Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
changeset 72:3dd981256764
fix summa links
| author | ht |
|---|---|
| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 23:43:20 +0000 |
| parents | d8c190e4b9ef |
| children | 4d008448af18 |
| files | summa/bilingual/FP_ii.html summa/bilingual/bi.xsl summa/bilingual/merge.xpl |
| diffstat | 3 files changed, 249 insertions(+), 230 deletions(-) [+] |
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--- a/summa/bilingual/FP_ii.html Sun Jan 03 18:56:45 2010 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/FP_ii.html Sun Jan 03 23:43:20 2010 +0000 @@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ </style> </head> <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.ii" class="div2"> - <a href="summa.FP_Q1_A10.html"/> - <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"/> + + <h2 id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2> <div id="FP_Q2" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q2-p0.1">Q. 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown ( - <a id="FP_Q2_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated + <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q2_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature---namely, by effects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="28303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28303] Iª q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ quod dicitur Ioan. IV, <i>spiritus est Deus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved ( - <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the + <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only @@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ Illud autem per quod vivit corpus, est nobilius quam corpus. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( - <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q1_A9.html">Q[1], A[9]</a>), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes + <a href="FP_i.html#FP_Q1_A9" id="FP_Q3_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[9]</a>), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration of His existence; by @@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ est quae primo inhaeret materiae. Sed Deus non est corpus, ut ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est compositus ex materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown ( - <a id="FP_Q3_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, + <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the best---viz. God---is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. @@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt</i>. Ergo esse Dei non est eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above ( - <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2], A[2]</a>); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or + <a href="#FP_Q2_A2" id="FP_Q3_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[2]</a>); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28349] Iª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de Deo scire possumus an sit, ut supra dictum est. Non autem possumus @@ -817,10 +817,10 @@ as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above - <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, + <a href="#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above - <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">(A[3])</a> if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not + <a href="#FP_Q3_A3" id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="28351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28351] Iª q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est, sed etiam @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is true; and this we know from His effects ( - <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2], + <a href="#FP_Q2_A2" id="FP_Q3_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[2] </a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28353] Iª q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum @@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ <b>I answer that,</b> From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown ( - <a id="FP_Q3_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded + <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A6-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is @@ -1075,9 +1075,9 @@ difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them + <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must + <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, @@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@ qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p6"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, ( - <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). + <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28370] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt a Deo, imitantur Deum sicut causata primam causam. Est autem hoc de ratione causati, quod sit aliquo @@ -1131,8 +1131,8 @@ est, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing ( - <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a> and - <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], A[2]</a>). + <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[1]</a> and + <a href="#FP_Q6_A2" id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[6], A[2]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28371] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod apud nos composita sunt meliora simplicibus, quia perfectio bonitatis creaturae non invenitur in uno simplici, sed in @@ -1186,10 +1186,10 @@ because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear from the foregoing ( - <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which + <a href="#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[1]</a>): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being ( - <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). + <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="28377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28377] Iª q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc fuerunt tres errores. Quidam enim posuerunt quod Deus esset anima mundi, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. VII de @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ imperfecta, semen enim est principium animalium et plantarum. Ergo Deus est imperfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q4_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q4_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is imperfect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28384] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ostensum est supra quod essentia Dei est ipsum esse. Sed ipsum esse @@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q4_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q4_A2-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 2. Whether the perfections of all things are in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q4_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28390] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sint perfectiones omnium rerum. Deus enim simplex est, ut ostensum est. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt @@ -1382,7 +1382,7 @@ cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all." Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent ( - <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has + <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, @@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore neither can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as God: since God is no "genus," as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q4_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore no creature is like God. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q4_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore no creature is like God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28399] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, similitudo est comparatio quaedam. Non est autem comparatio eorum quae sunt diversorum generum; ergo nec similitudo, non enim dicimus @@ -1623,8 +1623,8 @@ desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing ( - <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>; - <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which + <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 co."><a name="28413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28413] Iª q. 5 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum @@ -2039,7 +2039,7 @@ esset, nisi ratio boni in eis consisteret. Ergo ratio boni consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above - <a id="FP_Q5_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is + <a href="#FP_Q5_A1" id="FP_Q5_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, @@ -2265,7 +2265,7 @@ tria sunt in Deo sicut in causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said above ( - <a id="FP_Q6_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4] , A[3]</a>). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others + <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q6_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4] , A[3]</a>). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28471] Iª q. 6 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum @@ -2281,7 +2281,7 @@ <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is supremely simple; as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the supreme good. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q6_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the supreme good. