Four Working versions of GA in the files (A--D), plus the reference
version

Plan was to read those.  But haven't.  Again.  So maybe we should do
that together.  But larger things have
been on my mind.

Did reread most of the reference version.  It struck me as extremely
compressed, dense.  A lot of mulling and consideration has been
cmopressed in a small amount of prose.

Maybe I/we should just read through it and "let the thing breath",
[that is, try to expand that sort of density where we find it].

One consideration of whether the religious (not theological)
sensibility/attempt to tie the paper to religious themes -- how much
weight should that have?  For the moment that sensibility has been in
the driver's seat.  Not sure if that's best.  Another possibility is
to let the metaphysical content be given voice, and then to comment on their
potential relation to religious sensibilities.  In other words, give
more emphasis to the world views and ease up on the religious
impliciations.

So, let this be an exposition of the metaphysics, and leave the
religious connection until later.

The undone homework is the get ahold of what the narrative arc of the paper
is.  It's not clear to me as it stands, but the above distinction is
maybe necessary for giving some clarity.

Brian will have a look at classifying some paragraphs wrt to whether
the are primarily addressed towards exposition of the world view, or
exposition of its relation to religious sensibility.

===== 4 March =====

Brian has looked at sections 1&2 of the reference version.  Doing a
classification seemed good, color-coding for yellow for relig-sens,
blue for exposition of world-view and green for the relationship.

Section 2, pp 6--13, is almost all green.  On 2nd reading, Brian says
"mostly redundant".

----- 
Let's say that this thing should be less compressed, more relaxed,
easier to access for a non-academic audience

 1) Forget the 'G' part and r-s, just give a non-academic
    version of the world-view, just stated, not so much defended;

 2) Another, given that, what are the implications for not r-s as
    such, but the issues which have been dealt with by the religious
    traditions

I worry about both of these - that a sort of secular summary (i.e. 1)
will just devolve into a secular summary of 03 (Objects book)

So given limited time, we focus on (2), relating the world-view to
r-s.

Because although that's what R-V is trying to do, but it's pretty bad
at it.

--------

Trying to mine/milk "the current state of science" to prop up or
... the new world-view (ref. O3) and from that to derive morals.

  But a) the current state of science is not well enough articulated
        to give the reader a sense of the new world-view
      b) and it doesn't actually make the connection
         to lead the reader to a morality

  More seriously, the curret state of science doesn't so much compel the
  new world view as make room for it

Does this mean that O3 needs to be updated to take account of what has
happened since (e.g. LMMs).  And to articulate the new world view.

So how, given that we can't "full on" deliver the new wv here, what is
the minimum necessary to declare victory -- what GA might/should do is
to just _state_ the nwv, w/o trying to convincingly/thoroughly argue
for it.

================10/3=====

The picture of science as it stands is not clear enough/compelling
enough to support the morals I want to draw from it.

---------New section 1-------
 Look, these two sets of sensibilities can't be treated
as independent anymore, because the subject matter of r-s have in fact
been domesticated by scientific results.

For example, the views that C. was attributing to FK, are that these
two world-views.  Maybe 'Quietist' should be 'Compatabilist', because
FK was saying science is (just) an articulation of the glory of God's
creation. _Ad maioram Dei gloriam_

[HST summarises:  The Quietist says "yes, the scientists are doing a
great job on Question 1, and it gets better all the time, but that has
nothing to do with Question 2: for that I have the Church"]

>>>>>>>>>>side tracks???>>>>>>>>>
Is there anything like a consensus/received wisdom as to what those
two forms of understanding are?  On the science side, people might
assume that it's causal explanations (mechanism).  The (r-s?) critique
of that might be that the pure mechanism story can't even account for
physical objects, to say nothing of
intentionality/reference/social/purpose/beauty/love/humaneness.

Call the Scientific world=view the scientific _register_.

We've shifted from what can be said in the scientific register to what
the scientific register is incapable of explaining.

[HST: 
The Scientific ideological _claim_ wrt the s-r is that it's complete and sufficient.

The Compatablilist position is that it's self-consistent, but _not_ sufficient.
]

[HST: what's the other one?]

[HST: write a two-page version? A skeleton]
<<<<<<<<<<end of side tracks>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

The ideological claim wrt the s-r is that it's complete and sufficient.

