil things---as removed from the care of divine providence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence
                     does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the
                     author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine
                     providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and
                     others of the ancients.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that
                     he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only
                     acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards
                     an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which
                     these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since
                     the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise
                     of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular
                     under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over
                     the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that love God,
                     all things work together unto good" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether
                     withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His
                     providence. This was the reason that had weight with
                     Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html">Q[19], A[10]</a>), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit;
                     and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the
                     care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape
                     the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p15"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p16"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q22_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q22_A3-p0.1">Whether God has immediate providence over everything?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must
                     be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides
                     for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good.
                     But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence.
                     If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example,
                     vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore
                     He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.13" target="asv">Job 34:13</a>): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On which passage Gregory
                     says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things belong to providence---namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution
                     of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because
                     He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He
                     gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand
                     the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs
                     things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so
                     that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid.
                     viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and
                     foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes.
                     The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities
                     who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The
                     third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the
                     gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those
                     things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more
                     it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His
                     order, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q22_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], AA[5]</a>,8).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and
                     higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards
                     evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction
                     of evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q22_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q22_A4-p0.1">Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a "per se" cause, either
                     present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the
                     providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot
                     be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns
                     the stability of necessity to things provided.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes
                     by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some
                     things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs
                     to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good
                     in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things.
                     Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has
                     prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen
                     by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity
                     or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly
                     and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen,
                     whether from necessity or from contingency.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not
                     to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember
                     that properly speaking 'necessary' and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and
                     of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for
                     all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q23" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q23-p0.1">OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q23-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q23-p2"> After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination
                  there are eight points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q23-p3"> (1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q23-p4"> (2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q23-p5"> (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q23-p6"> (4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q23-p7"> (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q23-p8"> (6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q23-p9"> (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q23-p10"> (8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q23_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q23_A1-p0.1">Whether men are predestined by God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God
                     foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But
                     human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore
                     to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done
                     away.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them
                     there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose
                     to take pity [miserendi]" [*See 
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>]. Therefore men are not predestined.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:12</a>): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are
                     given us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination
                     would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of
                     created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing
                     God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power
                     of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another;
                     thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal
                     life, is led towards it,
                     directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things
                     towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a
                     kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards
                     the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that
                     predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards
                     one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not
                     excluded by Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly
                     said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take
                     its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of
                     making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the
                     notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of
                     misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown
                     previously (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html">Q[21], AA[3]</a>,4).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to
                     everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q23_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q23_A2-p0.1">Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore
                     predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc. (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.4" target="asv">Rom. 1:4</a>): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination
                     but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something
                     in the predestined.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine
                     says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the
                     definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore
                     predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is
                     in Him is eternal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge
                     is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines,
                     and not in the predestined.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination
                     is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider,
                     as was proved above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active
                     way in the governor.
                     Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing
                     in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The
                     execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but
                     not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>; 
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">Q[18], A[3]</a>, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its
                     execution, which passes out to external things, has
                     an effect in them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually
                     existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we
                     are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not
                     to do any unlawful things for the love of life" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.6.20" target="asv">2 Macc.
                        6:20
                     </a>). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it
                     implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action,
                     and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to
                     act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination,
                     conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination
                     implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination
                     is anything temporal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q23_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q23_A3-p0.1">Whether God reprobates any man?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as
                     predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation
                     will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.9" target="asv">Osee 13:9</a>): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate
                     any man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For
                     it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.14" target="asv">Eccles. 7:14</a>): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man,
                     were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.2" target="asv">Malachi 1:2,3</a>): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God does reprobate some. For it was said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things
                     which are subject to providence, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit
                     some to fall away from that end; this is called
                     reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation
                     is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge,
                     but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit
                     a person to fall into
                     sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all.
                     So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good---namely, eternal life---He is said to hate or reprobated them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future
                     life by the predestined---namely, glory---and of what is received in this life---namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not
                     the cause of what is in the present---namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of
                     what is assigned in the future---namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from
                     the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true---namely,
                     "Destruction is thy own, O Israel."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated
                     cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as
                     was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of
                     choice. Whence, although
                     anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the
                     use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q23_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q23_A4-p0.1">Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends
                     his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial
                     manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and
                     this belongs to predestination.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore,
                     some are predestined without election.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.4" target="asv">Eph. 1:4</a>): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination,
                     as stated above 
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering
                     of some things towards an end; as was proved above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end
                     already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills
                     their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal
                     salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above
                     
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not
                     cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election
                     in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the
                     cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love
                     precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of
                     election and love.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch
                     as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives
                     certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the
                     conferring of grace and glory election is implied.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the
                     choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above
                     (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], A[2]</a>). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His
                     choice."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent
                     will, which is to will simply.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q23_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q23_A5-p0.1">Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv">Rom. 8:29</a>): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.15" target="asv"> Rom. 9:15</a>: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his
                     whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the
                     purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than
                     the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "There is no injustice in God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.14" target="asv">Rom. 9:14</a>). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original
                     sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things
                     for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.3.5" target="asv">Titus 3:5</a>): "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He saved us, so He predestined
                     that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since predestination includes will, as was said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above
                     (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], A[5]</a> ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the
                     part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else.
