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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FS.i" class="div2">
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2 <a href="summa.FS.html"></a>
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3 <a href="summa.FS.i.i.html"></a>
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4 <h2 id="FS.i-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ[1]-5)</h2>
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5 <div id="FS.i.i" class="div3">
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6 <a href="summa.FS.i.html"></a>
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7 <a href="summa.FS_Q1.html"></a>
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8 <h3 id="FS.i.i-p0.1">PROLOGUE</h3>
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9 <p id="FS.i.i-p1"> Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God's image, in so far as the image implies
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10 "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of
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11 those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image,
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12 i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.
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13 </p>
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14 <a href="summa.FS.i.html"></a>
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15 <a href="summa.FS_Q1.html"></a>
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16 </div>
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17 <div id="FS_Q1" class="div3">
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18 <a href="summa.FS.i.i.html"></a>
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19 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html"></a>
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20 <h3 id="FS_Q1-p0.1">OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
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21 <p id="FS_Q1-p1"></p>
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22 <p id="FS_Q1-p2"> In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and secondly, those things by means of which man may advance
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23 towards this end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And since the last end
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24 of human life is stated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness.
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25 </p>
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26 <p id="FS_Q1-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
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27 <p id="FS_Q1-p4"> (1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?</p>
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28 <p id="FS_Q1-p5"> (2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?</p>
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29 <p id="FS_Q1-p6"> (3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?</p>
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30 <p id="FS_Q1-p7"> (4) Whether there is any last end of human life?</p>
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31 <p id="FS_Q1-p8"> (5) Whether one man can have several last ends?</p>
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32 <p id="FS_Q1-p9"> (6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?</p>
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33 <p id="FS_Q1-p10"> (7) Whether all men have the same last end?</p>
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34 <p id="FS_Q1-p11"> (8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?</p>
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35 <div id="FS_Q1_A1" class="div4">
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36 <a href="summa.FS_Q1.html"></a>
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37 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html"></a>
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38 <h4 id="FS_Q1_A1-p0.1">Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?</h4>
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39 <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p1"></p>
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40 <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p2">
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41 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name,
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42 implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action;
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43 since this preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not belong to man to act for an end.
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44 </p>
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45 <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p3">
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46 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher
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47 states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
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48 </p>
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49 <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p4">
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50 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation,
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51 sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard,
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52 while intent on something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
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53 </p>
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54 <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p5">
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55 <b>On the contrary,</b> All things contained in a genus are derived from the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human operations,
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56 as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs to man to do everything for an end.
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57 </p>
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58 <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p6">
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59 <b>I answer that,</b> Of actions done by man those alone are properly called "human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational
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60 animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is
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61 master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty
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62 and will of reason." Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed
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63 from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly
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64 "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are
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65 caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore
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66 all human actions must be for an end.
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67 </p>
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68 <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p7">
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69 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this
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70 way that it is a cause.
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71 </p>
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72 <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p8">
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73 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is
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74 voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it
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75 is elicited by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act elicited by the will
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76 to be the last end. For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is
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77 color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible
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78 object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action
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79 be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing,
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80 is for the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does that action
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81 in which the last end consists.
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82 </p>
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83 <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p9">
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84 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the
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85 proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason.
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86 </p>
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87 <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p10"></p>
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88 <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p11"></p>
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89 <a href="summa.FS_Q1.html"></a>
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90 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html"></a>
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91 </div>
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92 <div id="FS_Q1_A2" class="div4">
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93 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html"></a>
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94 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html"></a>
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95 <h4 id="FS_Q1_A2-p0.1">Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?</h4>
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96 <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p1"></p>
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97 <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p2">
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98 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end,
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99 never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they
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100 are altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as
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101 irrational animals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for an end.
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102 </p>
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103 <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p3">
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104 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong
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105 to things that lack reason.
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106 </p>
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107 <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p4">
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108 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But "the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to
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109 act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature.
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110 </p>
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111 <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p5">
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112 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only mind but also nature acts for an end."
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113 </p>
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114 <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p6">
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115 <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed,
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116 the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that
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117 matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act.
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118 But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not
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119 determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce
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120 a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as
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121 this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other
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122 things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."
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123 </p>
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124 <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p7"> Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing,
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125 moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end
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126 through being moved by the archer who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason,
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127 move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the
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128 "faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by
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129 another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything
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130 to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument
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131 to the principal agent, as stated above (
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132 <a id="FS_Q1_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">FP, Q[22], A[2]</a>, ad 4;
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133 <a id="FS_Q1_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html">FP,
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134 Q[103], A[1]
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135 </a>, ad 3). Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens] and leading itself to the
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136 end: whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend
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137 the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge.
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138 </p>
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139 <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p8">
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140 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he
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141 acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end.
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142 And it is thus with irrational creatures.
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143 </p>
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144 <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p9">
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145 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that
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146 which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.
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147 </p>
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148 <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p10">
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149 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack
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150 reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite,
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151 determinate to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause: thus the governor
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152 of a city, who intends the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular
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153 departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some
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154 rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will.
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155 </p>
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156 <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p11"></p>
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157 <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p12"></p>
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158 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html"></a>
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159 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html"></a>
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160 </div>
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161 <div id="FS_Q1_A3" class="div4">
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162 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html"></a>
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163 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A4.html"></a>
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164 <h4 id="FS_Q1_A3-p0.1">Whether human acts are specified by their end?</h4>
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165 <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p1"></p>
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166 <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p2">
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167 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified
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168 by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end.
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169 </p>
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170 <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p3">
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171 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore
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172 a human act does not derive its species from the end.
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173 </p>
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174 <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p4">
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175 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends.
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176 Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts.
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177 </p>
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178 <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p5">
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179 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13): "According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy
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180 of blame or praise."
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181 </p>
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182 <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p6"> I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed
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183 of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper
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184 movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its species from an
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185 act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the
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186 terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while
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187 heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific nature.
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188 And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For
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189 human acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above
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190
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191 <a id="FS_Q1_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the
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192 end. And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In like manner it is
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193 their terminus: for the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of
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194 the thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog.
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195 super Luc.) "morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral
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196 acts are the same as human acts.
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197 </p>
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198 <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p7">
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199 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just
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200 this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something,
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201 considered as passion.
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202 </p>
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203 <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p8">
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204 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it is thus
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205 that it gives the species to the human or moral act.
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206 </p>
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207 <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p9">
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208 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has
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209 its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however,
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210 that an act which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the will: thus this act "to kill
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211 a man," which is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as
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212 to an end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result being that there would be several acts
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213 in different species of morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a movement
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214 does not receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its "per se" terminus.
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215 Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality.
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216 Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered
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217 in their moral species, and conversely.
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218 </p>
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219 <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p10"></p>
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220 <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p11"></p>
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221 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html"></a>
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222 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A4.html"></a>
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223 </div>
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224 <div id="FS_Q1_A4" class="div4">
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225 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html"></a>
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226 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html"></a>
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227 <h4 id="FS_Q1_A4-p0.1">Whether there is one last end of human life?</h4>
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228 <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p1"></p>
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229 <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p2">
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230 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive,
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231 as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse
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232 some other good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an end. Therefore there is
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233 an indefinite series of ends.
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234 </p>
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235 <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p3">
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236 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the
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237 same reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire
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238 of the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an infinite series of ends.
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239 </p>
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240 <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p4">
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241 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for
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242 I can will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human
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243 will, and there is no last end of the human will.
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244 </p>
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245 <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p5">
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246 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good
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247 is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore
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248 it is necessary to fix one last end.
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249 </p>
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250 <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p6">
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251 <b>I answer that,</b> Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in whatsoever
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252 things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must
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253 of necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes
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254 of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can
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255 the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order
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256 in ends---the order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something first.
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257 For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you
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258 remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein
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259 operation has its beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the intention
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260 is the last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently,
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261 on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any
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262 action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing among those that are
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263 ordained to the end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue indefinitely.
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264 </p>
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265 <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p7"> On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally;
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266 for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things
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267 ordained to the end.
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268 </p>
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269 <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p8">
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270 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The very nature of good is that something flows from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good
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271 has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that
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272 from the end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are ordained to the end. And
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273 this would be true if we considered but the power of the First Good, which is
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274 infinite. But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its
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275 effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the
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276 First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely
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277 but, as it is written (
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278 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure."
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279 </p>
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280 <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p9">
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281 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things which are of themselves, reason begins from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore
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282 the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process
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283 of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those things which are accidentally
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284 connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is
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285 accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing
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286 hinders the reason from an indefinite process.
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287 </p>
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288 <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p10">
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289 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the fact
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290 that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently once or several times.
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291 </p>
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292 <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p11"></p>
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293 <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p12"></p>
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294 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html"></a>
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295 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html"></a>
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296 </div>
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297 <div id="FS_Q1_A5" class="div4">
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298 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A4.html"></a>
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299 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A6.html"></a>
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300 <h4 id="FS_Q1_A5-p0.1">Whether one man can have several last ends?</h4>
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301 <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p1"></p>
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302 <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p2">
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303 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine
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304 says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of
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305 nature, and virtue." But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of his will in many
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306 things.
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307 </p>
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308 <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p3">
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309 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition
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310 to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the will does not exclude others.
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311 </p>
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312 <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p4">
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313 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its
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314 last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed
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315 his last end in pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is possible for one man's
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316 will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends.
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317 </p>
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318 <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p5">
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319 <b>On the contrary,</b> That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life.
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320 Hence of gluttons it is written (
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321 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.19" target="asv">Phil. 3:19</a>): "Whose god is their belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now according to
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322 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.24" target="asv"> Mat. 6:24, </a> "No man can serve two masters," such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is impossible for one man
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323 to have several last ends not ordained to one another.
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324 </p>
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325 <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p6">
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326 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be
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327 assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which
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328 he desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean
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329 now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be
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330 complete." It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to
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331 desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite
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332 so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.
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333 </p>
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334 <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p7"> The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in
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335 the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must
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336 needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last
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337 end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end, is one.
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338 </p>
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339 <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p8"> The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their species from the end, as stated above
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340 <a id="FS_Q1_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, they must needs receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as natural things are placed in
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341 a genus according to a common form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one genus,
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342 the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every genus there is one first principle;
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343 and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to the
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344 whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally
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345 one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.
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346 </p>
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347 <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p9">
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348 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these several objects were considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end.
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349 </p>
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350 <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p10">
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351 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's
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352 perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection.
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353 </p>
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354 <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p11">
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355 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend
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356 to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2).
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357 </p>
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358 <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p12"></p>
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359 <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p13"></p>
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360 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A4.html"></a>
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361 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A6.html"></a>
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362 </div>
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363 <div id="FS_Q1_A6" class="div4">
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364 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html"></a>
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365 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A7.html"></a>
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366 <h4 id="FS_Q1_A6-p0.1">Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?</h4>
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367 <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p1"></p>
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368 <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p2">
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369 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are
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370 said to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains
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371 not to the last end.
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372 </p>
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373 <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p3">
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374 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake.
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375 Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires,
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376 for the last end.
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377 </p>
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378 <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p4">
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379 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all
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380 that he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end.
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381 </p>
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382 <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p5">
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383 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we
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384 love it for its own sake."
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385 </p>
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386 <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p6">
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387 <b>I answer that,</b> Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First, because
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388 whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last
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389 end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained
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390 to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art.
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391 Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly,
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392 because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is
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393 clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects
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394 of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.
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395 </p>
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396 <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p7">
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397 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford
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398 him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end.
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399 </p>
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400 <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p8">
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401 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good,
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402 which is the ultimate end.
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403 </p>
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404 <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p9">
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405 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention,
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406 which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts
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407 be not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every
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408 step.
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409 </p>
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410 <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p10"></p>
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411 <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p11"></p>
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412 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html"></a>
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413 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A7.html"></a>
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414 </div>
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415 <div id="FS_Q1_A7" class="div4">
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416 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A6.html"></a>
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417 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html"></a>
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418 <h4 id="FS_Q1_A7-p0.1">Whether all men have the same last end?</h4>
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419 <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p1"></p>
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420 <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p2">
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421 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end
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422 of man. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have not the same last end.