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28472] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit summum bonum. Summum enim bonum addit aliquid supra bonum, alioquin omni bono conveniret. Sed @@ -2302,8 +2302,8 @@ bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above ( - <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>; - <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28474] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, summum comparationem importat. Sed quae non sunt unius generis, non sunt comparabilia; sicut dulcedo inconvenienter dicitur maior vel minor @@ -2318,7 +2318,7 @@ <b>I answer that,</b> God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an + <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q6_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good. @@ -2370,7 +2370,7 @@ comparationem importat summum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A3-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 3. Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good"; as we said above ( - <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially. + <a href="#FP_Q5_A1" id="FP_Q6_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28480] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum per essentiam non sit proprium Dei. Sicut enim unum convertitur cum ente, ita et bonum, ut supra @@ -2410,7 +2410,7 @@ to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above ( - <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html">Q[3], A[6]</a>); and + <a href="#FP_Q3_A6" id="FP_Q6_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[6]</a>); and He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 co."><a name="28484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28484] Iª q. 6 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum @@ -2486,7 +2486,7 @@ bonitate divina, sed bonitate propria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p5"> <b>I answer that,</b> As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and "measured" from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas ( - <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A4.html">Q[84], A[4]</a>) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A4" id="FP_Q6_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[4]</a>) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation @@ -2496,10 +2496,10 @@ </p><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p6"> Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as Aristotle argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and + <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears from the above ( - <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). + <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>). </p><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p7"> Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many @@ -2558,7 +2558,7 @@ infinitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for He is not a body, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q7_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28495] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, secundum philosophum in I Physic., finitum et infinitum conveniunt quantitati. Sed in Deo non est quantitas, cum non sit corpus, ut @@ -2589,9 +2589,9 @@ perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>, OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was + <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[1]</a>, OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 co."><a name="28498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28498] Iª q. 7 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod omnes antiqui philosophi attribuunt infinitum primo principio, ut dicitur in III Physic., et hoc rationabiliter, considerantes res @@ -2655,7 +2655,7 @@ universale, quod se potest extendere ad infinita singularia. Ergo omnis substantia intellectualis creata est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q7_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A8" id="FP_Q7_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28504] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, materia prima aliud est a Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Sed materia prima est infinita. Ergo aliquid aliud praeter Deum potest esse @@ -3040,7 +3040,7 @@ caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q8_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Hence + <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q8_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Hence it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 co."><a name="28534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28534] Iª q. 8 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae, @@ -3254,7 +3254,7 @@ of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later - <a id="FP_Q8_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12.html">(Q[12])</a>. He is said to be thus in the saints by grace. + <a href="#FP_Q12" id="FP_Q8_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(Q[12])</a>. He is said to be thus in the saints by grace. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 co."><a name="28552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28552] Iª q. 8 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio @@ -3344,7 +3344,7 @@ <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is said above - <a id="FP_Q8_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. + <a href="#FP_Q3" id="FP_Q8_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28557] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse ubique non sit proprium Dei. Universale enim, secundum philosophum, est ubique et semper, @@ -3510,7 +3510,7 @@ Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q9_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, + <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q9_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not @@ -3656,7 +3656,7 @@ in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html">Q[8], A[2]</a>). + <a href="#FP_Q8_A2" id="FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[8], A[2]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Si autem dicatur aliquid mutabile per potentiam in ipso existentem, sic etiam aliquo modo omnis creatura est mutabilis. Est enim in creatura duplex potentia, @@ -3977,7 +3977,7 @@ Solus ergo Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability + <a href="#FP_Q9_A1" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.4" target="asv">Eccles. 1:4</a>). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature @@ -4386,7 +4386,7 @@ is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later ( - <a id="FP_Q10_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity. + <a href="FP_v.html#FP_Q47_A2" id="FP_Q10_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Hoc igitur habito, sciendum quod de substantiis spiritualibus duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod omnes processerunt a Deo in quadam aequalitate, ut @@ -4708,7 +4708,7 @@ Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A3" id="FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[3]</a>). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 co."><a name="28670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28670] Iª q. 11 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod Deum esse unum, ex tribus demonstratur. Primo quidem ex eius simplicitate. Manifestum est enim quod illud unde aliquod singulare @@ -4720,7 +4720,7 @@ convenit Deo, nam ipse Deus est sua natura, ut supra ostensum est. Secundum igitur idem est Deus, et hic Deus. Impossibile est igitur esse plures deos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p6"> Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ + <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q11_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite @@ -4806,7 +4806,7 @@ is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme degree. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme degree. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 co."><a name="28677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28677] Iª q. 11 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, ad hoc quod aliquid sit maxime unum, oportet quod sit et maxime ens et maxime indivisum. Utrumque @@ -4885,7 +4885,7 @@ Div. Nom., loquens de Deo, dicit, <i>neque sensus est eius, neque phantasia, neque opinio, nec ratio, nec scientia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore in Himself He is unknown. + <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q12_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore in Himself He is unknown. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28683] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne infinitum, inquantum huiusmodi, est ignotum. Sed Deus est infinitus, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo secundum se est ignotus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p4"> @@ -4957,7 +4957,7 @@ <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as appears from what was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). + <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q12_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28689] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae non perfectae per formam, ignotum est secundum se, quia omnis cognitio @@ -5036,7 +5036,7 @@ i), "by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known;" as by the likeness of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q12_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God + <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q12_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness; for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like @@ -5146,9 +5146,9 @@ cernuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later - <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78.html">(Q[78])</a>. Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78" id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(Q[78])</a>. Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Hence He cannot be seen by the + <a href="#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 co."><a name="28704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28704] Iª q. 12 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est Deum videri sensu visus, vel quocumque alio @@ -5237,7 +5237,7 @@ <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above - <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence. + <a href="#FP_Q12_A1" id="FP_Q12_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28710] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sensus corporeus non potest elevari ad intelligendam substantiam incorpoream, quia est supra eius naturam. Si igitur videre Deum per @@ -5315,7 +5315,7 @@ intellectui creato coniungit, ut intelligibile ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above - <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power. + <a href="#FP_Q12_A2" id="FP_Q12_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28713] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iste modus cognoscendi Deum, est Angelo connaturalis, ut scilicet cognoscat eum per similitudinem eius in ipso Angelo @@ -5606,7 +5606,7 @@ not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears---Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above - <a id="FP_Q12_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7.html">(Q[7])</a> is + <a href="#FP_Q7" id="FP_Q12_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(Q[7])</a> is infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know @@ -5754,7 +5754,7 @@ weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above - <a id="FP_Q12_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know + <a href="#FP_Q12_A7" id="FP_Q12_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it sees God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 co."><a name="28745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28745] Iª q. 12 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum @@ -6040,11 +6040,11 @@ potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, as was said above - <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its + <a href="#FP_Q12_A4" id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible + <a href="#FP_Q12_A2" id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.2" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily senses @@ -6073,7 +6073,7 @@ have seen God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as will later be explained (SS, - <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q174.html">Q[174])</a> in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, + <a href="unknown.html#FP_Q174" id="FP_Q12_A11-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[174])</a> in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28768] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. Cael. Hier., sic in @@ -6091,7 +6091,7 @@ of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of rapture (SS, - <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q175.html">Q[175])</a>. + <a href="unknown.html#FP_Q175" id="FP_Q12_A11-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[175])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28769] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Deus miraculose aliquid supernaturaliter in rebus corporeis operatur, ita etiam et supernaturaliter, et praeter @@ -6128,7 +6128,7 @@ praesentiam, essentiam, et potentiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A12-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 12. Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q12_A12-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a> ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q12_A12-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a> ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28772] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per naturalem rationem Deum in hac vita cognoscere non possimus. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de @@ -6365,7 +6365,7 @@ <b>I answer that,</b> Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q13_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html">Q[12], AA[11]</a>,12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God + <a href="#FP_Q12_A11" id="FP_Q13_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[12], AA[11]</a>,12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed @@ -6505,12 +6505,12 @@ of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God prepossesses in Himself all the + <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above ( - <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>), in treating + <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent @@ -6613,7 +6613,7 @@ imposita eam significant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A3-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 3. Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained above - <a id="FP_Q13_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore + <a href="#FP_Q13_A1" id="FP_Q13_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28805] Iª q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo proprie. Omnia @@ -6741,7 +6741,7 @@ <b>I answer that,</b> These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above - <a id="FP_Q13_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, that these names signify the divine substance, although in an + <a href="#FP_Q13_A2" id="FP_Q13_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, that these names signify the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which @@ -6876,7 +6876,7 @@ latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures - <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and + <a href="#FP_Q13_A1" id="FP_Q13_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various @@ -6957,7 +6957,7 @@ praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum, non univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing ( - <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). + <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q13_A5-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28828] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo creaturae ad Deum est imperfecta, quia etiam nec idem secundum genus repraesentat, ut supra dictum @@ -7025,13 +7025,13 @@ the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above - <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify + <a href="#FP_Q13_A2" id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above - <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. + <a href="#FP_Q13_A3" id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 co."><a name="28835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28835] Iª q. 13 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum, et ideo @@ -7394,7 +7394,7 @@ the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above ( - <a id="FP_Q13_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, + <a href="#FP_Q12_A12" id="FP_Q13_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28858] Iª q. 13 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum quod naturam alicuius rei ex eius @@ -7469,8 +7469,8 @@ some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures. </p><p id="FP_Q13_A9-p7"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above - <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this + <a href="#FP_Q13_A8" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q11_A3" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: "You served them who by nature are not gods," ( @@ -7686,7 +7686,7 @@ diversis praedicamentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion ( - <a id="FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol + <a href="#FP_Q12_A12" id="FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use names the meaning of which we know not. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 5"><a name="28876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28876] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum @@ -7732,7 +7732,7 @@ <b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons: </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p7"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other ( - <a id="FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form. </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p8"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about @@ -7816,7 +7816,7 @@ Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition + <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28887] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed @@ -7974,7 +7974,7 @@ causata, scilicet ex cognitione principiorum. Sed nihil causatum est in Deo. Ergo scientia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore in God there is not knowledge. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q14_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore in God there is not knowledge. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28896] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis scientia vel universalis vel particularis est. Sed in Deo non est universale et particulare, ut ex superioribus patet; ergo in Deo @@ -7990,13 +7990,13 @@ nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that + <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge. + <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 co."><a name="28898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28898] Iª q. 14 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in Deo perfectissime est scientia. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc @@ -8019,7 +8019,7 @@ immaterialitatis, ut ex superioribus patet, sequitur quod ipse sit in summo cognitionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from + <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q14_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28899] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo @@ -8031,11 +8031,11 @@ Unde scientia non est qualitas in Deo vel habitus, sed substantia et actus purus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as + <a href="#FP_Q13_A4" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[4]</a>). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown - <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from + <a href="#FP_Q14_A7" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding" ( @@ -8206,7 +8206,7 @@ <b>Objection 2:</b> If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is against what was laid down above ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself. + <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q14_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28911] Iª q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod Deus infinitus est nobis, sed sibi finitus, contra, verius est unumquodque secundum quod est apud Deum, quam secundum quod est @@ -8227,7 +8227,7 @@ in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that + <a href="#FP_Q14_A1" id="FP_Q14_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 co."><a name="28913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28913] Iª q. 14 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod Deus perfecte comprehendit seipsum. Quod sic patet. Tunc enim @@ -8298,7 +8298,7 @@ Non ergo ipsum intelligere Dei est eius substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q14_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28919] Iª q. 14 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, Lib. VII de Trin., <i>Deo hoc est esse, quod sapientem esse</i>. Hoc autem est sapientem esse, quod intelligere. @@ -8310,11 +8310,11 @@ the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how this is. As was laid down above - <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; + <a href="#FP_Q14_A2" id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above - <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Hence as His essence itself is also + <a href="#FP_Q3" id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">(Q[3])</a>. Hence as His essence itself is also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence. </p><p id="FP_Q14_A4-p7"> Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity @@ -8391,7 +8391,7 @@ of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence + <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. @@ -8472,7 +8472,7 @@ non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse Deus, specificetur per aliud quam per essentiam divinam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 6. Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown - <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and + <a href="#FP_Q14_A5" id="FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge. @@ -8531,7 +8531,7 @@ of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is + <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it @@ -8543,7 +8543,7 @@ of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not + <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its @@ -8949,7 +8949,7 @@ Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing - <a id="FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no + <a href="#FP_Q14_A5" id="FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28966] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum @@ -9060,7 +9060,7 @@ eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers + <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, @@ -9077,9 +9077,9 @@ But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things. </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p10"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above - <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which + <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since + <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form. @@ -9193,7 +9193,7 @@ numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei, cuius scientiae non est numerus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A12-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above - <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has + <a href="#FP_Q14_A9" id="FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things @@ -9244,7 +9244,7 @@ the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above - <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things. + <a href="#FP_Q14_A7" id="FP_Q14_A12-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28987] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod <i>infiniti ratio congruit quantitati</i>, secundum philosophum in I Physic. De ratione autem quantitatis est ordo @@ -9289,7 +9289,7 @@ naturas. Unde mensurabilia essent secundum scientiam Dei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A13" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 13. Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above - <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not + <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q14_A13-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28990] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit @@ -9332,7 +9332,7 @@ opera hominum sunt contingentia, utpote libero arbitrio subiecta. Ergo Deus scit futura contingentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above - <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future + <a href="#FP_Q14_A9" id="FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things. </p><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p7"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent @@ -9347,7 +9347,7 @@ contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only + <a href="#FP_Q10_A2" id="FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their @@ -9523,7 +9523,7 @@ hominum. Ergo Deus cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A14-p5"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above - <a id="FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed. + <a href="#FP_Q14_A9" id="FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed. </p><p id="FP_Q14_A14-p6"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand @@ -9592,8 +9592,8 @@ quod dicitur Iac. I, quod <i>apud Deum non est transmutatio, neque vicissitudinis obumbratio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing - <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable. + <a href="#FP_Q14_A4" id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q9_A1" id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 co."><a name="29008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29008] Iª q. 14 a. 15 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum scientia Dei sit eius substantia, ut ex dictis patet; sicut substantia eius est omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum @@ -9687,7 +9687,7 @@ eum non sedere. Quorum neutrum potest esse in Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A16" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 16. Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above - <a id="FP_Q14_A16-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative. + <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q14_A16-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1"><a name="29012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29012] Iª q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimumsextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus de rebus non habeat scientiam speculativam. Scientia enim Dei est causa rerum, ut supra @@ -9810,7 +9810,7 @@ ideae non ponuntur ad aliud, nisi ut per eas cognoscantur res. Ergo ideae non sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said ( - <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things. + <a href="#FP_Q14_A5" id="FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29021] Iª q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus in seipso cognoscit omnia, ut supra dictum est. Sed seipsum non cognoscit per ideam. Ergo nec alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p4"> @@ -9839,7 +9839,7 @@ in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later ( - <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the + <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q46_A1" id="FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 co."><a name="29024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29024] Iª q. 15 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere in mente divina ideas. Idea enim Graece, @@ -10040,7 +10040,7 @@ in Deo. Sed mala cognoscuntur a Deo. Ergo non omnium quae cognoscuntur a Deo, sunt ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above - <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining + <a href="#FP_Q15_A9" id="FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29039] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus cognoscit ea quae nec sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt, ut supra dictum @@ -10119,7 +10119,7 @@ things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later ( - <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a> ). + <a href="#FP_Q22_A3" id="FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a> ). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29047] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod genera non possunt habere ideam aliam ab idea speciei, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, quia nunquam genus @@ -10368,7 +10368,7 @@ intellectu cognoscente quod quid est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p6"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="29061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29061] Iª q. 16 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 3. Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated - <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible. + <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29062] Iª q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim est proprie in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in @@ -10403,9 +10403,9 @@ sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum comparationem ad intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before - <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible + <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already - <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the + <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29067] Iª q. 16 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est. @@ -10453,7 +10453,7 @@ est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo bonum prius est secundum rationem quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above - <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true. + <a href="#FP_Q16_A2" id="FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29071] Iª q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum est in rebus, verum autem in compositione et divisione intellectus, ut dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt in re, sunt priora his quae sunt in @@ -10515,7 +10515,7 @@ <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things - <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he + <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29077] Iª q. 16 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus quae dicitur veritas, non est veritas @@ -10554,7 +10554,7 @@ quod dicit dominus, Ioan. XIV, <i>ego sum via, veritas et vita</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As said above - <a id="FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being + <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His @@ -10635,7 +10635,7 @@ of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said - <a id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the + <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on @@ -10724,7 +10724,7 @@ postquam desierit, verum enim erit veritatem non esse. Ergo veritas est aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> God alone is eternal, as laid down before ( - <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html">Q[10], A[3]</a>). + <a href="#FP_Q10_A3" id="FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[10], A[3]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29096] Iª q. 16 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod solus Deus est aeternus, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in @@ -10735,7 +10735,7 @@ the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already - <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. + <a href="#FP_Q16_A5" id="FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 co."><a name="29097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29097] Iª q. 16 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod veritas enuntiabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus. Enuntiabile enim et est in intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum @@ -10845,7 +10845,7 @@ quod dicitur in Psalmo XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before - <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded + <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself @@ -10853,7 +10853,7 @@ from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said before ( - <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself + <a href="#FP_Q14_A15" id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable. @@ -10943,7 +10943,7 @@ in libro de vera Relig., <i>quia non ostendunt aliud quam suam speciem</i>. Ergo falsum in rebus non invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above - <a id="FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16.html">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus + <a href="#FP_Q16" id="FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29115] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, verum dicitur in rebus per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, ut supra @@ -11098,7 +11098,7 @@ sensibus similitudine lenocinante falli</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above ( - <a id="FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the + <a href="#FP_Q16_A2" id="FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really are. </p><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p7"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness @@ -11194,17 +11194,17 @@ qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said - <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about + <a href="#FP_Q17_A2" id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth ( - <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can + <a href="#FP_Q16_A2" id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above - <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. + <a href="#FP_Q17_A2" id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. </p><p id="FP_Q17_A3-p6"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition @@ -11518,10 +11518,10 @@ quod dicit philosophus, in II de anima, <i>vivere viventibus est esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q18_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said ( - <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which + <a href="#FP_Q17_A3" id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said ( - <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly + <a href="#FP_Q13_A1" id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the @@ -11607,7 +11607,7 @@ ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q18_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 3. Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously stated - <a id="FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life. + <a href="#FP_Q18_A2" id="FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29161] Iª q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deo non conveniat vita. Vivere enim dicuntur aliqua secundum quod movent seipsa, ut dictum est. Sed Deo @@ -11792,7 +11792,7 @@ quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>quod factum est, in ipso vita erat</i>. Sed omnia praeter Deum facta sunt. Ergo omnia in Deo sunt vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> In God to live is to understand, as before stated - <a id="FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as + <a href="#FP_Q18_A3" id="FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 co."><a name="29174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29174] Iª q. 18 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum @@ -11951,7 +11951,7 @@ suum velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good. + <a href="#FP_Q6_A3" id="FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29185] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet nihil aliud a Deo sit finis Dei, tamen ipsemet est finis respectu omnium quae ab eo fiunt. Et hoc per suam @@ -12010,7 +12010,7 @@ quod apostolus dicit, I Thess. IV, <i>haec est voluntas Dei, sanctificatio vestra</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above - <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, + <a href="#FP_Q19_A1" id="FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; @@ -12038,7 +12038,7 @@ participare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said ( - <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. + <a href="#FP_Q13_A4" id="FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29194] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo @@ -12096,7 +12096,7 @@ suam ex necessitate vult. Ergo alia a se ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown ( - <a id="FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as + <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29200] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quidquid est Deo naturale, est necessarium, quia Deus est per se @@ -12281,7 +12281,7 @@ Deus bonus est, sumus</i>. Ergo Deus per suam naturam est causa rerum, et non per voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before ( - <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things. + <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29215] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, unius rei una est causa. Sed rerum creatarum est causa scientia Dei, ut supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas Dei non debet poni causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6"> @@ -12303,7 +12303,7 @@ natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown ( - <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection + <a href="#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect. </p><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p10"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode @@ -12386,7 +12386,7 @@ volendi. Ergo voluntas Dei habet aliquam causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown - <a id="FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus + <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29223] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in @@ -12667,7 +12667,7 @@ facit, nam quandoque praecepit legalia observari, quandoque prohibuit. Ergo habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before - <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable + <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29241] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Deus @@ -12692,8 +12692,8 @@ so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable ( - <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>; - <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable. + <a href="#FP_Q9_A1" id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q14_A15" id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 co."