annotate summa/bilingual/FP_ii_13-18.html @ 22:6d097403ddb9

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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
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2 <!DOCTYPE html [
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3 <!ENTITY ordf "">
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4 ]>
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5 <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><title>Bilingual AquinasQuestion 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</title><style>
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6 h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both}
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7 @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm}
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8 </style></head><body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="bi.xsl"?><div id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])"><h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2>
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9 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13" next="FP_Q13_A1" prev="FP_Q12_A13" progress="1.92%" n="xii" title="Question. 13 - THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
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10 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p0.1">Question 13. THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
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11 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9" next="FP_Q13_A10" prev="FP_Q13_A8" progress="2.21%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether this name “God” is communicable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is communicable?</h4>
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12 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Pet.1.4" parsed="vul|2Pet|1|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p2.1" passage="2 Pet. 1:4">2 Pet. 1:4</scripRef>). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to
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13 others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28859" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28859] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
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14 proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus sit communicabile.
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15 Cuicumque enim communicatur res significata per nomen, communicatur
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16 et nomen ipsum. Sed hoc nomen Deus, ut dictum est, significat
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17 divinam naturam, quae est communicabilis aliis, secundum illud II
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18 Pet. I, <i>magna et pretiosa promissa nobis donavit, ut per hoc
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19 efficiamur divinae consortes naturae</i>. Ergo hoc nomen Deus est
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20 communicabile.</p></div></div>
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21 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
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22 Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God"
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23 is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the fact
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24 that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are
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25 gods" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.81.6" parsed="vul|Ps|81|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p3.1" passage="Ps. 81:6">Ps. 81:6</scripRef>). Therefore this name "God" is
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26 communicable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28860" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28860] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sola
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27 nomina propria non sunt communicabilia. Sed hoc nomen Deus non est
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28 nomen proprium, sed appellativum, quod patet ex hoc quod habet
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29 plurale, secundum illud Psalmi LXXXI, <i>ego dixi, dii estis</i>.
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30 Ergo hoc nomen Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div>
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31 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
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32 Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other
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33 names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable; as
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34 "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is
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35 communicable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28861" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28861] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, hoc
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36 nomen Deus imponitur ab operatione, ut dictum est. Sed alia nomina
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37 quae imponuntur Deo ab operationibus, sive ab effectibus, sunt
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38 communicabilia, ut bonus, sapiens et huiusmodi. Ergo et hoc nomen
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39 Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div>
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40 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
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41 contrary,</b> It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to
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42 wood and stones" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.14.21" parsed="vul|Wis|14|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p5.1" passage="Wis. 14:21">Wis. 14:21</scripRef>), in reference to the
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43 divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 s. c." shownumber="no"><a name="28862" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28862] Iª q. 13 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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44 quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus
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45 imposuerunt</i>; et loquitur de nomine deitatis. Ergo hoc nomen
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46 Deus est nomen incommunicabile.</p></div></div>
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47 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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48 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or
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49 strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the
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50 reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing
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51 cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum," but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be
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52 communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound
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53 things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7" shownumber="no"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: "You served them who
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54 by nature are not gods," (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gal.4.8" parsed="vul|Gal|4|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" passage="Gal. 4:8">Gal. 4:8</scripRef>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.81.6" parsed="vul|Ps|81|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.4" passage="Ps. 81:6">Ps. 81:6</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p8" shownumber="no"> But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.</p>
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55 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28863" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28863] Iª q. 13 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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56 quod aliquod nomen potest esse communicabile dupliciter, uno modo,
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57 proprie; alio modo, per similitudinem. Proprie quidem communicabile
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58 est, quod secundum totam significationem nominis, est communicabile
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59 multis. Per similitudinem autem communicabile est, quod est
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60 communicabile secundum aliquid eorum quae includuntur in nominis
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61 significatione. Hoc enim nomen leo proprie communicatur omnibus
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62 illis in quibus invenitur natura quam significat hoc nomen leo, per
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63 similitudinem vero communicabile est illis qui participant aliquid
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64 leoninum, ut puta audaciam vel fortitudinem, qui metaphorice leones
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65 dicuntur. Ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt
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66 communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito
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67 singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel
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68 secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem, sicut natura humana
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69 communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solis
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70 non est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum;
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71 potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis
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72 existens. Et hoc ideo, quia intellectus intelligit naturam
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73 cuiuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari, unde esse in uno
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74 supposito singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectum
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75 naturae speciei, unde, servato intellectu naturae speciei, potest
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76 intelligi ut in pluribus existens. Sed singulare, ex hoc ipso quod
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77 est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. Unde omne nomen
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78 impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare, est incommunicabile
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79 et re et ratione, non enim potest nec in apprehensione cadere
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80 pluralitas huius individui. Unde nullum nomen significans aliquod
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81 individuum, est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum
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82 similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles,
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83 inquantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achillis, scilicet
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84 fortitudinem. Formae vero quae non individuantur per aliquod
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85 suppositum, sed per seipsas (quia scilicet sunt formae
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86 subsistentes), si intelligerentur secundum quod sunt in seipsis,
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87 non possent communicari nec re neque ratione; sed forte per
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88 similitudinem, sicut dictum est de individuis. Sed quia formas
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89 simplices per se subsistentes non possumus intelligere secundum
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90 quod sunt, sed intelligimus eas ad modum rerum compositarum
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91 habentium formas in materia; ideo, ut dictum est, imponimus eis
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92 nomina concreta significantia naturam in aliquo supposito. Unde,
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93 quantum pertinet ad rationem nominum, eadem ratio est de nominibus
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94 quae a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas rerum
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95 compositarum, et de nominibus quae a nobis imponuntur ad
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96 significandum naturas simplices subsistentes. Unde, cum hoc nomen
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97 Deus impositum sit ad significandum naturam divinam, ut dictum est;
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98 natura autem divina multiplicabilis non est, ut supra ostensum est,
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99 sequitur quod hoc nomen Deus incommunicabile quidem sit secundum
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100 rem, sed communicabile sit secundum opinionem, quemadmodum hoc
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101 nomen sol esset communicabile secundum opinionem ponentium multos
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102 soles. Et secundum hoc dicitur Gal. IV, <i>his qui natura non sunt
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103 dii, serviebatis</i>; Glossa, <i>non sunt dii natura, sed opinione
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104 hominum</i>. Est nihilominus communicabile hoc nomen Deus, non
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105 secundum suam totam significationem, sed secundum aliquid eius, per
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106 quandam similitudinem, ut dii dicantur, qui participant aliquid
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107 divinum per similitudinem, secundum illud, <i>ego dixi, dii
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108 estis</i>. Si vero esset aliquod nomen impositum ad significandum
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109 Deum non ex parte naturae, sed ex parte suppositi, secundum quod
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110 consideratur ut hoc aliquid, illud nomen esset omnibus modis
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111 incommunicabile, sicut forte est nomen tetragrammaton apud
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112 Hebraeos. Et est simile si quis imponeret nomen soli designans hoc
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113 individuum.</p></div></div>
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114 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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115 1:</b> The divine nature is only communicable according to the
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116 participation of some similitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28864" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28864] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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117 dicendum quod natura divina non est communicabilis nisi secundum
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118 similitudinis participationem.</p></div></div>
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119 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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120 2:</b> This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name,
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121 for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although God
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122 Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do
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123 not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of
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124 being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to
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125 the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name
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126 "sun."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28865" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28865] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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127 dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus est nomen appellativum, et non
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128 proprium, quia significat naturam divinam ut in habente; licet ipse
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129 Deus, secundum rem, non sit nec universalis nec particularis.
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130 Nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum
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131 essendi secundum quod in cognitione nostra est. Et tamen, secundum
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132 rei veritatem, est incommunicabile, secundum quod dictum est de hoc
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133 nomine sol.</p></div></div>
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134 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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135 3:</b> These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the
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136 perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify
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137 the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves
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138 absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But
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139 this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which
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140 we experience continually, to signify the divine nature.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28866" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28866] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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141 dicendum quod haec nomina bonus, sapiens, et similia, imposita
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142 quidem sunt a perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas, non
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143 tamen sunt imposita ad significandum divinam naturam, sed ad
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144 significandum ipsas perfectiones absolute. Et ideo etiam secundum
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145 rei veritatem sunt communicabilia multis. Sed hoc nomen Deus
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146 impositum est ab operatione propria Deo, quam experimur continue,
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147 ad significandum divinam naturam.</p></div></div>
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148 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10" next="FP_Q13_A11" prev="FP_Q13_A9" progress="2.25%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether this name “God” is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?</h4>
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149 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b>
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150 It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature,
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151 by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse
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152 signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and
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153 negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who
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154 says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is
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155 God." Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken of univocally.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28867" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28867] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
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156 proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus univoce dicatur de Deo per
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157 naturam, et per participationem, et secundum opinionem. Ubi enim
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158 est diversa significatio, non est contradictio affirmantis et
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159 negantis, aequivocatio enim impedit contradictionem sed Catholicus
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160 dicens idolum non est Deus, contradicit Pagano dicenti idolum est
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161 Deus. Ergo Deus utrobique sumptum univoce dicitur.</p></div></div>
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162 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
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163 Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the
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164 enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not
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165 in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this
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166 supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this
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167 name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in
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168 opinion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28868" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28868] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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169 sicut idolum est Deus secundum opinionem et non secundum veritatem,
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170 ita fruitio carnalium delectationum dicitur felicitas secundum
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171 opinionem, et non secundum veritatem. Sed hoc nomen beatitudo
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172 univoce dicitur de hac beatitudine opinata, et de hac beatitudine
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173 vera. Ergo et hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur de Deo secundum
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174 veritatem, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p></div></div>
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175 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
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176 Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now
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177 when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by the name
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178 God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the
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179 heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God." Therefore
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180 this name "God" is applied univocally to both.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28869" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28869] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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181 univoca dicuntur quorum est ratio una. Sed Catholicus, cum dicit
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182 unum esse Deum, intelligit nomine Dei rem omnipotentem, et super
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183 omnia venerandam, et hoc idem intelligit gentilis, cum dicit idolum
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184 esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur utrobique.</p></div></div>
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185 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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186 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied equivocally.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p6" shownumber="no"> Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion.</p>
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187 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><div xml:lang="la">
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188 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28870" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28870] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra,
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189 illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius quod est in re,
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190 ut dicitur in I Periherm. Sed animal, dictum de animali vero et de
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191 animali picto, aequivoce dicitur. Ergo hoc nomen Deus, dictum de
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192 Deo vero et de Deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur.</p>
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193 <p title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28871" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28871] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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194 nullus potest significare id quod non cognoscit, sed gentilis non
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195 cognoscit naturam divinam, ergo, cum dicit idolum est Deus, non
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196 significat veram deitatem. Hanc autem significat Catholicus dicens
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197 unum esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non dicitur univoce, sed
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198 aequivoce, de Deo vero, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p>
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199 </div></div></div>
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200 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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201 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition
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202 of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p8" shownumber="no"> The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
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203 comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.</p>
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204 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28872" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28872] Iª q. 13 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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205 quod hoc nomen Deus, in praemissis tribus significationibus, non
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206 accipitur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice. Quod ex hoc
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207 patet. Quia univocorum est omnino eadem ratio, aequivocorum est
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208 omnino ratio diversa, in analogicis vero, oportet quod nomen
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209 secundum unam significationem acceptum, ponatur in definitione
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210 eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti. Sicut ens
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211 de substantia dictum, ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de
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212 accidente dicitur; et sanum dictum de animali, ponitur in
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213 definitione sani secundum quod dicitur de urina et de medicina;
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214 huius enim sani quod est in animali, urina est significativa, et
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215 medicina factiva. Sic accidit in proposito. Nam hoc nomen Deus,
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216 secundum quod pro Deo vero sumitur, in ratione Dei sumitur secundum
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217 quod dicitur Deus secundum opinionem vel participationem. Cum enim
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218 aliquem nominamus Deum secundum participationem, intelligimus
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219 nomine Dei aliquid habens similitudinem veri Dei. Similiter cum
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220 idolum nominamus Deum, hoc nomine Deus intelligimus significari
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221 aliquid, de quo homines opinantur quod sit Deus. Et sic manifestum
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222 est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis, sed una illarum
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223 significationum clauditur in significationibus aliis. Unde
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224 manifestum est quod analogice dicitur.</p></div></div>
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225 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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226 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it
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227 is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.95.5" parsed="vul|Ps|95|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p9.1" passage="Ps. 95:5">Ps. 95:5</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p10" shownumber="no"> The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations.</p>
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228 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><div xml:lang="la">
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229 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28873" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28873] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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230 dicendum quod nominum multiplicitas non attenditur secundum nominis
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231 praedicationem, sed secundum significationem, hoc enim nomen homo,
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232 de quocumque praedicetur, sive vere sive false, dicitur uno modo.
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233 Sed tunc multipliciter diceretur, si per hoc nomen homo
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234 intenderemus significare diversa, puta, si unus intenderet
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235 significare per hoc nomen homo id quod vere est homo, et alius
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236 intenderet significare eodem nomine lapidem, vel aliquid aliud.
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237 Unde patet quod Catholicus dicens idolum non esse Deum, contradicit
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238 Pagano hoc asserenti, quia uterque utitur hoc nomine Deus ad
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239 significandum verum Deum. Cum enim Paganus dicit idolum esse Deum,
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240 non utitur hoc nomine secundum quod significat Deum opinabilem, sic
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241 enim verum diceret, cum etiam Catholici interdum in tali
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242 significatione hoc nomine utantur, ut cum dicitur, <i>omnes dii
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243 gentium Daemonia</i>.</p>
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244 <p title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28874" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28874] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter
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245 dicendum ad secundum et tertium. Nam illae rationes procedunt
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246 secundum diversitatem praedicationis nominis, et non secundum
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247 diversam significationem.</p>
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248 </div></div></div>
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249 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to
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250 Objection 4:</b> The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured
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251 animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal
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252 names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being,
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253 which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated
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254 equivocally of different predicaments.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 4" shownumber="no"><a name="28875" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28875] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
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255 dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et de picto, non
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256 dicitur pure aequivoce; sed philosophus largo modo accipit
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257 aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod
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258 analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de
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259 diversis praedicamentis.</p></div></div>
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260 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
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261 names the meaning of which we know not.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 5" shownumber="no"><a name="28876" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28876] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
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262 dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque Catholicus
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263 neque Paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam
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264 rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis, ut supra
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265 dictum est. Et secundum hoc, in eadem significatione accipere
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266 potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum dicit idolum est Deus, in qua
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267 accipit ipsum Catholicus dicens idolum non est Deus. Si vero
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268 aliquis esset qui secundum nullam rationem Deum cognosceret, nec
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269 ipsum nominaret, nisi forte sicut proferimus nomina quorum
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270 significationem ignoramus.</p></div></div>
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271 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11" next="FP_Q13_A12" prev="FP_Q13_A10" progress="2.29%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p0.1">Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?</h4>
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272 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b>
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273 It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of
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274 God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this name HE
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275 WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS
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276 is not the most proper name of God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28877" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28877] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
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277 sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen qui est non sit maxime
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278 proprium nomen Dei. Hoc enim nomen Deus est nomen incommunicabile,
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279 ut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen qui est non est nomen incommunicabile.
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280 Ergo hoc nomen qui est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div>
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281 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
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282 Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good
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283 excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it especially
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284 belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore
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285 this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE WHO
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286 IS.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28878" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28878] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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287 Dionysius dicit, III cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>boni nominatio est
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288 manifestativa omnium Dei processionum</i>. Sed hoc maxime Deo
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289 convenit, quod sit universale rerum principium. Ergo hoc nomen
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290 bonum est maxime proprium Dei, et non hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div>
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291 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
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292 Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for
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293 God is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS
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294 imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not
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295 the most applicable to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28879" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28879] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
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296 nomen divinum videtur importare relationem ad creaturas, cum Deus
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297 non cognoscatur a nobis nisi per creaturas. Sed hoc nomen qui est
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298 nullam importat habitudinem ad creaturas. Ergo hoc nomen qui est
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299 non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div>
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300 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
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301 contrary,</b> It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say
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302 to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered
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303 him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you"
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304 (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.3.13-Exod.3.14" parsed="vul|Exod|3|13|3|14" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p5.1" passage="Ex. 3:13,14">Ex. 3:13,14</scripRef>). Therefor this name HE
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305 WHO IS most properly belongs to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 s. c." shownumber="no"><a name="28880" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28880] Iª q. 13 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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306 quod dicitur Exod. III, quod Moysi quaerenti, <i>si dixerint mihi,
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307 quod est nomen eius? Quid dicam eis?</i> Et respondit ei dominus,
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308 <i>sic dices eis, qui est misit me ad vos</i>. Ergo hoc nomen qui
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309 est est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div>
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310 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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311 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p7" shownumber="no"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p8" shownumber="no"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the
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312 more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean of
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313 substance."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p9" shownumber="no"> Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).</p>
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314 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28881" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28881] Iª q. 13 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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315 quod hoc nomen qui est triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen
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316 Dei. Primo quidem, propter sui significationem. Non enim significat
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317 formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde, cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius
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318 essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat, ut supra ostensum est,
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319 manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominat
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320 Deum, unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma. Secundo, propter
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321 eius universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus
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322 communia; vel, si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra
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323 ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant
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324 ipsum. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam
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325 cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se est, sed quemcumque
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326 modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo
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327 quo Deus in se est. Et ideo, quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus
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328 determinata, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie
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329 dicuntur de Deo a nobis. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod
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330 <i>principalius omnibus quae de Deo dicuntur nominibus, est qui
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331 est, totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut
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332 quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum</i>.
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333 Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae
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334 rei, sed hoc nomen qui est nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se
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335 habet indeterminate ad omnes; et ideo nominat ipsum <i>pelagus
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336 substantiae infinitum</i>. Tertio vero, ex eius consignificatione.
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337 Significat enim esse in praesenti, et hoc maxime proprie de Deo
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338 dicitur, cuius esse non novit praeteritum vel futurum, ut dicit
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339 Augustinus in V de Trin.</p></div></div>
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340 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak,
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341 singular.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28882" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28882] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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342 dicendum quod hoc nomen qui est est magis proprium nomen Dei quam
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343 hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et
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344 quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est.
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345 Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, est
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346 magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum
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347 naturam divinam. Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragrammaton,
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348 quod est impositum ad significandam ipsam Dei substantiam
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349 incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem.</p></div></div>
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350 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to
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351 Objection 2:</b> This name "good" is the principal name of God in so
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352 far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered
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353 absolutely comes before the idea of cause.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28883" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28883] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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354 dicendum quod hoc nomen bonum est principale nomen Dei inquantum
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355 est causa, non tamen simpliciter, nam esse absolute
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356 praeintelligitur causae.</p></div></div>
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357 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to
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358 Objection 3:</b> It is not necessary that all the divine names should
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359 import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed
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360 from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the
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361 first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28884" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28884] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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362 dicendum quod non est necessarium quod omnia nomina divina
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363 importent habitudinem ad creaturas; sed sufficit quod imponantur ab
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364 aliquibus perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Inter
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365 quas prima est ipsum esse, a qua sumitur hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div>
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366 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12" next="FP_Q14" prev="FP_Q13_A11" progress="2.31%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p0.1">Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</h4>
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367 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b>
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368 It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For
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369 Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about God are true;
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370 but affirmations are vague."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28885" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28885] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
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371 sic proceditur. Videtur quod propositiones affirmativae non possunt
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372 formari de Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II cap. Cael. Hier., quod
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373 <i>negationes de Deo sunt verae, affirmationes autem
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374 incompactae</i>.</p></div></div>
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375 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
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376 Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a
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377 subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Q[3]
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378 ): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an
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379 affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an
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380 affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28886" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28886] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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381 Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod <i>forma simplex subiectum
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382 esse non potest</i>. Sed Deus maxime est forma simplex, ut supra
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383 ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo
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384 propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de
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385 Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest.</p></div></div>
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386 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
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387 Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise
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388 than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown
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389 above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every
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390 affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows
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391 that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28887" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28887] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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392 omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed
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393 Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est.
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394 Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum
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395 compositione, videtur quod propositio affirmativa vere de Deo
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396 formari non possit.</p></div></div>
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397 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
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398 contrary,</b> What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative
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399 propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He
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400 is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed
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401 about God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 s. c." shownumber="no"><a name="28888" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28888] Iª q. 13 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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402 quod fidei non subest falsum. Sed propositiones quaedam
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403 affirmativae subduntur fidei, utpote quod Deus est trinus et unus,
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404 et quod est omnipotens. Ergo propositiones affirmativae possunt
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405 vere formari de Deo.</p></div></div>
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406 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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407 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for
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408 the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in
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409 some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.</p>
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410 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28889" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28889] Iª q. 13 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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411 quod propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo. Ad
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412 cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione
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413 affirmativa vera, oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent
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414 idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et
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415 hoc patet tam in propositionibus quae sunt de praedicato
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416 accidentali, quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato substantiali.
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417 Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subiecto, et
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418 differunt ratione, alia enim est ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi.
