Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
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| date | Wed, 02 Jun 2010 10:44:15 +0000 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/FP_iv.html Wed Jun 02 10:44:15 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,2086 @@ + + <html xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> + <style> + h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} + .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} + div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} + div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} + @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm; + orphans: 2; widows: 2; + } + @media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}} + </style> + </head> + <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.iv" class="div2"> + + + <h2 id="FP.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44-46)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FP_Q44">Q. 44. THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q45">Q. 45. THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q46">Q. 46. OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> + <div id="FP_Q44" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q44-p0.1">Q. 44. THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q44-p2"> After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration + will be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and + government. Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode + of procession of creatures from the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things. + </p><p id="FP_Q44-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q44-p4"><a href="#FP_Q44_A1"> (1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?</a></p><p id="FP_Q44-p5"><a href="#FP_Q44_A2"> (2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent coordinate principle with Him?</a></p><p id="FP_Q44-p6"><a href="#FP_Q44_A3"> (3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes?</a></p><p id="FP_Q44-p7"><a href="#FP_Q44_A4"> (4) Whether He is the final cause of things?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 pr."><a name="30282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30282] +Iª q. 44 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinarum +personarum, considerandum restat de processione creaturarum a Deo. +Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita, ut primo consideretur de +productione creaturarum; secundo, de earum distinctione; tertio, de +conservatione et gubernatione. Circa primum tria sunt consideranda, +primo quidem, quae sit prima causa entium; secundo, de modo +procedendi creaturarum a prima causa; tertio vero, de principio +durationis rerum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +Deus sit causa efficiens omnium entium. Secundo, utrum materia +prima sit creata a Deo, vel sit principium ex aequo coordinatum ei. +Tertio, utrum Deus sit causa exemplaris rerum, vel sint alia +exemplaria praeter ipsum. Quarto, utrum ipse sit causa finalis +rerum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q44_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A1-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 1. Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being + without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing + caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be understood without it; therefore they + can exist without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="30283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30283] Iª q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium omne ens esse creatum +a Deo. Nihil enim prohibet inveniri rem sine eo quod non est de +ratione rei, sicut hominem sine albedine. Sed habitudo causati ad +causam non videtur esse de ratione entium quia sine hac possunt +aliqua entia intelligi. Ergo sine hac possunt esse. Ergo nihil +prohibet esse aliqua entia non creata a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient + cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are + many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="30284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30284] Iª q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad +hoc aliquid indiget causa efficiente, ut sit. Ergo quod non potest +non esse, non indiget causa efficiente. Sed nullum necessarium +potest non esse, quia quod necesse est esse, non potest non esse. +Cum igitur multa sint necessaria in rebus, videtur quod non omnia +entia sint a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by + the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore not all beings are from God as from + their efficient cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="30285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30285] Iª q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quorumcumque est aliqua causa, in his potest fieri demonstratio per +causam illam. Sed in mathematicis non fit demonstratio per causam +agentem, ut per philosophum patet, in III Metaphys. Non igitur +omnia entia sunt a Deo sicut a causa agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.36" target="asv">Rom. 11:36</a>): "Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 s. c."><a name="30286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30286] Iª q. 44 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Rom. XI, <i>ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt +omnia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q44_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must + be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>) when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q11_A3" id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[11], AA[3]</a>,4) that subsisting being must be + one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all + beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which + are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who + possesses being most perfectly. + </p><p id="FP_Q44_A1-p7"> Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever + is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest + in heat is the cause of all heat. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 co."><a name="30287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30287] Iª q. 44 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo esse. +Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse +est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit; sicut +ferrum fit ignitum ab igne. Ostensum est autem supra, cum de divina +simplicitate ageretur, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens. +Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse nisi +unum, sicut si albedo esset subsistens, non posset esse nisi una, +cum albedines multiplicentur secundum recipientia. Relinquitur ergo +quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse. +Necesse est igitur omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam +participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius vel minus perfecte, +causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est. Unde et Plato +dixit quod necesse est ante omnem multitudinem ponere unitatem. Et +Aristoteles dicit, in II Metaphys., quod id quod est maxime ens et +maxime verum, est causa omnis entis et omnis veri, sicut id quod +maxime calidum est, est causa omnis caliditatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on + what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused. + Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since + to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible + for us to find a being uncaused. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="30288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30288] Iª q. 44 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem +entis quod est causatum, tamen sequitur ad ea qua sunt de eius +ratione, quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens, +sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio. Unde huiusmodi ens non potest +esse, quin sit causatum; sicut nec homo, quin sit risibile. Sed +quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis simpliciter, propter +hoc invenitur aliquod ens non causatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly false + in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle + says (Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an + efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but + because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and + consequent be possible or impossible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="30289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30289] Iª q. 44 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex hac ratione quidam moti fuerunt ad ponendum quod +id quod est necessarium non habeat causam, ut dicitur in VIII +Physic. Sed hoc manifeste falsum apparet in scientiis +demonstrativis, in quibus principia necessaria sunt causae +conclusionum necessariarum. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles, in V +Metaphys., quod sunt quaedam necessaria quae habent causam suae +necessitatis. Non ergo propter hoc solum requiritur causa agens, +quia effectus potest non esse, sed quia effectus non esset, si +causa non esset. Haec enim conditionalis est vera, sive antecedens +et consequens sint possibilia, sive impossibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract + in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although + the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under + the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that + object from its efficient cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="30290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30290] Iª q. 44 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod mathematica accipiuntur ut abstracta secundum +rationem, cum tamen non sint abstracta secundum esse. Unicuique +autem competit habere causam agentem, secundum quod habet esse. +Licet igitur ea quae sunt mathematica habeant causam agentem, non +tamen secundum habitudinem quam habent ad causam agentem, cadunt +sub consideratione mathematici. Et ideo in scientiis mathematicis +non demonstratur aliquid per causam agentem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q44_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A2-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 2. Whether primary matter is created by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else + (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="30291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30291] Iª q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod materia prima non sit creata a Deo. Omne +enim quod fit, componitur ex subiecto et ex aliquo alio, ut dicitur +in I Physic. Sed materiae primae non est aliquod subiectum. Ergo +materia prima non potest esse facta a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, action and passion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first passive + principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from + the other. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="30292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30292] Iª q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, actio +et passio dividuntur contra se invicem. Sed sicut primum principium +activum est Deus, ita primum principium passivum est materia. Ergo +Deus et materia prima sunt duo principia contra se invicem divisa, +quorum neutrum est ab alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that + everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore + it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="30293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30293] Iª q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne +agens agit sibi simile, et sic, cum omne agens agat inquantum est +actu, sequitur quod omne factum aliquo modo sit in actu. Sed +materia prima est tantum in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi. Ergo +contra rationem materiae primae est, quod sit facta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other nigh + unto nothing"---viz. primary matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 s. c."><a name="30294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30294] Iª q. 44 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, XII Confess., duo fecisti, domine, unum +prope te, scilicet Angelum, aliud prope nihil, scilicet materiam +primam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q44_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser + mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did + not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and + separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, + they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of + that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter, + which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential + forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according + to + Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its + form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by a supervening accident to + a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered "being" under some + particular aspect, either as "this" or as "such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then others + there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as + "such," but as "beings." + </p><p id="FP_Q44_A2-p7"> Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are + "such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs + to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause + of things. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 co."><a name="30295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30295] Iª q. 44 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod antiqui philosophi paulatim, et quasi pedetentim, intraverunt +in cognitionem veritatis. A principio enim, quasi grossiores +existentes, non existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia. +Quorum qui ponebant in eis motum, non considerabant motum nisi +secundum aliqua accidentia, ut puta secundum raritatem et +densitatem, congregationem et segregationem. Et supponentes ipsam +substantiam corporum increatam, assignabant aliquas causas +huiusmodi accidentalium transmutationum, ut puta amicitiam, litem, +intellectum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Ulterius vero procedentes, +distinxerunt per intellectum inter formam substantialem et +materiam, quam ponebant increatam; et perceperunt transmutationem +fieri in corporibus secundum formas essentiales. Quarum +transmutationum quasdam causas universaliores ponebant, ut obliquum +circulum, secundum Aristotelem, vel ideas, secundum Platonem. Sed +considerandum est quod materia per formam contrahitur ad +determinatam speciem; sicut substantia alicuius speciei per +accidens ei adveniens contrahitur ad determinatum modum essendi, ut +homo contrahitur per album. Utrique igitur consideraverunt ens +particulari quadam consideratione, vel inquantum est hoc ens, vel +inquantum est tale ens. Et sic rebus causas agentes particulares +assignaverunt. Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens +inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum +secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia. +Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse +causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas +accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec per formas substantiales, +sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum +quocumque modo. Et sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam +ab universali causa entium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form to form, either accidental + or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from + which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="30296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30296] Iª q. 44 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod philosophus in I Physic. loquitur de fieri +particulari, quod est de forma in formam, sive accidentalem sive +substantialem nunc autem loquimur de rebus secundum emanationem +earum ab universali principio essendi. A qua quidem emanatione nec +materia excluditur, licet a primo modo factionis excludatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first + active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle + says (Metaph. xii, text 40). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="30297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30297] Iª q. 44 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod passio est effectus actionis. Unde et rationabile est +quod primum principium passivum sit effectus primi principii +activi, nam omne imperfectum causatur a perfecto. Oportet enim +primum principium esse perfectissimum, ut dicit Aristoteles, in XII +Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything + created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if + all that belongs to its being is created. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="30298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30298] Iª q. 44 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa non ostendit quod materia non sit creata, +sed quod non sit creata sine forma. Licet enim omne creatum sit in +actu, non tamen est actus purus. Unde oportet quod etiam illud quod +se habet ex parte potentiae, sit creatum, si totum quod ad esse +ipsius pertinet, creatum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q44_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A3-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 3. Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures + are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="30299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30299] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod causa exemplaris sit aliquid praeter Deum. +Exemplatum enim habet similitudinem exemplaris. Sed creaturae longe +sunt a divina similitudine. Non ergo Deus est causa exemplaris +earum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated + above + <a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q44_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in + all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles + of the species. Therefore it is necessary to admit + self-existing species, as for instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars. + Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="30300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30300] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod est per participationem, reducitur ad aliquid per se existens, +ut ignitum ad ignem, sicut iam dictum est. Sed quaecumque sunt in +sensibilibus rebus, sunt solum per participationem alicuius +speciei, quod ex hoc patet, quod in nullo sensibilium invenitur +solum id quod ad rationem speciei pertinet, sed adiunguntur +principiis speciei principia individuantia. Oportet ergo ponere +ipsas species per se existentes, ut per se hominem, et per se +equum, et huiusmodi. Et haec dicuntur exemplaria. Sunt igitur +exemplaria res quaedam extra Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because + there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing + in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="30301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30301] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +scientiae et definitiones sunt de ipsis speciebus, non secundum +quod sunt in particularibus, quia particularium non est scientia +nec definitio. Ergo sunt quaedam entia, quae sunt entia vel species +non in singularibus. Et haec dicuntur exemplaria. Ergo idem quod +prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting + life, and before self-subsisting wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="30302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30302] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, hoc +idem videtur per Dionysium, qui dicit, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod +<i>ipsum secundum se esse, prius est eo quod est per se vitam esse, +et eo quod est per se sapientiam esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are + contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 s. c."><a name="30303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30303] Iª q. 44 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod exemplar est idem quod idea. Sed ideae, secundum quod +Augustinus libro octoginta trium quaest. dicit, <i>sunt formae +principales, quae divina intelligentia continentur</i>. Ergo +exemplaria rerum non sunt extra Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an + exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate + form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily + conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive + determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom + devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine + wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas---i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q15_A1" id="FP_Q44_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[15], A[1]</a>). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not + apart from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this + manner therefore God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar + of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 co."><a name="30304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30304] Iª q. 44 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum. Ad cuius +evidentiam, considerandum est quod ad productionem alicuius rei +ideo necessarium est exemplar, ut effectus determinatam formam +consequatur, artifex enim producit determinatam formam in materia, +propter exemplar ad quod inspicit, sive illud sit exemplar ad quod +extra intuetur, sive sit exemplar interius mente conceptum. +Manifestum est autem quod ea quae naturaliter fiunt, determinatas +formas consequuntur. Haec autem formarum determinatio oportet quod +reducatur, sicut in primum principium, in divinam sapientiam, quae +ordinem universi excogitavit, qui in rerum distinctione consistit. +Et ideo oportet dicere quod in divina sapientia sunt rationes +omnium rerum, quas supra diximus ideas, id est formas exemplares in +mente divina existentes. Quae quidem licet multiplicentur secundum +respectum ad res, tamen non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia, +prout eius similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode. +Sic igitur ipse Deus est primum exemplar omnium. Possunt etiam in +rebus creatis quaedam aliorum exemplaria dici, secundum quod +quaedam sunt ad similitudinem aliorum, vel secundum eandem speciem, +vel secundum analogiam alicuius imitationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like + to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material + house is like to the house in the architect's mind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="30305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30305] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, licet creaturae non pertingant ad hoc quod sint +similes Deo secundum suam naturam, similitudine speciei, ut homo +genitus homini generanti; attingunt tamen ad eius similitudinem +secundum repraesentationem rationis intellectae a Deo, ut domus +quae est in materia, domui quae est in mente artificis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man + is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior + species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="30306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30306] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod de ratione hominis est quod sit in materia, et sic +non potest inveniri homo sine materia. Licet igitur hic homo sit +per participationem speciei, non tamen potest reduci ad aliquid +existens per se in eadem specie; sed ad speciem superexcedentem, +sicut sunt substantiae separatae. Et eadem ratio est de aliis +sensibilibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the + same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active + intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars + in order to be their exemplars. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="30307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30307] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet quaelibet scientia et definitio sit solum +entium, non tamen oportet quod res eundem modum habeant in essendo, +quem intellectus habet in intelligendo. Nos enim, per virtutem +intellectus agentis, abstrahimus species universales a +particularibus conditionibus, non tamen oportet quod universalia +praeter particularia subsistant, ut particularium exemplaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes + the powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="30308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30308] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius, XI cap. de Div. Nom., per se +vitam et per se sapientiam quandoque nominat ipsum Deum, quandoque +virtutes ipsis rebus datas, non autem quasdam subsistentes res, +sicut antiqui posuerunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q44_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A4-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 4. Whether God is the final cause of all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is not the final cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God + needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="30309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30309] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit causa finalis omnium. Agere +enim propter finem videtur esse alicuius indigentis fine. Sed Deus +nullo est indigens. Ergo non competit sibi agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70), + because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore + He is not the final cause of all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="30310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30310] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, finis +generationis et forma generati et agens non incidunt in idem +numero, ut dicitur in II Physic., quia finis generationis est forma +generati. Sed Deus est primum agens omnium. Non ergo est causa +finalis omnium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not + the end of all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="30311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30311] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, finem +omnia appetunt. Sed Deum non omnia appetunt, quia neque omnia ipsum +cognoscunt. Deus ergo non est omnium finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows + that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="30312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30312] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +finalis causa est prima causarum. Si igitur Deus sit causa agens et +causa finalis, sequitur quod in eo sit prius et posterius. Quod est +impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord has made all things for Himself." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 s. c."><a name="30313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30313] Iª q. 44 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Prov. XVI, <i>universa propter semetipsum operatus est +dominus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless + it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. + For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some + things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect + agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the + First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which + is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection + and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 co."><a name="30314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30314] Iª q. 44 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod omne agens agit propter finem, alioquin ex actione agentis non +magis sequeretur hoc quam illud, nisi a casu. Est autem idem finis +agentis et patientis, inquantum huiusmodi, sed aliter et aliter, +unum enim et idem est quod agens intendit imprimere, et quod +patiens intendit recipere. Sunt autem quaedam quae simul agunt et +patiuntur, quae sunt agentia imperfecta, et his convenit quod etiam +in agendo intendant aliquid acquirere. Sed primo agenti, qui est +agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicuius +finis; sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quae est +eius bonitas. Et unaquaeque creatura intendit consequi suam +perfectionem, quae est similitudo perfectionis et bonitatis +divinae. Sic ergo divina bonitas est finis rerum omnium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong + to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for + His own goodness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="30315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30315] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod agere propter indigentiam non est nisi agentis +imperfecti, quod natum est agere et pati. Sed hoc Deo non competit. +Et ideo ipse solus est maxime liberalis, quia non agit propter suam +utilitatem, sed solum propter suam bonitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The form of the thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator, + which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator, + since the end is more noble than the means to the end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="30316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30316] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod forma generati non est finis generationis nisi +inquantum est similitudo formae generantis, quod suam similitudinem +communicare intendit. Alioquin forma generati esset nobilior +generante, cum finis sit nobilior his quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or + natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness + to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="30317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30317] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia appetunt Deum ut finem, appetendo quodcumque +bonum, sive appetitu intelligibili, sive sensibili, sive naturali, +qui est sine cognitione, quia nihil habet rationem boni et +appetibilis, nisi secundum quod participat Dei similitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows + that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things + in Him, some of which come into our mind before others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="30318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30318] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, cum Deus sit causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis +omnium rerum, et materia prima sit ab ipso, sequitur quod primum +principium omnium rerum sit unum tantum secundum rem. Nihil tamen +prohibet in eo considerari multa secundum rationem, quorum quaedam +prius cadunt in intellectu nostro quam alia.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q45" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q45-p0.1">Q. 45. THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q45-p2"> The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called creation, and + includes eight points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q45-p3"><a href="#FP_Q45_A1"> (1) What is creation?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p4"><a href="#FP_Q45_A2"> (2) Whether God can create anything?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p5"><a href="#FP_Q45_A3"> (3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p6"><a href="#FP_Q45_A4"> (4) To what things it belongs to be created?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p7"><a href="#FP_Q45_A5"> (5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p8"><a href="#FP_Q45_A6"> (6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p9"><a href="#FP_Q45_A7"> (7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p10"><a href="#FP_Q45_A8"> (8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 pr."><a name="30319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30319] +Iª q. 45 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de modo emanationis +rerum a primo principio, qui dicitur creatio. De qua quaeruntur +octo. Primo, quid sit creatio. Secundo, utrum Deus possit aliquid +creare. Tertio, utrum creatio sit aliquod ens in rerum natura. +Quarto, cui competit creari. Quinto, utrum solius Dei sit creare. +Sexto, utrum commune sit toti Trinitati, aut proprium alicuius +personae. Septimo, utrum vestigium aliquod Trinitatis sit in rebus +creatis. Octavo, utrum opus creationis admisceatur in operibus +naturae et voluntatis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q45_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A1-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 1. Whether to create is to make something from nothing?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To + make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="30320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30320] Iª q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod creare non sit ex nihilo aliquid facere. +Dicit enim Augustinus, contra adversarium legis et prophetarum, +<i>facere est quod omnino non erat, creare vero est ex eo quod iam +erat educendo aliquid constituere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, + and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among + all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="30321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30321] Iª q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nobilitas actionis et motus ex terminis consideratur. Nobilior +igitur est actio quae ex bono in bonum est, et ex ente in ens, quam +quae est ex nihilo in aliquid. Sed creatio videtur esse nobilissima +actio, et prima inter omnes actiones. Ergo non est ex nihilo in +aliquid, sed magis ex ente in ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say + that a statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create + is not to make something from nothing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="30322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30322] Iª q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, haec +praepositio ex importat habitudinem alicuius causae, et maxime +materialis; sicut cum dicimus quod statua fit ex aere. Sed nihil +non potest esse materia entis, nec aliquo modo causa eius. Ergo +creare non est ex nihilo aliquid facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> On the text of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, "In the beginning God created," etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 s. c."><a name="30323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30323] Iª q. 45 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod super illud Gen. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum</i> +etc., dicit Glossa quod creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q45_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being + from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular + emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from "not-man," + and white from "not-white." + Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being + should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is + from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is + "nothing." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 co."><a name="30324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30324] Iª q. 45 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, non solum oportet considerare +emanationem alicuius entis particularis ab aliquo particulari +agente, sed etiam emanationem totius entis a causa universali, quae +est Deus, et hanc quidem emanationem designamus nomine creationis. +Quod autem procedit secundum emanationem particularem, non +praesupponitur emanationi, sicut, si generatur homo, non fuit prius +homo, sed homo fit ex non homine, et album ex non albo. Unde, si +consideretur emanatio totius entis universalis a primo principio, +impossibile est quod aliquod ens praesupponatur huic emanationi. +Idem autem est nihil quod nullum ens. Sicut igitur generatio +hominis est ex non ente quod est non homo, ita creatio, quae est +emanatio totius esse, est ex non ente quod est nihil.