--- a/summa/bilingual/FP_ii.xml	Mon Dec 08 23:06:19 2008 +0000
+++ b/summa/bilingual/FP_ii.xml	Mon Dec 08 23:15:50 2008 +0000
@@ -1,15 +1,7 @@
-<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
-<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="bi.xsl"?>
-<!DOCTYPE div2 SYSTEM "../../dtd/ThML10.dtd" >
-<div2 id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])">
-		  <h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q2" next="FP_Q2_A1" prev="FP.ii" progress="0.25%" n="i" title="Question. 2 - The Existence of God (Three Articles)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2-p0.1">Question 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="bi.xsl"?>
+<!DOCTYPE div2
+  SYSTEM "../../dtd/ThML10.dtd">
+<div2 id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])"><h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q2" next="FP_Q2_A1" prev="FP.ii" progress="0.25%" n="i" title="Question. 2 - The Existence of God (Three Articles)"><h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2-p0.1">Question 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2-p2"> Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2-p3"> In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.</p>
@@ -20,7 +12,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2-p8"> (3) Whether God exists?</p>
 </div>
 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 pr."><a name="28298"><span class="ref">[28298]
-I&ordf; q. 2 pr.</span></a> Quia igitur principalis intentio huius
+Iª q. 2 pr.</span></a> Quia igitur principalis intentio huius
 sacrae doctrinae est Dei cognitionem tradere, et non solum secundum
 quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et
 finis earum, et specialiter rationalis creaturae, ut ex dictis est
@@ -37,36 +29,28 @@
 voluntate et potentia. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum
 Deum esse sit per se notum. Secundo, utrum sit demonstrabile.
 Tertio, an Deus sit.</p>
-</div>
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1" next="FP_Q2_A2" prev="FP_Q2" progress="0.25%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether the existence of God is self-evident?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p0.1">Whether the existence of God is self-evident?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1" next="FP_Q2_A2" prev="FP_Q2" progress="0.25%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether the existence of God is self-evident?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p0.1">Whether the existence of God is self-evident?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
 existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be
 self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in
 us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says
 (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the knowledge of God is naturally implanted
 in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28299"><span class="ref">[28299] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28299"><span class="ref">[28299] Iª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse sit per se notum. Illa enim
 nobis dicuntur per se nota, quorum cognitio nobis naturaliter
 inest, sicut patet de primis principiis. Sed, sicut dicit
 Damascenus in principio libri sui, <i>omnibus cognitio existendi
 Deum naturaliter est inserta</i>. Ergo Deum esse est per se
 notum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than
   which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists
 actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only
 mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it
 exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore
 the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28300"><span class="ref">[28300] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illa
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28300"><span class="ref">[28300] Iª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illa
 dicuntur esse per se nota, quae statim, cognitis terminis,
 cognoscuntur, quod philosophus attribuit primis demonstrationis
 principiis, in I Poster., scito enim quid est totum et quid pars,
@@ -77,9 +61,7 @@
 intellectu tantum, unde cum, intellecto hoc nomine Deus, statim sit
 in intellectu, sequitur etiam quod sit in re. Ergo Deum esse est
 per se notum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the
 existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence
 of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not
@@ -87,15 +69,13 @@
 there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself:
 "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.14.6" parsed="vul|John|14|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p4.1" passage="Jn. 14:6">Jn. 14:6</scripRef>)
 Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28301"><span class="ref">[28301] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28301"><span class="ref">[28301] Iª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 veritatem esse est per se notum, quia qui negat veritatem esse,
 concedit veritatem esse, si enim veritas non est, verum est
 veritatem non esse. Si autem est aliquid verum, oportet quod
 veritas sit. Deus autem est ipsa veritas, Ioann. XIV, <i>ego sum
 via, veritas et vita</i>. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is
 self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states
@@ -103,22 +83,20 @@
 the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in
 his heart, There is no God" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.52.1" parsed="vul|Ps|52|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p5.1" passage="Ps. 52:1">Ps. 52:1</scripRef>). Therefore, that God exists is
 not self-evident.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28302"><span class="ref">[28302] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, nullus
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28302"><span class="ref">[28302] Iª q. 2 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, nullus
 potest cogitare oppositum eius quod est per se notum ut patet per
 philosophum, in IV Metaphys. et I Poster., circa prima
 demonstrationis principia. Cogitari autem potest oppositum eius
 quod est Deum esse, secundum illud Psalmi LII, <i>dixit insipiens
 in corde suo, non est Deus</i>. Ergo Deum esse non est per se
 notum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with
   regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is,
   is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more
   known to us, though less known in their nature---namely, by
 effects.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="28303"><span class="ref">[28303] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="28303"><span class="ref">[28303] Iª q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter, uno modo,
 secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos.
 Ex hoc enim aliqua propositio est per se nota, quod praedicatum
@@ -139,13 +117,11 @@
 nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed
 indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, et minus
 nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who
   imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in
 riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28304"><span class="ref">[28304] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28304"><span class="ref">[28304] Iª q. 2 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam
 confusione, est nobis naturaliter insertum, inquantum scilicet Deus
 est hominis beatitudo, homo enim naturaliter desiderat
@@ -155,15 +131,13 @@
 cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Petrus veniens, multi enim perfectum
 hominis bonum, quod est beatitudo, existimant divitias; quidam vero
 voluptates; quidam autem aliquid aliud.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can
   it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that
 there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be
 thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God
 does not exist.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28305"><span class="ref">[28305] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28305"><span class="ref">[28305] Iª q. 2 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod forte ille qui audit hoc nomen Deus, non intelligit
 significari aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, cum quidam
 crediderint Deum esse corpus. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat
@@ -173,55 +147,37 @@
 sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum. Nec potest argui quod sit
 in re, nisi daretur quod sit in re aliquid quo maius cogitari non
 potest, quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 3:</b> The existence of truth in general is self-evident
 but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28306"><span class="ref">[28306] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28306"><span class="ref">[28306] Iª q. 2 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod veritatem esse in communi, est per se notum, sed primam
 veritatem esse, hoc non est per se notum quoad nos.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2" next="FP_Q2_A3" prev="FP_Q2_A1" progress="0.29%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p0.1">Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2" next="FP_Q2_A3" prev="FP_Q2_A1" progress="0.29%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p0.1">Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
 existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith
 that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because
 a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the
 unseen (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.11.1" parsed="vul|Heb|11|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p2.1" passage="Heb. 11:1">Heb. 11:1</scripRef>). Therefore it cannot be
 demonstrated that God exists.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28307"><span class="ref">[28307] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28307"><span class="ref">[28307] Iª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse non sit demonstrabile. Deum enim
 esse est articulus fidei. Sed ea quae sunt fidei, non sunt
 demonstrabilia, quia demonstratio facit scire, fides autem de non
 apparentibus est, ut patet per apostolum, ad Hebr. XI. Ergo Deum
 esse non est demonstrabile.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence
 is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's
 essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene
 says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God
 exists.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28308"><span class="ref">[28308] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, medium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28308"><span class="ref">[28308] Iª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, medium
 demonstrationis est quod quid est. Sed de Deo non possumus scire
 quid est, sed solum quid non est, ut dicit Damascenus. Ergo non
 possumus demonstrare Deum esse.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the
 existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His
 effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is
@@ -229,37 +185,33 @@
 infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be
 demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the
 existence of God cannot be demonstrated.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28309"><span class="ref">[28309] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28309"><span class="ref">[28309] Iª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
 demonstraretur Deum esse, hoc non esset nisi ex effectibus eius.
 Sed effectus eius non sunt proportionati ei, cum ipse sit
 infinitus, et effectus finiti; finiti autem ad infinitum non est
 proportio. Cum ergo causa non possit demonstrari per effectum sibi
 non proportionatum, videtur quod Deum esse non possit
 demonstrari.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are
 clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.1.20" parsed="vul|Rom|1|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p5.1" passage="Rom. 1:20">Rom. 1:20</scripRef>). But this would not be
 unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things
 that are made; for the first thing we must know of anything is whether
 it exists.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28310"><span class="ref">[28310] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28310"><span class="ref">[28310] Iª q. 2 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea quae
 facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>. Sed hoc non esset, nisi
 per ea quae facta sunt, posset demonstrari Deum esse, primum enim
 quod oportet intelligi de aliquo, est an sit.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be
   demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because
 since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the
 cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is
 not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects
 which are known to us.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 co."><a name="28311"><span class="ref">[28311] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 co."><a name="28311"><span class="ref">[28311] Iª q. 2 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod duplex est demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur
 propter quid, et haec est per priora simpliciter. Alia est per
 effectum, et dicitur demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae
@@ -270,12 +222,10 @@
 nos), quia, cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito effectu necesse
 est causam praeexistere. Unde Deum esse, secundum quod non est per
 se notum quoad nos, demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
   known and demonstrated.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28312"><span class="ref">[28312] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28312"><span class="ref">[28312] Iª q. 2 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod Deum esse, et alia huiusmodi quae per rationem
 naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur Rom. I non sunt
 articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos, sic enim fides
@@ -283,14 +233,12 @@
 perfectio perfectibile. Nihil tamen prohibet illud quod secundum se
 demonstrabile est et scibile, ab aliquo accipi ut credibile, qui
 demonstrationem non capit.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are
   derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the
 existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the
 meaning of the word "God".</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28313"><span class="ref">[28313] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28313"><span class="ref">[28313] Iª q. 2 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse est uti
 effectu loco definitionis causae, ad probandum causam esse, et hoc
 maxime contingit in Deo. Quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse
@@ -299,49 +247,33 @@
 autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendetur, unde,
 demonstrando Deum esse per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio
 quid significet hoc nomen Deus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 3:</b> From effects not proportionate to the cause no
 perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect
 the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can
 demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we
 cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28314"><span class="ref">[28314] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28314"><span class="ref">[28314] Iª q. 2 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod per effectus non proportionatos causae, non potest perfecta
 cognitio de causa haberi, sed tamen ex quocumque effectu potest
 manifeste nobis demonstrari causam esse, ut dictum est. Et sic ex
 effectibus Dei potest demonstrari Deum esse, licet per eos non
 perfecte possimus eum cognoscere secundum suam essentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" next="FP_Q3" prev="FP_Q2_A2" progress="0.31%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God exists?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p0.1">Whether God exists?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" next="FP_Q3" prev="FP_Q2_A2" progress="0.31%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God exists?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p0.1">Whether God exists?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
 does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the
 other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He
 is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no
 evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does
 not exist.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28315"><span class="ref">[28315] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28315"><span class="ref">[28315] Iª q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit. Quia si unum contrariorum
 fuerit infinitum, totaliter destruetur aliud. Sed hoc intelligitur
 in hoc nomine Deus, scilicet quod sit quoddam bonum infinitum. Si
 ergo Deus esset, nullum malum inveniretur. Invenitur autem malum in
 mundo. Ergo Deus non est.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is
 superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few
 principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we
@@ -350,24 +282,20 @@
 principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to
 one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no
 need to suppose God's existence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28316"><span class="ref">[28316] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28316"><span class="ref">[28316] Iª q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
 potest compleri per pauciora principia, non fit per plura. Sed
 videtur quod omnia quae apparent in mundo, possunt compleri per
 alia principia, supposito quod Deus non sit, quia ea quae sunt
 naturalia, reducuntur in principium quod est natura; ea vero quae
 sunt a proposito, reducuntur in principium quod est ratio humana
 vel voluntas. Nulla igitur necessitas est ponere Deum esse.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p4"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am."
 (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.3.14" parsed="vul|Exod|3|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p4.1" passage="Ex. 3:14">Ex. 3:14</scripRef>)</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28317"><span class="ref">[28317] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28317"><span class="ref">[28317] Iª q. 2 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Exodi III, ex persona Dei, <i>ego sum qui sum</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> The existence of God can be proved in five ways.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p6"> The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality
@@ -385,7 +313,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p10"> The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the
   arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.</p>
 </div>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 co."><a name="28318"><span class="ref">[28318] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 co."><a name="28318"><span class="ref">[28318] Iª q. 2 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod Deum esse quinque viis probari potest. Prima autem et
 manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim,
 et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod
@@ -460,27 +388,23 @@
 finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut
 sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res
 naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As
 Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He
 would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence
 and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is
 part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to
 exist, and out of it produce good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28319"><span class="ref">[28319] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28319"><span class="ref">[28319] Iª q. 2 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio, <i>Deus, cum
 sit summe bonus, nullo modo sineret aliquid mali esse in operibus
 suis, nisi esset adeo omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de
 malo</i>. Hoc ergo ad infinitam Dei bonitatem pertinet, ut esse
 permittat mala, et ex eis eliciat bona.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown
   in the body of the Article.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28320"><span class="ref">[28320] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28320"><span class="ref">[28320] Iª q. 2 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod, cum natura propter determinatum finem operetur ex
 directione alicuius superioris agentis, necesse est ea quae a
 natura fiunt, etiam in Deum reducere, sicut in primam causam.
@@ -489,20 +413,7 @@
 quia haec mutabilia sunt et defectibilia; oportet autem omnia
 mobilia et deficere possibilia reduci in aliquod primum principium
 immobile et per se necessarium, sicut ostensum est.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3" next="FP_Q3_A1" prev="FP_Q2_A3" progress="0.36%" n="ii" title="Question. 3 - OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3-p0.1">Question 3. OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3" next="FP_Q3_A1" prev="FP_Q2_A3" progress="0.36%" n="ii" title="Question. 3 - OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)"><h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3-p0.1">Question 3. OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3-p2"> When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3-p3"> Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.</p>
@@ -518,7 +429,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3-p13"> (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?</p>
 </div>
 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 pr."><a name="28321"><span class="ref">[28321]
-I&ordf; q. 3 pr.</span></a> Cognito de aliquo an sit, inquirendum
+Iª q. 3 pr.</span></a> Cognito de aliquo an sit, inquirendum
 restat quomodo sit, ut sciatur de eo quid sit. Sed quia de Deo
 scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus
 considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non sit. Primo
@@ -538,13 +449,7 @@
 utrum sit in eo compositio subiecti et accidentis. Septimo, utrum
 sit quocumque modo compositus, vel totaliter simplex. Octavo, utrum
 veniat in compositionem cum aliis.</p>
-</div>
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1" next="FP_Q3_A2" prev="FP_Q3" progress="0.37%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is a body?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p0.1">Whether God is a body?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1" next="FP_Q3_A2" prev="FP_Q3" progress="0.37%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is a body?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p0.1">Whether God is a body?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy
 Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written:
@@ -552,31 +457,27 @@
 Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the
 earth and broader than the sea" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.11.8-Job.11.9" parsed="vul|Job|11|8|11|9" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p2.1" passage="Job 11:8,9">Job
 11:8,9</scripRef>). Therefore God is a body.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28322"><span class="ref">[28322] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28322"><span class="ref">[28322] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit corpus. Corpus enim est quod
 habet trinam dimensionem. Sed sacra Scriptura attribuit Deo trinam
 dimensionem, dicitur enim Iob XI, <i>excelsior caelo est, et quid
 facies? Profundior Inferno, et unde cognosces? Longior terra
 mensura eius, et latior mari</i>. Ergo Deus est corpus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything
 that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But
 God seems to have figure, for it is written: "Let us make man to our
 image and likeness" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.1.26" parsed="vul|Gen|1|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p3.1" passage="Gn. 1:26">Gn. 1:26</scripRef>). Now a figure is called an
 image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His glory
 and the figure," i.e. the image, "of His substance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.1.3" parsed="vul|Heb|1|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p3.2" passage="Heb. 1:3">Heb. 1:3</scripRef>). Therefore God is a body.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28323"><span class="ref">[28323] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28323"><span class="ref">[28323] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
 figuratum est corpus, cum figura sit qualitas circa quantitatem.
 Sed Deus videtur esse figuratus, cum scriptum sit Gen. I,
 <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram</i>,
 figura enim imago dicitur, secundum illud Hebr. I, <i>cum sit
 splendor gloriae, et figura substantiae eius</i>, idest imago. Ergo
 Deus est corpus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever has
 corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to
 God. "Hast thou an arm like God?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.40.4" parsed="vul|Job|40|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p4.1" passage="Job 40:4">Job
@@ -584,26 +485,22 @@
 (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.33.16" parsed="vul|Ps|33|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p4.2" passage="Ps. 33:16">Ps. 33:16</scripRef>); and "The right hand of the
 Lord hath wrought strength" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.117.16" parsed="vul|Ps|117|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p4.3" passage="Ps. 117:16">Ps. 117:16</scripRef>). Therefore God is a
 body.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28324"><span class="ref">[28324] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28324"><span class="ref">[28324] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
 quod habet partes corporeas, est corpus. Sed Scriptura attribuit
 Deo partes corporeas, dicitur enim Iob XL, <i>si habes brachium ut
 Deus</i>; et in Psalmo, <i>oculi domini super iustos; et, dextera
 domini fecit virtutem</i>. Ergo Deus est corpus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, posture
 belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said
 of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the Lord sitting" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.6.1" parsed="vul|Isa|6|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p5.1" passage="Is. 6:1">Is. 6:1</scripRef>),
 and "He standeth up to judge" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.3.13" parsed="vul|Isa|3|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p5.2" passage="Is. 3:13">Is. 3:13</scripRef>). Therefore God is a body.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28325"><span class="ref">[28325] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, situs
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28325"><span class="ref">[28325] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, situs
 non convenit nisi corpori. Sed ea quae ad situm pertinent, in
 Scripturis dicuntur de Deo, dicitur enim Isaiae VI, <i>vidi dominum
 sedentem</i>; et Isaiae III, <i>stat ad iudicandum dominus</i>.