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419 Et similiter cum dico homo est animal, illud enim ipsum quod est
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420 homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura
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421 sensibilis, a qua dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur
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422 homo. Unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem supposito,
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423 sed diversa ratione. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem
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424 praedicatur de seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; inquantum
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425 intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad partem
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426 suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati, trahit ad naturam
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427 formae in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod
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428 praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta materialiter. Huic vero
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429 diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas
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430 praedicati et subiecti, identitatem vero rei significat intellectus
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431 per ipsam compositionem. Deus autem, in se consideratus, est omnino
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432 unus et simplex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas
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433 conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum ut in seipso
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434 est, videre. Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis
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435 conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod omnibus suis conceptionibus
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436 respondet una et eadem res simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae
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437 est secundum rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem praedicati et
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438 subiecti, unitatem vero repraesentat intellectus per
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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439 compositionem.</p></div></div>
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440 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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441 1:</b> Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or,
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442 according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as no name
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443 can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28890" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28890] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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444 dicendum quod Dionysius dicit affirmationes de Deo esse
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diff changeset
445 incompactas, vel inconvenientes secundum aliam translationem,
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diff changeset
446 inquantum nullum nomen Deo competit secundum modum significandi, ut
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447 supra dictum est.</p></div></div>
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448 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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449 2:</b> Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
450 they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound
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451 things in which there is something taken as subject and something that
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452 is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and
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453 attributes something else to it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28891" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28891] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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454 dicendum quod intellectus noster non potest formas simplices
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455 subsistentes secundum quod in seipsis sunt, apprehendere, sed
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456 apprehendit eas secundum modum compositorum, in quibus est aliquid
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457 quod subiicitur, et est aliquid quod inest. Et ideo apprehendit
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458 formam simplicem in ratione subiecti, et attribuit ei aliquid.</p></div></div>
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459 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this
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460 does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but
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diff changeset
461 its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it
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diff changeset
462 understands simple things above itself, it understands them according
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diff changeset
463 to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to
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diff changeset
464 understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not
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465 false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28892" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28892] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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diff changeset
466 dicendum quod haec propositio, intellectus intelligens rem aliter
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diff changeset
467 quam sit, est falsus, est duplex, ex eo quod hoc adverbium aliter
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468 potest determinare hoc verbum intelligit ex parte intellecti, vel
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diff changeset
469 ex parte intelligentis. Si ex parte intellecti, sic propositio vera
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470 est, et est sensus, quicumque intellectus intelligit rem esse
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471 aliter quam sit, falsus est. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito,
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472 quia intellectus noster, formans propositionem de Deo, non dicit
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diff changeset
473 eum esse compositum, sed simplicem. Si vero ex parte intelligentis,
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diff changeset
474 sic propositio falsa est. Alius est enim modus intellectus in
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diff changeset
475 intelligendo, quam rei in essendo. Manifestum est enim quod
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diff changeset
476 intellectus noster res materiales infra se existentes intelligit
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diff changeset
477 immaterialiter; non quod intelligat eas esse immateriales, sed
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diff changeset
478 habet modum immaterialem in intelligendo. Et similiter, cum
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diff changeset
479 intelligit simplicia quae sunt supra se, intelligit ea secundum
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diff changeset
480 modum suum, scilicet composite, non tamen ita quod intelligat ea
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diff changeset
481 esse composita. Et sic intellectus noster non est falsus, formans
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parents:
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482 compositionem de Deo.</p></div></div>
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483 </div></div>
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diff changeset
484
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485 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14" next="FP_Q14_A1" prev="FP_Q13_A12" progress="2.35%" n="xiii" title="Question. 14 - OF GOD’S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)">
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486 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p0.1">Question 14. OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
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487 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" next="FP_Q14_A6" prev="FP_Q14_A4" progress="2.46%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God knows things other than Himself?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself?</h4>
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488 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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489 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p2"
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490 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know
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diff changeset
491 things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
492 God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does
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diff changeset
493 not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things
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diff changeset
494 other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
495 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28924"><span class=
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diff changeset
496 "ref">[28924] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
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diff changeset
497 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se. Quaecumque
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diff changeset
498 enim sunt alia a Deo, sunt extra ipsum. Sed Augustinus dicit, in
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diff changeset
499 libro octoginta trium qu., quod <i>neque quidquam Deus extra
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parents:
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500 seipsum intuetur</i>. Ergo non cognoscit alia a se.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
501 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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502 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p3"
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diff changeset
503 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object understood is
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parents:
diff changeset
504 the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God
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ht
parents:
diff changeset
505 understands other things besides Himself, something else will be the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
506 perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is
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507 impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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parents:
diff changeset
508 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28925"><span class=
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diff changeset
509 "ref">[28925] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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diff changeset
510 intellectum est perfectio intelligentis. Si ergo Deus intelligat
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
511 alia a se, aliquid aliud erit perfectio Dei, et nobilius ipso. Quod
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512 est impossibile.</p></div></div>
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513 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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514 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p4"
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diff changeset
515 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of understanding
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516 is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
517 its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the
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518 nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If
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519 therefore God understands anything other than Himself, then God
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ht
parents:
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520 Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot
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521 be. Therefore He does not understand things other than
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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522 Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
523 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28926"><span class=
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diff changeset
524 "ref">[28926] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ipsum
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ht
parents:
diff changeset
525 intelligere speciem habet ab intelligibili, sicut et omnis alius
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
526 actus a suo obiecto, unde et ipsum intelligere tanto est nobilius,
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ht
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diff changeset
527 quanto etiam nobilius est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed Deus est
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parents:
diff changeset
528 ipsum suum intelligere, ut ex dictis patet. Si igitur Deus
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ht
parents:
diff changeset
529 intelligit aliquid aliud a se, ipse Deus specificatur per aliquid
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parents:
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530 aliud a se, quod est impossibile. Non igitur intelligit alia a
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531 se.</p></div></div>
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532 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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533 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p5"
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534 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "All things are
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535 naked and open to His eyes" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.4.13"
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536 parsed="vul|Heb|4|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p5.1"
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537 passage="Heb. 4:13">Heb. 4:13</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width:
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538 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28927"><span class=
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539 "ref">[28927] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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parents:
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540 quod dicitur Hebr. IV, <i>omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis
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parents:
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541 eius</i>.</p></div></div>
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542 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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543 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact
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544 that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for
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545 everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.</p>
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546 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 co."><a name="28928"><span class=
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547 "ref">[28928] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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parents:
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548 quod necesse est Deum cognoscere alia a se. Manifestum est enim
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parents:
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549 quod seipsum perfecte intelligit, alioquin suum esse non esset
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550 perfectum, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Si autem perfecte
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parents:
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551 aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod virtus eius perfecte
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parents:
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552 cognoscatur. Virtus autem alicuius rei perfecte cognosci non
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parents:
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553 potest, nisi cognoscantur ea ad quae virtus se extendit. Unde, cum
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554 virtus divina se extendat ad alia, eo quod ipsa est prima causa
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555 effectiva omnium entium, ut ex supradictis patet; necesse est quod
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556 Deus alia a se cognoscat. Et hoc etiam evidentius fit, si
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557 adiungatur quod ipsum esse causae agentis primae, scilicet Dei, est
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558 eius intelligere. Unde quicumque effectus praeexistunt in Deo sicut
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559 in causa prima, necesse est quod sint in ipso eius intelligere; et
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parents:
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560 quod omnia in eo sint secundum modum intelligibilem, nam omne quod
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561 est in altero, est in eo secundum modum eius in quo est.</p></div></div>
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562 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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563 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the
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564 mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p8" shownumber="no"> So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.</p>
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565 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p>Ad
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566 sciendum autem qualiter alia a se cognoscat, considerandum est quod
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567 dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur, uno modo, in seipso; alio modo, in
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568 altero. In seipso quidem cognoscitur aliquid, quando cognoscitur
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569 per speciem propriam adaequatam ipsi cognoscibili, sicut cum oculus
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570 videt hominem per speciem hominis. In alio autem videtur id quod
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571 videtur per speciem continentis, sicut cum pars videtur in toto per
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572 speciem totius, vel cum homo videtur in speculo per speciem
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573 speculi, vel quocumque alio modo contingat aliquid in alio videri.</p>
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574 <p>Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus seipsum videt in seipso, quia
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575 seipsum videt per essentiam suam. Alia autem a se videt non in
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576 ipsis, sed in seipso, inquantum essentia sua continet similitudinem
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577 aliorum ab ipso.</p></div></div>
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578 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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579 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p9"
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580 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage of Augustine
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parents:
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581 in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to
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582 be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in
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583 the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in
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584 Himself, as above explained.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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585 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28929"><span class=
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586 "ref">[28929] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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587 dicendum quod verbum Augustini dicentis quod Deus nihil extra se
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588 intuetur, non est sic intelligendum, quasi nihil quod sit extra se
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589 intueatur, sed quia id quod est extra seipsum, non intuetur nisi in
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590 seipso, ut dictum est.</p></div></div>
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591 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image." Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the
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592 divine intellect other than the divine essence.</p></div><div
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593 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28930"><span class=
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594 "ref">[28930] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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595 dicendum quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis non quidem
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596 secundum suam substantiam, sed secundum suam speciem, secundum quam
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597 est in intellectu, ut forma et perfectio eius, <i>lapis enim non
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598 est in anima, sed species eius</i>, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ea
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599 vero quae sunt alia a Deo, intelliguntur a Deo inquantum essentia
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600 Dei continet species eorum, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod
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601 aliquid aliud sit perfectio divini intellectus, quam ipsa essentia
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602 Dei.</p></div></div>
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603 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible
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604 form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the
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605 principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own
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diff changeset
606 essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does
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607 not follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is
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608 specified by anything else than the divine essence
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609 itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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610 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28931"><span class=
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611 "ref">[28931] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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612 dicendum quod ipsum intelligere non specificatur per id quod in
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613 alio intelligitur, sed per principale intellectum, in quo alia
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diff changeset
614 intelliguntur. Intantum enim ipsum intelligere specificatur per
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diff changeset
615 obiectum suum, inquantum forma intelligibilis est principium
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diff changeset
616 intellectualis operationis, nam omnis operatio specificatur per
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617 formam quae est principium operationis, sicut calefactio per
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618 calorem. Unde per illam formam intelligibilem specificatur
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parents:
diff changeset
619 intellectualis operatio, quae facit intellectum in actu. Et haec
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620 est species principalis intellecti, quae in Deo nihil est aliud
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621 quam essentia sua, in qua omnes species rerum comprehenduntur. Unde
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622 non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse Deus,
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623 specificetur per aliud quam per essentiam divinam.</p></div></div>
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624 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6" next="FP_Q14_A7" prev="FP_Q14_A5" progress="2.50%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4>
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625 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper
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626 knowledge.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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627 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28932"><span class=
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628 "ref">[28932] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
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629 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se propria
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630 cognitione. Sic enim cognoscit alia a se, ut dictum est, secundum
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diff changeset
631 quod alia ab ipso in eo sunt. Sed alia ab eo sunt in ipso sicut in
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632 prima causa communi et universali. Ergo et alia cognoscuntur a Deo,
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633 sicut in causa prima et universali. Hoc autem est cognoscere in
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634 universali, et non secundum propriam cognitionem. Ergo Deus
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635 cognoscit alia a se in universali, et non secundum propriam
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636 cognitionem.</p></div></div>
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637 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge
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638 of it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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639 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28933"><span class=
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640 "ref">[28933] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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641 quantum distat essentia creaturae ab essentia divina, tantum distat
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parents:
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642 essentia divina ab essentia creaturae. Sed per essentiam creaturae
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parents:
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643 non potest cognosci essentia divina, ut supra dictum est. Ergo nec
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parents:
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644 per essentiam divinam potest cognosci essentia creaturae. Et sic,
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diff changeset
645 cum Deus nihil cognoscat nisi per essentiam suam, sequitur quod non
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parents:
diff changeset
646 cognoscat creaturam secundum eius essentiam, ut cognoscat de ea
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647 quid est, quod est propriam cognitionem de re habere.</p></div></div>
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648 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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649 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p4"
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650 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, proper knowledge of a
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651 thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all
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652 things by His essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by
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653 its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and
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diff changeset
654 diverse things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things,
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parents:
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655 but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their
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656 proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of
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657 them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28934"><span class=
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658 "ref">[28934] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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659 propria cognitio non habetur de re, nisi per propriam eius
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parents:
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660 rationem. Sed cum Deus cognoscat omnia per essentiam suam, non
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parents:
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661 videtur quod unumquodque per propriam rationem cognoscat, idem enim
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parents:
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662 non potest esse propria ratio multorum et diversorum. Non ergo
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parents:
diff changeset
663 habet propriam cognitionem Deus de rebus, sed communem, nam
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parents:
diff changeset
664 cognoscere res non secundum propriam rationem, est cognoscere res
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665 solum in communi.</p></div></div>
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666 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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667 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p5"
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668 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> To have a proper knowledge of
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669 things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct
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670 from each other. Now God knows things in that manner. Hence it is
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671 written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the
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672 spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of
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673 thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature
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674 invisible in His sight" (<scripRef
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675 osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.4.12-Heb.4.13" parsed="vul|Heb|4|12|4|13"
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676 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p5.1"
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parents:
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677 passage="Heb. 4:12,13">Heb. 4:12,13</scripRef>).</p></div><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
678 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28935"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
679 "ref">[28935] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
680 habere propriam cognitionem de rebus, est cognoscere res non solum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
681 in communi, sed secundum quod sunt ab invicem distinctae. Sic autem
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parents:
diff changeset
682 Deus cognoscit res. Unde dicitur Heb. IV, quod <i>pertingit usque
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parents:
diff changeset
683 ad divisionem spiritus et animae, compagum quoque et medullarum; et
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parents:
diff changeset
684 discretor cogitationum et intentionum cordis; et non est ulla
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parents:
diff changeset
685 creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius</i>.</p></div></div>
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686 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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687 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p7" shownumber="no"> But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His
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688 understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for
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diff changeset
689 instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know all colors.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p8" shownumber="no"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity
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diff changeset
690 of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes
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diff changeset
691 them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of God
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692 is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge;
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693 and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p9" shownumber="no"> As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly,
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694 unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each other.</p>
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parents:
diff changeset
695 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 co."><a name="28936"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
696 "ref">[28936] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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parents:
diff changeset
697 quod circa hoc quidam erraverunt, dicentes quod Deus alia a se non
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parents:
diff changeset
698 cognoscit nisi in communi, scilicet inquantum sunt entia. Sicut
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
699 enim ignis, si cognosceret seipsum ut est principium caloris,
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parents:
diff changeset
700 cognosceret naturam caloris, et omnia alia inquantum sunt calida;
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parents:
diff changeset
701 ita Deus, inquantum cognoscit se ut principium essendi, cognoscit
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parents:
diff changeset
702 naturam entis, et omnia alia inquantum sunt entia. Sed hoc non
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parents:
diff changeset
703 potest esse. Nam intelligere aliquid in communi, et non in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
704 speciali, est imperfecte aliquid cognoscere. Unde intellectus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
705 noster, dum de potentia in actum reducitur, pertingit prius ad
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
706 cognitionem universalem et confusam de rebus, quam ad propriam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
707 rerum cognitionem, sicut de imperfecto ad perfectum procedens, ut
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
708 patet in I Physic. Si igitur cognitio Dei de rebus aliis a se,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
709 esset in universali tantum, et non in speciali, sequeretur quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
710 eius intelligere non esset omnibus modis perfectum, et per
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
711 consequens nec eius esse, quod est contra ea quae superius ostensa
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parents:
diff changeset
712 sunt. Oportet igitur dicere quod alia a se cognoscat propria
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parents:
diff changeset
713 cognitione; non solum secundum quod communicant in ratione entis,
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parents:
diff changeset
714 sed secundum quod unum ab alio distinguitur. Et ad huius
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
715 evidentiam, considerandum est quod quidam, volentes ostendere quod
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parents:
diff changeset
716 Deus per unum cognoscit multa, utuntur quibusdam exemplis, ut puta
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
717 quod, si centrum cognosceret seipsum, cognosceret omnes lineas
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parents:
diff changeset
718 progredientes a centro; vel lux, si cognosceret seipsam,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
719 cognosceret omnes colores. Sed haec exempla, licet quantum ad
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
720 aliquid similia sint, scilicet quantum ad universalem causalitatem;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
721 tamen deficiunt quantum ad hoc, quod multitudo et diversitas non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
722 causantur ab illo uno principio universali, quantum ad id quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
723 principium distinctionis est, sed solum quantum ad id in quo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
724 communicant. Non enim diversitas colorum causatur ex luce solum,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
725 sed ex diversa dispositione diaphani recipientis, et similiter
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parents:
diff changeset
726 diversitas linearum ex diverso situ. Et inde est quod huiusmodi
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
727 diversitas et multitudo non potest cognosci in suo principio
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
728 secundum propriam cognitionem, sed solum in communi. Sed in Deo non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
729 sic est. Supra enim ostensum est quod quidquid perfectionis est in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
730 quacumque creatura, totum praeexistit et continetur in Deo secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
731 modum excellentem. Non solum autem id in quo creaturae communicant,
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parents:
diff changeset
732 scilicet ipsum esse, ad perfectionem pertinet; sed etiam ea per
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
733 quae creaturae ad invicem distinguuntur, sicut vivere, et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
734 intelligere, et huiusmodi, quibus viventia a non viventibus, et
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parents:
diff changeset
735 intelligentia a non intelligentibus distinguuntur. Et omnis forma,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
736 per quam quaelibet res in propria specie constituitur, perfectio
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
737 quaedam est. Et sic omnia in Deo praeexistunt, non solum quantum ad
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parents:
diff changeset
738 id quod commune est omnibus, sed etiam quantum ad ea secundum quae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
739 res distinguuntur. Et sic, cum Deus in se omnes perfectiones
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parents:
diff changeset
740 contineat, comparatur Dei essentia ad omnes rerum essentias, non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
741 sicut commune ad propria, ut unitas ad numeros, vel centrum ad
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
742 lineas; sed sicut perfectus actus ad imperfectos, ut si dicerem,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
743 homo ad animal, vel senarius, qui est numerus perfectus, ad numeros
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
744 imperfectos sub ipso contentos. Manifestum est autem quod per actum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
745 perfectum cognosci possunt actus imperfecti, non solum in communi,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
746 sed etiam propria cognitione. Sicut qui cognoscit hominem,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
747 cognoscit animal propria cognitione, et qui cognoscit senarium,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
748 cognoscit trinarium propria cognitione. Sic igitur, cum essentia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
749 Dei habeat in se quidquid perfectionis habet essentia cuiuscumque
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
750 rei alterius, et adhuc amplius, Deus in seipso potest omnia propria
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parents:
diff changeset
751 cognitione cognoscere. Propria enim natura uniuscuiusque consistit,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
752 secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem participat.
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parents:
diff changeset
753 Non autem Deus perfecte seipsum cognosceret, nisi cognosceret
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
754 quomodocumque participabilis est ab aliis sua perfectio, nec etiam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
755 ipsam naturam essendi perfecte sciret, nisi cognosceret omnes modos
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
756 essendi. Unde manifestum est quod Deus cognoscit omnes res propria
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
757 cognitione, secundum quod ab aliis distinguuntur.</p></div></div>
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parents:
diff changeset
758 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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parents:
diff changeset
759 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
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760 according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
761 import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of knowledge.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p11" shownumber="no"> We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.</p>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
762 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28937"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
763 "ref">[28937] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
764 dicendum quod sic cognoscere aliquid sicut in cognoscente est,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
765 potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
766 sic importat modum cognitionis ex parte rei cognitae. Et sic falsum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
767 est. Non enim semper cognoscens cognoscit cognitum secundum illud
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
768 esse quod habet in cognoscente, oculus enim non cognoscit lapidem
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
769 secundum esse quod habet in oculo; sed per speciem lapidis quam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
770 habet in se, cognoscit lapidem secundum esse quod habet extra
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
771 oculum. Et si aliquis cognoscens cognoscat cognitum secundum esse
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
772 quod habet in cognoscente, nihilominus cognoscit ipsum secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
773 esse quod habet extra cognoscentem, sicut intellectus cognoscit
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
774 lapidem secundum esse intelligibile quod habet in intellectu,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
775 inquantum cognoscit se intelligere; sed nihilominus cognoscit esse
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
776 lapidis in propria natura. Si vero intelligatur secundum quod hoc
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
777 adverbium sic importat modum ex parte cognoscentis, verum est quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
778 sic solum cognoscens cognoscit cognitum, secundum quod est in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
779 cognoscente, quia quanto perfectius est cognitum in cognoscente,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
780 tanto perfectior est modus cognitionis. Sic igitur dicendum est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
781 quod Deus non solum cognoscit res esse in seipso; sed per id quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
782 in seipso continet res, cognoscit eas in propria natura; et tanto
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
783 perfectius, quanto perfectius est unumquodque in ipso.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
784 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents:
diff changeset
785 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p12"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
786 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The created essence is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
787 compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
788 act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
789 knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
790 converse.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
791 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28938"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
792 "ref">[28938] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
793 dicendum quod essentia creaturae comparatur ad essentiam Dei, ut
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
794 actus imperfectus ad perfectum. Et ideo essentia creaturae non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
795 sufficienter ducit in cognitionem essentiae divinae, sed e
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
796 converso.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
797 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
798 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p13"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
799 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same thing cannot be
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
800 taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
801 divine essence excels all creatures. Hence it can be taken as the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
802 proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
803 diverse creatures participate in, and imitate it.</p></div><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
804 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28939"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
805 "ref">[28939] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
806 dicendum quod idem non potest accipi ut ratio diversorum per modum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
807 adaequationis. Sed divina essentia est aliquid excedens omnes
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
808 creaturas. Unde potest accipi ut propria ratio uniuscuiusque,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
809 secundum quod diversimode est participabilis vel imitabilis a
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
810 diversis creaturis.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
811 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7" next="FP_Q14_A8"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
812 prev="FP_Q14_A6" progress="2.55%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
813 the knowledge of God is discursive?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
814 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
815 discursive?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
816 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
817 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
818 seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
819 God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
820 Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
821 things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
822 time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
823 shown above (AA 2,5), it seems that He does not understand all at
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
824 once, but discourses from one to another.</p></div><div style="width:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
825 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28940"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
826 "ref">[28940] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
827 proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit discursiva. Scientia enim
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
828 Dei non est secundum scire in habitu, sed secundum intelligere in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
829 actu. Sed secundum philosophum, in II Topic., scire in habitu
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
830 contingit multa simul, sed intelligere actu unum tantum. Cum ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
831 Deus multa cognoscat, quia et se et alia, ut ostensum est, videtur
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
832 quod non simul omnia intelligat, sed de uno in aliud
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
833 discurrat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
834 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
835 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
836 Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
837 cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is known)
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
838 through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
839 discursive.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
840 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28941"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
841 "ref">[28941] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
842 cognoscere effectum per causam est scire discurrentis. Sed Deus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
843 cognoscit alia per seipsum, sicut effectum per causam. Ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
844 cognitio sua est discursiva.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
845 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
846 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p4"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
847 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows each creature
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
848 more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
849 created causes; and thus we go discursively from causes to things
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
850 caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.</p></div><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
851 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28942"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
852 "ref">[28942] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
853 perfectius Deus scit unamquamque creaturam quam nos sciamus. Sed
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
854 nos in causis creatis cognoscimus earum effectus, et sic de causis
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
855 ad causata discurrimus. Ergo videtur similiter esse in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
856 Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
857 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
858 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
859 Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
860 particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
861 but He sees all things together at once."</p></div><div style="width:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
862 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28943"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
863 "ref">[28943] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
864 quod Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., quod <i>Deus non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
865 particulatim vel singillatim omnia videt, velut alternante
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
866 conspectu hinc illuc, et inde huc; sed omnia videt simul</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
867 which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
868 proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
869 Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
870 discursive.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
871 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 co."><a name="28944"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
872 "ref">[28944] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
873 quod in scientia divina nullus est discursus. Quod sic patet. In
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
874 scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus. Unus secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
875 successionem tantum, sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
876 actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud. Alius discursus est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
877 secundum causalitatem, sicut cum per principia pervenimus in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
878 cognitionem conclusionum. Primus autem discursus Deo convenire non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
879 potest. Multa enim, quae successive intelligimus si unumquodque
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
880 eorum in seipso consideretur, omnia simul intelligimus si in aliquo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
881 uno ea intelligamus, puta si partes intelligamus in toto, vel si
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
882 diversas res videamus in speculo. Deus autem omnia videt in uno,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
883 quod est ipse, ut habitum est. Unde simul, et non successive omnia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
884 videt. Similiter etiam et secundus discursus Deo competere non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
885 potest. Primo quidem, quia secundus discursus praesupponit primum,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
886 procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones, non simul utrumque
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
887 considerant. Deinde, quia discursus talis est procedentis de noto
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
888 ad ignotum. Unde manifestum est quod, quando cognoscitur primum,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
889 adhuc ignoratur secundum. Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
890 sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
891 in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas, et tunc cessat discursus.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
892 Unde, cum Deus effectus suos in seipso videat sicut in causa, eius
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
893 cognitio non est discursiva.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
894 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
895 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
896 to Objection 1:</b> Altogether there is only one act of understanding
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
897 in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium),
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
898 as shown above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
899 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28945"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
900 "ref">[28945] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
901 dicendum quod, licet sit unum tantum intelligere in seipso, tamen
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
902 contingit multa intelligere in aliquo uno, ut dictum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
903 est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
904 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
905 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
906 2:</b> God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
907 effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
908 knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.</p></div><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
909 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28946"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
910 "ref">[28946] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
911 dicendum quod Deus non cognoscit per causam quasi prius cognitam,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
912 effectus incognitos, sed eos cognoscit in causa. Unde eius cognitio
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
913 est sine discursu, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
914 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
915 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
916 to Objection 3:</b> God sees the effects of created causes in the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
917 causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
918 manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
919 knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
920 knowledge is not discursive.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
921 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28947"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
922 "ref">[28947] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
923 dicendum quod effectus causarum creatarum videt quidem Deus in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
924 ipsis causis, multo melius quam nos, non tamen ita quod cognitio
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
925 effectuum causetur in ipso ex cognitione causarum creatarum, sicut
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
926 in nobis. Unde eius scientia non est discursiva.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" next="FP_Q14_A9" prev="FP_Q14_A7" progress="2.57%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</h4>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
927 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
928 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p2"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
929 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
930 is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on<scripRef
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
931 osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.30" parsed="vul|Rom|8|30|0|0"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
932 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p2.1" passage=" Rom. 8:30, "> Rom. 8:30,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
933 </scripRef> "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
934 will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
935 future, it is on that account known by God, before it
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
936 exists."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
937 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28948"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
938 "ref">[28948] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
939 proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
940 enim Origenes, super epistolam ad Rom., <i>non propterea aliquid
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
941 erit, quia id scit Deus futurum; sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
942 a Deo antequam fiat</i>.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
943 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
944 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p3"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
945 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, given the cause, the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
946 effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
947 knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
948 creatures are eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
949 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28949"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
950 "ref">[28949] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
951 posita causa ponitur effectus. Sed scientia Dei est aeterna. Si
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
952 ergo scientia Dei est causa rerum creatarum, videtur quod creaturae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
953 sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
954 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
955 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p4"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
956 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "The thing known is prior
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
957 to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
958 (Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot be a
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
959 cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
960 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
961 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28950"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
962 "ref">[28950] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
963 scibile est prius scientia, et mensura eius, ut dicitur in X
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
964 Metaphys. Sed id quod est posterius et mensuratum, non potest esse
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
965 causa. Ergo scientia Dei non est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
966 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
967 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p5"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
968 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv),
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
969 "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
970 temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
971 are."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28951"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
972 "ref">[28951] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
973 quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., <i>universas creaturas, et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
974 spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt, ideo novit Deus; sed ideo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
975 sunt, quia novit</i>.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
976 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
977 remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
978 determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
979 appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
980 that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
981 understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
982 so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
983 cause of things is usually called the "knowledge of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
984 approbation."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
985 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 co."><a name="28952"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