                     Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator.
                     But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether
                     God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p7"> Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing
                     merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning,
                     and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body.
                     The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.11" target="asv">Rom. 9:11,12</a>): "For when they were
                     not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall
                     serve the younger."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p8"> Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians
                     taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect
                     of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other
                     did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:5</a>), that "we are not
                     sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act
                     of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p9"> And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand
                     that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good
                     use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these
                     seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as
                     if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and
                     this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore,
                     if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction
                     between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a
                     secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes,
                     as was above shown (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination
                     may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination
                     should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent
                     effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent
                     as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give
                     glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination
                     may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have
                     any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect
                     of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to
                     the prophet Jeremias (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Lam.5.21" target="asv">Lam. 5:21</a>): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect,
                     the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of
                     predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was
                     explained above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular
                     effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He
                     is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is
                     necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because
                     creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that
                     for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low
                     place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good
                     things should never happen, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness
                     in men; in respect to those whom He predestines,
                     by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing
                     them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.22" target="asv">Rom. 9:22,23</a>): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that
                     is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His
                     glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.3" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.20" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:20</a>): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto
                     honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine
                     will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou
                     dost not wish to err."
                     Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it
                     was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity
                     of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another,
                     depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of
                     the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place.
                     Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This
                     would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously.
                     In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody
                     of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy
                     way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.14" target="asv">Mat. 20:14,15</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q23_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q23_A6-p0.1">Whether predestination is certain?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown,"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.11" target="asv">Rev 3:11</a>), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which
                     is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e.g. Peter---may
                     sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then,
                     is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore
                     now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv"> Rom. 8:29</a>: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of
                     God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect
                     should take place from necessity. For it was said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening
                     from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects.
                     Yet
                     the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html">Q[22], A[4]</a>). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has
                     its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">Q[14], A[13]</a>; 
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are
                     most certain and infallible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown:
                     secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal
                     sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to
                     fall, without raising others; according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.24" target="asv"> Job 34:24</a>: "He shall
                     break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the
                     fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives
                     the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice
                     at all good whether done by himself or by others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible,
                     supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short
                     of its effect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above 
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>: and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability
                     of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to
                     say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense,
                     thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q23_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q23_A7-p0.1">Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain.
                     But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.11" target="asv">Dt. 1:11</a>): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him."
                     Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged
                     by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by God cannot be certain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority
                     of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there
                     would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.13" target="asv"> Mat. 7:13,14</a>: "For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow
                     is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number of those pre-ordained
                     by God to be saved is not certain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were
                     to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys
                     the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above 
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It
                     must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge,
                     because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the
                     sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must
                     remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the
                     infinite (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which
                     are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally,
                     but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such
                     numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder
                     thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house;
                     and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and
                     uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in
                     regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and
                     what
                     number would befit the essential parts of that universe---that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity;
                     how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption,
                     are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species
                     is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such
                     like, is not pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation
                     of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such
                     incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end.
                     Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal
                     pre-ordination.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p7"> It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for
                     the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as
                     there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God
                     alone is
                     known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']"
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness.
                     For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the
                     reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion
                     of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority.
                     The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is
                     clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge
                     are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge
                     of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the
                     vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption
                     of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has
                     chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall
                     short.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q23_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q24.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q23_A8-p0.1">Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything
                     temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal.
                     Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination
                     therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through
                     defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the
                     Spirit of the Lord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been His counsellor?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.34" target="asv">Rom. 11:34</a>). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore
                     it cannot be furthered by anything.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.25.21" target="asv">Gn. 25:21</a>). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had
                     never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that
                     prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the
                     predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings
                     of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p7"> Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians,
                     who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against
                     this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved
                     to repentance" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.15.29" target="asv">1 Kings 15:29</a>); and that "the gifts and the calling of God are
                     without repentance" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.29" target="asv">Rom. 11:29</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p8"> Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and
                     its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it
                     is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped
                     by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does
                     not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence.
                     So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects,
                     without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever
                     helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of
                     another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must
                     strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason
                     it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.10" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:10</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus
                     belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?"