 Ergo Deus est corpus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, only bodies
 or things corporeal can be a local term "wherefrom" or "whereto." But
 in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term "whereto,"
@@ -611,28 +508,24 @@
 "All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth"
 (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.17.13" parsed="vul|Jer|17|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p6.2" passage="Jer. 17:13">Jer. 17:13</scripRef>). Therefore God is a
 body.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="28326"><span class="ref">[28326] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="28326"><span class="ref">[28326] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
 potest esse terminus localis a quo vel ad quem, nisi sit corpus vel
 aliquod corporeum. Sed Deus in Scriptura dicitur esse terminus
 localis ut ad quem, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>accedite ad eum, et
 illuminamini</i>; et ut a quo, secundum illud Hierem. XVII,
 recedentes a te in terra scribentur. Ergo Deus est corpus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p7"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is written in the Gospel of St. John (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.4.24" parsed="vul|John|4|24|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p7.1" passage="Jn. 4:24">Jn. 4:24</scripRef>): "God is a spirit."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28327"><span class="ref">[28327] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28327"><span class="ref">[28327] Iª q. 3 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Ioan. IV, <i>spiritus est Deus</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p8"><b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3">Q[2], A[3]</a>), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any
   single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to
   infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence
   that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the
 body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 co."><a name="28328"><span class="ref">[28328] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 co."><a name="28328"><span class="ref">[28328] Iª q. 3 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 absolute Deum non esse corpus. Quod tripliciter ostendi potest.
 Primo quidem, quia nullum corpus movet non motum, ut patet
 inducendo per singula. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est
@@ -654,16 +547,14 @@
 vivat per aliquid aliud, sicut corpus nostrum vivit per animam.
 Illud autem per quod vivit corpus, est nobilius quam corpus.
 Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p9.1" href="#FP.i.FP_Q1.FP_Q1_A9">Q[1], A[9]</a>), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration of His existence; by
   breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius
 (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility
 of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power;
 by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie
 under His protection.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28329"><span class="ref">[28329] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28329"><span class="ref">[28329] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sacra Scriptura tradit nobis
 spiritualia et divina sub similitudinibus corporalium. Unde, cum
 trinam dimensionem Deo attribuit, sub similitudine quantitatis
@@ -676,12 +567,10 @@
 virtutis eius, omnia penetrantis; per latitudinem vero,
 superextensio eius ad omnia, inquantum scilicet sub eius
 protectione omnia continentur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.1.26" parsed="vul|Gen|1|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p10.1" passage="Gn. 1:26">Gn. 1:26</scripRef>). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of
   God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28330"><span class="ref">[28330] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28330"><span class="ref">[28330] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod homo dicitur esse ad imaginem Dei, non secundum
 corpus, sed secundum id quo homo excellit alia animalia, unde, Gen.
 I, postquam dictum est, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et
@@ -689,117 +578,91 @@
 maris,</i> et cetera. Excellit autem homo omnia animalia quantum ad
 rationem et intellectum. Unde secundum intellectum et rationem,
 quae sunt incorporea, homo est ad imaginem Dei.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Corporeal
 parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions,
 and this is owing to a certain parallel. For instance the act of the
 eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of
 seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with the other
 parts.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28331"><span class="ref">[28331] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28331"><span class="ref">[28331] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod partes corporeae attribuuntur Deo in Scripturis ratione suorum
 actuum, secundum quandam similitudinem. Sicut actus oculi est
 videre, unde oculus de Deo dictus, significat virtutem eius ad
 videndum modo intelligibili, non sensibili. Et simile est de aliis
 partibus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever
 pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of
 parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of His
 unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His
 power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28332"><span class="ref">[28332] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28332"><span class="ref">[28332] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
 quod etiam ea quae ad situm pertinent, non attribuuntur Deo nisi
 secundum quandam similitudinem, sicut dicitur sedens, propter suam
 immobilitatem et auctoritatem; et stans, propter suam fortitudinem
 ad debellandum omne quod adversatur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> We draw
 near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the
 affections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul do we
 withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies
 merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="28333"><span class="ref">[28333] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="28333"><span class="ref">[28333] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum
 quod ad Deum non acceditur passibus corporalibus, cum ubique sit,
 sed affectibus mentis, et eodem modo ab eo receditur. Et sic
 accessus et recessus, sub similitudine localis motus, designant
 spiritualem affectum.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2" next="FP_Q3_A3" prev="FP_Q3_A1" progress="0.41%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God is composed of matter and form?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p0.1">Whether God is composed of matter and form?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2" next="FP_Q3_A3" prev="FP_Q3_A1" progress="0.41%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God is composed of matter and form?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p0.1">Whether God is composed of matter and form?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of
 matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture
 attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.10.38" parsed="vul|Heb|10|38|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p2.1" passage="Heb. 10:38">Heb. 10:38</scripRef>), where God says: "But My
 just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not
 please My soul." Therefore God is composed of matter and form.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28334"><span class="ref">[28334] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28334"><span class="ref">[28334] Iª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae.
 Omne enim quod habet animam, est compositum ex materia et forma,
 quia anima est forma corporis. Sed Scriptura attribuit animam Deo,
 introducitur enim ad Hebr. X, ex persona Dei, <i>iustus autem meus
 ex fide vivit; quod si subtraxerit se, non placebit animae
 meae</i>. Ergo Deus est compositus ex materia et forma.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger, joy
 and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed
 to God in Scripture: "The Lord was exceeding angry with His people"
 (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.105.40" parsed="vul|Ps|105|40|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p3.1" passage="Ps. 105:40">Ps. 105:40</scripRef>). Therefore God is composed
 of matter and form.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28335"><span class="ref">[28335] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ira,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28335"><span class="ref">[28335] Iª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ira,
 gaudium, et huiusmodi, sunt passiones coniuncti, ut dicitur I de
 anima. Sed huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo in Scriptura dicitur enim in
 Psalmo, <i>iratus est furore dominus in populum suum</i>. Ergo Deus
 ex materia et forma est compositus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matter is
 the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual,
 for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of
 matter and form.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28336"><span class="ref">[28336] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28336"><span class="ref">[28336] Iª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 materia est principium individuationis. Sed Deus videtur esse
 individuum, non enim de multis praedicatur. Ergo est compositus ex
 materia et forma.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body;
 for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not
 a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not
 composed of matter and form.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28337"><span class="ref">[28337] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28337"><span class="ref">[28337] Iª q. 3 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
 compositum ex materia et forma est corpus, quantitas enim dimensiva
 est quae primo inhaeret materiae. Sed Deus non est corpus, ut
 ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est compositus ex materia et forma.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3">Q[2], A[3]</a>) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the
   first good and the best---viz. God---is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is
   therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and
 form.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 co."><a name="28338"><span class="ref">[28338] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 co."><a name="28338"><span class="ref">[28338] Iª q. 3 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod impossibile est in Deo esse materiam. Primo quidem, quia
 materia est id quod est in potentia. Ostensum est autem quod Deus
 est purus actus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate. Unde
@@ -817,36 +680,30 @@
 primum agens, cum sit prima causa efficiens, ut ostensum est. Est
 igitur per essentiam suam forma; et non compositus ex materia et
 forma.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p7"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> A soul is attributed to God because His acts
 resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our
 soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His
 soul.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28339"><span class="ref">[28339] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28339"><span class="ref">[28339] Iª q. 3 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod anima attribuitur Deo per similitudinem actus. Quod
 enim volumus aliquid nobis, ex anima nostra est, unde illud dicitur
 esse placitum animae Dei, quod est placitum voluntati ipsius.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p8"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> Anger and the like are attributed to God on
 account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly
 the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of
 as His anger.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28340"><span class="ref">[28340] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28340"><span class="ref">[28340] Iª q. 3 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod ira et huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo secundum
 similitudinem effectus, quia enim proprium est irati punire, ira
 eius punitio metaphorice vocatur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in
   God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28341"><span class="ref">[28341] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28341"><span class="ref">[28341] Iª q. 3 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod formae quae sunt receptibiles in materia individuantur per
 materiam, quae non potest esse in alio, cum sit primum subiectum
 substans, forma vero, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid aliud
@@ -854,58 +711,40 @@
 receptibilis in materia, sed est per se subsistens, ex hoc ipso
 individuatur, quod non potest recipi in alio, et huiusmodi forma
 est Deus. Unde non sequitur quod habeat materiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3" next="FP_Q3_A4" prev="FP_Q3_A2" progress="0.43%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3" next="FP_Q3_A4" prev="FP_Q3_A2" progress="0.43%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in
 itself. But the substance or nature of God---i.e. the Godhead---is
 said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His
 essence or nature.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28342"><span class="ref">[28342] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28342"><span class="ref">[28342] Iª q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod non sit idem Deus quod sua essentia vel
 natura. Nihil enim est in seipso. Sed essentia vel natura Dei, quae
 est deitas, dicitur esse in Deo. Ergo videtur quod Deus non sit
 idem quod sua essentia vel natura.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect
 is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in
 created things the "suppositum" is not identical with its nature; for
 a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same
 as His Godhead.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28343"><span class="ref">[28343] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28343"><span class="ref">[28343] Iª q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 effectus assimilatur suae causae, quia omne agens agit sibi simile.
 Sed in rebus creatis non est idem suppositum quod sua natura, non
 enim idem est homo quod sua humanitas. Ergo nec Deus est idem quod
 sua deitas.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p4"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is said of God that He is life itself, and not
 only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the
 life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.14.6" parsed="vul|John|14|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p4.1" passage="Jn. 14:6">Jn. 14:6</scripRef>). Now the relation between
 Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living
 thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28344"><span class="ref">[28344] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Contra, de Deo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28344"><span class="ref">[28344] Iª q. 3 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Contra, de Deo
 dicitur quod est vita, et non solum quod est vivens, ut patet Ioan.
 XIV, <i>ego sum via, veritas et vita</i>. Sicut autem se habet vita
 ad viventem, ita deitas ad Deum. Ergo Deus est ipsa deitas.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now
   individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity.
   Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter---that is to say, to "this" matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is necessary the forms themselves should
@@ -913,7 +752,7 @@
 are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He
 must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus
 predicated of Him.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 co."><a name="28345"><span class="ref">[28345] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 co."><a name="28345"><span class="ref">[28345] Iª q. 3 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod Deus est idem quod sua essentia vel natura. Ad cuius
 intellectum sciendum est, quod in rebus compositis ex materia et
 forma, necesse est quod differant natura vel essentia et
@@ -938,12 +777,10 @@
 suppositum et natura. Et sic, cum Deus non sit compositus ex
 materia et forma, ut ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit sua
 deitas, sua vita, et quidquid aliud sic de Deo praedicatur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not
   that there is any composition in God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28346"><span class="ref">[28346] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28346"><span class="ref">[28346] Iª q. 3 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod de rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus, nisi per
 modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accipimus. Et ideo, de Deo
 loquentes, utimur nominibus concretis, ut significemus eius
@@ -952,37 +789,23 @@
 Quod ergo dicitur deitas vel vita, vel aliquid huiusmodi, esse in
 Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptione
 intellectus nostri; et non ad aliquam diversitatem rei.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p7"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly,
 but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective,
 precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by
 divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and
 therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28347"><span class="ref">[28347] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28347"><span class="ref">[28347] Iª q. 3 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod effectus Dei imitantur ipsum, non perfecte, sed
 secundum quod possunt. Et hoc ad defectum imitationis pertinet,
 quod id quod est simplex et unum, non potest repraesentari nisi per
 multa, et sic accidit in eis compositio, ex qua provenit quod in
 eis non est idem suppositum quod natura.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4" next="FP_Q3_A5" prev="FP_Q3_A3" progress="0.45%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether essence and existence are the same in God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p0.1">Whether essence and existence are the same in God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4" next="FP_Q3_A5" prev="FP_Q3_A3" progress="0.45%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether essence and existence are the same in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p0.1">Whether essence and existence are the same in God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.14.21" parsed="vul|Wis|14|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p2.1" passage="Wis. 14:21">Wis. 14:21</scripRef>). Therefore God's existence is not His
   essence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28348"><span class="ref">[28348] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28348"><span class="ref">[28348] Iª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit idem essentia et esse. Si
 enim hoc sit, tunc ad esse divinum nihil additur. Sed esse cui
 nulla fit additio, est esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur,
@@ -990,39 +813,33 @@
 Hoc autem est falsum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile
 nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt</i>. Ergo esse Dei non est
 eius essentia.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can know
 "whether" God exists as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2">Q[2],
 A[2]</a>); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence
 is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or
 nature.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28349"><span class="ref">[28349] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de Deo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28349"><span class="ref">[28349] Iª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de Deo
 scire possumus an sit, ut supra dictum est. Non autem possumus
 scire quid sit. Ergo non est idem esse Dei, et quod quid est eius,
 sive quidditas vel natura.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p4"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an
 accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in
 God is His existence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28350"><span class="ref">[28350] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28350"><span class="ref">[28350] Iª q. 3 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod Hilarius dicit in VII de Trin., <i>esse non est accidens in
 Deo, sed subsistens veritas</i>. Id ergo quod subsistit in Deo, est
 suum esse.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species---as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man---and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent---as heat is caused
   in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of
   God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above
   <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1">(A[1])</a>, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3">(A[3])</a> if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not
   therefore be the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His
 own existence, and not merely His own essence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="28351"><span class="ref">[28351] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="28351"><span class="ref">[28351] Iª q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est, sed etiam
 suum esse. Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem,
 quia quidquid est in aliquo quod est praeter essentiam eius,
@@ -1052,14 +869,12 @@
 participationem, et non per essentiam. Non ergo erit primum ens,
 quod absurdum est dicere. Est igitur Deus suum esse, et non solum
 sua essentia.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to
   lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the
 first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the
 second sense.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28352"><span class="ref">[28352] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28352"><span class="ref">[28352] Iª q. 3 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod aliquid cui non fit additio potest intelligi
 dupliciter. Uno modo, ut de ratione eius sit quod non fiat ei
 additio; sicut de ratione animalis irrationalis est, ut sit sine
@@ -1069,12 +884,10 @@
 ut habeat rationem; sed nec de ratione eius est ut careat ratione.
 Primo igitur modo, esse sine additione, est esse divinum, secundo
 modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is true; and this we know from His effects (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2">Q[2],
   A[2]</a>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28353"><span class="ref">[28353] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28353"><span class="ref">[28353] Iª q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum
 essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam
 anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo
@@ -1082,56 +895,36 @@
 essentiam, sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio
 quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus Deus est, vera est. Et hoc scimus
 ex eius effectibus, ut supra dictum est.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5" next="FP_Q3_A6" prev="FP_Q3_A4" progress="0.48%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God is contained in a genus?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5-p0.1">Whether God is contained in a genus?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5" next="FP_Q3_A6" prev="FP_Q3_A4" progress="0.48%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God is contained in a genus?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5-p0.1">Whether God is contained in a genus?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of
 itself. But this is especially true of God. Therefore God is in a
 genus of substance.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28354"><span class="ref">[28354] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28354"><span class="ref">[28354] Iª q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit in genere aliquo. Substantia enim
 est ens per se subsistens. Hoc autem maxime convenit Deo. Ergo Deus
 est in genere substantiae.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can
 be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured
 by length and numbers by number. But God is the measure of all
 substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore God is in
 the genus of substance.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28355"><span class="ref">[28355] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28355"><span class="ref">[28355] Iª q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 unumquodque mensuratur per aliquid sui generis; sicut longitudines
 per longitudinem, et numeri per numerum. Sed Deus est mensura
 omnium substantiarum, ut patet per Commentatorem, X Metaphys. Ergo
 Deus est in genere substantiae.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5-p4"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But
 nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is
 not in any genus.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28356"><span class="ref">[28356] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, genus
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28356"><span class="ref">[28356] Iª q. 3 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, genus
 est prius, secundum intellectum, eo quod in genere continetur. Sed
 nihil est prius Deo, nec secundum rem, nec secundum intellectum.