986 "ref">[28952] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
987 quod scientia Dei est causa rerum. Sic enim scientia Dei se habet
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
988 ad omnes res creatas, sicut scientia artificis se habet ad
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
989 artificiata. Scientia autem artificis est causa artificiatorum, eo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
990 quod artifex operatur per suum intellectum, unde oportet quod forma
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
991 intellectus sit principium operationis, sicut calor est principium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
992 calefactionis. Sed considerandum est quod forma naturalis,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
993 inquantum est forma manens in eo cui dat esse, non nominat
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
994 principium actionis; sed secundum quod habet inclinationem ad
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
995 effectum. Et similiter forma intelligibilis non nominat principium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
996 actionis secundum quod est tantum in intelligente, nisi adiungatur
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
997 ei inclinatio ad effectum, quae est per voluntatem. Cum enim forma
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
998 intelligibilis ad opposita se habeat (cum sit eadem scientia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
999 oppositorum), non produceret determinatum effectum, nisi
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1000 determinaretur ad unum per appetitum, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1001 Manifestum est autem quod Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1002 suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde necesse est quod sua scientia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1003 sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem coniunctam. Unde
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1004 scientia Dei, secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1005 scientia approbationis.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1006 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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parents:
diff changeset
1007 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p8" shownumber="no"> But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.</p>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1008 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28953"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1009 "ref">[28953] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1010 dicendum quod Origenes locutus est attendens rationem scientiae,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1011 cui non competit ratio causalitatis, nisi adiuncta voluntate, ut
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1012 dictum est. Sed quod dicit ideo praescire Deum aliqua, quia sunt
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1013 futura, intelligendum est secundum causam consequentiae, non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1014 secundum causam essendi. Sequitur enim, si aliqua sunt futura, quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1015 Deus ea praescierit, non tamen res futurae sunt causa quod Deus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1016 sciat.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1017 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1018 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p9"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1019 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1020 the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1021 things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1022 although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1023 creatures are eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1024 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28954"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1025 "ref">[28954] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1026 dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa rerum, secundum quod res sunt
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1027 in scientia. Non fuit autem in scientia Dei, quod res essent ab
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1028 aeterno. Unde, quamvis scientia Dei sit aeterna, non sequitur tamen
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1029 quod creaturae sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1030 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1031 gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1032 built.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1033 title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28955"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1034 "ref">[28955] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1035 dicendum quod res naturales sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1036 scientiam nostram, nos enim scientiam accipimus a rebus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1037 naturalibus, quarum Deus per suam scientiam causa est. Unde, sicut
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1038 scibilia naturalia sunt priora quam scientia nostra, et mensura
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1039 eius, ita scientia Dei est prior quam res naturales, et mensura
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1040 ipsarum. Sicut aliqua domus est media inter scientiam artificis qui
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1041 eam fecit, et scientiam illius qui eius cognitionem ex ipsa iam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1042 facta capit.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1043 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" next="FP_Q14_A10" prev="FP_Q14_A8" progress="2.60%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p0.1">Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?</h4>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1044 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1045 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p2"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1046 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1047 knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1048 things. But "truth" and "being" are convertible terms. Therefore the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1049 knowledge of God is not of things that are not.</p></div><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1050 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28956"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1051 "ref">[28956] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1052 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat scientiam non entium.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1053 Scientia enim Dei non est nisi verorum. Sed verum et ens
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1054 convertuntur. Ergo scientia Dei non est non entium.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1055 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1056 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p3"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1057 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, knowledge requires
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1058 likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1059 are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1060 what is not, cannot be known by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1061 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28957"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1062 "ref">[28957] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1063 scientia requirit similitudinem inter scientem et scitum. Sed ea
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1064 quae non sunt, non possunt habere aliquam similitudinem ad Deum,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1065 qui est ipsum esse. Ergo ea quae non sunt, non possunt sciri a
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1066 Deo.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1067 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1068 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p4"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1069 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1070 the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1071 that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1072 has no knowledge of things that are not.</p></div><div style="width:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1073 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="28958"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1074 "ref">[28958] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1075 scientia Dei est causa scitorum ab ipso. Sed non est causa non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1076 entium, quia non ens non habet causam. Ergo Deus non habet
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1077 scientiam de non entibus.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1078 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1079 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p5"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1080 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Who
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1081 . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" (<scripRef
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1082 osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.4.17" parsed="vul|Rom|4|17|0|0"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1083 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p5.1"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1084 passage="Rom. 4:17">Rom. 4:17</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1085 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28959"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1086 "ref">[28959] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1087 quod dicit apostolus ad Rom. IV, <i>qui vocat ea quae non sunt,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1088 tanquam ea quae sunt</i>.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1089 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1090 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1091 the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p7" shownumber="no"> Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1092 as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.</p>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1093 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 co."><a name="28960"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1094 "ref">[28960] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1095 quod Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo. Nihil autem
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1096 prohibet ea quae non sunt simpliciter, aliquo modo esse.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1097 Simpliciter enim sunt, quae actu sunt. Ea vero quae non sunt actu,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1098 sunt in potentia vel ipsius Dei, vel creaturae; sive in potentia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1099 activa, sive in passiva, sive in potentia opinandi, vel imaginandi,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1100 vel quocumque modo significandi. Quaecumque igitur possunt per
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1101 creaturam fieri vel cogitari vel dici, et etiam quaecumque ipse
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1102 facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiam si actu non sint. Et pro
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1103 tanto dici potest quod habet etiam non entium scientiam. Sed horum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1104 quae actu non sunt, est attendenda quaedam diversitas. Quaedam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1105 enim, licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt vel erunt, et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1106 omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis. Quia, cum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1107 intelligere Dei, quod est eius esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1108 sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1109 intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1110 quocumque tempore, sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter. Quaedam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1111 vero sunt, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nec
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1112 sunt nec erunt neque fuerunt. Et respectu horum non dicitur habere
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1113 scientiam visionis, sed simplicis intelligentiae. Quod ideo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1114 dicitur, quia ea quae videntur apud nos, habent esse distinctum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1115 extra videntem.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1116 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1117 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p8"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1118 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1119 actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1120 that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1121 God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28961"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1122 "ref">[28961] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1123 dicendum quod, secundum quod sunt in potentia, sic habent veritatem
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1124 ea quae non sunt actu, verum est enim ea esse in potentia. Et sic
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1125 sciuntur a Deo.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1126 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1127 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p9"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1128 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God is very being
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1129 everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1130 everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1131 potentiality are known by God, although they are not in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1132 act.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28962"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1133 "ref">[28962] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1134 dicendum quod, cum Deus sit ipsum esse, intantum unumquodque est,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1135 inquantum participat de Dei similitudine, sicut unumquodque
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1136 intantum est calidum, inquantum participat calorem. Sic et ea quae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1137 sunt in potentia, etiam si non sunt in actu, cognoscuntur a
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1138 Deo.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1139 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1140 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p10"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1141 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1142 joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1143 that what ever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1144 necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1145 it is in the knowledge of God not that they be, but that they be
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1146 possible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1147 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="28963"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1148 "ref">[28963] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1149 dicendum quod Dei scientia est causa rerum, voluntate adiuncta.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1150 Unde non oportet quod quaecumque scit Deus, sint vel fuerint vel
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1151 futura sint, sed solum ea quae vult esse, vel permittit esse. Et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1152 iterum, non est in scientia Dei ut illa sint, sed quod esse
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1153 possint.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1154 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10" next="FP_Q14_A11"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1155 prev="FP_Q14_A9" progress="2.62%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1156 God knows evil things?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1157 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p0.1">Whether God knows evil
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1158 things?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1159 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1160 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1161 seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1162 Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1163 not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1164 says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1165 potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1166 (A[2] ), it seems that God does not know evil things.</p></div><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1167 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28964"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1168 "ref">[28964] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1169 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. Dicit enim
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1170 philosophus, in III de anima, quod intellectus qui non est in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1171 potentia, non cognoscit privationem. Sed malum est privatio boni,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1172 ut dicit Augustinus. Igitur, cum intellectus Dei nunquam sit in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1173 potentia, sed semper actu, ut ex dictis patet, videtur quod Deus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1174 non cognoscat mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1175 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1176 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p3"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1177 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is either
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1178 the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1179 God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1180 does not know evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1181 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28965"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1182 "ref">[28965] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1183 omnis scientia vel est causa sciti, vel causatur ab eo. Sed
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1184 scientia Dei non est causa mali, nec causatur a malo. Ergo scientia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1185 Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1186 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1187 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p4"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1188 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1189 either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1190 knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing <a
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1191 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1192 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1193 neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1194 the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1195 Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.</p></div><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1196 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28966"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1197 "ref">[28966] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1198 quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1199 oppositum. Quidquid autem cognoscit Deus, cognoscit per suam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1200 essentiam, ut ex dictis patet. Divina autem essentia neque est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1201 similitudo mali, neque ei malum opponitur, divinae enim essentiae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1202 nihil est contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1203 Deus non cognoscit mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1204 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1205 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p5"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1206 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is known through
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1207 another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1208 known by God; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1209 evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1210 by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1211 imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.</p></div><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1212 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4"><a name="28967"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1213 "ref">[28967] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1214 cognoscitur non per seipsum, sed per aliud, imperfecte cognoscitur.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1215 Sed malum non cognoscitur a Deo per seipsum, quia sic oporteret
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1216 quod malum esset in Deo; oportet enim cognitum esse in cognoscente.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1217 Si ergo cognoscitur per aliud, scilicet per bonum, imperfecte
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1218 cognoscetur ab ipso, quod est impossibile, quia nulla cognitio Dei
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1219 est imperfecta. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1220 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1221 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p6"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1222 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1223 osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.15.11" parsed="vul|Prov|15|11|0|0"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1224 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p6.1"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1225 passage="Prov. 15:11">Prov. 15:11</scripRef>), "Hell and destruction
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1226 are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1227 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 s. c."><a name="28968"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1228 "ref">[28968] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1229 quod dicitur Proverb. XV, <i>Infernus et perditio coram
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1230 Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1231 Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1232 the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1233 light."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1234 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 co."><a name="28969"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1235 "ref">[28969] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1236 quod quicumque perfecte cognoscit aliquid, oportet quod cognoscat
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1237 omnia quae possunt illi accidere. Sunt autem quaedam bona, quibus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1238 accidere potest ut per mala corrumpantur. Unde Deus non perfecte
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1239 cognosceret bona, nisi etiam cognosceret mala. Sic autem est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1240 cognoscibile unumquodque, secundum quod est. Unde, cum hoc sit esse
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1241 mali, quod est privatio boni, per hoc ipsum quod Deus cognoscit
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1242 bona, cognoscit etiam mala; sicut per lucem cognoscuntur tenebrae.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1243 Unde dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus per
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1244 semetipsum tenebrarum accipit visionem, non aliunde videns tenebras
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1245 quam a lumine</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1246 privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1247 substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1248 Himself, but by the opposite good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1249 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28970"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1250 "ref">[28970] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1251 dicendum quod verbum philosophi est sic intelligendum, quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1252 intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem per
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1253 privationem in ipso existentem. Et hoc congruit cum eo quod supra
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1254 dixerat, quod punctum et omne indivisibile per privationem
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1255 divisionis cognoscitur. Quod contingit ex hoc, quia formae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1256 simplices et indivisibiles non sunt actu in intellectu nostro, sed
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1257 in potentia tantum, nam si essent actu in intellectu nostro, non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1258 per privationem cognoscerentur. Et sic cognoscuntur simplicia a
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1259 substantiis separatis. Deus igitur non cognoscit malum per
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1260 privationem in se existentem, sed per bonum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1261 oppositum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1262 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1263 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1264 2:</b> The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1265 of the good whereby evil is known.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1266 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28971"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1267 "ref">[28971] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1268 dicendum quod scientia Dei non est causa mali, sed est causa boni,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1269 per quod cognoscitur malum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1270 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1271 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p10"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1272 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although evil is not
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1273 opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1274 opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1275 knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.</p></div><div style="width:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1276 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="28972"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1277 "ref">[28972] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1278 dicendum quod, licet malum non opponatur essentiae divinae, quae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1279 non est corruptibilis per malum, opponitur tamen effectibus Dei;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1280 quos per essentiam suam cognoscit, et eos cognoscens, mala opposita
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ht
parents:
diff changeset
1281 cognoscit.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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ht
parents:
diff changeset
1282 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1283 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1284 4:</b> To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1285 knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1286 itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1287 privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1288 except by good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1289 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 4"><a name="28973"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1290 "ref">[28973] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1291 dicendum quod cognoscere aliquid per aliud tantum, est imperfectae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1292 cognitionis, si illud sit cognoscibile per se. Sed malum non est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1293 per se cognoscibile, quia de ratione mali est, quod sit privatio
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ht
parents:
diff changeset
1294 boni. Et sic neque definiri, neque cognosci potest, nisi per
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1295 bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11" next="FP_Q14_A12" prev="FP_Q14_A10" progress="2.64%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether God knows singular things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p0.1">Whether God knows singular things?</h4>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1296 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1297 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p2"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1298 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1299 singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1300 human intellect. Now the human intellect by reason of its
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1301 immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1302 says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do with universals, sense with
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1303 singular things." Therefore God does not know singular
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1304 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1305 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28974"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1306 "ref">[28974] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1307 sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat singularia.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1308 Intellectus enim divinus immaterialior est quam intellectus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1309 humanus. Sed intellectus humanus, propter suam immaterialitatem,
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ht
parents:
diff changeset
1310 non cognoscit singularia, sed, sicut dicitur in II de anima,
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ht
parents:
diff changeset
1311 <i>ratio est universalium, sensus vero singularium</i>. Ergo Deus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1312 non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1313 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1314 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p3"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1315 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in us those faculties
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1316 alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1317 material conditions. But in God things are in the highest degree
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1318 abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1319 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1320 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28975"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1321 "ref">[28975] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1322 illae solae virtutes in nobis sunt singularium cognoscitivae, quae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1323 recipiunt species non abstractas a materialibus conditionibus. Sed
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1324 res in Deo sunt maxime abstractae ab omni materialitate. Ergo Deus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1325 non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1326 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1327 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p4"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1328 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge comes about
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1329 through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1330 things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1331 the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1332 potentiality only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1333 act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.</p></div><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1334 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28976"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1335 "ref">[28976] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1336 omnis cognitio est per aliquam similitudinem. Sed similitudo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1337 singularium, inquantum sunt singularia, non videtur esse in Deo,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1338 quia principium singularitatis est materia, quae, cum sit ens in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1339 potentia tantum, omnino est dissimilis Deo, qui est actus purus.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1340 Non ergo Deus potest cognoscere singularia.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1341 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1342 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p5"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1343 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1344 osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.16.2" parsed="vul|Prov|16|2|0|0"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1345 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p5.1"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1346 passage="Prov. 16:2">Prov. 16:2</scripRef>), "All the ways of a man
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1347 are open to His eyes."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1348 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28977"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1349 "ref">[28977] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1350 quod dicitur, Proverb. XVI, <i>omnes viae hominum patent oculis
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1351 eius</i>.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1352 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1353 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1354 He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p7" shownumber="no"> Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1355 together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p8" shownumber="no"> singular things in their singularity.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p9" shownumber="no"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10" shownumber="no"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" href="#FP.iv.FP_Q44.FP_Q44_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1356 He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.</p>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1357 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 co."><a name="28978"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1358 "ref">[28978] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1359 quod Deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1360 creaturis inventae, in Deo praeexistunt secundum altiorem modum, ut
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1361 ex dictis patet. Cognoscere autem singularia pertinet ad
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1362 perfectionem nostram. Unde necesse est quod Deus singularia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1363 cognoscat. Nam et philosophus pro inconvenienti habet, quod aliquid
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1364 cognoscatur a nobis, quod non cognoscatur a Deo. Unde contra
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1365 Empedoclem arguit, in I de anima et in III Metaphys., quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1366 accideret Deum esse insipientissimum, si discordiam ignoraret. Sed
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1367 perfectiones quae in inferioribus dividuntur, in Deo simpliciter et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1368 unite existunt. Unde, licet nos per aliam potentiam cognoscamus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1369 universalia et immaterialia, et per aliam singularia et materialia;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1370 Deus tamen per suum simplicem intellectum utraque cognoscit. Sed
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1371 qualiter hoc esse possit, quidam manifestare volentes, dixerunt
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1372 quod Deus cognoscit singularia per causas universales, nam nihil
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1373 est in aliquo singularium, quod non ex aliqua causa oriatur
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1374 universali. Et ponunt exemplum, sicut si aliquis astrologus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1375 cognosceret omnes motus universales caeli, posset praenuntiare
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1376 omnes eclipses futuras. Sed istud non sufficit. Quia singularia ex
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1377 causis universalibus sortiuntur quasdam formas et virtutes, quae,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1378 quantumcumque ad invicem coniungantur, non individuantur nisi per
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1379 materiam individualem. Unde qui cognosceret Socratem per hoc quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1380 est albus vel Sophronisci filius, vel quidquid aliud sic dicatur,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1381 non cognosceret ipsum inquantum est hic homo. Unde secundum modum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1382 praedictum, Deus non cognosceret singularia in sua singularitate.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1383 Alii vero dixerunt quod Deus cognoscit singularia, applicando
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1384 causas universales ad particulares effectus. Sed hoc nihil est.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1385 Quia nullus potest applicare aliquid ad alterum, nisi illud
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1386 praecognoscat, unde dicta applicatio non potest esse ratio
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1387 cognoscendi particularia, sed cognitionem singularium praesupponit.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1388 Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod, cum Deus sit causa rerum per
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1389 suam scientiam, ut dictum est, intantum se extendit scientia Dei,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1390 inquantum se extendit eius causalitas. Unde, cum virtus activa Dei
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1391 se extendat non solum ad formas, a quibus accipitur ratio
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1392 universalis, sed etiam usque ad materiam, ut infra ostendetur;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1393 necesse est quod scientia Dei usque ad singularia se extendat, quae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1394 per materiam individuantur. Cum enim sciat alia a se per essentiam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1395 suam, inquantum est similitudo rerum velut principium activum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1396 earum, necesse est quod essentia sua sit principium sufficiens
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1397 cognoscendi omnia quae per ipsum fiunt, non solum in universali,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1398 sed etiam in singulari. Et esset simile de scientia artificis, si
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1399 esset productiva totius rei, et non formae tantum.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1400 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1401 of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1402 individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1403 singular things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1404 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28979"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1405 "ref">[28979] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1406 dicendum quod intellectus noster speciem intelligibilem abstrahit a
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1407 principiis individuantibus, unde species intelligibilis nostri
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1408 intellectus non potest esse similitudo principiorum individualium.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1409 Et propter hoc, intellectus noster singularia non cognoscit. Sed
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1410 species intelligibilis divini intellectus, quae est Dei essentia,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1411 non est immaterialis per abstractionem, sed per seipsam, principium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1412 existens omnium principiorum quae intrant rei compositionem, sive
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1413 sint principia speciei, sive principia individui. Unde per eam Deus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1414 cognoscit non solum universalia, sed etiam singularia.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1415 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1416 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p12"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1417 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although as regards the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1418 species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1419 like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1420 extends to both immaterial and material things.</p></div><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1421 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28980"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1422 "ref">[28980] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1423 dicendum quod, quamvis species intellectus divini secundum esse
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1424 suum non habeat conditiones materiales, sicut species receptae in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1425 imaginatione et sensu; tamen virtute se extendit ad immaterialia et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1426 materialia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1427 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1428 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p13"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1429 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although matter as
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1430 regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1431 far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1432 divine being.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1433 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28981"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1434 "ref">[28981] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1435 dicendum quod materia, licet recedat a Dei similitudine secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1436 suam potentialitatem, tamen inquantum vel sic esse habet,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1437 similitudinem quandam retinet divini esse.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1438 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12" next="FP_Q14_A13" prev="FP_Q14_A11" progress="2.68%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether God can know infinite things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p0.1">Whether God can know infinite things?</h4>
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1439 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1440 God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1441 title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28982"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1442 "ref">[28982] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1443 sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit cognoscere infinita.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1444 Infinitum enim, secundum quod est infinitum, est ignotum, quia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1445 infinitum est cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1446 extra assumere, ut dicitur in III Physic. Augustinus etiam dicit,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1447 XII de Civ. Dei, quod <i>quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1448 comprehensione finitur</i>. Sed infinita non possunt finiri. Ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1449 non possunt scientia Dei comprehendi.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1450 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1451 God's knowledge, which is infinite.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1452 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28983"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1453 "ref">[28983] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1454 ea quae in se sunt infinita, scientiae Dei finita sunt, contra,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1455 ratio infiniti est quod sit impertransibile; et finiti quod sit
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1456 pertransibile, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed infinitum non potest
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1457 transiri nec a finito, nec ab infinito, ut probatur in VI Physic.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1458 Ergo infinitum non potest esse finitum finito, neque etiam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1459 infinito. Et ita infinita non sunt finita scientiae Dei, quae est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1460 infinita.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1461 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1462 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p4"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1463 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1464 the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1465 infinite that it be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1466 known by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1467 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28984"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1468 "ref">[28984] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1469 scientia Dei est mensura scitorum. Sed contra rationem infiniti
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1470 est, quod sit mensuratum. Ergo infinita non possunt sciri a
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1471 Deo.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1472 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1473 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p5"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1474 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1475 xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1476 comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds."</p></div><div
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1477 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28985"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1478 "ref">[28985] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1479 quod dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, <i>quamvis infinitorum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1480 numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1481 cuius scientiae non est numerus</i>.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1482 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1483 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1484 that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1485 species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1486 principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.</p>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1487 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 co."><a name="28986"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1488 "ref">[28986] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1489 quod, cum Deus sciat non solum ea quae sunt actu, sed etiam ea quae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1490 sunt in potentia vel sua vel creaturae, ut ostensum est; haec autem
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1491 constat esse infinita; necesse est dicere quod Deus sciat infinita.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1492 Et licet scientia visionis, quae est tantum eorum quae sunt vel
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1493 erunt vel fuerunt, non sit infinitorum, ut quidam dicunt, cum non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1494 ponamus mundum ab aeterno fuisse, nec generationem et motum in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1495 aeternum mansura, ut individua in infinitum multiplicentur, tamen,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1496 si diligentius consideretur, necesse est dicere quod Deus etiam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1497 scientia visionis sciat infinita. Quia Deus scit etiam cogitationes
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1498 et affectiones cordium, quae in infinitum multiplicabuntur,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1499 creaturis rationalibus permanentibus absque fine. Hoc autem ideo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1500 est, quia cognitio cuiuslibet cognoscentis se extendit secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1501 modum formae quae est principium cognitionis. Species enim
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1502 sensibilis, quae est in sensu, est similitudo solum unius
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1503 individui, unde per eam solum unum individuum cognosci potest.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1504 Species autem intelligibilis intellectus nostri est similitudo rei
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1505 quantum ad naturam speciei, quae est participabilis a
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1506 particularibus infinitis, unde intellectus noster per speciem
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1507 intelligibilem hominis, cognoscit quodammodo homines infinitos. Sed
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1508 tamen non inquantum distinguuntur ab invicem, sed secundum quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1509 communicant in natura speciei; propter hoc quod species
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1510 intelligibilis intellectus nostri non est similitudo hominum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1511 quantum ad principia individualia, sed solum quantum ad principia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1512 speciei. Essentia autem divina, per quam intellectus divinus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1513 intelligit, est similitudo sufficiens omnium quae sunt vel esse
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1514 possunt, non solum quantum ad principia communia, sed etiam quantum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1515 ad principia propria uniuscuiusque, ut ostensum est. Unde sequitur
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1516 quod scientia Dei se extendat ad infinita, etiam secundum quod sunt
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1517 ab invicem distincta.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1518 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1519 part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1520 successively, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p8.1"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1521 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7" shape="rect"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1522 xml:link="simple">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1523 from knowing infinite things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1524 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28987"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1525 "ref">[28987] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1526 dicendum quod <i>infiniti ratio congruit quantitati</i>, secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1527 philosophum in I Physic. De ratione autem quantitatis est ordo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1528 partium. Cognoscere ergo infinitum secundum modum infiniti, est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1529 cognoscere partem post partem. Et sic nullo modo contingit cognosci
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1530 infinitum, quia quantacumque quantitas partium accipiatur, semper
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1531 remanet aliquid extra accipientem. Deus autem non sic cognoscit
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1532 infinitum vel infinita, quasi enumerando partem post partem; cum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1533 cognoscat omnia simul, non successive, ut supra dictum est. Unde
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1534 nihil prohibet ipsum cognoscere infinita.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1535 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1536 as if it were traversable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1537 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28988"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1538 "ref">[28988] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1539 dicendum quod transitio importat quandam successionem in partibus,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1540 et inde est quod infinitum transiri non potest, neque a finito
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1541 neque ab infinito. Sed ad rationem comprehensionis sufficit
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1542 adaequatio, quia id comprehendi dicitur, cuius nihil est extra
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1543 comprehendentem. Unde non est contra rationem infiniti, quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1544 comprehendatur ab infinito. Et sic, quod in se est infinitum,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1545 potest dici finitum scientiae Dei, tanquam comprehensum, non tamen
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1546 tanquam pertransibile.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1547 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1548 quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1549 it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1550 because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1551 they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1552 God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28989"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1553 "ref">[28989] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1554 dicendum quod scientia Dei est mensura rerum, non quantitativa, qua
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1555 quidem mensura carent infinita; sed quia mensurat essentiam et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1556 veritatem rei. Unumquodque enim intantum habet de veritate suae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1557 naturae, inquantum imitatur Dei scientiam; sicut artificiatum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1558 inquantum concordat arti. Dato autem quod essent aliqua infinita
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1559 actu secundum numerum, puta infiniti homines; vel secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1560 quantitatem continuam, ut si esset aer infinitus, ut quidam antiqui
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1561 dixerunt, tamen manifestum est quod haberent esse determinatum et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1562 finitum, quia esse eorum esset limitatum ad aliquas determinatas
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1563 naturas. Unde mensurabilia essent secundum scientiam Dei.</p></div></div>
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1564 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13" next="FP_Q14_A14" prev="FP_Q14_A12" progress="2.71%" n="xiii" title="Article. 13 - Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4>
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1565 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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1566 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p2"
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1567 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God
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1568 is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause
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1569 proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of
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1570 things known, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p2.1"
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1571 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect"
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1572 xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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1573 necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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1574 knowledge of God is not of contingent things.</p></div><div
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1575 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28990"><span class=
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1576 "ref">[28990] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
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1577 decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit
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1578 futurorum contingentium. A causa enim necessaria procedit effectus
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1579 necessarius. Sed scientia Dei est causa scitorum, ut supra dictum
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1580 est. Cum ergo ipsa sit necessaria, sequitur scita eius esse
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1581 necessaria. Non ergo scientia Dei est contingentium.</p></div></div>
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1582 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the
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1583 antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it
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1584 is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the
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diff changeset
1585 consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows,
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1586 is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent
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1587 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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1588 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="28991"><span class=
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1589 "ref">[28991] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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diff changeset
1590 omnis conditionalis cuius antecedens est necessarium absolute,
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diff changeset
1591 consequens est necessarium absolute. Sic enim se habet antecedens
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diff changeset
1592 ad consequens, sicut principia ad conclusionem, ex principiis autem
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1593 necessariis non sequitur conclusio nisi necessaria, ut in I Poster.
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1594 probatur. Sed haec est quaedam conditionalis vera, si Deus scivit
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1595 hoc futurum esse, hoc erit, quia scientia Dei non est nisi verorum.
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1596 Huius autem conditionalis antecedens est necessarium absolute, tum
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1597 quia est aeternum; tum quia significatur ut praeteritum. Ergo et
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1598 consequens est necessarium absolute. Igitur quidquid scitur a Deo,
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1599 est necessarium. Et sic scientia Dei non est contingentium.</p></div></div>
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1600 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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1601 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p4"
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1602 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known by God
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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1603 must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must
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1604 necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more
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1605 certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily
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1606 be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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1607 God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="28992"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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1608 "ref">[28992] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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1609 scitum a Deo necesse est esse, quia etiam omne scitum a nobis
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1610 necesse est esse, cum tamen scientia Dei certior sit quam scientia
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1611 nostra. Sed nullum contingens futurum necesse est esse. Ergo nullum
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1612 contingens futurum est scitum a Deo.</p></div></div>
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1613 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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1614 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p5"
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1615 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
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1616 osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.32.15" parsed="vul|Ps|32|15|0|0"
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1617 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p5.1"
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1618 passage="Ps. 32:15">Ps. 32:15</scripRef>), "He Who hath made the
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1619 hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works,"
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1620 i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to
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1621 free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.</p></div><div
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1622 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 s. c."><a name="28993"><span class=
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1623 "ref">[28993] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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1624 quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXII, <i>qui finxit singillatim corda
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1625 eorum, qui intelligit omnia opera eorum</i>, scilicet hominum. Sed
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1626 opera hominum sunt contingentia, utpote libero arbitrio subiecta.
