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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.v" class="div2">
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2 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A3.html"></a>
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3 <a href="summa.FP_Q47.html"></a>
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4 <h2 id="FP.v-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL (Q[47])</h2>
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5 <div id="FP_Q47" class="div3">
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6 <a href="summa.FP.v.html"></a>
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7 <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html"></a>
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8 <h3 id="FP_Q47-p0.1">OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
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9 <p id="FP_Q47-p1"></p>
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10 <p id="FP_Q47-p2"> After considering the production of creatures, we come to the consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration
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11 will be threefold---first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly, of the distinction of good and evil; thirdly,
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12 of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature.
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13 </p>
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14 <p id="FP_Q47-p3"> Under the first head, there are three points of inquiry:</p>
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15 <p id="FP_Q47-p4"> (1) The multitude or distinction of things.</p>
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16 <p id="FP_Q47-p5"> (2) Their inequality.</p>
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17 <p id="FP_Q47-p6"> (3) The unity of the world.</p>
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18 <div id="FP_Q47_A1" class="div4">
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19 <a href="summa.FP_Q47.html"></a>
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20 <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html"></a>
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21 <h4 id="FP_Q47_A1-p0.1">Whether the multitude and distinction of things come from God?</h4>
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22 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p1"></p>
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23 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p2">
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24 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the multitude and distinction of things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one. But
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25 God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (
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26 <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html">Q[11], A[4]</a>). Therefore He produces but one effect.
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27 </p>
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28 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p3">
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29 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar. But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above
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30 (
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31 <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html">Q[44], A[3]</a>). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not diverse.
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32 </p>
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33 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p4">
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34 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end of the creation is one---viz. the divine goodness, as was shown
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35 above (
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36 <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html">Q[44] , A[4]</a>). Therefore the effect of God is but one.
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37 </p>
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38 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p5">
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39 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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40 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.4" target="asv">Gn. 1:4</a>,
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41 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.7" target="asv">7</a>) that God "divided the light from the darkness," and "divided waters from waters." Therefore the distinction and multitude
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42 of things is from God.
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43 </p>
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44 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p6">
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45 <b>I answer that,</b> The distinction of things has been ascribed to many causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by itself
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46 or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter, attributed
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47 it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter.
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48 Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of things to matter
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49 and to the agent together; and he said that the intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in matter.
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50 </p>
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51 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p7"> But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown above (
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52 <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), even matter itself was created by God. Hence we must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause. Secondly,
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53 because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their
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54 proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the matter; but rather, on the contrary,
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55 created matter is formless, in order that it may be accommodated to different forms.
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56 </p>
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57 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p8"> Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents, as did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding
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58 Himself, produced the first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own being, there is necessarily composition
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59 of potentiality and act, as will appear later (
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60 <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A3.html">Q[50], A[3]</a>). And so the first intelligence, inasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the second intelligence; and in so far
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61 as it understood itself as in
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62 potentiality it produced the heavenly body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as it understood itself as having actuality
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63 it produced the soul of the heavens.
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64 </p>
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65 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p9"> But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it was shown above (
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66 <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html">Q[45], A[5]</a>) that to create belongs to God alone, and hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by God alone---viz. all those
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67 things which are not subject to generation and corruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the universality
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68 of things would not proceed from the intention of the first agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes;
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69 and such an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance. Therefore, the perfection of the universe, which consists
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70 of the diversity of things, would thus be a thing of chance, which is impossible.
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71 </p>
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72 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p10"> Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For
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73 He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and
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74 because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that
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75 what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For
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76 goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates
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77 the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.
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78 </p>
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79 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p11"> And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct
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80 by the word of God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read in
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81 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.3" target="asv">Gn. 1:3,4</a>: "God said: Be light made . . . And He divided the light from the darkness."
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82 </p>
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83 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p12">
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84 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural agent acts by the form which makes it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its effect
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85 is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was shown above (
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86 <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), acts by an intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand many things,
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87 as was shown above (
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88 <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p12.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html">Q[15], A[2]</a>), it follows that, although He is one, He
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89 can make many things.