 Ergo Deus non est in aliquo genere.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a
   species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is
   compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for
@@ -1142,7 +935,7 @@
 quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the
 principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus as
 its principle.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 co."><a name="28357"><span class="ref">[28357] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 co."><a name="28357"><span class="ref">[28357] Iª q. 3 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod aliquid est in genere dupliciter. Uno modo simpliciter et
 proprie; sicut species, quae sub genere continentur. Alio modo, per
 reductionem, sicut principia et privationes, sicut punctus et
@@ -1184,9 +977,7 @@
 unitas quantitatis discretae. Deus autem est principium totius
 esse, ut infra ostendetur. Unde non continetur in aliquo genere
 sicut principium.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5-p6"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> The word substance signifies not only what exists
 of itself---for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the
@@ -1194,39 +985,25 @@
 property of existing in this way---namely, of existing of itself; this
 existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is
 not in the genus of substance.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28358"><span class="ref">[28358] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28358"><span class="ref">[28358] Iª q. 3 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod substantiae nomen non significat hoc solum quod est
 per se esse, quia hoc quod est esse, non potest per se esse genus,
 ut ostensum est. Sed significat essentiam cui competit sic esse,
 idest per se esse, quod tamen esse non est ipsa eius essentia. Et
 sic patet quod Deus non est in genere substantiae.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5-p7"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> This objection turns upon proportionate measure
 which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a
 measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of
 all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as
 it resembles Him.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28359"><span class="ref">[28359] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28359"><span class="ref">[28359] Iª q. 3 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de mensura proportionata, hanc
 enim oportet esse homogeneam mensurato. Deus autem non est mensura
 proportionata alicui. Dicitur tamen mensura omnium, ex eo quod
 unumquodque tantum habet de esse, quantum ei appropinquat.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6" next="FP_Q3_A7" prev="FP_Q3_A5" progress="0.51%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether in God there are any accidents?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6-p0.1">Whether in God there are any accidents?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6" next="FP_Q3_A7" prev="FP_Q3_A5" progress="0.51%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether in God there are any accidents?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6-p0.1">Whether in God there are any accidents?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there
 are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as
 Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that which is an accident in one,
@@ -1234,44 +1011,38 @@
 be the substantial form of fire, because it is an accident in other
 things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us,
 are attributes of God. Therefore in God there are accidents.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28360"><span class="ref">[28360] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28360"><span class="ref">[28360] Iª q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sint aliqua accidentia. Substantia
 enim nulli est accidens, ut dicitur in I Physic. Quod ergo in uno
 est accidens, non potest in alio esse substantia, sicut probatur
 quod calor non sit forma substantialis ignis, quia in aliis est
 accidens. Sed sapientia, virtus, et huiusmodi, quae in nobis sunt
 accidentia, Deo attribuuntur. Ergo et in Deo sunt accidentia.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every
 genus there is a first principle. But there are many "genera" of
 accidents. If, therefore, the primal members of these genera are not
 in God, there will be many primal beings other than God---which is
 absurd.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28361"><span class="ref">[28361] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28361"><span class="ref">[28361] Iª q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
 quolibet genere est unum primum. Multa autem sunt genera
 accidentium. Si igitur prima illorum generum non sunt in Deo, erunt
 multa prima extra Deum, quod est inconveniens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6-p4"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a
 subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De
 Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28362"><span class="ref">[28362] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28362"><span class="ref">[28362] Iª q. 3 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
 accidens in subiecto est. Deus autem non potest esse subiectum,
 quia <i>forma simplex non potest esse subiectum</i>, ut dicit
 Boetius in Lib. de Trin. Ergo in Deo non potest esse accidens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to
   absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the
   subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the
 first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 co."><a name="28363"><span class="ref">[28363] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 co."><a name="28363"><span class="ref">[28363] Iª q. 3 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod, secundum praemissa, manifeste apparet quod in Deo accidens
 esse non potest. Primo quidem, quia subiectum comparatur ad
 accidens, sicut potentia ad actum, subiectum enim secundum accidens
@@ -1288,79 +1059,57 @@
 hominis. Quia huiusmodi accidentia causantur ex principiis
 subiecti, in Deo autem nihil potest esse causatum, cum sit causa
 prima. Unde relinquitur quod in Deo nullum sit accidens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6-p6"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of
 us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in
 God as there are in us.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28364"><span class="ref">[28364] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28364"><span class="ref">[28364] Iª q. 3 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod virtus et sapientia non univoce dicuntur de Deo et de
 nobis, ut infra patebit. Unde non sequitur quod accidentia sint in
 Deo, sicut in nobis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6-p7"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> Since substance is prior to its accidents, the
 principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the
 substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if
 contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all
 being, outside of every genus.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28365"><span class="ref">[28365] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28365"><span class="ref">[28365] Iª q. 3 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod, cum substantia sit prior accidentibus, principia
 accidentium reducuntur in principia substantiae sicut in priora.
 Quamvis Deus non sit primum contentum in genere substantiae, sed
 primum extra omne genus, respectu totius esse.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7" next="FP_Q3_A8" prev="FP_Q3_A6" progress="0.53%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether God is altogether simple?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p0.1">Whether God is altogether simple?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7" next="FP_Q3_A8" prev="FP_Q3_A6" progress="0.53%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether God is altogether simple?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p0.1">Whether God is altogether simple?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus
 from the first being are all beings; and from the first good is all
 good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether
 simple. Therefore neither is God altogether simple.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28366"><span class="ref">[28366] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28366"><span class="ref">[28366] Iª q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino simplex. Ea enim quae
 sunt a Deo, imitantur ipsum, unde a primo ente sunt omnia entia, et
 a primo bono sunt omnia bona. Sed in rebus quae sunt a Deo, nihil
 est omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non est omnino simplex.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is
 best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is
 better than that which is simple; thus, chemical compounds are better
 than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose
 them. Therefore it cannot be said that God is altogether simple.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28367"><span class="ref">[28367] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28367"><span class="ref">[28367] Iª q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
 quod est melius, Deo attribuendum est. Sed, apud nos, composita
 sunt meliora simplicibus, sicut corpora mixta elementis, et
 elementa suis partibus. Ergo non est dicendum quod Deus sit omnino
 simplex.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p4"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and
 absolutely simple."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28368"><span class="ref">[28368] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28368"><span class="ref">[28368] Iª q. 3 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod Deus vere et summe simplex
 est.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite,
   but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3">Q[2], A[3]</a>), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must
   be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a
@@ -1371,7 +1120,7 @@
 argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not
 made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of
 things that are dim."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 co."><a name="28369"><span class="ref">[28369] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 co."><a name="28369"><span class="ref">[28369] Iª q. 3 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod Deum omnino esse simplicem, multipliciter potest esse
 manifestum. Primo quidem per supradicta. Cum enim in Deo non sit
 compositio, neque quantitativarum partium, quia corpus non est;
@@ -1403,102 +1152,76 @@
 esse potest. Et hanc rationem tangit Hilarius, VII de Trin.,
 dicens, <i>Deus, qui virtus est, ex infirmis non continetur, neque
 qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p6"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused
 things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to
 be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from
 its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4], A[3]</a>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28370"><span class="ref">[28370] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28370"><span class="ref">[28370] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod ea quae sunt a Deo, imitantur Deum sicut causata
 primam causam. Est autem hoc de ratione causati, quod sit aliquo
 modo compositum, quia ad minus esse eius est aliud quam quod quid
 est, ut infra patebit.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p7"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> With us composite things are better than simple
 things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in
 one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine
 goodness is found in one simple thing (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1">Q[4], A[1]</a> and <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2">Q[6], A[2]</a>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28371"><span class="ref">[28371] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28371"><span class="ref">[28371] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod apud nos composita sunt meliora simplicibus, quia
 perfectio bonitatis creaturae non invenitur in uno simplici, sed in
 multis. Sed perfectio divinae bonitatis invenitur in uno simplici,
 ut infra ostendetur.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8" next="FP_Q4" prev="FP_Q3_A7" progress="0.55%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether God enters into the composition of other things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p0.1">Whether God enters into the composition of other things?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8" next="FP_Q4" prev="FP_Q3_A7" progress="0.55%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether God enters into the composition of other things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p0.1">Whether God enters into the composition of other things?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
 enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says
 (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things is that which is above
 being---the Godhead." But the being of all things enters into the
 composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the composition
 of other things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28372"><span class="ref">[28372] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28372"><span class="ref">[28372] Iª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat.
 Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier., <i>esse omnium est, quae
 super esse est deitas</i>. Sed esse omnium intrat compositionem
 uniuscuiusque. Ergo Deus in compositionem aliorum venit.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is a
 form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., [*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the
 word of God, which is God, is an uncreated form." But a form is part
 of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28373"><span class="ref">[28373] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28373"><span class="ref">[28373] Iª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
 est forma, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de verbis domini, quod
 verbum Dei (quod est Deus) est forma quaedam non formata. Sed forma
 est pars compositi. Ergo Deus est pars alicuius compositi.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ
   from each other.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28374"><span class="ref">[28374] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28374"><span class="ref">[28374] Iª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 quaecumque sunt et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et
 materia prima sunt, et nullo modo differunt. Ergo penitus sunt
 idem. Sed materia prima intrat compositionem rerum. Ergo et Deus.
 Probatio mediae, quaecumque differunt, aliquibus differentiis
 differunt, et ita oportet ea esse composita; sed Deus et materia
 prima sunt omnino simplicia; ergo nullo modo differunt.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no
 touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling
 part with part."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1"><a name="28375"><span class="ref">[28375] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1"><a name="28375"><span class="ref">[28375] Iª q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod neque tactus est
 eius (scilicet Dei), <i>neque alia quaedam ad partes commiscendi
 communio</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p6">
 Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with
 them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2"><a name="28376"><span class="ref">[28376] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2"><a name="28376"><span class="ref">[28376] Iª q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 dicitur in libro de causis, quod <i>causa prima regit omnes res,
 praeterquam commisceatur eis</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter.
   Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is
   actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal
@@ -1510,7 +1233,7 @@
 essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in
 ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it
 has been proved that God is absolutely primal being (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3">Q[2], A[3]</a>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="28377"><span class="ref">[28377] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="28377"><span class="ref">[28377] Iª q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod circa hoc fuerunt tres errores. Quidam enim posuerunt quod
 Deus esset anima mundi, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. VII de
 civitate Dei, et ad hoc etiam reducitur, quod quidam dixerunt Deum
@@ -1538,33 +1261,27 @@
 essentiam, ita et ipsum participatum; sicut ignis in ignitis est
 posterior eo quod est per essentiam. Ostensum est autem quod Deus
 est primum ens simpliciter.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p8"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> The Godhead is called the being of all things, as
 their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their
 essence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28378"><span class="ref">[28378] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28378"><span class="ref">[28378] Iª q. 3 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod deitas dicitur esse omnium effective et exemplariter,
 non autem per essentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that
 is part of a compound.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28379"><span class="ref">[28379] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28379"><span class="ref">[28379] Iª q. 3 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod verbum est forma exemplaris, non autem forma quae est
 pars compositi.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Simple things do not differ by added differences---for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are
   different differ by something." Therefore, strictly speaking,
 primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very being,
 diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28380"><span class="ref">[28380] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28380"><span class="ref">[28380] Iª q. 3 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod simplicia non differunt aliquibus aliis differentiis, hoc enim
 compositorum est. Homo enim et equus differunt rationali et
 irrationali differentiis, quae quidem differentiae non differunt
@@ -1574,20 +1291,7 @@
 differens aliquo differt. Unde, si fiat vis in verbo, materia prima
 et Deus non differunt, sed sunt diversa seipsis. Unde non sequitur
 quod sint idem.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q4" next="FP_Q4_A1" prev="FP_Q3_A8" progress="0.58%" n="iii" title="Question. 4 - THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4-p0.1">Question 4. THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q4" next="FP_Q4_A1" prev="FP_Q3_A8" progress="0.58%" n="iii" title="Question. 4 - THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)"><h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4-p0.1">Question 4. THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4-p2"> Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4-p3"> Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:</p>
@@ -1596,63 +1300,49 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4-p6"> (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?</p>
 </div>
      <div xml:lang="la"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 pr."><a name="28381"><span class="ref">[28381]
-I&ordf; q. 4 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae
+Iª q. 4 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae
 simplicitatis, de perfectione ipsius Dei dicendum est. Et quia
 unumquodque, secundum quod perfectum est, sic dicitur bonum, primo
 agendum est de perfectione divina; secundo de eius bonitate. Circa
 primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum Deus sit perfectus. Secundo,
 utrum Deus sit universaliter perfectus omnium in se perfectiones
 habens. Tertio, utrum creaturae similes Deo dici possint.</p></div>
-</div>
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1" next="FP_Q4_A2" prev="FP_Q4" progress="0.58%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is perfect?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p0.1">Whether God is perfect?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1" next="FP_Q4_A2" prev="FP_Q4" progress="0.58%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is perfect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p0.1">Whether God is perfect?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
 perfection does not belong to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it
 is completely made. But it does not befit God to be made. Therefore He
 is not perfect.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28382"><span class="ref">[28382] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28382"><span class="ref">[28382] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod esse perfectum non conveniat Deo.
 Perfectum enim dicitur quasi totaliter factum. Sed Deo non convenit
 esse factum. Ergo nec esse perfectum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the
 first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be
 imperfect, as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable
 life. Therefore God is imperfect.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28383"><span class="ref">[28383] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28383"><span class="ref">[28383] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
 est primum rerum principium. Sed principia rerum videntur esse
 imperfecta, semen enim est principium animalium et plantarum. Ergo
 Deus est imperfectus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as shown
 above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3],
 A[4]</a>), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most
 imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all
 modification. Therefore God is imperfect.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28384"><span class="ref">[28384] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28384"><span class="ref">[28384] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 ostensum est supra quod essentia Dei est ipsum esse. Sed ipsum esse
 videtur esse imperfectissimum, cum sit communissimum, et recipiens
 omnium additiones. Ergo Deus est imperfectus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly
 Father is perfect" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.5.48" parsed="vul|Matt|5|48|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p5.1" passage="Mat. 5:48">Mat. 5:48</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28385"><span class="ref">[28385] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28385"><span class="ref">[28385] Iª q. 4 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Matt. V, <i>estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester
 caelestis perfectus est</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle,
   not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be
 most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an
@@ -1661,7 +1351,7 @@
 thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we
 call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its
 perfection.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 co."><a name="28386"><span class="ref">[28386] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 co."><a name="28386"><span class="ref">[28386] Iª q. 4 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod, sicut philosophus narrat in XII Metaphys., quidam antiqui
 philosophi, scilicet Pythagorici et Speusippus, non attribuerunt
 optimum et perfectissimum primo principio. Cuius ratio est, quia
@@ -1677,9 +1367,7 @@
 maxime esse perfectum. Secundum hoc enim dicitur aliquid esse
 perfectum, secundum quod est actu, nam perfectum dicitur, cui nihil
 deest secundum modum suae perfectionis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p7"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our
 lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that
@@ -1688,16 +1376,14 @@
 are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is
 not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or
 not.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28387"><span class="ref">[28387] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28387"><span class="ref">[28387] Iª q. 4 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Gregorius, <i>balbutiendo ut possumus,
 excelsa Dei resonamus, quod enim factum non est, perfectum proprie
 dici non potest</i>. Sed quia in his quae fiunt, tunc dicitur esse
 aliquid perfectum, cum de potentia educitur in actum; transumitur
 hoc nomen perfectum ad significandum omne illud cui non deest esse
 in actu, sive hoc habeat per modum factionis, sive non.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p8"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> The material principle which with us is found to
 be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by
@@ -1706,7 +1392,7 @@
 which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be
 that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into
 act by some being already actual.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28388"><span class="ref">[28388] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28388"><span class="ref">[28388] Iª q. 4 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod principium materiale, quod apud nos imperfectum
 invenitur, non potest esse simpliciter primum, sed praeceditur ab
 alio perfecto. Nam semen, licet sit principium animalis generati ex
@@ -1714,13 +1400,11 @@
 Oportet enim ante id quod est in potentia, esse aliquid actu, cum
 ens in potentia non reducatur in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in
 actu.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is
   considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as
 that which exists.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28389"><span class="ref">[28389] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28389"><span class="ref">[28389] Iª q. 4 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium, comparatur enim ad omnia
 ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde
 ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum.
@@ -1728,32 +1412,18 @@
 sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi,
 vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et
 receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" next="FP_Q4_A3" prev="FP_Q4_A1" progress="0.61%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the perfections of all things are in God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p0.1">Whether the perfections of all things are in God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" next="FP_Q4_A3" prev="FP_Q4_A1" progress="0.61%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the perfections of all things are in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p0.1">Whether the perfections of all things are in God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
 perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown
 above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3],
 A[7]</a>); whereas the perfections of things are many and
 diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28390"><span class="ref">[28390] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28390"><span class="ref">[28390] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sint perfectiones omnium rerum.