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1627 Ergo Deus scit futura contingentia.</p></div></div>
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1628 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1629 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p7" shownumber="no"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
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1630 another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as
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1631 each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only
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1632 because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.</p>
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1633 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 co."><a name="28994"><span class=
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1634 "ref">[28994] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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1635 quod, cum supra ostensum sit quod Deus sciat omnia non solum quae
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1636 actu sunt, sed etiam quae sunt in potentia sua vel creaturae; horum
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1637 autem quaedam sunt contingentia nobis futura; sequitur quod Deus
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diff changeset
1638 contingentia futura cognoscat. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum
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1639 est quod contingens aliquod dupliciter potest considerari. Uno
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1640 modo, in seipso, secundum quod iam actu est. Et sic non
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diff changeset
1641 consideratur ut futurum, sed ut praesens, neque ut ad utrumlibet
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1642 contingens, sed ut determinatum ad unum. Et propter hoc, sic
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diff changeset
1643 infallibiliter subdi potest certae cognitioni, utpote sensui visus,
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diff changeset
1644 sicut cum video Socratem sedere. Alio modo potest considerari
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diff changeset
1645 contingens, ut est in sua causa. Et sic consideratur ut futurum, et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1646 ut contingens nondum determinatum ad unum, quia causa contingens se
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diff changeset
1647 habet ad opposita. Et sic contingens non subditur per certitudinem
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diff changeset
1648 alicui cognitioni. Unde quicumque cognoscit effectum contingentem
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1649 in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi coniecturalem
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1650 cognitionem. Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum
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diff changeset
1651 prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est
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diff changeset
1652 actu in seipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non
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diff changeset
1653 tamen Deus successive cognoscit contingentia, prout sunt in suo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1654 esse, sicut nos, sed simul. Quia sua cognitio mensuratur
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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1655 aeternitate, sicut etiam suum esse, aeternitas autem, tota simul
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1656 existens, ambit totum tempus, ut supra dictum est. Unde omnia quae
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diff changeset
1657 sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea
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diff changeset
1658 ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam
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1659 dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout
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diff changeset
1660 sunt in sua praesentialitate. Unde manifestum est quod contingentia
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1661 et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, inquantum subduntur divino
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diff changeset
1662 conspectui secundum suam praesentialitatem, et tamen sunt futura
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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1663 contingentia, suis causis comparata.</p></div></div>
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1664 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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1665 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p8"
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1666 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the supreme
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1667 cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the
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1668 proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is
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diff changeset
1669 contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the
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1670 movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So
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diff changeset
1671 likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1672 proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first
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diff changeset
1673 cause, is necessary.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1674 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="28995"><span class=
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diff changeset
1675 "ref">[28995] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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diff changeset
1676 dicendum quod, licet causa suprema sit necessaria, tamen effectus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1677 potest esse contingens, propter causam proximam contingentem, sicut
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1678 germinatio plantae est contingens propter causam proximam
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diff changeset
1679 contingentem, licet motus solis, qui est causa prima, sit
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diff changeset
1680 necessarius. Et similiter scita a Deo sunt contingentia propter
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diff changeset
1681 causas proximas, licet scientia Dei, quae est causa prima, sit
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diff changeset
1682 necessaria.</p></div></div>
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1683 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1684 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as
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1685 this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies
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1686 to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass
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1687 will grow."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p10" shownumber="no"> Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew
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1688 anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.</p>
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1689 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="28996"><span class=
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diff changeset
1690 "ref">[28996] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1691 dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod hoc antecedens, Deus scivit hoc
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diff changeset
1692 contingens futurum, non est necessarium, sed contingens, quia,
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diff changeset
1693 licet sit praeteritum, tamen importat respectum ad futurum. Sed hoc
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diff changeset
1694 non tollit ei necessitatem, quia id quod habuit respectum ad
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diff changeset
1695 futurum, necesse est habuisse, licet etiam futurum non sequatur
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diff changeset
1696 quandoque. Alii vero dicunt hoc antecedens esse contingens, quia
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parents:
diff changeset
1697 est compositum ex necessario et contingenti; sicut istud dictum est
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diff changeset
1698 contingens, Socratem esse hominem album. Sed hoc etiam nihil est.
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diff changeset
1699 Quia cum dicitur, Deus scivit esse futurum hoc contingens,
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parents:
diff changeset
1700 contingens non ponitur ibi nisi ut materia verbi, et non sicut
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diff changeset
1701 principalis pars propositionis, unde contingentia eius vel
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diff changeset
1702 necessitas nihil refert ad hoc quod propositio sit necessaria vel
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diff changeset
1703 contingens, vera vel falsa. Ita enim potest esse verum me dixisse
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diff changeset
1704 hominem esse asinum, sicut me dixisse Socratem currere, vel Deum
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diff changeset
1705 esse, et eadem ratio est de necessario et contingenti. Unde
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1706 dicendum est quod hoc antecedens est necessarium absolute. Nec
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diff changeset
1707 tamen sequitur, ut quidam dicunt, quod consequens sit necessarium
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1708 absolute, quia antecedens est causa remota consequentis, quod
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diff changeset
1709 propter causam proximam contingens est. Sed hoc nihil est. Esset
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parents:
diff changeset
1710 enim conditionalis falsa, cuius antecedens esset causa remota
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parents:
diff changeset
1711 necessaria, et consequens effectus contingens, ut puta si dicerem,
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diff changeset
1712 si sol movetur, herba germinabit. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod
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diff changeset
1713 quando in antecedente ponitur aliquid pertinens ad actum animae,
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diff changeset
1714 consequens est accipiendum non secundum quod in se est, sed
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diff changeset
1715 secundum quod est in anima, aliud enim est esse rei in seipsa, et
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diff changeset
1716 esse rei in anima. Ut puta, si dicam, si anima intelligit aliquid,
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diff changeset
1717 illud est immateriale, intelligendum est quod illud est immateriale
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1718 secundum quod est in intellectu, non secundum quod est in seipso.
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1719 Et similiter si dicam, si Deus scivit aliquid, illud erit,
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diff changeset
1720 consequens intelligendum est prout subest divinae scientiae,
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1721 scilicet prout est in sua praesentialitate. Et sic necessarium est,
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1722 sicut et antecedens, <i>quia omne quod est, dum est, necesse est
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diff changeset
1723 esse</i>, ut dicitur in I Periherm.</p></div></div>
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1724 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1725 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling
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1726 by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it
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1727 refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p12" shownumber="no"> Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,
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1728 "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus
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1729 material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.</p>
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1730 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="28997"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1731 "ref">[28997] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1732 dicendum quod ea quae temporaliter in actum reducuntur, a nobis
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diff changeset
1733 successive cognoscuntur in tempore, sed a Deo in aeternitate, quae
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diff changeset
1734 est supra tempus. Unde nobis, quia cognoscimus futura contingentia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1735 inquantum talia sunt, certa esse non possunt, sed soli Deo, cuius
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1736 intelligere est in aeternitate supra tempus. Sicut ille qui vadit
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1737 per viam, non videt illos qui post eum veniunt, sed ille qui ab
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diff changeset
1738 aliqua altitudine totam viam intuetur, simul videt omnes
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1739 transeuntes per viam. Et ideo illud quod scitur a nobis, oportet
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diff changeset
1740 esse necessarium etiam secundum quod in se est, quia ea quae in se
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diff changeset
1741 sunt contingentia futura, a nobis sciri non possunt. Sed ea quae
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diff changeset
1742 sunt scita a Deo, oportet esse necessaria secundum modum quo
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diff changeset
1743 subsunt divinae scientiae, ut dictum est, non autem absolute,
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diff changeset
1744 secundum quod in propriis causis considerantur. Unde et haec
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diff changeset
1745 propositio, omne scitum a Deo necessarium est esse, consuevit
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diff changeset
1746 distingui. Quia potest esse de re, vel de dicto. Si intelligatur de
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diff changeset
1747 re, est divisa et falsa, et est sensus, omnis res quam Deus scit,
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diff changeset
1748 est necessaria. Vel potest intelligi de dicto, et sic est composita
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diff changeset
1749 et vera; et est sensus, hoc dictum, scitum a Deo esse, est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1750 necessarium. Sed obstant quidam, dicentes quod ista distinctio
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diff changeset
1751 habet locum in formis separabilibus a subiecto; ut si dicam, album
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diff changeset
1752 possibile est esse nigrum. Quae quidem de dicto est falsa, et de re
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diff changeset
1753 est vera, res enim quae est alba, potest esse nigra; sed hoc
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1754 dictum, album esse nigrum, nunquam potest esse verum. In formis
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1755 autem inseparabilibus a subiecto, non habet locum praedicta
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diff changeset
1756 distinctio; ut si dicam, corvum nigrum possibile est esse album,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1757 quia in utroque sensu est falsa. Esse autem scitum a Deo, est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1758 inseparabile a re, quia quod est scitum a Deo, non potest esse non
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parents:
diff changeset
1759 scitum. Haec autem instantia locum haberet, si hoc quod dico
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1760 scitum, importaret aliquam dispositionem subiecto inhaerentem. Sed
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diff changeset
1761 cum importet actum scientis, ipsi rei scitae, licet semper sciatur,
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diff changeset
1762 potest aliquid attribui secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei
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parents:
diff changeset
1763 inquantum stat sub actu sciendi, sicut esse materiale attribuitur
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1764 lapidi secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei secundum quod est
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diff changeset
1765 intelligibile.</p></div></div>
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1766 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14" next="FP_Q14_A15" prev="FP_Q14_A13" progress="2.77%" n="xiv" title="Article. 14 - Whether God knows enunciable things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p0.1">Whether God knows enunciable things?</h4>
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1767 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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1768 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p2"
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1769 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1770 enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1771 intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1772 there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1773 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1774 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1"><a name="28998"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1775 "ref">[28998] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
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diff changeset
1776 decimumquartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat
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diff changeset
1777 enuntiabilia. Cognoscere enim enuntiabilia convenit intellectui
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1778 nostro, secundum quod componit et dividit. Sed in intellectu divino
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1779 nulla est compositio. Ergo Deus non cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
1780 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
1781 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p3"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1782 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every kind of knowledge
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1783 is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of
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diff changeset
1784 enunciable things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1785 not know enunciable things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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diff changeset
1786 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2"><a name="28999"><span class=
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diff changeset
1787 "ref">[28999] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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diff changeset
1788 omnis cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Sed in Deo nulla est
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diff changeset
1789 similitudo enuntiabilium, cum sit omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1790 cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
1791 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
1792 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p4"
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diff changeset
1793 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Lord
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diff changeset
1794 knoweth the thoughts of men" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.93.11"
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diff changeset
1795 parsed="vul|Ps|93|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p4.1"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1796 passage="Ps. 93:11">Ps. 93:11</scripRef>). But enunciable things are
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1797 contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1798 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
1799 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 s. c."><a name="29000"><span class=
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diff changeset
1800 "ref">[29000] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1801 quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, <i>dominus scit cogitationes
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diff changeset
1802 hominum</i>. Sed enuntiabilia continentur in cogitationibus
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diff changeset
1803 hominum. Ergo Deus cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
1804 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1805 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p6" shownumber="no"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our
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1806 intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine
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diff changeset
1807 intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.</p>
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1808 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 co."><a name="29001"><span class=
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diff changeset
1809 "ref">[29001] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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diff changeset
1810 quod, cum formare enuntiabilia sit in potestate intellectus nostri;
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diff changeset
1811 Deus autem scit quidquid est in potentia sua vel creaturae, ut
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diff changeset
1812 supra dictum est; necesse est quod Deus sciat omnia enuntiabilia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1813 quae formari possunt. Sed, sicut scit materialia immaterialiter, et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1814 composita simpliciter, ita scit enuntiabilia non per modum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1815 enuntiabilium, quasi scilicet in intellectu eius sit compositio vel
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1816 divisio enuntiabilium; sed unumquodque cognoscit per simplicem
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parents:
diff changeset
1817 intelligentiam, intelligendo essentiam uniuscuiusque. Sicut si nos
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1818 in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid est homo, intelligeremus omnia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1819 quae de homine praedicari possunt. Quod quidem in intellectu nostro
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1820 non contingit, qui de uno in aliud discurrit, propter hoc quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1821 species intelligibilis sic repraesentat unum, quod non repraesentat
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1822 aliud. Unde, intelligendo quid est homo, non ex hoc ipso alia quae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1823 ei insunt, intelligimus; sed divisim, secundum quandam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1824 successionem. Et propter hoc, ea quae seorsum intelligimus, oportet
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1825 nos in unum redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1826 enuntiationem formando. Sed species intellectus divini, scilicet
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1827 eius essentia, sufficit ad demonstrandum omnia. Unde, intelligendo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1828 essentiam suam, cognoscit essentias omnium, et quaecumque eis
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1829 accidere possunt.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
1830 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
1831 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p7"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1832 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection would
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1833 avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1834 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1835 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 1"><a name="29002"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1836 "ref">[29002] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1837 dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus cognosceret
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1838 enuntiabilia per modum enuntiabilium.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
1839 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1840 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p8"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1841 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enunciatory composition
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1842 signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1843 which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1844 signified by enunciation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1845 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 2"><a name="29003"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1846 "ref">[29003] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1847 dicendum quod compositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod esse rei,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1848 et sic Deus per suum esse, quod est eius essentia, est similitudo
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parents:
diff changeset
1849 omnium eorum quae per enuntiabilia significantur.</p></div></div>
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parents:
diff changeset
1850 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" next="FP_Q14_A16"
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parents:
diff changeset
1851 prev="FP_Q14_A14" progress="2.79%" n="xv" title="Article. 15 - Whether
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1852 the knowledge of God is variable?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1853 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1854 variable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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parents:
diff changeset
1855 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1856 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1857 seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1858 to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1859 applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1860 creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1861 variation of creatures.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1862 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1"><a name="29004"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1863 "ref">[29004] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1864 decimumquintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1865 variabilis. Scientia enim relative dicitur ad scibile. Sed ea quae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1866 important relationem ad creaturam, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1867 variantur secundum variationem creaturarum. Ergo scientia Dei est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1868 variabilis, secundum variationem creaturarum.</p></div></div><div
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parents:
diff changeset
1869 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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diff changeset
1870 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p3"
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parents:
diff changeset
1871 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever God can make, He
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1872 can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1873 more than He knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1874 and diminution.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1875 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2"><a name="29005"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1876 "ref">[29005] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1877 quidquid potest Deus facere, potest scire. Sed Deus potest plura
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1878 facere quam faciat. Ergo potest plura scire quam sciat. Et sic
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1879 scientia sua potest variari secundum augmentum et
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parents:
diff changeset
1880 diminutionem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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parents:
diff changeset
1881 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1882 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
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parents:
diff changeset
1883 Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1884 that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1885 future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1886 the knowledge of God is variable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
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parents:
diff changeset
1887 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3"><a name="29006"><span class=
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diff changeset
1888 "ref">[29006] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1889 scivit Christum nasciturum. Nunc autem nescit Christum nasciturum,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1890 quia Christus nasciturus non est. Ergo non quidquid Deus scivit,
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parents:
diff changeset
1891 scit. Et ita scientia Dei videtur esse variabilis.</p></div></div><div
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parents:
diff changeset
1892 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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diff changeset
1893 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p5"
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parents:
diff changeset
1894 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, that in God "there
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1895 is no change nor shadow of alteration" (<scripRef
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parents:
diff changeset
1896 osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.1.17" parsed="vul|Jas|1|17|0|0"
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parents:
diff changeset
1897 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p5.1" passage="James 1:17">James
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parents:
diff changeset
1898 1:17</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1899 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 s. c."><a name="29007"><span class=
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parents:
diff changeset
1900 "ref">[29007] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1901 quod dicitur Iac. I, quod <i>apud Deum non est transmutatio, neque
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parents:
diff changeset
1902 vicissitudinis obumbratio</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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parents:
diff changeset
1903 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1904 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I
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parents:
diff changeset
1905 answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1906 clear from the foregoing <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6.1"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1907 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4" shape="rect"
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parents:
diff changeset
1908 xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1909 immutable, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6.2"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1910 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9],
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1911 A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1912 invariable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1913 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 co."><a name="29008"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1914 "ref">[29008] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1915 quod, cum scientia Dei sit eius substantia, ut ex dictis patet;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1916 sicut substantia eius est omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1917 est, ita oportet scientiam eius omnino invariabilem esse.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent
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parents:
diff changeset
1918 upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1919 themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1920 attributed to God variously, according to the variation of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1921 creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import relations
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1922 consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1923 therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1924 manner.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1925 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 1"><a name="29009"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1926 "ref">[29009] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1927 dicendum quod dominus et creator, et huiusmodi, important
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1928 relationes ad creaturas secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Sed scientia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1929 Dei importat relationem ad creaturas secundum quod sunt in Deo,
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ht
parents:
diff changeset
1930 quia secundum hoc est unumquodque intellectum in actu quod est in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1931 intelligente. Res autem creatae sunt in Deo invariabiliter, in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1932 seipsis autem variabiliter. Vel aliter dicendum est, quod dominus
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1933 et creator, et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1934 actus qui intelliguntur terminari ad ipsas creaturas secundum quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1935 in seipsis sunt, et ideo huiusmodi relationes varie de Deo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1936 dicuntur, secundum variationem creaturarum. Sed scientia et amor,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1937 et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur actus qui
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parents:
diff changeset
1938 intelliguntur in Deo esse, et ideo invariabiliter praedicantur de
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parents:
diff changeset
1939 Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His
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1940 knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because
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parents:
diff changeset
1941 such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
1942 then afterwards knew.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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parents:
diff changeset
1943 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 2"><a name="29010"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1944 "ref">[29010] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1945 dicendum quod Deus scit etiam ea quae potest facere et non facit.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1946 Unde ex hoc quod potest plura facere quam facit, non sequitur quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1947 possit plura scire quam sciat, nisi hoc referatur ad scientiam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1948 visionis, secundum quam dicitur scire ea quae sunt in actu secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1949 aliquod tempus. Ex hoc tamen quod scit quod aliqua possunt esse
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1950 quae non sunt, vel non esse quae sunt, non sequitur quod scientia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1951 sua sit variabilis, sed quod cognoscat rerum variabilitatem. Si
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1952 tamen aliquid esset quod prius Deus nescivisset et postea sciret,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1953 esset eius scientia variabilis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1954 quidquid est vel potest esse secundum aliquod tempus, Deus in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1955 aeterno suo scit. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod ponitur aliquid esse
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1956 secundum quodcumque tempus, oportet poni quod ab aeterno sit scitum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1957 a Deo. Et ideo non debet concedi quod Deus possit plura scire quam
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parents:
diff changeset
1958 sciat, quia haec propositio implicat quod ante nesciverit et postea
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parents:
diff changeset
1959 sciat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because the same thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes
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parents:
diff changeset
1960 a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1961 variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1962 example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1963 if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it;
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1964 or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1965 sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1966 which can be in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1967 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 3"><a name="29011"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1968 "ref">[29011] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1969 dicendum quod antiqui nominales dixerunt idem esse enuntiabile,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1970 Christum nasci, et esse nasciturum, et esse natum, quia eadem res
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1971 significatur per haec tria, scilicet nativitas Christi. Et secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1972 hoc sequitur quod Deus quidquid scivit, sciat, quia modo scit
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1973 Christum natum, quod significat idem ei quod est Christum esse
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1974 nasciturum. Sed haec opinio falsa est. Tum quia diversitas partium
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1975 orationis diversitatem enuntiabilium causat. Tum etiam quia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1976 sequeretur quod propositio quae semel est vera, esset semper vera,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1977 quod est contra philosophum, qui dicit quod haec oratio, Socrates
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1978 sedet, vera est eo sedente, et eadem falsa est, eo surgente. Et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1979 ideo concedendum est quod haec non est vera, quidquid Deus scivit,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1980 scit, si ad enuntiabilia referatur. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1981 scientia Dei sit variabilis. Sicut enim absque variatione divinae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1982 scientiae est, quod sciat unam et eandem rem quandoque esse et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1983 quandoque non esse; ita absque variatione divinae scientiae est,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1984 quod scit aliquod enuntiabile quandoque esse verum, et quandoque
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1985 esse falsum. Esset autem ex hoc scientia Dei variabilis, si
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1986 enuntiabilia cognosceret per modum enuntiabilium, componendo et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1987 dividendo, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro. Unde cognitio nostra
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1988 variatur, vel secundum veritatem et falsitatem, puta si, mutata re,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
1989 eandem opinionem de re illa retineamus, vel secundum diversas
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1990 opiniones, ut si primo opinemur aliquem sedere, et postea opinemur
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1991 eum non sedere. Quorum neutrum potest esse in Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16" next="FP_Q15" prev="FP_Q14_A15" progress="2.82%" n="xvi" title="Article. 16 - Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4>
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diff changeset
1992 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents:
diff changeset
1993 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p2"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1994 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1995 speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
1996 of things, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p2.1"
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diff changeset
1997 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect"
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1998 xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the
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diff changeset
1999 cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
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diff changeset
2000 speculative.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
2001 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1"><a name="29012"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
2002 "ref">[29012] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
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diff changeset
2003 decimumsextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus de rebus non habeat
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diff changeset
2004 scientiam speculativam. Scientia enim Dei est causa rerum, ut supra
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diff changeset
2005 ostensum est. Sed scientia speculativa non est causa rerum
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diff changeset
2006 scitarum. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
2007 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
2008 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p3"
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parents:
diff changeset
2009 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speculative knowledge
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diff changeset
2010 comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine
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diff changeset
2011 knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
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diff changeset
2012 speculative.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
2013 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2"><a name="29013"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
2014 "ref">[29013] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea.
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parents:
diff changeset
2015 Scientia speculativa est per abstractionem a rebus, quod divinae
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diff changeset
2016 scientiae non competit. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
2017 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
2018 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p4"
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parents:
diff changeset
2019 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is the more excellent
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parents:
diff changeset
2020 must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent
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parents:
diff changeset
2021 than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of
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parents:
diff changeset
2022 Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2023 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2024 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 s. c."><a name="29014"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2025 "ref">[29014] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
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parents:
diff changeset
2026 quod est nobilius, Deo est attribuendum. Sed scientia speculativa
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parents:
diff changeset
2027 est nobilior quam practica, ut patet per philosophum, in principio
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parents:
diff changeset
2028 Metaphys. Ergo Deus habet de rebus scientiam speculativam.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
2029 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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2030 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing---as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing,
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diff changeset
2031 and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the
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diff changeset
2032 end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative
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diff changeset
2033 and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p6" shownumber="no"> In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p7" shownumber="no"> Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the
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diff changeset
2034 physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.</p>
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parents:
diff changeset
2035 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 co."><a name="29015"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2036 "ref">[29015] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2037 quod aliqua scientia est speculativa tantum, aliqua practica
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2038 tantum, aliqua vero secundum aliquid speculativa et secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2039 aliquid practica. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod aliqua
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2040 scientia potest dici speculativa tripliciter. Primo, ex parte rerum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2041 scitarum, quae non sunt operabiles a sciente, sicut est scientia
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2042 hominis de rebus naturalibus vel divinis. Secundo, quantum ad modum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2043 sciendi, ut puta si aedificator consideret domum definiendo et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2044 dividendo et considerando universalia praedicata ipsius. Hoc
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parents:
diff changeset
2045 siquidem est operabilia modo speculativo considerare, et non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2046 secundum quod operabilia sunt, operabile enim est aliquid per
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2047 applicationem formae ad materiam, non per resolutionem compositi in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2048 principia universalia formalia. Tertio, quantum ad finem, <i>nam
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parents:
diff changeset
2049 intellectus practicus differt fine a speculativo</i>, sicut dicitur
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2050 in III de anima. Intellectus enim practicus ordinatur ad finem
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parents:
diff changeset
2051 operationis, finis autem intellectus speculativi est consideratio
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2052 veritatis. Unde, si quis aedificator consideret qualiter posset
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2053 fieri aliqua domus, non ordinans ad finem operationis, sed ad
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2054 cognoscendum tantum, erit, quantum ad finem, speculativa
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2055 consideratio, tamen de re operabili. Scientia igitur quae est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2056 speculativa ratione ipsius rei scitae, est speculativa tantum. Quae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2057 vero speculativa est vel secundum modum vel secundum finem, est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2058 secundum quid speculativa et secundum quid practica. Cum vero
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2059 ordinatur ad finem operationis, est simpliciter practica. Secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2060 hoc ergo, dicendum est quod Deus de seipso habet scientiam
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parents:
diff changeset
2061 speculativam tantum, ipse enim operabilis non est. De omnibus vero
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2062 aliis habet scientiam et speculativam et practicam. Speculativam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2063 quidem, quantum ad modum, quidquid enim in rebus nos speculative
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2064 cognoscimus definiendo et dividendo, hoc totum Deus multo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2065 perfectius novit. Sed de his quae potest quidem facere, sed
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2066 secundum nullum tempus facit, non habet practicam scientiam,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2067 secundum quod practica scientia dicitur a fine. Sic autem habet
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parents:
diff changeset
2068 practicam scientiam de his quae secundum aliquod tempus facit. Mala
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2069 vero, licet ab eo non sint operabilia, tamen sub cognitione
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2070 practica ipsius cadunt, sicut et bona, inquantum permittit vel
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2071 impedit vel ordinat ea, sicut et aegritudines cadunt sub practica
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2072 scientia medici, inquantum per artem suam curat eas.</p></div></div>
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parents:
diff changeset
2073 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
2074 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p8"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2075 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of God is
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2076 the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2077 the cause of some, that is, of things that come to be in some period
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2078 of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things
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parents:
diff changeset
2079 which He can make, and which nevertheless are never
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
2080 made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 1"><a name="29016"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2081 "ref">[29016] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2082 dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa, non quidem sui ipsius, sed
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2083 aliorum, quorundam quidem actu, scilicet eorum quae secundum
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parents:
diff changeset
2084 aliquod tempus fiunt; quorundam vero virtute, scilicet eorum quae
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2085 potest facere, et tamen nunquam fiunt.</p></div></div>
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parents:
diff changeset
2086 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2087 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as it is human.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p10" shownumber="no"> In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2088 knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.</p>
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parents:
diff changeset
2089 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 2"><a name="29017"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2090 "ref">[29017] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2091 dicendum quod scientiam esse acceptam a rebus scitis, non per se
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2092 convenit scientiae speculativae, sed per accidens, inquantum est
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2093 humana.</p><p title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 3"><a name="29018"><span class=
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2094 "ref">[29018] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 ad 3</span></a> Ad id vero quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2095 in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod de operabilibus perfecta
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2096 scientia non habetur, nisi sciantur inquantum operabilia sunt. Et
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2097 ideo, cum scientia Dei sit omnibus modis perfecta, oportet quod
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2098 sciat ea quae sunt a se operabilia, inquantum huiusmodi, et non
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2099 solum secundum quod sunt speculabilia. Sed tamen non receditur a
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parents:
diff changeset
2100 nobilitate speculativae scientiae, quia omnia alia a se videt in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2101 seipso, seipsum autem speculative cognoscit; et sic in speculativa
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2102 sui ipsius scientia, habet cognitionem et speculativam et practicam
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2103 omnium aliorum.</p></div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2104 </div></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2105 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15" next="FP_Q15_A1" prev="FP_Q14_A16" progress="2.85%" n="xiv" title="Question. 15 - OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
2106 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p0.1">Question 15. OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
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parents:
diff changeset
2107 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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parents:
diff changeset
2108 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there are ideas?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether they are many, or one only?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?</p>
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parents:
diff changeset
2109 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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diff changeset
2110 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1" next="FP_Q15_A2" prev="FP_Q15" progress="2.86%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there are ideas?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Whether there are ideas?</h4>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2111 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
2112 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2113 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
2114 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2115 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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diff changeset
2116 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2117 him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p7" shownumber="no"> In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made
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2118 pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.iv.FP_Q46.FP_Q46_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2119 world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.</p>
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parents:
diff changeset
2120 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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diff changeset
2121 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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2122 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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2123 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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2124 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2" next="FP_Q15_A3" prev="FP_Q15_A1" progress="2.88%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether ideas are many?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Whether ideas are many?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one,
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2125 except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the
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2126 accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot
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2127 be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily
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2128 be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it
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2129 would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to
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2130 which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house,
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2131 as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3" next="FP_Q16" prev="FP_Q15_A2" progress="2.92%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" href="#FP_Q15_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to
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2132 everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;
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2133 whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved.
