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7 xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><title>Bilingual Aquinas Questions 19--25</title><style>
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10 </style></head><body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])"><h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ19-26)</h2><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
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11 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
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12 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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13 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11" shownumber="no"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12" shownumber="no"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13" shownumber="no"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14" shownumber="no"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p>
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14 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 pr."><a name="29179"><span class="ref">[29179]
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15 Iª q. 19 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad
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16 divinam scientiam pertinent, considerandum est de his quae
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17 pertinent ad voluntatem divinam, ut sit prima consideratio de ipsa
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18 Dei voluntate; secunda, de his quae ad voluntatem absolute
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19 pertinent; tertia, de his quae ad intellectum in ordine ad
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20 voluntatem pertinent. Circa ipsam autem voluntatem quaeruntur
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21 duodecim. Primo, utrum in Deo sit voluntas. Secundo, utrum Deus
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22 velit alia a se. Tertio, utrum quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate
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23 velit. Quarto, utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum. Quinto, utrum
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24 voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam causam. Sexto, utrum
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25 voluntas divina semper impleatur. Septimo, utrum voluntas Dei sit
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26 mutabilis. Octavo, utrum voluntas Dei necessitatem rebus volitis
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27 imponat. Nono, utrum in Deo sit voluntas malorum. Decimo, utrum
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28 Deus habeat liberum arbitrium. Undecimo, utrum sit distinguenda in
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29 Deo voluntas signi. Duodecimo, utrum convenienter circa divinam
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30 voluntatem ponantur quinque signa.</p></div></div>
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31 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" next="FP_Q19_A2" prev="FP_Q19"
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32 progress="3.42%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is will in
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33 God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether there
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34 is will in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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35 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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36 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
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37 seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end
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38 and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is
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39 not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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40 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29180"><span class=
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41 "ref">[29180] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
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42 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit voluntas. Obiectum enim
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43 voluntatis est finis et bonum. Sed Dei non est assignare aliquem
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44 finem. Ergo voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
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45 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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46 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p3"
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47 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of
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48 appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed,
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49 implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there
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50 is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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51 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29181"><span class=
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52 "ref">[29181] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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53 voluntas est appetitus quidam. Appetitus autem, cum sit rei non
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54 habitae, imperfectionem designat, quae Deo non competit. Ergo
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55 voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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56 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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57 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p4"
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58 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the
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59 Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God
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60 is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in
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61 Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div
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62 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29182"><span class=
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63 "ref">[29182] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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64 secundum philosophum, in III de anima, voluntas est movens motum.
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65 Sed Deus est primum movens immobile. Ut probatur VIII Physic. Ergo
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66 in Deo non est voluntas.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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67 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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68 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
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69 contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.12.2"
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70 parsed="vul|Rom|12|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5.1"
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71 passage="Rom. 12:2">Rom. 12:2</scripRef>): "That you may prove what is
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72 the will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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73 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29183"><span class=
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74 "ref">[29183] Iª q. 19 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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75 quod dicit apostolus, Rom. XII, <i>ut probetis quae sit voluntas
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76 Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
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77 without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
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78 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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79 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 co."><a name="29184"><span class=
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80 "ref">[29184] Iª q. 19 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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81 in Deo voluntatem esse, sicut et in eo est intellectus, voluntas
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82 enim intellectum consequitur. Sicut enim res naturalis habet esse
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83 in actu per suam formam, ita intellectus intelligens actu per suam
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84 formam intelligibilem. Quaelibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem
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85 hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendat in eam;
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86 et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea. Et idem est de qualibet
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87 perfectione naturali, quod est bonum naturae. Et haec habitudo ad
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88 bonum, in rebus carentibus cognitione, vocatur appetitus naturalis.
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89 Unde et natura intellectualis ad bonum apprehensum per formam
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90 intelligibilem, similem habitudinem habet, ut scilicet, cum habet
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91 ipsum, quiescat in illo; cum vero non habet, quaerat ipsum. Et
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92 utrumque pertinet ad voluntatem. Unde in quolibet habente
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93 intellectum, est voluntas; sicut in quolibet habente sensum, est
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94 appetitus animalis. Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit
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95 in eo intellectus. Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita
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96 suum velle.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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97 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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98 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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99 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is
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100 the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His
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101 essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (<a
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102 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3"
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103 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the
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104 aspect of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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105 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29185"><span class=
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106 "ref">[29185] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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107 dicendum quod, licet nihil aliud a Deo sit finis Dei, tamen ipsemet
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108 est finis respectu omnium quae ab eo fiunt. Et hoc per suam
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109 essentiam, cum per suam essentiam sit bonus, ut supra ostensum est,
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110 finis enim habet rationem boni.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
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111 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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112 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
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113 to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which,
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114 although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking
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115 what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in
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116 what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as
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117 having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is
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118 not distinct from His essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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119 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29186"><span class=
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120 "ref">[29186] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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121 dicendum quod voluntas in nobis pertinet ad appetitivam partem,
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122 quae licet ab appetendo nominetur, non tamen hunc solum habet
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123 actum, ut appetat quae non habet; sed etiam ut amet quod habet, et
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124 delectetur in illo. Et quantum ad hoc voluntas in Deo ponitur; quae
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125 semper habet bonum quod est eius obiectum, cum sit indifferens ab
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126 eo secundum essentiam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div
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127 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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128 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p9"
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129 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the
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130 principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another;
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131 but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His
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132 essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved
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133 by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as
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134 understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato
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135 meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.</p></div><div
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136 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29187"><span class=
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137 "ref">[29187] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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138 dicendum quod voluntas cuius obiectum principale est bonum quod est
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139 extra voluntatem, oportet quod sit mota ab aliquo. Sed obiectum
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140 divinae voluntatis est bonitas sua, quae est eius essentia. Unde,
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141 cum voluntas Dei sit eius essentia, non movetur ab alio a se, sed a
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142 se tantum, eo modo loquendi quo intelligere et velle dicitur motus.
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143 Et secundum hoc Plato dixit quod primum movens movet
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144 seipsum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2"
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145 next="FP_Q19_A3" prev="FP_Q19_A1" progress="3.44%" n="ii"
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146 title="Article. 2 - Whether God wills things apart from Himself?"><h4
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147 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether God wills
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148 things apart from Himself?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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149 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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150 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
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151 seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine
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152 will is the divine existence. But God is not other than
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153 Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than
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154 Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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155 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29188"><span class=
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156 "ref">[29188] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
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157 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non velit alia a se. Velle enim
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158 divinum est eius esse. Sed Deus non est aliud a se. Ergo non vult
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159 aliud a se.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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160 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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161 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
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162 Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite,
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163 as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills anything apart
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164 from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is
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165 impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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166 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29189"><span class=
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167 "ref">[29189] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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168 volitum movet voluntatem, sicut appetibile appetitum, ut dicitur in
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169 III de anima. Si igitur Deus velit aliquid aliud a se, movebitur
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170 eius voluntas ab aliquo alio, quod est
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171 impossibile.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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172 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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173 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
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174 Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing
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175 beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies
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176 His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from
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177 Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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178 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29190"><span class=
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179 "ref">[29190] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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180 cuicumque voluntati sufficit aliquod volitum, nihil quaerit extra
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181 illud. Sed Deo sufficit sua bonitas, et voluntas eius ex ea
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182 satiatur. Ergo Deus non vult aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div
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183 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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184 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p5"
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185 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are
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186 multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If,
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187 therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows
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188 that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence,
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189 which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will
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190 things apart from Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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191 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29191"><span class=
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192 "ref">[29191] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, actus
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193 voluntatis multiplicatur secundum volita. Si igitur Deus velit se
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194 et alia a se, sequitur quod actus voluntatis eius sit multiplex, et
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195 per consequens eius esse, quod est eius velle. Hoc autem est
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196 impossibile. Non ergo vult alia a se.</p></div></div><div
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197 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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198 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6"
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199 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef
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200 osisRef="Bible.vul:1Thess.4.3" parsed="vul|1Thess|4|3|0|0"
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201 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" passage="1 Thess. 4:3">1
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202 Thess. 4:3</scripRef>): "This is the will of God, your
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203 sanctification."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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204 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29192"><span class=
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205 "ref">[29192] Iª q. 19 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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206 quod apostolus dicit, I Thess. IV, <i>haec est voluntas Dei,
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207 sanctificatio vestra</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces
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208 its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other
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209 things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained
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210 to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other
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211 things should be partakers therein.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
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212 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 co."><a name="29193"><span class=
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213 "ref">[29193] Iª q. 19 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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214 quod Deus non solum se vult, sed etiam alia a se. Quod apparet a
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215 simili prius introducto. Res enim naturalis non solum habet
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216 naturalem inclinationem respectu proprii boni, ut acquirat ipsum
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217 cum non habet, vel ut quiescat in illo cum habet; sed etiam ut
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218 proprium bonum in alia diffundat, secundum quod possibile est. Unde
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219 videmus quod omne agens, inquantum est actu et perfectum, facit
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220 sibi simile. Unde et hoc pertinet ad rationem voluntatis, ut bonum
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221 quod quis habet, aliis communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Et
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222 hoc praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, a qua, per quandam
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223 similitudinem, derivatur omnis perfectio. Unde, si res naturales,
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224 inquantum perfectae sunt, suum bonum aliis communicant, multo magis
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225 pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, ut bonum suum aliis per
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226 similitudinem communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Sic igitur
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227 vult et se esse, et alia. Sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem,
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228 inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam
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229 participare.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from
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230 Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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231 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29194"><span class=
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232 "ref">[29194] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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233 dicendum quod, licet divinum velle sit eius esse secundum rem,
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234 tamen differt ratione, secundum diversum modum intelligendi et
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235 significandi, ut ex superioribus patet. In hoc enim quod dico Deum
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236 esse, non importatur habitudo ad aliquid, sicut in hoc quod dico
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237 Deum velle. Et ideo, licet non sit aliquid aliud a se, vult tamen
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238 aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its
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239 own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only
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240 for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow
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241 that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He
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242 understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own
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243 essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own
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244 goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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245 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29195"><span class=
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246 "ref">[29195] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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247 dicendum quod in his quae volumus propter finem, tota ratio movendi
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248 est finis, et hoc est quod movet voluntatem. Et hoc maxime apparet
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249 in his quae volumus tantum propter finem. Qui enim vult sumere
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250 potionem amaram, nihil in ea vult nisi sanitatem, et hoc solum est
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251 quod movet eius voluntatem. Secus autem est in eo qui sumit
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252 potionem dulcem, quam non solum propter sanitatem, sed etiam
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253 propter se aliquis velle potest. Unde, cum Deus alia a se non velit
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254 nisi propter finem qui est sua bonitas, ut dictum est, non sequitur
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255 quod aliquid aliud moveat voluntatem eius nisi bonitas sua. Et sic,
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256 sicut alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a
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257 se vult, volendo bonitatem suam.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
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258 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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259 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
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260 to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the
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261 divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from
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262 itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its
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263 goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
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264 consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that
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265 essence knows other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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266 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29196"><span class=
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267 "ref">[29196] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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268 dicendum quod ex hoc quod voluntati divinae sufficit sua bonitas,
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269 non sequitur quod nihil aliud velit, sed quod nihil aliud vult nisi
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270 ratione suae bonitatis. Sicut etiam intellectus divinus, licet sit
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271 perfectus ex hoc ipso quod essentiam divinam cognoscit, tamen in ea
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272 cognoscit alia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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273 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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274 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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275 4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the
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276 one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the
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277 many only through the one, that is, through its own
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278 goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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279 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29197"><span class=
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280 "ref">[29197] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
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281 dicendum quod, sicut intelligere divinum est unum, quia multa non
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282 videt nisi in uno; ita velle divinum est unum et simplex, quia
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283 multa non vult nisi per unum, quod est bonitas
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284 sua.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3"
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285 next="FP_Q19_A4" prev="FP_Q19_A2" progress="3.47%" n="iii"
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286 title="Article. 3 - Whether whatever God wills He wills
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287 necessarily?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
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288 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether whatever God wills He wills
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289 necessarily?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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290 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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291 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
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292 seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything
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293 eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity,
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294 for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills,
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295 He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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296 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29198"><span class=
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297 "ref">[29198] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
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298 proceditur. Videtur quod quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate velit.
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299 Omne enim aeternum est necessarium. Sed quidquid Deus vult, ab
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300 aeterno vult, alias, voluntas eius esset mutabilis. Ergo quidquid
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301 vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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302 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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303 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p3"
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304 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart
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305 from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His
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306 own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself
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307 necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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308 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29199"><span class=
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309 "ref">[29199] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
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310 vult alia a se, inquantum vult bonitatem suam. Sed Deus bonitatem
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311 suam ex necessitate vult. Ergo alia a se ex necessitate
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312 vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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313 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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314 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
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315 Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God
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316 is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as
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317 above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4.1"
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318 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2],
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319 A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills;
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320 since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated
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321 in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills
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322 necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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323 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29200"><span class=
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324 "ref">[29200] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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325 quidquid est Deo naturale, est necessarium, quia Deus est per se
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326 necesse esse, et principium omnis necessitatis, ut supra ostensum
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327 est. Sed naturale est ei velle quidquid vult, quia in Deo nihil
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328 potest esse praeter naturam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ergo
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329 quidquid vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
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330 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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331 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p5"
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332 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not
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333 necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same
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334 thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He
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335 wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible
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336 for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is
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337 contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since
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338 everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.</p></div><div
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339 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="29201"><span class=
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340 "ref">[29201] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non
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341 necesse esse, et possibile non esse, aequipollent. Si igitur non
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342 necesse est Deum velle aliquid eorum quae vult, possibile est eum
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343 non velle illud; et possibile est eum velle illud quod non vult.
