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finished Q19
author ht
date Fri, 04 Dec 2009 20:50:28 +0000
parents 9c8612174a28
children 13a814a86d4b
files summa/bilingual/FP_ii_19-26.html
diffstat 1 files changed, 322 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) [+]
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--- a/summa/bilingual/FP_ii_19-26.html	Fri Dec 04 20:31:38 2009 +0000
+++ b/summa/bilingual/FP_ii_19-26.html	Fri Dec 04 20:50:28 2009 +0000
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
 <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="bi.xsl"?>
+<!DOCTYPE html [
+<!ENTITY ordf "">
+]>
 <html
 					xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><title>Bilingual Aquinas Questions 19--25</title><style>
      h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both}
@@ -1375,26 +1378,333 @@
 opponantur; tamen velle mala fieri, et velle mala non fieri, non
 opponuntur contradictorie, cum utrumque sit affirmativum. Deus
 igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult
-permittere mala fieri. Et hoc est bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9" progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
-  necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2"> Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
+permittere mala fieri. Et hoc est bonum.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9"
+progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has
+free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not
+free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146,
+ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be
+liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either
+side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
+title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="29264"><span class=
+"ref">[29264] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat liberum arbitrium. Dicit
+enim Hieronymus, in homilia de filio prodigo, <i>solus Deus est, in
+quem peccatum non cadit, nec cadere potest; cetera, cum sint liberi
+arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty
+of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God
+does not will evil, as has been said <a
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9"
+shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not
+free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="29265"><span class=
+"ref">[29265] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum et
+malum eligitur. Sed Deus non vult malum, ut dictum est. Ergo
+liberum arbitrium non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
+both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit
+divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free
+choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 s. c."><a name="29266"><span class=
+"ref">[29266] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro de fide, <i>spiritus sanctus dividit
+singulis prout vult, idest pro liberae voluntatis arbitrio, non
+necessitatis obsequio</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
+  necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 co."><a name="29267"><span class=
+"ref">[29267] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod liberum arbitrium habemus respectu eorum quae non necessario
+volumus, vel naturali instinctu. Non enim ad liberum arbitrium
+pertinet quod volumus esse felices, sed ad naturalem instinctum.
+Unde et alia animalia, quae naturali instinctu moventur ad aliquid,
+non dicuntur libero arbitrio moveri. Cum igitur Deus ex necessitate
+suam bonitatem velit, alia vero non ex necessitate, ut supra
+ostensum est; respectu illorum quae non ex necessitate vult,
+liberum arbitrium habet.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply,
+but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="29268"><span class=
+"ref">[29268] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Hieronymus videtur excludere a Deo liberum arbitrium,
+non simpliciter, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod est deflecti in
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine
+goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii,
+3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet
+He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a
+thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin,
+can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="29269"><span class=
+"ref">[29269] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, cum malum culpae dicatur per aversionem a bonitate
+divina, per quam Deus omnia vult, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum
+est quod impossibile est eum malum culpae velle. Et tamen ad
+opposita se habet, inquantum velle potest hoc esse vel non esse.
+Sicut et nos, non peccando, possumus velle sedere, et non velle
+sedere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11"
+next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi"
+title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be
+distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to
+be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in
+God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His
+wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine
+wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine
+will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="29270"><span class=
+"ref">[29270] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas
+signi. Sicut enim voluntas Dei est causa rerum, ita et scientia.
+Sed non assignantur aliqua signa ex parte divinae scientiae. Ergo
+neque debent assignari aliqua signa ex parte divinae
+voluntatis.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of
+him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions
+assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they
+are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions
+therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="29271"><span class=
+"ref">[29271] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+signum quod non concordat ei cuius est signum, est falsum. Si
+igitur signa quae assignantur circa voluntatem divinam, non
+concordant divinae voluntati, sunt falsa, si autem concordant,
+superflue assignantur. Non igitur sunt aliqua signa circa
+voluntatem divinam assignanda.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence
+of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words
+of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2">
+Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out
+according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be
+taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 s. c."><a name="29272"><span class=
+"ref">[29272] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod voluntas Dei est una, cum ipsa sit Dei essentia. Quandoque
+autem pluraliter significatur, ut cum dicitur, <i>magna opera
+domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius</i>. Ergo oportet quod
+aliquando signum voluntatis pro voluntate accipiatur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
   punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat.