 Deus enim simplex est, ut ostensum est. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt
 multae et diversae. Ergo in Deo non sunt omnes perfectiones
 rerum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposites
 cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each
 other, for each thing is perfected by its specific difference. But the
@@ -1761,39 +1431,33 @@
 are opposed to each other. Therefore because opposites cannot coexist
 in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are
 not in God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28391"><span class="ref">[28391] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28391"><span class="ref">[28391] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 opposita non possunt esse in eodem. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt
 oppositae, unaquaeque enim species perficitur per suam differentiam
 specificam; differentiae autem quibus dividitur genus et
 constituuntur species, sunt oppositae. Cum ergo opposita non
 possint simul esse in eodem, videtur quod non omnes rerum
 perfectiones sint in Deo.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a living
 thing is more perfect than what merely exists; and an intelligent
 thing than what merely lives. Therefore life is more perfect than
 existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is
 existence itself. Therefore He has not the perfections of life, and
 knowledge, and other similar perfections.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28392"><span class="ref">[28392] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, vivens
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28392"><span class="ref">[28392] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, vivens
 est perfectius quam ens, et sapiens quam vivens, ergo et vivere est
 perfectius quam esse, et sapere quam vivere. Sed essentia Dei est
 ipsum esse. Ergo non habet in se perfectionem vitae et sapientiae,
 et alias huiusmodi perfectiones.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one
 existence prepossesses all things."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28393"><span class="ref">[28393] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28393"><span class="ref">[28393] Iª q. 4 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., quod Deus in uno
 existentia omnia praehabet.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator, Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent---as when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal
   agent---thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective
   cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all." Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has
@@ -1803,7 +1467,7 @@
 single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely,
 without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards he adds that, "He is
 the very existence to subsisting things."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 co."><a name="28394"><span class="ref">[28394] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 co."><a name="28394"><span class="ref">[28394] Iª q. 4 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod in Deo sunt perfectiones omnium rerum. Unde et dicitur
 universaliter perfectus, quia non deest ei aliqua nobilitas quae
 inveniatur in aliquo genere, ut dicit Commentator in V Metaphys. Et
@@ -1837,13 +1501,11 @@
 est existens, sed simpliciter et incircumscripte totum in seipso
 uniformiter esse praeaccipit</i>, et postea subdit quod <i>ipse est
 esse subsistentibus</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; "a fortiori" should all things in a kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity. This suffices for the Reply
   to the Second Objection.</p>
 <div xml:lang="la">
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28395"><span class="ref">[28395] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28395"><span class="ref">[28395] Iª q. 4 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, <i>sicut sol</i>, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. V de Div.
 Nom., <i>sensibilium substantias et qualitates multas et
 differentes, ipse unus existens et uniformiter lucendo, in seipso
@@ -1851,17 +1513,15 @@
 est praeexistere omnia secundum naturalem unionem</i>. Et sic, quae
 sunt diversa et opposita in seipsis, in Deo praeexistunt ut unum,
 absque detrimento simplicitatis ipsius.</p>
-<p title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28396"><span class="ref">[28396] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet
+<p title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28396"><span class="ref">[28396] Iª q. 4 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet
 solutio ad secundum.</p>
 </div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that, although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of
   existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and
 wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to
 Him who is subsisting being itself.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28397"><span class="ref">[28397] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28397"><span class="ref">[28397] Iª q. 4 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod, sicut in eodem capite idem Dionysius dicit, licet ipsum esse
 sit perfectius quam vita, et ipsa vita quam ipsa sapientia, si
 considerentur secundum quod distinguuntur ratione, tamen vivens est
@@ -1871,84 +1531,61 @@
 participet ipsum secundum omnem modum essendi, tamen ipsum esse Dei
 includit in se vitam et sapientiam; quia nulla de perfectionibus
 essendi potest deesse ei quod est ipsum esse subsistens.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3" next="FP_Q5" prev="FP_Q4_A2" progress="0.64%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether any creature can be like God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p0.1">Whether any creature can be like God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3" next="FP_Q5" prev="FP_Q4_A2" progress="0.64%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether any creature can be like God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p0.1">Whether any creature can be like God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no
 creature can be like God. For it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.85.8" parsed="vul|Ps|85|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p2.1" passage="Ps. 85:8">Ps. 85:8</scripRef>): "There is none among the gods
 like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are
 those which are called participation gods. Therefore still less can
 other creatures be said to be like God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28398"><span class="ref">[28398] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28398"><span class="ref">[28398] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod nulla creatura possit esse similis Deo.
 Dicitur enim in Psalmo, <i>non est similis tui in diis, domine</i>.
 Sed inter omnes creaturas, excellentiores sunt quae dicuntur dii
 participative. Multo ergo minus aliae creaturae possunt dici Deo
 similes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness
 implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a
 different "genus." Therefore neither can there be any likeness. Thus
 we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in
 the same "genus" as God: since God is no "genus," as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore no creature is
 like God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28399"><span class="ref">[28399] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28399"><span class="ref">[28399] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 similitudo est comparatio quaedam. Non est autem comparatio eorum
 quae sunt diversorum generum; ergo nec similitudo, non enim dicimus
 quod dulcedo sit similis albedini. Sed nulla creatura est eiusdem
 generis cum Deo, cum Deus non sit in genere, ut supra ostensum est.
 Ergo nulla creatura est similis Deo.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we speak of
 those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with
 God in form; for, save in God alone, essence and existence
 differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28400"><span class="ref">[28400] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28400"><span class="ref">[28400] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 similia dicuntur quae conveniunt in forma. Sed nihil convenit cum
 Deo in forma, nullius enim rei essentia est ipsum esse, nisi solius
 Dei. Ergo nulla creatura potest esse similis Deo.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, among like
 things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If
 therefore any creature is like God, God will be like some creature,
 which is against what is said by Isaias: "To whom have you likened
 God?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.40.18" parsed="vul|Isa|40|18|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p5.1" passage="Is. 40:18">Is. 40:18</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28401"><span class="ref">[28401] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28401"><span class="ref">[28401] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
 similibus est mutua similitudo, nam simile est simili simile. Si
 igitur aliqua creatura est similis Deo, et Deus erit similis alicui
 creaturae. Quod est contra id quod dicitur Isaiae XL, <i>cui
 similem fecistis Deum?</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is written: "Let us make man to our image and
 likeness" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.1.26" parsed="vul|Gen|1|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p6.1" passage="Gn. 1:26">Gn. 1:26</scripRef>), and: "When He shall appear we
-shall be like to Him" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1John.3.2" parsed="vul|1John|3|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p6.2" passage="1
-Jn. 3:2">1 Jn. 3:2</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28402"><span class="ref">[28402] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+shall be like to Him" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1John.3.2" parsed="vul|1John|3|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p6.2" passage="1 Jn. 3:2">1 Jn. 3:2</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28402"><span class="ref">[28402] Iª q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et
 similitudinem nostram</i>; et I Ioann. III, <i>cum apparuerit,
 similes ei erimus</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of
   things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts
   according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as things generated
@@ -1956,11 +1593,11 @@
   In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like
 God as the first and universal principle of all being.</p>
 <div xml:lang="la">
-<p title="I q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28402"><span class="ref">[28402] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p title="I q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28402"><span class="ref">[28402] Iª q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et
 similitudinem nostram</i>; et I Ioann. III, <i>cum apparuerit,
 similes ei erimus</i>.</p>
-<p title="I q. 4 a. 3 co."><a name="28403"><span class="ref">[28403] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p title="I q. 4 a. 3 co."><a name="28403"><span class="ref">[28403] Iª q. 4 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod, cum similitudo attendatur secundum convenientiam vel
 communicationem in forma, multiplex est similitudo, secundum multos
 modos communicandi in forma. Quaedam enim dicuntur similia, quae
@@ -1991,12 +1628,10 @@
 modo illa quae sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei inquantum sunt entia, ut
 primo et universali principio totius esse.</p>
 </div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission, as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because
   they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28404"><span class="ref">[28404] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28404"><span class="ref">[28404] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom., cum
 sacra Scriptura dicit aliquid non esse simile Deo, <i>non est
 contrarium assimilationi ad ipsum. Eadem enim sunt similia Deo, et
@@ -2006,33 +1641,27 @@
 intensionem et remissionem, sicut minus album deficit a magis albo;
 sed quia non est convenientia nec secundum speciem nec secundum
 genus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> God is not related to creatures as though
 belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus,"
 and as the principle of all "genera."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28405"><span class="ref">[28405] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28405"><span class="ref">[28405] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod Deus non se habet ad creaturas sicut res diversorum
 generum, sed sicut id quod est extra omne genus, et principium
 omnium generum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Likeness of
 creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form
 according to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely
 according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas
 other things are beings by participation.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28406"><span class="ref">[28406] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28406"><span class="ref">[28406] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod non dicitur esse similitudo creaturae ad Deum propter
 communicantiam in forma secundum eandem rationem generis et
 speciei, sed secundum analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens
 per essentiam, et alia per participationem.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it
 may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must
 nowise be admitted that God is like creatures; because, as Dionysius
@@ -2041,7 +1670,7 @@
 For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a
 creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God
 is like a creature.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28407"><span class="ref">[28407] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28407"><span class="ref">[28407] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
 quod, licet aliquo modo concedatur quod creatura sit similis Deo,
 nullo tamen modo concedendum est quod Deus sit similis creaturae,
 quia, ut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom., <i>in his quae unius
@@ -2049,19 +1678,7 @@
 causato</i>, dicimus enim quod imago sit similis homini, et non e
 converso. Et similiter dici potest aliquo modo quod creatura sit
 similis Deo, non tamen quod Deus sit similis creaturae.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5" next="FP_Q5_A1" prev="FP_Q4_A3" progress="0.67%" n="iv" title="Question. 5 - OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p0.1">Question 5. OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5" next="FP_Q5_A1" prev="FP_Q4_A3" progress="0.67%" n="iv" title="Question. 5 - OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)"><h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p0.1">Question 5. OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)</h3><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p2"> We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
@@ -2073,7 +1690,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p9"> (6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?</p>
 </div>
 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 pr."><a name="28408"><span class="ref">[28408]
-I&ordf; q. 5 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de bono, et primo de
+Iª q. 5 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de bono, et primo de
 bono in communi; secundo de bonitate Dei. Circa primum quaeruntur
 sex. Primo, utrum bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem. Secundo,
 supposito quod differant ratione tantum, quid sit prius secundum
@@ -2082,73 +1699,47 @@
 reducatur. Quinto, utrum ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et
 ordine. Sexto, quomodo dividatur bonum in honestum, utile et
 delectabile.</p>
-</div>
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" next="FP_Q5_A2" prev="FP_Q5" progress="0.67%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether goodness differs really from being?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p0.1">Whether goodness differs really from being?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+</div><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" next="FP_Q5_A2" prev="FP_Q5" progress="0.67%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether goodness differs really from being?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p0.1">Whether goodness differs really from being?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
 goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I
 perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing:
 that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really
 differ.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28409"><span class=
-"ref">[28409] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28409"><span class="ref">[28409] Iª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod bonum differat secundum rem ab ente. Dicit
 enim Boetius, in libro de Hebdom., <i>intueor in rebus aliud esse
 quod sunt bona, et aliud esse quod sunt</i>. Ergo bonum et ens
 differunt secundum rem.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can
 be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of
 being", according to the commentary on De Causis. Therefore goodness
 differs really from being.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28410"><span class=
-"ref">[28410] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28410"><span class="ref">[28410] Iª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
 informatur seipso. Sed bonum dicitur per informationem entis, ut
 habetur in commento libri de causis. Ergo bonum differt secundum
 rem ab ente.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness can
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness can
 be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness
 differs really from being.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28411"><span class=
-"ref">[28411] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28411"><span class="ref">[28411] Iª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
 suscipit magis et minus. Esse autem non suscipit magis et minus.
 Ergo bonum differt secundum rem ab ente.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that,
 "inasmuch as we exist we are good."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28412"><span class=
-"ref">[28412] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28412"><span class="ref">[28412] Iª q. 5 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de doctrina Christiana, quod
 <i>inquantum sumus, boni sumus</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect
   so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things
-actual, as is clear from the foregoing (<a
- id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p6.1"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3], A[4]</a>; <a
- id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p6.2"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that
+actual, as is clear from the foregoing (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3], A[4]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that
 goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the
 aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 co."><a name="28413"><span class=
-"ref">[28413] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 co."><a name="28413"><span class="ref">[28413] Iª q. 5 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum
 rationem tantum. Quod sic patet. Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit,
 quod aliquid sit appetibile, unde philosophus, in I Ethic., dicit
@@ -2160,9 +1751,7 @@
 omnis rei, ut ex superioribus patet. Unde manifestum est quod bonum
 et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed bonum dicit rationem
 appetibilis, quam non dicit ens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial
   being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; but
   that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e. substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.),
@@ -2173,8 +1762,7 @@
 actuality, it is good simply---in such sort that even in its primal
 actuality, it is in some sort good, and even in its complete
 actuality, it in some sort has being.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28414"><span class=
-"ref">[28414] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28414"><span class="ref">[28414] Iª q. 5 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem, quia
 tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid
 ens simpliciter, et bonum simpliciter. Nam cum ens dicat aliquid
@@ -2201,125 +1789,84 @@
 simpliciter; et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter. Et tamen
 secundum primum actum est quodammodo bonum, et secundum ultimum
 actum est quodammodo ens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p8"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness
 signifies complete actuality.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28415"><span class=
-"ref">[28415] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28415"><span class="ref">[28415] Iª q. 5 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod bonum dicitur per informationem, prout accipitur
 bonum simpliciter, secundum ultimum actum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 3:</b> Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less
 according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to
 knowledge or virtue.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28416"><span class=
-"ref">[28416] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28416"><span class="ref">[28416] Iª q. 5 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter
 dicendum ad tertium, quod bonum dicitur secundum magis et minus,
 secundum actum supervenientem; puta secundum scientiam vel
 virtutem.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2" next="FP_Q5_A3" prev="FP_Q5_A1" progress="0.70%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p0.1">Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2" next="FP_Q5_A3" prev="FP_Q5_A1" progress="0.70%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p0.1">Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
 goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according
 to the arrangement of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius
 (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of
 God, to His goodness rather than to His being. Therefore in idea
 goodness is prior to being.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28417"><span class=
-"ref">[28417] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28417"><span class="ref">[28417] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam
 ens. Ordo enim nominum est secundum ordinem rerum significatarum
 per nomina. Sed Dionysius, inter alia nomina Dei, prius ponit bonum
 quam ens, ut patet, in III cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo bonum secundum
 rationem est prius quam ens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which
 is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive
 than being, because, as Dionysius notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness
 extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence
 extends to existing things alone." Therefore goodness is in idea prior
 to being.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28418"><span class=
-"ref">[28418] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28418"><span class="ref">[28418] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud
 est prius secundum rationem, quod ad plura se extendit. Sed bonum
 ad plura se extendit quam ens, quia, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de
 Div. Nom., <i>bonum se extendit ad existentia et non existentia,
 ens vero ad existentia tantum</i>. Ergo bonum est prius secundum
 rationem quam ens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is the
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is the
 more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more
 universal than being, since goodness has the aspect of desirable;
 whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas:
-"It were better for him, if that man had not been born" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.26.24" parsed="vul|Matt|26|24|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p4.1"
-passage="Mat. 26:24">Mat. 26:24</scripRef>). Therefore in idea
+"It were better for him, if that man had not been born" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.26.24" parsed="vul|Matt|26|24|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p4.1" passage="Mat. 26:24">Mat. 26:24</scripRef>). Therefore in idea
 goodness is prior to being.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28419"><span class=
-"ref">[28419] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28419"><span class="ref">[28419] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
 est universalius, est prius secundum rationem. Sed bonum videtur
 universalius esse quam ens, quia bonum habet rationem appetibilis;
 quibusdam autem appetibile est ipsum non esse; dicitur enim, Matth.
 XXVI, de Iuda, <i>bonum erat ei, si natus non fuisset</i> et
 cetera. Ergo bonum est prius quam ens, secundum rationem.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, not only is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, not only is
 existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things
 besides. Thus it seems that existence is a particular appetible, and
 goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is
 prior in idea to being.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28420"><span class=
-"ref">[28420] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28420"><span class="ref">[28420] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non
 solum esse est appetibile, sed et vita et sapientia, et multa
 huiusmodi, et sic videtur quod esse sit quoddam particulare
 appetibile, et bonum, universale. Bonum ergo simpliciter est prius
 secundum rationem quam ens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first
 of created things is being."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28421"><span class=
-"ref">[28421] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28421"><span class="ref">[28421] Iª q. 5 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur in libro de causis, quod <i>prima rerum creatarum est
 esse</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as
   sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is
 prior to goodness.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 co."><a name="28422"><span class=
-"ref">[28422] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 co."><a name="28422"><span class="ref">[28422] Iª q. 5 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod ens secundum rationem est prius quam bonum. Ratio enim
 significata per nomen, est id quod concipit intellectus de re, et
 significat illud per vocem, illud ergo est prius secundum rationem,
@@ -2329,15 +1876,12 @@
 Unde ens est proprium obiectum intellectus, et sic est primum
 intelligibile, sicut sonus est primum audibile. Ita ergo secundum
 rationem prius est ens quam bonum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus
   goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation, said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being.
   Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence"
 (Div. Nom. v).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28423"><span class=
-"ref">[28423] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28423"><span class="ref">[28423] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod Dionysius determinat de divinis nominibus secundum
 quod important circa Deum habitudinem causae, nominamus enim Deum,
 ut ipse dicit, ex creaturis, sicut causam ex effectibus. Bonum
@@ -2354,16 +1898,13 @@
 simile sibi), non autem participat ens, cum ponatur non ens. Et
 ideo dicit Dionysius quod <i>bonum extenditur ad non
 existentia</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which
   tend even those things which are not actual, but merely
 potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only,
 either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to
 those things which are actual.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28424"><span class=
-"ref">[28424] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet solutio
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28424"><span class="ref">[28424] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet solutio
 ad secundum. Vel dicendum quod bonum extenditur ad existentia et
 non existentia, non secundum praedicationem, sed secundum
 causalitatem, ut per non existentia intelligamus, non ea
@@ -2374,13 +1915,10 @@
 habitudinem causae nisi formalis tantum, vel inhaerentis vel
 exemplaris, cuius causalitas non se extendit nisi ad ea quae sunt
 in actu.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively---i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as
   relatively good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28425"><span class=
-"ref">[28425] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28425"><span class="ref">[28425] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod non esse secundum se non est appetibile, sed per accidens,
 inquantum scilicet ablatio alicuius mali est appetibilis, quod
 malum quidem aufertur per non esse. Ablatio vero mali non est
@@ -2389,122 +1927,79 @@
 accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet quoddam esse appetitur, quo
 homo non sustinet privari. Et sic etiam per accidens non esse
 dicitur bonum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Life,
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Life,
 wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are
 actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is desired. And
 thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is
 good except being.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28426"><span class=
-"ref">[28426] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28426"><span class="ref">[28426] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
 quod vita et scientia, et alia huiusmodi, sic appetuntur ut sunt in
 actu, unde in omnibus appetitur quoddam esse. Et sic nihil est
 appetibile nisi ens, et per consequens nihil est bonum nisi
 ens.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3" next="FP_Q5_A4" prev="FP_Q5_A2" progress="0.73%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether every being is good?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p0.1">Whether every being is good?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3" next="FP_Q5_A4" prev="FP_Q5_A2" progress="0.73%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether every being is good?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p0.1">Whether every being is good?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not
 every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as
 is clear from A[1]. But whatever is added to being limits it; as
 substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits
 being. Therefore not every being is good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28427"><span class=
-"ref">[28427] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28427"><span class="ref">[28427] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod non omne ens sit bonum. Bonum enim addit
 supra ens, ut ex dictis patet. Ea vero quae addunt aliquid supra
 ens, contrahunt ipsum, sicut substantia, quantitas, qualitas, et
 alia huiusmodi. Ergo bonum contrahit ens. Non igitur omne ens est
 bonum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no evil is
-good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.5.20" parsed="vul|Isa|5|20|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p3.1"
-passage="Is. 5:20">Is. 5:20</scripRef>). But some things are called
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no evil is
+good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.5.20" parsed="vul|Isa|5|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p3.1" passage="Is. 5:20">Is. 5:20</scripRef>). But some things are called
 evil. Therefore not every being is good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28428"><span class=
-"ref">[28428] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nullum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28428"><span class="ref">[28428] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nullum
 malum est bonum, Isaiae V, <i>vae qui dicitis malum bonum, et bonum
 malum</i>. Sed aliquod ens dicitur malum. Ergo non omne ens est
 bonum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness
 implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability,
 but rather that which desires. Therefore primary matter does not
 contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is
 good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28429"><span class=
-"ref">[28429] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28429"><span class="ref">[28429] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
 habet rationem appetibilis. Sed materia prima non habet rationem
 appetibilis, sed appetentis tantum. Ergo materia prima non habet
 rationem boni. Non igitur omne ens est bonum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the
 Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics goodness does not
 exist." But mathematics are entities; otherwise there would be no
 science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28430"><span class=
-"ref">[28430] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28430"><span class="ref">[28430] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
 philosophus dicit, in III Metaphys., quod in mathematicis non est
 bonum. Sed mathematica sunt quaedam entia, alioquin de eis non
 esset scientia. Ergo non omne ens est bonum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now
-every creature of God is good (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.4.4"
-parsed="vul|1Tim|4|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p6.1" passage="1
-Tim. 4:4">1 Tim. 4:4</scripRef>): and God is the greatest
+every creature of God is good (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.4.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|4|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p6.1" passage="1 Tim. 4:4">1 Tim. 4:4</scripRef>): and God is the greatest
 good. Therefore every being is good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28431"><span class=
-"ref">[28431] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28431"><span class="ref">[28431] Iª q. 5 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
 ens quod non est Deus, est Dei creatura. Sed omnis creatura Dei est
 bona, ut dicitur I ad Tim., IV cap., Deus vero est maxime bonus.
 Ergo omne ens est bonum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p7"><b>I
 answer that,</b> Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as
 being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act
 implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability
 and goodness, as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every being
 as such is good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 co."><a name="28432"><span class=
-"ref">[28432] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 co."><a name="28432"><span class="ref">[28432] Iª q. 5 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod omne ens, inquantum est ens, est bonum. Omne enim ens,
 inquantum est ens, est in actu, et quodammodo perfectum, quia omnis
 actus perfectio quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem
 appetibilis et boni, ut ex dictis patet. Unde sequitur omne ens,
 inquantum huiusmodi, bonum esse.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p8"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> Substance, quantity, quality, and everything
 included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or
@@ -2512,53 +2007,42 @@
 beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper
 to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not
 limit being.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28433"><span class=
-"ref">[28433] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28433"><span class="ref">[28433] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod substantia, quantitas et qualitas, et ea quae sub eis
 continentur, contrahunt ens applicando ens ad aliquam quidditatem
 seu naturam. Sic autem non addit aliquid bonum super ens, sed
 rationem tantum appetibilis et perfectionis, quod convenit ipsi
 esse in quacumque natura sit. Unde bonum non contrahit ens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as
 being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be
 evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil,
 because it lacks the power to see well.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28434"><span class=
-"ref">[28434] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28434"><span class="ref">[28434] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod nullum ens dicitur malum inquantum est ens, sed
 inquantum caret quodam esse, sicut homo dicitur malus inquantum
 caret esse virtutis, et oculus dicitur malus inquantum caret
 acumine visus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As primary
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As primary
 matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially
 good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary matter may be
 said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it,
 nevertheless, it does participate to a certain extent in goodness,
 viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to
 be desirable is not its property, but to desire.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28435"><span class=
-"ref">[28435] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28435"><span class="ref">[28435] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod materia prima, sicut non est ens nisi in potentia, ita nec
 bonum nisi in potentia. Licet, secundum Platonicos, dici possit
 quod materia prima est non ens, propter privationem adiunctam. Sed
 tamen participat aliquid de bono, scilicet ipsum ordinem vel
 aptitudinem ad bonum. Et ideo non convenit sibi quod sit
 appetibile, sed quod appetat.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness,
   as was said in the preceding article.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28436"><span class=
-"ref">[28436] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28436"><span class="ref">[28436] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
 quod mathematica non subsistunt separata secundum esse, quia si
 subsisterent, esset in eis bonum, scilicet ipsum esse ipsorum. Sunt
 autem mathematica separata secundum rationem tantum, prout
@@ -2566,80 +2050,52 @@
 finis, qui habet rationem moventis. Non est autem inconveniens quod
 in aliquo ente secundum rationem non sit bonum vel ratio boni, cum
 ratio entis sit prior quam ratio boni, sicut supra dictum est.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4" next="FP_Q5_A5" prev="FP_Q5_A3" progress="0.75%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p0.1">Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4" next="FP_Q5_A5" prev="FP_Q5_A3" progress="0.75%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p0.1">Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
 goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other
 causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as
 beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore
 goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28437"><span class=
-"ref">[28437] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28437"><span class="ref">[28437] Iª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod bonum non habeat rationem causae finalis,
 sed magis aliarum. Ut enim dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom.,
 <i>bonum laudatur ut pulchrum</i>. Sed pulchrum importat rationem
 causae formalis. Ergo bonum habet rationem causae formalis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, goodness is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, goodness is
 self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is
 that whereby all things subsist, and are. But to be self-giving
 implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore goodness has the
 aspect of an efficient cause.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28438"><span class=
-"ref">[28438] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28438"><span class="ref">[28438] Iª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
 est diffusivum sui esse, ut ex verbis Dionysii accipitur, quibus
 dicit quod <i>bonum est ex quo omnia subsistunt et sunt</i>. Sed
 esse diffusivum importat rationem causae efficientis. Ergo bonum
 habet rationem causae efficientis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine
 says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we exist because God is good."
 But we owe our existence to God as the efficient cause. Therefore
 goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28439"><span class=
-"ref">[28439] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, dicit
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28439"><span class="ref">[28439] Iª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, dicit
 Augustinus in I de Doctr. Christ., quod <i>quia Deus bonus est, nos
 sumus</i>. Sed ex Deo sumus sicut ex causa efficiente. Ergo bonum
 importat rationem causae efficientis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be
 considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of
 which something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final
 cause.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28440"><span class=
-"ref">[28440] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28440"><span class="ref">[28440] Iª q. 5 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod <i>illud cuius causa
 est, est sicut finis et bonum aliorum</i>. Bonum ergo habet
 rationem causae finalis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in
   causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality of
   goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 co."><a name="28441"><span class=
-"ref">[28441] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 co."><a name="28441"><span class="ref">[28441] Iª q. 5 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod, cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem
 finis; manifestum est quod bonum rationem finis importat. Sed tamen
 ratio boni praesupponit rationem causae efficientis, et rationem
@@ -2654,9 +2110,7 @@
 esse (quia unumquodque tunc perfectum est, quando potest sibi
 simile facere, ut dicit philosophus in IV Meteor.); tertio
 consequitur ratio boni, per quam in ente perfectio fundatur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful
   things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in
 due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as
@@ -2664,8 +2118,7 @@
 reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by
 assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs
 to the nature of a formal cause.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28442"><span class=
-"ref">[28442] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28442"><span class="ref">[28442] Iª q. 5 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia
 super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc,
 bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. Sed ratione differunt. Nam bonum
@@ -2678,19 +2131,14 @@
 virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem,
 similitudo autem respicit formam, pulchrum proprie pertinet ad
 rationem causae formalis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p8"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the
 sense that an end is said to move.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28443"><span class=
-"ref">[28443] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28443"><span class="ref">[28443] Iª q. 5 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod bonum dicitur diffusivum sui esse, eo modo quo finis
 dicitur movere.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 3:</b> He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he
 has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever
@@ -2698,32 +2146,18 @@
 understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end
 as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is
 good" has reference to the final cause.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28444"><span class=
-"ref">[28444] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28444"><span class="ref">[28444] Iª q. 5 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod quilibet habens voluntatem, dicitur bonus inquantum habet
 bonam voluntatem, quia per voluntatem utimur omnibus quae in nobis
 sunt. Unde non dicitur bonus homo, qui habet bonum intellectum, sed
 qui habet bonam voluntatem. Voluntas autem respicit finem ut
 obiectum proprium, et sic, quod dicitur, quia Deus est bonus,
 sumus, refertur ad causam finalem.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5" next="FP_Q5_A6" prev="FP_Q5_A4" progress="0.77%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p0.1">Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5" next="FP_Q5_A6" prev="FP_Q5_A4" progress="0.77%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p0.1">Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.21" parsed="vul|Wis|11|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p2.1" passage="Wis. 11:21">Wis. 11:21</scripRef>). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the mode of everything, number gives it
   its species, and weight gives it rest and stability." Therefore the
 essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28445"><span class=
-"ref">[28445] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28445"><span class="ref">[28445] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod ratio boni non consistat in modo, specie
 et ordine. Bonum enim et ens ratione differunt, ut supra dictum
 est. Sed modus, species et ordo pertinere ad rationem entis
@@ -2733,69 +2167,51 @@
 <i>mensura omni rei modum praefigit, et numerus omni rei speciem
 praebet, et pondus omnem rem ad quietem et stabilitatem trahit</i>.
 Ergo ratio boni non consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mode,
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mode,
 species and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of
 goodness consists in mode, species and order, then every mode must
 have its own mode, species and order. The same would be the case with
 species and order in endless succession.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28446"><span class=
-"ref">[28446] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ipse
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28446"><span class="ref">[28446] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ipse
 modus, species et ordo bona quaedam sunt. Si ergo ratio boni
 consistit in modo, specie et ordine, oportet etiam quod modus
 habeat modum, speciem et ordinem, et similiter species et ordo.
 Ergo procederetur in infinitum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil is the
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil is the
 privation of mode, species and order. But evil is not the total
 absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of goodness does not
 consist in mode, species and order.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28447"><span class=
-"ref">[28447] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, malum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28447"><span class="ref">[28447] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, malum
 est privatio modi et speciei et ordinis. Sed malum non tollit
 totaliter bonum. Ergo ratio boni non consistit in modo, specie et
 ordine.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that wherein
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that wherein
 consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we
 can speak of an evil mode, species and order. Therefore the essence of
 goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="28448"><span class=
-"ref">[28448] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, illud
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="28448"><span class="ref">[28448] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, illud
 in quo consistit ratio boni, non potest dici malum. Sed dicitur
 malus modus, mala species, malus ordo. Ergo ratio boni non
 consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, mode,
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, mode,
 species and order are caused by weight, number and measure, as appears
 from the quotation from Augustine. But not every good thing has
 weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): "It is of
 the nature of light not to have been created in number, weight and
 measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
 species and order.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="28449"><span class=
-"ref">[28449] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, modus,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="28449"><span class="ref">[28449] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, modus,
 species et ordo ex pondere, numero et mensura causantur, ut ex
 auctoritate Augustini inducta patet. Non autem omnia bona habent
 pondus, numerum et mensuram, dicit enim Ambrosius, in Hexaemeron,
 quod <i>lucis natura est, ut non in numero, non in pondere, non in
 mensura creata sit</i>. Non ergo ratio boni consistit in modo,
 specie et ordine.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p7"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These
 three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in
@@ -2804,17 +2220,14 @@
 do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be
 unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the
 essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28450"><span class=
-"ref">[28450] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28450"><span class="ref">[28450] Iª q. 5 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, <i>haec tria,
 modus, species et ordo, tanquam generalia bona sunt in rebus a Deo
 factis, et ita, haec tria ubi magna sunt, magna bona sunt; ubi
 parva, parva bona sunt; ubi nulla, nullum bonum est</i>. Quod non
 esset, nisi ratio boni in eis consisteret. Ergo ratio boni
 consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p8"><b>I answer that,</b> Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1">AA[1]</a>,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together
   with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit
   added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a
@@ -2825,8 +2238,7 @@
 its form; and this belongs to weight and order. Hence the essence of
 goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode,
 species and order.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 co."><a name="28451"><span class=
-"ref">[28451] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 co."><a name="28451"><span class="ref">[28451] Iª q. 5 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod unumquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum, sic enim
 est appetibile, ut supra dictum est. Perfectum autem dicitur, cui
 nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem unumquodque
@@ -2848,24 +2260,18 @@
 id quod sibi convenit secundum suam formam. Et hoc pertinet ad
 pondus et ordinem. Unde ratio boni, secundum quod consistit in
 perfectione, consistit etiam in modo, specie et ordine.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> These three only follow upon being, so far as it
 is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28452"><span class=
-"ref">[28452] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28452"><span class="ref">[28452] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod ista tria non consequuntur ens, nisi inquantum est
 perfectum, et secundum hoc est bonum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because it is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything
   else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an
 object that is white.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28453"><span class=
-"ref">[28453] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28453"><span class="ref">[28453] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod modus, species et ordo eo modo dicuntur bona, sicut
 et entia, non quia ipsa sint quasi subsistentia, sed quia eis alia
 sunt et entia et bona. Unde non oportet quod ipsa habeant aliqua
@@ -2873,11 +2279,8 @@
 formaliter aliis sint bona; sed quia ipsis formaliter aliqua sunt
 bona; sicut albedo non dicitur ens quia ipsa aliquo sit, sed quia
 ipsa aliquid est secundum quid, scilicet album.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every being
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every being
 is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its
 mode, species, order. Thus, a man has a mode, species and order as he
 is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according to everything
@@ -2885,8 +2288,7 @@
 blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not
 destroy every mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon
 the being of sight.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28454"><span class=
-"ref">[28454] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28454"><span class="ref">[28454] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod quodlibet esse est secundum formam aliquam, unde secundum
 quodlibet esse rei, consequuntur ipsam modus, species et ordo,
 sicut homo habet speciem, modum et ordinem, inquantum est homo; et
@@ -2896,111 +2298,76 @@
 esse, sicut caecitas privat esse visus, unde non tollit omnem
 modum, speciem et ordinem; sed solum modum, speciem et ordinem quae
 consequuntur esse visus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine
 says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every mode, as mode, is good" (and the
 same can be said of species and order). "But an evil mode, species and
 order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not
 belonging to that which they ought to belong. Therefore they are
 called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28455"><span class=
-"ref">[28455] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28455"><span class="ref">[28455] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
 quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de natura boni, <i>omnis
 modus, inquantum modus, bonus est</i> (et sic potest dici de specie
 et ordine), <i>sed malus modus, vel mala species, vel malus ordo,
 aut ideo dicuntur quia minora sunt quam esse debuerunt; aut quia
 non his rebus accommodantur, quibus accommodanda sunt; ut ideo
 dicantur mala, quia sunt aliena et incongrua</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The nature
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The nature
 of light is spoken of as being without number, weight and measure, not
 absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal things, because the power
 of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active
 quality of the first body that causes change, i.e. the heavens.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="28456"><span class=
-"ref">[28456] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="28456"><span class="ref">[28456] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum
 quod natura lucis dicitur esse sine numero et pondere et mensura,
 non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad corporalia, quia virtus
 lucis ad omnia corporalia se extendit, inquantum est qualitas
 activa primi corporis alterantis, scilicet caeli.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6" next="FP_Q6" prev="FP_Q5_A5" progress="0.81%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and  the pleasant? [*“Bonum honestum” is the virtuous good considered as  fitting. (cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])]">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p0.1">Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and the pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good considered as fitting. (cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])]</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6" next="FP_Q6" prev="FP_Q5_A5" progress="0.81%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and  the pleasant? [*“Bonum honestum” is the virtuous good considered as  fitting. (cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])]"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p0.1">Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and the pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good considered as fitting. (cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])]</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
 goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the
 pleasant. For goodness is divided by the ten predicaments, as the
 Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the useful and the
 pleasant can be found under one predicament. Therefore goodness is not
 rightly divided by them.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28457"><span class=
-"ref">[28457] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28457"><span class="ref">[28457] Iª q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod non convenienter dividatur bonum per
 honestum, utile et delectabile. Bonum enim, sicut dicit philosophus
 in I Ethic., dividitur per decem praedicamenta. Honestum autem,
 utile et delectabile inveniri possunt in uno praedicamento. Ergo
 non convenienter per haec dividitur bonum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every
 division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be
 opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and no wickedness is useful;
 whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by
 opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be opposed; and
 Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is
 incorrect.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28458"><span class=
-"ref">[28458] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28458"><span class="ref">[28458] Iª q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
 divisio fit per opposita. Sed haec tria non videntur esse opposita,
 nam honesta sunt delectabilia, nullumque inhonestum est utile (quod
 tamen oportet, si divisio fieret per opposita, ut opponerentur
 honestum et utile), ut etiam dicit Tullius, in libro de officiis.