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344 Ergo voluntas divina est contingens ad utrumlibet. Et sic
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345 imperfecta, quia omne contingens est imperfectum et
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346 mutabile.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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347 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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348 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b>
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349 Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other
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350 of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the
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351 other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in
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352 Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to
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353 anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another;
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354 and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.</p></div><div
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355 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="29202"><span class=
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356 "ref">[29202] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, ab eo
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357 quod est ad utrumlibet, non sequitur aliqua actio, nisi ab aliquo
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358 alio inclinetur ad unum, ut dicit Commentator, in II Physic. Si
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359 ergo voluntas Dei in aliquibus se habet ad utrumlibet, sequitur
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360 quod ab aliquo alio determinetur ad effectum. Et sic habet aliquam
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361 causam priorem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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362 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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363 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 6:</b>
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364 Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine
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365 knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever
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366 God wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
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367 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6"><a name="29203"><span class=
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368 "ref">[29203] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
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369 quidquid Deus scit, ex necessitate scit. Sed sicut scientia divina
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370 est eius essentia, ita voluntas divina. Ergo quidquid Deus vult, ex
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371 necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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372 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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373 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
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374 The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11"
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375 parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8.1"
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376 passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>): "Who worketh all things
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377 according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to
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378 the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God
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379 does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div
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380 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29204"><span class=
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381 "ref">[29204] Iª q. 19 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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382 quod dicit apostolus, Ephes. I, <i>qui operatur omnia secundum
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383 consilium voluntatis suae</i>. Quod autem operamur ex consilio
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384 voluntatis, non ex necessitate volumus. Non ergo quidquid Deus
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385 vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not
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386 necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we
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387 will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship
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388 in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for
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389 supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it,
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390 as His will cannot change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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391 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 co."><a name="29205"><span class=
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392 "ref">[29205] Iª q. 19 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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393 quod necessarium dicitur aliquid dupliciter, scilicet absolute, et
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394 ex suppositione. Necessarium absolute iudicatur aliquid ex
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395 habitudine terminorum, utpote quia praedicatum est in definitione
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396 subiecti, sicut necessarium est hominem esse animal; vel quia
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397 subiectum est de ratione praedicati, sicut hoc est necessarium,
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398 numerum esse parem vel imparem. Sic autem non est necessarium
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399 Socratem sedere. Unde non est necessarium absolute, sed potest dici
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400 necessarium ex suppositione, supposito enim quod sedeat, necesse
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401 est eum sedere dum sedet. Circa divina igitur volita hoc
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402 considerandum est, quod aliquid Deum velle est necessarium
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403 absolute, non tamen hoc est verum de omnibus quae vult. Voluntas
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404 enim divina necessariam habitudinem habet ad bonitatem suam, quae
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405 est proprium eius obiectum. Unde bonitatem suam esse Deus ex
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406 necessitate vult; sicut et voluntas nostra ex necessitate vult
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407 beatitudinem. Sicut et quaelibet alia potentia necessariam
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408 habitudinem habet ad proprium et principale obiectum, ut visus ad
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409 colorem; quia de sui ratione est, ut in illud tendat. Alia autem a
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410 se Deus vult, inquantum ordinantur ad suam bonitatem ut in finem.
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411 Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non ex necessitate volumus volentes
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412 finem, nisi sint talia, sine quibus finis esse non potest, sicut
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413 volumus cibum, volentes conservationem vitae; et navem, volentes
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414 transfretare. Non sic autem ex necessitate volumus ea sine quibus
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415 finis esse potest, sicut equum ad ambulandum, quia sine hoc
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416 possumus ire; et eadem ratio est in aliis. Unde, cum bonitas Dei
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417 sit perfecta, et esse possit sine aliis, cum nihil ei perfectionis
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418 ex aliis accrescat; sequitur quod alia a se eum velle, non sit
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419 necessarium absolute. Et tamen necessarium est ex suppositione,
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420 supposito enim quod velit, non potest non velle, quia non potest
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421 voluntas eius mutari.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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422 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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423 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
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424 to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity
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425 whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily;
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426 except by supposition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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427 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29206"><span class=
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428 "ref">[29206] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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429 dicendum quod ex hoc quod Deus ab aeterno vult aliquid, non
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430 sequitur quod necesse est eum illud velle, nisi ex
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431 suppositione.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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432 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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433 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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434 2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not
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435 necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can
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436 exist without other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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437 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29207"><span class=
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438 "ref">[29207] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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439 dicendum quod, licet Deus ex necessitate velit bonitatem suam, non
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440 tamen ex necessitate vult ea quae vult propter bonitatem suam, quia
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441 bonitas eius potest esse sine aliis.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
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442 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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443 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
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444 to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those
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445 other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not
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446 unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.</p></div><div
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447 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29208"><span class=
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448 "ref">[29208] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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449 dicendum quod non est naturale Deo velle aliquid aliorum, quae non
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450 ex necessitate vult. Neque tamen innaturale, aut contra naturam,
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451 sed est voluntarium.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the
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452 divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing
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453 willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it;
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454 and such defect accompanies all created good.</p></div><div
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455 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29209"><span class=
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456 "ref">[29209] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
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457 dicendum quod aliquando aliqua causa necessaria habet non
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458 necessariam habitudinem ad aliquem effectum, quod est propter
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459 defectum effectus, et non propter defectum causae. Sicut virtus
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460 solis habet non necessariam habitudinem ad aliquid eorum quae
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461 contingenter hic eveniunt, non propter defectum virtutis solaris,
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462 sed propter defectum effectus non necessario ex causa provenientis.
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463 Et similiter, quod Deus non ex necessitate velit aliquid eorum quae
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464 vult, non accidit ex defectu voluntatis divinae, sed ex defectu qui
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465 competit volito secundum suam rationem, quia scilicet est tale, ut
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466 sine eo esse possit perfecta bonitas Dei. Qui quidem defectus
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467 consequitur omne bonum creatum.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
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468 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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469 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
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470 to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to
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471 act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is
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472 necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no
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473 necessary relation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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474 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="29210"><span class=
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475 "ref">[29210] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum ergo
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476 dicendum quod causa quae est ex se contingens, oportet quod
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477 determinetur ab aliquo exteriori ad effectum. Sed voluntas divina,
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478 quae ex se necessitatem habet, determinat seipsam ad volitum, ad
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479 quod habet habitudinem non necessariam.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p15" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute
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480 necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they
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481 exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He
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482 wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div
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483 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="29211"><span class=
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484 "ref">[29211] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
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485 quod, sicut divinum esse in se est necessarium, ita et divinum
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486 velle et divinum scire, sed divinum scire habet necessariam
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487 habitudinem ad scita, non autem divinum velle ad volita. Quod ideo
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488 est, quia scientia habetur de rebus, secundum quod sunt in sciente,
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489 voluntas autem comparatur ad res, secundum quod sunt in seipsis.
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490 Quia igitur omnia alia habent necessarium esse secundum quod sunt
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491 in Deo; non autem secundum quod sunt in seipsis, habent
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492 necessitatem absolutam ita quod sint per seipsa necessaria; propter
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493 hoc Deus quaecumque scit, ex necessitate scit, non autem quaecumque
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494 vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" next="FP_Q19_A5" prev="FP_Q19_A3" progress="3.51%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the will of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4>
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495 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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496 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p2"
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497 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is
|
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498 not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our
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499 sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being,
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500 enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine
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501 good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything
|
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502 that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and
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503 pre-election. Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is
|
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504 not the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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505 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29212"><span class=
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506 "ref">[29212] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
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507 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit
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508 enim Dionysius, cap. IV de Div. Nom., <i>sicut noster sol, non
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509 ratiocinans aut praeeligens, sed per ipsum esse illuminat omnia
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510 participare lumen ipsius valentia; ita et bonum divinum per ipsam
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511 essentiam omnibus existentibus immittit bonitatis suae radios</i>.
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512 Sed omne quod agit per voluntatem, agit ut ratiocinans et
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513 praeeligens. Ergo Deus non agit per voluntatem. Ergo voluntas Dei
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514 non est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
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515 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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516 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p3"
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517 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is
|
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518 that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things,
|
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519 that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the first
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520 agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He
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521 acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not
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522 the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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523 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29213"><span class=
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524 "ref">[29213] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
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525 quod est per essentiam, est primum in quolibet ordine sicut in
|
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526 ordine ignitorum est primum, quod est ignis per essentiam sed Deus
|
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527 est primum agens. Ergo est agens per essentiam suam, quae est
|
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528 natura eius. Agit igitur per naturam, et non per voluntatem.
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529 Voluntas igitur divina non est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
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530 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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531 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p4"
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532 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of
|
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533 anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and
|
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534 not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot;
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535 whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to
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536 build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God
|
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537 is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His
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538 nature, and not by His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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539 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29214"><span class=
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540 "ref">[29214] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
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541 quidquid est causa alicuius per hoc quod est tale, est causa per
|
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542 naturam, et non per voluntatem, ignis enim causa est calefactionis,
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543 quia est calidus; sed artifex est causa domus, quia vult eam
|
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544 facere. Sed Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., quod <i>quia
|
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545 Deus bonus est, sumus</i>. Ergo Deus per suam naturam est causa
|
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546 rerum, et non per voluntatem.</p></div></div>
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547 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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548 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5"
|
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549 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one
|
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550 cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before
|
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551 (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8"
|
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552 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of
|
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553 God cannot be considered the cause of things.</p></div><div
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554 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29215"><span class=
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555 "ref">[29215] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, unius
|
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556 rei una est causa. Sed rerum creatarum est causa scientia Dei, ut
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557 supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas Dei non debet poni causa rerum.</p></div></div>
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558 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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559 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6"
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560 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef
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561 osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0"
|
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562 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6.1"
|
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563 passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>), "How could anything
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564 endure, if Thou wouldst not?"</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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565 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29216"><span class=
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566 "ref">[29216] Iª q. 19 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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567 quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>quomodo posset aliquid permanere, nisi tu
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568 voluisses?</i></p></div></div>
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569 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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570 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p8" shownumber="no"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He
|
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571 must act by intellect and will.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9" shownumber="no"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
|
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572 the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p10" shownumber="no"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
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573 for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.</p>
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574 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 co."><a name="29217"><span class=
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575 "ref">[29217] Iª q. 19 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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576 quod necesse est dicere voluntatem Dei esse causam rerum, et Deum
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577 agere per voluntatem, non per necessitatem naturae, ut quidam
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578 existimaverunt. Quod quidem apparere potest tripliciter. Primo
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579 quidem, ex ipso ordine causarum agentium. Cum enim propter finem
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580 agat et intellectus et natura, ut probatur in II Physic., necesse
|
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581 est ut agenti per naturam praedeterminetur finis, et media
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582 necessaria ad finem, ab aliquo superiori intellectu; sicut sagittae
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583 praedeterminatur finis et certus modus a sagittante. Unde necesse
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584 est quod agens per intellectum et voluntatem, sit prius agente per
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585 naturam. Unde, cum primum in ordine agentium sit Deus, necesse est
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586 quod per intellectum et voluntatem agat. Secundo, ex ratione
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587 naturalis agentis, ad quod pertinet ut unum effectum producat, quia
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588 natura uno et eodem modo operatur, nisi impediatur. Et hoc ideo,
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589 quia secundum quod est tale, agit, unde, quandiu est tale, non
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590 facit nisi tale. Omne enim agens per naturam, habet esse
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591 determinatum. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit determinatum, sed
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592 contineat in se totam perfectionem essendi, non potest esse quod
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593 agat per necessitatem naturae, nisi forte causaret aliquid
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594 indeterminatum et infinitum in essendo; quod est impossibile, ut ex
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595 superioribus patet. Non igitur agit per necessitatem naturae sed
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596 effectus determinati ab infinita ipsius perfectione procedunt
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597 secundum determinationem voluntatis et intellectus ipsius. Tertio,
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598 ex habitudine effectuum ad causam. Secundum hoc enim effectus
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599 procedunt a causa agente, secundum quod praeexistunt in ea, quia
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600 omne agens agit sibi simile. Praeexistunt autem effectus in causa
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601 secundum modum causae. Unde, cum esse divinum sit ipsum eius
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602 intelligere, praeexistunt in eo effectus eius secundum modum
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603 intelligibilem. Unde et per modum intelligibilem procedunt ab eo.
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604 Et sic, per consequens, per modum voluntatis, nam inclinatio eius
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605 ad agendum quod intellectu conceptum est, pertinet ad voluntatem.
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606 Voluntas igitur Dei est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
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607 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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608 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p11"
|
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609 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words
|
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|
610 does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a
|
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611 certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not
|
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612 merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a
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613 certain distinction.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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614 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29218"><span class=
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615 "ref">[29218] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
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616 dicendum quod Dionysius per verba illa non intendit excludere
|
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617 electionem a Deo simpliciter, sed secundum quid, inquantum
|
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618 scilicet, non quibusdam solum bonitatem suam communicat, sed
|
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619 omnibus, prout scilicet electio discretionem quandam importat.</p></div></div>
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620 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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621 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p12"
|
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622 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of
|
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623 God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His
|
|
|
624 essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and
|
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625 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29219"><span class=
|
|
|
626 "ref">[29219] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
627 dicendum quod, quia essentia Dei est eius intelligere et velle, ex
|
|
|
628 hoc ipso quod per essentiam suam agit, sequitur quod agat per modum
|
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629 intellectus et voluntatis.</p></div></div>
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630 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
631 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p13"
|
|
|
632 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the
|
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633 will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true
|
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634 inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other
|
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|
635 things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
636 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29220"><span class=
|
|
|
637 "ref">[29220] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
638 dicendum quod bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Pro tanto ergo
|
|
|
639 dicitur, quia Deus bonus est, sumus, inquantum sua bonitas est ei
|
|
|
640 ratio volendi omnia alia, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div>
|
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|
641 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God
|
|
|
642 all these things are one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
643 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29221"><span class=
|
|
|
644 "ref">[29221] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
645 dicendum quod unius et eiusdem effectus, etiam in nobis, est causa
|
|
|
646 scientia ut dirigens, qua concipitur forma operis, et voluntas ut
|
|
|
647 imperans, quia forma, ut est in intellectu tantum, non determinatur
|
|
|
648 ad hoc quod sit vel non sit in effectu, nisi per voluntatem. Unde
|
|
|
649 intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de operando. Sed potentia est
|
|
|
650 causa ut exequens, quia nominat immediatum principium operationis.