><a name="29243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29243] Iª q. 19 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc considerandum est, quod aliud est mutare voluntatem; et aliud est @@ -12769,7 +12769,7 @@ mutabilem voluntatem; sed quod mutationem velit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above - <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. + <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29247] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet Deum velle aliquid non sit necessarium absolute, tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, propter @@ -12925,7 +12925,7 @@ quod quolibet malo fit aliquid deterius. Ergo Deus non vult mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before ( - <a id="FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either + <a href="#FP_Q5_A1" id="FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies @@ -13006,7 +13006,7 @@ arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said - <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God. + <a href="#FP_Q19_A9" id="FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="29265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29265] Iª q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum et malum eligitur. Sed Deus non vult malum, ut dictum est. Ergo @@ -13021,7 +13021,7 @@ appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above - <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not + <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 co."><a name="29267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29267] Iª q. 19 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod liberum arbitrium habemus respectu eorum quae non necessario @@ -13075,7 +13075,7 @@ domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius</i>. Ergo oportet quod aliquando signum voluntatis pro voluntate accipiatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5"> <b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before ( - <a id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. + <a href="#FP_Q13_A3" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed @@ -13304,7 +13304,7 @@ Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God ( - <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him. + <a href="#FP_Q19_A1" id="FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 co."><a name="29290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29290] Iª q. 20 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere amorem in Deo. Primus enim motus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor. Cum enim @@ -13367,10 +13367,10 @@ none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show ( - <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2; - <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without + <a href="#FP_Q3_A2" id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2; + <a href="#FP_Q19_A11" id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, as said before ( - <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>). + <a href="#FP_Q19_A11" id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" shape="rect">Q[19], A[11]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29292] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod in passionibus sensitivi appetitus, est considerare aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet corporalem transmutationem; et @@ -13393,7 +13393,7 @@ possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as above shown ( - <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place + <a href="#FP_Q6_A1" id="FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in God. @@ -13451,7 +13451,7 @@ eorum quae fecisti</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, + <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as @@ -13555,7 +13555,7 @@ itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said - <a id="FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another. + <a href="#FP_Q20_A2" id="FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 co."><a name="29308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29308] Iª q. 20 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, duplici ratione potest aliquid magis vel minus amari. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius actus @@ -13653,7 +13653,7 @@ aliquid est melius, inquantum est Deo similius. Ergo meliora magis diliguntur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown ( - <a id="FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because + <a href="#FP_Q20_A2" id="FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things. @@ -13848,7 +13848,7 @@ virtute</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above ( - <a id="FP_Q21_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html">Q[20], A[1]</a> ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject + <a href="#FP_Q20_A1" id="FP_Q21_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[1]</a> ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although @@ -13956,7 +13956,7 @@ quod in Psalmo LXXXIV dicitur, <i>misericordia et veritas obviaverunt sibi</i>; et ponitur ibi veritas pro iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q21_A2-p5"> <b>I answer that,</b> Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above ( - <a id="FP_Q21_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case + <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q21_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in @@ -14024,13 +14024,13 @@ sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6] , A[4]</a>). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His + <a href="#FP_Q6_A4" id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[6] , A[4]</a>). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already + <a href="#FP_Q6_A1" id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already said - <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in + <a href="#FP_Q21_A1" id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.3" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by God expel defects, it belongs to mercy. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 co."><a name="29344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29344] Iª q. 21 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum @@ -14257,12 +14257,12 @@ providentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and + <a href="#FP_Q6_A4" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[4]</a>). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness ( - <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21], A[4]</a>). This good of order existing in things created, is + <a href="#FP_Q21_A4" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[21], A[4]</a>). This good of order existing in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before ( - <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type + <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other parts are directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is @@ -14306,7 +14306,7 @@ rerum in finem, quam ratio ordinis partium in toto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. - <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q57_A6" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to God, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.6" target="asv"> Ps. 148:6</a>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although @@ -14340,7 +14340,7 @@ is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect are one and the same thing, as we have said above - <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19.html">(Q[19])</a>. + <a href="#FP_Q19" id="FP_Q22_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">(Q[19])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29365] Iª q. 22 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod providentia est in intellectu, sed praesupponit voluntatem finis, nullus enim praecipit de agendis propter finem, @@ -14418,7 +14418,7 @@ <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also been shown ( - <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html">Q[14], AA[6]</a>,11) that God knows all + <a href="#FP_Q14_A6" id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[14], AA[6]</a>,11) that God knows all things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art. @@ -14565,7 +14565,7 @@ fuisse Tullius, qui res humanas, de quibus consiliamur, divinae providentiae subtraxit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html">Q[19], A[10]</a>), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; + <a href="#FP_Q19_A10" id="FP_Q22_A2-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[10]</a>), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses. @@ -14657,7 +14657,7 @@ considerat, in quibus est actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q22_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], AA[5]</a>,8). + <a href="#FP_Q19_A5" id="FP_Q22_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[19], AA[5]</a>,8). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29384] Iª q. 22 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod per hoc quod Deus habet immediate providentiam de rebus omnibus, non excluduntur causae secundae, quae sunt @@ -14789,7 +14789,7 @@ pertinent ad meritum vel demeritum, non praedestinantur a Deo. Et sic hominum praedestinatio tollitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men. + <a href="#FP_Q22_A1" id="FP_Q23_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29396] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnes creaturae ordinantur ad suos fines per divinam providentiam, ut supra dictum est. Sed aliae creaturae non dicuntur praedestinari a @@ -14797,7 +14797,7 @@ <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to take pity [miserendi]" [*See - <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>]. Therefore men are not predestined. + <a href="#FP_Q22_A3" id="FP_Q23_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>]. Therefore men are not predestined. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29397] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Angeli sunt capaces beatitudinis, sicut et homines. Sed Angelis non competit praedestinari, ut videtur, cum in eis nunquam fuerit @@ -14822,11 +14822,11 @@ quod dicitur Rom. VIII, <i>quos praedestinavit, hos et vocavit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of + <a href="#FP_Q22_A2" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said ( + <a href="#FP_Q22_A1" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power + <a href="#FP_Q12_A4" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, @@ -14879,7 +14879,7 @@ notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html">Q[21], AA[3]</a>,4). + <a href="#FP_Q21_A3" id="FP_Q23_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[21], AA[3]</a>,4). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29403] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod praedestinari convenit Angelis, sicut et hominibus, licet nunquam fuerint miseri. Nam motus non accipit speciem a @@ -14944,7 +14944,7 @@ <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active + <a href="#FP_Q22_A1" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[1]</a>). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The @@ -14966,8 +14966,8 @@ magnificavit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>; - <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">Q[18], A[3]</a>, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its + <a href="#FP_Q14_A2" id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q18_A3" id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[18], A[3]</a>, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things, has an effect in them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29411] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo @@ -15052,14 +15052,14 @@ quod dicitur Malach. I, <i>Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> God does reprobate some. For it was said above - <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things + <a href="#FP_Q23_A1" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit + <a href="#FP_Q22_A2" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit + <a href="#FP_Q22_A1" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[22], A[1]</a>). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 co."><a name="29419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29419] Iª q. 23 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum @@ -15105,7 +15105,7 @@ <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of + <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q23_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt. @@ -15151,15 +15151,15 @@ constitutionem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above - <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering + <a href="#FP_Q23_A1" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end + <a href="#FP_Q22_A2" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above + <a href="#FP_Q20_A2" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above - <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not + <a href="#FP_Q23_A3" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.4" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love @@ -15189,7 +15189,7 @@ praedestinati sunt electi et dilecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives + <a href="#FP_Q6_A4" id="FP_Q23_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29428] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo @@ -15203,7 +15203,7 @@ <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], A[2]</a>). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His + <a href="#FP_Q20_A2" id="FP_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[2]</a>). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29429] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, quando voluntas eligentis provocatur ad eligendum a @@ -15261,9 +15261,9 @@ salvos fieri. Non ergo praescientia meritorum est causa vel ratio praedestinationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since predestination includes will, as was said above - <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above + <a href="#FP_Q23_A4" id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], A[5]</a> ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the + <a href="#FP_Q19_A5" id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[5]</a> ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether @@ -15292,7 +15292,7 @@ between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination + <a href="#FP_Q22_A3" id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent @@ -15387,7 +15387,7 @@ for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness + <a href="#FP_Q22_A2" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying ( @@ -15489,14 +15489,14 @@ liberantur quicumque liberantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above - <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening + <a href="#FP_Q23_A1" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html">Q[22], A[4]</a>). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has + <a href="#FP_Q22_A4" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[22], A[4]</a>). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">Q[14], A[13]</a>; - <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are + <a href="#FP_Q14_A13" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[14], A[13]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are most certain and infallible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 co."><a name="29443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29443] Iª q. 23 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod praedestinatio certissime et infallibiliter consequitur suum @@ -15545,7 +15545,7 @@ praedestinatum. Unde non sequitur quod praedestinatio falli possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above - <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>: and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability + <a href="#FP_Q23_A4" id="FP_Q23_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>: and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed. @@ -15600,13 +15600,13 @@ <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above - <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It + <a href="#FP_Q23_A6" id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the infinite ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which + <a href="#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally, but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder @@ -15837,7 +15837,7 @@ servetur in rebus, et ut etiam creaturis dignitatem causalitatis communicet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above ( - <a id="FP_Q23_A8-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html">Q[19], A[6]</a>), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by + <a href="#FP_Q19_A6" id="FP_Q23_A8-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[6]</a>), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29462] Iª q. 23 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod secundae causae non possunt egredi ordinem causae @@ -15888,7 +15888,7 @@ <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding ( - <a id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, + <a href="#FP_Q23_A4" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.3" target="asv"> Prov. 3:3</a>: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For @@ -15973,7 +15973,7 @@ electionis divinae, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam est respectu vitae gratiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above - <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined + <a href="#FP_Q24_A1" id="FP_Q24_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29476] Iª q. 24 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod liber vitae est notitia praedestinationis, ut dictum est. Sed @@ -15982,12 +15982,12 @@ gratiam et deficiunt a gloria. Liber igitur vitae non dicitur nisi respectu gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life, as stated above - <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to + <a href="#FP_Q24_A1" id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as said above ( - <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory. + <a href="#FP_Q23_A1" id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 co."><a name="29477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29477] Iª q. 24 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod liber vitae, ut dictum est, importat conscriptionem quandam sive notitiam electorum ad vitam. Eligitur autem aliquis ad id quod @@ -16154,7 +16154,7 @@ <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3] , A[3]</a>). Therefore, there is no power in God. + <a href="#FP_Q3_A3" id="FP_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3] , A[3]</a>). Therefore, there is no power in God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29491] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in IX Metaphys., qualibet potentia melior est eius actus, nam forma est melior quam materia, et actio quam @@ -16169,8 +16169,8 @@ non est aliquod principium. Ergo ratio potentiae Deo non convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>; - <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, + <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[8]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="29493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29493] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, supra ostensum est quod scientia Dei et voluntas eius sunt causa rerum. @@ -16184,8 +16184,8 @@ <b>I answer that,</b> Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>; - <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], AA[1]</a>, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all + <a href="#FP_Q3_A2" id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[4], AA[1]</a>, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon @@ -16283,14 +16283,14 @@ virtutis, vivens, potens. Omne autem immensum est infinitum. Ergo virtus divina est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above - <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it + <a href="#FP_Q25_A1" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine essence ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the + <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) it follows that His power likewise is infinite. + <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>) it follows that His power likewise is infinite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 co."