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when + we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="30325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30325] Iª q. 45 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Augustinus aequivoce utitur nomine creationis, +secundum quod creari dicuntur ea quae in melius reformantur, ut cum +dicitur aliquis creari in episcopum. Sic autem non loquimur hic de +creatione, sed sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto." Therefore a change is more + perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding + to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because + the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the + privation of the substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which + is the term "wherefrom" in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because + the term "whereto" is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term "wherefrom" is simply not-being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="30326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30326] Iª q. 45 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod mutationes accipiunt speciem et dignitatem non a +termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem. Tanto ergo perfectior et +prior est aliqua mutatio, quanto terminus ad quem illius mutationis +est nobilior et prior; licet terminus a quo, qui opponitur termino +ad quem, sit imperfectior. Sicut generatio simpliciter est nobilior +et prior quam alteratio, propter hoc quod forma substantialis est +nobilior quam forma accidentalis, tamen privatio substantialis +formae, quae est terminus a quo in generatione, est imperfectior +quam contrarium, quod est terminus a quo in alteratione. Et +similiter creatio est perfectior et prior quam generatio et +alteratio, quia terminus ad quem est tota substantia rei. Id autem +quod intelligitur ut terminus a quo, est simpliciter non ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only + order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition + "from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing," or can be included in it. If taken in the first + sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and + its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, "It + is made from nothing---i.e. it is not made from anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does + not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the + first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the + material + cause, which is denied. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="30327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30327] Iª q. 45 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, cum dicitur aliquid ex nihilo fieri, haec +praepositio ex non designat causam materialem, sed ordinem tantum; +sicut cum dicitur, ex mane fit meridies, idest, post mane fit +meridies. Sed intelligendum est quod haec praepositio ex potest +includere negationem importatam in hoc quod dico nihil, vel includi +ab ea. Si primo modo, tunc ordo remanet affirmatus, et ostenditur +ordo eius, quod est ad non esse praecedens. Si vero negatio +includat praepositionem, tunc ordo negatur, et est sensus, fit ex +nihilo, idest non fit ex aliquo; sicut si dicatur, iste loquitur de +nihilo, quia non loquitur de aliquo. Et utroque modo verificatur, +cum dicitur ex nihilo aliquid fieri. Sed primo modo, haec +praepositio ex importat ordinem, ut dictum est, secundo modo, +importat habitudinem causae materialis, quae negatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A2-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 2. Whether God can create anything?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot create anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient philosophers + considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the + contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation + and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from + nothing, or create. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="30328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30328] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit aliquid creare. Quia +secundum philosophum, I Physic., antiqui philosophi acceperunt ut +communem conceptionem animi, ex nihilo nihil fieri. Sed potentia +Dei non se extendit ad contraria primorum principiorum; utpote quod +Deus faciat quod totum non sit maius sua parte, vel quod affirmatio +et negatio sint simul vera. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid ex nihilo +facere, vel creare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore + creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the + act of what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="30329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30329] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si +creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere, ergo creari est aliquid fieri. +Sed omne fieri est mutari. Ergo creatio est mutatio. Sed omnis +mutatio est ex subiecto aliquo, ut patet per definitionem motus, +nam motus est actus existentis in potentia. Ergo est impossibile +aliquid a Deo ex nihilo fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what has been made must have at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same + time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already + is: and so it would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becoming + precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which + the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="30330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30330] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod +factum est, necesse est aliquando fieri. Sed non potest dici quod +illud quod creatur, simul fiat et factum sit, quia in +permanentibus, quod fit, non est, quod autem factum est, iam est; +simul ergo aliquid esset et non esset. Ergo, si aliquid fit, fieri +eius praecedit factum esse. Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi +praeexistat subiectum in quo sustentetur ipsum fieri. Ergo +impossibile est aliquid fieri ex nihilo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not + happen that something is made from nothing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="30331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30331] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +infinitam distantiam non est pertransire. Sed infinita distantia +est inter ens et nihil. Ergo non contingit ex nihilo aliquid +fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 s. c."><a name="30332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30332] Iª q. 45 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et +terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Not only is it impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created + by God, as appears from what has been said ( + <a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[1]</a>). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is + not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action + of art, + but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If + therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him. + Now it has been shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that + God brings things into being from nothing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 co."><a name="30333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30333] Iª q. 45 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod non solum non est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari, sed +necesse est ponere a Deo omnia creata esse, ut ex praemissis +habetur. Quicumque enim facit aliquid ex aliquo, illud ex quo facit +praesupponitur actioni eius, et non producitur per ipsam actionem, +sicut artifex operatur ex rebus naturalibus, ut ex ligno et aere, +quae per artis actionem non causantur, sed causantur per actionem +naturae. Sed et ipsa natura causat res naturales quantum ad formam, +sed praesupponit materiam. Si ergo Deus non ageret nisi ex aliquo +praesupposito, sequeretur quod illud praesuppositum non esset +causatum ab ipso. Ostensum est autem supra quod nihil potest esse +in entibus quod non sit a Deo, qui est causa universalis totius +esse. Unde necesse est dicere quod Deus ex nihilo res in esse +producit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ancient philosophers, as is said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q45_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their + action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing." But this has no place in the first emanation + from the universal principle of things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="30334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30334] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod antiqui philosophi, sicut supra dictum est, non +consideraverunt nisi emanationem effectuum particularium a causis +particularibus, quas necesse est praesupponere aliquid in sua +actione, et secundum hoc erat eorum communis opinio, ex nihilo +nihil fieri. Sed tamen hoc locum non habet in prima emanatione ab +universali rerum principio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different + now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in + motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial + change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole + substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding, + so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide + as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that + when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of + signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A1" id="FP_Q45_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing. + And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to make" + and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="30335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30335] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod creatio non est mutatio nisi secundum modum +intelligendi tantum. Nam de ratione mutationis est, quod aliquid +idem se habeat aliter nunc et prius, nam quandoque est idem ens +actu, aliter se habens nunc et prius, sicut in motibus secundum +quantitatem et qualitatem et ubi; quandoque vero est idem ens in +potentia tantum, sicut in mutatione secundum substantiam, cuius +subiectum est materia. Sed in creatione, per quam producitur tota +substantia rerum, non potest accipi aliquid idem aliter se habens +nunc et prius, nisi secundum intellectum tantum; sicut si +intelligatur aliqua res prius non fuisse totaliter, et postea esse. +Sed cum actio et passio conveniant in substantia motus, et +differant solum secundum habitudines diversas, ut dicitur in III +Physic., oportet quod, subtracto motu, non remaneant nisi diversae +habitudines in creante et creato. Sed quia modus significandi +sequitur modum intelligendi, ut dictum est, creatio significatur +per modum mutationis, et propter hoc dicitur quod creare est ex +nihilo aliquid facere. Quamvis facere et fieri magis in hoc +conveniant quam mutare et mutari, quia facere et fieri important +habitudinem causae ad effectum et effectus ad causam, sed +mutationem ex consequenti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the + term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is + not the term of movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time. In these things what is being + made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was + not previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and is already created at the same time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="30336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30336] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in his quae fiunt sine motu, simul est fieri et +factum esse, sive talis factio sit terminus motus, sicut +illuminatio (nam simul aliquid illuminatur et illuminatum est); +sive non sit terminus motus, sicut simul formatur verbum in corde +et formatum est. Et in his, quod fit, est, sed cum dicitur fieri, +significatur ab alio esse, et prius non fuisse. Unde, cum creatio +sit sine motu, simul aliquid creatur et creatum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is + plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two forms. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="30337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30337] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit ex falsa imaginatione, ac si +sit aliquod infinitum medium inter nihilum et ens, quod patet esse +falsum. Procedit autem falsa haec imaginatio ex eo quod creatio +significatur ut quaedam mutatio inter duos terminos existens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A3-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 3. Whether creation is anything in the creature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the + creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in + the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively + is not anything in the creature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="30338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30338] Iª q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod creatio non sit aliquid in creatura. Sicut +enim creatio passive accepta attribuitur creaturae, ita creatio +active accepta attribuitur creatori. Sed creatio active accepta non +est aliquid in creatore, quia sic sequeretur quod in Deo esset +aliquid temporale. Ergo creatio passive accepta non est aliquid in +creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both: + since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case it would be necessary for + the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the + creature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="30339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30339] Iª q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil +est medium inter creatorem et creaturam. Sed creatio significatur +ut medium inter utrumque, non enim est creator, cum non sit +aeterna; neque creatura, quia oporteret eadem ratione aliam ponere +creationem qua ipsa crearetur, et sic in infinitum. Creatio ergo +non est aliquid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if creation is anything besides the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident + is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and + also the term of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident; while + the term is after the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action + and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="30340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30340] Iª q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +creatio est aliquid praeter substantiam creatam, oportet quod sit +accidens eius. Omne autem accidens est in subiecto. Ergo res creata +esset subiectum creationis. Et sic idem esset subiectum creationis +et terminus. Quod est impossibile, quia subiectum prius est +accidente, et conservat accidens; terminus autem posterius est +actione et passione cuius est terminus, et eo existente cessat +actio et passio. Igitur ipsa creatio non est aliqua res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental + form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental + form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole + substance, something in the thing created. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 s. c."><a name="30341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30341] Iª q. 45 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, maius +est fieri aliquid secundum totam substantiam, quam secundum formam +substantialem vel accidentalem. Sed generatio simpliciter vel +secundum quid, qua fit aliquid secundum formam substantialem vel +accidentalem, est aliquid in generato. Ergo multo magis creatio, +qua fit aliquid secundum totam substantiam, est aliquid in +creato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, + or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in + the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all + beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when + movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above (A[2], ad 2). Hence creation in the + creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement, + is implied a relation to the principle of motion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 co."><a name="30342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30342] Iª q. 45 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod creatio ponit aliquid in creato secundum relationem tantum. +Quia quod creatur, non fit per motum vel per mutationem. Quod enim +fit per motum vel mutationem, fit ex aliquo praeexistenti, quod +quidem contingit in productionibus particularibus aliquorum entium; +non autem potest hoc contingere in productione totius esse a causa +universali omnium entium, quae est Deus. Unde Deus, creando, +producit res sine motu. Subtracto autem motu ab actione et +passione, nihil remanet nisi relatio, ut dictum est. Unde +relinquitur quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quaedam +ad creatorem, ut ad principium sui esse; sicut in passione quae est +cum motu, importatur relatio ad principium motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God + relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God + is a real relation, as was said above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A7" id="FP_Q45_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[7]</a>) in treating of the divine names. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="30343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30343] Iª q. 45 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod creatio active significata significat actionem +divinam, quae est eius essentia cum relatione ad creaturam. Sed +relatio in Deo ad creaturam non est realis, sed secundum rationem +tantum. Relatio vero creaturae ad Deum est relatio realis, ut supra +dictum est, cum de divinis nominibus ageretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because creation is signified as a change, as was said above (A[2], ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover + and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive + creation is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further creation in its creation; because relations, + or their entire nature being referred to something, are not referred by any other + relations, but by themselves; as was also shown above ( + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q42_A1" id="FP_Q45_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[42], A[1]</a>, ad 4), in treating of the equality of the Persons. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="30344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30344] Iª q. 45 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quia creatio significatur ut mutatio, sicut dictum +est; mutatio autem media quodammodo est inter movens et motum, ideo +etiam creatio significatur ut media inter creatorem et creaturam. +Tamen creatio passive accepta est in creatura, et est creatura. +Neque tamen oportet quod alia creatione creetur, quia relationes, +cum hoc ipsum quod sunt, ad aliquid dicantur, non referuntur per +aliquas alias relationes, sed per seipsas; sicut etiam supra dictum +est, cum de aequalitate personarum ageretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The creature is the term of creation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and + is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the + part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the + creature is it should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature + to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="30345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30345] Iª q. 45 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod creationis, secundum quod significatur ut mutatio, +creatura est terminus, sed secundum quod vere est relatio, creatura +est eius subiectum, et prius ea in esse, sicut subiectum accidente. +Sed habet quandam rationem prioritatis ex parte obiecti ad quod +dicitur, quod est principium creaturae. Neque tamen oportet quod, +quandiu creatura sit, dicatur creari, quia creatio importat +habitudinem creaturae ad creatorem cum quadam novitate seu +incoeptione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A4-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 4. Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv) + it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly + speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="30346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30346] Iª q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod creari non sit proprium compositorum et +subsistentium. Dicitur enim in libro de causis, prima rerum +creatarum est esse. Sed esse rei creatae non est subsistens. Ergo +creatio proprie non est subsistentis et compositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own + component parts. Therefore composite things are not created. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="30347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30347] Iª q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod +creatur est ex nihilo. Composita autem non sunt ex nihilo, sed ex +suis componentibus. Ergo compositis non convenit creari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the + natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore + matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="30348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30348] Iª q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud +proprie producitur per primam emanationem, quod supponitur in +secunda, sicut res naturalis per generationem naturalem, quae +supponitur in operatione artis. Sed illud quod supponitur in +generatione naturali, est materia. Ergo materia est quae proprie +creatur, et non compositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation + belongs to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 s. c."><a name="30349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30349] Iª q. 45 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et +terram</i>. Caelum autem et terra sunt res compositae subsistentes. +Ergo horum proprie est creatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q45_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>, ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever + being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate + substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has + being---that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they + themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it. + Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being." + Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they + ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 co."><a name="30350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30350] Iª q. 45 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod creari est quoddam fieri, ut dictum est. Fieri autem ordinatur +ad esse rei. Unde illis proprie convenit fieri et creari, quibus +convenit esse. Quod quidem convenit proprie subsistentibus, sive +sint simplicia, sicut substantiae separatae; sive sint composita, +sicut substantiae materiales. Illi enim proprie convenit esse, quod +habet esse; et hoc est subsistens in suo esse. Formae autem et +accidentia, et alia huiusmodi, non dicuntur entia quasi ipsa sint, +sed quia eis aliquid est; ut albedo ea ratione dicitur ens, quia ea +subiectum est album. Unde, secundum philosophum, accidens magis +proprie dicitur entis quam ens. Sicut igitur accidentia et formae, +et huiusmodi, quae non subsistunt, magis sunt coexistentia quam +entia; ita magis debent dici concreata quam creata. Proprie vero +creata sunt subsistentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the proposition "the first of created things is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but + to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because + it is "this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above + <a href="#FP_Q45_A1" id="FP_Q45_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. We use a similar way of speaking when we say that "the first visible + thing is color," although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="30351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30351] Iª q. 45 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, cum dicitur, prima rerum creatarum est esse, ly esse +non importat subiectum creatum; sed importat propriam rationem +obiecti creationis. Nam ex eo dicitur aliquid creatum, quod est +ens, non ex eo quod est hoc ens, cum creatio sit emanatio totius +esse ab ente universali, ut dictum est. Et est similis modus +loquendi, sicut si diceretur quod primum visibile est color, +quamvis illud quod proprie videtur, sit coloratum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite" + is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="30352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30352] Iª q. 45 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod creatio non dicit constitutionem rei compositae ex +principiis praeexistentibus, sed compositum sic dicitur creari, +quod simul cum omnibus suis principiis in esse producitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for creation + is the production of the whole being, and not only matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="30353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30353] Iª q. 45 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa non probat quod sola materia creetur; sed +quod materia non sit nisi ex creatione. Nam creatio est productio +totius esse, et non solum materiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A5-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 5. Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34), + what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless + can make their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance + like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it + has no matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="30354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30354] Iª q. 45 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non solius Dei sit creare. Quia secundum +philosophum, perfectum est quod potest sibi simile facere. Sed +creaturae immateriales sunt perfectiores creaturis materialibus, +quae faciunt sibi simile, ignis enim generat ignem, et homo generat +hominem. Ergo substantia immaterialis potest facere substantiam +sibi similem. Sed substantia immaterialis non potest fieri nisi per +creationem, cum non habeat materiam ex qua fiat. Ergo aliqua +creatura potest creare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. + But a "contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which + nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature do this. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="30355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30355] Iª q. 45 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto maior est resistentia ex parte facti, tanto maior virtus +requiritur in faciente. Sed plus resistit contrarium quam nihil. +Ergo maioris virtutis est aliquid facere ex contrario, quod tamen +creatura facit; quam aliquid facere ex nihilo. Multo magis igitur +creatura hoc facere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we + proved above when treating of the infinity of God ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q45_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary + to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="30356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30356] Iª q. 45 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus facientis consideratur secundum mensuram eius quod fit. Sed +ens creatum est finitum, ut supra probatum est, cum de Dei +infinitate ageretur. Ergo ad producendum per creationem aliquid +creatum, non requiritur nisi virtus finita. Sed habere virtutem +finitam non est contra rationem creaturae. Ergo non est impossibile +creaturam creare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other + creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 s. c."><a name="30357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30357] Iª q. 45 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., quod neque boni neque mali +Angeli possunt esse creatores alicuius rei. Multo minus igitur +aliae creaturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes + <a href="#FP_Q45_A1" id="FP_Q45_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that to create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and + prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first + and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii) that "neither + intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation." Now to produce being absolutely, + not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone. + </p><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p7"> It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, + inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some have supposed that + although creation is the proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause, + can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by God created another after + itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. + And in the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that + the latter can create ministerially, not by its own power. + </p><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p8"> But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause, + except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. If therefore + it effects nothing, according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need of certain + instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its + own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating + is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally + to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent. + So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally---that + is, ministerially. + </p><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p9"> And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it + requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 co."><a name="30358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30358] Iª q. 45 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod satis apparet in primo aspectu, secundum praemissa, quod +creare non potest esse propria actio nisi solius Dei. Oportet enim +universaliores effectus in universaliores et priores causas +reducere. Inter omnes autem effectus, universalissimum est ipsum +esse. Unde oportet quod sit proprius effectus primae et +universalissimae causae, quae est Deus. Unde etiam dicitur libro de +causis, quod neque intelligentia vel anima nobilis dat esse, nisi +inquantum operatur operatione divina. Producere autem esse +absolute, non inquantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad rationem +creationis. Unde manifestum est quod creatio est propria actio +ipsius Dei. Contingit autem quod aliquid participet actionem +propriam alicuius alterius, non virtute propria, sed +instrumentaliter, inquantum agit in virtute alterius; sicut aer per +virtutem ignis habet calefacere et ignire. Et secundum hoc, aliqui +opinati sunt quod, licet creatio sit propria actio universalis +causae, tamen aliqua inferiorum causarum inquantum agit in virtute +primae causae, potest creare. Et sic posuit Avicenna quod prima +substantia separata, creata a Deo, creat aliam post se, et +substantiam orbis, et animam eius; et quod substantia orbis creat +materiam inferiorum corporum. Et secundum hunc etiam modum Magister +dicit, in V dist. IV Sent., quod Deus potest creaturae communicare +potentiam creandi, ut creet per ministerium, non propria +auctoritate. Sed hoc esse non potest. Quia causa secunda +instrumentalis non participat actionem causae superioris, nisi +inquantum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad +effectum principalis agentis. Si igitur nihil ibi ageret secundum +illud quod est sibi proprium, frustra adhiberetur ad agendum, nec +oporteret esse determinata instrumenta determinatarum actionum. Sic +enim videmus quod securis, scindendo lignum, quod habet ex +proprietate suae formae, producit scamni formam, quae est effectus +proprius principalis agentis. Illud autem quod est proprius +effectus Dei creantis, est illud quod praesupponitur omnibus aliis, +scilicet esse absolute. Unde non potest aliquid operari dispositive +et instrumentaliter ad hunc effectum, cum creatio non sit ex aliquo +praesupposito, quod possit disponi per actionem instrumentalis +agentis. Sic igitur impossibile est quod alicui creaturae conveniat +creare, neque virtute propria, neque instrumentaliter sive per +ministerium. Et hoc praecipue inconveniens est dici de aliquo +corpore, quod creet, cum nullum corpus agat nisi tangendo vel +movendo; et sic requirit in sua actione aliquid praeexistens, quod +possit tangi et moveri; quod est contra rationem creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying + it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause + of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate + matter whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man + participates human nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own + being, as we have said above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[7], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in "this": and so it + is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in + an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything + whereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore + an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards + some added perfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x). + In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.15" target="asv">Eph. 3:15</a>): "From whom all + paternity in heaven and on earth is named." From which evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless + something is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="30359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30359] Iª q. 45 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod aliquod perfectum participans aliquam naturam, facit +sibi simile, non quidem producendo absolute illam naturam, sed +applicando eam ad aliquid. Non enim hic homo potest esse causa +naturae humanae absolute, quia sic esset causa sui ipsius, sed est +causa quod natura humana sit in hoc homine generato. Et sic +praesupponit in sua actione determinatam materiam per quam est hic +homo. Sed sicut hic homo participat humanam naturam, ita quodcumque +ens creatum participat, ut ita dixerim, naturam essendi, quia solus +Deus est suum esse, ut supra dictum est. Nullum igitur ens creatum +potest producere aliquod ens absolute, nisi inquantum esse causat +in hoc, et sic oportet quod praeintelligatur id per quod aliquid +est hoc, actioni qua facit sibi simile. In substantia autem +immateriali non potest praeintelligi aliquid per quod sit haec, +quia est haec per suam formam, per quam habet esse, cum sint formae +subsistentes. Igitur substantia immaterialis non potest producere +aliam substantiam immaterialem sibi similem, quantum ad esse eius; +sed quantum ad perfectionem aliquam superadditam; sicut si dicamus +quod superior Angelus illuminat inferiorem, ut Dionysius dicit. +Secundum quem modum etiam in caelestibus est paternitas, ut ex +verbis apostoli patet, Ephes. III, <i>ex quo omnis paternitas in +caelo et in terra nominatur</i>. Et ex hoc etiam evidenter apparet +quod nullum ens creatum potest causare aliquid, nisi praesupposito +aliquo. Quod repugnat rationi creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality. + And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce, + as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, + whereby the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act; + and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a + much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of + much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="30360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30360] Iª q. 45 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex contrario fit aliquid per accidens, ut dicitur in +I Physic., per se autem fit aliquid ex subiecto, quod est in +potentia. Contrarium igitur resistit agenti, inquantum impedit +potentiam ab actu in quem intendit reducere agens, sicut ignis +intendit reducere materiam aquae in actum sibi similem, sed +impeditur per formam et dispositiones contrarias, quibus quasi +ligatur potentia ne reducatur in actum. Et quanto magis fuerit +potentia ligata, tanto requiritur maior virtus in agente ad +reducendam materiam in actum. Unde multo maior potentia requiritur +in agente, si nulla potentia praeexistat. Sic ergo patet quod multo +maioris virtutis est facere aliquid ex nihilo, quam ex +contrario.