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423 </p>
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424 <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p3">
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425 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not
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426 have various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.
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427 </p>
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428 <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p4">
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429 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature,
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430 yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last end.
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431 </p>
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432 <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p5">
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433 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness.
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434 </p>
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435 <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p6">
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436 <b>I answer that,</b> We can speak of the last end in two ways: first, considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing
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437 in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since
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438 all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated
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439 above
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440 <a id="FS_Q1_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. But as to the thing in which this aspect is
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441 realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure;
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442 others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to
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443 others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in
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444 which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed
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445 affections desires for his last end.
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446 </p>
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447 <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p7">
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448 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the
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449 last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.
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450 </p>
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451 <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p8">
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452 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end.
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453 </p>
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454 <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p9">
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455 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although actions are of individuals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above
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456
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457 <a id="FS_Q1_A7-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html">(A[5])</a>.
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458 </p>
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459 <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p10"></p>
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460 <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p11"></p>
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461 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A6.html"></a>
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462 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html"></a>
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463 </div>
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464 <div id="FS_Q1_A8" class="div4">
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465 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A7.html"></a>
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466 <a href="summa.FS_Q2.html"></a>
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467 <h4 id="FS_Q1_A8-p0.1">Whether other creatures concur in that last end?</h4>
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468 <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p1"></p>
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469 <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p2">
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470 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's beginning---i.e.
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471 God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in man's last end.
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472 </p>
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473 <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p3">
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474 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all things to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's
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475 last end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore other things,
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476 too, concur in man's last end.
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477 </p>
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478 <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p4">
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479 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of
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480 all. Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end.
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481 </p>
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482 <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p5">
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483 <b>On the contrary,</b> man's last end is happiness; which all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But "happiness is not possible
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484 for animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore other things do not concur in man's last end.
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485 </p>
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486 <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p6">
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487 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is twofold---the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing itself
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488 in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of
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489 a weighty body is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place, as "use"; and the end of the miser is money
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490 as "thing," or possession of money as "use."
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491 </p>
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492 <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p7"> If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end,
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493 since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisition of
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494 the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their
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495 last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in
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496 so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.
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497 </p>
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498 <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p8"> Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means the acquisition of the last end.</p>
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499 <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p9"></p>
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500 <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p10"></p>
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501 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A7.html"></a>
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502 <a href="summa.FS_Q2.html"></a>
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503 </div>
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504 <a href="summa.FS.i.i.html"></a>
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505 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html"></a>
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506 </div>
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507 <div id="FS_Q2" class="div3">
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508 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html"></a>
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509 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A1.html"></a>
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510 <h3 id="FS_Q2-p0.1">OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
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511 <p id="FS_Q2-p1"></p>
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512 <p id="FS_Q2-p2"> We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.</p>
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513 <p id="FS_Q2-p3"> Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
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514 <p id="FS_Q2-p4"> (1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?</p>
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515 <p id="FS_Q2-p5"> (2) Whether in honor?</p>
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516 <p id="FS_Q2-p6"> (3) Whether in fame or glory?</p>
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517 <p id="FS_Q2-p7"> (4) Whether in power?</p>
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518 <p id="FS_Q2-p8"> (5) Whether in any good of the body?</p>
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519 <p id="FS_Q2-p9"> (6) Whether in pleasure?</p>
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520 <p id="FS_Q2-p10"> (7) Whether in any good of the soul?</p>
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521 <p id="FS_Q2-p11"> (8) Whether in any created good?</p>
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522 <div id="FS_Q2_A1" class="div4">
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523 <a href="summa.FS_Q2.html"></a>
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524 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A2.html"></a>
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525 <h4 id="FS_Q2_A1-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in wealth?</h4>
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526 <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p1"></p>
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527 <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p2">
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528 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which
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529 has the greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written (
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530 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.19" target="asv">Eccles. 10:19</a>): "All things obey money." Therefore man's happiness consists in wealth.
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531 </p>
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532 <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p3">
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533 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is "a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good
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534 things." Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented,
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535 that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
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536 </p>
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537 <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p4">
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538 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more
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539 than anything else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches" (
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540 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.9" target="asv">Eccles. 5:9</a>). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
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541 </p>
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542 <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p5">
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543 <b>On the contrary,</b> Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth shines
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544 in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded." Therefore man's happiness
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545 does not consist in wealth.
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546 </p>
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547 <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p6">
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548 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3),
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549 viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink,
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550 clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money,
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551 but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things
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552 salable.
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553 </p>
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554 <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of
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555 something else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it ordained to man
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556 as to its end. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to
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557 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.8" target="asv"> Ps. 8:8</a>: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet."
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558 </p>
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559 <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p8"> And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because,
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560 by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of
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561 the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth.
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562 </p>
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563 <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p9">
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564 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which
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565 can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as
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566 it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.
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567 </p>
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568 <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p10">
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569 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (
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570 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.17.16" target="asv">Prov. 17:16</a>): "What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom."
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571 </p>
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572 <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p11">
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573 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial
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574 wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear
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575 (Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly
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576 the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things
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577 despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (
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578 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:29</a>): "They that eat me shall yet hunger." Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is
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579 the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words (
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580 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11.2" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosoever drinketh of this water," by which temporal goods are signified, "shall thirst again." The reason
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581 of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect,
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582 and the sovereign good does not consist therein.
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583 </p>
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584 <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p12"></p>
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585 <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p13"></p>
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586 <a href="summa.FS_Q2.html"></a>
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587 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A2.html"></a>
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588 </div>
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589 <div id="FS_Q2_A2" class="div4">
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590 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A1.html"></a>
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591 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A3.html"></a>
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592 <h4 id="FS_Q2_A2-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in honors?</h4>
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593 <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p1"></p>
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594 <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p2">
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595 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher
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596 says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says
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597 (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.
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598 </p>
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599 <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p3">
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600 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect
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601 good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apostle says (
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602 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:17</a>): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore happiness consists in honor.
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603 </p>
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604 <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p4">
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605 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers
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606 loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness consists in honor.
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607 </p>
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608 <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p5">
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609 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the
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610 person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness does not consist in honor.
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611 </p>
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612 <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p6">
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613 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and
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614 consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion,
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615 especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share
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616 of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot
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617 principally consist therein.
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618 </p>
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619 <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p7">
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620 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive
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621 honor from men by way of reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to offer." But virtue's true reward is happiness
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622 itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition.
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623 </p>
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624 <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p8">
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625 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that
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626 honor makes them excellent.
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627 </p>
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628 <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p9">
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629 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated
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630 above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or
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631 happy.
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632 </p>
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633 <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p10"></p>
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634 <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p11"></p>
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635 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A1.html"></a>
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636 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A3.html"></a>
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637 </div>
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638 <div id="FS_Q2_A3" class="div4">
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639 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A2.html"></a>
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640 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A4.html"></a>
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641 <h4 id="FS_Q2_A3-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory?</h4>
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642 <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p1"></p>
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643 <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p2">
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644 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints
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645 for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says (
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646 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.18" target="asv">Rom. 8:18</a>): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." Therefore
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647 happiness consists in glory.
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648 </p>
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649 <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p3">
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650 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge
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651 of others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory
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652 consists "in being well known and praised." Therefore man's happiness consists in glory.
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653 </p>
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654 <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p4">
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655 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity
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656 after a fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity, when you think of your
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657 fame in future time." Therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory.
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658 </p>
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659 <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p5">
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660 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many owe
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661 their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame,
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662 must needs blush at their own praise." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory.
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663 </p>
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664 <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p6">
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665 <b>I answer that,</b> Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose [*Augustine,
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666 Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for
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667 human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection
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668 of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human
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669 knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness
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670 itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's good depends
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671 on God's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God;
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672 according to
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673 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.15" target="asv"> Ps. 90:15,16</a>: "I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with
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674 length of days, and I will show him my salvation."
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675 </p>
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676 <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p7"> Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts.
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677 For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it
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678 is written (
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679 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:18</a>): "He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth."
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680 </p>
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681 <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p8">
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682 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence
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683 it is written (
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684 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.8.38" target="asv">Mk. 8:38</a>): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins
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685 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.8.38" target="asv"> Mk. 8:38 </a>with
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686 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.8" target="asv"> Lk. 12:8 </a>owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory].
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687 </p>
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688 <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p9">
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689 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived
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690 from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false,
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691 it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that
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692 fame can nowise make man happy.
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693 </p>
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694 <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p10">
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695 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But
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696 happiness endures of itself, and for ever.
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697 </p>
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698 <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p11"></p>
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699 <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p12"></p>
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700 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A2.html"></a>
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701 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A4.html"></a>
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702 </div>
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703 <div id="FS_Q2_A4" class="div4">
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704 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A3.html"></a>
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705 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html"></a>
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706 <h4 id="FS_Q2_A4-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in power?</h4>
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707 <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p1"></p>
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708 <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p2">
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709 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first
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710 beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture
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711 they are called "gods" (
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712 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.28" target="asv">Ex. 22:28</a>), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods." Therefore happiness consists in power.
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713 </p>
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714 <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p3">
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715 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to
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716 those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
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717 </p>
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718 <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p4">
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719 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than
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720 aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
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721 </p>
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722 <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p5">
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723 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man cannot
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724 relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who
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725 is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more?"
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726 </p>
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727 <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p6">
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728 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle,
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729 as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Secondly, because power has relation to good
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730 and evil: whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power,
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731 which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.
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732 </p>
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733 <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p7"> Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because,
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734 since happiness is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and
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735 in evil men. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as stated in Ethic. i, 7, having
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736 gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may
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|
737 still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since
|
|
|
738 happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written
|
|
|
739 (
|
|
|
740 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.12" target="asv">Eccles. 5:12</a>) that "riches" are sometimes "kept to the hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said of the other three. Fourthly, because
|
|
|
741 man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained
|
|
|
742 thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for
|
|
|
743 which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.
|
|
|
744 </p>
|
|
|
745 <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p8">
|
|
|
746 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it
|
|
|
747 is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.
|
|
|
748 </p>
|
|
|
749 <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p9">
|
|
|
750 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes
|
|
|
751 a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.
|
|
|
752 </p>
|
|
|
753 <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p10">
|
|
|
754 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme
|
|
|
755 good consists in power.
|
|
|
756 </p>
|
|
|
757 <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
758 <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p12"></p>
|
|
|
759 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
760 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
761 </div>
|
|
|
762 <div id="FS_Q2_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
763 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
764 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
765 <h4 id="FS_Q2_A5-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good?</h4>
|
|
|
766 <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
767 <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p2">
|
|
|
768 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written (
|
|
|
769 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.16" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:16</a>): "There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore
|
|
|
770 it consists in the health of the body.
|
|
|
771 </p>
|
|
|
772 <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p3">
|
|
|
773 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows.
|
|
|
774 But for man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it
|
|
|
775 seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness.
|
|
|
776 </p>
|
|
|
777 <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p4">
|
|
|
778 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the
|
|
|
779 greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so
|
|
|
780 the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into
|
|
|
781 all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that
|
|
|
782 which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the
|
|
|
783 health of the body.
|
|
|
784 </p>
|
|
|
785 <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p5">
|
|
|
786 <b>On the contrary,</b> Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance,
|
|
|
787 by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. Therefore man's happiness does not consist
|
|
|
788 in goods of the body.
|
|
|
789 </p>
|
|
|
790 <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p6">
|
|
|
791 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a
|
|
|
792 thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain
|
|
|
793 does not intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained to something else as
|
|
|
794 its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer
|
|
|
795 its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; according to
|
|
|
796 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 15:14</a>: "God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Now it is evident that man is ordained to
|
|
|
797 something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot be the preservation
|
|
|
798 of man's being.
|
|
|
799 </p>
|
|
|
800 <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p7"> Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be the preservation of man's being, it could not be said
|
|
|
801 that the end of man is some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and body; and though the being of the body
|
|
|
802 depends on the soul, yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (
|
|
|
803 <a id="FS_Q2_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts
|
|
|
804 them into motion, that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the
|
|
|
805 soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.