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2134 However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to
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2135 individuals as will be shown later (<a
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2136 id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3"
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2137 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[3]</a> ).</p></div></div></div></div>
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2138 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16" next="FP_Q16_A1" prev="FP_Q15_A3" progress="2.95%" n="xv" title="Question. 16 - OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
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2139 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p0.1">Question 16. OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
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2140 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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2141 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p2" shownumber="no"> Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) On the comparison of the true to being.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether God is truth?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) On the eternity of truth.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.</p>
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2142 </div></div><div
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2143 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 pr."><a name="29048"><span class="ref">[29048]
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2144 I&ordf; q. 16 pr.</span></a> Quoniam autem scientia verorum est,
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2145 post considerationem scientiae Dei, de veritate inquirendum est.
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2146 Circa quam quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum veritas sit in re, vel
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2147 tantum in intellectu. Secundo, utrum sit tantum in intellectu
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2148 componente et dividente. Tertio, de comparatione veri ad ens.
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2149 Quarto, de comparatione veri ad bonum. Quinto, utrum Deus sit
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2150 veritas. Sexto, utrum omnia sint vera veritate una, vel pluribus.
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2151 Septimo, de aeternitate veritatis. Octavo, de incommutabilitate
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2152 ipsius.</p></div></div>
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2153 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" next="FP_Q16_A2" prev="FP_Q16" progress="2.95%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect?</h4>
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2154 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true,
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2155 unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That
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2156 is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and
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2157 not in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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2158 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29049"><span class=
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2159 "ref">[29049] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
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2160 proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit tantum in intellectu, sed
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2161 magis in rebus. Augustinus enim, in libro Soliloq., reprobat hanc
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2162 notificationem veri, verum est id quod videtur, quia secundum hoc,
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2163 lapides qui sunt in abditissimo terrae sinu, non essent veri
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2164 lapides, quia non videntur. Reprobat etiam istam, verum est quod
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2165 ita se habet ut videtur cognitori, si velit et possit cognoscere,
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2166 quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod nihil esset verum, si nullus
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2167 posset cognoscere. Et definit sic verum, verum est id quod est. Et
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2168 sic videtur quod veritas sit in rebus, et non in intellectu.</p></div></div>
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2169 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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2170 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p3"
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2171 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is true, is true
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2172 by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing
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2173 will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the
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2174 error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be
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2175 true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as
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2176 seen by different persons at the same time.</p></div><div
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2177 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29050"><span class=
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2178 "ref">[29050] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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2179 quidquid est verum, veritate verum est. Si igitur veritas est in
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2180 intellectu solo, nihil erit verum nisi secundum quod intelligitur,
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2181 quod est error antiquorum philosophorum, qui dicebant omne quod
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2182 videtur, esse verum. Ad quod sequitur contradictoria simul esse
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2183 vera, cum contradictoria simul a diversis vera esse videantur.</p></div></div>
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2184 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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2185 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p4"
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2186 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "that, on account of
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2187 which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the
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2188 Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is
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2189 not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher
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2190 teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things
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2191 than in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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2192 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29051"><span class=
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2193 "ref">[29051] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea,
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2194 propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis</i>, ut patet I Poster.
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2195 <i>Sed ex eo quod res est vel non est, est opinio vel oratio vera
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2196 vel falsa</i>, secundum philosophum in praedicamentis. Ergo veritas
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2197 magis est in rebus quam in intellectu.</p></div></div>
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2198 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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2199 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p5"
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2200 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says
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2201 (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in
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2202 the intellect."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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2203 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29052"><span class=
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2204 "ref">[29052] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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2205 quod philosophus dicit, VI Metaphys., quod <i>verum et falsum non
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2206 sunt in rebus, sed in intellectu</i>.</p></div></div>
19
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2207 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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2208 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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2209 namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite---and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be
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2210 true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p7" shownumber="no"> Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
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2211 intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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2212 Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone";
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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2213 for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.</p>
22
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2214 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 co."><a name="29053"><span class=
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2215 "ref">[29053] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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diff changeset
2216 quod, sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum
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diff changeset
2217 nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter
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diff changeset
2218 appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia
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diff changeset
2219 cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, appetitus
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diff changeset
2220 autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam.
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diff changeset
2221 Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili,
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diff changeset
2222 sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu.
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diff changeset
2223 Sicut autem bonum est in re, inquantum habet ordinem ad appetitum;
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diff changeset
2224 et propter hoc ratio bonitatis derivatur a re appetibili in
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diff changeset
2225 appetitum, secundum quod appetitus dicitur bonus, prout est boni,
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diff changeset
2226 ita, cum verum sit in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei
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diff changeset
2227 intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem
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diff changeset
2228 intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur,
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diff changeset
2229 secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum. Res autem
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diff changeset
2230 intellecta ad intellectum aliquem potest habere ordinem vel per se,
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diff changeset
2231 vel per accidens. Per se quidem habet ordinem ad intellectum a quo
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diff changeset
2232 dependet secundum suum esse, per accidens autem ad intellectum a
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diff changeset
2233 quo cognoscibilis est. Sicut si dicamus quod domus comparatur ad
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diff changeset
2234 intellectum artificis per se, per accidens autem comparatur ad
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diff changeset
2235 intellectum a quo non dependet. Iudicium autem de re non sumitur
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diff changeset
2236 secundum id quod inest ei per accidens, sed secundum id quod inest
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diff changeset
2237 ei per se. Unde unaquaeque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum
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diff changeset
2238 ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet. Et inde est quod res
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diff changeset
2239 artificiales dicuntur verae per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum,
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diff changeset
2240 dicitur enim domus vera, quae assequitur similitudinem formae quae
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diff changeset
2241 est in mente artificis; et dicitur oratio vera, inquantum est
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diff changeset
2242 signum intellectus veri. Et similiter res naturales dicuntur esse
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diff changeset
2243 verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt
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diff changeset
2244 in mente divina, dicitur enim verus lapis, qui assequitur propriam
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diff changeset
2245 lapidis naturam, secundum praeconceptionem intellectus divini. Sic
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diff changeset
2246 ergo veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in
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diff changeset
2247 rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium.
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diff changeset
2248 Et secundum hoc, veritas diversimode notificatur. Nam Augustinus,
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diff changeset
2249 in libro de vera Relig., dicit quod <i>veritas est, qua ostenditur
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diff changeset
2250 id quod est</i>. Et Hilarius dicit quod <i>verum est declarativum
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diff changeset
2251 aut manifestativum esse</i>. Et hoc pertinet ad veritatem secundum
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2252 quod est in intellectu. Ad veritatem autem rei secundum ordinem ad
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diff changeset
2253 intellectum, pertinet definitio Augustini in libro de vera Relig.,
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2254 <i>veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla
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diff changeset
2255 dissimilitudine est</i>. Et quaedam definitio Anselmi, <i>veritas
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diff changeset
2256 est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis</i>; nam rectum est, quod
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diff changeset
2257 principio concordat. Et quaedam definitio Avicennae, <i>veritas
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diff changeset
2258 uniuscuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est
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diff changeset
2259 ei</i>. Quod autem dicitur quod veritas est adaequatio rei et
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diff changeset
2260 intellectus potest ad utrumque pertinere.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
2261 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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2262 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p8"
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diff changeset
2263 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking
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diff changeset
2264 about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth,
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diff changeset
2265 relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from
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diff changeset
2266 every definition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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2267 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29054"><span class=
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diff changeset
2268 "ref">[29054] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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diff changeset
2269 dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate rei; et excludit a
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diff changeset
2270 ratione huius veritatis, comparationem ad intellectum nostrum. Nam
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diff changeset
2271 id quod est per accidens, ab unaquaque definitione excluditur.</p></div></div>
19
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2272 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their
22
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diff changeset
2273 relation to the divine intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
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2274 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29055"><span class=
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diff changeset
2275 "ref">[29055] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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diff changeset
2276 dicendum quod antiqui philosophi species rerum naturalium non
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diff changeset
2277 dicebant procedere ab aliquo intellectu, sed eas provenire a casu,
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diff changeset
2278 et quia considerabant quod verum importat comparationem ad
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diff changeset
2279 intellectum, cogebantur veritatem rerum constituere in ordine ad
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diff changeset
2280 intellectum nostrum. Ex quo inconvenientia sequebantur quae
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diff changeset
2281 philosophus prosequitur in IV Metaphys. Quae quidem inconvenientia
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diff changeset
2282 non accidunt, si ponamus veritatem rerum consistere in comparatione
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
2283 ad intellectum divinum.</p></div></div>
19
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2284 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought
22
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diff changeset
2285 or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
2286 thing is true."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
2287 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29056"><span class=
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diff changeset
2288 "ref">[29056] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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diff changeset
2289 dicendum quod, licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non
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diff changeset
2290 tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis,
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diff changeset
2291 sicut neque in medicina per prius invenitur ratio sanitatis quam in
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diff changeset
2292 animali; virtus enim medicinae, non sanitas eius, causat sanitatem,
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diff changeset
2293 cum non sit agens univocum. Et similiter esse rei, non veritas
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diff changeset
2294 eius, causat veritatem intellectus. Unde philosophus dicit quod
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diff changeset
2295 opinio et oratio vera est <i>ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res
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diff changeset
2296 vera est</i>.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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2297 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" next="FP_Q16_A3" prev="FP_Q16_A1" progress="2.99%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</h4>
22
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2298 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
2299 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p2"
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diff changeset
2300 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not
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diff changeset
2301 reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the
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diff changeset
2302 Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as
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diff changeset
2303 regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards
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diff changeset
2304 "what a thing is." Now composition and division are neither in the
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diff changeset
2305 senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth
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diff changeset
2306 does not reside only in the intellect composing and
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
2307 dividing.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
2308 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29057"><span class=
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diff changeset
2309 "ref">[29057] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
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diff changeset
2310 proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit solum in intellectu
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diff changeset
2311 componente et dividente. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima,
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diff changeset
2312 quod sicut sensus propriorum sensibilium semper veri sunt, ita et
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diff changeset
2313 intellectus eius quod quid est. Sed compositio et divisio non est
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diff changeset
2314 neque in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est. Ergo
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diff changeset
2315 veritas non solum est in compositione et divisione intellectus.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
2316 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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2317 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p3"
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diff changeset
2318 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac says in his book On
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diff changeset
2319 Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just
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diff changeset
2320 as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to
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diff changeset
2321 things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of
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diff changeset
2322 sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside
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diff changeset
2323 only in the intellect composing and dividing.</p></div><div
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diff changeset
2324 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29058"><span class=
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2325 "ref">[29058] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Isaac
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diff changeset
2326 dicit, in libro de definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
2327 et intellectus. Sed sicut intellectus complexorum potest adaequari
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diff changeset
2328 rebus, ita intellectus incomplexorum, et etiam sensus sentiens rem
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diff changeset
2329 ut est. Ergo veritas non est solum in compositione et divisione
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diff changeset
2330 intellectus.</p></div></div>
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2331 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
2332 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p4"
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diff changeset
2333 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says
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diff changeset
2334 (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is,"
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diff changeset
2335 truth is "found neither in the intellect nor in things."</p></div><div
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diff changeset
2336 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29059"><span class=
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2337 "ref">[29059] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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diff changeset
2338 quod dicit philosophus, in VI Metaphys., quod circa simplicia et
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diff changeset
2339 quod quid est non est veritas, nec in intellectu neque in
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diff changeset
2340 rebus.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
2341 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
2342 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2343 although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing:
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2344 for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
2345 thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p6" shownumber="no"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p>
22
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2346 </div></div>
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diff changeset
2347 <div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 2 co."><a name="29060"><span class=
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diff changeset
2348 "ref">[29060] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2349 quod verum, sicut dictum est, secundum sui primam rationem est in
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2350 intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2351 propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2352 inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habet similitudinem
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2353 rei cognitae, quae est forma eius inquantum est cognoscens. Et
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diff changeset
2354 propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur.
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2355 Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc
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diff changeset
2356 autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit, licet enim visus habeat
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2357 similitudinem visibilis, non tamen cognoscit comparationem quae est
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2358 inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea. Intellectus
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2359 autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2360 sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2361 quod quid est; sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2362 quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2363 facit componendo et dividendo, nam in omni propositione aliquam
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2364 formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2365 significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea. Et ideo bene
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2366 invenitur quod sensus est verus de aliqua re, vel intellectus
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2367 cognoscendo quod quid est, sed non quod cognoscat aut dicat verum.
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2368 Et similiter est de vocibus complexis aut incomplexis. Veritas
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2369 quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2370 quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2371 cognoscente, quod importat nomen veri; perfectio enim intellectus
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2372 est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, veritas est in
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2373 intellectu componente et dividente, non autem in sensu, neque in
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2374 intellectu cognoscente quod quid est.</p><p title="I q. 16 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="29061"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2375 "ref">[29061] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2376 patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
2377 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3" next="FP_Q16_A4"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2378 prev="FP_Q16_A2" progress="3.01%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2379 the true and being are convertible terms?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2380 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether the true and being are
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2381 convertible terms?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2382 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2383 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2384 seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2385 resides properly in the intellect, as stated <a
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2386 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2387 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2388 things. Therefore they are not convertible.</p></div><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2389 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29062"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2390 "ref">[29062] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2391 proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2392 est proprie in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2393 rebus. Ergo non convertuntur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2394 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2395 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p3"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2396 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2397 being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2398 extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2399 that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2400 convertible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
2401 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29063"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2402 "ref">[29063] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2403 quod se extendit ad ens et non ens, non convertitur cum ente. Sed
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2404 verum se extendit ad ens et non ens, nam verum est quod est esse,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2405 et quod non est non esse. Ergo verum et ens non
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2406 convertuntur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2407 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2408 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2409 Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2410 posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2411 prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
2412 the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.</p></div><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2413 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29064"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2414 "ref">[29064] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quae
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2415 se habent secundum prius et posterius, non videntur converti. Sed
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2416 verum videtur prius esse quam ens, nam ens non intelligitur nisi
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2417 sub ratione veri. Ergo videtur quod non sint
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2418 convertibilia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2419 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2420 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2421 the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2422 of things in being and in truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2423 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29065"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2424 "ref">[29065] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2425 quod dicit philosophus, II Metaphys., quod eadem est dispositio
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2426 rerum in esse et veritate.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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diff changeset
2427 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2428 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I
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diff changeset
2429 answer that,</b> As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2430 is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2431 far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2432 soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2433 intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2434 true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2435 adds relation to the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2436 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 co."><a name="29066"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2437 "ref">[29066] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2438 quod, sicut bonum habet rationem appetibilis, ita verum habet
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2439 ordinem ad cognitionem. Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2440 intantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc dicitur in III de anima,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2441 quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum. Et
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2442 ideo, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2443 sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
2444 comparationem ad intellectum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2445 intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things;
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2446 and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.</p></div><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2447 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29067"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2448 "ref">[29067] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2449 dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est.
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2450 Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2451 substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2452 ente, ut manifestativum cum manifestato. Hoc enim est de ratione
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2453 veri, ut dictum est. Quamvis posset dici quod etiam ens est in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2454 rebus et in intellectu, sicut et verum; licet verum principaliter
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ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2455 in intellectu, ens vero principaliter in rebus. Et hoc accidit
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2456 propter hoc, quod verum et ens differunt ratione.</p></div></div><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2457 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2458 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p8"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2459 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not-being has nothing in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2460 itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2461 intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2462 inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2463 is, by reason.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2464 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29068"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2465 "ref">[29068] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2466 dicendum quod non ens non habet in se unde cognoscatur, sed
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ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2467 cognoscitur inquantum intellectus facit illud cognoscibile. Unde
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ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2468 verum fundatur in ente, inquantum non ens est quoddam ens rationis,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2469 apprehensum scilicet a ratione.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2470 apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2471 true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2472 being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2473 intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2474 not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2475 is not understood by understanding being.</p></div><div style="width:
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2476 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29069"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2477 "ref">[29069] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2478 dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2479 ratione veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2480 non apprehendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur apprehensionem
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2481 entis. Et sic locutio habet veritatem. Alio modo posset sic
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2482 intelligi, quod ens non posset apprehendi, nisi apprehenderetur
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2483 ratio veri. Et hoc falsum est. Sed verum non potest apprehendi,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2484 nisi apprehendatur ratio entis, quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2485 est simile sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2486 potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile, sed tamen potest
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2487 intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas. Et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2488 similiter ens intellectum est verum, non tamen intelligendo ens,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2489 intelligitur verum.</p></div></div></div><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2490 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4" next="FP_Q16_A5" prev="FP_Q16_A3"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2491 progress="3.03%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether good is logically
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2492 prior to the true?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2493 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Whether good is logically prior to
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2494 the true?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2495 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2496 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2497 seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2498 universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2499 is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2500 namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2501 true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29070"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2502 "ref">[29070] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2503 proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2504 verum. Quod enim est universalius, secundum rationem prius est, ut
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2505 patet ex I Physic. Sed bonum est universalius quam verum, nam verum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2506 est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo bonum prius est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2507 secundum rationem quam verum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2508 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2509 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2510 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2511 the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above <a
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2512 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2513 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2514 is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2515 logically prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2516 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29071"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2517 "ref">[29071] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2518 est in rebus, verum autem in compositione et divisione intellectus,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2519 ut dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt in re, sunt priora his quae sunt in
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2520 intellectu. Ergo prius est secundum rationem bonum quam
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2521 verum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2522 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2523 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2524 Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2525 virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2526 Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2527 good is prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2528 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29072"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2529 "ref">[29072] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2530 veritas est quaedam species virtutis, ut patet in IV Ethic. Sed
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2531 virtus continetur sub bono, est enim bona qualitas mentis, ut dicit
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2532 Augustinus. Ergo bonum est prius quam verum.</p></div></div><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2533 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2534 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p5"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2535 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> What is in more things is
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2536 prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2537 as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2538 good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29073"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2539 "ref">[29073] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, quod
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2540 est in pluribus, est prius secundum rationem. Sed verum est in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2541 quibusdam in quibus non est bonum, scilicet in mathematicis. Ergo
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2542 verum est prius quam bonum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2543 from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2544 since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2545 the true must be prior in idea to the good.</p></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2546 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 co."><a name="29074"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2547 "ref">[29074] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2548 quod, licet bonum et verum supposito convertantur cum ente, tamen
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2549 ratione differunt. Et secundum hoc verum, absolute loquendo, prius
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2550 est quam bonum. Quod ex duobus apparet. Primo quidem ex hoc, quod
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2551 verum propinquius se habet ad ens, quod est prius, quam bonum. Nam
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2552 verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate, ratio autem
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2553 boni consequitur esse, secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum; sic
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2554 enim appetibile est. Secundo apparet ex hoc, quod cognitio
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2555 naturaliter praecedit appetitum. Unde, cum verum respiciat
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2556 cognitionem, bonum autem appetitum, prius erit verum quam bonum
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2557 secundum rationem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2558 fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2559 good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2560 prior absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2561 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29075"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2562 "ref">[29075] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2563 dicendum quod voluntas et intellectus mutuo se includunt, nam
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2564 intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et voluntas vult intellectum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2565 intelligere. Sic ergo inter illa quae ordinantur ad obiectum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2566 voluntatis, continentur etiam ea quae sunt intellectus; et e
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2567 converso. Unde in ordine appetibilium, bonum se habet ut
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2568 universale, et verum ut particulare, in ordine autem
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2569 intelligibilium est e converso. Ex hoc ergo quod verum est quoddam
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2570 bonum, sequitur quod bonum sit prius in ordine appetibilium, non
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2571 autem quod sit prius simpliciter.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2572 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2573 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2574 to Objection 2:</b> A thing is prior logically in so far as it is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2575 prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2576 itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2577 thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2578 is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2579 good is in things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2580 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29076"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2581 "ref">[29076] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2582 dicendum quod secundum hoc est aliquid prius ratione, quod prius
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2583 cadit in intellectu. Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2584 ens; et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens; et tertio
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2585 apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2586 ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2587 fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2588 cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2589 general.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2590 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29077"><span class=
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ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2591 "ref">[29077] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2592 dicendum quod virtus quae dicitur veritas, non est veritas
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2593 communis, sed quaedam veritas secundum quam homo in dictis et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2594 factis ostendit se ut est. Veritas autem vitae dicitur
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2595 particulariter, secundum quod homo in vita sua implet illud ad quod
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2596 ordinatur per intellectum divinum, sicut etiam dictum est veritatem
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2597 esse in ceteris rebus. Veritas autem iustitiae est secundum quod
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2598 homo servat id quod debet alteri secundum ordinem legum. Unde ex
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ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2599 his particularibus veritatibus non est procedendum ad veritatem
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2600 communem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" next="FP_Q16_A6" prev="FP_Q16_A4" progress="3.05%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God is truth?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Whether God is truth?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.14.6" parsed="vul|John|14|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" passage="Jn. 14:6">Jn. 14:6</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
2601 own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot
22
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2602 understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2603 negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2604 not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2605 "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2606 dissimilar to His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2607 right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2608 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2609 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2610 3:</b> Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2611 in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2612 intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2613 statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is entirely
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2614 from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2615 God", is a fallacy of Accident.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2616 float: right"/></div></div>
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2617 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6" next="FP_Q16_A7" prev="FP_Q16_A5"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2618 progress="3.07%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether there is only one
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2619 truth, according to which all things are true?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2620 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one truth,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2621 according to which all things are true?</h4><div style="clear: both;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2622 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left">
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2623 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p2"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2624 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is only one
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2625 truth, according to which all things are true. For according to
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2626 Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), "nothing is greater than the mind of man,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2627 except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2628 mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2629 according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2630 God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2631 God.</p></div>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2632 <div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29086"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2633 "ref">[29086] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2634 proceditur. Videtur quod una sola sit veritas, secundum quam omnia
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2635 sunt vera. Quia, secundum Augustinum, nihil est maius mente humana,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2636 nisi Deus. Sed veritas est maior mente humana, alioquin mens
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2637 iudicaret de veritate; nunc autem omnia iudicat secundum veritatem,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2638 et non secundum seipsam. Ergo solus Deus est veritas. Ergo non est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2639 alia veritas quam Deus.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2640 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2641 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p3"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2642 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2643 Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2644 is that of truth to true things." But there is only one time for all
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2645 temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2646 things are true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2647 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29087"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2648 "ref">[29087] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2649 Anselmus dicit, in libro de veritate, quod sicut tempus se habet ad
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2650 temporalia, ita veritas ad res veras. Sed unum est tempus omnium
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2651 temporalium. Ergo una est veritas, qua omnia vera
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2652 sunt.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2653 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2654 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2655 it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2656 parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4.1"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2657 passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>), "Truths are decayed from
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2658 among the children of men."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2659 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29088"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2660 "ref">[29088] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2661 quod in Psalmo XI dicitur, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2662 hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
2663 healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
2664 intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" passage=" Ps. 11:2, "> Ps. 11:2, </scripRef> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror,
22
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2665 so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2666 speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2667 primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2668 entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2669 yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2670 all things are said to be true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2671 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 co."><a name="29089"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2672 "ref">[29089] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2673 quod quodammodo una est veritas, qua omnia sunt vera, et quodammodo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2674 non. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, quando aliquid
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2675 praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2676 propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2677 animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2678 invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2679 alia denominantur. Sicut sanum dicitur de animali et urina et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2680 medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2681 sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, inquantum est illius
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2682 sanitatis effectiva, et urina, inquantum est illius sanitatis
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2683 significativa. Et quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina neque in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2684 urina, tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod hoc quidem facit,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2685 illud autem significat sanitatem. Dictum est autem quod veritas per
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2686 prius est in intellectu, et per posterius in rebus, secundum quod
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2687 ordinantur ad intellectum divinum. Si ergo loquamur de veritate
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2688 prout existit in intellectu, secundum propriam rationem, sic in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2689 multis intellectibus creatis sunt multae veritates; etiam in uno et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2690 eodem intellectu, secundum plura cognita. Unde dicit Glossa super
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2691 illud Psalmi XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum</i>
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2692 etc., quod sicut ab una facie hominis resultant plures
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2693 similitudines in speculo, sic ab una veritate divina resultant
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2694 plures veritates. Si vero loquamur de veritate secundum quod est in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2695 rebus, sic omnes sunt verae una prima veritate, cui unumquodque
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2696 assimilatur secundum suam entitatem. Et sic, licet plures sint
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2697 essentiae vel formae rerum, tamen una est veritas divini
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2698 intellectus, secundum quam omnes res denominantur verae.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2699 science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2700 nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2701 God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29090"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2702 "ref">[29090] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2703 dicendum quod anima non secundum quamcumque veritatem iudicat de
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2704 rebus omnibus; sed secundum veritatem primam, inquantum resultat in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2705 ea sicut in speculo, secundum prima intelligibilia. Unde sequitur
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2706 quod veritas prima sit maior anima. Et tamen etiam veritas creata,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2707 quae est in intellectu nostro, est maior anima, non simpliciter,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2708 sed secundum quid, inquantum est perfectio eius; sicut etiam
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2709 scientia posset dici maior anima. Sed verum est quod nihil
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2710 subsistens est maius mente rationali, nisi Deus.</p></div></div><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2711 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2712 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p7"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2713 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Anselm is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2714 correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2715 the divine intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2716 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29091"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2717 "ref">[29091] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2718 dicendum quod dictum Anselmi veritatem habet, secundum quod res
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2719 dicuntur verae per comparationem ad intellectum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2720 divinum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2721 next="FP_Q16_A8" prev="FP_Q16_A6" progress="3.10%" n="vii"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2722 title="Article. 7 - Whether created truth is eternal?"><h4
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2723 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Whether created truth
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2724 is eternal?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2725 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2726 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2727 seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2728 Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2729 circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2730 is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.</p></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2731 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29092"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2732 "ref">[29092] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2733 proceditur. Videtur quod veritas creata sit aeterna. Dicit enim
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2734 Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod nihil est magis
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2735 aeternum quam ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque. Sed horum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2736 veritas est veritas creata. Ergo veritas creata est
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2737 aeterna.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2738 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2739 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2740 Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2741 and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2742 which is the most universal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2743 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29093"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2744 "ref">[29093] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2745 quod est semper, est aeternum. Sed universalia sunt ubique et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2746 semper. Ergo sunt aeterna. Ergo et verum, quod est maxime
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2747 universale.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2748 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2749 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2750 Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2751 in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2752 is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2753 future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.</p></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2754 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29094"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2755 "ref">[29094] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2756 quod est verum in praesenti, semper fuit verum esse futurum. Sed
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2757 sicut veritas propositionis de praesenti est veritas creata, ita
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2758 veritas propositionis de futuro. Ergo aliqua veritas creata est
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2759 aeterna.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2760 eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2761 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29095"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2762 "ref">[29095] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, omne
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2763 quod caret principio et fine, est aeternum. Sed veritas
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2764 enuntiabilium caret principio et fine. Quia, si veritas incoepit
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2765 cum ante non esset, verum erat veritatem non esse, et utique aliqua
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2766 veritate verum erat, et sic veritas erat antequam inciperet. Et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2767 similiter si ponatur veritatem habere finem, sequitur quod sit
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2768 postquam desierit, verum enim erit veritatem non esse. Ergo veritas
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2769 est aeterna.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2770 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2771 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2772 God alone is eternal, as laid down before (<a
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2773 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2774 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[10], A[3]</a>).</p></div><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2775 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29096"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2776 "ref">[29096] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2777 quod solus Deus est aeternus, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2778 from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2779 has been already said that things are called true from the truth of
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2780 the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2781 eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2782 truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2783 but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2784 Himself, as shown already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7.1"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2785 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" shape="rect"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2786 xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2787 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 co."><a name="29097"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2788 "ref">[29097] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2789 quod veritas enuntiabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus.