|
|
|
651 Sed haec omnia in Deo unum sunt.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
652 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" next="FP_Q19_A6" prev="FP_Q19_A4" progress="3.55%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4>
|
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653 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
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654 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p2"
|
|
|
655 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be
|
|
|
656 assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46):
|
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|
657 "Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?" But
|
|
|
658 to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of
|
|
|
659 willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause.</p></div><div
|
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660 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29222"><span class=
|
|
|
661 "ref">[29222] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
|
|
|
662 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam
|
|
|
663 causam. Dicit enim Augustinus, libro octoginta trium quaest.,
|
|
|
664 <i>quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse?</i>
|
|
|
665 Sed agenti voluntario, quod est ratio operandi, est etiam causa
|
|
|
666 volendi. Ergo voluntas Dei habet aliquam causam.</p></div></div>
|
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|
667 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes
|
|
|
668 to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign
|
|
|
669 some cause to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
670 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29223"><span class=
|
|
|
671 "ref">[29223] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
|
|
|
672 his quae fiunt a volente qui propter nullam causam aliquid vult,
|
|
|
673 non oportet aliam causam assignare nisi voluntatem volentis. Sed
|
|
|
674 voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum, ut ostensum est. Si igitur
|
|
|
675 voluntatis eius non sit aliqua causa, non oportebit in omnibus
|
|
|
676 rebus naturalibus aliam causam quaerere, nisi solam voluntatem
|
|
|
677 divinam. Et sic omnes scientiae essent supervacuae, quae causas
|
|
|
678 aliquorum effectuum assignare nituntur, quod videtur inconveniens.
|
|
|
679 Est igitur assignare aliquam causam voluntatis divinae.</p></div></div>
|
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680 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
681 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p4"
|
|
|
682 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the
|
|
|
683 willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If,
|
|
|
684 therefore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things
|
|
|
685 made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also
|
|
|
686 is not admissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
687 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29224"><span class=
|
|
|
688 "ref">[29224] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
|
|
|
689 fit a volente non propter aliquam causam, dependet ex simplici
|
|
|
690 voluntate eius. Si igitur voluntas Dei non habeat aliquam causam,
|
|
|
691 sequitur quod omnia quae fiunt, dependeant ex simplici eius
|
|
|
692 voluntate, et non habeant aliquam aliam causam. Quod est
|
|
|
693 inconveniens.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
694 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
695 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p5"
|
|
|
696 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii,
|
|
|
697 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But
|
|
|
698 nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not then seek for a
|
|
|
699 cause of it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
700 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29225"><span class=
|
|
|
701 "ref">[29225] Iª q. 19 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
|
702 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnis
|
|
|
703 causa efficiens maior est eo quod efficitur; nihil tamen maius est
|
|
|
704 voluntate Dei; non ergo causa eius quaerenda est</i>.</p></div></div>
|
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|
705 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
|
|
|
706 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known.
|
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|
707 If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
|
|
|
708 premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the
|
|
|
709 cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.</p>
|
|
|
710 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 co."><a name="29226"><span class=
|
|
|
711 "ref">[29226] Iª q. 19 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
712 quod nullo modo voluntas Dei causam habet. Ad cuius evidentiam,
|
|
|
713 considerandum est quod, cum voluntas sequatur intellectum, eodem
|
|
|
714 modo contingit esse causam alicuius volentis ut velit, et alicuius
|
|
|
715 intelligentis ut intelligat. In intellectu autem sic est quod, si
|
|
|
716 seorsum intelligat principium, et seorsum conclusionem,
|
|
|
717 intelligentia principii est causa scientiae conclusionis. Sed si
|
|
|
718 intellectus in ipso principio inspiceret conclusionem, uno intuitu
|
|
|
719 apprehendens utrumque, in eo scientia conclusionis non causaretur
|
|
|
720 ab intellectu principiorum, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Sed
|
|
|
721 tamen intelligeret principia esse causas conclusionis. Similiter
|
|
|
722 est ex parte voluntatis, circa quam sic se habet finis ad ea quae
|
|
|
723 sunt ad finem, sicut in intellectu principia ad conclusiones. Unde,
|
|
|
724 si aliquis uno actu velit finem, et alio actu ea quae sunt ad
|
|
|
725 finem, velle finem erit ei causa volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed
|
|
|
726 si uno actu velit finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, hoc esse non
|
|
|
727 poterit, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Et tamen erit verum
|
|
|
728 dicere quod velit ordinare ea quae sunt ad finem, in finem. Deus
|
|
|
729 autem, sicut uno actu omnia in essentia sua intelligit, ita uno
|
|
|
730 actu vult omnia in sua bonitate. Unde, sicut in Deo intelligere
|
|
|
731 causam non est causa intelligendi effectus, sed ipse intelligit
|
|
|
732 effectus in causa; ita velle finem non est ei causa volendi ea quae
|
|
|
733 sunt ad finem, sed tamen vult ea quae sunt ad finem, ordinari in
|
|
|
734 finem. Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult
|
|
|
735 hoc.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
736 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
737 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p8"
|
|
|
738 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is
|
|
|
739 reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in
|
|
|
740 so far as He wills one thing to be on account of
|
|
|
741 another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
742 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29227"><span class=
|
|
|
743 "ref">[29227] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
744 dicendum quod voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid sit
|
|
|
745 Deo causa volendi, sed inquantum vult unum esse propter aliud.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
746 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly
|
|
|
747 unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the
|
|
|
748 will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
749 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29228"><span class=
|
|
|
750 "ref">[29228] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
751 dicendum quod, cum velit Deus effectus sic esse, ut ex causis
|
|
|
752 certis proveniant, ad hoc quod servetur ordo in rebus; non est
|
|
|
753 supervacuum, etiam cum voluntate Dei, alias causas quaerere. Esset
|
|
|
754 tamen supervacuum, si aliae causae quaererentur ut primae, et non
|
|
|
755 dependentes a divina voluntate. Et sic loquitur Augustinus in III
|
|
|
756 de Trin., <i>placuit vanitati philosophorum etiam aliis causis
|
|
|
757 effectus contingentes tribuere, cum omnino videre non possent
|
|
|
758 superiorem ceteris omnibus causam, idest voluntatem Dei</i>.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
759 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this
|
|
|
760 cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things
|
|
|
761 depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other
|
|
|
762 causes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
763 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29229"><span class=
|
|
|
764 "ref">[29229] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
765 dicendum quod, cum Deus velit effectus esse propter causas,
|
|
|
766 quicumque effectus praesupponunt aliquem alium effectum, non
|
|
|
767 dependent ex sola Dei voluntate, sed ex aliquo alio. Sed primi
|
|
|
768 effectus ex sola divina voluntate dependent. Utpote si dicamus quod
|
|
|
769 Deus voluit hominem habere manus, ut deservirent intellectui,
|
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|
770 operando diversa opera, et voluit eum habere intellectum, ad hoc
|
|
|
771 quod esset homo, et voluit eum esse hominem, ut frueretur ipso, vel
|
|
|
772 ad complementum universi. Quae quidem non est reducere ad alios
|
|
|
773 fines creatos ulteriores. Unde huiusmodi dependent ex simplici
|
|
|
774 voluntate Dei, alia vero ex ordine etiam aliarum causarum.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
775 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6" next="FP_Q19_A7" prev="FP_Q19_A5" progress="3.58%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4>
|
|
|
776 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
777 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2"
|
|
|
778 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is
|
|
|
779 not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (<scripRef
|
|
|
780 osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.2.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|2|4|0|0"
|
|
|
781 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" passage="1 Tim. 2:4">1
|
|
|
782 Tim. 2:4</scripRef>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come
|
|
|
783 to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore
|
|
|
784 the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width:
|
|
|
785 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29230"><span class=
|
|
|
786 "ref">[29230] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
|
|
|
787 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non semper impleatur. Dicit
|
|
|
788 enim apostolus, I ad Tim. II, quod <i>Deus vult omnes homines
|
|
|
789 salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire</i>. Sed hoc non
|
|
|
790 ita evenit. Ergo voluntas Dei non semper impletur.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
791 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
792 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p3"
|
|
|
793 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of
|
|
|
794 knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all
|
|
|
795 truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists;
|
|
|
796 for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not
|
|
|
797 always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
798 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29231"><span class=
|
|
|
799 "ref">[29231] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
|
|
|
800 se habet scientia ad verum, ita voluntas ad bonum. Sed Deus scit
|
|
|
801 omne verum. Ergo vult omne bonum. Sed non omne bonum fit, multa
|
|
|
802 enim bona possunt fieri, quae non fiunt. Non ergo voluntas Dei
|
|
|
803 semper impletur.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
804 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
805 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p4"
|
|
|
806 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is
|
|
|
807 the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the
|
|
|
808 effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary
|
|
|
809 cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the
|
|
|
810 weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be
|
|
|
811 hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God,
|
|
|
812 therefore, is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
813 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="29232"><span class=
|
|
|
814 "ref">[29232] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
815 voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima, non excludit causas medias, ut
|
|
|
816 dictum est. Sed effectus causae primae potest impediri per defectum
|
|
|
817 causae secundae, sicut effectus virtutis motivae impeditur propter
|
|
|
818 debilitatem tibiae. Ergo et effectus divinae voluntatis potest
|
|
|
819 impediri propter defectum secundarum causarum. Non ergo voluntas
|
|
|
820 Dei semper impletur.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
821 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
822 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5"
|
|
|
823 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef
|
|
|
824 osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.113.11" parsed="vul|Ps|113|11|0|0"
|
|
|
825 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5.1"
|
|
|
826 passage="Ps. 113:11">Ps. 113:11</scripRef>): "God hath done all
|
|
|
827 things, whatsoever He would."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
828 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29233"><span class=
|
|
|
829 "ref">[29233] Iª q. 19 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
|
830 quod dicitur in Psalmo CXIII, <i>omnia quaecumque voluit Deus,
|
|
|
831 fecit</i>.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
832 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence
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833 the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
|
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834 For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as
|
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|
835 does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much
|
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|
836 as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by
|
|
|
837 its justice he is punished.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
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|
838 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 co."><a name="29234"><span class=
|
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|
839 "ref">[29234] Iª q. 19 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
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840 quod necesse est voluntatem Dei semper impleri. Ad cuius
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841 evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum effectus conformetur agenti
|
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842 secundum suam formam, eadem ratio est in causis agentibus, quae est
|
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843 in causis formalibus. In formis autem sic est quod, licet aliquid
|
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|
844 possit deficere ab aliqua forma particulari, tamen a forma
|
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845 universali nihil deficere potest, potest enim esse aliquid quod non
|
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846 est homo vel vivum, non autem potest esse aliquid quod non sit ens.
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847 Unde et hoc idem in causis agentibus contingere oportet. Potest
|
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848 enim aliquid fieri extra ordinem alicuius causae particularis
|
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|
849 agentis, non autem extra ordinem alicuius causae universalis, sub
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850 qua omnes causae particulares comprehenduntur. Quia, si aliqua
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851 causa particularis deficiat a suo effectu, hoc est propter aliquam
|
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852 aliam causam particularem impedientem, quae continetur sub ordine
|
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853 causae universalis, unde effectus ordinem causae universalis nullo
|
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854 modo potest exire. Et hoc etiam patet in corporalibus. Potest enim
|
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855 impediri quod aliqua stella non inducat suum effectum, sed tamen
|
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856 quicumque effectus ex causa corporea impediente in rebus
|
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857 corporalibus consequatur, oportet quod reducatur per aliquas causas
|
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858 medias in universalem virtutem primi caeli. Cum igitur voluntas Dei
|
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|
859 sit universalis causa omnium rerum, impossibile est quod divina
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860 voluntas suum effectum non consequatur. Unde quod recedere videtur
|
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|
861 a divina voluntate secundum unum ordinem, relabitur in ipsam
|
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|
862 secundum alium, sicut peccator, qui, quantum est in se, recedit a
|
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|
863 divina voluntate peccando, incidit in ordinem divinae voluntatis,
|
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864 dum per eius iustitiam punitur.</p></div></div>
|
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|
865 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
|
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866 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every
|
|
|
867 class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent,
|
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868 but to the things willed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p8" shownumber="no"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or
|
|
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869 dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in
|
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870 themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills
|
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871 takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.</p>
|
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872 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29235"><span class=
|
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|
873 "ref">[29235] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
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874 dicendum quod illud verbum apostoli, quod Deus vult omnes homines
|
|
|
875 salvos fieri etc., potest tripliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ut sit
|
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|
876 accommoda distributio, secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult salvos fieri
|
|
|
877 omnes homines qui salvantur, non quia nullus homo sit quem salvum
|
|
|
878 fieri non velit, sed quia nullus salvus fit, quem non velit salvum
|
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|
879 fieri, ut dicit Augustinus secundo potest intelligi, ut fiat
|
|
|
880 distributio pro generibus singulorum, et non pro singulis generum,
|
|
|
881 secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult de quolibet statu hominum salvos
|
|
|
882 fieri, mares et feminas, Iudaeos et gentiles, parvos et magnos; non
|
|
|
883 tamen omnes de singulis statibus. Tertio, secundum Damascenum,
|
|
|
884 intelligitur de voluntate antecedente, non de voluntate
|
|
|
885 consequente. Quae quidem distinctio non accipitur ex parte ipsius
|
|
|
886 voluntatis divinae, in qua nihil est prius vel posterius; sed ex
|
|
|
887 parte volitorum. Ad cuius intellectum, considerandum est quod
|
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|
888 unumquodque, secundum quod bonum est, sic est volitum a Deo.
|
|
|
889 Aliquid autem potest esse in prima sui consideratione, secundum
|
|
|
890 quod absolute consideratur, bonum vel malum, quod tamen, prout cum
|
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|
891 aliquo adiuncto consideratur, quae est consequens consideratio
|
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|
892 eius, e contrario se habet. Sicut hominem vivere est bonum, et
|
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|
893 hominem occidi est malum, secundum absolutam considerationem, sed
|
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|
894 si addatur circa aliquem hominem, quod sit homicida, vel vivens in
|
|
|
895 periculum multitudinis, sic bonum est eum occidi, et malum est eum
|
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|
896 vivere. Unde potest dici quod iudex iustus antecedenter vult omnem
|
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|
897 hominem vivere; sed consequenter vult homicidam suspendi. Similiter
|
|
|
898 Deus antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari; sed consequenter vult
|
|
|
899 quosdam damnari, secundum exigentiam suae iustitiae. Neque tamen id
|
|
|
900 quod antecedenter volumus, simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid.