|
|
|
806 </p>
|
|
|
807 <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p8">
|
|
|
808 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it
|
|
|
809 is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by "riches," just as the good
|
|
|
810 of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods.
|
|
|
811 </p>
|
|
|
812 <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p9">
|
|
|
813 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes
|
|
|
814 all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which
|
|
|
815 does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident
|
|
|
816 that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent.
|
|
|
817 Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than
|
|
|
818 living things.
|
|
|
819 </p>
|
|
|
820 <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p10">
|
|
|
821 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom
|
|
|
822 every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living
|
|
|
823 being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few.
|
|
|
824 </p>
|
|
|
825 <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p11"></p>
|
|
|
826 <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p12"></p>
|
|
|
827 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
828 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
829 </div>
|
|
|
830 <div id="FS_Q2_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
831 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
832 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
833 <h4 id="FS_Q2_A6-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure?</h4>
|
|
|
834 <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
835 <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p2">
|
|
|
836 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something
|
|
|
837 else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what
|
|
|
838 is his motive in wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight.
|
|
|
839 </p>
|
|
|
840 <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p3">
|
|
|
841 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the
|
|
|
842 end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion
|
|
|
843 of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will and reason, that it causes
|
|
|
844 him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness,
|
|
|
845 consists principally in pleasure.
|
|
|
846 </p>
|
|
|
847 <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p4">
|
|
|
848 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish,
|
|
|
849 and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists
|
|
|
850 in pleasure.
|
|
|
851 </p>
|
|
|
852 <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p5">
|
|
|
853 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had
|
|
|
854 a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy
|
|
|
855 too."
|
|
|
856 </p>
|
|
|
857 <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p6">
|
|
|
858 <b>I answer that,</b> Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13),
|
|
|
859 although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains
|
|
|
860 to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and
|
|
|
861 another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper
|
|
|
862 accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has
|
|
|
863 some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good,
|
|
|
864 is precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least
|
|
|
865 apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness,
|
|
|
866 but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.
|
|
|
867 </p>
|
|
|
868 <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p7"> But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense,
|
|
|
869 which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense,
|
|
|
870 cannot be man's perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which
|
|
|
871 is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul
|
|
|
872 which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form
|
|
|
873 is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite.
|
|
|
874 Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect,
|
|
|
875 which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite
|
|
|
876 number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through
|
|
|
877 being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence
|
|
|
878 it is written (
|
|
|
879 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.9" target="asv">Wis. 7:9</a>) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor
|
|
|
880 a proper accident of happiness.
|
|
|
881 </p>
|
|
|
882 <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p8">
|
|
|
883 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus
|
|
|
884 it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as
|
|
|
885 good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition "for" denote the
|
|
|
886 final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight
|
|
|
887 is desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle,
|
|
|
888 and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.
|
|
|
889 </p>
|
|
|
890 <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p9">
|
|
|
891 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles
|
|
|
892 of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.
|
|
|
893 </p>
|
|
|
894 <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p10">
|
|
|
895 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely,
|
|
|
896 as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight
|
|
|
897 results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.
|
|
|
898 </p>
|
|
|
899 <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p11"></p>
|
|
|
900 <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p12"></p>
|
|
|
901 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
902 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
903 </div>
|
|
|
904 <div id="FS_Q2_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
905 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
906 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
907 <h4 id="FS_Q2_A7-p0.1">Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness?</h4>
|
|
|
908 <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
909 <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p2">
|
|
|
910 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold:
|
|
|
911 external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of
|
|
|
912 the body, as shown above (
|
|
|
913 <a id="FS_Q2_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A4.html">AA[4]</a>,5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.
|
|
|
914 </p>
|
|
|
915 <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p3">
|
|
|
916 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom
|
|
|
917 we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself
|
|
|
918 more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all
|
|
|
919 else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not,
|
|
|
920 however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.
|
|
|
921 </p>
|
|
|
922 <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p4">
|
|
|
923 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness
|
|
|
924 is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above
|
|
|
925 <a id="FS_Q2_A7-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.
|
|
|
926 </p>
|
|
|
927 <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p5">
|
|
|
928 <b>On the contrary,</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake."
|
|
|
929 But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists
|
|
|
930 in no good of the soul.
|
|
|
931 </p>
|
|
|
932 <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p6">
|
|
|
933 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
|
|
|
934 <a id="FS_Q2_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession
|
|
|
935 of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or something
|
|
|
936 belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing
|
|
|
937 actually, from being potentially
|
|
|
938 knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its
|
|
|
939 fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last
|
|
|
940 end.
|
|
|
941 </p>
|
|
|
942 <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p7"> In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is
|
|
|
943 the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent
|
|
|
944 to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end.
|
|
|
945 </p>
|
|
|
946 <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p8"> But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself
|
|
|
947 desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness
|
|
|
948 through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy;
|
|
|
949 but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something
|
|
|
950 belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.
|
|
|
951 </p>
|
|
|
952 <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p9">
|
|
|
953 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or
|
|
|
954 act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes
|
|
|
955 happiness is a good of the soul.
|
|
|
956 </p>
|
|
|
957 <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p10">
|
|
|
958 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved
|
|
|
959 as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both
|
|
|
960 cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when
|
|
|
961 we treat of Charity.
|
|
|
962 </p>
|
|
|
963 <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p11">
|
|
|
964 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness,
|
|
|
965 viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above.
|
|
|
966 </p>
|
|
|
967 <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p12"></p>
|
|
|
968 <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p13"></p>
|
|
|
969 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
970 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
971 </div>
|
|
|
972 <div id="FS_Q2_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
973 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
974 <a href="summa.FS_Q3.html"></a>
|
|
|
975 <h4 id="FS_Q2_A8-p0.1">Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?</h4>
|
|
|
976 <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
977 <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p2">
|
|
|
978 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom "unites
|
|
|
979 the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things," from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches
|
|
|
980 the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature,
|
|
|
981 as stated in
|
|
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982 <a id="FS_Q2_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>, it seems that man's
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983 happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.
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|
984 </p>
|
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|
985 <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p3">
|
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|
986 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for
|
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|
987 its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys.
|
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|
988 viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.
|
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|
989 </p>
|
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990 <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p4">
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|
991 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good
|
|
|
992 surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation,
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|
993 it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man's happiness.
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|
994 </p>
|
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995 <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p5">
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|
996 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it
|
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|
997 is written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (
|
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|
998 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.143.15" target="asv">Ps. 143:15</a>)."
|
|
|
999 </p>
|
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|
1000 <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p6">
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|
1001 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite
|
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|
1002 altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of
|
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|
1003 man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that
|
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|
1004 naught can lull man's will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any
|
|
|
1005 creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will
|
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|
1006 of man, according to the words of
|
|
|
1007 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.5" target="asv"> Ps. 102:5</a>: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness.
|
|
|
1008 </p>
|
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|
1009 <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p7">
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|
1010 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as
|
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|
1011 in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the
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1012 blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good.
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|
1013 </p>
|
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|
1014 <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p8">
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|
1015 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself,
|
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|
1016 but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is
|
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|
1017 ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself.
|
|
|
1018 </p>
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|
1019 <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p9">
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|
1020 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is
|
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|
1021 less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an
|
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1022 angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.
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|
1023 </p>
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1024 <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p10"></p>
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1025 <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p11"></p>
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1026 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"></a>
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1027 <a href="summa.FS_Q3.html"></a>
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1028 </div>
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1029 <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html"></a>
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1030 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A1.html"></a>
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1031 </div>
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1032 <div id="FS_Q3" class="div3">
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1033 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A8.html"></a>
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1034 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html"></a>
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1035 <h3 id="FS_Q3-p0.1">WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
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1036 <p id="FS_Q3-p1"></p>
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1037 <p id="FS_Q3-p2"> We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it.</p>
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1038 <p id="FS_Q3-p3"> Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
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1039 <p id="FS_Q3-p4"> (1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?</p>
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1040 <p id="FS_Q3-p5"> (2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?</p>
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1041 <p id="FS_Q3-p6"> (3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part?</p>
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1042 <p id="FS_Q3-p7"> (4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will?</p>
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1043 <p id="FS_Q3-p8"> (5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect?</p>
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1044 <p id="FS_Q3-p9"> (6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?</p>
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1045 <p id="FS_Q3-p10"> (7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels?</p>
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1046 <p id="FS_Q3-p11"> (8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence?</p>
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1047 <div id="FS_Q3_A1" class="div4">
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1048 <a href="summa.FS_Q3.html"></a>
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1049 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html"></a>
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1050 <h4 id="FS_Q3_A1-p0.1">Whether happiness is something uncreated?</h4>
|
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1051 <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p1"></p>
|
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1052 <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p2">
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|
1053 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God
|
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|
1054 is happiness itself."
|
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|
1055 </p>
|
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1056 <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p3">
|
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|
1057 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several
|
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|
1058 supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God.
|
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|
1059 </p>
|
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1060 <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p4">
|
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|
1061 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an
|
|
|
1062 end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same
|
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|
1063 as God.
|
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|
1064 </p>
|
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1065 <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p5">
|
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|
1066 <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3):
|
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|
1067 "Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore happiness is not something uncreated.
|
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|
1068 </p>
|
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1069 <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p6">
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|
1070 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
|
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|
1071 <a id="FS_Q3_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
|
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|
1072 <a id="FS_Q3_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly
|
|
|
1073 there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser
|
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|
1074 is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense,
|
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|
1075 then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will.
|
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|
1076 But in the second way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment
|
|
|
1077 or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause
|
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|
1078 or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something
|
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|
1079 created.
|
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|
1080 </p>
|
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|
1081 <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p7">
|
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|
1082 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence.
|
|
|
1083 On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called "gods," by
|
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|
1084 participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created.
|
|
|
1085 </p>
|
|
|
1086 <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p8">
|
|
|
1087 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.
|
|
|
1088 </p>
|
|
|
1089 <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1090 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end.
|
|
|
1091 </p>
|
|
|
1092 <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p10"></p>
|
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|
1093 <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1094 <a href="summa.FS_Q3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1095 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1096 </div>
|
|
|
1097 <div id="FS_Q3_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1098 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1099 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1100 <h4 id="FS_Q3_A2-p0.1">Whether happiness is an operation?</h4>
|
|
|
1101 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1102 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1103 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle says (
|
|
|
1104 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.22" target="asv">Rom. 6:22</a>): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very being
|
|
|
1105 of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an operation.
|
|
|
1106 </p>
|
|
|
1107 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1108 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But
|
|
|
1109 state does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
|
|
|
1110 </p>
|
|
|
1111 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1112 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of
|
|
|
1113 operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness
|
|
|
1114 is not an operation.
|
|
|
1115 </p>
|
|
|
1116 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1117 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
|
|
|
1118 </p>
|
|
|
1119 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1120 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
|
|
|
1121 </p>
|
|
|
1122 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p7">
|
|
|
1123 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep,
|
|
|
1124 or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
|
|
|
1125 </p>
|
|
|
1126 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1127 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue."
|
|
|
1128 </p>
|
|
|
1129 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1130 <b>I answer that,</b> In so far as man's happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness
|
|
|
1131 is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect.
|
|
|
1132 Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore
|
|
|
1133 the Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has
|
|
|
1134 a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things,
|
|
|
1135 too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an
|
|
|
1136 operation.
|
|
|
1137 </p>
|
|
|
1138 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p10">
|
|
|
1139 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown
|
|
|
1140 (
|
|
|
1141 <a id="FS_Q3_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html">Q[2] , A[5]</a>) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true that
|
|
|
1142 His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which operation the principle of life is
|
|
|
1143 made actual: thus we speak of active and
|
|
|
1144 contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from
|
|
|
1145 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God."
|
|
|
1146 </p>
|
|
|
1147 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p11">
|
|
|
1148 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and
|
|
|
1149 he signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that
|
|
|
1150 the state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, showing
|
|
|
1151 by what man is established in this state, and that it is by some kind of
|
|
|
1152 operation. And so it is that he proves happiness to be "the perfect good" (Ethic. i, 7).