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made; + for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite + power, yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater + power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the + potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potentiality is + infinite, because there is no proportion between "no potentiality" and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural + agent, as there is no proportion between "not being" and "being." And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any + more than it has an infinite being, as was proved above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q45_A5-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[2]</a>), it follows that no creature can + create. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="30361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30361] Iª q. 45 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtus facientis non solum consideratur ex substantia +facti, sed etiam ex modo faciendi, maior enim calor non solum +magis, sed etiam citius calefacit. Quamvis igitur creare aliquem +effectum finitum non demonstret potentiam infinitam, tamen creare +ipsum ex nihilo demonstrat potentiam infinitam. Quod ex praedictis +patet. Si enim tanto maior virtus requiritur in agente, quanto +potentia est magis remota ab actu, oportet quod virtus agentis ex +nulla praesupposita potentia, quale agens est creans, sit infinita, +quia nulla proportio est nullius potentiae ad aliquam potentiam, +quam praesupponit virtus agentis naturalis, sicut et non entis ad +ens. Et quia nulla creatura habet simpliciter potentiam infinitam, +sicut neque esse infinitum, ut supra probatum est, relinquitur quod +nulla creatura possit creare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A6-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 6. Whether to create is proper to any person?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect + is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and + is more perfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle; whereas the creature proceeds + in imperfect similitude. Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of + the processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="30362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30362] Iª q. 45 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod creare sit proprium alicuius personae. +Quod enim est prius, est causa eius quod est post; et perfectum +imperfecti. Sed processio divinae personae est prior quam processio +creaturae, et magis perfecta, quia divina persona procedit in +perfecta similitudine sui principii, creatura vero in imperfecta. +Ergo processiones divinarum personarum sunt causa processionis +rerum. Et sic creare est proprium personae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever + difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the Persons. + But the causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed + that "He is the Creator of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by + Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He is "Lord and Life-giver." Therefore the causation + of creatures belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="30363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30363] Iª q. 45 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +personae divinae non distinguuntur ab invicem nisi per suas +processiones et relationes. Quidquid igitur differenter attribuitur +divinis personis, hoc convenit eis secundum processiones et +relationes personarum. Sed causalitas creaturarum diversimode +attribuitur divinis personis, nam in symbolo fidei patri +attribuitur quod sit creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium; +filio autem attribuitur quod per eum omnia facta sunt; sed spiritui +sancto, quod sit dominus et vivificator. Causalitas ergo +creaturarum convenit personis secundum processiones et +relationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person, + this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute---viz. by power, + goodness and wisdom---and thus does not belong to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought + not to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished + in creating according to relations and processions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="30364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30364] Iª q. 45 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +dicatur quod causalitas creaturae attenditur secundum aliquod +attributum essentiale quod appropriatur alicui personae, hoc non +videtur sufficiens. Quia quilibet effectus divinus causatur a +quolibet attributo essentiali, scilicet potentia, bonitate et +sapientia, et sic non magis pertinet ad unum quam ad aliud. Non +deberet ergo aliquis determinatus modus causalitatis attribui uni +personae magis quam alii, nisi distinguerentur in creando secundum +relationes et processiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused are the common work of the whole Godhead. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 s. c."><a name="30365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30365] Iª q. 45 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod communia totius +divinitatis sunt omnia causalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle + of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create + belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not + proper to any one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity. + </p><p id="FP_Q45_A6-p7"> Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of + things. For as was said above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[8]</a>; + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman + is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the + love of + his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through + His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch + as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 co."><a name="30366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30366] Iª q. 45 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod creare est proprie causare sive producere esse rerum. Cum +autem omne agens agat sibi simile, principium actionis considerari +potest ex actionis effectu, ignis enim est qui generat ignem. Et +ideo creare convenit Deo secundum suum esse, quod est eius +essentia, quae est communis tribus personis. Unde creare non est +proprium alicui personae, sed commune toti Trinitati. Sed tamen +divinae personae secundum rationem suae processionis habent +causalitatem respectu creationis rerum. Ut enim supra ostensum est, +cum de Dei scientia et voluntate ageretur, Deus est causa rerum per +suum intellectum et voluntatem, sicut artifex rerum artificiatarum. +Artifex autem per verbum in intellectu conceptum, et per amorem +suae voluntatis ad aliquid relatum, operatur. Unde et Deus pater +operatus est creaturam per suum verbum, quod est filius; et per +suum amorem, qui est spiritus sanctus. Et secundum hoc processiones +personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, inquantum +includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia et +voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="30367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30367] Iª q. 45 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod processiones divinarum personarum sunt causa +creationis sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son + receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common + to the three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from + both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not + receive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3</a>), "Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power, but from another; for this preposition "through" + usually denotes a mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle." But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, + is attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for + this particular + appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated ( + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q39_A8" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[39], A[8]</a>, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to + be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: "Through + Whom all things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which + belong both government, which brings things to their proper end, and the giving of life---for life consists in a certain interior + movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="30368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30368] Iª q. 45 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut natura divina, licet sit communis tribus +personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit, inquantum filius +accipit naturam divinam a patre, et spiritus sanctus ab utroque; +ita etiam et virtus creandi, licet sit communis tribus personis, +ordine tamen quodam eis convenit; nam filius habet eam a patre, et +spiritus sanctus ab utroque. Unde creatorem esse attribuitur patri, +ut ei qui non habet virtutem creandi ab alio. De filio autem +dicitur per quem omnia facta sunt, inquantum habet eandem virtutem, +sed ab alio, nam haec praepositio per solet denotare causam mediam, +sive principium de principio. Sed spiritui sancto, qui habet eandem +virtutem ab utroque, attribuitur quod dominando gubernet, et +vivificet quae sunt creata a patre per filium. Potest etiam huius +attributionis communis ratio accipi ex appropriatione essentialium +attributorum. Nam, sicut supra dictum est, patri appropriatur +potentia, quae maxime manifestatur in creatione, et ideo +attribuitur patri creatorem esse. Filio autem appropriatur +sapientia, per quam agens per intellectum operatur, et ideo dicitur +de filio, per quem omnia facta sunt. Spiritui sancto autem +appropriatur bonitas, ad quam pertinet gubernatio deducens res in +debitos fines, et vivificatio, nam vita in interiori quodam motu +consistit, primum autem movens est finis et bonitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally + connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom," and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness" + poured out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to "power." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="30369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30369] Iª q. 45 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet quilibet effectus Dei procedat ex quolibet +attributorum, tamen reducitur unusquisque effectus ad illud +attributum, cum quo habet convenientiam secundum propriam rationem, +sicut ordinatio rerum ad sapientiam, et iustificatio impii ad +misericordiam et bonitatem se superabundanter diffundentem. Creatio +vero, quae est productio ipsius substantiae rei, reducitur ad +potentiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A7-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 7. Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through + its traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above stated ( + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q45_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="30370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30370] Iª q. 45 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in creaturis non sit necesse inveniri +vestigium Trinitatis. Per sua enim vestigia unumquodque investigari +potest. Sed Trinitas personarum non potest investigari ex +creaturis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo vestigia Trinitatis non sunt +in creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some + of their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity + in each of these (properties): and so on to infinitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="30371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30371] Iª q. 45 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid in creatura est, creatum est. Si igitur vestigium +Trinitatis invenitur in creatura secundum aliquas proprietates +suas, et omne creatum habet vestigium Trinitatis, oportet in +unaquaque illarum inveniri etiam vestigium Trinitatis, et sic in +infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to + the relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of + the Trinity but of the unity of essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="30372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30372] Iª q. 45 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +effectus non repraesentat nisi suam causam. Sed causalitas +creaturarum pertinet ad naturam communem, non autem ad relationes, +quibus personae distinguuntur et numerantur. Ergo in creatura non +invenitur vestigium Trinitatis, sed solum unitatis essentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that "the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 s. c."><a name="30373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30373] Iª q. 45 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod <i>Trinitatis vestigium in +creatura apparet</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause, + but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a "trace": for a trace shows that someone has + passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents + fire generating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the + representation of "image." Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was + said above + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q27" id="FP_Q45_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(Q[27])</a>. For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational + creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there + is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding. + </p><p id="FP_Q45_A7-p7"> But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are + necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, + whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents + the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle + from no principle." According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is + from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He + is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De + Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according "as it is one individual," and according + "as it + is formed by a species," and according as it "has a certain relation of order." And to these also are reduced those three, + "number," "weight," and "measure," mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing + limited by its principles, "number" refers to the species, "weight" refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the + other three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," "species," and "order," and also those he mentions (QQ. 83, + qu. + 18): "that which exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing exists by its substance, is distinct + by its form, and agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 co."><a name="30374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30374] Iª q. 45 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod omnis effectus aliqualiter repraesentat suam causam, sed +diversimode. Nam aliquis effectus repraesentat solam causalitatem +causae, non autem formam eius, sicut fumus repraesentat ignem, et +talis repraesentatio dicitur esse repraesentatio vestigii; +vestigium enim demonstrat motum alicuius transeuntis, sed non +qualis sit. Aliquis autem effectus repraesentat causam quantum ad +similitudinem formae eius, sicut ignis generatus ignem generantem, +et statua Mercurii Mercurium, et haec est repraesentatio imaginis. +Processiones autem divinarum personarum attenduntur secundum actus +intellectus et voluntatis, sicut supra dictum est, nam filius +procedit ut verbum intellectus, spiritus sanctus ut amor +voluntatis. In creaturis igitur rationalibus, in quibus est +intellectus et voluntas, invenitur repraesentatio Trinitatis per +modum imaginis, inquantum invenitur in eis verbum conceptum et amor +procedens. Sed in creaturis omnibus invenitur repraesentatio +Trinitatis per modum vestigii, inquantum in qualibet creatura +inveniuntur aliqua quae necesse est reducere in divinas personas +sicut in causam. Quaelibet enim creatura subsistit in suo esse, et +habet formam per quam determinatur ad speciem, et habet ordinem ad +aliquid aliud. Secundum igitur quod est quaedam substantia creata, +repraesentat causam et principium, et sic demonstrat personam +patris, qui est principium non de principio. Secundum autem quod +habet quandam formam et speciem, repraesentat verbum; secundum quod +forma artificiati est ex conceptione artificis. Secundum autem quod +habet ordinem, repraesentat spiritum sanctum, inquantum est amor, +quia ordo effectus ad aliquid alterum est ex voluntate creantis. Et +ideo dicit Augustinus, in VI Lib. de Trin., quod vestigium +Trinitatis invenitur in unaquaque creatura, secundum quod unum +aliquid est, et secundum quod aliqua specie formatur, et secundum +quod quendam ordinem tenet. Et ad haec etiam reducuntur illa tria, +numerus, pondus et mensura, quae ponuntur Sap. XI, nam mensura +refertur ad substantiam rei limitatam suis principiis, numerus ad +speciem, pondus ad ordinem. Et ad haec etiam reducuntur alia tria +quae ponit Augustinus, modus species et ordo. Et ea quae ponit in +libro octoginta trium quaest. quod constat, quod discernitur, quod +congruit, constat enim aliquid per suam substantiam, discernitur +per formam, congruit per ordinem. Et in idem de facili reduci +possunt quaecumque sic dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge + of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we have said ( + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q45_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="30375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30375] Iª q. 45 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod repraesentatio vestigii attenditur secundum +appropriata, per quem modum ex creaturis in Trinitatem divinarum +personarum veniri potest, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A creature properly speaking is a thing self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found. Nor + is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being + is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="30376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30376] Iª q. 45 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod creatura est res proprie subsistens, in qua est +praedicta tria invenire. Neque oportet quod in quolibet eorum quae +ei insunt, haec tria inveniantur, sed secundum ea vestigium rei +subsistenti attribuitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation; as appears from the above + <a href="#FP_Q45_A6" id="FP_Q45_A7-p10.