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90 </p>
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91 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p13">
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92 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This reason would apply to the representation which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by reason of
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93 matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is only one. But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly,
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94 which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by many things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars,
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95 the plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of
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96 things.
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97 </p>
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98 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p14">
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99 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In speculative things the medium of demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one only; whereas probable
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100 means of proof are many. Likewise when operation is concerned, if the means be equal, so to speak, to the end, one only is
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101 sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to its end, which is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is necessary.
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102 </p>
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103 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p15"></p>
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104 <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p16"></p>
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105 <a href="summa.FP_Q47.html"></a>
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106 <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html"></a>
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107 </div>
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108 <div id="FP_Q47_A2" class="div4">
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109 <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html"></a>
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110 <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A3.html"></a>
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111 <h4 id="FP_Q47_A2-p0.1">Whether the inequality of things is from God?</h4>
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112 <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p1"></p>
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113 <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p2">
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114 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the inequality of things is not from God. For it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things
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115 that are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal.
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116 </p>
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117 <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p3">
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118 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, equality is the effect of unity (Metaph. v, text 20). But God is one. Therefore, He has made all things equal.
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119 </p>
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120 <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p4">
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121 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal things. But God is just in all His works. Since, therefore,
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122 no inequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby He gives being to things, it seems that He has made all things
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123 equal.
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124 </p>
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125 <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p5">
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126 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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127 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.33.7" target="asv">Ecclus. 33:7</a>): "Why does one day excel another, and one light another, and one year another year, one sun another sun? [Vulg.: 'when all
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128 come of the sun']. By the knowledge of the Lord they were distinguished."
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129 </p>
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130 <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p6">
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131 <b>I answer that,</b> When Origen wished to refute those who said that the distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and
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132 evil, he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by God. For he asserted that God first created only the
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133 rational creatures and all equal; and that inequality arose in them from free-will, some being turned to God more and some
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134 less, and others turned more and others less away from God. And so those rational creatures
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135 which were turned to God by free-will, were promoted to the order of angels according to the diversity of merits. And those
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136 who were turned away from God were bound down to bodies according to the diversity of their sin; and he said this was the
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137 cause of the creation and diversity of bodies. But according to this opinion, it would follow that the universality of bodily
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138 creatures would not be the effect of the goodness of God as communicated to creatures, but it would be for the sake of the
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139 punishment of sin, which is contrary to what is said: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good" (
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140 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv">Gn. 1:31</a>). And, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 3): "What can be more foolish than to say that the divine Architect provided this
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141 one sun for the one world, not to be an ornament to its beauty, nor for the benefit of corporeal things, but that it happened
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142 through the sin of one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, there would be a hundred
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143 suns in the world?"
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144 </p>
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145 <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p7"> Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is the cause of the distinction of things, so the same wisdom is the
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146 cause of their inequality. This may be explained as follows. A twofold distinction is found in things; one is a formal distinction
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147 as regards things differing specifically; the other is a material distinction as regards things differing numerically only.
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148 And as the matter is on account of the form, material distinction exists for the sake of the formal
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149 distinction. Hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only one individual of each species, forasmuch as the species
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150 is sufficiently preserved in the one; whereas in things generated and corruptible there are many individuals of one species
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151 for the preservation of the species. Whence it appears that formal distinction is of greater consequence than material. Now,
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152 formal distinction always requires inequality, because as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, 10), the forms of things are
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153 like numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species seem to be arranged
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154 in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and
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155 men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more perfect than others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the
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156 cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so it is the cause of inequality. For the
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157 universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things.
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158 </p>
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159 <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p8">
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160 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is part of the best agent to produce an effect which is best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every
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161 part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness
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162 would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also made the universe to be best
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163 as a whole, according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each single
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164 creature best, but one better than another. And therefore we find it said of each creature, "God saw the light that it was
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165 good" (
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166 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.4" target="asv">Gn. 1:4</a>); and in like manner of each one of the rest. But of all together it is said, "God saw all the things that He had made, and
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167 they were very good" (
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168 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv">Gn. 1:31</a>).