|
|
|
1153 </p>
|
|
|
1154 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p12">
|
|
|
1155 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold. One proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and "to
|
|
|
1156 cut." And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but
|
|
|
1157 rather of the patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an action that remains in the agent, such as to feel,
|
|
|
1158 to understand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the
|
|
|
1159 agent. And such an operation can be happiness.
|
|
|
1160 </p>
|
|
|
1161 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p13">
|
|
|
1162 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees
|
|
|
1163 of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His
|
|
|
1164 very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect
|
|
|
1165 of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this
|
|
|
1166 operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection
|
|
|
1167 is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently,
|
|
|
1168 is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect
|
|
|
1169 happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10),
|
|
|
1170 says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men." But God has promised
|
|
|
1171 us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" (
|
|
|
1172 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>).
|
|
|
1173 </p>
|
|
|
1174 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p14"> Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man's mind will
|
|
|
1175 be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity
|
|
|
1176 and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness:
|
|
|
1177 and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life,
|
|
|
1178 which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the
|
|
|
1179 contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn
|
|
|
1180 to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the
|
|
|
1181 latter seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are evident.
|
|
|
1182 </p>
|
|
|
1183 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p15"></p>
|
|
|
1184 <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p16"></p>
|
|
|
1185 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1186 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1187 </div>
|
|
|
1188 <div id="FS_Q3_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
1189 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1190 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1191 <h4 id="FS_Q3_A3-p0.1">Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the intellective part only?</h4>
|
|
|
1192 <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1193 <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1194 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man
|
|
|
1195 than that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective operation depends on the sensitive:
|
|
|
1196 since "we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the senses
|
|
|
1197 also.
|
|
|
1198 </p>
|
|
|
1199 <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1200 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But
|
|
|
1201 some goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses
|
|
|
1202 is needed for happiness.
|
|
|
1203 </p>
|
|
|
1204 <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1205 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected
|
|
|
1206 thereby in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation
|
|
|
1207 is required for happiness.
|
|
|
1208 </p>
|
|
|
1209 <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1210 <b>On the contrary,</b> Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore
|
|
|
1211 happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.
|
|
|
1212 </p>
|
|
|
1213 <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1214 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of
|
|
|
1215 sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated
|
|
|
1216 Good, Which is his last end, as shown above
|
|
|
1217 <a id="FS_Q3_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html">(A[1])</a>: to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (Q[2], A[5]),
|
|
|
1218 man's happiness
|
|
|
1219 does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses.
|
|
|
1220 </p>
|
|
|
1221 <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p7"> Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect
|
|
|
1222 of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation
|
|
|
1223 of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, "from the very
|
|
|
1224 happiness of the soul," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a
|
|
|
1225 certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of
|
|
|
1226 the resurrection (SS, QQ[82] -85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.
|
|
|
1227 </p>
|
|
|
1228 <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p8">
|
|
|
1229 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proves that the operation of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had
|
|
|
1230 in this life.
|
|
|
1231 </p>
|
|
|
1232 <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p9">
|
|
|
1233 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source
|
|
|
1234 of all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods
|
|
|
1235 that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life.
|
|
|
1236 </p>
|
|
|
1237 <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p10">
|
|
|
1238 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in
|
|
|
1239 the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection
|
|
|
1240 of the higher part.
|
|
|
1241 </p>
|
|
|
1242 <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1243 <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1244 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1245 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1246 </div>
|
|
|
1247 <div id="FS_Q3_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
1248 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1249 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1250 <h4 id="FS_Q3_A4-p0.1">Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect or of the will?</h4>
|
|
|
1251 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1252 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p2">
|
|
|
1253 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness
|
|
|
1254 consists in peace; wherefore it is written (
|
|
|
1255 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.147.3" target="asv">Ps. 147:3</a>): "Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man's happiness is in
|
|
|
1256 the will.
|
|
|
1257 </p>
|
|
|
1258 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p3">
|
|
|
1259 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation
|
|
|
1260 of the will.
|
|
|
1261 </p>
|
|
|
1262 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1263 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of
|
|
|
1264 the general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: because it moves the other powers,
|
|
|
1265 as we shall state further on (
|
|
|
1266 <a id="FS_Q3_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore happiness regards the will.
|
|
|
1267 </p>
|
|
|
1268 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1269 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an
|
|
|
1270 act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares
|
|
|
1271 (
|
|
|
1272 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13</a>). Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.
|
|
|
1273 </p>
|
|
|
1274 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p6">
|
|
|
1275 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And
|
|
|
1276 a little further on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy,
|
|
|
1277 and such a man already possesses some good---i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists in an act of the will.
|
|
|
1278 </p>
|
|
|
1279 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p7">
|
|
|
1280 <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
|
|
|
1281 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (A[2],
|
|
|
1282 ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.
|
|
|
1283 </p>
|
|
|
1284 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p8">
|
|
|
1285 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[2], A[6]) two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that
|
|
|
1286 is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness,
|
|
|
1287 it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said (
|
|
|
1288 <a id="FS_Q3_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2; Q[2], A[7]) that happiness is the attainment of the last end. But the
|
|
|
1289 attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when
|
|
|
1290 it desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is
|
|
|
1291 not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present;
|
|
|
1292 and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present
|
|
|
1293 to
|
|
|
1294 him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.
|
|
|
1295 </p>
|
|
|
1296 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p9"> This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the
|
|
|
1297 covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far from him; and he attains
|
|
|
1298 it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it is with an intelligible
|
|
|
1299 end. For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to
|
|
|
1300 us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.
|
|
|
1301 </p>
|
|
|
1302 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p10"> So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness
|
|
|
1303 pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy
|
|
|
1304 itself is the consummation of happiness.
|
|
|
1305 </p>
|
|
|
1306 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p11">
|
|
|
1307 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent
|
|
|
1308 thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent
|
|
|
1309 inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being at rest.
|
|
|
1310 </p>
|
|
|
1311 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p12">
|
|
|
1312 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will's first object is not its act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore,
|
|
|
1313 from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it
|
|
|
1314 as its act.
|
|
|
1315 </p>
|
|
|
1316 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p13">
|
|
|
1317 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the
|
|
|
1318 will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. delight or enjoyment.
|
|
|
1319 </p>
|
|
|
1320 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p14">
|
|
|
1321 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known,"
|
|
|
1322 as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we
|
|
|
1323 first attain a sensible end by an act of sense.
|
|
|
1324 </p>
|
|
|
1325 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p15">
|
|
|
1326 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the
|
|
|
1327 act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will
|
|
|
1328 is reckoned among the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement
|
|
|
1329 is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus
|
|
|
1330 "quality."
|
|
|
1331 </p>
|
|
|
1332 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p16"></p>
|
|
|
1333 <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p17"></p>
|
|
|
1334 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1335 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1336 </div>
|
|
|
1337 <div id="FS_Q3_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
1338 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1339 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1340 <h4 id="FS_Q3_A5-p0.1">Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical intellect?</h4>
|
|
|
1341 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1342 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p2">
|
|
|
1343 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming
|
|
|
1344 like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative
|
|
|
1345 intellect, which derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect
|
|
|
1346 rather than of the speculative.
|
|
|
1347 </p>
|
|
|
1348 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p3">
|
|
|
1349 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative
|
|
|
1350 intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect,
|
|
|
1351 but not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding.
|
|
|
1352 Therefore man's happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather
|
|
|
1353 than of the speculative.
|
|
|
1354 </p>
|
|
|
1355 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p4">
|
|
|
1356 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas
|
|
|
1357 the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's
|
|
|
1358 happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
|
|
|
1359 </p>
|
|
|
1360 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p5">
|
|
|
1361 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting
|
|
|
1362 perfection of our joys."
|
|
|
1363 </p>
|
|
|
1364 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p6">
|
|
|
1365 <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three reasons.
|
|
|
1366 First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is
|
|
|
1367 that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is
|
|
|
1368 the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative
|
|
|
1369 intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And
|
|
|
1370 since that "seems to be each man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation
|
|
|
1371 is most proper to man and most delightful to him.
|
|
|
1372 </p>
|
|
|
1373 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p7"> Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical
|
|
|
1374 intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently
|
|
|
1375 it is evident that the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect.
|
|
|
1376 </p>
|
|
|
1377 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p8"> Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above
|
|
|
1378 him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other
|
|
|
1379 animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly.
|
|
|
1380 </p>
|
|
|
1381 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p9"> Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect
|
|
|
1382 happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human
|
|
|
1383 actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.
|
|
|
1384 </p>
|
|
|
1385 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p10">
|
|
|
1386 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in
|
|
|
1387 relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union
|
|
|
1388 and "information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to the principal thing known,
|
|
|
1389 which is His Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative
|
|
|
1390 knowledge.
|
|
|
1391 </p>
|
|
|
1392 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p11">
|
|
|
1393 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz.
|
|
|
1394 the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the
|
|
|
1395 practical intellect has not; but it directs man thereto.
|
|
|
1396 </p>
|
|
|
1397 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p12">
|
|
|
1398 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and
|
|
|
1399 passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by
|
|
|
1400 an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect
|
|
|
1401 rather than of the practical intellect.
|
|
|
1402 </p>
|
|
|
1403 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p13"></p>
|
|
|
1404 <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p14"></p>
|
|
|
1405 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1406 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1407 </div>
|
|
|
1408 <div id="FS_Q3_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
1409 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1410 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
1411 <h4 id="FS_Q3_A6-p0.1">Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?</h4>
|
|
|
1412 <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1413 <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p2">
|
|
|
1414 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
|
|
|
1415 i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than
|
|
|
1416 three speculative virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which all belong to the consideration of speculative
|
|
|
1417 sciences. Therefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative
|
|
|
1418 sciences.
|
|
|
1419 </p>
|
|
|
1420 <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p3">
|
|
|
1421 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative
|
|
|
1422 sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated
|
|
|
1423 that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative
|
|
|
1424 sciences.
|
|
|
1425 </p>
|
|
|
1426 <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p4">
|
|
|
1427 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to
|
|
|
1428 act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the
|
|
|
1429 consideration of these sciences, man's final happiness consists.
|
|
|
1430 </p>
|
|
|
1431 <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p5">
|
|
|
1432 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
1433 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.23" target="asv">Jer. 9:23</a>): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man's final
|
|
|
1434 happiness does not consist in the consideration of these.
|
|
|
1435 </p>
|
|
|
1436 <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p6">
|
|
|
1437 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man's happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are
|
|
|
1438 to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto,
|
|
|
1439 but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to
|
|
|
1440 be done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed
|
|
|
1441 of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence.
|
|
|
1442 </p>
|
|
|
1443 <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p7"> Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we
|
|
|
1444 must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science:
|
|
|
1445 since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received
|
|
|
1446 through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at
|
|
|
1447 the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther
|
|
|
1448 than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge
|
|
|
1449 of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher.
|
|
|
1450 Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not
|
|
|
1451 perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human
|
|
|
1452 intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which
|
|
|
1453 is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But
|
|
|
1454 it has been shown (
|
|
|
1455 <a id="FS_Q3_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q88_A2.html">FP, Q[88], A[2]</a>), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of
|
|
|
1456 separate substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the
|
|
|
1457 consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances,
|
|
|
1458 so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness.
|
|
|
1459 </p>
|
|
|
1460 <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p8">
|
|
|
1461 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (A[2],
|
|
|
1462 ad 4).
|
|
|
1463 </p>
|
|
|
1464 <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p9">
|
|
|
1465 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof.
|
|
|
1466 </p>
|
|
|
1467 <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p10">
|
|
|
1468 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect
|
|
|
1469 act.
|
|
|
1470 </p>
|
|
|
1471 <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1472 <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1473 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1474 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
1475 </div>
|
|
|
1476 <div id="FS_Q3_A7" class="div4">
|
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|
1477 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A6.html"></a>
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1478 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html"></a>
|
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1479 <h4 id="FS_Q3_A7-p0.1">Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels?</h4>
|
|
|
1480 <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1481 <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p2">
|
|
|
1482 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in
|
|
|
1483 a homily (xxvi in Evang.): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of
|
|
|
1484 angels"; by which he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore
|
|
|
1485 it seems that man's final happiness consists in contemplating the angels.