   6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called
-  will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3.1" passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+  will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 co."><a name="29273"><span class=
+"ref">[29273] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod in Deo quaedam dicuntur proprie, et quaedam secundum
+metaphoram, ut ex supradictis patet. Cum autem aliquae passiones
+humanae in divinam praedicationem metaphorice assumuntur, hoc fit
+secundum similitudinem effectus, unde illud quod est signum talis
+passionis in nobis, in Deo nomine illius passionis metaphorice
+significatur. Sicut, apud nos, irati punire consueverunt, unde ipsa
+punitio est signum irae, et propter hoc, ipsa punitio nomine irae
+significatur, cum Deo attribuitur. Similiter id quod solet esse in
+nobis signum voluntatis, quandoque metaphorice in Deo voluntas
+dicitur. Sicut, cum aliquis praecipit aliquid, signum est quod
+velit illud fieri, unde praeceptum divinum quandoque metaphorice
+voluntas Dei dicitur, secundum illud Matth. VI, <i>fiat voluntas
+tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>. Sed hoc distat inter
+voluntatem et iram, quia ira de Deo nunquam proprie dicitur, cum in
+suo principali intellectu includat passionem, voluntas autem
+proprie de Deo dicitur. Et ideo in Deo distinguitur voluntas
+proprie, et metaphorice dicta. Voluntas enim proprie dicta, vocatur
+voluntas beneplaciti, voluntas autem metaphorice dicta, est
+voluntas signi, eo quod ipsum signum voluntatis voluntas
+dicitur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless
+through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we
+will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge,
+but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="29274"><span class=
+"ref">[29274] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod scientia non est causa eorum quae fiunt, nisi per
+voluntatem, non enim quae scimus facimus, nisi velimus. Et ideo
+signum non attribuitur scientiae, sicut attribuitur
+voluntati.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs
+that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual
+expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus
+punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called
+anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in
+ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="29275"><span class=
+"ref">[29275] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod signa voluntatis dicuntur voluntates divinae, non
+quia sint signa quod Deus velit, sed quia ea quae in nobis solent
+esse signa volendi, in Deo divinae voluntates dicuntur. Sicut
+punitio non est signum quod in Deo sit ira, sed punitio, ex eo ipso
+quod in nobis est signum irae, in Deo dicitur ira.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of
+will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and
+permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same
+things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He
+sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these
+He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as
+distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="29276"><span class=
+"ref">[29276] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter circa divinam
+voluntatem ponantur quinque signa, scilicet, prohibitio,
+praeceptum, consilium, operatio et permissio. Nam eadem quae nobis
+praecipit Deus vel consulit, in nobis quandoque operatur, et eadem
+quae prohibet, quandoque permittit. Ergo non debent ex opposito
+dividi.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless
+He wills it, as the Scripture says (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3.1"
+passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>). But the will of
+expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore
+operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of
+expression.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="29277"><span class=
+"ref">[29277] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nihil Deus operatur, nisi volens, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Sed voluntas
+signi distinguitur a voluntate beneplaciti. Ergo operatio sub
+voluntate signi comprehendi non debet.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission
+appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and
+permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition
+belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly
+under one division, not being of one order.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="29278"><span class=
+"ref">[29278] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+operatio et permissio communiter ad omnes creaturas pertinent, quia
+in omnibus Deus operatur, et in omnibus aliquid fieri permittit.