|
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|
901 Quia voluntas comparatur ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt, in
|
|
|
902 seipsis autem sunt in particulari, unde simpliciter volumus
|
|
|
903 aliquid, secundum quod volumus illud consideratis omnibus
|
|
|
904 circumstantiis particularibus, quod est consequenter velle. Unde
|
|
|
905 potest dici quod iudex iustus simpliciter vult homicidam suspendi,
|
|
|
906 sed secundum quid vellet eum vivere, scilicet inquantum est homo.
|
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|
907 Unde magis potest dici velleitas, quam absoluta voluntas. Et sic
|
|
|
908 patet quod quidquid Deus simpliciter vult, fit; licet illud quod
|
|
|
909 antecedenter vult, non fiat.</p></div></div>
|
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|
910 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
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|
911 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p9"
|
|
|
912 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive
|
|
|
913 faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act
|
|
|
914 of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in
|
|
|
915 themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth
|
|
|
916 virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created
|
|
|
917 things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good,
|
|
|
918 except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually
|
|
|
919 exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
920 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29236"><span class=
|
|
|
921 "ref">[29236] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
922 dicendum quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis est secundum quod
|
|
|
923 cognitum est in cognoscente, actus autem virtutis appetitivae est
|
|
|
924 ordinatus ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Quidquid autem
|
|
|
925 potest habere rationem entis et veri, totum est virtualiter in Deo;
|
|
|
926 sed non totum existit in rebus creatis. Et ideo Deus cognoscit omne
|
|
|
927 verum, non tamen vult omne bonum, nisi inquantum vult se, in quo
|
|
|
928 virtualiter omne bonum existit.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
929 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
930 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p10"
|
|
|
931 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be
|
|
|
932 hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it
|
|
|
933 is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes;
|
|
|
934 for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is
|
|
|
935 with the will of God, as said above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
936 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29237"><span class=
|
|
|
937 "ref">[29237] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
938 dicendum quod causa prima tunc potest impediri a suo effectu per
|
|
|
939 defectum causae secundae, quando non est universaliter prima, sub
|
|
|
940 se omnes causas comprehendens, quia sic effectus nullo modo posset
|
|
|
941 suum ordinem evadere. Et sic est de voluntate Dei, ut dictum
|
|
|
942 est.</p></div></div>
|
|
25
|
943 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8"
|
|
|
944 prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether
|
|
|
945 the will of God is changeable?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
946 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is
|
|
|
947 changeable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
|
|
|
948 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
949 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
|
|
|
950 seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (<scripRef
|
|
|
951 osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.6.7" parsed="vul|Gen|6|7|0|0"
|
|
|
952 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2.1"
|
|
|
953 passage="Gn. 6:7">Gn. 6:7</scripRef>): "It repenteth Me that I have
|
|
|
954 made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable
|
|
|
955 will. Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width:
|
|
|
956 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29238"><span class=
|
|
|
957 "ref">[29238] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
|
|
|
958 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit mutabilis. Dicit enim
|
|
|
959 dominus Genes. VI, <i>poenitet me fecisse hominem</i>. Sed
|
|
|
960 quemcumque poenitet de eo quod fecit, habet mutabilem voluntatem.
|
|
|
961 Ergo Deus habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div
|
|
|
962 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
963 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3"
|
|
|
964 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person
|
|
|
965 of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to
|
|
|
966 root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation
|
|
|
967 shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have
|
|
|
968 thought to do to them" (<scripRef
|
|
|
969 osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.18.7-Jer.18.8" parsed="vul|Jer|18|7|18|8"
|
|
|
970 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3.1"
|
|
|
971 passage="Jer. 18:7,8">Jer. 18:7,8</scripRef>) Therefore God has a
|
|
|
972 changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
973 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29239"><span class=
|
|
|
974 "ref">[29239] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
975 Ierem. XVIII, ex persona domini dicitur, <i>loquar adversus gentem
|
|
|
976 et adversus regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud; sed
|
|
|
977 si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego
|
|
|
978 poenitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei</i>. Ergo Deus
|
|
|
979 habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
|
|
|
980 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
|
|
|
981 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p4"
|
|
|
982 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He
|
|
|
983 does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at
|
|
|
984 one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time
|
|
|
985 forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.</p></div><div
|
|
|
986 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29240"><span class=
|
|
|
987 "ref">[29240] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
988 quidquid Deus facit, voluntarie facit. Sed Deus non semper eadem
|
|
|
989 facit, nam quandoque praecepit legalia observari, quandoque
|
|
|
990 prohibuit. Ergo habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div
|
|
|
991 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
992 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5"
|
|
|
993 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of
|
|
|
994 necessity what He wills, as said before <a
|
|
|
995 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3"
|
|
|
996 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will
|
|
|
997 and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two
|
|
|
998 opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a
|
|
|
999 place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is
|
|
|
1000 changeable as regards His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1001 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29241"><span class=
|
|
|
1002 "ref">[29241] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
|
|
|
1003 non ex necessitate vult quod vult, ut supra dictum est. Ergo potest
|
|
|
1004 velle et non velle idem. Sed omne quod habet potentiam ad opposita,
|
|
|
1005 est mutabile, sicut quod potest esse et non esse, est mutabile
|
|
|
1006 secundum substantiam; et quod potest esse hic et non esse hic, est
|
|
|
1007 mutabile secundum locum. Ergo Deus est mutabilis secundum
|
|
|
1008 voluntatem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1009 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1010 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
|
|
|
1011 It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son
|
|
|
1012 of man, that He should be changed" (<scripRef
|
|
|
1013 osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.23.19" parsed="vul|Num|23|19|0|0"
|
|
|
1014 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6.1"
|
|
|
1015 passage="Num. 23:19">Num. 23:19</scripRef>).</p></div><div
|
|
|
1016 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29242"><span class=
|
|
|
1017 "ref">[29242] Iª q. 19 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
|
1018 quod dicitur Num. XXIII, <i>non est Deus, quasi homo, ut mentiatur;
|
|
|
1019 neque ut filius hominis, ut mutetur</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless
|
|
24
|
1020 we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
|
|
25
|
1021 hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it
|
|
|
1022 has already been shown that both the substance of God and His
|
|
|
1023 knowledge are entirely unchangeable (<a
|
|
|
1024 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1"
|
|
|
1025 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a
|
|
|
1026 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15"
|
|
|
1027 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will
|
|
|
1028 must be entirely unchangeable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1029 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 co."><a name="29243"><span class=
|
|
|
1030 "ref">[29243] Iª q. 19 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1031 quod voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc
|
|
|
1032 considerandum est, quod aliud est mutare voluntatem; et aliud est
|
|
|
1033 velle aliquarum rerum mutationem. Potest enim aliquis, eadem
|
|
|
1034 voluntate immobiliter permanente, velle quod nunc fiat hoc, et
|
|
|
1035 postea fiat contrarium. Sed tunc voluntas mutaretur, si aliquis
|
|
|
1036 inciperet velle quod prius non voluit, vel desineret velle quod
|
|
|
1037 voluit. Quod quidem accidere non potest, nisi praesupposita
|
|
|
1038 mutatione vel ex parte cognitionis, vel circa dispositionem
|
|
|
1039 substantiae ipsius volentis. Cum enim voluntas sit boni, aliquis de
|
|
|
1040 novo dupliciter potest incipere aliquid velle. Uno modo sic, quod
|
|
|
1041 de novo incipiat sibi illud esse bonum. Quod non est absque
|
|
|
1042 mutatione eius, sicut adveniente frigore, incipit esse bonum sedere
|
|
|
1043 ad ignem, quod prius non erat. Alio modo sic, quod de novo
|
|
|
1044 cognoscat illud esse sibi bonum, cum prius hoc ignorasset, ad hoc
|
|
|
1045 enim consiliamur, ut sciamus quid nobis sit bonum. Ostensum est
|
|
|
1046 autem supra quod tam substantia Dei quam eius scientia est omnino
|
|
|
1047 immutabilis. Unde oportet voluntatem eius omnino esse
|
|
|
1048 immutabilem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
|
|
|
1049 He had made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1050 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29244"><span class=
|
|
|
1051 "ref">[29244] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1052 dicendum quod illud verbum domini metaphorice intelligendum est,
|
|
|
1053 secundum similitudinem nostram, cum enim nos poenitet, destruimus
|
|
|
1054 quod fecimus. Quamvis hoc esse possit absque mutatione voluntatis,
|
|
|
1055 cum etiam aliquis homo, absque mutatione voluntatis, interdum velit
|
|
|
1056 aliquid facere, simul intendens postea illud destruere. Sic igitur
|
|
|
1057 Deus poenituisse dicitur, secundum similitudinem operationis,
|
|
|
1058 inquantum hominem quem fecerat, per diluvium a facie terrae
|
|
|
1059 delevit.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
|
|
24
|
1060 rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
|
|
|
1061 and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.38.1" parsed="vul|Isa|38|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" passage="Is. 38:1">Is. 38:1</scripRef>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For
|
|
25
|
1062 men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have
|
|
|
1063 threatened.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1064 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29245"><span class=
|
|
|
1065 "ref">[29245] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1066 dicendum quod voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima et universalis, non
|
|
|
1067 excludit causas medias, in quarum virtute est ut aliqui effectus
|
|
|
1068 producantur. Sed quia omnes causae mediae non adaequant virtutem
|
|
|
1069 causae primae, multa sunt in virtute et scientia et voluntate
|
|
|
1070 divina, quae non continentur sub ordine causarum inferiorum; sicut
|
|
|
1071 resuscitatio Lazari. Unde aliquis respiciens ad causas inferiores,
|
|
|
1072 dicere poterat, Lazarus non resurget, respiciens vero ad causam
|
|
|
1073 primam divinam, poterat dicere, Lazarus resurget. Et utrumque horum
|
|
|
1074 Deus vult, scilicet quod aliquid quandoque sit futurum secundum
|
|
|
1075 causam inferiorem, quod tamen futurum non sit secundum causam
|
|
|
1076 superiorem; vel e converso. Sic ergo dicendum est quod Deus
|
|
|
1077 aliquando pronuntiat aliquid futurum, secundum quod continetur in
|
|
|
1078 ordine causarum inferiorum, ut puta secundum dispositionem naturae
|
|
|
1079 vel meritorum; quod tamen non fit, quia aliter est in causa
|
|
|
1080 superiori divina. Sicut cum praedixit Ezechiae, <i>dispone domui
|
|
|
1081 tuae, quia morieris et non vives</i>, ut habetur Isaiae XXXVIII;
|
|
|
1082 neque tamen ita evenit, quia ab aeterno aliter fuit in scientia et
|
|
|
1083 voluntate divina, quae immutabilis est. Propter quod dicit
|
|
|
1084 Gregorius, quod <i>Deus immutat sententiam, non tamen mutat
|
|
|
1085 consilium</i>, scilicet voluntatis suae. Quod ergo dicit,
|
|
|
1086 poenitentiam agam ego, intelligitur metaphorice dictum, nam homines
|
|
|
1087 quando non implent quod comminati sunt, poenitere
|
|
|
1088 videntur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1089 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1090 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
|
|
|
1091 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that
|
|
|
1092 changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should
|
|
|
1093 change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1094 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29246"><span class=
|
|
|
1095 "ref">[29246] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1096 dicendum quod ex ratione illa non potest concludi quod Deus habeat
|
|
|
1097 mutabilem voluntatem; sed quod mutationem velit.</p></div></div><div
|
|
|
1098 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1099 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11"
|
|
|
1100 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a
|
|
|
1101 thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by
|
|
|
1102 supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as
|
|
|
1103 has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11.1"
|
|
|
1104 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect"
|
|
|
1105 xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1106 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29247"><span class=
|
|
|
1107 "ref">[29247] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
1108 dicendum quod, licet Deum velle aliquid non sit necessarium
|
|
|
1109 absolute, tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, propter
|
|
|
1110 immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4>
|
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|
1111 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1112 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p2"
|
|
|
1113 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God
|
|
|
1114 imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says
|
|
|
1115 (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be
|
|
|
1116 saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it
|
|
|
1117 must necessarily be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1118 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29248"><span class=
|
|
|
1119 "ref">[29248] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
|
|
|
1120 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei rebus volitis necessitatem
|
|
|
1121 imponat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>nullus fit salvus,
|
|
|
1122 nisi quem Deus voluerit salvari. Et ideo rogandus est ut velit,
|
|
|
1123 quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit</i>.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1124 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1125 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3"
|
|
|
1126 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot
|
|
|
1127 be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the
|
|
|
1128 Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way,
|
|
|
1129 if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be
|
|
|
1130 hindered. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.19"
|
|
|
1131 parsed="vul|Rom|9|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3.1"
|
|
|
1132 passage="Rom. 9:19">Rom. 9:19</scripRef>): "Who resisteth His will?"
|
|
|
1133 Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things
|
|
|
1134 willed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1135 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29249"><span class=
|
|
|
1136 "ref">[29249] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
|
|
|
1137 causa quae non potest impediri, ex necessitate suum effectum
|
|
|
1138 producit, quia et natura semper idem operatur, nisi aliquid
|
|
|
1139 impediat, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed voluntas Dei non potest
|
|
|
1140 impediri, dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. IX, <i>voluntati enim eius
|
|
|
1141 quis resistit?</i> Ergo voluntas Dei imponit rebus volitis
|
|
|
1142 necessitatem.</p></div></div>
|
|
24
|
1143 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
|
|
25
|
1144 necessary absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1145 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29250"><span class=
|
|
|
1146 "ref">[29250] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud
|
|
|
1147 quod habet necessitatem ex priori, est necessarium absolute, sicut
|
|
|
1148 animal mori est necessarium, quia est ex contrariis compositum. Sed
|
|
|
1149 res creatae a Deo, comparantur ad voluntatem divinam sicut ad
|
|
|
1150 aliquid prius, a quo habent necessitatem, cum haec conditionalis
|
|
|
1151 sit vera, si aliquid Deus vult, illud est; omnis autem
|
|
|
1152 conditionalis vera est necessaria. Sequitur ergo quod omne quod
|
|
|
1153 Deus vult, sit necessarium absolute.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1154 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1155 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p5"
|
|
|
1156 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God
|
|
|
1157 wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed,
|
|
|
1158 it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an
|
|
|
1159 end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.</p></div><div
|
|
|
1160 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29251"><span class=
|
|
|
1161 "ref">[29251] Iª q. 19 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnia
|
|
|
1162 bona quae fiunt, Deus vult fieri. Si igitur eius voluntas imponat
|
|
|
1163 rebus volitis necessitatem, sequitur quod omnia bona ex necessitate
|
|
|
1164 eveniunt. Et sic perit liberum arbitrium et consilium, et omnia
|
|
|
1165 huiusmodi.</p></div></div>
|
|
24
|
1166 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
|
|
|
1167 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
|
|
|
1168 referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that
|
|
|
1169 belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise
|
|
|
1170 contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.</p>
|
|
25
|
1171 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 co."><a name="29252"><span class=
|
|
|
1172 "ref">[29252] Iª q. 19 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1173 quod divina voluntas quibusdam volitis necessitatem imponit, non
|
|
|
1174 autem omnibus. Cuius quidem rationem aliqui assignare voluerunt ex
|
|
|
1175 causis mediis quia ea quae producit per causas necessarias, sunt
|
|
|
1176 necessaria; ea vero quae producit per causas contingentes, sunt
|
|
|
1177 contingentia. Sed hoc non videtur sufficienter dictum, propter duo.