|
|
|
1486 </p>
|
|
|
1487 <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p3">
|
|
|
1488 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect
|
|
|
1489 figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened,
|
|
|
1490 as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human intellect consists in contemplating the angels.
|
|
|
1491 </p>
|
|
|
1492 <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p4">
|
|
|
1493 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to
|
|
|
1494 the spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the angels. Therefore the final perfection
|
|
|
1495 of the human intellect is to be united to the angels by contemplation.
|
|
|
1496 </p>
|
|
|
1497 <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p5">
|
|
|
1498 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
1499 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.24" target="asv">Jer. 9:24</a>): "Let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Therefore man's final glory or happiness
|
|
|
1500 consists only in the knowledge of God.
|
|
|
1501 </p>
|
|
|
1502 <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p6">
|
|
|
1503 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
|
|
|
1504 <a id="FS_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, man's perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so
|
|
|
1505 by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of
|
|
|
1506 that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has
|
|
|
1507 participated truth, does not perfect the
|
|
|
1508 intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1);
|
|
|
1509 whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by participation: because in God alone
|
|
|
1510 is His Being His Essence, as shown in the
|
|
|
1511 <a id="FS_Q3_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">FP, Q[44], A[1]</a>. It follows that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain
|
|
|
1512 imperfect happiness in the
|
|
|
1513 contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science.
|
|
|
1514 </p>
|
|
|
1515 <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p7">
|
|
|
1516 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God Himself.
|
|
|
1517 </p>
|
|
|
1518 <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p8">
|
|
|
1519 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to those that hold human souls to be created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should
|
|
|
1520 consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as
|
|
|
1521 stated in
|
|
|
1522 <a id="FS_Q3_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q90_A3.html">FP, Q[90], A[3]</a>. Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the creation
|
|
|
1523 of the soul and of its
|
|
|
1524 enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the
|
|
|
1525 <a id="FS_Q3_A7-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html">FP, Q[111], A[2]</a>, ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.
|
|
|
1526 </p>
|
|
|
1527 <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p9">
|
|
|
1528 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man's
|
|
|
1529 final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained
|
|
|
1530 by the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal object.
|
|
|
1531 </p>
|
|
|
1532 <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1533 <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1534 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1535 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
1536 </div>
|
|
|
1537 <div id="FS_Q3_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
1538 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
1539 <a href="summa.FS_Q4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1540 <h4 id="FS_Q3_A8-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?</h4>
|
|
|
1541 <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1542 <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p2">
|
|
|
1543 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol.
|
|
|
1544 i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which
|
|
|
1545 is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, namely, happiness, does
|
|
|
1546 not consist in God being seen in His Essence.
|
|
|
1547 </p>
|
|
|
1548 <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p3">
|
|
|
1549 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the
|
|
|
1550 Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something
|
|
|
1551 less.
|
|
|
1552 </p>
|
|
|
1553 <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p4">
|
|
|
1554 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
1555 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>): "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is."
|
|
|
1556 </p>
|
|
|
1557 <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p5">
|
|
|
1558 <b>I answer that,</b> Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points
|
|
|
1559 must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly,
|
|
|
1560 that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing
|
|
|
1561 is," i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the
|
|
|
1562 intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of
|
|
|
1563 some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect
|
|
|
1564 cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause
|
|
|
1565 is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire
|
|
|
1566 to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning
|
|
|
1567 of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause,
|
|
|
1568 and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease
|
|
|
1569 until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.
|
|
|
1570 </p>
|
|
|
1571 <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p6"> If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the
|
|
|
1572 perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek
|
|
|
1573 the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very
|
|
|
1574 Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in
|
|
|
1575 which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above (
|
|
|
1576 <a id="FS_Q3_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,7; Q[2], A[8]).
|
|
|
1577 </p>
|
|
|
1578 <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p7">
|
|
|
1579 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness.
|
|
|
1580 </p>
|
|
|
1581 <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p8">
|
|
|
1582 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
|
|
|
1583 <a id="FS_Q3_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>), the end has a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing is the
|
|
|
1584 end of the higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above (
|
|
|
1585 <a id="FS_Q3_A8-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower,
|
|
|
1586 according to their respective
|
|
|
1587 habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than
|
|
|
1588 that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.
|
|
|
1589 </p>
|
|
|
1590 <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p9"></p>
|
|
|
1591 <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1592 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
1593 <a href="summa.FS_Q4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1594 </div>
|
|
|
1595 <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
1596 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1597 </div>
|
|
|
1598 <div id="FS_Q4" class="div3">
|
|
|
1599 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
1600 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1601 <h3 id="FS_Q4-p0.1">OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1602 <p id="FS_Q4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1603 <p id="FS_Q4-p2"> We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
1604 <p id="FS_Q4-p3"> (1) Whether delight is required for happiness?</p>
|
|
|
1605 <p id="FS_Q4-p4"> (2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?</p>
|
|
|
1606 <p id="FS_Q4-p5"> (3) Whether comprehension is required?</p>
|
|
|
1607 <p id="FS_Q4-p6"> (4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?</p>
|
|
|
1608 <p id="FS_Q4-p7"> (5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?</p>
|
|
|
1609 <p id="FS_Q4-p8"> (6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?</p>
|
|
|
1610 <p id="FS_Q4-p9"> (7) Whether any external goods are necessary?</p>
|
|
|
1611 <p id="FS_Q4-p10"> (8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?</p>
|
|
|
1612 <div id="FS_Q4_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
1613 <a href="summa.FS_Q4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1614 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1615 <h4 id="FS_Q4_A1-p0.1">Whether delight is required for happiness?</h4>
|
|
|
1616 <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1617 <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1618 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward
|
|
|
1619 of faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing
|
|
|
1620 besides vision is required for happiness.
|
|
|
1621 </p>
|
|
|
1622 <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1623 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which
|
|
|
1624 needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above (
|
|
|
1625 <a id="FS_Q4_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness.
|
|
|
1626 </p>
|
|
|
1627 <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1628 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of
|
|
|
1629 the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.
|
|
|
1630 </p>
|
|
|
1631 <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1632 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth."
|
|
|
1633 </p>
|
|
|
1634 <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1635 <b>I answer that,</b> One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary
|
|
|
1636 for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from
|
|
|
1637 without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat
|
|
|
1638 is necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is
|
|
|
1639 caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of
|
|
|
1640 the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.
|
|
|
1641 </p>
|
|
|
1642 <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p7">
|
|
|
1643 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight.
|
|
|
1644 Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward.
|
|
|
1645 </p>
|
|
|
1646 <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p8">
|
|
|
1647 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.
|
|
|
1648 </p>
|
|
|
1649 <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1650 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in
|
|
|
1651 Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is
|
|
|
1652 extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention because, as already observed, we
|
|
|
1653 are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to
|
|
|
1654 one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is
|
|
|
1655 contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect.
|
|
|
1656 </p>
|
|
|
1657 <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1658 <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1659 <a href="summa.FS_Q4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1660 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1661 </div>
|
|
|
1662 <div id="FS_Q4_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1663 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1664 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1665 <h4 id="FS_Q4_A2-p0.1">Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?</h4>
|
|
|
1666 <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1667 <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1668 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4).
|
|
|
1669 But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision.
|
|
|
1670 </p>
|
|
|
1671 <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1672 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the
|
|
|
1673 delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation
|
|
|
1674 of the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks
|
|
|
1675 before the operation of the intellect, which is vision.
|
|
|
1676 </p>
|
|
|
1677 <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1678 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith,
|
|
|
1679 as the Apostle says (
|
|
|
1680 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision.
|
|
|
1681 </p>
|
|
|
1682 <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1683 <b>On the contrary,</b> The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.
|
|
|
1684 </p>
|
|
|
1685 <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1686 <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully,
|
|
|
1687 the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of
|
|
|
1688 the will. Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes.
|
|
|
1689 If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness
|
|
|
1690 of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end,
|
|
|
1691 which has been disproved above (
|
|
|
1692 <a id="FS_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 2;
|
|
|
1693 <a id="FS_Q4_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html"> Q[3], A[4]</a>): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation
|
|
|
1694 in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.
|
|
|
1695 </p>
|
|
|
1696 <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p7">
|
|
|
1697 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth.
|
|
|
1698 Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own
|
|
|
1699 species.
|
|
|
1700 </p>
|
|
|
1701 <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1702 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And
|
|
|
1703 consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But
|
|
|
1704 the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed
|
|
|
1705 to good rather than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the
|
|
|
1706 Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations. And we should form our estimate of things
|
|
|
1707 not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite.
|
|
|
1708 </p>
|
|
|
1709 <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1710 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity does not seem the beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good
|
|
|
1711 gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made
|
|
|
1712 present to charity.
|
|
|
1713 </p>
|
|
|
1714 <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1715 <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1716 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1717 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1718 </div>
|
|
|
1719 <div id="FS_Q4_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
1720 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1721 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1722 <h4 id="FS_Q4_A3-p0.1">Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?</h4>
|
|
|
1723 <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1724 <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1725 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm.
|
|
|
1726 xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible." Therefore happiness is
|
|
|
1727 without comprehension.
|
|
|
1728 </p>
|
|
|
1729 <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1730 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect
|
|
|
1731 and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will
|
|
|
1732 by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
|
|
|
1733 </p>
|
|
|
1734 <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1735 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal
|
|
|
1736 objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for
|
|
|
1737 comprehension as a third.
|
|
|
1738 </p>
|
|
|
1739 <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1740 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
|
|
|
1741 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:24</a>): "So run that you may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says (
|
|
|
1742 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iiTim.4.7" target="asv">2 Tim. 4:7,8</a>): "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid up for me a
|
|
|
1743 crown of justice." Therefore comprehension is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
1744 </p>
|
|
|
1745 <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1746 <b>I answer that,</b> Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the
|
|
|
1747 way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly
|
|
|
1748 through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect:
|
|
|
1749 through the will, first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything; secondly,
|
|
|
1750 by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is
|
|
|
1751 present to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to attain it:
|
|
|
1752 and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the
|
|
|
1753 attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and
|
|
|
1754 this
|
|
|
1755 relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect
|
|
|
1756 knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight
|
|
|
1757 in the end now present results from love, as already stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with Happiness;
|
|
|
1758 to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end;
|
|
|
1759 and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.
|
|
|
1760 </p>
|
|
|
1761 <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p7">
|
|
|
1762 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by
|
|
|
1763 the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means
|
|
|
1764 nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend
|
|
|
1765 [*In English we should say 'catch.'] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense
|
|
|
1766 comprehension is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
1767 </p>
|
|
|
1768 <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p8">
|
|
|
1769 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while
|
|
|
1770 not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes
|
|
|
1771 therein.
|
|
|
1772 </p>
|
|
|
1773 <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p9">
|
|
|
1774 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision
|
|
|
1775 itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of comprehension.
|
|
|
1776 </p>
|
|
|
1777 <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p10"></p>
|
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|
1778 <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1779 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1780 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1781 </div>
|
|
|
1782 <div id="FS_Q4_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
1783 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1784 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1785 <h4 id="FS_Q4_A4-p0.1">Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?</h4>
|
|
|
1786 <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1787 <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p2">
|
|
|
1788 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation
|
|
|
1789 of the intellect, as stated above (
|
|
|
1790 <a id="FS_Q4_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the perfect operation
|
|
|
1791 of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O God, Who didst will none
|
|
|
1792 but the clean of
|
|
|
1793 heart to know the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths." Therefore rectitude
|
|
|
1794 of the will is not necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
1795 </p>
|
|
|
1796 <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p3">
|
|
|
1797 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the
|
|
|
1798 will. Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on rectitude of the will.
|
|
|
1799 </p>
|
|
|
1800 <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1801 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance,
|
|
|
1802 after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore,
|
|
|
1803 Happiness once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.
|
|
|
1804 </p>
|
|
|
1805 <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1806 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
1807 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.8" target="asv">Mat. 5:8</a>): "Blessed are the clean of heart; for they shall see God": and (
|
|
|
1808 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.14" target="asv">Heb. 12:14</a>): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God."