                     In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In
                     this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to
                     
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:9</a>: "We are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary
                     causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures
                     the dignity of causality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q23_A8-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html">Q[19], A[6]</a>), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by
                     them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q24.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q24" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q24-p0.1">THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q24-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q24-p2"> We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q24-p3"> (1) What is the book of life?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q24-p4"> (2) Of what life is it the book?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q24-p5"> (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q24_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q24.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q24_A1-p0.1">Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.4.32" target="asv">Ecclus. 4:32</a>)---i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life
                     is not predestination.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that
                     to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but
                     rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the book of life were the same as predestination, there should
                     also be a book of death, as there is a book of life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in a gloss upon
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.29" target="asv"> Ps. 68:29, </a> "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life
                     those whom He foreknew."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among
                     men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who
                     formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding (
                     <a id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore,
                     of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it
                     is firmly held in the memory, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.3" target="asv"> Prov. 3:3</a>: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For
                     things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that
                     He has predestined some to eternal life, is called
                     the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him
                     of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iiTim.11.19" target="asv">2 Tim. 11:19</a>: "The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we
                     now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book
                     of life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of
                     life; or of things already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens
                     that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the
                     book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare,
                     or relates the deeds of soldiers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p8"> Hence the solution of the Second Objection.</p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding
                     to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of predestination;
                     as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q24.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q24_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q24_A2-p0.1">Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge
                     of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine
                     life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of
                     glory is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said:
                     "Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.71" target="asv">Jn. 6:71</a>). But the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the
                     life of grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above 
                     <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined
                     who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life, as stated above 
                     <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to
                     him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed
                     merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of
                     glory is an end exceeding
                     human nature, as said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in
                     consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things
                     that are consequent on nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p8"> From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life
                     of nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen
                     to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace,
                     fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book
                     of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and
                     knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q24_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q24_A3-p0.1">Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge,
                     which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination.
                     Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal
                     and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither
                     therefore can he be blotted out.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of the living" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.29" target="asv">Ps. 68:29</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For
                     it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in
                     the book of life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present righteousness they see in them;
                     but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from
                     that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted
                     out of the book of the living." But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just,
                     according to the text, "He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out
                     of the book of life" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.5" target="asv">Apoc. 3:5</a>) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the
                     opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to
                     be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained
                     to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and
                     from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because
                     some
                     are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore those who
                     are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because they
                     are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who
                     are ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of
                     life
                     not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though
                     these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew
                     a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life,
                     and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change;
                     but as regards things foreknown, which can change.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of
                     the book of life refers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew;
                     either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is
                     included in the knowledge of God, although not anew.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q25" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q25-p0.1">THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q25-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q25-p2"> After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the
                  power of God. About this are six points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q25-p3"> (1) Whether there is power in God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q25-p4"> (2) Whether His power is infinite?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q25-p5"> (3) Whether He is almighty?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q25-p6"> (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q25-p7"> (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q25-p8"> (6) Whether what He makes He could make better?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q25_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q25_A1-p0.1">Whether there is power in God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary
                     matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter;
                     and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God,
                     is God, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3] , A[3]</a>). Therefore, there is no power in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in
                     God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>; 
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not,
                     therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.88.9" target="asv">Ps. 88:9</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest
                     degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something:
                     whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>; 
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], AA[1]</a>, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all
                     ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle,
                     and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power.
                     For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon
                     by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the
                     highest degree.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive power
                     is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only
                     active power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for
                     both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence. Hence it does not follow that there should
                     be anything in God nobler than His power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In creatures, power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained,
                     inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence
                     itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself
                     all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the
                     notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of "suppositum" possessing nature, and
                     under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle of an effect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically;
                     inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs,
                     which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective
                     principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of
                     the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q25_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q25_A2-p0.1">Whether the power of God is infinite?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher
                     (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite,
                     it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous
                     movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal
                     creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23). Therefore, His power is not infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is immeasurable
                     is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it
                     is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine
                     essence (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the
                     more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the
                     greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence,
                     since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to
                     quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to
                     do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect:
                     as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction.