+Sed praeceptum, consilium et prohibitio pertinent ad solam
+rationalem creaturam. Ergo non veniunt convenienter in unam
+divisionem, cum non sint unius ordinis.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways
+than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of
+ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius
+(Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression
+only in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely,
+counsel and precept---in the case of good.</p></div><div style="width:
+45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4"><a name="29279"><span class=
+"ref">[29279] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+malum pluribus modis contingit quam bonum, quia bonum contingit uno
+modo, sed malum omnifariam, ut patet per philosophum in II Ethic.,
+et per Dionysium in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Inconvenienter igitur
+respectu mali assignatur unum signum tantum, scilicet prohibitio;
+respectu vero boni, duo signa, scilicet consilium et
+praeceptum.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for
   what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept,
   counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. 6:10</scripRef>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.</p>
-</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 co."><a name="29280"><span class=
+"ref">[29280] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod huiusmodi signa voluntatis dicuntur ea, quibus consuevimus
+demonstrare nos aliquid velle. Potest autem aliquis declarare se
+velle aliquid, vel per seipsum, vel per alium. Per seipsum quidem,
+inquantum facit aliquid, vel directe, vel indirecte et per
+accidens. Directe quidem, cum per se aliquid operatur, et quantum
+ad hoc, dicitur esse signum operatio. Indirecte autem, inquantum
+non impedit operationem, nam removens prohibens dicitur movens per
+accidens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Et quantum ad hoc, dicitur
+signum permissio. Per alium autem declarat se aliquid velle,
+inquantum ordinat alium ad aliquid faciendum; vel necessaria
+inductione, quod fit praecipiendo quod quis vult, et prohibendo
+contrarium; vel aliqua persuasoria inductione, quod pertinet ad
+consilium. Quia igitur his modis declaratur aliquem velle aliquid,
+propter hoc ista quinque nominantur interdum nomine voluntatis
+divinae, tanquam signa voluntatis. Quod enim praeceptum, consilium
+et prohibitio dicantur Dei voluntas, patet per id quod dicitur
+Matth. VI <i>fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>.
+Quod autem permissio vel operatio dicantur Dei voluntas patet per
+Augustinum, qui dicit in Enchirid., <i>nihil fit, nisi omnipotens
+fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel faciendo</i>. Vel potest dici
+quod permissio et operatio referuntur ad praesens permissio quidem
+ad malum, operatio vero ad bonum. Ad futurum vero, prohibitio,
+respectu mali; respectu vero boni necessarii, praeceptum; respectu
+vero superabundantis boni, consilium.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p8"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to
+prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different
+ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is
+not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept,
+operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="29281"><span class=
+"ref">[29281] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod nihil prohibet, circa eandem rem, aliquem diversimode
+declarare se aliquid velle, sicut inveniuntur multa nomina idem
+significantia. Unde nihil prohibet idem subiacere praecepto et
+consilio et operationi, et prohibitioni vel permissioni.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter
-  the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+  the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the
+will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of
+another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="29282"><span class=
+"ref">[29282] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut Deus potest significari metaphorice velle id
+quod non vult voluntate proprie accepta, ita potest metaphorice
+significari velle id quod proprie vult. Unde nihil prohibet de
+eodem esse voluntatem beneplaciti, et voluntatem signi. Sed
+operatio semper est eadem cum voluntate beneplaciti, non autem
+praeceptum vel consilium, tum quia haec est de praesenti, illud de
+futuro; tum quia haec per se est effectus voluntatis, illud autem
+per alium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p10"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are
+masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special
+expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as
+God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of
+themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation;
+therefore only operation and permission are concerned with
+these.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
+title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="29283"><span class=
+"ref">[29283] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod creatura rationalis est domina sui actus, et ideo
+circa ipsam specialia quaedam signa divinae voluntatis assignantur,
+inquantum rationalem creaturam Deus ordinat ad agendum voluntarie
+et per se. Sed aliae creaturae non agunt nisi motae ex operatione
+divina, et ideo circa alias non habent locum nisi operatio et
+permissio.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and
-  these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+  these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is
+not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with
+the avoiding of lesser evils.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 4"><a name="29284"><span class=
+"ref">[29284] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod omne malum culpae, licet multipliciter contingat,
+tamen in hoc convenit, quod discordat a voluntate divina et ideo
+unum signum respectu malorum assignatur, scilicet prohibitio. Sed
+diversimode bona se habent ad bonitatem divinam. Quia quaedam sunt,
+sine quibus fruitionem divinae bonitatis consequi non possumus, et
+respectu horum est praeceptum. Quaedam vero sunt, quibus perfectius
+consequimur, et respectu horum est consilium. Vel dicendum quod
+consilium est non solum de melioribus bonis assequendis, sed etiam
+de minoribus malis vitandis.</p></div></div>
 </div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20" next="FP_Q20_A1" prev="FP_Q19_A12" progress="3.78%" n="xix" title="Question. 20 - GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)">
 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p0.1">Question 20. GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">