|
|
|
1809 </p>
|
|
|
1810 <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p6">
|
|
|
1811 <b>I answer that,</b> Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the
|
|
|
1812 will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared
|
|
|
1813 to matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except
|
|
|
1814 it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without
|
|
|
1815 rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above (
|
|
|
1816 <a id="FS_Q4_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of
|
|
|
1817 him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him
|
|
|
1818 who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this
|
|
|
1819 is precisely what makes the will
|
|
|
1820 right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will.
|
|
|
1821 </p>
|
|
|
1822 <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p7">
|
|
|
1823 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the
|
|
|
1824 intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of
|
|
|
1825 the will is required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike the target.
|
|
|
1826 </p>
|
|
|
1827 <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p8">
|
|
|
1828 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection,
|
|
|
1829 such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order
|
|
|
1830 to the end is necessary.
|
|
|
1831 </p>
|
|
|
1832 <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p9"></p>
|
|
|
1833 <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1834 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1835 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1836 </div>
|
|
|
1837 <div id="FS_Q4_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
1838 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1839 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1840 <h4 id="FS_Q4_A5-p0.1">Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?</h4>
|
|
|
1841 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1842 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p2">
|
|
|
1843 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection
|
|
|
1844 of nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the body, has not the perfection of
|
|
|
1845 nature; since it is naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its whole. Therefore
|
|
|
1846 the soul cannot be happy without the body.
|
|
|
1847 </p>
|
|
|
1848 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p3">
|
|
|
1849 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above (
|
|
|
1850 <a id="FS_Q4_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], AA[2]</a>,5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since,
|
|
|
1851 therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate
|
|
|
1852 from its whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body.
|
|
|
1853 </p>
|
|
|
1854 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p4">
|
|
|
1855 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul, without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in
|
|
|
1856 the soul separated from the body.
|
|
|
1857 </p>
|
|
|
1858 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p5">
|
|
|
1859 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is
|
|
|
1860 "not hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the
|
|
|
1861 soul "has a natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to speak, from tending with all
|
|
|
1862 its might to the heavenward journey," i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the
|
|
|
1863 soul cannot be happy without the body.
|
|
|
1864 </p>
|
|
|
1865 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p6">
|
|
|
1866 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires
|
|
|
1867 to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the
|
|
|
1868 body.
|
|
|
1869 </p>
|
|
|
1870 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p7">
|
|
|
1871 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine
|
|
|
1872 says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.
|
|
|
1873 </p>
|
|
|
1874 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p8">
|
|
|
1875 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
1876 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.14.13" target="asv">Apoc. 14:13</a>): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed'] are the dead who die in the Lord."
|
|
|
1877 </p>
|
|
|
1878 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p9">
|
|
|
1879 <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God.
|
|
|
1880 Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life consists in an
|
|
|
1881 operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without
|
|
|
1882 a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the
|
|
|
1883 <a id="FS_Q4_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">FP,
|
|
|
1884 Q[84], AA[6]
|
|
|
1885 </a>,7. Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness,
|
|
|
1886 which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and
|
|
|
1887 have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment,
|
|
|
1888 when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by
|
|
|
1889 reason. By authority, since the Apostle says (
|
|
|
1890 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6</a>): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: "For we
|
|
|
1891 walk by faith and not by sight." Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the
|
|
|
1892 vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are
|
|
|
1893 in God's presence; wherefore the text continues:
|
|
|
1894 "But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Whence it is
|
|
|
1895 evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of God, wherein is
|
|
|
1896 true Happiness.
|
|
|
1897 </p>
|
|
|
1898 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p10"> Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms,
|
|
|
1899 wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the
|
|
|
1900 <a id="FS_Q4_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the
|
|
|
1901 <a id="FS_Q4_A5-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html">FP, Q[12], A[3]</a>. Wherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the
|
|
|
1902 body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.
|
|
|
1903 </p>
|
|
|
1904 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p11"> We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence
|
|
|
1905 thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its well-being: thus, beauty of body
|
|
|
1906 and keenness of perfection belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection
|
|
|
1907 of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the
|
|
|
1908 more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence,
|
|
|
1909 Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead
|
|
|
1910 separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either
|
|
|
1911 for some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to rule the body."
|
|
|
1912 </p>
|
|
|
1913 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p12">
|
|
|
1914 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs
|
|
|
1915 of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection
|
|
|
1916 in respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the
|
|
|
1917 form of the body.
|
|
|
1918 </p>
|
|
|
1919 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p13">
|
|
|
1920 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual
|
|
|
1921 part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when
|
|
|
1922 the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from
|
|
|
1923 that of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the
|
|
|
1924 composite after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and
|
|
|
1925 this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the
|
|
|
1926 <a id="FS_Q4_A5-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a
|
|
|
1927 perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.
|
|
|
1928 </p>
|
|
|
1929 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p14">
|
|
|
1930 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness.
|
|
|
1931 Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.
|
|
|
1932 </p>
|
|
|
1933 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p15">
|
|
|
1934 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such
|
|
|
1935 a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is
|
|
|
1936 hindered has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompatible
|
|
|
1937 with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is
|
|
|
1938 that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence.
|
|
|
1939 For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And
|
|
|
1940 therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in
|
|
|
1941 such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share.
|
|
|
1942 </p>
|
|
|
1943 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p16">
|
|
|
1944 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices
|
|
|
1945 its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that
|
|
|
1946 it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.
|
|
|
1947 </p>
|
|
|
1948 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p17">
|
|
|
1949 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," is
|
|
|
1950 not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the
|
|
|
1951 higher orders of the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to inequality of proportion:
|
|
|
1952 because the angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever
|
|
|
1953 will have, whereas the separated souls of the saints have not.
|
|
|
1954 </p>
|
|
|
1955 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p18"></p>
|
|
|
1956 <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p19"></p>
|
|
|
1957 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A4.html"></a>
|
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1958 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1959 </div>
|
|
|
1960 <div id="FS_Q4_A6" class="div4">
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1961 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A5.html"></a>
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1962 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A7.html"></a>
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1963 <h4 id="FS_Q4_A6-p0.1">Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?</h4>
|
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1964 <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p1"></p>
|
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1965 <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p2">
|
|
|
1966 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily
|
|
|
1967 good. But it has been shown above (
|
|
|
1968 <a id="FS_Q4_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2.html">Q[2])</a> that Happiness does not consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for man's Happiness.
|
|
|
1969 </p>
|
|
|
1970 <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p3">
|
|
|
1971 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (Q[3], A[8]). But the body has not
|
|
|
1972 part in this operation, as shown above
|
|
|
1973 <a id="FS_Q4_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q4_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
1974 </p>
|
|
|
1975 <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p4">
|
|
|
1976 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in
|
|
|
1977 the most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore,
|
|
|
1978 in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
1979 </p>
|
|
|
1980 <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p5">
|
|
|
1981 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is written (
|
|
|
1982 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.17" target="asv">Jn. 13:17</a>): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy
|
|
|
1983 God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written (
|
|
|
1984 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.66.14" target="asv">Is. 66:14</a>): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good disposition of
|
|
|
1985 the body is
|
|
|
1986 necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
1987 </p>
|
|
|
1988 <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p6">
|
|
|
1989 <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity
|
|
|
1990 required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect
|
|
|
1991 virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue.
|
|
|
1992 </p>
|
|
|
1993 <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p7"> But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that
|
|
|
1994 it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words
|
|
|
1995 of Porphyry who said that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything corporeal." But this is unreasonable.
|
|
|
1996 For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the
|
|
|
1997 soul to exclude its natural perfection.
|
|
|
1998 </p>
|
|
|
1999 <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p8"> Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that
|
|
|
2000 Happiness which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such,
|
|
|
2001 that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the
|
|
|
2002 mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven." Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no
|
|
|
2003 longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile
|
|
|
2004 was its burden." Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this
|
|
|
2005 too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a powerful nature that
|
|
|
2006 from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature."
|
|
|
2007 </p>
|
|
|
2008 <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p9">
|
|
|
2009 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness.
|
|
|
2010 </p>
|
|
|
2011 <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p10">
|
|
|
2012 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove
|
|
|
2013 a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.
|
|
|
2014 </p>
|
|
|
2015 <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p11">
|
|
|
2016 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which
|
|
|
2017 weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall
|
|
|
2018 treat in the Third Part of this work (SS, Q[82], seqq.).
|
|
|
2019 </p>
|
|
|
2020 <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2021 <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p13"></p>
|
|
|
2022 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2023 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
2024 </div>
|
|
|
2025 <div id="FS_Q4_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
2026 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
2027 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
2028 <h4 id="FS_Q4_A7-p0.1">Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?</h4>
|
|
|
2029 <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2030 <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p2">
|
|
|
2031 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that external goods also are necessary for Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs
|
|
|
2032 to Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said
|
|
|
2033 (
|
|
|
2034 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.30" target="asv">Lk. 22:30</a>): "That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and (
|
|
|
2035 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.20" target="asv">Mat. 6:20</a>): "Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and (
|
|
|
2036 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.34" target="asv">Mat. 25:34</a>):
|
|
|
2037 "Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom." Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
2038 </p>
|
|
|
2039 <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p3">
|
|
|
2040 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things."
|
|
|
2041 But some of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore
|
|
|
2042 they too are necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
2043 </p>
|
|
|
2044 <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p4">
|
|
|
2045 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Our Lord said (
|
|
|
2046 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.12" target="asv">Mat. 5:12</a>): "Your reward is very great in heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place. Therefore at least external place
|
|
|
2047 is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
2048 </p>
|
|
|
2049 <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p5">
|
|
|
2050 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2051 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.25" target="asv">Ps. 72:25</a>): "For what have I in heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to say: "I desire nothing but this,"---"It
|
|
|
2052 is good for me to adhere to my God." Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
2053 </p>
|
|
|
2054 <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p6">
|
|
|
2055 <b>I answer that,</b> For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of
|
|
|
2056 happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.
|
|
|
2057 For man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation
|
|
|
2058 of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to
|
|
|
2059 perform its operations.
|
|
|
2060 </p>
|
|
|
2061 <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p7"> On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason
|
|
|
2062 of this is that all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the animal body; or for certain operations
|
|
|
2063 which belong to human life, which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect Happiness which consists in
|
|
|
2064 seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no
|
|
|
2065 longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained
|
|
|
2066 to the animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than
|
|
|
2067 that of action to the likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated
|
|
|
2068 in Ethic. x, 8.
|
|
|
2069 </p>
|
|
|
2070 <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p8">
|
|
|
2071 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont
|
|
|
2072 to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire
|
|
|
2073 of things unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the
|
|
|
2074 sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of
|
|
|
2075 God.
|
|
|
2076 </p>
|
|
|
2077 <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p9">
|
|
|
2078 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists.
|
|
|
2079 Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things,
|
|
|
2080 we shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.
|
|
|
2081 </p>
|
|
|
2082 <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p10">
|
|
|
2083 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints,
|
|
|
2084 but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed
|
|
|
2085 to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment.
|
|
|
2086 </p>
|
|
|
2087 <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2088 <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2089 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
2090 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
2091 </div>
|
|
|
2092 <div id="FS_Q4_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
2093 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
2094 <a href="summa.FS_Q5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2095 <h4 id="FS_Q4_A8-p0.1">Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?</h4>
|
|
|
2096 <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2097 <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p2">
|
|
|
2098 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under
|
|
|
2099 the name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends
|
|
|
2100 is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
2101 </p>
|
|
|
2102 <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p3">
|
|
|
2103 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius [*Seneca,
|
|
|
2104 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 6</a>] says that "there is no delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us." But delight is necessary
|
|
|
2105 for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary.
|
|
|
2106 </p>
|
|
|
2107 <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p4">
|
|
|
2108 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems
|
|
|
2109 that fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
2110 </p>
|
|
|
2111 <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p5">
|
|
|
2112 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2113 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.11" target="asv">Wis. 7:11</a>): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently
|
|
|
2114 nothing else is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
2115 </p>
|
|
|
2116 <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p6">
|
|
|
2117 <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed,
|
|
|
2118 to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation
|
|
|
2119 of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do
|
|
|
2120 good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may
|
|
|
2121 do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.
|
|
|
2122 </p>
|
|
|
2123 <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p7"> But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential
|
|
|
2124 to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being
|
|
|
2125 of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to
|
|
|
2126 happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from
|
|
|
2127 without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship."