                     Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with
                     Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>; 
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power
                     of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God
                     would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But
                     the
                     power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he
                     shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according
                     to his reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time; not, however, the power of
                     an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one body moving another is a
                     univocal agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then the greater
                     the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite, it
                     would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent;
                     whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and
                     especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q25_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Whether God is omnipotent?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God,
                     for He is immovable, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore He is not omnipotent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13.</a> Therefore He is not omnipotent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday
                     after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much
                     greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not
                     omnipotent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:20</a>), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those things to
                     be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in
                     reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If
                     God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible,
                     then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing
                     at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.1.37" target="asv">Lk. 1:37</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there
                     may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider
                     the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood
                     to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said
                     to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation
                     to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the
                     relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all
                     things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say
                     that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining
                     the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is
                     able to do.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p8"> It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the
                     second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation
                     in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates
                     sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for
                     instance, that a man is a donkey.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p9"> It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds
                     a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance,
                     the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence,
                     however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
                     being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is
                     numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the
                     idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea
                     of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence,
                     not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore,
                     everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God
                     is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because
                     it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot
                     do
                     them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies
                     a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above 
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant
                     to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic.
                     iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which
                     is impossible---as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things
                     if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent
                     are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God can
                     do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking
                     after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme
                     power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free
                     will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is
                     the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21],
                        A[4]
                     </a>), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account
                     of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because
                     to it pertains the first foundation of all good things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself.
                     But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which
                     it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible
                     in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as
                     to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition
                     of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">Q[14], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be
                     impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and
                     necessity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q25_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q25_A4-p0.1">Whether God can make the past not to have been?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that
                     which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise
                     the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible
                     accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from
                     the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates
                     ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost
                     virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 22</a> ad Eustoch.): "Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted." Therefore,
                     for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should
                     not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting,
                     so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say
                     that he did not sit, is to say that
                     it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what
                     Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if
                     it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact
                     that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely, to
                     make
                     undone the things that have been done."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance,
                     the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible,
                     not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead;
                     in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible
                     in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine
                     power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to
                     His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever
                     God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to
                     be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So
                     is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot
                     be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed
                     from the sinner.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q25_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q25_A5-p0.1">Whether God can do what He does not?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He
                     would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except
                     what He does.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not;
                     nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them
                     to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.53" target="asv">Mat. 26:53</a>). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that
                     as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of
                     man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things,
                     nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and
                     from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from
                     any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present
                     course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God
                     does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly
                     said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes
                     the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His
                     justice consists, as said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html">Q[21], A[2]</a>), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine
                     wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man
                     puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the
                     wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion
                     things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could
                     happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from
                     justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and
                     essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which
                     cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because
                     His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there
                     being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things.
                     Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the
                     intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance
                     with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God
                     is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by
                     His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything
                     which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge
                     and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the
                     power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this
                     than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood
                     in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things;
                     and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is false;
                     for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the
                     verb "can" (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the present will be signified, but
                     in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything except that which, if
                     He did it, would be suitable and just."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence,
                     although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon
                     them another order.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q25_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q25_A6-p0.1">Whether God can do better than what He does?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing
                     is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): "If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have
                     been envious." For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He
                     would have been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore
                     make anything better than He does.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine
                     says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them
                     all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again
                     created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above
                     all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made
                     them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.20" target="asv">Eph. 3:20</a>): "God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to
                     the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing
                     better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be
                     four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is
                     after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and
                     above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better
                     the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is
                     true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better
                     than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, "better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner
                     of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because
                     He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something
                     better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards
                     the substance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature
                     of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things
                     by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed;
                     as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other
                     things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be
                     another and a better universe.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the
                     fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from
                     the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything
                     better than God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q26" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q26-p0.1">OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
               <p id="FP_Q26-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q26-p2"> After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning
                  this, there are four points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q26-p3"> (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q26-p4"> (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q26-p5"> (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q26-p6"> (4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q26_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q26_A1-p0.1">Whether beatitude belongs to God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect
                     by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude
                     does not belong to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not
                     apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of
                     Lords." (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q26_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.15" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:15</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than
                     the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses,
                     to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in
                     a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence.
                     Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures
                     is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>; 
                     <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>), in simplicity and unity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even
                     as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God
                     has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q26_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q26_A2-p0.1">Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said
                     to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius
                     (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude
                     is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in glory,
                     however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole
                     of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His
                     intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude, as stated above 
                     <a id="FP_Q26_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual
                     nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation,
                     by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding.
                     Now in God, to be and to
                     understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be
                     assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation
                     to His beatitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His
                     essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence
                     in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the
                     act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q26_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing
                     else but God Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to
                     God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q26_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41</a>: "Star differeth from star in glory." But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely,
                     the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered
                     on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God,
                     in accordance with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth
                     Thee, though he know nought else." But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures;
                     but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their
                     supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> End is twofold, namely, "objective" and "subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing itself"
                     and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational
                     creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p8"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q26_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP.iii.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q26_A4-p0.1">Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing
                     false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now
                     none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q26_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a> ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the
                     divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of
                     all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which
                     consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol.
                     iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency,
                     which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place
                     of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in
                     God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p8"> We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.</p>
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