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2790 Enuntiabile enim et est in intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2791 autem quod est in intellectu, habet per se veritatem. Sed secundum
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2792 quod est in voce, dicitur verum enuntiabile, secundum quod
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2793 significat aliquam veritatem intellectus; non propter aliquam
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2794 veritatem in enuntiabili existentem sicut in subiecto. Sicut urina
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2795 dicitur sana, non a sanitate quae in ipsa sit, sed a sanitate
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2796 animalis, quam significat. Similiter etiam supra dictum est quod
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2797 res denominantur verae a veritate intellectus. Unde si nullus
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2798 intellectus esset aeternus, nulla veritas esset aeterna. Sed quia
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2799 solus intellectus divinus est aeternus, in ipso solo veritas
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2800 aeternitatem habet. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2801 aeternum quam Deus, quia veritas intellectus divini est ipse Deus,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2802 ut supra ostensum est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2803 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2804 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2805 to Objection 1:</b> The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2806 three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.</p></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2807 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29098"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2808 "ref">[29098] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2809 dicendum quod ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2810 aeternitatem in mente divina.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2811 and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2812 time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2813 except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.</p></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2814 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29099"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2815 "ref">[29099] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2816 dicendum quod aliquid esse semper et ubique, potest intelligi
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2817 dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet in se unde se extendat ad omne
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2818 tempus et ad omnem locum, sicut Deo competit esse ubique et semper.
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2819 Alio modo, quia non habet in se quo determinetur ad aliquem locum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2820 vel tempus, sicut materia prima dicitur esse una, non quia habet
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2821 unam formam, sicut homo est unus ab unitate unius formae, sed per
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2822 remotionem omnium formarum distinguentium. Et per hunc modum,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2823 quodlibet universale dicitur esse ubique et semper, inquantum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2824 universalia abstrahunt ab hic et nunc. Sed ex hoc non sequitur ea
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2825 esse aeterna, nisi in intellectu, si quis sit
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2826 aeternus.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2827 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2828 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2829 3:</b> That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was;
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2830 because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2831 removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2832 is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2833 that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2834 the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.</p></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2835 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29100"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2836 "ref">[29100] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2837 dicendum quod illud quod nunc est, ex eo futurum fuit antequam
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2838 esset, quia in causa sua erat ut fieret. Unde, sublata causa, non
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2839 esset futurum illud fieri. Sola autem causa prima est aeterna. Unde
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2840 ex hoc non sequitur quod ea quae sunt, semper fuerit verum ea esse
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2841 futura, nisi quatenus in causa sempiterna fuit ut essent futura.
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2842 Quae quidem causa solus Deus est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2843 reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2844 not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2845 our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2846 not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2847 being.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2848 title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29101"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2849 "ref">[29101] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2850 dicendum quod, quia intellectus noster non est aeternus, nec
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2851 veritas enuntiabilium quae a nobis formantur, est aeterna, sed
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2852 quandoque incoepit. Et antequam huiusmodi veritas esset, non erat
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2853 verum dicere veritatem talem non esse, nisi ab intellectu divino,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2854 in quo solum veritas est aeterna. Sed nunc verum est dicere
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2855 veritatem tunc non fuisse. Quod quidem non est verum nisi veritate
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2856 quae nunc est in intellectu nostro, non autem per aliquam veritatem
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2857 ex parte rei. Quia ista est veritas de non ente; non ens autem non
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2858 habet ex se ut sit verum, sed solummodo ex intellectu apprehendente
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2859 ipsum. Unde intantum est verum dicere veritatem non fuisse,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2860 inquantum apprehendimus non esse ipsius ut praecedens esse
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2861 eius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2862 next="FP_Q17" prev="FP_Q16_A7" progress="3.13%" n="viii"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2863 title="Article. 8 - Whether truth is immutable?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2864 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Whether truth is immutable?</h4><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2865 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2866 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p2"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2867 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2868 immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2869 mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2870 mind is."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2871 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29102"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2872 "ref">[29102] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2873 proceditur. Videtur quod veritas sit immutabilis. Dicit enim
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2874 Augustinus, in libro II de libero arbitrio, quod veritas non est
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2875 aequalis menti, quia esset mutabilis, sicut et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2876 mens.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2877 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2878 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2879 Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2880 matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2881 generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2882 after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2883 not. Therefore truth is immutable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2884 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29103"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2885 "ref">[29103] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2886 quod remanet post omnem mutationem, est immutabile, sicut prima
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2887 materia est ingenita et incorruptibilis, quia remanet post omnem
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2888 generationem et corruptionem. Sed veritas remanet post omnem
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2889 mutationem, quia post omnem mutationem verum est dicere esse vel
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2890 non esse. Ergo veritas est immutabilis.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit.
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2891 Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2892 changes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2893 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29104"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2894 "ref">[29104] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2895 veritas enuntiationis mutatur, maxime mutatur ad mutationem rei.
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2896 Sed sic non mutatur. Veritas enim, secundum Anselmum, est rectitudo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2897 quaedam, inquantum aliquid implet id quod est de ipso in mente
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2898 divina. Haec autem propositio, Socrates sedet, accipit a mente
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2899 divina ut significet Socratem sedere, quod significat etiam eo non
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2900 sedente. Ergo veritas propositionis nullo modo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2901 mutatur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2902 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2903 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b>
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2904 Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2905 the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2906 "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2907 same. But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2908 truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2909 that of any other.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2910 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="29105"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2911 "ref">[29105] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ubi
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2912 est eadem causa, et idem effectus. Sed eadem res est causa
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2913 veritatis harum trium propositionum Socrates sedet, sedebit, et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2914 sedit. Ergo eadem est harum veritas. Sed oportet quod alterum horum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2915 sit verum. Ergo veritas harum propositionum immutabiliter manet. Et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2916 eadem ratione cuiuslibet alterius propositionis.</p></div></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2917 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2918 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2919 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2920 osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2921 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6.1"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2922 passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>),"Truths are decayed from among
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2923 the children of men."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2924 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29106"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
2925 "ref">[29106] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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diff changeset
2926 quod dicitur in Psalmo XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis
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diff changeset
2927 hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
2928 one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said
22
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2929 before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.2"
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diff changeset
2930 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14],
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2931 A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
2932 the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the
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diff changeset
2933 subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth
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diff changeset
2934 to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of
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diff changeset
2935 the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are
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diff changeset
2936 said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.</p></div><div
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diff changeset
2937 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 co."><a name="29107"><span class=
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diff changeset
2938 "ref">[29107] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2939 quod, sicut supra dictum est, veritas proprie est in solo
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2940 intellectu, res autem dicuntur verae a veritate quae est in aliquo
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2941 intellectu. Unde mutabilitas veritatis consideranda est circa
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2942 intellectum. Cuius quidem veritas in hoc consistit, quod habeat
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2943 conformitatem ad res intellectas. Quae quidem conformitas variari
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diff changeset
2944 potest dupliciter, sicut et quaelibet alia similitudo, ex mutatione
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diff changeset
2945 alterius extremi. Unde uno modo variatur veritas ex parte
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2946 intellectus, ex eo quod de re eodem modo se habente aliquis aliam
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diff changeset
2947 opinionem accipit, alio modo si, opinione eadem manente, res
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diff changeset
2948 mutetur. Et utroque modo fit mutatio de vero in falsum. Si ergo sit
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2949 aliquis intellectus in quo non possit esse alternatio opinionum,
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diff changeset
2950 vel cuius acceptionem non potest subterfugere res aliqua, in eo est
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diff changeset
2951 immutabilis veritas. Talis autem est intellectus divinus, ut ex
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diff changeset
2952 superioribus patet. Unde veritas divini intellectus est
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2953 immutabilis. Veritas autem intellectus nostri mutabilis est. Non
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diff changeset
2954 quod ipsa sit subiectum mutationis, sed inquantum intellectus
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diff changeset
2955 noster mutatur de veritate in falsitatem; sic enim formae mutabiles
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2956 dici possunt. Veritas autem intellectus divini est secundum quam
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diff changeset
2957 res naturales dicuntur verae, quae est omnino
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diff changeset
2958 immutabilis.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2959 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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diff changeset
2960 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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diff changeset
2961 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of divine truth.</p></div><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2962 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29108"><span class=
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diff changeset
2963 "ref">[29108] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2964 dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate
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diff changeset
2965 divina.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2966 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2967 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2968 2:</b> The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2969 is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2970 as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2971 Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2972 because that truth does not remain which was before.</p></div><div
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diff changeset
2973 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29109"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2974 "ref">[29109] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2975 dicendum quod verum et ens sunt convertibilia. Unde, sicut ens non
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2976 generatur neque corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens, inquantum hoc
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2977 vel illud ens corrumpitur vel generatur, ut dicitur in I Physic.;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2978 ita veritas mutatur, non quod nulla veritas remaneat, sed quia non
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2979 remanet illa veritas quae prius erat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2980 this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2981 sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2982 is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2983 signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2984 remains, but the second is changed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2985 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29110"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2986 "ref">[29110] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2987 dicendum quod propositio non solum habet veritatem sicut res aliae
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2988 veritatem habere dicuntur, inquantum implent id quod de eis est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2989 ordinatum ab intellectu divino; sed dicitur habere veritatem quodam
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2990 speciali modo, inquantum significat veritatem intellectus. Quae
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2991 quidem consistit in conformitate intellectus et rei. Qua quidem
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2992 subtracta, mutatur veritas opinionis, et per consequens veritas
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2993 propositionis. Sic igitur haec propositio, Socrates sedet, eo
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2994 sedente vera est et veritate rei, inquantum est quaedam vox
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2995 significativa; et veritate significationis, inquantum significat
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diff changeset
2996 opinionem veram. Socrate vero surgente, remanet prima veritas, sed
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diff changeset
2997 mutatur secunda.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2998 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
2999 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3000 4:</b> The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3001 proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when Socrates
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3002 sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3003 results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3004 concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3005 one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3006 invariable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3007 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="29111"><span class=
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diff changeset
3008 "ref">[29111] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3009 dicendum quod sessio Socratis, quae est causa veritatis huius
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3010 propositionis, Socrates sedet, non eodem modo se habet dum Socrates
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3011 sedet, et postquam sederit, et antequam sederet. Unde et veritas ab
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3012 hoc causata, diversimode se habet; et diversimode significatur
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3013 propositionibus de praesenti, praeterito et futuro. Unde non
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3014 sequitur quod, licet altera trium propositionum sit vera, quod
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diff changeset
3015 eadem veritas invariabilis maneat.</p></div></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17" next="FP_Q17_A1" prev="FP_Q16_A8" progress="3.16%" n="xvi" title="Question. 17 - CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)">
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3016 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p0.1">Question 17. CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3017 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3018 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p2" shownumber="no"> We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether falsity exists in things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether it exists in the sense?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether it exists in the intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.</p>
22
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3019 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 pr."><a name="29112"><span class="ref">[29112]
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3020 I&ordf; q. 17 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de falsitate. Et
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3021 circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum falsitas sit in rebus.
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3022 Secundo, utrum sit in sensu. Tertio, utrum sit in intellectu.
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3023 Quarto, de oppositione veri et falsi.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
3024 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1" next="FP_Q17_A2" prev="FP_Q17" progress="3.16%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether falsity exists in things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether falsity exists in things?</h4>
22
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3025 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3026 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29113"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3027 "ref">[29113] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3028 proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in rebus. Dicit enim
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3029 Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>si verum est id quod est, falsum
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3030 non esse uspiam concludetur, quovis repugnante</i>.</p></div></div>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3031 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3032 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p3"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3033 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, false is derived from
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3034 "fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3035 says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show nothing but their own
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3036 species. Therefore the false is not found in things.</p></div><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3037 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29114"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3038 "ref">[29114] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3039 falsum dicitur a fallendo. Sed res non fallunt, ut dicit Augustinus
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3040 in libro de vera Relig., <i>quia non ostendunt aliud quam suam
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3041 speciem</i>. Ergo falsum in rebus non invenitur.</p></div></div>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3042 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3043 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3044 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3045 in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above <a
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3046 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16" shape="rect"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3047 xml:link="simple">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3048 imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3049 falsity; and thus nothing is false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3050 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29115"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3051 "ref">[29115] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, verum
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3052 dicitur in rebus per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, ut supra
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3053 dictum est. Sed quaelibet res, inquantum est, imitatur Deum. Ergo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3054 quaelibet res vera est, absque falsitate. Et sic nulla res est
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3055 falsa.</p></div></div>
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3056 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3057 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p5"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3058 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3059 Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3060 imitates unity without being unity." But everything imitates the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3061 divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3062 exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3063 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29116"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3064 "ref">[29116] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3065 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod <i>omne corpus
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3066 est verum corpus et falsa unitas</i>; quia imitatur unitatem, et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3067 non est unitas. Sed quaelibet res imitatur divinam bonitatem, et ab
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3068 ea deficit. Ergo in omnibus rebus est falsitas.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
3069 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
3070 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when
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diff changeset
3071 compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper
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diff changeset
3072 operation of his art.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7" shownumber="no"> In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3073 vanity, and seek after lying?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.4.3" parsed="vul|Ps|4|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7.1" passage="Ps. 4:3">Ps. 4:3</scripRef>): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.3.21" parsed="vul|John|3|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7.2" passage="Jn. 3:21">Jn. 3:21</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p8" shownumber="no"> But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the
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3074 Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and
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diff changeset
3075 naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In this
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diff changeset
3076 way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.</p>
22
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diff changeset
3077 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 co."><a name="29117"><span class=
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diff changeset
3078 "ref">[29117] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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diff changeset
3079 quod, cum verum et falsum opponantur; opposita autem sunt circa
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diff changeset
3080 idem; necesse est ut ibi prius quaeratur falsitas, ubi primo
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diff changeset
3081 veritas invenitur, hoc est in intellectu. In rebus autem neque
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diff changeset
3082 veritas neque falsitas est, nisi per ordinem ad intellectum. Et
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diff changeset
3083 quia unumquodque secundum id quod convenit ei per se, simpliciter
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diff changeset
3084 nominatur; secundum autem id quod convenit ei per accidens, non
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diff changeset
3085 nominatur nisi secundum quid; res quidem simpliciter falsa dici
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diff changeset
3086 posset per comparationem ad intellectum a quo dependet, cui
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diff changeset
3087 comparatur per se; in ordine autem ad alium intellectum, cui
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diff changeset
3088 comparatur per accidens, non posset dici falsa nisi secundum quid.
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diff changeset
3089 Dependent autem ab intellectu divino res naturales, sicut ab
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diff changeset
3090 intellectu humano res artificiales. Dicuntur igitur res
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diff changeset
3091 artificiales falsae simpliciter et secundum se, inquantum deficiunt
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diff changeset
3092 a forma artis, unde dicitur aliquis artifex opus falsum facere,
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diff changeset
3093 quando deficit ab operatione artis. Sic autem in rebus
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diff changeset
3094 dependentibus a Deo, falsitas inveniri non potest per comparationem
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diff changeset
3095 ad intellectum divinum, cum quidquid in rebus accidit, ex
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diff changeset
3096 ordinatione divini intellectus procedat, nisi forte in voluntariis
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diff changeset
3097 agentibus tantum, in quorum potestate est subducere se ab
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diff changeset
3098 ordinatione divini intellectus; in quo malum culpae consistit,
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diff changeset
3099 secundum quod ipsa peccata falsitates et mendacia dicuntur in
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diff changeset
3100 Scripturis, secundum illud Psalmi IV, <i>ut quid diligitis
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diff changeset
3101 vanitatem et quaeritis mendacium?</i> Sicut per oppositum operatio
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diff changeset
3102 virtuosa veritas vitae nominatur, inquantum subditur ordini divini
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diff changeset
3103 intellectus; sicut dicitur Ioan. III, <i>qui facit veritatem, venit
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diff changeset
3104 ad lucem</i>. Sed per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, ad quem
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diff changeset
3105 comparantur res naturales per accidens, possunt dici falsae, non
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diff changeset
3106 simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo,
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diff changeset
3107 secundum rationem significati, ut dicatur illud esse falsum in
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diff changeset
3108 rebus, quod significatur vel repraesentatur oratione vel intellectu
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diff changeset
3109 falso. Secundum quem modum quaelibet res potest dici esse falsa,
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diff changeset
3110 quantum ad id quod ei non inest, sicut si dicamus diametrum esse
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diff changeset
3111 falsum commensurabile, ut dicit philosophus in V Metaphys.; et
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diff changeset
3112 sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., quod <i>tragoedus est
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diff changeset
3113 falsus Hector</i>. Sicut e contrario potest unumquodque dici verum,
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diff changeset
3114 secundum id quod competit ei. Alio modo, per modum causae. Et sic
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diff changeset
3115 dicitur res esse falsa, quae nata est facere de se opinionem
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diff changeset
3116 falsam. Et quia innatum est nobis per ea quae exterius apparent de
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diff changeset
3117 rebus iudicare, eo quod nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, qui
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diff changeset
3118 primo et per se est exteriorum accidentium; ideo ea quae in
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diff changeset
3119 exterioribus accidentibus habent similitudinem aliarum rerum,
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diff changeset
3120 dicuntur esse falsa secundum illas res; sicut fel est falsum mel,
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diff changeset
3121 et stannum est falsum argentum. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus,
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diff changeset
3122 in libro Soliloq., quod <i>eas res falsas nominamus, quae
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diff changeset
3123 verisimilia apprehendimus</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in V
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3124 Metaphys., quod <i>falsa dicuntur quaecumque apta nata sunt
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diff changeset
3125 apparere aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt</i>. Et per hunc
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diff changeset
3126 modum etiam dicitur homo falsus, inquantum est amativus falsarum
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diff changeset
3127 opinionum vel locutionum. Non autem ex hoc quod potest eas
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diff changeset
3128 confingere, quia sic etiam sapientes et scientes falsi dicerentur,
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diff changeset
3129 ut dicitur in V Metaphys.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
3130 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3131 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p9"
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diff changeset
3132 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing compared with the
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diff changeset
3133 intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in
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diff changeset
3134 respect to what it is not. Hence, "The true tragedian is a false
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diff changeset
3135 Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that
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diff changeset
3136 are is found a certain non-being, so in things that are is found a
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diff changeset
3137 degree of falseness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
3138 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29118"><span class=
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diff changeset
3139 "ref">[29118] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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diff changeset
3140 dicendum quod res comparata ad intellectum, secundum id quod est,
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diff changeset
3141 dicitur vera, secundum id quod non est, dicitur falsa. <i>Unde
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diff changeset
3142 verus tragoedus est falsus Hector</i>, ut dicitur in II Soliloq.
