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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FP_v.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.v" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47.html"></a> + <h2 id="FP.v-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL (Q[47])</h2> + <div id="FP_Q47" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP.v.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q47-p0.1">OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q47-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q47-p2"> After considering the production of creatures, we come to the consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration + will be threefold---first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly, of the distinction of good and evil; thirdly, + of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47-p3"> Under the first head, there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q47-p4"> (1) The multitude or distinction of things.</p> + <p id="FP_Q47-p5"> (2) Their inequality.</p> + <p id="FP_Q47-p6"> (3) The unity of the world.</p> + <div id="FP_Q47_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q47_A1-p0.1">Whether the multitude and distinction of things come from God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the multitude and distinction of things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one. But + God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes ( + <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html">Q[11], A[4]</a>). Therefore He produces but one effect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar. But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above + ( + <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html">Q[44], A[3]</a>). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not diverse. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end of the creation is one---viz. the divine goodness, as was shown + above ( + <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html">Q[44] , A[4]</a>). Therefore the effect of God is but one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.4" target="asv">Gn. 1:4</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.7" target="asv">7</a>) that God "divided the light from the darkness," and "divided waters from waters." Therefore the distinction and multitude + of things is from God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The distinction of things has been ascribed to many causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by itself + or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter, attributed + it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter. + Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of things to matter + and to the agent together; and he said that the intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p7"> But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), even matter itself was created by God. Hence we must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause. Secondly, + because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their + proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the matter; but rather, on the contrary, + created matter is formless, in order that it may be accommodated to different forms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p8"> Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents, as did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding + Himself, produced the first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own being, there is necessarily composition + of potentiality and act, as will appear later ( + <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A3.html">Q[50], A[3]</a>). And so the first intelligence, inasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the second intelligence; and in so far + as it understood itself as in + potentiality it produced the heavenly body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as it understood itself as having actuality + it produced the soul of the heavens. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p9"> But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html">Q[45], A[5]</a>) that to create belongs to God alone, and hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by God alone---viz. all those + things which are not subject to generation and corruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the universality + of things would not proceed from the intention of the first agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes; + and such an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance. Therefore, the perfection of the universe, which consists + of the diversity of things, would thus be a thing of chance, which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p10"> Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For + He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and + because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that + what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For + goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates + the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p11"> And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct + by the word of God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read in + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.3" target="asv">Gn. 1:3,4</a>: "God said: Be light made . . . And He divided the light from the darkness." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural agent acts by the form which makes it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its effect + is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), acts by an intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand many things, + as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q47_A1-p12.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html">Q[15], A[2]</a>), it follows that, although He is one, He + can make many things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This reason would apply to the representation which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by reason of + matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is only one. But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly, + which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by many things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, + the plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of + things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In speculative things the medium of demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one only; whereas probable + means of proof are many. Likewise when operation is concerned, if the means be equal, so to speak, to the end, one only is + sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to its end, which is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is necessary. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A1-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q47_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q47_A2-p0.1">Whether the inequality of things is from God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the inequality of things is not from God. For it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things + that are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, equality is the effect of unity (Metaph. v, text 20). But God is one. Therefore, He has made all things equal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal things. But God is just in all His works. Since, therefore, + no inequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby He gives being to things, it seems that He has made all things + equal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.33.7" target="asv">Ecclus. 33:7</a>): "Why does one day excel another, and one light another, and one year another year, one sun another sun? [Vulg.: 'when all + come of the sun']. By the knowledge of the Lord they were distinguished." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When Origen wished to refute those who said that the distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and + evil, he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by God. For he asserted that God first created only the + rational creatures and all equal; and that inequality arose in them from free-will, some being turned to God more and some + less, and others turned more and others less away from God. And so those rational creatures + which were turned to God by free-will, were promoted to the order of angels according to the diversity of merits. And those + who were turned away from God were bound down to bodies according to the diversity of their sin; and he said this was the + cause of the creation and diversity of bodies. But according to this opinion, it would follow that the universality of bodily + creatures would not be the effect of the goodness of God as communicated to creatures, but it would be for the sake of the + punishment of sin, which is contrary to what is said: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv">Gn. 1:31</a>). And, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 3): "What can be more foolish than to say that the divine Architect provided this + one sun for the one world, not to be an ornament to its beauty, nor for the benefit of corporeal things, but that it happened + through the sin of one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, there would be a hundred + suns in the world?" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p7"> Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is the cause of the distinction of things, so the same wisdom is the + cause of their inequality. This may be explained as follows. A twofold distinction is found in things; one is a formal distinction + as regards things differing specifically; the other is a material distinction as regards things differing numerically only. + And as the matter is on account of the form, material distinction exists for the sake of the formal + distinction. Hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only one individual of each species, forasmuch as the species + is sufficiently preserved in the one; whereas in things generated and corruptible there are many individuals of one species + for the preservation of the species. Whence it appears that formal distinction is of greater consequence than material. Now, + formal distinction always requires inequality, because as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, 10), the forms of things are + like numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species seem to be arranged + in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and + men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more perfect than others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the + cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so it is the cause of inequality. For the + universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is part of the best agent to produce an effect which is best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every + part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness + would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also made the universe to be best + as a whole, according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each single + creature best, but one better than another. And therefore we find it said of each creature, "God saw the light that it was + good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.4" target="asv">Gn. 1:4</a>); and in like manner of each one of the rest. But of all together it is said, "God saw all the things that He had made, and + they were very good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv">Gn. 1:31</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The first effect of unity is equality; and then comes multiplicity; and therefore from the Father, to Whom, according to + Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5), is appropriated unity, the Son proceeds to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from + Him the creature proceeds, to which belongs inequality; but nevertheless even creatures share in a certain equality---namely, + of proportion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is the argument that persuaded Origen: but it holds only as regards the distribution of rewards, the inequality of which + is due to unequal merits. But in the constitution of things there is no inequality of parts through any preceding inequality, + either of merits or of the disposition of the matter; but inequality comes from the perfection of the whole. This appears + also in works done by art; for the roof of a house differs from the foundation, + not because it is made of other material; but in order that the house may be made perfect of different parts, the artificer + seeks different material; indeed, he would make such material if he could. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q47_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.vi.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q47_A3-p0.1">Whether there is only one world?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not only one world, but many. Because, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46), it is unfitting to + say that God has created things without a reason. But for the same reason He created one, He could create many, since His + power is not limited to the creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q47_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore God has produced many worlds. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nature does what is best and much more does God. But it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because + many good things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been made by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which has a form in matter can be multiplied in number, the species remaining the same, because multiplication + in number comes from matter. But the world has a form in matter. Thus as when I say "man" I mean the form, and when I say + "this man," I mean the form in matter; so when we say "world," the form is signified, and when we say "this world," the form + in the matter is signified. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the existence of + many worlds. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q47_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.10" target="asv">Jn. 1:10</a>): "The world was made by Him," where the world is named as one, as if only one existed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The very order of things created by God shows the unity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of order, + whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things come from God, have relation of order to each other, and to + God Himself, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q47_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q47_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html">Q[21], A[1]</a>). Hence it must be that all things should belong to one world. Therefore those only can assert that many worlds + exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but rather believe in chance, as Democritus, who said that this world, + besides an infinite number of other worlds, was made from a casual concourse of atoms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This reason proves that the world is one because all things must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore from + the unity of order in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. xii, text 52) the unity of God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from + the unity of the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No agent intends material plurality as the end forasmuch as material multitude has no certain limit, but of itself tends + to infinity, and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end. Now when it is said that many worlds are better than one, this + has reference to material order. But the best in this sense is not the intention of the divine agent; forasmuch as for the + same reason it might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be better if He + had made three; and so on to infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The world is composed of the whole of its matter. For it is not possible for there to be another earth than this one, since + every earth would naturally be carried to this central one, wherever it was. The same applies to the other bodies which are + part of the world. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q47_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.vi.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP.v.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file