 Ergo praedicta divisio non est conveniens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where one
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where one
 thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the
 useful is not goodness, except so far as it is pleasing and
 virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the
 pleasant and the virtuous.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28459"><span class=
-"ref">[28459] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ubi
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28459"><span class="ref">[28459] Iª q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ubi
 unum propter alterum, ibi unum tantum est. Sed utile non est bonum
 nisi propter delectabile vel honestum. Ergo non debet utile dividi
 contra delectabile et honestum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De
 Offic. i, 9)</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28460"><span class=
-"ref">[28460] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28460"><span class="ref">[28460] Iª q. 5 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod Ambrosius, in libro de officiis, utitur ista divisione
 boni.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end
   absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which
   something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that
@@ -3010,8 +2377,7 @@
 desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of
 the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called the
 pleasant.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 co."><a name="28461"><span class=
-"ref">[28461] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 co."><a name="28461"><span class="ref">[28461] Iª q. 5 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod haec divisio proprie videtur esse boni humani. Si tamen altius
 et communius rationem boni consideremus, invenitur haec divisio
 proprie competere bono, secundum quod bonum est. Nam bonum est
@@ -3030,25 +2396,19 @@
 quam per se appetitus tendit, vocatur honestum, quia honestum
 dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod terminat motum
 appetitus ut quies in re desiderata, est delectatio.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p7"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is
 divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it
 according to its proper formality.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28462"><span class=
-"ref">[28462] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28462"><span class="ref">[28462] Iª q. 5 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod bonum, inquantum est idem subiecto cum ente,
 dividitur per decem praedicamenta, sed secundum propriam rationem,
 competit sibi ista divisio.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable
   in themselves.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28463"><span class=
-"ref">[28463] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28463"><span class="ref">[28463] Iª q. 5 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod haec divisio non est per oppositas res, sed per
 oppositas rationes. Dicuntur tamen illa proprie delectabilia, quae
 nullam habent aliam rationem appetibilitatis nisi delectationem,
@@ -3056,34 +2416,19 @@
 quae non habent in se unde desiderentur; sed desiderantur solum ut
 sunt ducentia in alterum, sicut sumptio medicinae amarae. Honesta
 vero dicuntur, quae in seipsis habent unde desiderentur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 3:</b> Goodness is not divided into these three as
 something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as
 something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority
 and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then
 of the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28464"><span class=
-"ref">[28464] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28464"><span class="ref">[28464] Iª q. 5 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod bonum non dividitur in ista tria sicut univocum aequaliter de
 his praedicatum, sed sicut analogum, quod praedicatur secundum
 prius et posterius. Per prius enim praedicatur de honesto; et
 secundario de delectabili; tertio de utili.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q6" next="FP_Q6_A1" prev="FP_Q5_A6" progress="0.84%" n="v" title="Question. 6 - THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6-p0.1">Question 6. THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q6" next="FP_Q6_A1" prev="FP_Q5_A6" progress="0.84%" n="v" title="Question. 6 - THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)"><h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6-p0.1">Question 6. THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6-p2"> We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6-p3"> (1) Whether goodness belongs to God?</p>
@@ -3093,63 +2438,44 @@
 things are good by the divine goodness?</p>
 </div>
 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 pr."><a name="28465"><span class="ref">[28465]
-I&ordf; q. 6 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de bonitate Dei. Et
+Iª q. 6 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de bonitate Dei. Et
 circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum esse bonum conveniat
 Deo. Secundo, utrum Deus sit summum bonum. Tertio, utrum ipse solus
 sit bonus per suam essentiam. Quarto, utrum omnia sint bona
-bonitate divina.</p></div>
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1" next="FP_Q6_A2" prev="FP_Q6" progress="0.84%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is good?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p0.1">Whether God is good?</h4>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be
+bonitate divina.</p></div><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1" next="FP_Q6_A2" prev="FP_Q6" progress="0.84%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is good?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p0.1">Whether God is good?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be
 good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species
 and order. But these do not seem to belong to God; since God is
 immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does
 not belong to God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28466"><span class=
-"ref">[28466] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28466"><span class="ref">[28466] Iª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum non conveniat Deo. Ratio enim
 boni consistit in modo, specie et ordine. Haec autem non videntur
 Deo convenire, cum Deus immensus sit, et ad aliquid non ordinetur.
 Ergo esse bonum non convenit Deo.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good is
 what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all
 things do not know Him; and nothing is desired unless it is
 known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28467"><span class=
-"ref">[28467] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28467"><span class="ref">[28467] Iª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
 est quod omnia appetunt. Sed Deum non omnia appetunt, quia non
 omnia cognoscunt ipsum, nihil autem appetitur nisi notum. Ergo esse
 bonum non convenit Deo.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p4"><b>On
-the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Lam.3.25" parsed="vul|Lam|3|25|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p4.1"
-passage="Lam. 3:25">Lam. 3:25</scripRef>): "The Lord is good to them
+the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Lam.3.25" parsed="vul|Lam|3|25|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p4.1" passage="Lam. 3:25">Lam. 3:25</scripRef>): "The Lord is good to them
 that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28468"><span class=
-"ref">[28468] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28468"><span class="ref">[28468] Iª q. 6 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Thren. III, <i>bonus est dominus sperantibus in eum,
 animae quaerenti illum</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of
   all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of
 desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv)
 attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that,
 God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 co."><a name="28469"><span class=
-"ref">[28469] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 co."><a name="28469"><span class="ref">[28469] Iª q. 6 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod bonum esse praecipue Deo convenit. Bonum enim aliquid est,
 secundum quod est appetibile. Unumquodque autem appetit suam
 perfectionem. Perfectio autem et forma effectus est quaedam
@@ -3160,28 +2486,22 @@
 ratio boni et appetibilis. Unde Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom.,
 attribuit bonum Deo sicut primae causae efficienti, dicens quod
 bonus dicitur Deus, <i>sicut ex quo omnia subsistunt</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p6"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> To have mode, species and order belongs to the
 essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence
 it belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others;
 wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28470"><span class=
-"ref">[28470] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28470"><span class="ref">[28470] Iª q. 6 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod habere modum, speciem et ordinem, pertinet ad
 rationem boni causati. Sed bonum in Deo est sicut in causa, unde ad
 eum pertinet imponere aliis modum, speciem et ordinem. Unde ista
 tria sunt in Deo sicut in causa.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4] , A[3]</a>). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a
   natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by
 a higher intelligence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28471"><span class=
-"ref">[28471] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28471"><span class="ref">[28471] Iª q. 6 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod omnia, appetendo proprias perfectiones, appetunt
 ipsum Deum, inquantum perfectiones omnium rerum sunt quaedam
 similitudines divini esse, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic eorum quae
@@ -3191,51 +2511,30 @@
 cognitionem sensibilem. Quaedam vero appetitum naturalem habent
 absque cognitione, utpote inclinata ad suos fines ab alio superiori
 cognoscente.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2" next="FP_Q6_A3" prev="FP_Q6_A1" progress="0.85%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God is the supreme good?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p0.1">Whether God is the supreme good?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2" next="FP_Q6_A3" prev="FP_Q6_A1" progress="0.85%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God is the supreme good?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p0.1">Whether God is the supreme good?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good;
 otherwise it would belong to every good. But everything which is an
 addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme
 good is a compound. But God is supremely simple; as was shown above
-(<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p2.1"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the
+(<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the
 supreme good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28472"><span class=
-"ref">[28472] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28472"><span class="ref">[28472] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit summum bonum. Summum enim
 bonum addit aliquid supra bonum, alioquin omni bono conveniret. Sed
 omne quod se habet ex additione ad aliquid, est compositum. Ergo
 summum bonum est compositum. Sed Deus est summe simplex, ut supra
 ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est summum bonum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Good is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Good is
 what all desire," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all
 desire is nothing but God, Who is the end of all things: therefore
 there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.18.19" parsed="vul|Luke|18|19|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p3.1"
-passage="Lk. 18:19">Lk. 18:19</scripRef>): "None is good but God
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.18.19" parsed="vul|Luke|18|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p3.1" passage="Lk. 18:19">Lk. 18:19</scripRef>): "None is good but God
 alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as
 e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison with all other
 heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28473"><span class=
-"ref">[28473] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> <i>Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28473"><span class="ref">[28473] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> <i>Praeterea,
 bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>, ut dicit philosophus. Sed nihil
 aliud est quod omnia appetunt, nisi solus Deus, qui est finis
 omnium. Ergo nihil aliud est bonum nisi Deus. Quod etiam videtur
@@ -3243,42 +2542,31 @@
 Sed summum dicitur in comparatione aliorum; sicut summum calidum in
 comparatione ad omnia calida. Ergo Deus non potest dici summum
 bonum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, supreme
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, supreme
 implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not
 comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater or less than a
 line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good
-things, as appears above (<a
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5">Q[3],
-A[5]</a>; <a
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4],
+things, as appears above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5">Q[3],
+A[5]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4],
 A[3]</a>) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in
 relation to others.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28474"><span class=
-"ref">[28474] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, summum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28474"><span class="ref">[28474] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, summum
 comparationem importat. Sed quae non sunt unius generis, non sunt
 comparabilia; sicut dulcedo inconvenienter dicitur maior vel minor
 quam linea. Cum igitur Deus non sit in eodem genere cum aliis
 bonis, ut ex superioribus patet, videtur quod Deus non possit dici
 summum bonum respectu eorum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of
 the divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified
 minds."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28475"><span class=
-"ref">[28475] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28475"><span class="ref">[28475] Iª q. 6 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Augustinus, I de Trin., quod <i>Trinitas divinarum
 personarum est summum bonum, quod purgatissimis mentibus
 cernitur</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2">Q[4], A[2]</a>); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an
   effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the
 equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun
@@ -3286,8 +2574,7 @@
 the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in
 Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme
 good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 co."><a name="28476"><span class=
-"ref">[28476] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 co."><a name="28476"><span class="ref">[28476] Iª q. 6 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod Deus est summum bonum simpliciter, et non solum in aliquo
 genere vel ordine rerum. Sic enim bonum Deo attribuitur, ut dictum
 est, inquantum omnes perfectiones desideratae effluunt ab eo, sicut
@@ -3300,13 +2587,10 @@
 quod cum bonum sit in Deo sicut in prima causa omnium non univoca,
 quod sit in eo excellentissimo modo. Et propter hoc dicitur summum
 bonum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are deficient in
   comparison with it.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28477"><span class=
-"ref">[28477] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28477"><span class="ref">[28477] Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod summum bonum addit super bonum, non rem aliquam
 absolutam, sed relationem tantum. Relatio autem qua aliquid de Deo
 dicitur relative ad creaturas, non est realiter in Deo, sed in
@@ -3314,25 +2598,20 @@
 dicitur ad scientiam, non quia ad ipsam referatur, sed quia
 scientia refertur ad ipsum. Et sic non oportet quod in summo bono
 sit aliqua compositio, sed solum quod alia deficiant ab ipso.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p8"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> When we say that good is what all desire, it is
 not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all;
 but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is
 said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood of
 essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28478"><span class=
-"ref">[28478] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28478"><span class="ref">[28478] Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod, cum dicitur <i>bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>,
 non sic intelligitur quasi unumquodque bonum ab omnibus appetatur,
 sed quia quidquid appetitur, rationem boni habet. Quod autem
 dicitur, <i>nemo bonus nisi solus Deus</i>, intelligitur de bono
 per essentiam, ut post dicetur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 3:</b> Things not of the same genus are in no way
 comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now
@@ -3340,64 +2619,40 @@
 that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the
 principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess,
 and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28479"><span class=
-"ref">[28479] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28479"><span class="ref">[28479] Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod ea quae non sunt in eodem genere, si quidem sint in diversis
 generibus contenta, nullo modo comparabilia sunt. De Deo autem
 negatur esse in eodem genere cum aliis bonis, non quod ipse sit in
 quodam alio genere; sed quia ipse est extra genus, et principium
 omnis generis. Et sic comparatur ad alia per excessum. Et huiusmodi
 comparationem importat summum bonum.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3" next="FP_Q6_A4" prev="FP_Q6_A2" progress="0.88%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p0.1">Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3" next="FP_Q6_A4" prev="FP_Q6_A2" progress="0.88%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p0.1">Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be
 essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is
-convertible with "being," so is "good"; as we said above (<a
- id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p2.1"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one
+convertible with "being," so is "good"; as we said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one
 essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore
 every being is good essentially.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28480"><span class=
-"ref">[28480] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28480"><span class="ref">[28480] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum per essentiam non sit proprium
 Dei. Sicut enim unum convertitur cum ente, ita et bonum, ut supra
 habitum est. Sed omne ens est unum per suam essentiam, ut patet per
 philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne ens est bonum per suam
 essentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if good is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if good is
 what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the
 being of each thing is its good. But everything is a being
 essentially; therefore every being is good essentially.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28481"><span class=
-"ref">[28481] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28481"><span class="ref">[28481] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
 bonum est quod omnia appetunt, cum ipsum esse sit desideratum ab
 omnibus, ipsum esse cuiuslibet rei est eius bonum. Sed quaelibet
 res est ens per suam essentiam. Ergo quaelibet res est bona per
 suam essentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first
   supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good
 essentially.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28482"><span class=
-"ref">[28482] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28482"><span class="ref">[28482] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
 res per suam bonitatem est bona. Si igitur aliqua res est quae non
 sit bona per suam essentiam, oportebit quod eius bonitas non sit
 sua essentia. Illa ergo bonitas, cum sit ens quoddam, oportet quod
@@ -3406,28 +2661,22 @@
 aliquam bonitatem quae non erit bona per aliam bonitatem. Eadem
 ergo ratione standum est in primo. Res igitur quaelibet est bona
 per suam essentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God
 are good by participation." Therefore they are not good
 essentially.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28483"><span class=
-"ref">[28483] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28483"><span class="ref">[28483] Iª q. 6 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quod alia omnia a Deo
 sunt bona per participationem. Non igitur per essentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
   substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6">Q[3], A[6]</a>); and
   He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the
 last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every
 kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is
 good essentially.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 co."><a name="28484"><span class=
-"ref">[28484] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 co."><a name="28484"><span class="ref">[28484] Iª q. 6 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod solus Deus est bonus per suam essentiam. Unumquodque enim
 dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfectum. Perfectio autem
 alicuius rei triplex est. Prima quidem, secundum quod in suo esse
@@ -3447,9 +2696,7 @@
 rerum. Unde manifestum est quod solus Deus habet omnimodam
 perfectionem secundum suam essentiam. Et ideo ipse solus est bonus
 per suam essentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p7"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> "One" does not include the idea of perfection, but
 only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own
@@ -3457,33 +2704,26 @@
 and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided only
 actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not
 good essentially, as was shown above.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28485"><span class=
-"ref">[28485] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28485"><span class="ref">[28485] Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod unum non importat rationem perfectionis, sed
 indivisionis tantum, quae unicuique rei competit secundum suam
 essentiam. Simplicium autem essentiae sunt indivisae et actu et
 potentia, compositorum vero essentiae sunt indivisae secundum actum
 tantum. Et ideo oportet quod quaelibet res sit una per suam
 essentiam, non autem bona, ut ostensum est.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p8"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> Although everything is good in that it has being,
 yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does
 not follow that a creature is good essentially.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28486"><span class=
-"ref">[28486] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28486"><span class="ref">[28486] Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod, licet unumquodque sit bonum inquantum habet esse,
 tamen essentia rei creatae non est ipsum esse, et ideo non sequitur
 quod res creata sit bona per suam essentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being through something else: hence for this reason is it called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself
   has some other goodness whereby it is good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28487"><span class=
-"ref">[28487] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28487"><span class="ref">[28487] Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod bonitas rei creatae non est ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid
 superadditum; vel ipsum esse eius, vel aliqua perfectio
 superaddita, vel ordo ad finem. Ipsa tamen bonitas sic superaddita
@@ -3491,64 +2731,41 @@
 est aliquid, non quia ipsa aliquo alio sit. Unde hac ratione
 dicitur bona, quia ea est aliquid bonum, non quia ipsa habeat
 aliquam aliam bonitatem, qua sit bona.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4" next="FP_Q7" prev="FP_Q6_A3" progress="0.90%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4" next="FP_Q7" prev="FP_Q6_A3" progress="0.90%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all
 things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De
 Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take away this and that, and see
 good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any
 other good, but the good of every good." But everything is good by its
 own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is
 God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28488"><span class=
-"ref">[28488] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28488"><span class="ref">[28488] Iª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod omnia sint bona bonitate divina. Dicit
 enim Augustinus, VII de Trin., <i>bonum hoc et bonum illud, tolle
 hoc et tolle illud, et vide ipsum bonum, si potes, ita Deum
 videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni</i>. Sed
 unumquodque est bonum suo bono. Ergo unumquodque est bonum ipso
 bono quod est Deus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Boethius
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Boethius
 says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are
 directed to God, and this is by reason of the divine goodness;
 therefore all things are good by the divine goodness.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28489"><span class=
-"ref">[28489] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28489"><span class="ref">[28489] Iª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
 dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., omnia dicuntur bona inquantum
 ordinantur ad Deum, et hoc ratione bonitatis divinae. Ergo omnia
 sunt bona bonitate divina.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p4"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> All things are good, inasmuch as they have
 being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but
 through their own being; therefore all things are not good by the
 divine goodness, but by their own goodness.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28490"><span class=
-"ref">[28490] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28490"><span class="ref">[28490] Iª q. 6 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod omnia sunt bona inquantum sunt. Sed non dicuntur omnia entia
 per esse divinum, sed per esse proprium. Ergo non omnia sunt bona
 bonitate divina, sed bonitate propria.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <div>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and "measured" from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ix.FP_Q84.FP_Q84_A4">Q[84], A[4]</a>) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now
   just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are
@@ -3557,8 +2774,7 @@
   a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears from the above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4], A[3]</a>).</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p7"> Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.</p>
 </div>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 co."><a name="28491"><span class=
-"ref">[28491] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 co."><a name="28491"><span class="ref">[28491] Iª q. 6 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod nihil prohibet in his quae relationem important, aliquid ab
 extrinseco denominari; sicut aliquid denominatur locatum a loco, et
 mensuratum a mensura. Circa vero ea quae absolute dicuntur, diversa
@@ -3585,27 +2801,12 @@
 divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas
 denominans ipsum. Et sic est bonitas una omnium; et etiam multae
 bonitates.</p>
-</div>
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p8"> This is
 a sufficient Reply to the Objections.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 ad arg."><a name="28492"><span class=
-"ref">[28492] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 4 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc patet
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 ad arg."><a name="28492"><span class="ref">[28492] Iª q. 6 a. 4 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc patet
 responsio ad obiecta.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q7" next="FP_Q7_A1" prev="FP_Q6_A4" progress="0.92%" n="vi" title="Question. 7 - THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7-p0.1">Question 7. THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q7" next="FP_Q7_A1" prev="FP_Q6_A4" progress="0.92%" n="vi" title="Question. 7 - THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)"><h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7-p0.1">Question 7. THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7-p2"> After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7-p3"> Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:</p>
@@ -3615,7 +2816,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7-p7"> (4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</p>
 </div>
 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 pr."><a name="28493"><span class="ref">[28493]
-I&ordf; q. 7 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae
+Iª q. 7 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae
 perfectionis, considerandum est de eius infinitate, et de
 existentia eius in rebus, attribuitur enim Deo quod sit ubique et
 in omnibus rebus, inquantum est incircumscriptibilis et infinitus.