|
|
|
2128 </p>
|
|
|
2129 <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p8">
|
|
|
2130 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God.
|
|
|
2131 </p>
|
|
|
2132 <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p9">
|
|
|
2133 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying is to be understood of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question
|
|
|
2134 under consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.
|
|
|
2135 </p>
|
|
|
2136 <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p10">
|
|
|
2137 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore
|
|
|
2138 if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor
|
|
|
2139 to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect
|
|
|
2140 Happiness.
|
|
|
2141 </p>
|
|
|
2142 <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2143 <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2144 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
2145 <a href="summa.FS_Q5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2146 </div>
|
|
|
2147 <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
2148 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2149 </div>
|
|
|
2150 <div id="FS_Q5" class="div3">
|
|
|
2151 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
2152 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2153 <h3 id="FS_Q5-p0.1">OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
2154 <p id="FS_Q5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2155 <p id="FS_Q5-p2"> We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
2156 <p id="FS_Q5-p3"> (1) Whether man can attain Happiness?</p>
|
|
|
2157 <p id="FS_Q5-p4"> (2) Whether one man can be happier than another?</p>
|
|
|
2158 <p id="FS_Q5-p5"> (3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?</p>
|
|
|
2159 <p id="FS_Q5-p6"> (4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?</p>
|
|
|
2160 <p id="FS_Q5-p7"> (5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?</p>
|
|
|
2161 <p id="FS_Q5-p8"> (6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher creature?</p>
|
|
|
2162 <p id="FS_Q5-p9"> (7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain Happiness of God?</p>
|
|
|
2163 <p id="FS_Q5-p10"> (8) Whether every man desires Happiness?</p>
|
|
|
2164 <div id="FS_Q5_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
2165 <a href="summa.FS_Q5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2166 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2167 <h4 id="FS_Q5_A1-p0.1">Whether man can attain happiness?</h4>
|
|
|
2168 <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2169 <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p2">
|
|
|
2170 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual
|
|
|
2171 is above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. But irrational animals that have
|
|
|
2172 the sensitive nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man, who is of rational nature,
|
|
|
2173 attain the end of the intellectual nature, which is Happiness.
|
|
|
2174 </p>
|
|
|
2175 <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p3">
|
|
|
2176 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material
|
|
|
2177 things: wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain
|
|
|
2178 Happiness.
|
|
|
2179 </p>
|
|
|
2180 <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p4">
|
|
|
2181 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle.
|
|
|
2182 Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between God and human nature; it seems that
|
|
|
2183 he cannot attain Happiness.
|
|
|
2184 </p>
|
|
|
2185 <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p5">
|
|
|
2186 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2187 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.12" target="asv">Ps. 93:12</a>): "Blessed is the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord."
|
|
|
2188 </p>
|
|
|
2189 <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p6">
|
|
|
2190 <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain Happiness.
|
|
|
2191 Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect
|
|
|
2192 good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness. This can be proved again from the fact that
|
|
|
2193 man is capable of seeing God, as stated in
|
|
|
2194 <a id="FS_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html">FP, Q[12], A[1]</a>: in
|
|
|
2195 which vision, as we stated above (Q[3], A[8]) man's perfect Happiness consists.
|
|
|
2196 </p>
|
|
|
2197 <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p7">
|
|
|
2198 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds
|
|
|
2199 the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal,
|
|
|
2200 whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the
|
|
|
2201 same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth
|
|
|
2202 which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the
|
|
|
2203 <a id="FS_Q5_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html">FP, Q[58], A[3]</a>;
|
|
|
2204 <a id="FS_Q5_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A8.html">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can
|
|
|
2205 attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained
|
|
|
2206 it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after
|
|
|
2207 a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.
|
|
|
2208 </p>
|
|
|
2209 <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p8">
|
|
|
2210 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To man in the present state of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this
|
|
|
2211 state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the
|
|
|
2212 <a id="FS_Q5_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a> ;
|
|
|
2213 <a id="FS_Q5_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html">FP, Q[89], A[1]</a>.
|
|
|
2214 </p>
|
|
|
2215 <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p9">
|
|
|
2216 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an operation
|
|
|
2217 of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained
|
|
|
2218 it, he will be perfectly happy.
|
|
|
2219 </p>
|
|
|
2220 <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p10"></p>
|
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|
2221 <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p11"></p>
|
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|
2222 <a href="summa.FS_Q5.html"></a>
|
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|
2223 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A2.html"></a>
|
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|
2224 </div>
|
|
|
2225 <div id="FS_Q5_A2" class="div4">
|
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|
2226 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A1.html"></a>
|
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|
2227 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2228 <h4 id="FS_Q5_A2-p0.1">Whether one man can be happier than another?</h4>
|
|
|
2229 <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2230 <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p2">
|
|
|
2231 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says
|
|
|
2232 (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is written (
|
|
|
2233 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.10" target="asv">Mat. 20:10</a>) that all who labor in the vineyard "received every man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.), "each was equally
|
|
|
2234 rewarded with eternal life." Therefore one man cannot be happier than another.
|
|
|
2235 </p>
|
|
|
2236 <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p3">
|
|
|
2237 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be surpassed
|
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|
2238 by another's.
|
|
|
2239 </p>
|
|
|
2240 <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p4">
|
|
|
2241 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since Happiness is "the perfect and sufficient good" (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire
|
|
|
2242 is not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater
|
|
|
2243 good. Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be greater.
|
|
|
2244 </p>
|
|
|
2245 <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p5">
|
|
|
2246 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2247 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.2" target="asv">Jn. 14:2</a>): "In My Father's house there are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify "the diverse
|
|
|
2248 dignities of merits in the one eternal life." But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is Happiness
|
|
|
2249 itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.
|
|
|
2250 </p>
|
|
|
2251 <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2252 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
|
|
|
2253 <a id="FS_Q5_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
|
|
|
2254 <a id="FS_Q5_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of
|
|
|
2255 that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be greater than another,
|
|
|
2256 since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or
|
|
|
2257 enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now,
|
|
|
2258 that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And
|
|
|
2259 in this sense one man can be happier than another.
|
|
|
2260 </p>
|
|
|
2261 <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p7">
|
|
|
2262 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the
|
|
|
2263 divers degrees of enjoyment.
|
|
|
2264 </p>
|
|
|
2265 <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p8">
|
|
|
2266 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good.
|
|
|
2267 </p>
|
|
|
2268 <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2269 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all good,"
|
|
|
2270 as Augustine says (Enarr. in
|
|
|
2271 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.134" target="asv">Ps. 134</a>). But one is said to be happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the addition of other
|
|
|
2272 goods does not increase Happiness, since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others besides, is not the
|
|
|
2273 happier for knowing them, but is happy for
|
|
|
2274 knowing Thee alone."
|
|
|
2275 </p>
|
|
|
2276 <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2277 <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p11"></p>
|
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|
2278 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2279 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2280 </div>
|
|
|
2281 <div id="FS_Q5_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
2282 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2283 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2284 <h4 id="FS_Q5_A3-p0.1">Whether one can be happy in this life?</h4>
|
|
|
2285 <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2286 <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p2">
|
|
|
2287 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written (
|
|
|
2288 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.1" target="asv">Ps. 118:1</a>): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore one can
|
|
|
2289 be happy in this life.
|
|
|
2290 </p>
|
|
|
2291 <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p3">
|
|
|
2292 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not
|
|
|
2293 be happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly.
|
|
|
2294 Therefore man can be happy in this life.
|
|
|
2295 </p>
|
|
|
2296 <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p4">
|
|
|
2297 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature
|
|
|
2298 does not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as appears from
|
|
|
2299 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.143.15" target="asv"> Ps. 143:15</a>: "They have called the people happy that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life. Therefore one can be happy
|
|
|
2300 in this life.
|
|
|
2301 </p>
|
|
|
2302 <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p5">
|
|
|
2303 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2304 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.1" target="asv">Job 14:1</a>): "Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries." But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore
|
|
|
2305 man cannot be happy in this life.
|
|
|
2306 </p>
|
|
|
2307 <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p6">
|
|
|
2308 <b>I answer that,</b> A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life.
|
|
|
2309 This may be seen from a twofold consideration.
|
|
|
2310 </p>
|
|
|
2311 <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p7"> First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a "perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil,
|
|
|
2312 and fulfils every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable
|
|
|
2313 evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penalties
|
|
|
2314 on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire
|
|
|
2315 for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present
|
|
|
2316 life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man
|
|
|
2317 naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.
|
|
|
2318 </p>
|
|
|
2319 <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p8"> Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot
|
|
|
2320 obtain in this life, as was shown in the
|
|
|
2321 <a id="FS_Q5_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html">FP, Q[12], A[11]</a>. Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.
|
|
|
2322 </p>
|
|
|
2323 <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p9">
|
|
|
2324 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according
|
|
|
2325 to
|
|
|
2326 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv"> Rom. 8:24</a>: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign
|
|
|
2327 Good.
|
|
|
2328 </p>
|
|
|
2329 <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p10">
|
|
|
2330 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The imperfection of participated Happiness is due to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness, which
|
|
|
2331 is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be
|
|
|
2332 on the part of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however,
|
|
|
2333 in comparison with the way in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not
|
|
|
2334 destroy the true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as stated above (
|
|
|
2335 <a id="FS_Q5_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>), the true nature of Happiness is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject.
|
|
|
2336 </p>
|
|
|
2337 <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p11">
|
|
|
2338 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness.
|
|
|
2339 And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.
|
|
|
2340 </p>
|
|
|
2341 <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2342 <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
2343 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2344 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2345 </div>
|
|
|
2346 <div id="FS_Q5_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
2347 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2348 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2349 <h4 id="FS_Q5_A4-p0.1">Whether happiness once had can be lost?</h4>
|
|
|
2350 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2351 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p2">
|
|
|
2352 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according
|
|
|
2353 to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in
|
|
|
2354 a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness.
|
|
|
2355 </p>
|
|
|
2356 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p3">
|
|
|
2357 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed
|
|
|
2358 to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease
|
|
|
2359 to be happy.
|
|
|
2360 </p>
|
|
|
2361 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p4">
|
|
|
2362 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore
|
|
|
2363 it seems that it has an end.
|
|
|
2364 </p>
|
|
|
2365 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p5">
|
|
|
2366 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2367 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.46" target="asv">Mat. 25:46</a>) of the righteous that "they shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated
|
|
|
2368 <a id="FS_Q5_A4-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.
|
|
|
2369 </p>
|
|
|
2370 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p6">
|
|
|
2371 <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of contemplative
|
|
|
2372 happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain
|
|
|
2373 occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.
|
|
|
2374 </p>
|
|
|
2375 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p7"> This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act
|
|
|
2376 that happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like
|
|
|
2377 happiness, in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether because there still remains
|
|
|
2378 an act of virtue, whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of this
|
|
|
2379 life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state
|
|
|
2380 (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose nature is subject to change.
|
|
|
2381 </p>
|
|
|
2382 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p8"> But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii,
|
|
|
2383 3), following the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after the final Happiness.
|
|
|
2384 </p>
|
|
|
2385 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p9"> This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the
|
|
|
2386 "perfect and sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude every evil. Now man naturally desires to
|
|
|
2387 hold to the good that he has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be troubled with the fear of
|
|
|
2388 losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that
|
|
|
2389 man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never
|
|
|
2390 will lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion: because the false is
|
|
|
2391 the evil of the intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no longer be truly
|
|
|
2392 happy, if evil be in him.
|
|
|
2393 </p>
|
|
|
2394 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p10"> Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above (
|
|
|
2395 <a id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>) that man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine
|
|
|
2396 Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient,
|
|
|
2397 something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience
|
|
|
2398 attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good
|
|
|
2399 things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness; hence it is written (
|
|
|
2400 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.16.15" target="asv">Ps. 16:15</a>): "I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear"; and (
|
|
|
2401 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.11" target="asv">Wis. 7:11</a>): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like manner neither has it any
|
|
|
2402 inconvenience attached to it; because it is written
|
|
|
2403 of the contemplation of wisdom (
|
|
|
2404 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake
|
|
|
2405 Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away from him. Because, since
|
|
|
2406 the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault; and he that
|
|
|
2407 sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the
|
|
|
2408 will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above (
|
|
|
2409 <a id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q4_A4.html">Q[4], A[4]</a>). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other things:
|
|
|
2410 and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on,
|
|
|
2411 man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things
|
|
|
2412 as are subject to time and
|
|
|
2413 movement.