|
|
|
1178 Primo quidem, quia effectus alicuius primae causae est contingens
|
|
|
1179 propter causam secundam, ex eo quod impeditur effectus causae
|
|
|
1180 primae per defectum causae secundae; sicut virtus solis per
|
|
|
1181 defectum plantae impeditur. Nullus autem defectus causae secundae
|
|
|
1182 impedire potest quin voluntas Dei effectum suum producat. Secundo,
|
|
|
1183 quia, si distinctio contingentium a necessariis referatur solum in
|
|
|
1184 causas secundas, sequitur hoc esse praeter intentionem et
|
|
|
1185 voluntatem divinam, quod est inconveniens. Et ideo melius dicendum
|
|
|
1186 est, quod hoc contingit propter efficaciam divinae voluntatis. Cum
|
|
|
1187 enim aliqua causa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus consequitur
|
|
|
1188 causam non tantum secundum id quod fit, sed etiam secundum modum
|
|
|
1189 fiendi vel essendi, ex debilitate enim virtutis activae in semine,
|
|
|
1190 contingit quod filius nascitur dissimilis patri in accidentibus,
|
|
|
1191 quae pertinent ad modum essendi. Cum igitur voluntas divina sit
|
|
|
1192 efficacissima, non solum sequitur quod fiant ea quae Deus vult
|
|
|
1193 fieri; sed quod eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri vult. Vult autem
|
|
|
1194 quaedam fieri Deus necessario, et quaedam contingenter, ut sit ordo
|
|
|
1195 in rebus, ad complementum universi. Et ideo quibusdam effectibus
|
|
|
1196 aptavit causas necessarias, quae deficere non possunt, ex quibus
|
|
|
1197 effectus de necessitate proveniunt, quibusdam autem aptavit causas
|
|
|
1198 contingentes defectibiles, ex quibus effectus contingenter
|
|
|
1199 eveniunt. Non igitur propterea effectus voliti a Deo, eveniunt
|
|
|
1200 contingenter, quia causae proximae sunt contingentes, sed propterea
|
|
|
1201 quia Deus voluit eos contingenter evenire, contingentes causas ad
|
|
|
1202 eos praeparavit.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1203 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1204 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p8"
|
|
|
1205 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine
|
|
|
1206 we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not
|
|
|
1207 absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God
|
|
|
1208 wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily
|
|
|
1209 true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29253"><span class=
|
|
|
1210 "ref">[29253] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1211 dicendum quod per illud verbum Augustini intelligenda est
|
|
|
1212 necessitas in rebus volitis a Deo, non absoluta, sed conditionalis,
|
|
|
1213 necesse est enim hanc conditionalem veram esse, si Deus hoc vult,
|
|
|
1214 necesse est hoc esse.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1215 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1216 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p9"
|
|
|
1217 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that
|
|
|
1218 nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things
|
|
|
1219 happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or
|
|
|
1220 contingently according to His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1221 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29254"><span class=
|
|
|
1222 "ref">[29254] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1223 dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod nihil voluntati divinae resistit,
|
|
|
1224 sequitur quod non solum fiant ea quae Deus vult fieri; sed quod
|
|
|
1225 fiant contingenter vel necessario, quae sic fieri vult.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1226 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1227 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p10"
|
|
|
1228 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have
|
|
|
1229 necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the
|
|
|
1230 antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind
|
|
|
1231 of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or
|
|
|
1232 conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute
|
|
|
1233 necessities.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1234 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29255"><span class=
|
|
|
1235 "ref">[29255] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1236 dicendum quod posteriora habent necessitatem a prioribus, secundum
|
|
|
1237 modum priorum. Unde et ea quae fiunt a voluntate divina, talem
|
|
|
1238 necessitatem habent, qualem Deus vult ea habere, scilicet, vel
|
|
|
1239 absolutam, vel conditionalem tantum. Et sic, non omnia sunt
|
|
|
1240 necessaria absolute.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1241 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10"
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1242 prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether
|
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|
1243 God wills evils?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1244 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4><div
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1245 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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1246 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p2"
|
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1247 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For
|
|
|
1248 every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should
|
|
|
1249 exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far
|
|
|
1250 as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things
|
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|
1251 should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil
|
|
|
1252 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1253 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="29256"><span class=
|
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1254 "ref">[29256] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
|
|
|
1255 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit malorum. Omne enim bonum
|
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1256 quod fit, Deus vult. Sed mala fieri bonum est, dicit enim
|
|
|
1257 Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>quamvis ea quae mala sunt, inquantum
|
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|
1258 mala sunt, non sint bona; tamen, ut non solum bona, sed etiam ut
|
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1259 sint mala, bonum est</i>. Ergo Deus vult mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and
|
|
|
1260 beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all
|
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|
1261 things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.</p></div><div
|
|
|
1262 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="29257"><span class=
|
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|
1263 "ref">[29257] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dicit
|
|
|
1264 Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., erit malum ad omnis (idest
|
|
|
1265 universi) perfectionem conferens. Et Augustinus dicit, in
|
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|
1266 Enchirid., <i>ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis
|
|
|
1267 pulchritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum,
|
|
|
1268 et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona; ut magis placeant,
|
|
|
1269 et laudabiliora sint, dum comparantur malis</i>. Sed Deus vult omne
|
|
|
1270 illud quod pertinet ad perfectionem et decorem universi, quia hoc
|
|
|
1271 est quod Deus maxime vult in creaturis. Ergo Deus vult
|
|
|
1272 mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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1273 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
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|
1274 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
|
|
|
1275 Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are
|
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|
1276 contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not
|
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|
1277 exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not
|
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|
1278 always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should
|
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|
1279 exist.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
|
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|
1280 title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="29258"><span class=
|
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1281 "ref">[29258] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, mala
|
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|
1282 fieri, et non fieri, sunt contradictorie opposita. Sed Deus non
|
|
|
1283 vult mala non fieri, quia, cum mala quaedam fiant, non semper
|
|
|
1284 voluntas Dei impleretur. Ergo Deus vult mala
|
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|
1285 fieri.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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1286 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
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1287 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
|
|
|
1288 Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man
|
|
|
1289 becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less
|
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|
1290 therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said
|
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|
1291 to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is
|
|
|
1292 not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every
|
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|
1293 evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil
|
|
|
1294 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
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1295 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 s. c."><a name="29259"><span class=
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1296 "ref">[29259] Iª q. 19 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
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1297 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>nullo
|
|
|
1298 sapiente homine auctore, fit homo deterior; est autem Deus omni
|
|
|
1299 sapiente homine praestantior; multo igitur minus, Deo auctore, fit
|
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|
1300 aliquis deterior. Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente
|
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1301 dicitur</i>. Non ergo volente Deo, fit homo deterior. Constat autem
|
|
|
1302 quod quolibet malo fit aliquid deterius. Ergo Deus non vult
|
|
|
1303 mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
|
|
24
|
1304 corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not
|
|
|
1305 even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
|
|
25
|
1306 willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things
|
|
|
1307 to be naturally corrupted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1308 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 co."><a name="29260"><span class=
|
|
|
1309 "ref">[29260] Iª q. 19 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
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|
1310 quod, cum ratio boni sit ratio appetibilis, ut supra dictum est,
|
|
|
1311 malum autem opponatur bono; impossibile est quod aliquod malum,
|
|
|
1312 inquantum huiusmodi, appetatur, neque appetitu naturali, neque
|
|
|
1313 animali, neque intellectuali, qui est voluntas. Sed aliquod malum
|
|
|
1314 appetitur per accidens, inquantum consequitur ad aliquod bonum. Et
|
|
|
1315 hoc apparet in quolibet appetitu. Non enim agens naturale intendit
|
|
|
1316 privationem vel corruptionem; sed formam, cui coniungitur privatio
|
|
|
1317 alterius formae; et generationem unius, quae est corruptio
|
|
|
1318 alterius. Leo etiam, occidens cervum, intendit cibum, cui
|
|
|
1319 coniungitur occisio animalis. Similiter fornicator intendit
|
|
|
1320 delectationem, cui coniungitur deformitas culpae. Malum autem quod
|
|
|
1321 coniungitur alicui bono, est privatio alterius boni. Nunquam igitur
|
|
|
1322 appeteretur malum, nec per accidens, nisi bonum cui coniungitur
|
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|
1323 malum, magis appeteretur quam bonum quod privatur per malum. Nullum
|
|
|
1324 autem bonum Deus magis vult quam suam bonitatem, vult tamen aliquod
|
|
|
1325 bonum magis quam aliud quoddam bonum. Unde malum culpae, quod
|
|
|
1326 privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult. Sed malum
|
|
|
1327 naturalis defectus, vel malum poenae vult, volendo aliquod bonum,
|
|
|
1328 cui coniungitur tale malum, sicut, volendo iustitiam, vult poenam;
|
|
|
1329 et volendo ordinem naturae servari, vult quaedam naturaliter
|
|
|
1330 corrumpi.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is
|
|
|
1331 beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from
|
|
|
1332 his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience
|
|
|
1333 of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It
|
|
|
1334 cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in
|
|
|
1335 the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done,
|
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|
1336 since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it
|
|
|
1337 accidentally, but by that which belongs to it
|
|
|
1338 essentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1339 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="29261"><span class=
|
|
|
1340 "ref">[29261] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1341 dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod, licet Deus non velit mala, vult
|
|
|
1342 tamen mala esse vel fieri, quia, licet mala non sint bona, bonum
|
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|
1343 tamen est mala esse vel fieri. Quod ideo dicebant, quia ea quae in
|
|
|
1344 se mala sunt, ordinantur ad aliquod bonum, quem quidem ordinem
|
|
|
1345 importari credebant in hoc quod dicitur, mala esse vel fieri. Sed
|
|
|
1346 hoc non recte dicitur. Quia malum non ordinatur ad bonum per se,
|
|
|
1347 sed per accidens. Praeter intentionem enim peccantis est, quod ex
|
|
|
1348 hoc sequatur aliquod bonum; sicut praeter intentionem tyrannorum
|
|
|
1349 fuit, quod ex eorum persecutionibus claresceret patientia martyrum.
|
|
|
1350 Et ideo non potest dici quod talis ordo ab bonum importetur per hoc
|
|
|
1351 quod dicitur, quod malum esse vel fieri sit bonum, quia nihil
|
|
|
1352 iudicatur secundum illud quod competit ei per accidens, sed
|
|
|
1353 secundum illud quod competit ei per se.</p></div></div><div
|
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|
1354 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1355 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p8"
|
|
|
1356 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate
|
|
|
1357 towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except
|
|
|
1358 accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that
|
|
|
1359 "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a
|
|
|
1360 conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.</p></div><div style="width:
|
|
|
1361 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="29262"><span class=
|
|
|
1362 "ref">[29262] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1363 dicendum quod malum non operatur ad perfectionem et decorem
|
|
|
1364 universi nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Unde et hoc quod dicit
|
|
|
1365 Dionysius, quod malum est ad universi perfectionem conferens,
|
|
|
1366 concludit inducendo quasi ad inconveniens.</p></div></div><div
|
|
|
1367 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1368 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p9"
|
|
|
1369 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil
|
|
|
1370 exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet
|
|
|
1371 the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it
|
|
|
1372 not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God
|
|
|
1373 therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done,
|
|
|
1374 but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.</p></div><div
|
|
|
1375 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="29263"><span class=
|
|
|
1376 "ref">[29263] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1377 dicendum quod, licet mala fieri, et mala non fieri, contradictorie
|
|
|
1378 opponantur; tamen velle mala fieri, et velle mala non fieri, non
|
|
|
1379 opponuntur contradictorie, cum utrumque sit affirmativum. Deus
|
|
|
1380 igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult
|
|
38
|
1381 permittere mala fieri. Et hoc est bonum.</p></div></div></div>
|
|
|
1382 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9"
|
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1383 progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has
|
|
|
1384 free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1385 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div
|
|
|
1386 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
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|
1387 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2"
|
|
|
1388 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not
|
|
|
1389 free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146,
|
|
|
1390 ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be
|
|
|
1391 liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either
|
|
|
1392 side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
|
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1393 title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="29264"><span class=
|
|
|
1394 "ref">[29264] Iª q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
|
|
|
1395 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat liberum arbitrium. Dicit
|
|
|
1396 enim Hieronymus, in homilia de filio prodigo, <i>solus Deus est, in
|
|
|
1397 quem peccatum non cadit, nec cadere potest; cetera, cum sint liberi
|
|
|
1398 arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div
|
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1399 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
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1400 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3"
|
|
|
1401 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty
|
|
|
1402 of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God
|
|
|
1403 does not will evil, as has been said <a
|
|
|
1404 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9"
|
|
|
1405 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not
|
|
|
1406 free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1407 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="29265"><span class=
|
|
|
1408 "ref">[29265] Iª q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1409 liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum et
|
|
|
1410 malum eligitur. Sed Deus non vult malum, ut dictum est. Ergo
|
|
|
1411 liberum arbitrium non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
|
|
|
1412 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
|
|
|
1413 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On
|
|
|
1414 the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit
|
|
|
1415 divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free
|
|
|
1416 choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div
|
|
|
1417 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 s. c."><a name="29266"><span class=
|
|
|
1418 "ref">[29266] Iª q. 19 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
|
1419 quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro de fide, <i>spiritus sanctus dividit
|
|
|
1420 singulis prout vult, idest pro liberae voluntatis arbitrio, non
|
|
|
1421 necessitatis obsequio</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
|
|
|
1422 necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1423 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 co."><a name="29267"><span class=
|
|
|
1424 "ref">[29267] Iª q. 19 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1425 quod liberum arbitrium habemus respectu eorum quae non necessario
|
|
|
1426 volumus, vel naturali instinctu. Non enim ad liberum arbitrium
|
|
|
1427 pertinet quod volumus esse felices, sed ad naturalem instinctum.