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="30377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30377] Iª q. 45 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam processiones personarum sunt causa et ratio +creationis aliquo modo, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A8-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 8. Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is + produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and + thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="30378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30378] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod creatio admisceatur in operibus naturae et +artis. In qualibet enim operatione naturae et artis producitur +aliqua forma. Sed non producitur ex aliquo, cum non habeat materiam +partem sui. Ergo producitur ex nihilo. Et sic in qualibet +operatione naturae et artis est creatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which + is an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it + must be produced by creation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="30379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30379] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +effectus non est potior sua causa. Sed in rebus naturalibus non +invenitur aliquid agens nisi forma accidentalis, quae est forma +activa vel passiva. Non ergo per operationem naturae producitur +forma substantialis. Relinquitur igitur quod sit per +creationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident + in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason + applies to other things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="30380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30380] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +natura facit sibi simile. Sed quaedam inveniuntur generata in +natura non ab aliquo sibi simili, sicut patet in animalibus +generatis per putrefactionem. Ergo eorum forma non est a natura, +sed a creatione. Et eadem ratio est de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow + that nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="30381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30381] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod +non creatur, non est creatura. Si igitur in his quae sunt a natura +non adiungatur creatio, sequitur quod ea quae sunt a natura, non +sunt creaturae. Quod est haereticum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 s. c."><a name="30382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30382] Iª q. 45 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus, super Gen. ad Lit., distinguit opus propagationis, +quod est opus naturae, ab opere creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but + previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from + not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they + asserted that they pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms were given or + caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this + opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting, + but is that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone, + as shown above + <a href="#FP_Q45_A4" id="FP_Q45_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be + "concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter. + </p><p id="FP_Q45_A8-p8"> Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is presupposed to the work of nature.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 co."><a name="30383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30383] Iª q. 45 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod haec dubitatio inducitur propter formas. Quas quidam posuerunt +non incipere per actionem naturae, sed prius in materia extitisse, +ponentes latitationem formarum. Et hoc accidit eis ex ignorantia +materiae, quia nesciebant distinguere inter potentiam et actum, +quia enim formae praeexistunt in materia in potentia, posuerunt eas +simpliciter praeexistere. Alii vero posuerunt formas dari vel +causari ab agente separato, per modum creationis. Et secundum hoc +cuilibet operationi naturae adiungitur creatio. Sed hoc accidit eis +ex ignorantia formae. Non enim considerabant quod forma naturalis +corporis non est subsistens, sed quo aliquid est, et ideo, cum +fieri et creari non conveniat proprie nisi rei subsistenti, sicut +supra dictum est, formarum non est fieri neque creari, sed +concreata esse. Quod autem proprie fit ab agente naturali, est +compositum, quod fit ex materia. Unde in operibus naturae non +admiscetur creatio, sed praesupponitur ad operationem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made, not as though they were made "directly," but only "indirectly." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="30384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30384] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod formae incipiunt esse in actu, compositis factis, non +quod ipsae fiant per se, sed per accidens tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its + like according to quality, but according to species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="30385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30385] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod qualitates activae in natura agunt in virtute +formarum substantialium. Et ideo agens naturale non solum producit +sibi simile secundum qualitatem, sed secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to which + they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are + created by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper + agent is required, in the shape of a univocal generator. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="30386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30386] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ad generationem animalium imperfectorum sufficit +agens universale, quod est virtus caelestis, cui assimilantur non +secundum speciem, sed secundum analogiam quandam, neque oportet +dicere quod eorum formae creantur ab agente separato. Ad +generationem vero animalium perfectorum non sufficit agens +universale, sed requiritur agens proprium, quod est generans +univocum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are + called creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="30387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30387] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod operatio naturae non est nisi ex praesuppositione +principiorum creatorum, et sic ea quae per naturam fiunt, creaturae +dicuntur.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q46" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q46-p0.1">Q. 46. OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q46-p2"> Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures, about which there are three points for treatment:</p><p id="FP_Q46-p3"><a href="#FP_Q46_A1"> (1) Whether creatures always existed?</a></p><p id="FP_Q46-p4"><a href="#FP_Q46_A2"> (2) Whether that they began to exist in an article of Faith?</a></p><p id="FP_Q46-p5"><a href="#FP_Q46_A3"> (3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 pr."><a name="30388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30388] +Iª q. 46 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +principio durationis rerum creatarum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. +Primo, utrum creaturae semper fuerint. Secundo, utrum eas +incoepisse sit articulus fidei. Tertio, quomodo Deus dicatur in +principio caelum et terram creasse.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q46_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q46_A1-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 1. Whether the universe of creatures always existed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything + which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore + the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in potentiality + to existence, which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from + privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist + without form: while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist: + which is impossible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="30389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30389] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod universitas creaturarum, quae mundi nomine +nuncupatur, non incoeperit, sed fuerit ab aeterno. Omne enim quod +incoepit esse, antequam fuerit, possibile fuit ipsum esse, alioquin +impossibile fuisset ipsum fieri. Si ergo mundus incoepit esse, +antequam inciperet, possibile fuit ipsum esse. Sed quod possibile +est esse, est materia, quae est in potentia ad esse, quod est per +formam, et ad non esse, quod est per privationem. Si ergo mundus +incoepit esse, ante mundum fuit materia. Sed non potest esse +materia sine forma, materia autem mundi cum forma, est mundus. Fuit +ergo mundus antequam esse inciperet, quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing + extends so long is exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its power does not extend to any determinate + time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not: but everything which has a beginning at some time + is, and at some time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there + are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did + not begin to exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="30390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30390] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil +quod habet virtutem ut sit semper, quandoque est et quandoque non +est, quia ad quantum se extendit virtus alicuius rei, tandiu est. +Sed omne incorruptibile habet virtutem ut sit semper, non enim +virtutem habet ad determinatum durationis tempus. Nullum ergo +incorruptibile quandoque est et quandoque non est. Sed omne quod +incipit esse, quandoque est et quandoque non est. Nullum ergo +incorruptibile incipit esse. Sed multa sunt in mundo +incorruptibilia, ut corpora caelestia, et omnes substantiae +intellectuales. Ergo mundus non incoepit esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and + also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="30391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30391] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nullum ingenitum incoepit esse. Sed philosophus probat in I +Physic., quod materia est ingenita; et in I de caelo et mundo, quod +caelum est ingenitum. Non ergo universitas rerum incoepit esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body + where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world + there was a vacuum; which is impossible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="30392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30392] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +vacuum est ubi non est corpus, sed possibile est esse. Sed si +mundus incoepit esse, ubi nunc est corpus mundi, prius non fuit +aliquod corpus, et tamen poterat ibi esse, alioquin nunc ibi non +esset. Ergo ante mundum fuit vacuum, quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before. + But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement. + Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only in a movable thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="30393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30393] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, nihil +de novo incipit moveri, nisi per hoc quod movens vel mobile aliter +se habet nunc quam prius. Sed quod aliter se habet nunc quam prius, +movetur. Ergo ante omnem motum de novo incipientem, fuit aliquis +motus. Motus ergo semper fuit. Ergo et mobile, quia motus non est +nisi in mobili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For + nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable + thing, there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there before. And the will, without itself being + changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined change, + at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow, + but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because + time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so + the same conclusion follows as before. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="30394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30394] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, omne +movens aut est naturale, aut est voluntarium. Sed neutrum incipit +movere, nisi aliquo motu praeexistente. Natura enim semper eodem +modo operatur. Unde, nisi praecedat aliqua immutatio vel in natura +moventis vel in mobili, non incipiet a movente naturali esse motus, +qui non fuit prius. Voluntas autem absque sui immutatione retardat +facere quod proponit, sed hoc non est nisi per aliquam immutationem +quam imaginatur, ad minus ex parte ipsius temporis. Sicut qui vult +facere domum cras, et non hodie, expectat aliquid futurum cras, +quod hodie non est; et ad minus expectat quod dies hodiernus +transeat, et crastinus adveniat; quod sine mutatione non est, quia +tempus est numerus motus. Relinquitur ergo quod ante omnem motum de +novo incipientem, fuit alius motus. Et sic idem quod prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is + not in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning and end, because there is no + time except "now" which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time cannot begin or end, and consequently + neither can movement, the measure of what is time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 7"><a name="30395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30395] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid est semper in principio et semper in fine, nec incipere +nec desinere potest, quia quod incipit, non est in suo fine; quod +autem desinit, non est in suo principio. Sed tempus semper est in +suo principio et fine, quia nihil est temporis nisi nunc, quod est +finis praeteriti, et principium futuri. Ergo tempus nec incipere +nec desinere potest. Et per consequens nec motus, cuius numerus +tempus est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, God is before the world either in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only, + therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior + in duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the world, which is impossible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 8"><a name="30396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30396] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +aut est prior mundo natura tantum, aut duratione. Si natura tantum, +ergo, cum Deus sit ab aeterno, et mundus est ab aeterno. Si autem +est prior duratione; prius autem et posterius in duratione +constituunt tempus, ergo ante mundum fuit tempus; quod est +impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause, + requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by + reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears + from the above ( + <a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q46_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Since therefore God is + eternal, the world is also eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 9"><a name="30397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30397] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea, +posita causa sufficienti, ponitur effectus, causa enim ad quam non +sequitur effectus, est causa imperfecta, indigens alio ad hoc quod +effectus sequatur. Sed Deus est sufficiens causa mundi; et finalis, +ratione suae bonitatis; et exemplaris, ratione suae sapientiae; et +effectiva, ratione suae potentiae; ut ex superioribus patet. Cum +ergo Deus sit ab aeterno, et mundus fuit ab aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p11"> + <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore + the world is eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 10"><a name="30398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30398] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 10</span></a> Praeterea, +cuius actio est aeterna, et effectus aeternus. Sed actio Dei est +eius substantia, quae est aeterna. Ergo et mundus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.5" target="asv">Jn. 17:5</a>), "Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.22" target="asv">Prov. 8:22</a>), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 s. c."><a name="30399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30399] Iª q. 46 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Ioan. XVII, <i>clarifica me, pater, apud temetipsum, +claritate quam habui priusquam mundus fieret</i>; et Proverb. VIII, +<i>dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum, antequam quidquam +faceret a principio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p13"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will + them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above + ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that, absolutely + speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will + that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world + depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot + be proved by demonstration. + </p><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p14"> Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively, demonstrative---viz. in order to contradict the reasons + of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three + ways. Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, + Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this + subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is + probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing + to say from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 co."><a name="30400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30400] Iª q. 46 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +nihil praeter Deum ab aeterno fuisse. Et hoc quidem ponere non est +impossibile. Ostensum est enim supra quod voluntas Dei est causa +rerum. Sic ergo aliqua necesse est esse, sicut necesse est Deum +velle illa, cum necessitas effectus ex necessitate causae +dependeat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ostensum est autem supra quod, +absolute loquendo, non est necesse Deum velle aliquid nisi seipsum. +Non est ergo necessarium Deum velle quod mundus fuerit semper. Sed +eatenus mundus est, quatenus Deus vult illum esse, cum esse mundi +ex voluntate Dei dependeat sicut ex sua causa. Non est igitur +necessarium mundum semper esse. Unde nec demonstrative probari +potest. Nec rationes quas ad hoc Aristoteles inducit, sunt +demonstrativae simpliciter, sed secundum quid, scilicet ad +contradicendum rationibus antiquorum, ponentium mundum incipere +secundum quosdam modos in veritate impossibiles. Et hoc apparet ex +tribus. Primo quidem, quia tam in VIII Physic. quam in I de caelo, +praemittit quasdam opiniones, ut Anaxagorae et Empedoclis et +Platonis, contra quos rationes contradictorias inducit. Secundo, +quia, ubicumque de hac materia loquitur, inducit testimonia +antiquorum, quod non est demonstratoris, sed probabiliter +persuadentis. Tertio, quia expresse dicit in I Lib. Topic., quod +quaedam sunt problemata dialectica, de quibus rationes non habemus, +ut utrum mundus sit aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter, + but according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to + any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed + to impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="30401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30401] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, antequam mundus esset, possibile fuit mundum esse, +non quidem secundum potentiam passivam, quae est materia; sed +secundum potentiam activam Dei. Et etiam secundum quod dicitur +aliquid absolute possibile, non secundum aliquam potentiam sed ex +sola habitudine terminorum, qui sibi non repugnant; secundum quod +possibile opponitur impossibili, ut patet per philosophum, in V +Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before + it received that power, it did not exist. + </p><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p17"> Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible things never + began to exist; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="30402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30402] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod habet virtutem ut sit semper ex quo habet +illam virtutem, non quandoque est et quandoque non est, sed +antequam haberet illam virtutem, non fuit. Unde haec ratio, quae +ponitur ab Aristotele in I de caelo, non concludit simpliciter quod +incorruptibilia non incoeperunt esse, sed quod non incoeperunt esse +per modum naturalem, quo generabilia et corruptibilia incipiunt +esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive + its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from + which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin + by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and + heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above ( + <a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q46_A1-p18.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[1]</a>, ad 2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="30403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30403] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Aristoteles, in I Physic., probat materiam esse +ingenitam, per hoc quod non habet subiectum de quo sit. In I autem +de caelo et mundo, probat caelum ingenitum, quia non habet +contrarium ex quo generetur. Unde patet quod per utrumque non +concluditur nisi quod materia et caelum non incoeperunt per +generationem, ut quidam ponebant, praecipue de caelo. Nos autem +dicimus quod materia et coelum producta sunt in esse per +creationem, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which + there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before + the world was. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="30404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30404] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ad rationem vacui non sufficit in quo nihil est, sed +requiritur quod sit spatium capax corporis, in quo non sit corpus, +ut patet per Aristotelem, in IV Physic. Nos autem dicimus non +fuisse locum aut spatium ante mundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas + hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q45_A2" id="FP_Q46_A1-p20.1" shape="rect">Q[45], A[2]</a>, as 2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys. viii), is valid against those who admitted the + existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal + movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things + began to exist movement also existed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="30405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30405] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod primus motor semper eodem modo se habuit primum autem +mobile non semper eodem modo se habuit, quia incoepit esse, cum +prius non fuisset. Sed hoc non fuit per mutationem, sed per +creationem, quae non est mutatio, ut supra dictum est. Unde patet +quod haec ratio, quam ponit Aristoteles in VIII Physic., procedit +contra eos qui ponebant mobilia aeterna, sed motum non aeternum; ut +patet ex opinionibus Anaxagorae et Empedoclis. Nos autem ponimus, +ex quo mobilia incoeperunt, semper fuisse motum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce + an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must + take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else, + and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the + form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. + Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different + kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say + of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it + presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time "after" and not in time "before," according to an imaginary + succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as + acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His + action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was + fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it + was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is + not so manifest of what always was. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="30406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30406] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum +quod primum agens est agens voluntarium. Et quamvis habuit +voluntatem aeternam producendi aliquem effectum, non tamen produxit +aeternum effectum. Nec est necesse quod praesupponatur aliqua +mutatio, nec etiam propter imaginationem temporis. Aliter enim est +intelligendum de agente particulari, quod praesupponit aliquid, et +causat alterum, et aliter de agente universali, quod producit +totum. Sicut agens particulare producit formam, et praesupponit +materiam, unde oportet quod formam inducat secundum proportionem ad +debitam materiam. Unde rationabiliter in ipso consideratur quod +inducit formam in talem materiam et non in aliam, ex differentia +materiae ad materiam. Sed hoc non rationabiliter consideratur in +Deo, qui simul producit formam et materiam, sed consideratur +rationabiliter in eo, quod ipse producit materiam congruam formae +et fini. Agens autem particulare praesupponit tempus, sicut et +materiam. Unde rationabiliter consideratur in eo, quod agit in +tempore posteriori et non in priori, secundum imaginationem +successionis temporis post tempus. Sed in agente universali, quod +producit rem et tempus, non est considerare quod agat nunc et non +prius, secundum imaginationem temporis post tempus, quasi tempus +praesupponatur eius actioni, sed considerandum est in eo, quod +dedit effectui suo tempus quantum voluit, et secundum quod +conveniens fuit ad suam potentiam demonstrandam. Manifestius enim +mundus ducit in cognitionem divinae potentiae creantis, si mundus +non semper fuit, quam si semper fuisset, omne enim quod non semper +fuit, manifestum est habere causam; sed non ita manifestum est de +eo quod semper fuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after" belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning + and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that + any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need not be if movement be a beginning. The same + applies to the "now" of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant "now," as + being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward + this reason (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 7"><a name="30407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30407] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IV Physic., prius et posterius est +in tempore, secundum quod prius et posterius est in motu. Unde +principium et finis accipienda sunt in tempore, sicut et in motu. +Supposita autem aeternitate motus, necesse est quod quodlibet +momentum in motu acceptum sit principium et terminus motus, quod +non oportet, si motus incipiat. Et eadem ratio est de nunc +temporis. Et sic patet quod ratio illa instantis nunc, quod semper +sit principium et finis temporis, praesupponit aeternitatem +temporis et motus. Unde Aristoteles hanc rationem inducit, in VIII +Physic., contra eos qui ponebant aeternitatem temporis, sed +negabant aeternitatem motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p23"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. + Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above + heaven there is nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other + dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 8"><a name="30408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30408] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +dicendum quod Deus est prior mundo duratione. Sed ly prius non +designat prioritatem temporis, sed aeternitatis. Vel dicendum quod +designat aeternitatem temporis imaginati, et non realiter +existentis. Sicut, cum dicitur, supra caelum nihil est, ly supra +designat locum imaginatum tantum, secundum quod possibile est +imaginari dimensionibus caelestis corporis dimensiones alias +superaddi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p24"> + <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> As the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from + the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>; + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q41_A2" id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.2" shape="rect">Q[41], A[2]</a>). Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was produced + by Him, + except as preordained by His will---that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare + its author. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 9"><a name="30409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30409] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum dicendum +quod, sicut effectus sequitur a causa agente naturaliter secundum +modum suae formae, ita sequitur ab agente per voluntatem secundum +formam ab eo praeconceptam et definitam, ut ex superioribus patet. +Licet igitur Deus ab aeterno fuerit sufficiens causa mundi, non +tamen oportet quod ponatur mundus ab eo productus, nisi secundum +quod est in praedefinitione suae voluntatis; ut scilicet habeat +esse post non esse, ut manifestius declaret suum auctorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p25"> + <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> Given the action, the effect follows according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents + acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore + from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which + has being after not being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 10"><a name="30410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30410] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 10</span></a> Ad decimum +dicendum quod, posita actione, sequitur effectus secundum +exigentiam formae quae est principium actionis. In agentibus autem +per voluntatem, quod conceptum est et praedefinitum, accipitur ut +forma quae est principium actionis. Ex actione igitur Dei aeterna +non sequitur effectus aeternus, sed qualem Deus voluit, ut scilicet +haberet esse post non esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q46_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q46_A2-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 2. Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that + is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; + indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="30411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30411] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod mundum incoepisse non sit articulus fidei, +sed conclusio demonstrabilis. Omne enim factum habet principium +suae durationis. Sed demonstrative probari potest quod Deus sit +causa effectiva mundi, et hoc etiam probabiliores philosophi +posuerunt. Ergo demonstrative probari potest quod mundus +incoeperit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from + something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which + are the arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world + was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have + begun. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="30412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30412] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si +necesse est dicere quod mundus factus est a Deo, aut ergo ex +nihilo, aut ex aliquo. Sed non ex aliquo, quia sic materia mundi +praecessisset mundum; contra quod procedunt rationes Aristotelis +ponentis caelum ingenitum. Ergo oportet dicere quod mundus sit +factus ex nihilo. Et sic habet esse post non esse. Ergo oportet +quod esse incoeperit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which works by intellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts + by intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="30413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30413] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod operatur per intellectum, a quodam principio operatur, ut +patet in omnibus artificibus. Sed Deus est agens per intellectum. +Ergo a quodam principio operatur mundus igitur, qui est eius +effectus, non fuit semper.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some + fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always + exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="30414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30414] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +manifeste apparet artes aliquas, et habitationes regionum, ex +determinatis temporibus incoepisse. Sed hoc non esset, si mundus +semper fuisset. Mundum igitur non semper fuisse manifestum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration. + Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="30415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30415] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +certum est nihil Deo aequari posse. Sed si mundus semper fuisset, +aequipararetur Deo in duratione. Ergo certum est non semper mundum +fuisse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to + pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 6"><a name="30416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30416] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, si +mundus semper fuit, infiniti dies praecesserunt diem istum. Sed +infinita non est pertransire. Ergo nunquam fuisset perventum ad +hunc diem, quod est manifeste falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite + series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be + an infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 7"><a name="30417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30417] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, si +mundus fuit aeternus, et generatio fuit ab aeterno. Ergo unus homo +genitus est ab alio in infinitum. Sed pater est causa efficiens +filii, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo in causis efficientibus est +procedere in infinitum, quod improbatur in II Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal: + therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with + certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 8"><a name="30418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30418] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, si +mundus et generatio semper fuit, infiniti homines praecesserunt. +Sed anima hominis est immortalis. Ergo infinitae animae humanae +nunc essent actu, quod est impossibile. Ergo ex necessitate sciri +potest quod mundus incoeperit; et non sola fide tenetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p10"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in + one God," etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God + created heaven and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated. + Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 s. c."><a name="30419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30419] Iª q. 46 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, fidei +articuli demonstrative probari non possunt, <i>quia fides de non +apparentibus est</i>, ut dicitur ad Hebr. XI. Sed Deum esse +creatorem mundi, sic quod mundus incoeperit esse, est articulus +fidei, dicimus enim, credo in unum Deum et cetera. Et iterum, +Gregorius dicit, in Homil. I in Ezech., quod Moyses prophetizavit +de praeterito, dicens in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram; +in quo novitas mundi traditur. Ergo novitas mundi habetur tantum +per revelationem. Et ideo non potest probari demonstrative.