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diff changeset
3143 Sicut igitur in his quae sunt, invenitur quoddam non esse; ita in
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diff changeset
3144 his quae sunt, invenitur quaedam ratio falsitatis.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
3145 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3146 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p10"
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diff changeset
3147 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things do not deceive by
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3148 their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity,
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diff changeset
3149 by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3150 not.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29119"><span class=
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diff changeset
3151 "ref">[29119] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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diff changeset
3152 dicendum quod res per se non fallunt, sed per accidens. Dant enim
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diff changeset
3153 occasionem falsitatis, eo quod similitudinem eorum gerunt, quorum
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diff changeset
3154 non habent existentiam.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3155 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3156 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p12" shownumber="no"> To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in the majority of instances.</p>
22
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diff changeset
3157 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29120"><span class=
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diff changeset
3158 "ref">[29120] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3159 dicendum quod per comparationem ad intellectum divinum non dicuntur
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diff changeset
3160 res falsae, quod esset eas esse falsas simpliciter, sed per
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diff changeset
3161 comparationem ad intellectum nostrum, quod est eas esse falsas
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diff changeset
3162 secundum quid.</p><p title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29121"><span class=
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diff changeset
3163 "ref">[29121] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum, quod
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diff changeset
3164 in oppositum obiicitur, dicendum quod similitudo vel repraesentatio
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3165 deficiens non inducit rationem falsitatis, nisi inquantum praestat
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diff changeset
3166 occasionem falsae opinionis. Unde non ubicumque est similitudo,
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diff changeset
3167 dicitur res falsa, sed ubicumque est talis similitudo, quae nata
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diff changeset
3168 est facere opinionem falsam, non cuicumque, sed ut in pluribus.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3169 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" next="FP_Q17_A3" prev="FP_Q17_A1" progress="3.20%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether there is falsity in the senses?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether there is falsity in the senses?</h4>
22
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diff changeset
3170 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3171 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p2"
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diff changeset
3172 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in
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diff changeset
3173 the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily
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diff changeset
3174 senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can
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diff changeset
3175 require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the
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diff changeset
3176 senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them.</p></div><div
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diff changeset
3177 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29122"><span class=
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diff changeset
3178 "ref">[29122] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
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diff changeset
3179 proceditur. Videtur quod in sensu non sit falsitas. Dicit enim
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diff changeset
3180 Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., <i>si omnes corporis sensus
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3181 ita nuntiant ut afficiuntur, quid ab eis amplius exigere debemus,
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diff changeset
3182 ignoro</i>. Et sic videtur quod ex sensibus non fallamur. Et sic
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diff changeset
3183 falsitas in sensu non est.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
3184 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3185 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p3"
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diff changeset
3186 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3187 (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3188 imagination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
3189 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29123"><span class=
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diff changeset
3190 "ref">[29123] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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diff changeset
3191 philosophus dicit, in IV Metaphys., quod <i>falsitas non est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3192 propria sensui, sed phantasiae</i>.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
3193 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3194 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p4"
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diff changeset
3195 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in non-complex things
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diff changeset
3196 there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3197 affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the
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diff changeset
3198 senses there is no falsity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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diff changeset
3199 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29124"><span class=
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diff changeset
3200 "ref">[29124] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3201 incomplexis non est verum nec falsum, sed solum in complexis. Sed
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diff changeset
3202 componere et dividere non pertinet ad sensum. Ergo in sensu non est
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3203 falsitas.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
3204 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3205 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p5"
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diff changeset
3206 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. ii,
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diff changeset
3207 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3208 deceptive similitudes."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3209 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29125"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3210 "ref">[29125] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3211 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>apparet nos in omnibus
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diff changeset
3212 sensibus similitudine lenocinante falli</i>.</p></div></div>
19
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parents:
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3213 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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3214 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3215 are.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p7" shownumber="no"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly,
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3216 neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p8" shownumber="no"> Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3217 sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.</p>
22
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3218 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 co."><a name="29126"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3219 "ref">[29126] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3220 quod falsitas non est quaerenda in sensu, nisi sicut ibi est
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3221 veritas. Veritas autem non sic est in sensu, ut sensus cognoscat
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3222 veritatem; sed inquantum veram apprehensionem habet de
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diff changeset
3223 sensibilibus, ut supra dictum est. Quod quidem contingit eo quod
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3224 apprehendit res ut sunt. Unde contingit falsitatem esse in sensu,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3225 ex hoc quod apprehendit vel iudicat res aliter quam sint. Sic autem
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3226 se habet ad cognoscendum res, inquantum similitudo rerum est in
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3227 sensu. Similitudo autem alicuius rei est in sensu tripliciter. Uno
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3228 modo, primo et per se; sicut in visu est similitudo colorum et
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diff changeset
3229 aliorum propriorum sensibilium. Alio modo, per se, sed non primo;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3230 sicut in visu est similitudo figurae vel magnitudinis, et aliorum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3231 communium sensibilium. Tertio modo, nec primo nec per se, sed per
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3232 accidens; sicut in visu est similitudo hominis, non inquantum est
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3233 homo, sed inquantum huic colorato accidit esse hominem. Et circa
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3234 propria sensibilia sensus non habet falsam cognitionem, nisi per
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3235 accidens, et ut in paucioribus, ex eo scilicet quod, propter
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3236 indispositionem organi, non convenienter recipit formam sensibilem,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3237 sicut et alia passiva, propter suam indispositionem, deficienter
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3238 recipiunt impressionem agentium. Et inde est quod, propter
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3239 corruptionem linguae, infirmis dulcia amara esse videntur. De
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3240 sensibilibus vero communibus et per accidens, potest esse falsum
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diff changeset
3241 iudicium etiam in sensu recte disposito, quia sensus non directe
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diff changeset
3242 refertur ad illa, sed per accidens, vel ex consequenti, inquantum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3243 refertur ad alia.</p></div></div>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3244 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3245 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p9"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3246 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The affection of sense is
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3247 its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3248 affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3249 we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3250 sometimes affected erroneously of that object, it follows that it
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3251 sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived
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diff changeset
3252 by sense about the object, but not about the fact of
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3253 sensation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3254 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29127"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3255 "ref">[29127] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3256 dicendum quod sensum affici, est ipsum eius sentire. Unde per hoc
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3257 quod sensus ita nuntiant sicut afficiuntur, sequitur quod non
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diff changeset
3258 decipiamur in iudicio quo iudicamus nos sentire aliquid. Sed ex eo
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3259 quod sensus aliter afficitur interdum quam res sit, sequitur quod
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3260 nuntiet nobis aliquando rem aliter quam sit. Et ex hoc fallimur per
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3261 sensum circa rem, non circa ipsum sentire.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3262 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason
22
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3263 the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3264 dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3265 things that are not present in substance.</p></div><div style="width:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3266 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29128"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3267 "ref">[29128] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3268 dicendum quod falsitas dicitur non esse propria sensui, quia non
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3269 decipitur circa proprium obiectum. Unde in alia translatione
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3270 planius dicitur, quod <i>sensus proprii sensibilis falsus non
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3271 est</i>. Phantasiae autem attribuitur falsitas, quia repraesentat
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3272 similitudinem rei etiam absentis; unde quando aliquis convertitur
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3273 ad similitudinem rei tanquam ad rem ipsam, provenit ex tali
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3274 apprehensione falsitas. Unde etiam philosophus, in V Metaphys.,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3275 dicit quod umbrae et picturae et somnia dicuntur falsa, inquantum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3276 non subsunt res quarum habent similitudinem.</p></div></div>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3277 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3278 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p11"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3279 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3280 the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3281 false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3282 title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29129"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3283 "ref">[29129] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3284 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quod falsitas non sit in sensu
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3285 sicut in cognoscente verum et falsum.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3286 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3" next="FP_Q17_A4" prev="FP_Q17_A2" progress="3.22%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether falsity is in the intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether falsity is in the intellect?</h4>
22
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3287 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3288 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p2"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3289 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3290 the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3291 deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3292 is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3293 therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3294 intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3295 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29130"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3296 "ref">[29130] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3297 proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in intellectu. Dicit enim
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3298 Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnis qui
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3299 fallitur, id in quo fallitur, non intelligit</i>. Sed falsum
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3300 dicitur esse in aliqua cognitione, secundum quod per eam fallimur.
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diff changeset
3301 Ergo in intellectu non est falsitas.</p></div></div>
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3302 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3303 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p3"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3304 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3305 Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3306 no falsity in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3307 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29131"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3308 "ref">[29131] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3309 philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus semper est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3310 rectus. Non ergo in intellectu est falsitas.</p></div></div>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3311 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3312 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p4"
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diff changeset
3313 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in De Anima iii,
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diff changeset
3314 21,[22] that "where there is composition of objects understood, there
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3315 is truth and falsehood." But such composition is in the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3316 intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3317 intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3318 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29132"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3319 "ref">[29132] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3320 quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>ubi compositio intellectuum
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3321 est, ibi verum et falsum est</i>. Sed compositio intellectuum est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3322 in intellectu. Ergo verum et falsum est in intellectu.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3323 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3324 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3325 with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
3326 sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3327 exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p6" shownumber="no"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another.
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
3328 In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
3329 all.</p>
22
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diff changeset
3330 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 co."><a name="29133"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3331 "ref">[29133] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3332 quod, sicut res habet esse per propriam formam, ita virtus
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3333 cognoscitiva habet cognoscere per similitudinem rei cognitae. Unde,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3334 sicut res naturalis non deficit ab esse quod sibi competit secundum
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diff changeset
3335 suam formam, potest autem deficere ab aliquibus accidentalibus vel
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diff changeset
3336 consequentibus; sicut homo ab hoc quod est habere duos pedes, non
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3337 autem ab hoc quod est esse hominem, ita virtus cognoscitiva non
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3338 deficit in cognoscendo respectu illius rei cuius similitudine
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3339 informatur; potest autem deficere circa aliquid consequens ad
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3340 ipsam, vel accidens ei. Sicut est dictum quod visus non decipitur
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3341 circa sensibile proprium, sed circa sensibilia communia, quae
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3342 consequenter se habent ad illud, et circa sensibilia per accidens.
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3343 Sicut autem sensus informatur directe similitudine propriorum
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diff changeset
3344 sensibilium, ita intellectus informatur similitudine quidditatis
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diff changeset
3345 rei. Unde circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur, sicut
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diff changeset
3346 neque sensus circa sensibilia propria. In componendo vero vel
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diff changeset
3347 dividendo potest decipi, dum attribuit rei cuius quidditatem
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3348 intelligit, aliquid quod eam non consequitur, vel quod ei
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3349 opponitur. Sic enim se habet intellectus ad iudicandum de
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diff changeset
3350 huiusmodi, sicut sensus ad iudicandum de sensibilibus communibus
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3351 vel per accidens. Hac tamen differentia servata, quae supra circa
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3352 veritatem dicta est, quod falsitas in intellectu esse potest, non
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3353 solum quia cognitio intellectus falsa est, sed quia intellectus eam
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3354 cognoscit, sicut et veritatem, in sensu autem falsitas non est ut
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3355 cognita, ut dictum est. Quia vero falsitas intellectus per se solum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3356 circa compositionem intellectus est, per accidens etiam in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3357 operatione intellectus qua cognoscit quod quid est, potest esse
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3358 falsitas, inquantum ibi compositio intellectus admiscetur. Quod
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3359 potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod intellectus
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3360 definitionem unius attribuit alteri; ut si definitionem circuli
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3361 attribuat homini. Unde definitio unius rei est falsa de altera.
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3362 Alio modo, secundum quod partes definitionis componit ad invicem,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3363 quae simul sociari non possunt, sic enim definitio non est solum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3364 falsa respectu alicuius rei, sed est falsa in se. Ut si formet
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3365 talem definitionem, animal rationale quadrupes, falsus est
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3366 intellectus sic definiendo, propterea quod falsus est in formando
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3367 hanc compositionem, aliquod animal rationale est quadrupes. Et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3368 propter hoc, in cognoscendo quidditates simplices non potest esse
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3369 intellectus falsus, sed vel est verus, vel totaliter nihil
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3370 intelligit.</p></div></div>
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3371 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3372 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p7"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3373 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because the essence of a
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3374 thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3375 understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3376 thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3377 falsity. In this sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3378 who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3379 in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3380 intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3381 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29134"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3382 "ref">[29134] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3383 dicendum quod, quia quidditas rei est proprium obiectum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3384 intellectus, propter hoc tunc proprie dicimur aliquid intelligere,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3385 quando, reducentes illud in quod quid est, sic de eo iudicamus,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3386 sicut accidit in demonstrationibus, in quibus non est falsitas. Et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3387 hoc modo intelligitur verbum Augustini, quod omnis qui fallitur,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3388 non intelligit id in quo fallitur, non autem ita, quod in nulla
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3389 operatione intellectus aliquis fallatur.</p></div></div>
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3390 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3391 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p8"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3392 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is always
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3393 right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3394 for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3395 self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3396 understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3397 definition of the subject.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3398 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29135"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3399 "ref">[29135] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3400 dicendum quod intellectus semper est rectus, secundum quod
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3401 intellectus est principiorum, circa quae non decipitur, ex eadem
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3402 causa qua non decipitur circa quod quid est. Nam principia per se
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3403 nota sunt illa quae statim, intellectis terminis, cognoscuntur, ex
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3404 eo quod praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti.</p></div></div>
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3405 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4" next="FP_Q18" prev="FP_Q17_A3"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3406 progress="3.25%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether true and false are
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3407 contraries?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3408 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Whether true and false are
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3409 contraries?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3410 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3411 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3412 seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3413 opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for "truth," as
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3414 Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3415 and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3416 and false are not contrary things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3417 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29136"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3418 "ref">[29136] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3419 proceditur. Videtur quod verum et falsum non sint contraria. Verum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3420 enim et falsum opponuntur sicut quod est et quod non est, <i>nam
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3421 verum est id quod est</i>, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed quod est et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3422 quod non est, non opponuntur ut contraria. Ergo verum et falsum non
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3423 sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3424 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3425 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3426 Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3427 truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A tragedian
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3428 would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian."
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3429 Therefore true and false are not contraries.</p></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3430 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29137"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3431 "ref">[29137] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3432 contrariorum non est in alio. Sed falsum est in vero, quia, sicut
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3433 dicit Augustinus in libro Soliloq., <i>tragoedus non esset falsus
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3434 Hector, si non esset verus tragoedus</i>. Ergo verum et falsum non
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3435 sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3436 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3437 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3438 Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3439 the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3440 falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3441 "They have laid hold on lying" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.8.5"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3442 parsed="vul|Jer|8|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4.1"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3443 passage="Jer. 8:5">Jer. 8:5</scripRef>), that is to say, "an idol," as
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3444 a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3445 contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3446 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29138"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3447 "ref">[29138] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3448 Deo non est contrarietas aliqua, nihil enim divinae substantiae est
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3449 contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civit. Dei. Sed Deo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3450 opponitur falsitas, nam idolum in Scriptura mendacium nominatur,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3451 Ierem. VIII, <i>apprehenderunt mendacium</i>; Glossa, <i>idest
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3452 idola</i>. Ergo verum et falsum non sunt
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3453 contraria.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3454 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3455 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3456 The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3457 to a true one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3458 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29139"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3459 "ref">[29139] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3460 quod dicit philosophus, in II Periherm., ponit enim falsam
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3461 opinionem verae contrariam.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3462 except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3463 assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3464 of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3465 Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3466 seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3467 is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3468 falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3469 are contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3470 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 co."><a name="29140"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3471 "ref">[29140] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3472 quod verum et falsum opponuntur ut contraria, et non sicut
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3473 affirmatio et negatio, ut quidam dixerunt. Ad cuius evidentiam,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3474 sciendum est quod negatio neque ponit aliquid, neque determinat
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3475 sibi aliquod subiectum. Et propter hoc, potest dici tam de ente
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3476 quam de non ente; sicut non videns, et non sedens. Privatio autem
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3477 non ponit aliquid, sed determinat sibi subiectum. Est enim negatio
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3478 in subiecto, ut dicitur IV Metaphys., caecum enim non dicitur nisi
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3479 de eo quod est natum videre. Contrarium vero et aliquid ponit, et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3480 subiectum determinat, nigrum enim est aliqua species coloris.
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3481 Falsum autem aliquid ponit. Est enim falsum, ut dicit philosophus,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3482 IV Metaphys., ex eo quod dicitur vel videtur aliquid esse quod non
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3483 est, vel non esse quod est. Sicut enim verum ponit acceptionem
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3484 adaequatam rei, ita falsum acceptionem rei non adaequatam. Unde
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3485 manifestum est quod verum et falsum sunt
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3486 contraria.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3487 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3488 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3489 1:</b> What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3490 apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3491 resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3492 apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3493 Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3494 "God is good," is, "God is not good."</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3495 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29141"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3496 "ref">[29141] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3497 dicendum quod id quod est in rebus, est veritas rei sed id quod est
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3498 ut apprehensum, est verum intellectus, in quo primo est veritas.
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3499 Unde et falsum est id quod non est ut apprehensum. Apprehendere
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3500 autem esse et non esse, contrarietatem habet, sicut probat
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3501 philosophus, in II Periherm., quod huic opinioni, bonum est bonum,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3502 contraria est, bonum non est bonum.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3503 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3504 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3505 to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is not founded in the truth which is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3506 contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3507 contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3508 in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3509 being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3510 being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3511 some truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3512 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29142"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3513 "ref">[29142] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3514 dicendum quod falsum non fundatur in vero sibi contrario, sicut nec
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3515 malum in bono sibi contrario; sed in eo quod sibi subiicitur. Et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3516 hoc ideo in utroque accidit, quia verum et bonum communia sunt, et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
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3517 convertuntur cum ente, unde, sicut omnis privatio fundatur in
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diff changeset
3518 subiecto quod est ens, ita omne malum fundatur in aliquo bono, et
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diff changeset
3519 omne falsum in aliquo vero.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false
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diff changeset
3520 opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the
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diff changeset
3521 divine unity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
3522 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29143"><span class=
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diff changeset
3523 "ref">[29143] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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diff changeset
3524 dicendum quod, quia contraria et opposita privative nata sunt fieri
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diff changeset
3525 circa idem, ideo Deo, prout in se consideratur, non est aliquid
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diff changeset
3526 contrarium, neque ratione suae bonitatis, neque ratione suae
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diff changeset
3527 veritatis, quia in intellectu eius non potest esse falsitas aliqua.
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diff changeset
3528 Sed in apprehensione nostra habet aliquid contrarium, nam verae
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diff changeset
3529 opinioni de ipso contrariatur falsa opinio. Et sic idola mendacia
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diff changeset
3530 dicuntur opposita veritati divinae, inquantum falsa opinio de
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diff changeset
3531 idolis contrariatur verae opinioni de unitate
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diff changeset
3532 Dei.</p></div></div></div></div>
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diff changeset
3533 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18" next="FP_Q18_A1" prev="FP_Q17_A4" progress="3.28%" n="xvii" title="Question. 18 - THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3534 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p0.1">Question 18. THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3535 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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3536 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p2" shownumber="no"> Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) To whom does it belong to live?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) What is life?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether all things in God are life?</p>
22
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diff changeset
3537 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 18 pr."><a name="29144"><span class="ref">[29144]
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diff changeset
3538 I&ordf; q. 18 pr.</span></a> Quoniam autem intelligere viventium
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diff changeset
3539 est, post considerationem de scientia et intellectu divino,
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diff changeset
3540 considerandum est de vita ipsius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
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diff changeset
3541 Primo, quorum sit vivere. Secundo, quid sit vita. Tertio, utrum
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diff changeset
3542 vita Deo conveniat. Quarto, utrum omnia in Deo sint vita.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
3543 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1" next="FP_Q18_A2" prev="FP_Q18"
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diff changeset
3544 progress="3.28%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether to live belongs to
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3545 all natural things?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3546 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether to live belongs to all
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diff changeset
3547 natural things?</h4>
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diff changeset
3548 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3549 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p2"
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diff changeset
3550 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to live belongs to
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diff changeset
3551 all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3552 "Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3553 nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3554 natural things partake of life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3555 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29145"><span class=
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diff changeset
3556 "ref">[29145] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
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diff changeset
3557 proceditur. Videtur quod omnium rerum naturalium sit vivere. Dicit
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diff changeset
3558 enim philosophus, in VIII Physic., quod motus est ut vita quaedam
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diff changeset
3559 natura existentibus omnibus. Sed omnes res naturales participant
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diff changeset
3560 motum. Ergo omnes res naturales participant vitam.</p></div></div><div
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diff changeset
3561 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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diff changeset
3562 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p3"
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diff changeset
3563 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, plants are said to live,
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diff changeset
3564 inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3565 decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3566 to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows
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diff changeset
3567 (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3568 some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies
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diff changeset
3569 live.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29146"><span class=
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diff changeset
3570 "ref">[29146] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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diff changeset
3571 plantae dicuntur vivere, inquantum habent in seipsis principium
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diff changeset
3572 motus augmenti et decrementi. Sed motus localis est perfectior et
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diff changeset
3573 prior secundum naturam quam motus augmenti et decrementi, ut
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diff changeset
3574 probatur in VIII Physic. Cum igitur omnia corpora naturalia habeant
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diff changeset
3575 aliquod principium motus localis, videtur quod omnia corpora
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diff changeset
3576 naturalia vivant.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3577 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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diff changeset
3578 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
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diff changeset
3579 Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet
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diff changeset
3580 life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living waters." Much
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3581 more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.</p></div><div
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diff changeset
3582 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29147"><span class=
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diff changeset
3583 "ref">[29147] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, inter
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diff changeset
3584 corpora naturalia imperfectiora sunt elementa. Sed eis attribuitur
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diff changeset
3585 vita, dicuntur enim aquae vivae. Ergo multo magis alia corpora
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diff changeset
3586 naturalia vitam habent.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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diff changeset
3587 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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diff changeset
3588 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
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diff changeset
3589 contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of
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diff changeset
3590 life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life
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diff changeset
3591 is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to
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diff changeset
3592 plants. Therefore they have not life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3593 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29148"><span class=
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diff changeset
3594 "ref">[29148] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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diff changeset
3595 quod dicit Dionysius, VI cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>plantae
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diff changeset
3596 secundum ultimam resonantiam vitae habent vivere</i>, ex quo potest
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diff changeset
3597 accipi quod ultimum gradum vitae obtinent plantae. Sed corpora
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diff changeset
3598 inanimata sunt infra plantas. Ergo eorum non est vivere.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3599 begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is
22
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diff changeset
3600 called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said
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diff changeset
3601 of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called
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diff changeset
3602 movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine
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diff changeset
3603 themselves to movement or operation of any kind: whereas those things
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diff changeset
3604 that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3605 a similitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
3606 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 co."><a name="29149"><span class=
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diff changeset
3607 "ref">[29149] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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diff changeset
3608 quod ex his quae manifeste vivunt, accipere possumus quorum sit
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diff changeset
3609 vivere, et quorum non sit vivere. Vivere autem manifeste animalibus
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diff changeset
3610 convenit, dicitur enim in libro de vegetabilibus, quod <i>vita in
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diff changeset
3611 animalibus manifesta est</i>. Unde secundum illud oportet
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diff changeset
3612 distinguere viventia a non viventibus secundum quod animalia
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diff changeset
3613 dicuntur vivere. Hoc autem est in quo primo manifestatur vita, et
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diff changeset
3614 in quo ultimo remanet. Primo autem dicimus animal vivere, quando
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diff changeset
3615 incipit ex se motum habere; et tandiu iudicatur animal vivere,
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diff changeset
3616 quandiu talis motus in eo apparet; quando vero iam ex se non habet
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diff changeset
3617 aliquem motum, sed movetur tantum ab alio tunc dicitur animal
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diff changeset
3618 mortuum, per defectum vitae. Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt
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diff changeset
3619 viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent; sive
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diff changeset
3620 accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti,
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diff changeset
3621 idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter,
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diff changeset
3622 prout motus dicitur actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire
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diff changeset
3623 dicitur moveri, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ut sic viventia
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diff changeset
3624 dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum vel operationem aliquam, ea
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diff changeset
3625 vero in quorum natura non est ut se agant ad aliquem motum vel
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diff changeset
3626 operationem, viventia dici non possunt, nisi per aliquam
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diff changeset
3627 similitudinem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals.
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3628 Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3629 has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3630 whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3631 from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact have held, in that
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diff changeset
3632 case movement would really be the life of all natural
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diff changeset
3633 bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
3634 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29150"><span class=
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diff changeset
3635 "ref">[29150] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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diff changeset
3636 dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi potest intelligi vel de motu
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diff changeset
3637 primo, scilicet corporum caelestium; vel de motu communiter. Et
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diff changeset
3638 utroque modo motus dicitur quasi vita corporum naturalium, per
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3639 similitudinem; et non per proprietatem. Nam motus caeli est in
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diff changeset
3640 universo corporalium naturarum, sicut motus cordis in animali, quo
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diff changeset
3641 conservatur vita. Similiter etiam quicumque motus naturalis hoc
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diff changeset
3642 modo se habet ad res naturales, ut quaedam similitudo vitalis
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diff changeset
3643 operationis. Unde, si totum universum corporale esset unum animal,
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diff changeset
3644 ita quod iste motus esset a movente intrinseco, ut quidam
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diff changeset
3645 posuerunt, sequeretur quod motus esset vita omnium naturalium
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diff changeset
3646 corporum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from
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diff changeset
3647 such movement, so far do they recede from their natural
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3648 disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3649 either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles
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diff changeset
3650 from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3651 bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
3652 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29151"><span class=
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diff changeset
3653 "ref">[29151] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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diff changeset
3654 dicendum quod corporibus gravibus et levibus non competit moveri,
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diff changeset
3655 nisi secundum quod sunt extra dispositionem suae naturae, utpote
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diff changeset
3656 cum sunt extra locum proprium, cum enim sunt in loco proprio et
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diff changeset
3657 naturali, quiescunt. Sed plantae et aliae res viventes moventur
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diff changeset
3658 motu vitali, secundum hoc quod sunt in sua dispositione naturali,
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diff changeset
3659 non autem in accedendo ad eam vel in recedendo ab ea, imo secundum
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diff changeset
3660 quod recedunt a tali motu, recedunt a naturali dispositione. Et
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3661 praeterea, corpora gravia et levia moventur a motore extrinseco,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3662 vel generante, qui dat formam, vel removente prohibens, ut dicitur
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3663 in VIII Physic., et ita non movent seipsa, sicut corpora
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diff changeset
3664 viventia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3665 case with the movement of other heavy and light
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3666 bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29152"><span class=
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diff changeset
3667 "ref">[29152] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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diff changeset
3668 dicendum quod aquae vivae dicuntur, quae habent continuum fluxum,
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diff changeset
3669 aquae enim stantes, quae non continuantur ad principium continue
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3670 fluens, dicuntur mortuae, ut aquae cisternarum et lacunarum. Et hoc
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3671 dicitur per similitudinem, inquantum enim videntur se movere,
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diff changeset
3672 habent similitudinem vitae. Sed tamen non est in eis vera ratio
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3673 vitae, quia hunc motum non habent a seipsis, sed a causa generante
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3674 eas; sicut accidit circa motum aliorum gravium et levium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" next="FP_Q18_A3" prev="FP_Q18_A1" progress="3.31%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether life is an operation?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether life is an operation?</h4>
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diff changeset
3675 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3676 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p2"
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diff changeset
3677 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is an
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diff changeset
3678 operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same
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diff changeset
3679 genus. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3680 Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life,
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diff changeset
3681 namely, nourishment, sensation, local movement and
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3682 understanding. Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div
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diff changeset
3683 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29153"><span class=
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diff changeset
3684 "ref">[29153] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3685 proceditur. Videtur quod vita sit quaedam operatio. Nihil enim
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diff changeset
3686 dividitur nisi per ea quae sunt sui generis. Sed vivere dividitur
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3687 per operationes quasdam, ut patet per philosophum in II libro de
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3688 anima, qui distinguit vivere per quatuor, scilicet alimento uti,
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diff changeset
3689 sentire, moveri secundum locum, et intelligere. Ergo vita est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3690 operatio quaedam.</p></div></div>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3691 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3692 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p3"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3693 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active life is said
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diff changeset
3694 to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3695 distinguished from the active by certain operations. Therefore life is
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3696 an operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
3697 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29154"><span class=
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diff changeset
3698 "ref">[29154] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, vita
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3699 activa dicitur alia esse a contemplativa. Sed contemplativi ab
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diff changeset
3700 activis non diversificantur nisi secundum operationes quasdam. Ergo
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diff changeset
3701 vita est quaedam operatio.</p></div></div>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3702 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3703 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4"
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diff changeset
3704 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know God is an
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diff changeset
3705 operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of<scripRef
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3706 osisRef="Bible.vul:John.18.3" parsed="vul|John|18|3|0|0"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3707 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4.1" passage=" Jn. 18:3, "> Jn. 18:3,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3708 </scripRef> "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3709 only true God." Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3710 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29155"><span class=
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diff changeset
3711 "ref">[29155] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3712 cognoscere Deum est operatio quaedam. Haec autem est vita, ut patet
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3713 per illud Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est autem vita aeterna, ut cognoscant
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3714 te solum verum Deum</i>. Ergo vita est operatio.</p></div></div>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3715 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3716 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p5"
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diff changeset
3717 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3718 ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be."</p></div><div
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3719 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29156"><span class=
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diff changeset
3720 "ref">[29156] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3721 quod dicit philosophus, in II de anima, <i>vivere viventibus est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3722 esse</i>.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3723 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3724 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
3725 dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running"
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
3726 denotes "to run" in the abstract.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p7" shownumber="no"> Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.</p>
22
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3727 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 co."><a name="29157"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3728 "ref">[29157] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3729 quod, sicut ex dictis patet, intellectus noster, qui proprie est
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3730 cognoscitivus quidditatis rei ut proprii obiecti, accipit a sensu,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3731 cuius propria obiecta sunt accidentia exteriora. Et inde est quod
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3732 ex his quae exterius apparent de re, devenimus ad cognoscendam
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3733 essentiam rei. Et quia sic nominamus aliquid sicut cognoscimus
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3734 illud, ut ex supradictis patet, inde est quod plerumque a
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3735 proprietatibus exterioribus imponuntur nomina ad significandas
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3736 essentias rerum. Unde huiusmodi nomina quandoque accipiuntur
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3737 proprie pro ipsis essentiis rerum, ad quas significandas
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3738 principaliter sunt imposita, aliquando autem sumuntur pro
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3739 proprietatibus a quibus imponuntur, et hoc minus proprie. Sicut
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3740 patet quod hoc nomen corpus impositum est ad significandum quoddam
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3741 genus substantiarum, ex eo quod in eis inveniuntur tres
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3742 dimensiones, et ideo aliquando ponitur hoc nomen corpus ad
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3743 significandas tres dimensiones, secundum quod corpus ponitur
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3744 species quantitatis. Sic ergo dicendum est et de vita. Nam vitae
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3745 nomen sumitur ex quodam exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3746 movere seipsum, non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3747 significandum, sed ad significandam substantiam cui convenit
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3748 secundum suam naturam movere seipsam, vel agere se quocumque modo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3749 ad operationem. Et secundum hoc, vivere nihil aliud est quam esse
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diff changeset
3750 in tali natura, et vita significat hoc ipsum, sed in abstracto;
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3751 sicut hoc nomen cursus significat ipsum currere in abstracto. Unde
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3752 vivum non est praedicatum accidentale, sed substantiale. Quandoque
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3753 tamen vita sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a quibus
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3754 nomen vitae assumitur; sicut dicit philosophus, IX Ethic., quod
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3755 <i>vivere principaliter est sentire vel intelligere</i>.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3756 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in
22
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3757 this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3758 nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3759 and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3760 addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3761 animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3762 place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3763 so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3764 understanding.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3765 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29158"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3766 "ref">[29158] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3767 dicendum quod philosophus ibi accipit vivere pro operatione vitae.