|
|
|
1428 Unde et alia animalia, quae naturali instinctu moventur ad aliquid,
|
|
|
1429 non dicuntur libero arbitrio moveri. Cum igitur Deus ex necessitate
|
|
|
1430 suam bonitatem velit, alia vero non ex necessitate, ut supra
|
|
|
1431 ostensum est; respectu illorum quae non ex necessitate vult,
|
|
|
1432 liberum arbitrium habet.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
|
|
|
1433 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
|
|
|
1434 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
|
|
|
1435 to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply,
|
|
|
1436 but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div
|
|
|
1437 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="29268"><span class=
|
|
|
1438 "ref">[29268] Iª q. 19 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1439 dicendum quod Hieronymus videtur excludere a Deo liberum arbitrium,
|
|
|
1440 non simpliciter, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod est deflecti in
|
|
|
1441 peccatum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1442 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1443 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
|
|
|
1444 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine
|
|
|
1445 goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii,
|
|
|
1446 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet
|
|
|
1447 He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a
|
|
|
1448 thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin,
|
|
|
1449 can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div
|
|
|
1450 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="29269"><span class=
|
|
|
1451 "ref">[29269] Iª q. 19 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1452 dicendum quod, cum malum culpae dicatur per aversionem a bonitate
|
|
|
1453 divina, per quam Deus omnia vult, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum
|
|
|
1454 est quod impossibile est eum malum culpae velle. Et tamen ad
|
|
|
1455 opposita se habet, inquantum velle potest hoc esse vel non esse.
|
|
|
1456 Sicut et nos, non peccando, possumus velle sedere, et non velle
|
|
|
1457 sedere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11"
|
|
|
1458 next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi"
|
|
|
1459 title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be
|
|
|
1460 distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1461 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to
|
|
|
1462 be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1463 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1464 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
|
|
|
1465 seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in
|
|
|
1466 God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His
|
|
|
1467 wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine
|
|
|
1468 wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine
|
|
|
1469 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="29270"><span class=
|
|
|
1470 "ref">[29270] Iª q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
|
|
|
1471 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas
|
|
|
1472 signi. Sicut enim voluntas Dei est causa rerum, ita et scientia.
|
|
|
1473 Sed non assignantur aliqua signa ex parte divinae scientiae. Ergo
|
|
|
1474 neque debent assignari aliqua signa ex parte divinae
|
|
|
1475 voluntatis.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1476 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1477 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
|
|
|
1478 Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of
|
|
|
1479 him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions
|
|
|
1480 assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they
|
|
|
1481 are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions
|
|
|
1482 therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div
|
|
|
1483 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="29271"><span class=
|
|
|
1484 "ref">[29271] Iª q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
|
|
|
1485 signum quod non concordat ei cuius est signum, est falsum. Si
|
|
|
1486 igitur signa quae assignantur circa voluntatem divinam, non
|
|
|
1487 concordant divinae voluntati, sunt falsa, si autem concordant,
|
|
|
1488 superflue assignantur. Non igitur sunt aliqua signa circa
|
|
|
1489 voluntatem divinam assignanda.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
|
|
|
1490 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
|
|
|
1491 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On
|
|
|
1492 the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence
|
|
|
1493 of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words
|
|
|
1494 of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0"
|
|
|
1495 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2">
|
|
|
1496 Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out
|
|
|
1497 according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be
|
|
|
1498 taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1499 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 s. c."><a name="29272"><span class=
|
|
|
1500 "ref">[29272] Iª q. 19 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
|
1501 quod voluntas Dei est una, cum ipsa sit Dei essentia. Quandoque
|
|
|
1502 autem pluraliter significatur, ut cum dicitur, <i>magna opera
|
|
|
1503 domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius</i>. Ergo oportet quod
|
|
|
1504 aliquando signum voluntatis pro voluntate accipiatur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
|
|
24
|
1505 punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat.
|
|
|
1506 6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called
|
|
38
|
1507 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1508 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 co."><a name="29273"><span class=
|
|
|
1509 "ref">[29273] Iª q. 19 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1510 quod in Deo quaedam dicuntur proprie, et quaedam secundum
|
|
|
1511 metaphoram, ut ex supradictis patet. Cum autem aliquae passiones
|
|
|
1512 humanae in divinam praedicationem metaphorice assumuntur, hoc fit
|
|
|
1513 secundum similitudinem effectus, unde illud quod est signum talis
|
|
|
1514 passionis in nobis, in Deo nomine illius passionis metaphorice
|
|
|
1515 significatur. Sicut, apud nos, irati punire consueverunt, unde ipsa
|
|
|
1516 punitio est signum irae, et propter hoc, ipsa punitio nomine irae
|
|
|
1517 significatur, cum Deo attribuitur. Similiter id quod solet esse in
|
|
|
1518 nobis signum voluntatis, quandoque metaphorice in Deo voluntas
|
|
|
1519 dicitur. Sicut, cum aliquis praecipit aliquid, signum est quod
|
|
|
1520 velit illud fieri, unde praeceptum divinum quandoque metaphorice
|
|
|
1521 voluntas Dei dicitur, secundum illud Matth. VI, <i>fiat voluntas
|
|
|
1522 tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>. Sed hoc distat inter
|
|
|
1523 voluntatem et iram, quia ira de Deo nunquam proprie dicitur, cum in
|
|
|
1524 suo principali intellectu includat passionem, voluntas autem
|
|
|
1525 proprie de Deo dicitur. Et ideo in Deo distinguitur voluntas
|
|
|
1526 proprie, et metaphorice dicta. Voluntas enim proprie dicta, vocatur
|
|
|
1527 voluntas beneplaciti, voluntas autem metaphorice dicta, est
|
|
|
1528 voluntas signi, eo quod ipsum signum voluntatis voluntas
|
|
|
1529 dicitur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1530 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1531 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
|
|
|
1532 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless
|
|
|
1533 through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we
|
|
|
1534 will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge,
|
|
|
1535 but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1536 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="29274"><span class=
|
|
|
1537 "ref">[29274] Iª q. 19 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1538 dicendum quod scientia non est causa eorum quae fiunt, nisi per
|
|
|
1539 voluntatem, non enim quae scimus facimus, nisi velimus. Et ideo
|
|
|
1540 signum non attribuitur scientiae, sicut attribuitur
|
|
|
1541 voluntati.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1542 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1543 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
|
|
|
1544 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs
|
|
|
1545 that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual
|
|
|
1546 expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus
|
|
|
1547 punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called
|
|
|
1548 anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in
|
|
|
1549 ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1550 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="29275"><span class=
|
|
|
1551 "ref">[29275] Iª q. 19 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1552 dicendum quod signa voluntatis dicuntur voluntates divinae, non
|
|
|
1553 quia sint signa quod Deus velit, sed quia ea quae in nobis solent
|
|
|
1554 esse signa volendi, in Deo divinae voluntates dicuntur. Sicut
|
|
|
1555 punitio non est signum quod in Deo sit ira, sed punitio, ex eo ipso
|
|
|
1556 quod in nobis est signum irae, in Deo dicitur ira.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
|
|
|
1557 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1558 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2"
|
|
|
1559 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of
|
|
|
1560 will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and
|
|
|
1561 permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same
|
|
|
1562 things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He
|
|
|
1563 sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these
|
|
|
1564 He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as
|
|
|
1565 distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1566 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="29276"><span class=
|
|
|
1567 "ref">[29276] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
|
|
|
1568 sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter circa divinam
|
|
|
1569 voluntatem ponantur quinque signa, scilicet, prohibitio,
|
|
|
1570 praeceptum, consilium, operatio et permissio. Nam eadem quae nobis
|
|
|
1571 praecipit Deus vel consulit, in nobis quandoque operatur, et eadem
|
|
|
1572 quae prohibet, quandoque permittit. Ergo non debent ex opposito
|
|
|
1573 dividi.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1574 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1575 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3"
|
|
|
1576 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless
|
|
|
1577 He wills it, as the Scripture says (<scripRef
|
|
|
1578 osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0"
|
|
|
1579 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3.1"
|
|
|
1580 passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>). But the will of
|
|
|
1581 expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore
|
|
|
1582 operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of
|
|
|
1583 expression.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1584 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="29277"><span class=
|
|
|
1585 "ref">[29277] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1586 nihil Deus operatur, nisi volens, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Sed voluntas
|
|
|
1587 signi distinguitur a voluntate beneplaciti. Ergo operatio sub
|
|
|
1588 voluntate signi comprehendi non debet.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1589 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1590 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p4"
|
|
|
1591 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission
|
|
|
1592 appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and
|
|
|
1593 permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition
|
|
|
1594 belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly
|
|
|
1595 under one division, not being of one order.</p></div><div
|
|
|
1596 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="29278"><span class=
|
|
|
1597 "ref">[29278] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1598 operatio et permissio communiter ad omnes creaturas pertinent, quia
|
|
|
1599 in omnibus Deus operatur, et in omnibus aliquid fieri permittit.
|
|
|
1600 Sed praeceptum, consilium et prohibitio pertinent ad solam
|
|
|
1601 rationalem creaturam. Ergo non veniunt convenienter in unam
|
|
|
1602 divisionem, cum non sint unius ordinis.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1603 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1604 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p5"
|
|
|
1605 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways
|
|
|
1606 than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of
|
|
|
1607 ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius
|
|
|
1608 (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression
|
|
|
1609 only in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely,
|
|
|
1610 counsel and precept---in the case of good.</p></div><div style="width:
|
|
|
1611 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4"><a name="29279"><span class=
|
|
|
1612 "ref">[29279] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1613 malum pluribus modis contingit quam bonum, quia bonum contingit uno
|
|
|
1614 modo, sed malum omnifariam, ut patet per philosophum in II Ethic.,
|
|
|
1615 et per Dionysium in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Inconvenienter igitur
|
|
|
1616 respectu mali assignatur unum signum tantum, scilicet prohibitio;
|
|
|
1617 respectu vero boni, duo signa, scilicet consilium et
|
|
|
1618 praeceptum.</p></div></div>
|
|
24
|
1619 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
|
|
|
1620 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for
|
|
|
1621 what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept,
|
|
|
1622 counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. 6:10</scripRef>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.</p>
|
|
38
|
1623 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 co."><a name="29280"><span class=
|
|
|
1624 "ref">[29280] Iª q. 19 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1625 quod huiusmodi signa voluntatis dicuntur ea, quibus consuevimus
|
|
|
1626 demonstrare nos aliquid velle. Potest autem aliquis declarare se
|
|
|
1627 velle aliquid, vel per seipsum, vel per alium. Per seipsum quidem,
|
|
|
1628 inquantum facit aliquid, vel directe, vel indirecte et per
|
|
|
1629 accidens. Directe quidem, cum per se aliquid operatur, et quantum
|
|
|
1630 ad hoc, dicitur esse signum operatio. Indirecte autem, inquantum
|
|
|
1631 non impedit operationem, nam removens prohibens dicitur movens per
|
|
|
1632 accidens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Et quantum ad hoc, dicitur