><a name="29504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29504] Iª q. 25 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, secundum hoc potentia activa invenitur in Deo, secundum quod ipse actu est. Esse autem eius est infinitum, @@ -16306,7 +16306,7 @@ ostensum est, sequitur quod eius potentia sit infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect. + <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29505] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de infinito quod est ex parte materiae non terminatae per formam; cuiusmodi est infinitum quod @@ -16318,8 +16318,8 @@ as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>; - <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power + <a href="#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But the @@ -16366,7 +16366,7 @@ voluntatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 3. Whether God is omnipotent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for He is immovable, as was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore He is not omnipotent. + <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q25_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore He is not omnipotent. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29508] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnipotens. Moveri enim et pati aliquid omnium est. Sed hoc Deus non potest, est enim @@ -16488,7 +16488,7 @@ contradictionem implicat, verbum esse non potest, quia nullus intellectus potest illud concipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above - <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence. + <a href="#FP_Q25_A1" id="FP_Q25_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29514] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus dicitur omnipotens secundum potentiam activam, non secundum potentiam passivam, ut dictum est. Unde, quod non @@ -16519,7 +16519,7 @@ power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21], + <a href="#FP_Q21_A4" id="FP_Q25_A3-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[21], A[4] </a>), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because @@ -16542,7 +16542,7 @@ in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">Q[14], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be + <a href="#FP_Q14_A1" id="FP_Q25_A3-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29517] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum @@ -16595,7 +16595,7 @@ corrupta facere incorruptam</i>. Ergo eadem ratione non potest facere de quocumque alio praeterito quod non fuerit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should + <a href="#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q25_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[2]</a>), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that @@ -16687,7 +16687,7 @@ as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and + <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God @@ -16695,7 +16695,7 @@ said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as said above ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html">Q[21], A[2]</a>), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine + <a href="#FP_Q21_A2" id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[21], A[2]</a>), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion @@ -16734,12 +16734,12 @@ essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there + <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things. Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above - <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God + <a href="#FP_Q25_A3" id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge @@ -16969,8 +16969,8 @@ intelligentem. Unde beatitudo maxime convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p6"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>; - <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>), in simplicity and unity. + <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q13_A4" id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[13], A[4]</a>), in simplicity and unity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29549] Iª q. 26 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aggregatio bonorum est in Deo non per modum compositionis, sed per modum simplicitatis, quia quae in creaturis @@ -17013,7 +17013,7 @@ Augustinus, videtur quod beatitudo dicatur in Deo secundum intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p5"> <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude, as stated above - <a id="FP_Q26_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual + <a href="#FP_Q26_A1" id="FP_Q26_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. Now in God, to be and to @@ -17049,8 +17049,8 @@ voluntatis in ea requiescentis. Et hoc non potest esse nisi actus intellectus. Unde in actu intellectus attenditur beatitudo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q26_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 3. Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above ( - <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above ( - <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing + <a href="#FP_Q6_A2" id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q11_A3" id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[11], A[3]</a>). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God Himself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29557] Iª q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit beatitudo cuiuslibet beati. Deus @@ -17117,7 +17117,7 @@ quidem Deo convenire non possunt, cum sit incorporeus. Ergo beatitudo eius non complectitur omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p4"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above ( - <a id="FP_Q26_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a> ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes. + <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q26_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a> ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29565] Iª q. 26 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod beatitudo est perfectio quaedam. Divina autem perfectio complectitur omnem perfectionem, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo divina @@ -17153,8 +17153,8 @@ dicendum quod bona quae sunt in corporalibus corporaliter, in Deo sunt spiritualiter, secundum modum suum. Et haec dicta sufficiant de his quae pertinent ad divinae essentiae unitatem.</p></div></div></div></div> - <a href="summa.FP_Q1_A10.html"/> - <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"/> + + ` </div> </body>
--- a/summa/bilingual/bi.xsl Sun Jan 03 18:56:45 2010 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/bi.xsl Sun Jan 03 23:43:20 2010 +0000 @@ -1,8 +1,24 @@ <?xml version='1.0'?> <!DOCTYPE xsl:stylesheet SYSTEM "../../../../lib/xml/xsl.dtd" > <xsl:stylesheet xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" version="1.0" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <xsl:param name="rawpart"/> + <xsl:variable name="part" select="concat(substring-before($rawpart,'.'),'_',substring-after($rawpart,'.'),'.html')"/> + <xsl:variable name="index" select="document('../english/index.xml',/)/*"/> + <xsl:key name="iq" match="file" use="substring-before(@name,'_')"/> - <xsl:template match="x:a[@href and not(text())]"/> + <xsl:template match="x:a[starts-with(@href,'summa.')]"> + <xsl:variable name="tw" select="substring-before(substring-after(@href,'summa.'),'.')"/> + <xsl:variable name="tp" select="substring-before($tw,'_')"/> + <xsl:variable name="ta" select="substring-after($tw,'_A')"/> + <xsl:variable name="tq" select="number(substring-after(if ($ta='') then $tw else substring-before($tw,'_A'),'_Q'))"/> + <xsl:variable name="ff" select="key('iq',$tp,$index)"/> + <xsl:variable name="f" select="$ff[number(@first) le $tq][number(@last) ge $tq]/@name"/> + <xsl:message>ref: <xsl:value-of select="$tw"/><xsl:text> </xsl:text><xsl:value-of select="$f"/></xsl:message> + <xsl:copy> + <xsl:attribute name="href"><xsl:value-of select="concat(if ($part=$f) then '' else (if ($f) then $f else 'unknown.html'),'#',$tw)"/></xsl:attribute> + <xsl:apply-templates select="@*[not(local-name()='href')]|node()"/> + </xsl:copy> + </xsl:template> <xsl:template match="x:h3"> <xsl:copy>
--- a/summa/bilingual/merge.xpl Sun Jan 03 18:56:45 2010 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/merge.xpl Sun Jan 03 23:43:20 2010 +0000 @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">list of latin files, use ; as separator</div> </p:documentation> </p:option> + <p:variable name="rawpart" select="/x:div/@id"/> + <p:delete match="x:a[@href and not(text())]"/> <p:viewport match="x:div[@class='div3']" name="vp"> <p:xslt> <p:input port="stylesheet"> @@ -22,6 +24,7 @@ <p:input port="stylesheet"> <p:document href="bi.xsl"/> </p:input> + <p:with-param name="rawpart" select="$rawpart"/> </p:xslt> </p:viewport> <p:insert match="x:body" position="first-child">