@@ -3624,73 +2825,50 @@
 essentiam. Tertio, utrum aliquid possit esse infinitum secundum
 magnitudinem. Quarto, utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum
 multitudinem.</p>
-</div>
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1" next="FP_Q7_A2" prev="FP_Q7" progress="0.92%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is infinite?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p0.1">Whether God is infinite?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+</div><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1" next="FP_Q7_A2" prev="FP_Q7" progress="0.92%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is infinite?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p0.1">Whether God is infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher
 says; because it has parts and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But
 God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28494"><span class=
-"ref">[28494] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28494"><span class="ref">[28494] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit infinitus. Omne enim
 infinitum est imperfectum, quia habet rationem partis et materiae,
 ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed Deus est perfectissimus. Ergo non est
 infinitus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to
 the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But
 there is no quantity in God, for He is not a body, as was shown above
-(<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p3.1"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not
+(<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not
 belong to Him to be infinite.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28495"><span class=
-"ref">[28495] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28495"><span class="ref">[28495] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 secundum philosophum in I Physic., finitum et infinitum conveniunt
 quantitati. Sed in Deo non est quantitas, cum non sit corpus, ut
 supra ostensum est. Ergo non competit sibi esse infinitum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is here
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is here
 in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to
 place. Therefore that which is a thing in such a way as not to be
 another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and
 not another; for He is not a stone or wood. Therefore God is not
 infinite in substance.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28496"><span class=
-"ref">[28496] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28496"><span class="ref">[28496] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
 ita est hic quod non alibi, est finitum secundum locum, ergo quod
 ita est hoc quod non est aliud, est finitum secundum substantiam.
 Sed Deus est hoc, et non est aliud, non enim est lapis nec lignum.
 Ergo Deus non est infinitus secundum substantiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is
 infinite and eternal, and boundless."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28497"><span class=
-"ref">[28497] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28497"><span class="ref">[28497] Iª q. 7 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Damascenus, quod <i>Deus est infinitus et aeternus et
 incircumscriptibilis</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to
   the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of
 things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 co."><a name="28498"><span class=
-"ref">[28498] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 co."><a name="28498"><span class="ref">[28498] Iª q. 7 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod omnes antiqui philosophi attribuunt infinitum primo principio,
 ut dicitur in III Physic., et hoc rationabiliter, considerantes res
 effluere a primo principio in infinitum. Sed quia quidam erraverunt
@@ -3698,17 +2876,13 @@
 infinitatem ipsius. Quia enim ponebant primum principium materiam,
 consequenter attribuerunt primo principio infinitatem materialem;
 dicentes aliquod corpus infinitum esse primum principium rerum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p7"> We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to
   this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown
-  above (<a
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1">Q[4],
+  above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1">Q[4],
 A[1]</a>, OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being
 received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was shown
-above (<a
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3],
+above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3],
 A[4]</a>), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.</p>
 <p xml:lang="la">
 Considerandum est igitur quod infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod
@@ -3728,119 +2902,82 @@
 patet. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed
 ipse sit suum esse subsistens, ut supra ostensum est; manifestum
 est quod ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p8"> From
 this appears the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28499"><span class=
-"ref">[28499] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28499"><span class="ref">[28499] Iª q. 7 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet
 responsio ad primum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to God; as was said above, in this article.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28500"><span class=
-"ref">[28500] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28500"><span class="ref">[28500] Iª q. 7 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod terminus quantitatis est sicut forma ipsius, cuius
 signum est, quod figura, quae consistit in terminatione
 quantitatis, est quaedam forma circa quantitatem. Unde infinitum
 quod competit quantitati, est infinitum quod se tenet ex parte
-materiae, et tale infinitum non attribuitur Deo, ut dictum est.</p></div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact
+materiae, et tale infinitum non attribuitur Deo, ut dictum est.</p></div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact
 that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other,
 and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all
 other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there
 such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did
 not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other
 whiteness existing in a subject.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28501"><span class=
-"ref">[28501] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28501"><span class="ref">[28501] Iª q. 7 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod, ex hoc ipso quod esse Dei est per se subsistens non receptum
 in aliquo, prout dicitur infinitum, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis,
 et alia removentur ab eo, sicut, si esset albedo subsistens, ex hoc
 ipso quod non esset in alio, differret ab omni albedine existente
 in subiecto.</p>
-</div>
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" next="FP_Q7_A3" prev="FP_Q7_A1" progress="0.95%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p0.1">Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" next="FP_Q7_A3" prev="FP_Q7_A1" progress="0.95%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p0.1">Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
 something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power
 of anything is proportioned to its essence. Now if the essence of God
 is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce
 an infinite effect, since the extent of a power is known by its
 effect.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28502"><span class=
-"ref">[28502] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28502"><span class="ref">[28502] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse
 infinitum per essentiam. Virtus enim rei proportionatur essentiae
 eius. Si igitur essentia Dei est infinita, oportet quod eius virtus
 sit infinita. Ergo potest producere effectum infinitum, cum
 quantitas virtutis per effectum cognoscatur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever has
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever has
 infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has
 an infinite power; for it apprehends the universal, which can extend
 itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created
 intellectual substance is infinite.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28503"><span class=
-"ref">[28503] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28503"><span class="ref">[28503] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 quidquid habet virtutem infinitam, habet essentiam infinitam. Sed
 intellectus creatus habet virtutem infinitam, apprehendit enim
 universale, quod se potest extendere ad infinita singularia. Ergo
 omnis substantia intellectualis creata est infinita.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, primary
-matter is something other than God, as was shown above (<a
- id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p4.1"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, primary
+matter is something other than God, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is
 infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28504"><span class=
-"ref">[28504] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28504"><span class="ref">[28504] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 materia prima aliud est a Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Sed materia
 prima est infinita. Ergo aliquid aliud praeter Deum potest esse
 infinitum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in
 Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first
 principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28505"><span class=
-"ref">[28505] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28505"><span class="ref">[28505] Iª q. 7 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod infinitum non potest esse ex principio aliquo, ut dicitur in
 III Physic. Omne autem quod est praeter Deum, est ex Deo sicut ex
 primo principio. Ergo nihil quod est praeter Deum, potest esse
 infinitum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to
   its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated,
   nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus
 subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows that
 its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it
 cannot be absolutely infinite.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 co."><a name="28506"><span class=
-"ref">[28506] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 co."><a name="28506"><span class="ref">[28506] Iª q. 7 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod aliquid praeter Deum potest esse infinitum secundum quid, sed
 non simpliciter. Si enim loquamur de infinito secundum quod
 competit materiae, manifestum est quod omne existens in actu, habet
@@ -3860,9 +2997,7 @@
 et non est suum esse, necesse est quod ipsum eius esse sit receptum
 et contractum ad determinatam naturam. Unde non potest esse
 infinitum simpliciter.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p7"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> It is against the nature of a made thing for its
 essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created
@@ -3871,70 +3006,49 @@
 make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two
 contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make
 anything to be absolutely infinite.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28507"><span class=
-"ref">[28507] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28507"><span class="ref">[28507] Iª q. 7 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod hoc est contra rationem facti, quod essentia rei sit
 ipsum esse eius, quia esse subsistens non est esse creatum, unde
 contra rationem facti est, quod sit simpliciter infinitum. Sicut
 ergo Deus, licet habeat potentiam infinitam, non tamen potest
 facere aliquid non factum (hoc enim esset contradictoria esse
 simul); ita non potest facere aliquid infinitum simpliciter.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p8"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> The fact that the power of the intellect extends
 itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form
 not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the
 angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the
 act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28508"><span class=
-"ref">[28508] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28508"><span class="ref">[28508] Iª q. 7 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod virtus intellectus extendit se
 quodammodo ad infinita, procedit ex hoc quod intellectus est forma
 non in materia; sed vel totaliter separata, sicut sunt substantiae
 Angelorum; vel ad minus potentia intellectiva, quae non est actus
 alicuius organi, in anima intellectiva corpori coniuncta.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 3:</b> Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature,
 since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is
 something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter
 even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively,
 because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28509"><span class=
-"ref">[28509] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28509"><span class="ref">[28509] Iª q. 7 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod materia prima non existit in rerum natura per seipsam, cum non
 sit ens in actu, sed potentia tantum, unde magis est aliquid
 concreatum, quam creatum. Nihilominus tamen materia prima, etiam
 secundum potentiam, non est infinita simpliciter, sed secundum
 quid, quia eius potentia non se extendit nisi ad formas
 naturales.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3" next="FP_Q7_A4" prev="FP_Q7_A2" progress="0.97%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p0.1">Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3" next="FP_Q7_A4" prev="FP_Q7_A2" progress="0.97%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p0.1">Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there
 can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics
 there is no error, since "there is no lie in things abstract," as the
 Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in
 magnitude; thus, the geometrician in his demonstrations says, "Let
 this line be infinite." Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to
 be infinite in magnitude.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28510"><span class=
-"ref">[28510] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28510"><span class="ref">[28510] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod possit esse aliquid infinitum actu
 secundum magnitudinem. In scientiis enim mathematicis non invenitur
 falsum, <i>quia abstrahentium non est mendacium</i>, ut dicitur in
@@ -3942,77 +3056,60 @@
 magnitudinem, dicit enim geometra in suis demonstrationibus, sit
 linea talis infinita. Ergo non est impossibile aliquid esse
 infinitum secundum magnitudinem.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is not
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is not
 against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite
 is not against the nature of magnitude; but rather both the finite and
 the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not
 impossible for some magnitude to be infinite.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28511"><span class=
-"ref">[28511] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28511"><span class="ref">[28511] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
 quod non est contra rationem alicuius, non est impossibile
 convenire sibi. Sed esse infinitum non est contra rationem
 magnitudinis, sed magis finitum et infinitum videntur esse
 passiones quantitatis. Ergo non est impossibile aliquam
 magnitudinem esse infinitam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnitude is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnitude is
 infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is
 infinitely divisible, as is clear from Phys. iii. But contraries are
 concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is
 opposed to division, and increase opposed to diminution, it appears
 that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible
 for magnitude to be infinite.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28512"><span class=
-"ref">[28512] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28512"><span class="ref">[28512] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 magnitudo divisibilis est in infinitum, sic enim definitur
 continuum, quod est in infinitum divisibile, ut patet in III
 Physic. Sed contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Cum ergo
 divisioni opponatur additio, et diminutioni augmentum, videtur quod
 magnitudo possit crescere in infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse
 magnitudinem infinitam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, movement and
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, movement and
 time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over
 which movement passes, as is said in Phys. iv. But it is not against
 the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every
 determinate indivisible in time and circular movement is both a
 beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of
 magnitude to be infinite.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28513"><span class=
-"ref">[28513] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, motus
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28513"><span class="ref">[28513] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, motus
 et tempus habent quantitatem et continuitatem a magnitudine super
 quam transit motus, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Sed non est contra
 rationem temporis et motus quod sint infinita, cum unumquodque
 indivisibile signatum in tempore et motu circulari, sit principium
 et finis. Ergo nec contra rationem magnitudinis erit quod sit
 infinita.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Every body has a surface. But every body which has a
 surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite
 body. Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to
 surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28514"><span class=
-"ref">[28514] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28514"><span class="ref">[28514] Iª q. 7 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
 corpus superficiem habet. Sed omne corpus superficiem habens est
 finitum, quia superficies est terminus corporis finiti. Ergo omne
 corpus est finitum. Et similiter potest dici de superficie et
 linea. Nihil est ergo infinitum secundum magnitudinem.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in
   magnitude.</p>
@@ -4036,8 +3133,7 @@
 quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure, and so
 would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.</p>
 </div>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 co."><a name="28515"><span class=
-"ref">[28515] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 co."><a name="28515"><span class="ref">[28515] Iª q. 7 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod aliud est esse infinitum secundum suam essentiam, et secundum
 magnitudinem. Dato enim quod esset aliquod corpus infinitum
 secundum magnitudinem, utpote ignis vel aer, non tamen esset
@@ -4075,33 +3171,25 @@
 suam formam. Unde, cum forma quanti, inquantum huiusmodi, sit
 figura, oportebit quod habeat aliquam figuram. Et sic erit finitum,
 est enim figura, quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A
 geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but
 takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts whatever he
 finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28516"><span class=
-"ref">[28516] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28516"><span class="ref">[28516] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod geometer non indiget sumere aliquam lineam esse
 infinitam actu, sed indiget accipere aliquam lineam finitam actu, a
 qua possit subtrahi quantum necesse est, et hanc nominat lineam
 infinitam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although
 the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still
 it is against the nature of any species of it; thus, for instance, it
 is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether
 circular or triangular, and so on. Now what is not possible in any
 species cannot exist in the genus; hence there cannot be any infinite
 magnitude, since no species of magnitude is infinite.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28517"><span class=
-"ref">[28517] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28517"><span class="ref">[28517] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod, licet infinitum non sit contra rationem magnitudinis
 in communi, est tamen contra rationem cuiuslibet speciei eius,
 scilicet contra rationem magnitudinis bicubitae vel tricubitae,
@@ -4109,114 +3197,76 @@
 possibile in genere esse quod in nulla specie est. Unde non est
 possibile esse aliquam magnitudinem infinitam, cum nulla species
 magnitudinis sit infinita.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The
 infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by
 division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch as parts have
 the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which
 has the aspect of a form. Therefore the infinite is not in the
 addition of magnitude, but only in division.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28518"><span class=
-"ref">[28518] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28518"><span class="ref">[28518] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod infinitum quod convenit quantitati, ut dictum est, se tenet ex
 parte materiae. Per divisionem autem totius acceditur ad materiam,
 nam partes se habent in ratione materiae, per additionem autem
 acceditur ad totum, quod se habet in ratione formae. Et ideo non
 invenitur infinitum in additione magnitudinis, sed in divisione
 tantum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Movement
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Movement
 and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have
 potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude is an actual whole;
 therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not
 agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it agrees with the totality
 of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in
 potentiality.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28519"><span class=
-"ref">[28519] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28519"><span class="ref">[28519] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
 quod motus et tempus non sunt secundum totum in actu, sed
 successive, unde habent potentiam permixtam actui. Sed magnitudo
 est tota in actu. Et ideo infinitum quod convenit quantitati, et se
 tenet ex parte materiae, repugnat totalitati magnitudinis, non
 autem totalitati temporis vel motus, esse enim in potentia convenit
 materiae.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4" next="FP_Q8" prev="FP_Q7_A3" progress="1.01%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether an infinite multitude can exist?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p0.1">Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4" next="FP_Q8" prev="FP_Q7_A3" progress="1.01%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether an infinite multitude can exist?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p0.1">Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an
 actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for
 a potentiality to be made actual. But number can be multiplied to
 infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually
 to exist.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28520"><span class=
-"ref">[28520] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28520"><span class="ref">[28520] Iª q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod possibile sit esse multitudinem infinitam
 secundum actum. Non enim est impossibile id quod est in potentia
 reduci ad actum. Sed numerus est in infinitum multiplicabilis. Ergo
 non est impossibile esse multitudinem infinitam in actu.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is
 possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the
 species of figures are infinite. Therefore an infinite number of
 actual figures is possible.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28521"><span class=
-"ref">[28521] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28521"><span class="ref">[28521] Iª q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 cuiuslibet speciei possibile est esse aliquod individuum in actu.