|
|
|
1633 signum permissio. Per alium autem declarat se aliquid velle,
|
|
|
1634 inquantum ordinat alium ad aliquid faciendum; vel necessaria
|
|
|
1635 inductione, quod fit praecipiendo quod quis vult, et prohibendo
|
|
|
1636 contrarium; vel aliqua persuasoria inductione, quod pertinet ad
|
|
|
1637 consilium. Quia igitur his modis declaratur aliquem velle aliquid,
|
|
|
1638 propter hoc ista quinque nominantur interdum nomine voluntatis
|
|
|
1639 divinae, tanquam signa voluntatis. Quod enim praeceptum, consilium
|
|
|
1640 et prohibitio dicantur Dei voluntas, patet per id quod dicitur
|
|
|
1641 Matth. VI <i>fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>.
|
|
|
1642 Quod autem permissio vel operatio dicantur Dei voluntas patet per
|
|
|
1643 Augustinum, qui dicit in Enchirid., <i>nihil fit, nisi omnipotens
|
|
|
1644 fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel faciendo</i>. Vel potest dici
|
|
|
1645 quod permissio et operatio referuntur ad praesens permissio quidem
|
|
|
1646 ad malum, operatio vero ad bonum. Ad futurum vero, prohibitio,
|
|
|
1647 respectu mali; respectu vero boni necessarii, praeceptum; respectu
|
|
|
1648 vero superabundantis boni, consilium.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1649 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1650 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p8"
|
|
|
1651 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to
|
|
|
1652 prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different
|
|
|
1653 ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is
|
|
|
1654 not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept,
|
|
|
1655 operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.</p></div><div
|
|
|
1656 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="29281"><span class=
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1657 "ref">[29281] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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1658 dicendum quod nihil prohibet, circa eandem rem, aliquem diversimode
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1659 declarare se aliquid velle, sicut inveniuntur multa nomina idem
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1660 significantia. Unde nihil prohibet idem subiacere praecepto et
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1661 consilio et operationi, et prohibitioni vel permissioni.</p></div></div>
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24
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1662 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter
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38
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1663 the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the
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1664 will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of
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1665 another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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1666 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="29282"><span class=
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1667 "ref">[29282] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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1668 dicendum quod, sicut Deus potest significari metaphorice velle id
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1669 quod non vult voluntate proprie accepta, ita potest metaphorice
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1670 significari velle id quod proprie vult. Unde nihil prohibet de
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1671 eodem esse voluntatem beneplaciti, et voluntatem signi. Sed
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1672 operatio semper est eadem cum voluntate beneplaciti, non autem
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1673 praeceptum vel consilium, tum quia haec est de praesenti, illud de
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1674 futuro; tum quia haec per se est effectus voluntatis, illud autem
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1675 per alium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div>
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1676 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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1677 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p10"
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1678 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are
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1679 masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special
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1680 expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as
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1681 God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of
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1682 themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation;
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1683 therefore only operation and permission are concerned with
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1684 these.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
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1685 title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="29283"><span class=
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1686 "ref">[29283] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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1687 dicendum quod creatura rationalis est domina sui actus, et ideo
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1688 circa ipsam specialia quaedam signa divinae voluntatis assignantur,
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1689 inquantum rationalem creaturam Deus ordinat ad agendum voluntarie
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1690 et per se. Sed aliae creaturae non agunt nisi motae ex operatione
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1691 divina, et ideo circa alias non habent locum nisi operatio et
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1692 permissio.</p></div></div>
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24
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1693 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and
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38
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1694 these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is
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1695 not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with
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1696 the avoiding of lesser evils.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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1697 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 4"><a name="29284"><span class=
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1698 "ref">[29284] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
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1699 dicendum quod omne malum culpae, licet multipliciter contingat,
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1700 tamen in hoc convenit, quod discordat a voluntate divina et ideo
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1701 unum signum respectu malorum assignatur, scilicet prohibitio. Sed
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1702 diversimode bona se habent ad bonitatem divinam. Quia quaedam sunt,
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1703 sine quibus fruitionem divinae bonitatis consequi non possumus, et
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1704 respectu horum est praeceptum. Quaedam vero sunt, quibus perfectius
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1705 consequimur, et respectu horum est consilium. Vel dicendum quod
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1706 consilium est non solum de melioribus bonis assequendis, sed etiam
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1707 de minoribus malis vitandis.</p></div></div>
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24
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1708 </div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20" next="FP_Q20_A1" prev="FP_Q19_A12" progress="3.78%" n="xix" title="Question. 20 - GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)">
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1709 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p0.1">Question 20. GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
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1710 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1711 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p2" shownumber="no"> We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether love exists in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether He loves all things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether He loves more the better things?</p>
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1712 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1713 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1" next="FP_Q20_A2" prev="FP_Q20" progress="3.78%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether love exists in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Whether love exists in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "God is love" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.4.16" parsed="vul|John|4|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p5.1" passage="Jn. 4:16">Jn. 4:16</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite
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1714 that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy
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1715 and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love.
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1716 Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always
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1717 accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It
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1718 is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily change---and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is
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1719 implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[11]</a>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence,
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1720 as above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" next="FP_Q20_A3" prev="FP_Q20_A1" progress="3.82%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God loves all things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Whether God loves all things?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.5.7" parsed="vul|Ps|5|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p5.1" passage="Ps. 5:7">Ps. 5:7</scripRef>): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.25" parsed="vul|Wis|11|25|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p6.1" passage="Wis. 11:25">Wis. 11:25</scripRef>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some
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1721 good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides
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1722 the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore,
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1723 God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3" next="FP_Q20_A4" prev="FP_Q20_A2" progress="3.86%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God loves all things equally?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Whether God loves all things equally?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.6.8" parsed="vul|Wis|6|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p2.1" passage="Wis. 6:8">Wis. 6:8</scripRef>). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not therefore love some things more than others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more
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1724 than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4" next="FP_Q21" prev="FP_Q20_A3" progress="3.87%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether God always loves more the better things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p0.1">Whether God always loves more the better things?</h4>
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1725 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.32" parsed="vul|Rom|8|32|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p2.1" passage="Rom. 8:32">Rom. 8:32</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1726 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.8.6" parsed="vul|Ps|8|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3.1" passage="Ps. 8:6">Ps. 8:6</scripRef>). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.2.16" parsed="vul|Heb|2|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3.2" passage="Heb. 2:16">Heb. 2:16</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1727 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore
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1728 God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1729 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.15.7" parsed="vul|Luke|15|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p5.1" passage="Lk. 15:7">Lk. 15:7</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more
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1730 the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1731 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1732 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.13.19" parsed="vul|Sir|13|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p7.1" passage="Ecclus. 13:19">Ecclus. 13:19</scripRef>): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more loved by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1733 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the
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1734 better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1735 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder,"
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1736 according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.9.6" parsed="vul|Isa|9|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p9.1" passage=" Is. 9:6."> Is. 9:6.</scripRef></p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1737 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rev.21.17" parsed="vul|Rev|21|17|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p10.1" passage=" Rev 21:17, "> Rev 21:17, </scripRef> the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this
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1738 respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1739 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1740 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For
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1741 it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p12" shownumber="no"> Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life.
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1742 Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was
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1743 loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the weigher of spirits" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.16.2" parsed="vul|Prov|16|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p12.1" passage="Prov. 16:2">Prov. 16:2</scripRef>).</p>
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1744 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1745 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1746 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In
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1747 battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p14" shownumber="no"> Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king.</p>
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1748 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1749 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p15" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1750 </div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q21" next="FP_Q21_A1" prev="FP_Q20_A4" progress="3.92%" n="xx" title="Question. 21 - THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
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1751 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p0.1">Question 21. THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
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1752 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1753 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is justice in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether His justice can be called truth?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether there is mercy in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?</p>
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1754 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1755 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1" next="FP_Q21_A2" prev="FP_Q21" progress="3.92%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is justice in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p0.1">Whether there is justice in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God: neither therefore does justice.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh all things according to the counsel of His will" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11" parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p3.1" passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.10.8" parsed="vul|Ps|10|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p6.1" passage="Ps. 10:8">Ps. 10:8</scripRef>): "The Lord is just, and hath loved justice."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.11.35" parsed="vul|Rom|11|35|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p7.1" passage="Rom. 11:35">Rom. 11:35</scripRef>). The other consists in distribution, and
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1756 is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the
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1757 condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[20], A[1]</a> ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral
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1758 virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power, God is a law unto Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to
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1759 substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. In this respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is
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1760 also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is
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1761 not directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10): "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the just, as the general to the special.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2" next="FP_Q21_A3" prev="FP_Q21_A1" progress="3.96%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the justice of God is truth?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p0.1">Whether the justice of God is truth?</h4>
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1762 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore justice does not appertain to truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1763 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain to the idea of justice.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1764 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.84.11" parsed="vul|Ps|84|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p4.1" passage="Ps. 84:11">Ps. 84:11</scripRef>): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1765 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1766 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not,
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1767 our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p6" shownumber="no"> Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.</p>
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1768 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1769 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed according to the law, it resides in the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1770 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1771 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3" next="FP_Q21_A4" prev="FP_Q21_A2" progress="3.98%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether mercy can be attributed to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p0.1">Whether mercy can be attributed to God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Tim.2.13" parsed="vul|2Tim|2|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p3.1" passage="2 Tim. 2:13">2 Tim. 2:13</scripRef>): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.4" parsed="vul|Ps|110|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p4.1" passage="Ps. 110:4">Ps. 110:4</scripRef>): "He is a merciful and gracious Lord."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To
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1772 sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6] , A[4]</a>). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality, and
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1773 mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p5.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by God
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1774 expel defects, it belongs to mercy.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one
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1775 another, as Christ has forgiven you" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.4.32" parsed="vul|Eph|4|32|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p7.1" passage="Eph. 4:32">Eph. 4:32</scripRef>). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy exalteth itself above judgement" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.2.13" parsed="vul|Jas|2|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p7.2" passage="James 2:13">James 2:13</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4" next="FP_Q22" prev="FP_Q21_A3" progress="4.00%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p0.1">Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?</h4>
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1776 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.2.13" parsed="vul|Jas|2|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p2.1" passage="James 2:13">James 2:13</scripRef>). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1777 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.15" parsed="vul|Rom|15|0|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p3.1" passage="Rom. 15">Rom. 15</scripRef>). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1778 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1779 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1780 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.24.10" parsed="vul|Ps|24|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p6.1" passage="Ps. 24:10">Ps. 24:10</scripRef>): "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1781 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be
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1782 lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except
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1783 for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine will---which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So
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1784 in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness
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1785 confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1786 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1787 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p9" shownumber="no"> In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.7.47" parsed="vul|Luke|7|47|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p9.1" passage="Lk. 7:47">Lk. 7:47</scripRef>).</p>
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1788 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1789 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account of the promises made to the fathers.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1790 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils that press on us in this world force us to go to God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1791 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1792 </div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q22" next="FP_Q22_A1" prev="FP_Q21_A4" progress="4.03%" n="xxi" title="Question. 22 - THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
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1793 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p0.1">Question 22. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
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1794 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1795 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p2" shownumber="no"> Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong.
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1796 Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?</p>
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1797 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1798 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1" next="FP_Q22_A2" prev="FP_Q22" progress="4.04%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p0.1">Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is no providence in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.14.3" parsed="vul|Wis|14|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p5.1" passage="Wis. 14:3">Wis. 14:3</scripRef>): "But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.']."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], A[4]</a>). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[21], A[4]</a>). This good of order existing in things created, is
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1799 itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[4]</a>), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other parts are
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1800 directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself---as for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a
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1801 family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.24.45" parsed="vul|Matt|24|45|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6.4" passage="Mat. 24:45">Mat. 24:45</scripRef>), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence is the divine type itself, seated in
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1802 the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p7.1" href="#FS.v.FS_Q57.FS_Q57_A6" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He
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1803 possesses, does belong to God, according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.148.6" parsed="vul|Ps|148|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p7.2" passage=" Ps. 148:6"> Ps. 148:6</scripRef>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of
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1804 His will" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11" parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p7.3" passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things pertain to the care of providence---namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition; and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect
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1805 are one and the same thing, as we have said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(Q[19])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2" next="FP_Q22_A3" prev="FP_Q22_A1" progress="4.07%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p0.1">Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?</h4>
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1806 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1807 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1808 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1809 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.15.14" parsed="vul|Sir|15|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p5.1" passage="Ecclus. 15:14">Ecclus. 15:14</scripRef>). And particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.80.13" parsed="vul|Ps|80|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p5.2" passage="Ps. 80:13">Ps. 80:13</scripRef>). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine
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1810 providence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1811 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.9.9" parsed="vul|1Cor|9|9|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p6.1" passage="1 Cor. 9:9">1 Cor. 9:9</scripRef>): "God doth not care for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1812 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.8.1" parsed="vul|Wis|8|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p7.1" passage="Wis. 8:1">Wis. 8:1</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1813 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1814 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.22.14" parsed="vul|Job|22|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p8.1" passage="Job 22:14">Job 22:14</scripRef>): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not
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1815 consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p9" shownumber="no"> We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual selves. This is mad evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the
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1816 intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.'Those powers that are, are ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt, a
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1817 Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.13.1" parsed="vul|Rom|13|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p9.1" passage="Rom. 13:1">Rom. 13:1</scripRef>). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also been shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p9.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], AA[6]</a>,11) that God knows all
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1818 things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art.</p>
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1819 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1820 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be
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1821 that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one
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1822 place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1823 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the
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1824 plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the
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1825 universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things---e.g. casual
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1826 and evil things---as removed from the care of divine providence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1827 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and
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1828 others of the ancients.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1829 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which
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1830 these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over
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1831 the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that love God, all things work together unto good" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.28" parsed="vul|Rom|8|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p13.1" passage="Rom. 8:28">Rom. 8:28</scripRef>). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had weight with
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1832 Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1833 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p14.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[10]</a>), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape
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1834 the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1835 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3" next="FP_Q22_A4" prev="FP_Q22_A2" progress="4.13%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God has immediate providence over everything?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p0.1">Whether God has immediate providence over everything?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.34.13" parsed="vul|Job|34|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p5.1" passage="Job 34:13">Job 34:13</scripRef>): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Two things belong to providence---namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand
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1836 the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and
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1837 foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the
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1838 gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], AA[5]</a>,8).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4" next="FP_Q23" prev="FP_Q22_A3" progress="4.16%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p0.1">Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a "per se" cause, either present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns the stability of necessity to things provided.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has
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1839 prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that properly speaking 'necessary' and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for
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1840 all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23" next="FP_Q23_A1" prev="FP_Q22_A4" progress="4.18%" n="xxii" title="Question. 23 - OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
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1841 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p0.1">Question 23. OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
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1842 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1843 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p2" shownumber="no"> After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</p>
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1844 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1845 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1" next="FP_Q23_A2" prev="FP_Q23" progress="4.19%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether men are predestined by God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p0.1">Whether men are predestined by God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done
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1846 away.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to take pity [miserendi]" [*See <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[3]</a>]. Therefore men are not predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.2.12" parsed="vul|1Cor|2|12|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p5.1" passage="1 Cor. 2:12">1 Cor. 2:12</scripRef>): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.30" parsed="vul|Rom|8|30|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p6.1" passage="Rom. 8:30">Rom. 8:30</scripRef>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing
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1847 God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p7.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it,
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1848 directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that
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1849 predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not excluded by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of
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1850 misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p10.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[21], AA[3]</a>,4).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2" next="FP_Q23_A3" prev="FP_Q23_A1" progress="4.22%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p0.1">Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc. (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.1.4" parsed="vul|Rom|1|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p3.1" passage="Rom. 1:4">Rom. 1:4</scripRef>): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something in the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[1]</a>). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor.
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1851 Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.30" parsed="vul|Rom|8|30|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p7.2" passage="Rom. 8:30">Rom. 8:30</scripRef>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[2]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p8.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[18], A[3]</a>, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things, has
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1852 an effect in them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Macc.6.20" parsed="vul|2Macc|6|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p9.1" passage="2 Macc. 6:20">2 Macc.