This (that these forms of thinking are distinct) is no longer a
tenable division.  [I.e. the compatibilist is mistaken]

These two sets of world-views are no longer tenably opposed.  Because
people are trying to corral a whole bunch of topics into the scientific
ones.

There are many topics which classically had been thought to fall into
the [r-s] category which are being explored in something like the
scientific one.  So, bottom-line, the whole distinction needs to be
rethought.

-----End of new section one-----

Next would be an informal account of the structure of intentionality?

If we look at that the structure of intentionality in light of
physical science it will turn out that the intentional stuff has
properties that are associated with [r-s].  So the essentially
infinite structure and complexity of the world, the fact that
descriptions are partial and inadequate.

Or, [BCS] has spent the last 50 years trying to formulate a theory of
intentionality compatible with the physical sciences, but it turns out
that the character of intentionality that you get if you do that has
many properties that have classically been assumed to lie within
[r-s].

Or, the story [BCS] is trying to tell here is _BCS's_ world-view.
It's not necessarily anyone else's.  What is it?

  a) A story about intentionality that's compatible with physics;

  b) A recognition that if this is the character of intentionality,
     and if we are currently using it, in other words, go
     ...
     What does the world look like from within that view of
     intentionality?

OR

  1) This is a place where BCS can state / give voice to his view of
     intentionality;

  2) There's a kind of first-person perspective which he's shifting
     to, as opposed to a third-person perspective.  Perhaps not
     necessary, but it's at least lurking...

----------------

Reverting to new section 1, says Brian later -- won't readers mostly
say, of the list I offer [altruism...fidelity], "That's nothing to do
with religion".  Just qualifying the assertion, to, 'some [r-s] people
have said that's their business'.

How about "these topics are topics that people have felt have a
religious dimension" or "to which religious sensibilities are
germane".

HST: What is it that a Scientist would recognise and accept as a)
non-mechanism and b) relevant to their own Scientific business.

BCS: Non-effective relations, which the CR book is all about...

 HST what underlies the claim of vast significance for intentionality:
 BCS: All the normative predicates are underlain by non-effective
      relations, truth for example


WARNING: BCS: It's not too late to add a sentence to that effective to
the CR book.

HST, wrt [19]: not just truly recognise, but go about it in a way that
embraces [r-s] and extends _the nature of science itself_, rather than
conquer more territory for good-old-fashioned-mechanistic Science.

BCS: what I mean in [19] is, for example, what's altogether missed by
experimental results heralding the discovery of "the contemplation
neuron".

BCS: tring again, scientists domesticating territories not classically
thought to be of science.  How do we understnda this:  

  1) as a broad-swath claim the Science (mechanistic theories) will do
     justice to this wider swath (HST: A land-grab).
  2) [HST: Expanding the understanding of what scientific explanation
      can look like beyond mere mechanism, to non-effective relations]
  2) [BCS] CR? _Meaning and Mechanism_, were it to exist: both
     effective and non-effective relations.  This story needs told,
     but maybe not here, or not beyond a brief version.  Or is HST
     confusing M&M and "the Scientific worldview" [today] vs. "the new
     expanded scientific worldview [which we are looking forward
     to/see encouraging signs of the emergence of], including, but
     [BCS] not only that, because also ...

Alternatively

     If we look at [the best/right-thinking] new scientific
     explorations of things classically thought of as the domain of
     [r-s], we find a (number of non-mechanistic properties) One is
     the theoretical centrality of the non-effective, the role of
     embodiment, one is the importance of indexicality.

or

     1) The essential role of the non-effective, in particular the
         non-efficacy of reference;
     2) The essential role of embodiment;
        2a) The inexorable role of the indexical	.
     3) The surplusity of the referent (the way in which it always
        exceeds that which the reference appears to convey) [There's a
        lot more to be said here] 
     4) [HST wonders about "the true flaw in determinism" == "the
         universe is [already] running the optimal algorithm"]

Then the observation could be made that these properties are
traditionally conceived as characteristic of [r-s]. [HST says: really?
Well, yes, at least for (3): "I know that God is greater than I
know God to be"]

Farewell challenge to BCS: show me why 1, 2 and 4.

HST: A great privilege to have had these sessions!