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169 </p>
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170 <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p9">
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171 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The first effect of unity is equality; and then comes multiplicity; and therefore from the Father, to Whom, according to
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172 Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5), is appropriated unity, the Son proceeds to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from
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173 Him the creature proceeds, to which belongs inequality; but nevertheless even creatures share in a certain equality---namely,
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174 of proportion.
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175 </p>
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176 <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p10">
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177 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is the argument that persuaded Origen: but it holds only as regards the distribution of rewards, the inequality of which
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178 is due to unequal merits. But in the constitution of things there is no inequality of parts through any preceding inequality,
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179 either of merits or of the disposition of the matter; but inequality comes from the perfection of the whole. This appears
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180 also in works done by art; for the roof of a house differs from the foundation,
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181 not because it is made of other material; but in order that the house may be made perfect of different parts, the artificer
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182 seeks different material; indeed, he would make such material if he could.
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183 </p>
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184 <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p11"></p>
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185 <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p12"></p>
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186 <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html"></a>
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187 <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A3.html"></a>
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188 </div>
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189 <div id="FP_Q47_A3" class="div4">
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190 <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html"></a>
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191 <a href="summa.FP.vi.html"></a>
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192 <h4 id="FP_Q47_A3-p0.1">Whether there is only one world?</h4>
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193 <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p1"></p>
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194 <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p2">
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195 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not only one world, but many. Because, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46), it is unfitting to
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196 say that God has created things without a reason. But for the same reason He created one, He could create many, since His
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197 power is not limited to the creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, as was shown above (
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198 <a id="FP_Q47_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore God has produced many worlds.
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199 </p>
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200 <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p3">
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201 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nature does what is best and much more does God. But it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because
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202 many good things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been made by God.
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203 </p>
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204 <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p4">
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205 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which has a form in matter can be multiplied in number, the species remaining the same, because multiplication
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206 in number comes from matter. But the world has a form in matter. Thus as when I say "man" I mean the form, and when I say
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207 "this man," I mean the form in matter; so when we say "world," the form is signified, and when we say "this world," the form
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208 in the matter is signified. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the existence of
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209 many worlds.
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210 </p>
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211 <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p5">
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212 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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213 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.10" target="asv">Jn. 1:10</a>): "The world was made by Him," where the world is named as one, as if only one existed.
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214 </p>
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215 <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p6">
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216 <b>I answer that,</b> The very order of things created by God shows the unity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of order,
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217 whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things come from God, have relation of order to each other, and to
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218 God Himself, as shown above (
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219 <a id="FP_Q47_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>;
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220 <a id="FP_Q47_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html">Q[21], A[1]</a>). Hence it must be that all things should belong to one world. Therefore those only can assert that many worlds
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221 exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but rather believe in chance, as Democritus, who said that this world,
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222 besides an infinite number of other worlds, was made from a casual concourse of atoms.
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223 </p>
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224 <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p7">
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225 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This reason proves that the world is one because all things must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore from
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226 the unity of order in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. xii, text 52) the unity of God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from
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227 the unity of the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed.
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228 </p>
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229 <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p8">
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230 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No agent intends material plurality as the end forasmuch as material multitude has no certain limit, but of itself tends
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231 to infinity, and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end. Now when it is said that many worlds are better than one, this
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232 has reference to material order. But the best in this sense is not the intention of the divine agent; forasmuch as for the
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233 same reason it might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be better if He
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234 had made three; and so on to infinite.
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235 </p>
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236 <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p9">
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237 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The world is composed of the whole of its matter. For it is not possible for there to be another earth than this one, since
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238 every earth would naturally be carried to this central one, wherever it was. The same applies to the other bodies which are
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239 part of the world.
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240 </p>
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241 <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p10"></p>
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242 <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p11"></p>
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243 <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html"></a>
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244 <a href="summa.FP.vi.html"></a>
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245 </div>
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246 <a href="summa.FP.v.html"></a>
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247 <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html"></a>
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248 </div>
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249 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A3.html"></a>
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250 <a href="summa.FP_Q47.html"></a>
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251 `
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252 </div> |