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1853 6:20</scripRef>). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3" next="FP_Q23_A4" prev="FP_Q23_A2" progress="4.25%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God reprobates any man?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p0.1">Whether God reprobates any man?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.25" parsed="vul|Wis|11|25|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p2.1" passage="Wis. 11:25">Wis. 11:25</scripRef>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Hos.13.9" parsed="vul|Hos|13|9|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p3.1" passage="Osee 13:9">Osee 13:9</scripRef>): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate
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1854 any man.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eccl.7.14" parsed="vul|Eccl|7|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p4.1" passage="Eccles. 7:14">Eccles. 7:14</scripRef>): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Mal.1.2-Mal.1.3" parsed="vul|Mal|1|2|1|3" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p5.1" passage="Malachi 1:2,3">Malachi 1:2,3</scripRef>): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God does reprobate some. For it was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a> that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called
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1855 reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[1]</a>). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into
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1856 sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good---namely, eternal life---He is said to hate or reprobated them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined---namely, glory---and of what is received in this life---namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present---namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future---namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from
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1857 the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true---namely, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although
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1858 anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4" next="FP_Q23_A5" prev="FP_Q23_A3" progress="4.27%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*“Eligantur.”]"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p0.1">Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.2.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|2|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p4.1" passage="1 Tim. 2:4">1 Tim. 2:4</scripRef>). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.4" parsed="vul|Eph|1|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p5.1" passage="Eph. 1:4">Eph. 1:4</scripRef>): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[2]</a>). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end
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1859 already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6.4" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love
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1860 precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the
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1861 conferring of grace and glory election is implied.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[20], A[2]</a>). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5" next="FP_Q23_A6" prev="FP_Q23_A4" progress="4.30%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p0.1">Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?</h4>
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1862 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.29" parsed="vul|Rom|8|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p2.1" passage="Rom. 8:29">Rom. 8:29</scripRef>): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.15" parsed="vul|Rom|9|15|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p2.2" passage=" Rom. 9:15"> Rom. 9:15</scripRef>: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1863 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1864 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "There is no injustice in God" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.14" parsed="vul|Rom|9|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p4.1" passage="Rom. 9:14">Rom. 9:14</scripRef>). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1865 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Titus.3.5" parsed="vul|Titus|3|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p5.1" passage="Titus 3:5">Titus 3:5</scripRef>): "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1866 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1867 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since predestination includes will, as was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>, the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[5]</a> ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else.
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1868 Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.11-Rom.9.12" parsed="vul|Rom|9|11|9|12" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p7.1" passage="Rom. 9:11,12">Rom. 9:11,12</scripRef>): "For when they were
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1869 not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the younger."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p8" shownumber="no"> Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Cor.3.5" parsed="vul|2Cor|3|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p8.1" passage="2 Cor. 3:5">2 Cor. 3:5</scripRef>), that "we are not
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1870 sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p9" shownumber="no"> And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as
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1871 if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a
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1872 secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent
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1873 effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have
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1874 any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Lam.5.21" parsed="vul|Lam|5|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p9.2" passage="Lam. 5:21">Lam. 5:21</scripRef>): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of
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1875 predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.</p>
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1876 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1877 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was explained above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1878 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1879 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that
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1880 for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p12.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines,
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1881 by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.22-Rom.9.23" parsed="vul|Rom|9|22|9|23" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p12.2" passage="Rom. 9:22,23">Rom. 9:22,23</scripRef>): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His
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1882 glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Tim.2.20" parsed="vul|2Tim|2|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p12.3" passage="2 Tim. 2:20">2 Tim. 2:20</scripRef>): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err."
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1883 Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of
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1884 the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody
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1885 of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.20.14-Matt.20.15" parsed="vul|Matt|20|14|20|15" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p12.4" passage="Mat. 20:14,15">Mat. 20:14,15</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1886 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6" next="FP_Q23_A7" prev="FP_Q23_A5" progress="4.36%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether predestination is certain?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p0.1">Whether predestination is certain?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown," (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rev.3.11" parsed="vul|Rev|3|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p2.1" passage="Rev 3:11">Rev 3:11</scripRef>), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e.g. Peter---may sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.29" parsed="vul|Rom|8|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p5.1" passage=" Rom. 8:29"> Rom. 8:29</scripRef>: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet
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1887 the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[4]</a>). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[13]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6.4" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[4]</a>) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are
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1888 most certain and infallible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others; according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.34.24" parsed="vul|Job|34|24|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p7.1" passage=" Job 34:24"> Job 34:24</scripRef>: "He shall
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1889 break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>: and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense,
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1890 thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7" next="FP_Q23_A8" prev="FP_Q23_A6" progress="4.39%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the number of the predestined is certain?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p0.1">Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</h4>
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1891 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain. But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Deut.1.11" parsed="vul|Deut|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p2.1" passage="Dt. 1:11">Dt. 1:11</scripRef>): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him." Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1892 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by God cannot be certain.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1893 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.7.13-Matt.7.14" parsed="vul|Matt|7|13|7|14" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p4.1" passage=" Mat. 7:13,14"> Mat. 7:13,14</scripRef>: "For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow
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1894 is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not certain.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1895 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1896 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1897 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[6])</a>. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It
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1898 must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the
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1899 infinite (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally, but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder
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1900 thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and what
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1901 number would befit the essential parts of that universe---that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such
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1902 like, is not pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal
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1903 pre-ordination.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p7" shownumber="no"> It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.28" parsed="vul|Rom|8|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p7.1" passage="Rom. 8:28">Rom. 8:28</scripRef>). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is
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1904 known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']"</p>
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1905 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1906 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1907 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1908 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge
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1909 of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall
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1910 short.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1911 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8" next="FP_Q24" prev="FP_Q23_A7" progress="4.44%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p0.1">Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</h4>
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1912 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1913 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been His counsellor?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.11.34" parsed="vul|Rom|11|34|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p3.1" passage="Rom. 11:34">Rom. 11:34</scripRef>). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1914 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it cannot be furthered by anything.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1915 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.25.21" parsed="vul|Gen|25|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p5.1" passage="Gn. 25:21">Gn. 25:21</scripRef>). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1916 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1917 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Kgs.15.29" parsed="vul|1Kgs|15|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p7.1" passage="1 Kings 15:29">1 Kings 15:29</scripRef>); and that "the gifts and the calling of God are
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1918 without repentance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.11.29" parsed="vul|Rom|11|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p7.2" passage="Rom. 11:29">Rom. 11:29</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p8" shownumber="no"> Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does
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1919 not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of
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1920 another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Pet.1.10" parsed="vul|2Pet|1|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p8.1" passage="2 Pet. 1:10">2 Pet. 1:10</scripRef>).</p>
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1921 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1922 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1923 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to
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1924 <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.3.9" parsed="vul|1Cor|3|9|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p10.1" passage="1 Cor. 3:9">1 Cor. 3:9</scripRef>: "We are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1925 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[6]</a>), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1926 </div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q24" next="FP_Q24_A1" prev="FP_Q23_A8" progress="4.47%" n="xxiii" title="Question. 24 - THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)">
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1927 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p0.1">Question 24. THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
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1928 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1929 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p2" shownumber="no"> We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) What is the book of life?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Of what life is it the book?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?</p>
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1930 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1931 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1" next="FP_Q24_A2" prev="FP_Q24" progress="4.47%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p0.1">Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?</h4>
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1932 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.4.32" parsed="vul|Sir|4|32|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p2.1" passage="Ecclus. 4:32">Ecclus. 4:32</scripRef>)---i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1933 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1934 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be a book of death, as there is a book of life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1935 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in a gloss upon<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.68.29" parsed="vul|Ps|68|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p5.1" passage=" Ps. 68:29, "> Ps. 68:29, </scripRef> "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1936 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[23], A[4]</a>) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore,
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1937 of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory, according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.3.3" parsed="vul|Prov|3|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p6.2" passage=" Prov. 3:3"> Prov. 3:3</scripRef>: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has predestined some to eternal life, is called
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1938 the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Tim.11.19" parsed="vul|2Tim|11|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p6.3" passage="2 Tim. 11:19">2 Tim. 11:19</scripRef>: "The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1939 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1940 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens
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1941 that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p8" shownumber="no"> Hence the solution of the Second Objection.</p>
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1942 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1943 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1944 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1945 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2" next="FP_Q24_A3" prev="FP_Q24_A1" progress="4.50%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p0.1">Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?</h4>
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1946 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1947 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1948 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: "Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.6.71" parsed="vul|John|6|71|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p4.1" passage="Jn. 6:71">Jn. 6:71</scripRef>). But the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1949 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1950 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The book of life, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of glory is an end exceeding
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1951 human nature, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1952 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1953 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are consequent on nature.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p8" shownumber="no"> From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.</p>
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1954 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1955 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and
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1956 knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1957 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3" next="FP_Q25" prev="FP_Q24_A2" progress="4.52%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p0.1">Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither therefore can he be blotted out.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of the living" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.68.29" parsed="vul|Ps|68|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p5.1" passage="Ps. 68:29">Ps. 68:29</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from
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1958 that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living." But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just, according to the text, "He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out of the book of life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rev.3.5" parsed="vul|Rev|3|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p6.1" passage="Apoc. 3:5">Apoc. 3:5</scripRef>) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the
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1959 opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because some
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1960 are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because they are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who are ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of life
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1961 not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of the book of life refers.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew; either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included in the knowledge of God, although not anew.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25" next="FP_Q25_A1" prev="FP_Q24_A3" progress="4.54%" n="xxiv" title="Question. 25 - THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)">
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1962 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p0.1">Question 25. THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
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1963 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1964 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God. About this are six points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is power in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether His power is infinite?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether He is almighty?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether what He makes He could make better?</p>
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1965 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1966 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1" next="FP_Q25_A2" prev="FP_Q25" progress="4.55%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is power in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p0.1">Whether there is power in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3] , A[3]</a>). Therefore, there is no power in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[8]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.88.9" parsed="vul|Ps|88|9|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p6.1" passage="Ps. 88:9">Ps. 88:9</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[2]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], AA[1]</a>, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all
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1967 ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the
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1968 highest degree.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only active power.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in God nobler than His power.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In creatures, power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the
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1969 notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of "suppositum" possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle of an effect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of
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1970 the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2" next="FP_Q25_A3" prev="FP_Q25_A1" progress="4.58%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the power of God is infinite?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p0.1">Whether the power of God is infinite?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23). Therefore, His power is not infinite.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine essence (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the
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1971 more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[1]</a>) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[1]</a>); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with
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1972 Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[5]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p8.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[3]</a>). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But the
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1973 power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one body moving another is a
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1974 univocal agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and
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1975 especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3" next="FP_Q25_A4" prev="FP_Q25_A2" progress="4.60%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is omnipotent?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Whether God is omnipotent?</h4>
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1976 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for He is immovable, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore He is not omnipotent.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1977 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Tim.2.13" parsed="vul|2Tim|2|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p3.1" passage="2 Tim. 2:13.">2 Tim. 2:13.</scripRef> Therefore He is not omnipotent.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1978 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1979 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.1.20" parsed="vul|1Cor|1|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p5.1" passage="1 Cor. 1:20">1 Cor. 1:20</scripRef>), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those things to be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If
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1980 God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1981 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.1.37" parsed="vul|Luke|1|37|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p6.1" passage="Lk. 1:37">Lk. 1:37</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1982 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1983 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said
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1984 to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say
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1985 that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able to do.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p8" shownumber="no"> It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for
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1986 instance, that a man is a donkey.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p9" shownumber="no"> It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
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1987 being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence,
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1988 not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do
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1989 them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.</p>
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1990 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1991 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p10.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1992 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible---as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things
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1993 if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1994 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p12.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[21],
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1995 A[4]</a>), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the first foundation of all good things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1996 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as
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1997 to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p13.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and
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1998 necessity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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1999 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4" next="FP_Q25_A5" prev="FP_Q25_A3" progress="4.66%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether God can make the past not to have been?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p0.1">Whether God can make the past not to have been?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from
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2000 the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (<scripRef id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p5.1" passage="Ep. 22">Ep. 22</scripRef> ad Eustoch.): "Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted." Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[2]</a>), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that
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2001 it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely, to make
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2002 undone the things that have been done."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible
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2003 in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So
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2004 is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5" next="FP_Q25_A6" prev="FP_Q25_A4" progress="4.69%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God can do what He does not?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p0.1">Whether God can do what He does not?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.26.53" parsed="vul|Matt|26|53|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p5.1" passage="Mat. 26:53">Mat. 26:53</scripRef>). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[3]</a>) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God
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2005 does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[21], A[2]</a>), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine
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2006 wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could
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2007 happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because
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2008 His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[3]</a>), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things. Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the
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2009 intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by
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2010 His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is false;
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2011 for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the verb "can" (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them another order.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6" next="FP_Q26" prev="FP_Q25_A5" progress="4.73%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether God can do better than what He does?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p0.1">Whether God can do better than what He does?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): "If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been envious." For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better than He does.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.3.20" parsed="vul|Eph|3|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p6.1" passage="Eph. 3:20">Eph. 3:20</scripRef>): "God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is
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2012 after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, "better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because
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2013 He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the substance.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be
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2014 another and a better universe.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything better than God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q26" next="FP_Q26_A1" prev="FP_Q25_A6" progress="4.76%" n="xxv" title="Question. 26 - OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) ">
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2015 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p0.1">Question 26. OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
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2016 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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2017 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?</p>
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2018 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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2019 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1" next="FP_Q26_A2" prev="FP_Q26" progress="4.76%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether beatitude belongs to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p0.1">Whether beatitude belongs to God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude does not belong to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords." (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.6.15" parsed="vul|1Tim|6|15|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p4.1" passage="1 Tim. 6:15">1 Tim. 6:15</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence.
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2020 Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[2]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[4]</a>), in simplicity and unity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2" next="FP_Q26_A3" prev="FP_Q26_A1" progress="4.77%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p0.1">Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. Now in God, to be and to
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2021 understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation to His beatitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3" next="FP_Q26_A4" prev="FP_Q26_A2" progress="4.79%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p2.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[11], A[3]</a>). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.15.41" parsed="vul|1Cor|15|41|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p4.1" passage="1 Cor. 15:41">1 Cor. 15:41</scripRef>: "Star differeth from star in glory." But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth
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2022 Thee, though he know nought else." But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> End is twofold, namely, "objective" and "subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing itself" and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4" next="FP.iii" prev="FP_Q26_A3" progress="4.81%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p0.1">Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?</h4>
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2023 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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2024 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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2025 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[2]</a> ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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2026 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol.
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2027 iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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2028 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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2029 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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2030 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p8" shownumber="no"> We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.</p>
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2031 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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2032 </div></div></div></body></html>
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