Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
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| author | ht |
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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FS_i.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,2699 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FS.i" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FS.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS.i.i.html"></a> + <h2 id="FS.i-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ[1]-5)</h2> + <div id="FS.i.i" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS.i.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS.i.i-p0.1">PROLOGUE</h3> + <p id="FS.i.i-p1"> Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God's image, in so far as the image implies + "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of + those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, + i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions. + </p> + <a href="summa.FS.i.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q1" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS.i.i.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q1-p0.1">OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1-p2"> In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and secondly, those things by means of which man may advance + towards this end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And since the last end + of human life is stated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q1-p4"> (1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?</p> + <p id="FS_Q1-p5"> (2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?</p> + <p id="FS_Q1-p6"> (3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?</p> + <p id="FS_Q1-p7"> (4) Whether there is any last end of human life?</p> + <p id="FS_Q1-p8"> (5) Whether one man can have several last ends?</p> + <p id="FS_Q1-p9"> (6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?</p> + <p id="FS_Q1-p10"> (7) Whether all men have the same last end?</p> + <p id="FS_Q1-p11"> (8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?</p> + <div id="FS_Q1_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q1_A1-p0.1">Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name, + implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; + since this preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not belong to man to act for an end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher + states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation, + sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, + while intent on something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All things contained in a genus are derived from the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human operations, + as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs to man to do everything for an end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Of actions done by man those alone are properly called "human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational + animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is + master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty + and will of reason." Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed + from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly + "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are + caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore + all human actions must be for an end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this + way that it is a cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is + voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it + is elicited by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act elicited by the will + to be the last end. For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is + color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible + object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action + be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing, + is for the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does that action + in which the last end consists. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the + proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q1_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q1_A2-p0.1">Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end, + never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they + are altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as + irrational animals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for an end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong + to things that lack reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But "the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to + act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only mind but also nature acts for an end." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, + the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that + matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. + But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not + determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce + a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as + this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other + things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p7"> Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, + moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end + through being moved by the archer who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason, + move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the + "faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by + another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything + to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument + to the principal agent, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q1_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">FP, Q[22], A[2]</a>, ad 4; + <a id="FS_Q1_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html">FP, + Q[103], A[1] + </a>, ad 3). Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens] and leading itself to the + end: whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend + the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he + acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. + And it is thus with irrational creatures. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that + which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack + reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, + determinate to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause: thus the governor + of a city, who intends the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular + departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some + rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q1_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q1_A3-p0.1">Whether human acts are specified by their end?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified + by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore + a human act does not derive its species from the end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends. + Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13): "According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy + of blame or praise." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p6"> I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed + of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper + movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its species from an + act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the + terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while + heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific nature. + And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For + human acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above + + <a id="FS_Q1_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the + end. And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In like manner it is + their terminus: for the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of + the thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. + super Luc.) "morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral + acts are the same as human acts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just + this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something, + considered as passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it is thus + that it gives the species to the human or moral act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has + its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however, + that an act which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the will: thus this act "to kill + a man," which is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as + to an end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result being that there would be several acts + in different species of morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a movement + does not receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its "per se" terminus. + Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality. + Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered + in their moral species, and conversely. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q1_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q1_A4-p0.1">Whether there is one last end of human life?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, + as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse + some other good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an end. Therefore there is + an indefinite series of ends. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the + same reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire + of the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an infinite series of ends. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for + I can will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human + will, and there is no last end of the human will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good + is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore + it is necessary to fix one last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in whatsoever + things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must + of necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes + of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can + the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order + in ends---the order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something first. + For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you + remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein + operation has its beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the intention + is the last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently, + on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any + action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing among those that are + ordained to the end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue indefinitely. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p7"> On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; + for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things + ordained to the end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The very nature of good is that something flows from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good + has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that + from the end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are ordained to the end. And + this would be true if we considered but the power of the First Good, which is + infinite. But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its + effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the + First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely + but, as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things which are of themselves, reason begins from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore + the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process + of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those things which are accidentally + connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is + accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing + hinders the reason from an indefinite process. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the fact + that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently once or several times. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q1_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q1_A5-p0.1">Whether one man can have several last ends?