|
|
|
2414 </p>
|
|
|
2415 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p11">
|
|
|
2416 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it
|
|
|
2417 altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends
|
|
|
2418 all change.
|
|
|
2419 </p>
|
|
|
2420 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p12">
|
|
|
2421 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will can be directed to opposites, in things which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity,
|
|
|
2422 to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be happy.
|
|
|
2423 </p>
|
|
|
2424 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p13">
|
|
|
2425 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the
|
|
|
2426 good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from
|
|
|
2427 another.
|
|
|
2428 </p>
|
|
|
2429 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p14"></p>
|
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|
2430 <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p15"></p>
|
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|
2431 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A3.html"></a>
|
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|
2432 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2433 </div>
|
|
|
2434 <div id="FS_Q5_A5" class="div4">
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2435 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A4.html"></a>
|
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|
2436 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A6.html"></a>
|
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|
2437 <h4 id="FS_Q5_A5-p0.1">Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?</h4>
|
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|
2438 <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p1"></p>
|
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|
2439 <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p2">
|
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|
2440 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing
|
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|
2441 is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore
|
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|
2442 man can attain Happiness by his natural powers.
|
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|
2443 </p>
|
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|
2444 <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p3">
|
|
|
2445 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since man is more noble than irrational creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational
|
|
|
2446 creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.
|
|
|
2447 </p>
|
|
|
2448 <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p4">
|
|
|
2449 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing
|
|
|
2450 belongs to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect operation, which is as the beginning
|
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|
2451 in human operations, is subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own actions; it seems that he can attain
|
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|
2452 to perfect operation, i.e. Happiness, by his natural powers.
|
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|
2453 </p>
|
|
|
2454 <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p5">
|
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|
2455 <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, surpasses
|
|
|
2456 the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (
|
|
|
2457 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them
|
|
|
2458 that love Him." Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.
|
|
|
2459 </p>
|
|
|
2460 <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p6">
|
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|
2461 <b>I answer that,</b> Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue,
|
|
|
2462 in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on (Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above
|
|
|
2463 (Q[3], A[8]), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's Essence surpasses the nature not only
|
|
|
2464 of man, but also of every creature, as was shown in the
|
|
|
2465 <a id="FS_Q5_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">FP, Q[12],
|
|
|
2466 A[4]
|
|
|
2467 </a>. For the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence
|
|
|
2468 (De Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its
|
|
|
2469 substance." But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine
|
|
|
2470 Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain
|
|
|
2471 final Happiness by his natural powers.
|
|
|
2472 </p>
|
|
|
2473 <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p7">
|
|
|
2474 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided
|
|
|
2475 other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did
|
|
|
2476 it fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do.
|
|
|
2477 But it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him
|
|
|
2478 happy. "For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).
|
|
|
2479 </p>
|
|
|
2480 <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p8">
|
|
|
2481 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition
|
|
|
2482 than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in
|
|
|
2483 order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect
|
|
|
2484 health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health,
|
|
|
2485 without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs
|
|
|
2486 the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this
|
|
|
2487 good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.
|
|
|
2488 </p>
|
|
|
2489 <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p9">
|
|
|
2490 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When imperfect and perfect are of the same species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of necessity,
|
|
|
2491 if they be of different species: for not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection.
|
|
|
2492 Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation
|
|
|
2493 which is man's happiness: since operation takes its species from its
|
|
|
2494 object. Consequently the argument does not prove.
|
|
|
2495 </p>
|
|
|
2496 <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2497 <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2498 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2499 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
2500 </div>
|
|
|
2501 <div id="FS_Q5_A6" class="div4">
|
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|
2502 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2503 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
2504 <h4 id="FS_Q5_A6-p0.1">Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?</h4>
|
|
|
2505 <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2506 <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p2">
|
|
|
2507 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can be made happy through the action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe
|
|
|
2508 a twofold order in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which
|
|
|
2509 is outside the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order
|
|
|
2510 of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the
|
|
|
2511 order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures
|
|
|
2512 acting on the lower, as stated in the
|
|
|
2513 <a id="FS_Q5_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html">FP, Q[109], A[2]</a>: while happiness consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe, i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy,
|
|
|
2514 through a higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him.
|
|
|
2515 </p>
|
|
|
2516 <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p3">
|
|
|
2517 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially
|
|
|
2518 hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually
|
|
|
2519 happy by an angel who is actually happy.
|
|
|
2520 </p>
|
|
|
2521 <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p4">
|
|
|
2522 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But an angel can enlighten man's
|
|
|
2523 intellect as shown in the
|
|
|
2524 <a id="FS_Q5_A6-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>. Therefore an angel can make a man happy.
|
|
|
2525 </p>
|
|
|
2526 <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p5">
|
|
|
2527 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2528 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.12" target="asv">Ps. 83:12</a>): "The Lord will give grace and glory."
|
|
|
2529 </p>
|
|
|
2530 <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p6">
|
|
|
2531 <b>I answer that,</b> Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which
|
|
|
2532 surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature. Consequently if anything need to be done that is above
|
|
|
2533 nature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like. Now
|
|
|
2534 it has been shown above
|
|
|
2535 <a id="FS_Q5_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html">(A[5])</a> that Happiness is a good surpassing
|
|
|
2536 created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature: but by God alone is man
|
|
|
2537 made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as
|
|
|
2538 of the virtue, in whose act it consists.
|
|
|
2539 </p>
|
|
|
2540 <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p7">
|
|
|
2541 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the
|
|
|
2542 last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to
|
|
|
2543 the art of sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made. Thus,
|
|
|
2544 too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the
|
|
|
2545 attainment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last end itself
|
|
|
2546 through the First Agent, which is God.
|
|
|
2547 </p>
|
|
|
2548 <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p8">
|
|
|
2549 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a form exists perfectly and naturally in something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for instance
|
|
|
2550 a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle
|
|
|
2551 whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the "intention" of color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white;
|
|
|
2552 nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something
|
|
|
2553 else; for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is
|
|
|
2554 in God perfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness or participation. Consequently
|
|
|
2555 no creature can communicate its Happiness to another.
|
|
|
2556 </p>
|
|
|
2557 <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p9">
|
|
|
2558 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as
|
|
|
2559 to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the
|
|
|
2560 <a id="FS_Q5_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">FP, Q[106], A[1]</a>: since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God.
|
|
|
2561 </p>
|
|
|
2562 <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2563 <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2564 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2565 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
2566 </div>
|
|
|
2567 <div id="FS_Q5_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
2568 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
2569 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
2570 <h4 id="FS_Q5_A7-p0.1">Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God?</h4>
|
|
|
2571 <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2572 <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p2">
|
|
|
2573 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite
|
|
|
2574 power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But
|
|
|
2575 man's works, since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause thereof, as stated above
|
|
|
2576 <a id="FS_Q5_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, can be required only as dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not
|
|
|
2577 require dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works.
|
|
|
2578 </p>
|
|
|
2579 <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p3">
|
|
|
2580 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established
|
|
|
2581 nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect
|
|
|
2582 forthwith in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man without any previous works.
|
|
|
2583 </p>
|
|
|
2584 <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p4">
|
|
|
2585 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
|
|
|
2586 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.6" target="asv">Rom. 4:6</a>) that Happiness is of the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works." Therefore no works of man are necessary for attaining
|
|
|
2587 Happiness.
|
|
|
2588 </p>
|
|
|
2589 <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p5">
|
|
|
2590 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2591 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.17" target="asv">Jn. 13:17</a>): "If you know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them." Therefore Happiness is obtained through works.
|
|
|
2592 </p>
|
|
|
2593 <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p6">
|
|
|
2594 <b>I answer that,</b> Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right
|
|
|
2595 order of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter,
|
|
|
2596 in order to receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need precede his Happiness: for God could make
|
|
|
2597 a will having a right tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as
|
|
|
2598 sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should
|
|
|
2599 not be thus; for as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one
|
|
|
2600 has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several." Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs
|
|
|
2601 to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not
|
|
|
2602 to be
|
|
|
2603 moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can
|
|
|
2604 becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in
|
|
|
2605 the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained
|
|
|
2606 in the
|
|
|
2607 <a id="FS_Q5_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html">FP, Q[62], A[5]</a>; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits.
|
|
|
2608 Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue.
|
|
|
2609 </p>
|
|
|
2610 <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p7">
|
|
|
2611 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows
|
|
|
2612 Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.
|
|
|
2613 </p>
|
|
|
2614 <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p8">
|
|
|
2615 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God produced the first creatures so that they are perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the
|
|
|
2616 creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various species, that through them nature might be propagated
|
|
|
2617 to their progeny. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through Christ, who is God and Man, "Who,"
|
|
|
2618 according to
|
|
|
2619 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.10" target="asv"> Heb. 2:10, </a> "had brought many children into glory";
|
|
|
2620 therefore, from the very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious operation. But
|
|
|
2621 this is peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no merits
|
|
|
2622 of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of Christ.
|
|
|
2623 </p>
|
|
|
2624 <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p9">
|
|
|
2625 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account
|
|
|
2626 of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends
|
|
|
2627 towards Happiness.
|
|
|
2628 </p>
|
|
|
2629 <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2630 <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2631 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
2632 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
2633 </div>
|
|
|
2634 <div id="FS_Q5_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
2635 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
2636 <a href="summa.FS.ii.html"></a>
|
|
|
2637 <h4 id="FS_Q5_A8-p0.1">Whether every man desires happiness?</h4>
|
|
|
2638 <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2639 <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p2">
|
|
|
2640 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object
|
|
|
2641 of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine
|
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|
2642 says (De Trin. xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some
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2643 in other things." Therefore not all desire Happiness.
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2644 </p>
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2645 <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p3">
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2646 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the Divine Essence, as stated above (
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2647 <a id="FS_Q5_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But some consider it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire it not. Therefore all men do not
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2648 desire Happiness.
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2649 </p>
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2650 <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p4">
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2651 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss." But all
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2652 do not desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to desire such things. Therefore all do not desire
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2653 Happiness.
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2654 </p>
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2655 <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p5">
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2656 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor had said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,' he
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2657 would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his will." Therefore everyone desires to be happy.
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2658 </p>
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2659 <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p6">
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2660 <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every
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2661 man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good, as stated above (
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2662 <a id="FS_Q5_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A3.html">AA[3]</a>,4). But since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will. Consequently
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2663 to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one's will be
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2664 satisfied. And this everyone desires. Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in which
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2665 it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness; because they know not in what thing the general notion of happiness is found.
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2666 And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it. Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is clear.
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2667 </p>
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2668 <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p7">
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2669 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the will follows the apprehension of the intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real distinction,
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2670 there may be a distinction according to the consideration of reason; so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired
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2671 in one way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be considered as the final and perfect good, which is the general
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2672 notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends
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2673 thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under other special aspects, either on the part of the operation itself,
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2674 or on the part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity.
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2675 </p>
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2676 <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p8">
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2677 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This definition of Happiness given by some---"Happy is the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every wish is fulfilled"
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2678 is a good and adequate definition; but an inadequate definition if understood in another. For if we understand it simply of
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2679 all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing
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2680 satisfies man's natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if
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2681 we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to
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2682 Happiness, to have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such
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2683 things hinders man from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things that
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2684 are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to
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2685 include perfect Happiness---that he "desires nothing amiss": although the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit,
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2686 that "happy is he who has all he desires."
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2687 </p>
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2688 <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p9"></p>
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2689 <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p10"></p>
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2690 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A7.html"></a>
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2691 <a href="summa.FS.ii.html"></a>
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2692 </div>
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2693 <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A8.html"></a>
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2694 <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A1.html"></a>
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2695 </div>
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2696 <a href="summa.FS.html"></a>
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2697 <a href="summa.FS.i.i.html"></a>
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2698 `
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2699 </div> |