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p11"> + <b>I answer that,</b> By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above + of the mystery of the Trinity ( + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle + of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence + it is said + that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always. + Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot + be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures + is not among these, as was said above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>). But the divine will can be manifested by + revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science. + And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that + are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of + faith. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 co."><a name="30420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30420] Iª q. 46 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod mundum non semper fuisse, sola fide tenetur, et demonstrative +probari non potest, sicut et supra de mysterio Trinitatis dictum +est. Et huius ratio est, quia novitas mundi non potest +demonstrationem recipere ex parte ipsius mundi. Demonstrationis +enim principium est quod quid est. Unumquodque autem, secundum +rationem suae speciei, abstrahit ab hic et nunc, propter quod +dicitur quod universalia sunt ubique et semper. Unde demonstrari +non potest quod homo, aut caelum, aut lapis non semper fuit. +Similiter etiam neque ex parte causae agentis, quae agit per +voluntatem. Voluntas enim Dei ratione investigari non potest, nisi +circa ea quae absolute necesse est Deum velle, talia autem non sunt +quae circa creaturas vult, ut dictum est. Potest autem voluntas +divina homini manifestari per revelationem, cui fides innititur. +Unde mundum incoepisse est credibile, non autem demonstrabile vel +scibile. Et hoc utile est ut consideretur, ne forte aliquis, quod +fidei est demonstrare praesumens, rationes non necessarias inducat, +quae praebeant materiam irridendi infidelibus, existimantibus nos +propter huiusmodi rationes credere quae fidei sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For + some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by + proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. For they hold that the world + has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible + way it was always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in + the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the + world always was, because its Maker always existed." To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts + by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent + must be the principle of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker + to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily + if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; because creation, by which He produced + the world, is not a successive change, as was said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q45_A2" id="FP_Q46_A2-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[45], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="30421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30421] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, XI de Civ. Dei, +philosophorum ponentium aeternitatem mundi, duplex fuit opinio. +Quidam enim posuerunt quod substantia mundi non sit a Deo. Et horum +est intollerabilis error; et ideo ex necessitate refellitur. Quidam +autem sic posuerunt mundum aeternum, quod tamen mundum a Deo factum +dixerunt. <i>Non enim mundum temporis volunt habere, sed suae +creationis initium, ut quodam modo vix intelligibili semper sit +factus. Id autem quomodo intelligant, invenerunt</i>, ut idem dicit +in X de Civ. Dei. <i>Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate +semper fuisset in pulvere, semper subesset vestigium, quod a +calcante factum nemo dubitaret; sic et mundus semper fuit, semper +existente qui fecit</i>. Et ad hoc intelligendum, considerandum est +quod causa efficiens quae agit per motum, de necessitate praecedit +tempore suum effectum, quia effectus non est nisi in termino +actionis, agens autem omne oportet esse principium actionis. Sed si +actio sit instantanea, et non successiva, non est necessarium +faciens esse prius facto duratione; sicut patet in illuminatione. +Unde dicunt quod non sequitur ex necessitate, si Deus est causa +activa mundi, quod sit prior mundo duratione, quia creatio, qua +mundum produxit, non est mutatio successiva, ut supra dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made + after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some + of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix, text 4). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="30422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30422] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi qui ponerent mundum aeternum, dicerent mundum +factum a Deo ex nihilo, non quod factus sit post nihilum, secundum +quod nos intelligimus per nomen creationis; sed quia non est factus +de aliquo. Et sic etiam non recusant aliqui eorum creationis nomen, +ut patet ex Avicenna in sua metaphysica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except + as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human + intellect, but not the divine intellect ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A7" id="FP_Q46_A2-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[14], AA[7]</a>,12). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="30423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30423] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa est ratio Anaxagorae, quae ponitur in III +Physic. Sed non de necessitate concludit, nisi de intellectu qui +deliberando investigat quid agendum sit, quod est simile motui. +Talis autem est intellectus humanus, sed non divinus, ut supra +patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable + to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents, + were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such particular + changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="30424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30424] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ponentes aeternitatem mundi, ponunt aliquam regionem +infinities esse mutatam de inhabitabili in habitabilem, et e +converso. Et similiter ponunt quod artes, propter diversas +corruptiones et accidentia, infinities fuerunt inventae, et iterum +corruptae. Unde Aristoteles dicit, in libro Meteor., quod ridiculum +est ex huiusmodi particularibus mutationibus opinionem accipere de +novitate mundi totius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because + the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="30425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30425] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, etsi mundus semper fuisset, non tamen parificaretur +Deo in aeternitate, ut dicit Boetius, in fine de Consolat., quia +esse divinum est esse totum simul, absque successione; non autem +sic est de mundo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there + is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there + is an infinite number of mean terms. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 6"><a name="30426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30426] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum +quod transitus semper intelligitur a termino in terminum. +Quaecumque autem praeterita dies signetur, ab illa usque ad istam +sunt finiti dies, qui pertransiri poterunt. Obiectio autem procedit +ac si, positis extremis, sint media infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity "per se"---thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes + that are "per se" required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and + so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity "accidentally" as regards efficient causes; for instance, + if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one + cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after + the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise + it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as + the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes---viz. the grade of a particular + generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if + the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 7"><a name="30427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30427] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod in causis efficientibus impossibile est procedere in +infinitum per se; ut puta si causae quae per se requiruntur ad +aliquem effectum, multiplicarentur in infinitum; sicut si lapis +moveretur a baculo, et baculus a manu, et hoc in infinitum. Sed per +accidens in infinitum procedere in causis agentibus non reputatur +impossibile; ut puta si omnes causae quae in infinitum +multiplicantur, non teneant ordinem nisi unius causae, sed earum +multiplicatio sit per accidens; sicut artifex agit multis martellis +per accidens, quia unus post unum frangitur. Accidit ergo huic +martello, quod agat post actionem alterius martelli. Et similiter +accidit huic homini, inquantum generat, quod sit generatus ab alio, +generat enim inquantum homo, et non inquantum est filius alterius +hominis; omnes enim homines generantes habent gradum unum in causis +efficientibus, scilicet gradum particularis generantis. Unde non +est impossibile quod homo generetur ab homine in infinitum. Esset +autem impossibile, si generatio huius hominis dependeret ab hoc +homine, et a corpore elementari, et a sole, et sic in +infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to + be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. + But this was disproved above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A4" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[4]</a>). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as + Augustine says + [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a circuit of souls---viz. + that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters + will be given later ( + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.2" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A6" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.3" shape="rect">Q[118], A[6]</a>). But be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or + least some creature, as an + angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 8"><a name="30428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30428] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +dicendum quod hanc rationem ponentes aeternitatem mundi +multipliciter effugiunt quidam enim non reputant impossibile esse +infinitas animas actu; ut patet in metaphysica Algazelis, dicentis +hoc esse infinitum per accidens. Sed hoc improbatum est superius. +Quidam vero dicunt animam corrumpi cum corpore. Quidam vero quod ex +omnibus animabus remanet una tantum. Alii vero, ut Augustinus +dicit, posuerunt propter hoc circuitum animarum; ut scilicet animae +separatae a corporibus, post determinata temporum curricula, iterum +redirent ad corpora. De quibus omnibus in sequentibus est agendum. +Considerandum tamen quod haec ratio particularis est. Unde posset +dicere aliquis quod mundus fuit aeternus, vel saltem aliqua +creatura, ut Angelus; non autem homo. Nos autem intendimus +universaliter, an aliqua creatura fuerit ab aeterno.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q46_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q46_A3-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 3. Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part + of time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being; and + time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. Therefore creation was not in the beginning + of time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="30429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30429] Iª q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod creatio rerum non fuit in principio +temporis. Quod enim non est in tempore, non est in aliquo temporis. +Sed creatio rerum non fuit in tempore, per creationem enim rerum +substantia in esse producta est; tempus autem non mensurat +substantiam rerum, et praecipue incorporalium. Ergo creatio non +fuit in principio temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies + a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore, + since to be created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="30430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30430] Iª q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus probat quod omne quod fit, fiebat, et sic omne fieri +habet prius et posterius. In principio autem temporis, cum sit +indivisibile, non est prius et posterius. Ergo, cum creari sit +quoddam fieri, videtur quod res non sint creatae in principio +temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the + beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="30431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30431] Iª q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ipsum +etiam tempus creatum est. Sed non potest creari in principio +temporis, cum tempus sit divisibile, principium autem temporis +indivisibile. Non ergo creatio rerum fuit in principio +temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 s. c."><a name="30432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30432] Iª q. 46 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Gen. I dicitur, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et +terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude + three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the + beginning" are expounded---viz. "of time." And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and + the other of evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded---"in the Son." + For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated + to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.24" target="asv">Ps. 103:24</a>), "Thou hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning---that is, in the + Son; according to the word of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.16" target="asv">Col. 1:16</a>), "In Him"---viz. the Son---"were created all things." But others said that corporeal + things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"---i.e. + before all things---"God created heaven and earth." For four things are stated to be created together---viz. the empyrean + heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 co."><a name="30433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30433] Iª q. 46 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod illud verbum Genes. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et +terram</i>, tripliciter exponitur, ad excludendum tres errores. +Quidam enim posuerunt mundum semper fuisse, et tempus non habere +principium. Et ad hoc excludendum, exponitur, in principio, +scilicet temporis. Quidam vero posuerunt duo esse creationis +principia, unum bonorum, aliud malorum. Et ad hoc excludendum, +exponitur, in principio, idest in filio. Sicut enim principium +effectivum appropriatur patri, propter potentiam, ita principium +exemplare appropriatur filio, propter sapientiam, ut sicut dicitur, +omnia in sapientia fecisti, ita intelligatur Deum omnia fecisse in +principio, idest in filio; secundum illud apostoli ad Coloss. I, in +ipso, scilicet filio, condita sunt universa. Alii vero dixerunt +corporalia esse creata a Deo mediantibus creaturis spiritualibus. +Et ad hoc excludendum, exponitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum +et terram, idest ante omnia. Quatuor enim ponuntur simul creata, +scilicet caelum Empyreum, materia corporalis (quae nomine terrae +intelligitur), tempus, et natura angelica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because + together with time heaven and earth were created. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="30434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30434] Iª q. 46 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod non dicuntur in principio temporis res esse creatae, +quasi principium temporis sit creationis mensura sed quia simul cum +tempore caelum et terra creata sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because, since + in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one point in a given movement---that is, whilst anything is in + the process of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after," because what is in the beginning of movement + or in its term is not in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the + term of movement, as was said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q45_A2" id="FP_Q46_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[45], AA[2]</a>,3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="30435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30435] Iª q. 46 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi intelligitur de fieri quod +est per motum, vel quod est terminus motus. Quia cum in quolibet +motu sit accipere prius et posterius, ante quodcumque signum in +motu signato, dum scilicet aliquid est in moveri et fieri, est +accipere prius, et etiam aliquid post ipsum, quia quod est in +principio motus, vel in termino, non est in moveri. Creatio autem +neque est motus neque terminus motus, ut supra dictum est. Unde sic +aliquid creatur, quod non prius creabatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according + to some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from it time begins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="30436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30436] Iª q. 46 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nihil fit nisi secundum quod est. Nihil autem est +temporis nisi nunc. Unde non potest fieri nisi secundum aliquod +nunc, non quia in ipso primo nunc sit tempus, sed quia ab eo +incipit tempus.</p></div></div></div></div> + + + ` + </div> + </body> + </html> \ No newline at end of file