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3768 Vel dicendum est melius, quod sentire et intelligere, et huiusmodi,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3769 quandoque sumuntur pro quibusdam operationibus; quandoque autem pro
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3770 ipso esse sic operantium. Dicitur enim IX Ethic., quod <i>esse est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3771 sentire vel intelligere</i>, idest habere naturam ad sentiendum vel
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3772 intelligendum. Et hoc modo distinguit philosophus vivere per illa
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3773 quatuor. Nam in istis inferioribus quatuor sunt genera viventium.
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3774 Quorum quaedam habent naturam solum ad utendum alimento, et ad
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3775 consequentia, quae sunt augmentum et generatio; quaedam ulterius ad
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3776 sentiendum, ut patet in animalibus immobilibus, sicut sunt ostrea;
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3777 quaedam vero, cum his, ulterius ad movendum se secundum locum,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3778 sicut animalia perfecta, ut quadrupedia et volatilia et huiusmodi;
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3779 quaedam vero ulterius ad intelligendum, sicut homines.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3780 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3781 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3782 a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p10" shownumber="no"> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p>
22
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diff changeset
3783 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29159"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3784 "ref">[29159] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3785 dicendum quod opera vitae dicuntur, quorum principia sunt in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3786 operantibus, ut seipsos inducant in tales operationes. Contingit
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3787 autem aliquorum operum inesse hominibus non solum principia
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3788 naturalia, ut sunt potentiae naturales; sed etiam quaedam
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3789 superaddita, ut sunt habitus inclinantes ad quaedam operationum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3790 genera quasi per modum naturae, et facientes illas operationes esse
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3791 delectabiles. Et ex hoc dicitur, quasi per quandam similitudinem,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3792 quod illa operatio quae est homini delectabilis, et ad quam
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3793 inclinatur, et in qua conversatur, et ordinat vitam suam ad ipsam,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3794 dicitur vita hominis, unde quidam dicuntur agere vitam luxuriosam,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3795 quidam vitam honestam. Et per hunc modum vita contemplativa ab
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3796 activa distinguitur. Et per hunc etiam modum cognoscere Deum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3797 dicitur vita aeterna.</p><p title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29160"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3798 "ref">[29160] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3799 ad tertium.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3800 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3" next="FP_Q18_A4" prev="FP_Q18_A2" progress="3.34%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether life is properly attributed to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4>
22
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diff changeset
3801 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3802 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3803 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly
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diff changeset
3804 attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3805 themselves, as previously stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2.1"
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diff changeset
3806 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" shape="rect"
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diff changeset
3807 xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to
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diff changeset
3808 God. Neither therefore does life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3809 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29161"><span class=
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diff changeset
3810 "ref">[29161] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
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diff changeset
3811 proceditur. Videtur quod Deo non conveniat vita. Vivere enim
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diff changeset
3812 dicuntur aliqua secundum quod movent seipsa, ut dictum est. Sed Deo
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diff changeset
3813 non competit moveri. Ergo neque vivere.</p></div></div>
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diff changeset
3814 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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diff changeset
3815 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p3"
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diff changeset
3816 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we
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diff changeset
3817 must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the
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diff changeset
3818 Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle
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diff changeset
3819 of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot
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diff changeset
3820 be attributed to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3821 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29162"><span class=
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diff changeset
3822 "ref">[29162] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
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diff changeset
3823 omnibus quae vivunt, est accipere aliquod vivendi principium, unde
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3824 dicitur in II de anima, quod <i>anima est viventis corporis causa
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diff changeset
3825 et principium</i>. Sed Deus non habet aliquod principium. Ergo sibi
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diff changeset
3826 non competit vivere.</p></div></div>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3827 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3828 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p4"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3829 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principle of life in
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diff changeset
3830 the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this
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diff changeset
3831 exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed
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diff changeset
3832 to incorporeal things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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diff changeset
3833 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29163"><span class=
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diff changeset
3834 "ref">[29163] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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diff changeset
3835 principium vitae in rebus viventibus quae apud nos sunt, est anima
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diff changeset
3836 vegetabilis, quae non est nisi in rebus corporalibus. Ergo rebus
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diff changeset
3837 incorporalibus non competit vivere.</p></div></div>
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3838 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3839 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3840 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef
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diff changeset
3841 osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.83.3" parsed="vul|Ps|83|3|0|0"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3842 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5.1"
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3843 passage="Ps. 83:3">Ps. 83:3</scripRef>): "My heart and my flesh have
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3844 rejoiced in the living God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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diff changeset
3845 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29164"><span class=
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diff changeset
3846 "ref">[29164] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3847 quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII, <i>cor meum et caro mea
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diff changeset
3848 exultaverunt in Deum vivum</i>.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3849 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3850 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3851 sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3852 inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p7" shownumber="no"> Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
3853 only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3854 their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
3855 beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p8" shownumber="no"> But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
3856 degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.</p>
22
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diff changeset
3857 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 co."><a name="29165"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3858 "ref">[29165] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3859 quod vita maxime proprie in Deo est. Ad cuius evidentiam,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3860 considerandum est quod, cum vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3861 operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab aliis mota; quanto perfectius
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3862 competit hoc alicui, tanto perfectius in eo invenitur vita. In
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3863 moventibus autem et motis tria per ordinem inveniuntur. Nam primo,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3864 finis movet agentem; agens vero principale est quod per suam formam
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3865 agit; et hoc interdum agit per aliquod instrumentum, quod non agit
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3866 ex virtute suae formae, sed ex virtute principalis agentis; cui
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3867 instrumento competit sola executio actionis. Inveniuntur igitur
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3868 quaedam, quae movent seipsa, non habito respectu ad formam vel
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3869 finem, quae inest eis a natura, sed solum quantum ad executionem
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3870 motus, sed forma per quam agunt, et finis propter quem agunt,
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3871 determinantur eis a natura. Et huiusmodi sunt plantae, quae
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3872 secundum formam inditam eis a natura, movent seipsas secundum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3873 augmentum et decrementum. Quaedam vero ulterius movent seipsa, non
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ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3874 solum habito respectu ad executionem motus, sed etiam quantum ad
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3875 formam quae est principium motus, quam per se acquirunt. Et
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ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3876 huiusmodi sunt animalia, quorum motus principium est forma non a
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3877 natura indita, sed per sensum accepta. Unde quanto perfectiorem
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3878 sensum habent, tanto perfectius movent seipsa. Nam ea quae non
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diff changeset
3879 habent nisi sensum tactus, movent solum seipsa motu dilatationis et
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3880 constrictionis, ut ostrea, parum excedentia motum plantae. Quae
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diff changeset
3881 vero habent virtutem sensitivam perfectam, non solum ad
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diff changeset
3882 cognoscendum coniuncta et tangentia, sed etiam ad cognoscendum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3883 distantia, movent seipsa in remotum motu processivo. Sed quamvis
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3884 huiusmodi animalia formam quae est principium motus, per sensum
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3885 accipiant, non tamen per seipsa praestituunt sibi finem suae
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diff changeset
3886 operationis, vel sui motus; sed est eis inditus a natura, cuius
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diff changeset
3887 instinctu ad aliquid agendum moventur per formam sensu apprehensam.
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diff changeset
3888 Unde supra talia animalia sunt illa quae movent seipsa, etiam
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diff changeset
3889 habito respectu ad finem, quem sibi praestituunt. Quod quidem non
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diff changeset
3890 fit nisi per rationem et intellectum, cuius est cognoscere
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3891 proportionem finis et eius quod est ad finem, et unum ordinare in
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diff changeset
3892 alterum. Unde perfectior modus vivendi est eorum quae habent
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diff changeset
3893 intellectum, haec enim perfectius movent seipsa. Et huius est
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diff changeset
3894 signum, quod in uno et eodem homine virtus intellectiva movet
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diff changeset
3895 potentias sensitivas; et potentiae sensitivae per suum imperium
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diff changeset
3896 movent organa, quae exequuntur motum. Sicut etiam in artibus,
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diff changeset
3897 videmus quod ars ad quam pertinet usus navis, scilicet ars
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diff changeset
3898 gubernatoria, praecipit ei quae inducit formam navis, et haec
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3899 praecipit illi quae habet executionem tantum, in disponendo
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3900 materiam. Sed quamvis intellectus noster ad aliqua se agat, tamen
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diff changeset
3901 aliqua sunt ei praestituta a natura; sicut sunt prima principia,
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diff changeset
3902 circa quae non potest aliter se habere, et ultimus finis, quem non
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diff changeset
3903 potest non velle. Unde, licet quantum ad aliquid moveat se, tamen
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diff changeset
3904 oportet quod quantum ad aliqua ab alio moveatur. Illud igitur cuius
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diff changeset
3905 sua natura est ipsum eius intelligere, et cui id quod naturaliter
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diff changeset
3906 habet, non determinatur ab alio, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3907 vitae. Tale autem est Deus. Unde in Deo maxime est vita. Unde
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3908 philosophus, in XII Metaphys., ostenso quod Deus sit intelligens,
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diff changeset
3909 concludit quod habeat vitam perfectissimam et sempiternam, quia
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diff changeset
3910 intellectus eius est perfectissimus, et semper in actu.</p></div></div>
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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diff changeset
3911 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
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parents:
diff changeset
3912 movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself
22
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3913 is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3914 that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3915 of the imperfect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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diff changeset
3916 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29166"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3917 "ref">[29166] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3918 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys., duplex est actio,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3919 una, quae transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3920 alia, quae manet in agente, ut intelligere, sentire et velle.
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3921 Quarum haec est differentia, quia prima actio non est perfectio
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3922 agentis quod movet, sed ipsius moti; secunda autem actio est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3923 perfectio agentis. Unde, quia motus est actus mobilis, secunda
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3924 actio, inquantum est actus operantis, dicitur motus eius; ex hac
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3925 similitudine, quod, sicut motus est actus mobilis, ita huiusmodi
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3926 actio est actus agentis; licet motus sit actus imperfecti, scilicet
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3927 existentis in potentia, huiusmodi autem actio est actus perfecti,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3928 idest existentis in actu, ut dicitur in III de anima. Hoc igitur
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3929 modo quo intelligere est motus, id quod se intelligit, dicitur se
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3930 movere. Et per hunc modum etiam Plato posuit quod Deus movet
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3931 seipsum, non eo modo quo motus est actus imperfecti.</p></div></div>
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3932 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3933 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p10"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3934 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God is His own very
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3935 existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3936 so lives that He has not principle of life.</p></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3937 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29167"><span class=
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3938 "ref">[29167] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3939 dicendum quod, sicut Deus est ipsum suum esse et suum intelligere,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3940 ita est suum vivere. Et propter hoc, sic vivit, quod non habet
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3941 vivendi principium.</p></div></div>
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3942 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3943 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p11"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3944 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Life in this lower world
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3945 is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3946 the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3947 reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but
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diff changeset
3948 this does not hold good with incorruptible natures.</p></div><div
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diff changeset
3949 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29168"><span class=
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diff changeset
3950 "ref">[29168] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6d097403ddb9 finished
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diff changeset
3951 dicendum quod vita in istis inferioribus recipitur in natura
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3952 corruptibili, quae indiget et generatione ad conservationem
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3953 speciei, et alimento ad conservationem individui. Et propter hoc,
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3954 in istis inferioribus non invenitur vita sine anima vegetabili. Sed
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3955 hoc non habet locum in rebus incorruptibilibus.</p></div></div>
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3956 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4" next="FP_Q19" prev="FP_Q18_A3"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3957 progress="3.38%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all things are
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3958 life in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3959 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are life in
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3960 God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width:
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3961 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3962 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all things are
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3963 life in God. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Acts.17.28"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3964 parsed="vul|Acts|17|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2.1"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3965 passage="Acts 17:28">Acts 17:28</scripRef>), "In Him we live, and
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3966 move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3967 all things are life in Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3968 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29169"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3969 "ref">[29169] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3970 proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia sint vita in Deo. Dicitur enim
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3971 Act. XVII, <i>in ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus</i>. Sed non omnia
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3972 in Deo sunt motus. Ergo non omnia in ipso sunt
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3973 vita.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3974 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3975 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3976 Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3977 modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3978 have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3979 God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29170"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3980 "ref">[29170] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnia
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3981 sunt in Deo sicut in primo exemplari. Sed exemplata debent
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3982 conformari exemplari. Cum igitur non omnia vivant in seipsis,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3983 videtur quod non omnia in Deo sint vita.</p></div></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3984 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3985 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p4"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3986 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3987 Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3988 does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3989 life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3990 than themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3991 they exist actually, but in God potentially.</p></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3992 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29171"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3993 "ref">[29171] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3994 Augustinus dicit in libro de vera Relig., substantia vivens est
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3995 melior qualibet substantia non vivente. Si igitur ea quae in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3996 seipsis non vivunt, in Deo sunt vita, videtur quod verius sint res
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3997 in Deo quam in seipsis. Quod tamen videtur esse falsum, cum in
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
3998 seipsis sint in actu, in Deo vero in potentia.</p></div></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
3999 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
4000 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p5"
6d097403ddb9 finished
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parents: 19
diff changeset
4001 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as good things and
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4002 things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4003 that God can make, but never will be made. If, therefore, all things
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4004 are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4005 things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4006 Him, and this appears inadmissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4007 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29172"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4008 "ref">[29172] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4009 sciuntur a Deo bona, et ea quae fiunt secundum aliquod tempus; ita
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4010 mala, et ea quae Deus potest facere, sed nunquam fiunt. Si ergo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4011 omnia sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt scita ab ipso, videtur quod
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4012 etiam mala, et quae nunquam fiunt, sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4013 scita ab eo. Quod videtur inconveniens.</p></div></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4014 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4015 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4016 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> (<scripRef
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4017 osisRef="Bible.vul:John.1.3-John.1.4" parsed="vul|John|1|3|1|4"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4018 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6.1"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4019 passage="Jn. 1:3,4">Jn. 1:3,4</scripRef>), it is said, "What was made,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4020 in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4021 things are life in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4022 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29173"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4023 "ref">[29173] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4024 quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>quod factum est, in ipso vita erat</i>.
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4025 Sed omnia praeter Deum facta sunt. Ergo omnia in Deo sunt
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4026 vita.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4027 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4028 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b>
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4029 In God to live is to understand, as before stated <a
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4030 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3"
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4031 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4032 understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4033 whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4034 God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4035 in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4036 divine life itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4037 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 co."><a name="29174"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4038 "ref">[29174] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4039 quod, sicut dictum est, vivere Dei est eius intelligere. In Deo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4040 autem est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, et ipsum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4041 intelligere eius. Unde quidquid est in Deo ut intellectum, est
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4042 ipsum vivere vel vita eius. Unde, cum omnia quae facta sunt a Deo,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4043 sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4044 vita divina.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4045 another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4046 them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4047 in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4048 are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4049 life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4050 manner are not movement, but life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4051 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29175"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4052 "ref">[29175] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4053 dicendum quod creaturae in Deo esse dicuntur dupliciter. Uno modo,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4054 inquantum continentur et conservantur virtute divina, sicut dicimus
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4055 ea esse in nobis, quae sunt in nostra potestate. Et sic creaturae
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4056 dicuntur esse in Deo, etiam prout sunt in propriis naturis. Et hoc
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4057 modo intelligendum est verbum apostoli dicentis, <i>in ipso
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4058 vivimus, movemur et sumus</i>, quia et nostrum vivere, et nostrum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4059 esse, et nostrum moveri causantur a Deo. Alio modo dicuntur res
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4060 esse in Deo sicut in cognoscente. Et sic sunt in Deo per proprias
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4061 rationes, quae non sunt aliud in Deo ab essentia divina. Unde res,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4062 prout sic in Deo sunt, sunt essentia divina. Et quia essentia
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4063 divina est vita, non autem motus, inde est quod res, hoc modo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4064 loquendi, in Deo non sunt motus, sed vita.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4065 as having a divine existence in that mind.</p></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4066 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29176"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4067 "ref">[29176] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4068 dicendum quod exemplata oportet conformari exemplari secundum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4069 rationem formae, non autem secundum modum essendi. Nam alterius
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4070 modi esse habet quandoque forma in exemplari et in exemplato, sicut
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4071 forma domus in mente artificis habet esse immateriale et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4072 intelligibile, in domo autem quae est extra animam, habet esse
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4073 materiale et sensibile. Unde et rationes rerum quae in seipsis non
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4074 vivunt, in mente divina sunt vita, quia in mente divina habent esse
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4075 divinum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more
19
bd2e6bbd9196 thru 14
ht
parents:
diff changeset
4076 truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the
22
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4077 mind; since the former is actual, the latter only
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4078 potential.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4079 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29177"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4080 "ref">[29177] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4081 dicendum quod, si de ratione rerum naturalium non esset materia,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4082 sed tantum forma, omnibus modis veriori modo essent res naturales
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4083 in mente divina per suas ideas, quam in seipsis. Propter quod et
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4084 Plato posuit quod homo separatus erat verus homo, homo autem
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4085 materialis est homo per participationem. Sed quia de ratione rerum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4086 naturalium est materia, dicendum quod res naturales verius esse
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4087 habent simpliciter in mente divina, quam in seipsis, quia in mente
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4088 divina habent esse increatum, in seipsis autem esse creatum. Sed
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4089 esse hoc, utpote homo vel equus, verius habent in propria natura
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4090 quam in mente divina, quia ad veritatem hominis pertinet esse
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4091 materiale, quod non habent in mente divina. Sicut domus nobilius
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4092 esse habet in mente artificis, quam in materia, sed tamen verius
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4093 dicitur domus quae est in materia, quam quae est in mente; quia
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4094 haec est domus in actu, illa autem domus in potentia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4095 far as life implies a principle of operation.</p></div><div
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4096 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29178"><span class=
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4097 "ref">[29178] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4098 dicendum quod, licet mala sint in Dei scientia, inquantum sub Dei
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4099 scientia comprehenduntur, non tamen sunt in Deo sicut creata a Deo
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
parents: 19
diff changeset
4100 vel conservata ab ipso, neque sicut habentia rationem in Deo,
6d097403ddb9 finished
ht
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4101 cognoscuntur enim a Deo per rationes bonorum. Unde non potest dici
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4102 quod mala sint vita in Deo. Ea vero quae secundum nullum tempus
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4103 sunt, possunt dici esse vita in Deo, secundum quod vivere nominat
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4104 intelligere tantum, inquantum intelliguntur a Deo, non autem
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4105 secundum quod vivere importat principium
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4106 operationis.</p></div></div></div></div>
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4107 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
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4108 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
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4109 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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4110 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11" shownumber="no"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12" shownumber="no"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13" shownumber="no"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14" shownumber="no"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p>
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4111 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4112 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" next="FP_Q19_A2" prev="FP_Q19" progress="3.42%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is will in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether there is will in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.12.2" parsed="vul|Rom|12|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5.1" passage="Rom. 12:2">Rom. 12:2</scripRef>): "That you may prove what is the will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
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4113 without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
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4114 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2" next="FP_Q19_A3" prev="FP_Q19_A1" progress="3.44%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God wills things apart from Himself?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Thess.4.3" parsed="vul|1Thess|4|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" passage="1 Thess. 4:3">1 Thess. 4:3</scripRef>): "This is the will of God, your sanctification."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces
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4115 its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other
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4116 things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from
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4117 Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its
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4118 own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" next="FP_Q19_A4" prev="FP_Q19_A2" progress="3.47%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11" parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8.1" passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not
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4119 necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we
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4120 will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship
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4121 in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for
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4122 supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the
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4123 divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p15" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute
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4124 necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" next="FP_Q19_A5" prev="FP_Q19_A3" progress="3.51%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the will of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4>
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4125 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4126 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4127 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4128 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4129 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6.1" passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?"</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4130 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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4131 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p8" shownumber="no"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He
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4132 must act by intellect and will.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9" shownumber="no"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
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4133 the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p10" shownumber="no"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
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4134 for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.</p>
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4135 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4136 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4137 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4138 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4139 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God
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4140 all these things are one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4141 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" next="FP_Q19_A6" prev="FP_Q19_A4" progress="3.55%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4>
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4142 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4143 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes
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4144 to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4145 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4146 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4147 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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4148 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known.
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4149 If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
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4150 premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the
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4151 cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.</p>
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4152 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4153 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4154 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly
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4155 unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4156 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this
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4157 cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4158 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6" next="FP_Q19_A7" prev="FP_Q19_A5" progress="3.58%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4>
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4159 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.2.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|2|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" passage="1 Tim. 2:4">1 Tim. 2:4</scripRef>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4160 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4161 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4162 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.113.11" parsed="vul|Ps|113|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5.1" passage="Ps. 113:11">Ps. 113:11</scripRef>): "God hath done all things, whatsoever He would."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4163 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence
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4164 the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
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4165 For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as
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4166 does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4167 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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4168 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every
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4169 class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent,
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4170 but to the things willed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p8" shownumber="no"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or
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4171 dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in
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4172 themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills
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4173 takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.</p>
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4174 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4175 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4176 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4177 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8" prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the will of God is changeable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.6.7" parsed="vul|Gen|6|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" passage="Gn. 6:7">Gn. 6:7</scripRef>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.18.7-Jer.18.8" parsed="vul|Jer|18|7|18|8" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" passage="Jer. 18:7,8">Jer. 18:7,8</scripRef>) Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.23.19" parsed="vul|Num|23|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" passage="Num. 23:19">Num. 23:19</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless
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4178 we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
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4179 hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
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4180 He had made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
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4181 rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
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4182 and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.38.1" parsed="vul|Isa|38|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" passage="Is. 38:1">Is. 38:1</scripRef>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For
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4183 men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4>
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4184 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4185 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.19" parsed="vul|Rom|9|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" passage="Rom. 9:19">Rom. 9:19</scripRef>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4186 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
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4187 necessary absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4188 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4189 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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4190 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
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4191 referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that
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4192 belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise
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4193 contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.</p>
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4194 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4195 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4196 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4197 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4198 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10" prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God wills evils?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and
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4199 beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
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4200 corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not
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4201 even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
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4202 willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is
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4203 beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9" progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
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4204 necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2"> Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
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4205 punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat.
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4206 6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called
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4207 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
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4208 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4209 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3.1" passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4210 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4211 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4212 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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4213 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for
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4214 what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept,
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4215 counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. 6:10</scripRef>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.</p>
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4216 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4217 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4218 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter
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4219 the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4220 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4221 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and
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4222 these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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4223 </div></div></div></body></html>