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of + nature, and virtue." But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of his will in many + things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition + to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the will does not exclude others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its + last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed + his last end in pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is possible for one man's + will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life. + Hence of gluttons it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.19" target="asv">Phil. 3:19</a>): "Whose god is their belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.24" target="asv"> Mat. 6:24, </a> "No man can serve two masters," such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is impossible for one man + to have several last ends not ordained to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be + assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which + he desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean + now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be + complete." It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to + desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite + so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p7"> The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in + the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must + needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last + end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end, is one. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p8"> The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their species from the end, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q1_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, they must needs receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as natural things are placed in + a genus according to a common form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one genus, + the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every genus there is one first principle; + and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to the + whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally + one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these several objects were considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's + perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend + to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q1_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q1_A6-p0.1">Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are + said to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains + not to the last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake. + Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, + for the last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all + that he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we + love it for its own sake." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First, because + whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last + end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained + to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. + Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly, + because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is + clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects + of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford + him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good, + which is the ultimate end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention, + which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts + be not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every + step. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q1_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q1_A7-p0.1">Whether all men have the same last end?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end + of man. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have not the same last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not + have various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, + yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We can speak of the last end in two ways: first, considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing + in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since + all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated + above + <a id="FS_Q1_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. But as to the thing in which this aspect is + realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; + others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to + others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in + which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed + affections desires for his last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the + last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although actions are of individuals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above + + <a id="FS_Q1_A7-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q1_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q1_A8-p0.1">Whether other creatures concur in that last end?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's beginning---i.e. + God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in man's last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all things to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's + last end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore other things, + too, concur in man's last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of + all. Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> man's last end is happiness; which all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But "happiness is not possible + for animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore other things do not concur in man's last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is twofold---the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing itself + in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of + a weighty body is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place, as "use"; and the end of the miser is money + as "thing," or possession of money as "use." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p7"> If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, + since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisition of + the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their + last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in + so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p8"> Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means the acquisition of the last end.</p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p9"></p> + <p id="FS_Q1_A8-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS.i.i.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q2" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q2-p0.1">OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2-p2"> We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.</p> + <p id="FS_Q2-p3"> Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q2-p4"> (1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?</p> + <p id="FS_Q2-p5"> (2) Whether in honor?</p> + <p id="FS_Q2-p6"> (3) Whether in fame or glory?</p> + <p id="FS_Q2-p7"> (4) Whether in power?</p> + <p id="FS_Q2-p8"> (5) Whether in any good of the body?</p> + <p id="FS_Q2-p9"> (6) Whether in pleasure?</p> + <p id="FS_Q2-p10"> (7) Whether in any good of the soul?</p> + <p id="FS_Q2-p11"> (8) Whether in any created good?</p> + <div id="FS_Q2_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q2_A1-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in wealth?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which + has the greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.19" target="asv">Eccles. 10:19</a>): "All things obey money." Therefore man's happiness consists in wealth. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is "a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good + things." Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, + that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more + than anything else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.9" target="asv">Eccles. 5:9</a>). Therefore happiness consists in wealth. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth shines + in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded." Therefore man's happiness + does not consist in wealth. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3), + viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, + clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money, + but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things + salable. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of + something else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it ordained to man + as to its end. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.8" target="asv"> Ps. 8:8</a>: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p8"> And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, + by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of + the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which + can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as + it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.17.16" target="asv">Prov. 17:16</a>): "What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial + wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear + (Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly + the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things + despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:29</a>): "They that eat me shall yet hunger." Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is + the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11.2" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosoever drinketh of this water," by which temporal goods are signified, "shall thirst again." The reason + of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, + and the sovereign good does not consist therein. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q2_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q2_A2-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in honors?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher + says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore happiness consists especially in honor. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect + good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:17</a>): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore happiness consists in honor. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers + loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness consists in honor. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the + person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness does not consist in honor. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and + consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion, + especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share + of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot + principally consist therein. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive + honor from men by way of reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to offer." But virtue's true reward is happiness + itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that + honor makes them excellent. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated + above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or + happy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q2_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q2_A3-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints + for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.18" target="asv">Rom. 8:18</a>): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." Therefore + happiness consists in glory. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge + of others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory + consists "in being well known and praised." Therefore man's happiness consists in glory. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity + after a fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity, when you think of your + fame in future time." Therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many owe + their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, + must needs blush at their own praise." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose [*Augustine, + Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for + human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection + of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human + knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness + itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's good depends + on God's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God; + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.15" target="asv"> Ps. 90:15,16</a>: "I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with + length of days, and I will show him my salvation." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p7"> Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. + For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it + is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:18</a>): "He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.8.38" target="asv">Mk. 8:38</a>): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.8.38" target="asv"> Mk. 8:38 </a>with + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.8" target="asv"> Lk. 12:8 </a>owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory]. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived + from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, + it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that + fame can nowise make man happy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But + happiness endures of itself, and for ever. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q2_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q2_A4-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in power?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first + beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture + they are called "gods" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.28" target="asv">Ex. 22:28</a>), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods." Therefore happiness consists in power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to + those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than + aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man cannot + relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who + is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more?" + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle, + as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Secondly, because power has relation to good + and evil: whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power, + which is by virtue, rather than in power itself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p7"> Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, + since happiness is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and + in evil men. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as stated in Ethic. i, 7, having + gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may + still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since + happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.12" target="asv">Eccles. 5:12</a>) that "riches" are sometimes "kept to the hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said of the other three. Fourthly, because + man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained + thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for + which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it + is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes + a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme + good consists in power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q2_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q2_A5-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.16" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:16</a>): "There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore + it consists in the health of the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows. + But for man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it + seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the + greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so + the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into + all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that + which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the + health of the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, + by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. Therefore man's happiness does not consist + in goods of the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a + thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain + does not intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained to something else as + its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer + its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 15:14</a>: "God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Now it is evident that man is ordained to + something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot be the preservation + of man's being. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p7"> Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be the preservation of man's being, it could not be said + that the end of man is some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and body; and though the being of the body + depends on the soul, yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q2_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts + them into motion, that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the + soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it + is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by "riches," just as the good + of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes + all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which + does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident + that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent. + Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than + living things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom + every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living + being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q2_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q2_A6-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something + else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what + is his motive in wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the + end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion + of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will and reason, that it causes + him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness, + consists principally in pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, + and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists + in pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had + a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy + too." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13), + although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains + to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and + another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper + accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has + some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, + is precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least + apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, + but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p7"> But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, + which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense, + cannot be man's perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which + is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul + which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form + is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. + Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect, + which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite + number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through + being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.9" target="asv">Wis. 7:9</a>) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor + a proper accident of happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus + it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as + good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition "for" denote the + final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight + is desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle, + and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles + of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, + as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight + results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q2_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q2_A7-p0.1">Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold: + external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of + the body, as shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q2_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A4.html">AA[4]</a>,5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom + we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself + more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all + else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, + however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness + is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above + <a id="FS_Q2_A7-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake." + But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists + in no good of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q2_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession + of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or something + belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing + actually, from being potentially + knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its + fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last + end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p7"> In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is + the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent + to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p8"> But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself + desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness + through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy; + but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something + belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or + act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes + happiness is a good of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved + as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both + cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when + we treat of Charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness, + viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A7-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q2_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q2_A8-p0.1">Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom "unites + the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things," from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches + the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, + as stated in + <a id="FS_Q2_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>, it seems that man's + happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for + its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. + viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good + surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, + it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man's happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it + is written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.143.15" target="asv">Ps. 143:15</a>)." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite + altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of + man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that + naught can lull man's will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any + creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will + of man, according to the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.5" target="asv"> Ps. 102:5</a>: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as + in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the + blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, + but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is + ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is + less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an + angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q2_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q3" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q3-p0.1">WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3-p2"> We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it.</p> + <p id="FS_Q3-p3"> Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q3-p4"> (1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?</p> + <p id="FS_Q3-p5"> (2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?</p> + <p id="FS_Q3-p6"> (3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part?</p> + <p id="FS_Q3-p7"> (4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will?</p> + <p id="FS_Q3-p8"> (5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect?</p> + <p id="FS_Q3-p9"> (6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?</p> + <p id="FS_Q3-p10"> (7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels?</p> + <p id="FS_Q3-p11"> (8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence?</p> + <div id="FS_Q3_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q3_A1-p0.1">Whether happiness is something uncreated?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God + is happiness itself." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several + supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an + end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same + as God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3): + "Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore happiness is not something uncreated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q3_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q3_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly + there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser + is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense, + then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will. + But in the second way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment + or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause + or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something + created. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence. + On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called "gods," by + participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q3_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q3_A2-p0.1">Whether happiness is an operation?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.22" target="asv">Rom. 6:22</a>): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very being + of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But + state does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of + operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness + is not an operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, + or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In so far as man's happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness + is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. + Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore + the Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has + a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, + too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an + operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown + ( + <a id="FS_Q3_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html">Q[2] , A[5]</a>) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true that + His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which operation the principle of life is + made actual: thus we speak of active and + contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and + he signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that + the state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, showing + by what man is established in this state, and that it is by some kind of + operation. And so it is that he proves happiness to be "the perfect good" (Ethic. i, 7). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold. One proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and "to + cut." And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but + rather of the patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an action that remains in the agent, such as to feel, + to understand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the + agent. And such an operation can be happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees + of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His + very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect + of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this + operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection + is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, + is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect + happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), + says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men." But God has promised + us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p14"> Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man's mind will + be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity + and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness: + and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, + which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the + contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn + to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the + latter seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are evident. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p15"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A2-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q3_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q3_A3-p0.1">Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the intellective part only?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man + than that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective operation depends on the sensitive: + since "we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the senses + also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But + some goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses + is needed for happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected + thereby in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation + is required for happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore + happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of + sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated + Good, Which is his last end, as shown above + <a id="FS_Q3_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html">(A[1])</a>: to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (Q[2], A[5]), + man's happiness + does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p7"> Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect + of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation + of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, "from the very + happiness of the soul," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a + certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of + the resurrection (SS, QQ[82] -85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proves that the operation of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had + in this life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source + of all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods + that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in + the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection + of the higher part. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q3_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q3_A4-p0.1">Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect or of the will?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness + consists in peace; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.147.3" target="asv">Ps. 147:3</a>): "Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man's happiness is in + the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation + of the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of + the general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: because it moves the other powers, + as we shall state further on ( + <a id="FS_Q3_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore happiness regards the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an + act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13</a>). Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And + a little further on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy, + and such a man already possesses some good---i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists in an act of the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (A[2], + ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[2], A[6]) two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that + is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, + it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said ( + <a id="FS_Q3_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2; Q[2], A[7]) that happiness is the attainment of the last end. But the + attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when + it desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is + not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present; + and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present + to + him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p9"> This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the + covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far from him; and he attains + it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it is with an intelligible + end. For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to + us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p10"> So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness + pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy + itself is the consummation of happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent + thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent + inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being at rest. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will's first object is not its act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore, + from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it + as its act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the + will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. delight or enjoyment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known," + as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we + first attain a sensible end by an act of sense. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the + act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will + is reckoned among the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement + is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus + "quality." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p16"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A4-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q3_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q3_A5-p0.1">Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical intellect?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming + like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative + intellect, which derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect + rather than of the speculative. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative + intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, + but not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding. + Therefore man's happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather + than of the speculative. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas + the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's + happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting + perfection of our joys." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three reasons. + First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is + that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is + the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative + intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And + since that "seems to be each man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation + is most proper to man and most delightful to him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p7"> Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical + intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently + it is evident that the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p8"> Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above + him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other + animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p9"> Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect + happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human + actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in + relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union + and "information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to the principal thing known, + which is His Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative + knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. + the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the + practical intellect has not; but it directs man thereto. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and + passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by + an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect + rather than of the practical intellect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A5-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q3_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q3_A6-p0.1">Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. + i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than + three speculative virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which all belong to the consideration of speculative + sciences. Therefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative + sciences. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative + sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated + that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative + sciences. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to + act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the + consideration of these sciences, man's final happiness consists. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.23" target="asv">Jer. 9:23</a>): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man's final + happiness does not consist in the consideration of these. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man's happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are + to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, + but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to + be done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed + of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p7"> Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we + must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science: + since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received + through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at + the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther + than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge + of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher. + Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not + perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human + intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which + is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But + it has been shown ( + <a id="FS_Q3_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q88_A2.html">FP, Q[88], A[2]</a>), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of + separate substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the + consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances, + so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (A[2], + ad 4). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect + act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q3_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q3_A7-p0.1">Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in + a homily (xxvi in Evang.): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of + angels"; by which he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore + it seems that man's final happiness consists in contemplating the angels. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect + figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, + as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human intellect consists in contemplating the angels. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to + the spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the angels. Therefore the final perfection + of the human intellect is to be united to the angels by contemplation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.24" target="asv">Jer. 9:24</a>): "Let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Therefore man's final glory or happiness + consists only in the knowledge of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, man's perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so + by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of + that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has + participated truth, does not perfect the + intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); + whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by participation: because in God alone + is His Being His Essence, as shown in the + <a id="FS_Q3_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">FP, Q[44], A[1]</a>. It follows that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain + imperfect happiness in the + contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God Himself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to those that hold human souls to be created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should + consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as + stated in + <a id="FS_Q3_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q90_A3.html">FP, Q[90], A[3]</a>. Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the creation + of the soul and of its + enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q3_A7-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html">FP, Q[111], A[2]</a>, ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man's + final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained + by the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal object. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q3_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q3_A8-p0.1">Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. + i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which + is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, namely, happiness, does + not consist in God being seen in His Essence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the + Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something + less. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>): "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points + must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, + that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing + is," i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the + intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of + some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect + cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause + is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire + to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning + of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause, + and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease + until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p6"> If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the + perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek + the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very + Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in + which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q3_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,7; Q[2], A[8]). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q3_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>), the end has a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing is the + end of the higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q3_A8-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower, + according to their respective + habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than + that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p9"></p> + <p id="FS_Q3_A8-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q2_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q4" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q4-p0.1">OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4-p2"> We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q4-p3"> (1) Whether delight is required for happiness?</p> + <p id="FS_Q4-p4"> (2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?</p> + <p id="FS_Q4-p5"> (3) Whether comprehension is required?</p> + <p id="FS_Q4-p6"> (4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?</p> + <p id="FS_Q4-p7"> (5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?</p> + <p id="FS_Q4-p8"> (6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?</p> + <p id="FS_Q4-p9"> (7) Whether any external goods are necessary?</p> + <p id="FS_Q4-p10"> (8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?</p> + <div id="FS_Q4_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q4_A1-p0.1">Whether delight is required for happiness?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward + of faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing + besides vision is required for happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which + needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q4_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of + the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary + for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from + without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat + is necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is + caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of + the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight. + Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in + Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is + extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention because, as already observed, we + are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to + one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is + contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q4_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q4_A2-p0.1">Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). + But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the + delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation + of the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks + before the operation of the intellect, which is vision. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, + as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, + the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of + the will. Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. + If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness + of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end, + which has been disproved above ( + <a id="FS_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 2; + <a id="FS_Q4_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html"> Q[3], A[4]</a>): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation + in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth. + Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own + species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And + consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But + the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed + to good rather than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the + Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations. And we should form our estimate of things + not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity does not seem the beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good + gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made + present to charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q4_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q4_A3-p0.1">Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm. + xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible." Therefore happiness is + without comprehension. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect + and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will + by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal + objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for + comprehension as a third. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:24</a>): "So run that you may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iiTim.4.7" target="asv">2 Tim. 4:7,8</a>): "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid up for me a + crown of justice." Therefore comprehension is necessary for Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the + way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly + through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: + through the will, first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything; secondly, + by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is + present to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to attain it: + and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the + attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and + this + relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect + knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight + in the end now present results from love, as already stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with Happiness; + to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; + and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by + the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means + nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend + [*In English we should say 'catch.'] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense + comprehension is necessary for Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while + not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes + therein. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision + itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of comprehension. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q4_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q4_A4-p0.1">Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation + of the intellect, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q4_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the perfect operation + of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O God, Who didst will none + but the clean of + heart to know the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths." Therefore rectitude + of the will is not necessary for Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the + will. Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on rectitude of the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance, + after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, + Happiness once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.8" target="asv">Mat. 5:8</a>): "Blessed are the clean of heart; for they shall see God": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.14" target="asv">Heb. 12:14</a>): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the + will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared + to matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except + it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without + rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q4_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of + him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him + who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this + is precisely what makes the will + right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the + intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of + the will is required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike the target. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection, + such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order + to the end is necessary. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q4_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q4_A5-p0.1">Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection + of nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the body, has not the perfection of + nature; since it is naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its whole. Therefore + the soul cannot be happy without the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q4_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], AA[2]</a>,5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since, + therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate + from its whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul, without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in + the soul separated from the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is + "not hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the + soul "has a natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to speak, from tending with all + its might to the heavenward journey," i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the + soul cannot be happy without the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires + to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the + body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.14.13" target="asv">Apoc. 14:13</a>): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed'] are the dead who die in the Lord." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. + Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life consists in an + operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without + a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the + <a id="FS_Q4_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">FP, + Q[84], AA[6] + </a>,7. Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, + which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and + have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, + when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by + reason. By authority, since the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6</a>): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: "For we + walk by faith and not by sight." Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the + vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are + in God's presence; wherefore the text continues: + "But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Whence it is + evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of God, wherein is + true Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p10"> Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, + wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q4_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q4_A5-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html">FP, Q[12], A[3]</a>. Wherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the + body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p11"> We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence + thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its well-being: thus, beauty of body + and keenness of perfection belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection + of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the + more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, + Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead + separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either + for some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to rule the body." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs + of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection + in respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the + form of the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual + part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when + the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from + that of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the + composite after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and + this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q4_A5-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a + perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness. + Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such + a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is + hindered has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompatible + with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is + that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence. + For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And + therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in + such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices + its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that + it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," is + not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the + higher orders of the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to inequality of proportion: + because the angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever + will have, whereas the separated souls of the saints have not. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p18"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A5-p19"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q4_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q4_A6-p0.1">Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily + good. But it has been shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q4_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2.html">Q[2])</a> that Happiness does not consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for man's Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (Q[3], A[8]). But the body has not + part in this operation, as shown above + <a id="FS_Q4_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q4_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in + the most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, + in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.17" target="asv">Jn. 13:17</a>): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy + God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.66.14" target="asv">Is. 66:14</a>): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good disposition of + the body is + necessary for Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity + required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect + virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p7"> But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that + it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words + of Porphyry who said that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything corporeal." But this is unreasonable. + For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the + soul to exclude its natural perfection. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p8"> Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that + Happiness which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such, + that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the + mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven." Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no + longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile + was its burden." Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this + too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a powerful nature that + from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove + a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which + weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall + treat in the Third Part of this work (SS, Q[82], seqq.). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q4_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q4_A7-p0.1">Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that external goods also are necessary for Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs + to Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.30" target="asv">Lk. 22:30</a>): "That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.20" target="asv">Mat. 6:20</a>): "Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.34" target="asv">Mat. 25:34</a>): + "Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom." Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." + But some of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore + they too are necessary for Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.12" target="asv">Mat. 5:12</a>): "Your reward is very great in heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place. Therefore at least external place + is necessary for Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.25" target="asv">Ps. 72:25</a>): "For what have I in heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to say: "I desire nothing but this,"---"It + is good for me to adhere to my God." Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of + happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. + For man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation + of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to + perform its operations. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p7"> On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason + of this is that all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the animal body; or for certain operations + which belong to human life, which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect Happiness which consists in + seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no + longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained + to the animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than + that of action to the likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated + in Ethic. x, 8. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont + to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire + of things unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the + sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of + God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists. + Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, + we shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints, + but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed + to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q4_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q4_A8-p0.1">Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under + the name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends + is necessary for Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius [*Seneca, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 6</a>] says that "there is no delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us." But delight is necessary + for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems + that fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.11" target="asv">Wis. 7:11</a>): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently + nothing else is necessary for Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, + to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation + of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do + good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may + do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p7"> But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential + to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being + of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to + happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from + without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying is to be understood of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question + under consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore + if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor + to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect + Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q4_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q5" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q5-p0.1">OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5-p2"> We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q5-p3"> (1) Whether man can attain Happiness?</p> + <p id="FS_Q5-p4"> (2) Whether one man can be happier than another?</p> + <p id="FS_Q5-p5"> (3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?</p> + <p id="FS_Q5-p6"> (4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?</p> + <p id="FS_Q5-p7"> (5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?</p> + <p id="FS_Q5-p8"> (6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher creature?</p> + <p id="FS_Q5-p9"> (7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain Happiness of God?</p> + <p id="FS_Q5-p10"> (8) Whether every man desires Happiness?</p> + <div id="FS_Q5_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q5_A1-p0.1">Whether man can attain happiness?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual + is above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. But irrational animals that have + the sensitive nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man, who is of rational nature, + attain the end of the intellectual nature, which is Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material + things: wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain + Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle. + Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between God and human nature; it seems that + he cannot attain Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.12" target="asv">Ps. 93:12</a>): "Blessed is the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain Happiness. + Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect + good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness. This can be proved again from the fact that + man is capable of seeing God, as stated in + <a id="FS_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html">FP, Q[12], A[1]</a>: in + which vision, as we stated above (Q[3], A[8]) man's perfect Happiness consists. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds + the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal, + whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the + same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth + which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the + <a id="FS_Q5_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html">FP, Q[58], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q5_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A8.html">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can + attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained + it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after + a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To man in the present state of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this + state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the + <a id="FS_Q5_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a> ; + <a id="FS_Q5_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html">FP, Q[89], A[1]</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an operation + of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained + it, he will be perfectly happy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q5_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q5_A2-p0.1">Whether one man can be happier than another?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.10" target="asv">Mat. 20:10</a>) that all who labor in the vineyard "received every man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.), "each was equally + rewarded with eternal life." Therefore one man cannot be happier than another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be surpassed + by another's. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since Happiness is "the perfect and sufficient good" (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire + is not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater + good. Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be greater. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.2" target="asv">Jn. 14:2</a>): "In My Father's house there are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify "the diverse + dignities of merits in the one eternal life." But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is Happiness + itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q5_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q5_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of + that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be greater than another, + since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or + enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now, + that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And + in this sense one man can be happier than another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the + divers degrees of enjoyment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all good," + as Augustine says (Enarr. in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.134" target="asv">Ps. 134</a>). But one is said to be happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the addition of other + goods does not increase Happiness, since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others besides, is not the + happier for knowing them, but is happy for + knowing Thee alone." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q5_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q5_A3-p0.1">Whether one can be happy in this life?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.1" target="asv">Ps. 118:1</a>): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore one can + be happy in this life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not + be happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. + Therefore man can be happy in this life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature + does not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.143.15" target="asv"> Ps. 143:15</a>: "They have called the people happy that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life. Therefore one can be happy + in this life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.1" target="asv">Job 14:1</a>): "Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries." But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore + man cannot be happy in this life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. + This may be seen from a twofold consideration. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p7"> First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a "perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, + and fulfils every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable + evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penalties + on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire + for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present + life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man + naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p8"> Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot + obtain in this life, as was shown in the + <a id="FS_Q5_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html">FP, Q[12], A[11]</a>. Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv"> Rom. 8:24</a>: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign + Good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The imperfection of participated Happiness is due to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness, which + is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be + on the part of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, + in comparison with the way in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not + destroy the true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q5_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>), the true nature of Happiness is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness. + And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q5_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q5_A4-p0.1">Whether happiness once had can be lost?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according + to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in + a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed + to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease + to be happy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore + it seems that it has an end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.46" target="asv">Mat. 25:46</a>) of the righteous that "they shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated + <a id="FS_Q5_A4-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of contemplative + happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain + occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p7"> This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act + that happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like + happiness, in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether because there still remains + an act of virtue, whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of this + life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state + (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose nature is subject to change. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p8"> But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, + 3), following the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after the final Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p9"> This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the + "perfect and sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude every evil. Now man naturally desires to + hold to the good that he has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be troubled with the fear of + losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that + man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never + will lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion: because the false is + the evil of the intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no longer be truly + happy, if evil be in him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p10"> Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>) that man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine + Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient, + something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience + attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good + things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.16.15" target="asv">Ps. 16:15</a>): "I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.11" target="asv">Wis. 7:11</a>): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like manner neither has it any + inconvenience attached to it; because it is written + of the contemplation of wisdom ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake + Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away from him. Because, since + the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault; and he that + sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the + will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q4_A4.html">Q[4], A[4]</a>). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other things: + and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, + man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things + as are subject to time and + movement. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it + altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends + all change. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will can be directed to opposites, in things which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity, + to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be happy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the + good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from + another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A4-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q5_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q5_A5-p0.1">Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing + is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore + man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since man is more noble than irrational creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational + creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing + belongs to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect operation, which is as the beginning + in human operations, is subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own actions; it seems that he can attain + to perfect operation, i.e. Happiness, by his natural powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, surpasses + the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them + that love Him." Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, + in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on (Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above + (Q[3], A[8]), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's Essence surpasses the nature not only + of man, but also of every creature, as was shown in the + <a id="FS_Q5_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">FP, Q[12], + A[4] + </a>. For the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence + (De Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its + substance." But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine + Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain + final Happiness by his natural powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided + other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did + it fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. + But it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him + happy. "For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition + than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in + order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect + health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, + without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs + the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this + good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When imperfect and perfect are of the same species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of necessity, + if they be of different species: for not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection. + Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation + which is man's happiness: since operation takes its species from its + object. Consequently the argument does not prove. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q5_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q5_A6-p0.1">Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can be made happy through the action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe + a twofold order in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which + is outside the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order + of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the + order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures + acting on the lower, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q5_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html">FP, Q[109], A[2]</a>: while happiness consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe, i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy, + through a higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially + hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually + happy by an angel who is actually happy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But an angel can enlighten man's + intellect as shown in the + <a id="FS_Q5_A6-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>. Therefore an angel can make a man happy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.12" target="asv">Ps. 83:12</a>): "The Lord will give grace and glory." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which + surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature. Consequently if anything need to be done that is above + nature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like. Now + it has been shown above + <a id="FS_Q5_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html">(A[5])</a> that Happiness is a good surpassing + created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature: but by God alone is man + made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as + of the virtue, in whose act it consists. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the + last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to + the art of sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, + too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the + attainment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last end itself + through the First Agent, which is God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a form exists perfectly and naturally in something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for instance + a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle + whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the "intention" of color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; + nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something + else; for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is + in God perfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness or participation. Consequently + no creature can communicate its Happiness to another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as + to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the + <a id="FS_Q5_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">FP, Q[106], A[1]</a>: since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q5_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q5_A7-p0.1">Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite + power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But + man's works, since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause thereof, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q5_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, can be required only as dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not + require dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established + nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect + forthwith in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man without any previous works. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.6" target="asv">Rom. 4:6</a>) that Happiness is of the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works." Therefore no works of man are necessary for attaining + Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.17" target="asv">Jn. 13:17</a>): "If you know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them." Therefore Happiness is obtained through works. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right + order of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, + in order to receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need precede his Happiness: for God could make + a will having a right tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as + sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should + not be thus; for as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one + has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several." Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs + to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not + to be + moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can + becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in + the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained + in the + <a id="FS_Q5_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html">FP, Q[62], A[5]</a>; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits. + Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows + Happiness, but that the order in things be observed. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God produced the first creatures so that they are perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the + creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various species, that through them nature might be propagated + to their progeny. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through Christ, who is God and Man, "Who," + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.10" target="asv"> Heb. 2:10, </a> "had brought many children into glory"; + therefore, from the very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious operation. But + this is peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no merits + of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of Christ. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account + of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends + towards Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q5_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS.ii.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q5_A8-p0.1">Whether every man desires happiness?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object + of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine + says (De Trin. xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some + in other things." Therefore not all desire Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the Divine Essence, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q5_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But some consider it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire it not. Therefore all men do not + desire Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss." But all + do not desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to desire such things. Therefore all do not desire + Happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor had said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,' he + would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his will." Therefore everyone desires to be happy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every + man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q5_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A3.html">AA[3]</a>,4). But since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will. Consequently + to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one's will be + satisfied. And this everyone desires. Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in which + it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness; because they know not in what thing the general notion of happiness is found. + And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it. Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is clear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the will follows the apprehension of the intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real distinction, + there may be a distinction according to the consideration of reason; so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired + in one way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be considered as the final and perfect good, which is the general + notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends + thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under other special aspects, either on the part of the operation itself, + or on the part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This definition of Happiness given by some---"Happy is the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every wish is fulfilled" + is a good and adequate definition; but an inadequate definition if understood in another. For if we understand it simply of + all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing + satisfies man's natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if + we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to + Happiness, to have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such + things hinders man from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things that + are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to + include perfect Happiness---that he "desires nothing amiss": although the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit, + that "happy is he who has all he desires." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p9"></p> + <p id="FS_Q5_A8-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS.ii.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q4_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS.i.i.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file