 Sed species figurae sunt infinitae. Ergo possibile est esse
 infinitas figuras in actu.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things not
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things not
 opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a
 multitude of things to exist, there can still be many others not
 opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to
 coexist with them, and so on to infinitude; therefore an actual
 infinite number of things is possible.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28522"><span class=
-"ref">[28522] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ea
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28522"><span class="ref">[28522] Iª q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ea
 quae non opponuntur ad invicem, non impediunt se invicem. Sed,
 posita aliqua multitudine rerum, adhuc possunt fieri alia multa
 quae eis non opponuntur, ergo non est impossibile aliqua iterum
 simul esse cum eis, et sic in infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse
 infinita in actu.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in
-measure, and number, and weight" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.21" parsed="vul|Wis|11|21|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p5.1"
-passage="Wis. 11:21">Wis. 11:21</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28523"><span class=
-"ref">[28523] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+measure, and number, and weight" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.21" parsed="vul|Wis|11|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p5.1" passage="Wis. 11:21">Wis. 11:21</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28523"><span class="ref">[28523] Iª q. 7 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>omnia in pondere, numero et mensura
 disposuisti</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation
   could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an
@@ -4231,8 +3281,7 @@
   for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach
   matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition of multitude.</p>
 </div>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 co."><a name="28524"><span class=
-"ref">[28524] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 co."><a name="28524"><span class="ref">[28524] Iª q. 7 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod circa hoc fuit duplex opinio. Quidam enim, sicut Avicenna et
 Algazel, dixerunt quod impossibile est esse multitudinem actu
 infinitam per se, sed infinitam per accidens multitudinem esse, non
@@ -4269,65 +3318,42 @@
 in potentia in divisione continui, quia proceditur ad materiam, ut
 supra ostensum est; eadem ratione etiam infinitum invenitur in
 potentia in additione multitudinis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> Every potentiality is made actual according to its
 mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and
 not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act
 successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be
 succeeded by another multitude to infinity.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28525"><span class=
-"ref">[28525] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28525"><span class="ref">[28525] Iª q. 7 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod unumquodque quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum
 secundum modum sui esse, dies enim non reducitur in actum ut sit
 tota simul, sed successive. Et similiter infinitum multitudinis non
 reducitur in actum ut sit totum simul, sed successive, quia post
 quamlibet multitudinem, potest sumi alia multitudo in
 infinitum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Species of
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Species of
 figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various
 species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral and so on; and
 as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to
 act, so neither is the multitude of figures.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28526"><span class=
-"ref">[28526] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28526"><span class="ref">[28526] Iª q. 7 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod species figurarum habent infinitatem ex infinitate
 numeri, sunt enim species figurarum, trilaterum, quadrilaterum, et
 sic inde. Unde, sicut multitudo infinita numerabilis non reducitur
 in actum quod sit tota simul, ita nec multitudo figurarum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although
 the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of
 others, still the supposition of an infinite number is opposed to any
 single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually
 infinite multitude to exist.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28527"><span class=
-"ref">[28527] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28527"><span class="ref">[28527] Iª q. 7 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod, licet, quibusdam positis, alia poni non sit eis oppositum;
 tamen infinita poni opponitur cuilibet speciei multitudinis. Unde
 non est possibile esse aliquam multitudinem actu infinitam.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8" next="FP_Q8_A1" prev="FP_Q7_A4" progress="1.04%" n="vii" title="Question. 8 - THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p0.1">Question 8. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8" next="FP_Q8_A1" prev="FP_Q7_A4" progress="1.04%" n="vii" title="Question. 8 - THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)"><h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p0.1">Question 8. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p2"> Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p3"> (1) Whether God is in all things?</p>
@@ -4336,101 +3362,67 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p6"> (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</p>
 </div>
 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 pr."><a name="28528"><span class="ref">[28528]
-I&ordf; q. 8 pr.</span></a> Quia vero infinito convenire videtur
+Iª q. 8 pr.</span></a> Quia vero infinito convenire videtur
 quod ubique et in omnibus sit, considerandum est utrum hoc Deo
 conveniat. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit
 in omnibus rebus. Secundo, utrum Deus sit ubique. Tertio, utrum
 Deus sit ubique per essentiam et potentiam et praesentiam. Quarto,
 utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1" next="FP_Q8_A2" prev="FP_Q8" progress="1.04%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is in all things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p0.1">Whether God is in all things?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+</div><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1" next="FP_Q8_A2" prev="FP_Q8" progress="1.04%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is in all things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p0.1">Whether God is in all things?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all
-things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.112.4" parsed="vul|Ps|112|4|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p2.1"
-passage="Ps. 112:4">Ps. 112:4</scripRef>), "The Lord is high above all
+things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.112.4" parsed="vul|Ps|112|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p2.1" passage="Ps. 112:4">Ps. 112:4</scripRef>), "The Lord is high above all
 nations," etc. Therefore God is not in all things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28529"><span class=
-"ref">[28529] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28529"><span class="ref">[28529] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit in omnibus rebus. Quod enim
 est supra omnia, non est in omnibus rebus. Sed Deus est supra
 omnia, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>excelsus super omnes gentes
 dominus,</i> et cetera. Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is in
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is in
 anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but
 rather does He contain them. Therefore God is not in things but things
 are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20),
 that "in Him things are, rather than He is in any place."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28530"><span class=
-"ref">[28530] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28530"><span class="ref">[28530] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
 est in aliquo, continetur ab eo. Sed Deus non continetur a rebus,
 sed magis continet res. Ergo Deus non est in rebus, sed magis res
 sunt in eo. Unde Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest.,
 dicit quod <i>in ipso potius sunt omnia, quam ipse alicubi</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more
 powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the
 most powerful of all agents. Therefore His action can extend to things
 which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be
 in all things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28531"><span class=
-"ref">[28531] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quanto
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28531"><span class="ref">[28531] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quanto
 aliquod agens est virtuosius, tanto ad magis distans eius actio
 procedit. Sed Deus est virtuosissimum agens. Ergo eius actio
 pertingere potest ad ea etiam quae ab ipso distant, nec oportet
 quod sit in omnibus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the demons
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the demons
 are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship
-between light and darkness (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Cor.6.14"
-parsed="vul|2Cor|6|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p5.1" passage="2
-Cor. 6:14">2 Cor. 6:14</scripRef>). Therefore God is not in all
+between light and darkness (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Cor.6.14" parsed="vul|2Cor|6|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p5.1" passage="2 Cor. 6:14">2 Cor. 6:14</scripRef>). Therefore God is not in all
 things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28532"><span class=
-"ref">[28532] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28532"><span class="ref">[28532] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
 Daemones res aliquae sunt. Nec tamen Deus est in Daemonibus, non
 enim est conventio lucis ad tenebras, ut dicitur II ad Cor. VI.
 Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in
-all things, according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.26.12"
-parsed="vul|Isa|26|12|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p6.1" passage="
-Is. 26:12, "> Is. 26:12, </scripRef> "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all
+all things, according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.26.12" parsed="vul|Isa|26|12|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p6.1" passage=" Is. 26:12, "> Is. 26:12, </scripRef> "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all
 our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28533"><span class=
-"ref">[28533] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28533"><span class="ref">[28533] Iª q. 8 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
 ubicumque operatur aliquid, ibi est. Sed Deus operatur in omnibus,
 secundum illud Isaiae XXVI, <i>omnia opera nostra operatus es in
 nobis, domine</i>. Ergo Deus est in omnibus rebus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God
   causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Hence
   it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 co."><a name="28534"><span class=
-"ref">[28534] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 co."><a name="28534"><span class="ref">[28534] Iª q. 8 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae,
 vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet
 enim omne agens coniungi ei in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute
@@ -4446,21 +3438,16 @@
 profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in
 re sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde oportet quod Deus sit in
 omnibus rebus, et intime.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p8"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> God is above all things by the excellence of His
 nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of
 all things; as was shown above in this article.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28535"><span class=
-"ref">[28535] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28535"><span class="ref">[28535] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod Deus est supra omnia per excellentiam suae naturae,
 et tamen est in omnibus rebus, ut causans omnium esse, ut supra
 dictum est.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> Although corporeal things are said to be in
 another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things
@@ -4468,26 +3455,21 @@
 body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a
 certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are
 in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28536"><span class=
-"ref">[28536] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28536"><span class="ref">[28536] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod, licet corporalia dicantur esse in aliquo sicut in
 continente, tamen spiritualia continent ea in quibus sunt, sicut
 anima continet corpus. Unde et Deus est in rebus sicut continens
 res. Tamen, per quandam similitudinem corporalium, dicuntur omnia
 esse in Deo, inquantum continentur ab ipso.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No action
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No action
 of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except
 through a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He
 acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as
 if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be
 distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also
 He is above all by the excellence of His own nature.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28537"><span class=
-"ref">[28537] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28537"><span class="ref">[28537] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod nullius agentis, quantumcumque virtuosi, actio procedit ad
 aliquid distans, nisi inquantum in illud per media agit. Hoc autem
 ad maximam virtutem Dei pertinet, quod immediate in omnibus agit.
@@ -4495,96 +3477,62 @@
 Dicuntur tamen res distare a Deo per dissimilitudinem naturae vel
 gratiae, sicut et ipse est super omnia per excellentiam suae
 naturae.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the
 demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity
 of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it is not to be absolutely
 conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition,
 "inasmuch as they are beings." But in things not deformed in their
 nature, we must say absolutely that God is.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28538"><span class=
-"ref">[28538] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28538"><span class="ref">[28538] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
 quod in Daemonibus intelligitur et natura, quae est a Deo, et
 deformitas culpae, quae non est ab ipso. Et ideo non est absolute
 concedendum quod Deus sit in Daemonibus, sed cum hac additione,
 inquantum sunt res quaedam. In rebus autem quae nominant naturam
 non deformatam, absolute dicendum est Deum esse.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2" next="FP_Q8_A3" prev="FP_Q8_A1" progress="1.07%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God is everywhere?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p0.1">Whether God is everywhere?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2" next="FP_Q8_A3" prev="FP_Q8_A1" progress="1.07%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God is everywhere?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p0.1">Whether God is everywhere?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But
 to be in every place does not belong to God, to Whom it does not
 belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things," as Boethius
 says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a place." Therefore God is not
 everywhere.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28539"><span class=
-"ref">[28539] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28539"><span class="ref">[28539] Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit ubique. Esse enim ubique
 significat esse in omni loco. Sed esse in omni loco non convenit
 Deo, cui non convenit esse in loco, nam incorporalia, ut dicit
 Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., non sunt in loco. Ergo Deus non est
 ubique.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation
 of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to
 permanence. But one indivisible part of action or movement cannot
 exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part
 in the genus of permanent things be in every place. Now the divine
 being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many
 places; and thus He is not everywhere.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28540"><span class=
-"ref">[28540] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28540"><span class="ref">[28540] Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
 se habet tempus ad successiva, ita se habet locus ad permanentia.
 Sed unum indivisibile actionis vel motus, non potest esse in
 diversis temporibus. Ergo nec unum indivisibile in genere rerum
 permanentium, potest esse in omnibus locis. Esse autem divinum non
 est successivum, sed permanens. Ergo Deus non est in pluribus
 locis. Et ita non est ubique.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is
 wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any
 one place He is all there; for He has no parts. No part of Him then is
 elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28541"><span class=
-"ref">[28541] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28541"><span class="ref">[28541] Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
 est totum alicubi, nihil eius est extra locum illum. Sed Deus, si
 est in aliquo loco, totus est ibi, non enim habet partes. Ergo
 nihil eius est extra locum illum. Ergo Deus non est ubique.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p5"><b>On
-the contrary,</b> It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.23.24" parsed="vul|Jer|23|24|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p5.1"
-passage="Jer. 23:24">Jer. 23:24</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28542"><span class=
-"ref">[28542] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+the contrary,</b> It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.23.24" parsed="vul|Jer|23|24|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p5.1" passage="Jer. 23:24">Jer. 23:24</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28542"><span class="ref">[28542] Iª q. 8 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Ierem. XXIII, <i>caelum et terram ego impleo</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things---i.e. as one thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every
   place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things
 placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every
@@ -4593,8 +3541,7 @@
 God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed,
 by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every
 place, He Himself fills every place.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 co."><a name="28543"><span class=
-"ref">[28543] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 co."><a name="28543"><span class="ref">[28543] Iª q. 8 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod, cum locus sit res quaedam, esse aliquid in loco potest
 intelligi dupliciter, vel per modum aliarum rerum, idest sicut
 dicitur aliquid esse in aliis rebus quocumque modo, sicut
@@ -4609,20 +3556,15 @@
 est in aliquo loco, non excluditur quin alia sint ibi, imo per hoc
 replet omnia loca, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quae replent
 omnia loca.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p7"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of
 dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28544"><span class=
-"ref">[28544] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28544"><span class="ref">[28544] Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod incorporalia non sunt in loco per contactum
 quantitatis dimensivae, sicut corpora, sed per contactum
 virtutis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is
   outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way
 incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called
@@ -4631,8 +3573,7 @@
 according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small
 thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places,
 and in a small or large place.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28545"><span class=
-"ref">[28545] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28545"><span class="ref">[28545] Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod indivisibile est duplex. Unum quod est terminus
 continui, ut punctus in permanentibus, et momentum in successivis.
 Et huiusmodi indivisibile, in permanentibus, quia habet
@@ -4647,9 +3588,7 @@
 secundum quod virtus sua se potest extendere ad unum vel multa, ad
 parvum vel magnum, secundum hoc est in uno vel pluribus locis, et
 in loco parvo vel magno.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of
   the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it is
   found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be
@@ -4659,8 +3598,7 @@
 except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as
 the soul is whole in every part of the body, so is God whole in all
 things and in each one.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28546"><span class=
-"ref">[28546] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28546"><span class="ref">[28546] Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod totum dicitur respectu partium. Est autem duplex pars,
 scilicet pars essentiae, ut forma et materia dicuntur partes
 compositi, et genus et differentia partes speciei; et etiam pars
@@ -4681,102 +3619,70 @@
 secundum perfectam rationem essentiae. Et ideo, sicut anima est
 tota in qualibet parte corporis, ita Deus totus est in omnibus et
 singulis.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3" next="FP_Q8_A4" prev="FP_Q8_A2" progress="1.10%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p0.1">Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3" next="FP_Q8_A4" prev="FP_Q8_A2" progress="1.10%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p0.1">Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
 mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way
 of essence, presence and power. For what is by essence in anything, is
 in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does
 not belong to the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be
 said that God is in things by essence, presence and power.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28547"><span class=
-"ref">[28547] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28547"><span class="ref">[28547] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod male assignentur modi existendi Deum in
 rebus, cum dicitur quod Deus est in omnibus rebus per essentiam,
 potentiam et praesentiam. Id enim per essentiam est in aliquo, quod
 essentialiter est in eo. Deus autem non est essentialiter in rebus,
 non enim est de essentia alicuius rei. Ergo non debet dici quod
 Deus sit in rebus per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be
 present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the
 meaning of God being in things by His essence, that He is not absent
 from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence
 and presence means the same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say
 that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28548"><span class=
-"ref">[28548] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, hoc
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28548"><span class="ref">[28548] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, hoc
 est esse praesentem alicui rei, scilicet non deesse illi. Sed hoc
 est Deum esse per essentiam in rebus, scilicet non deesse alicui
 rei. Ergo idem est esse Deum in omnibus per essentiam et
 praesentiam. Superfluum ergo fuit dicere quod Deus sit in rebus per
 essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God by
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God by
 His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise
 by His knowledge and will. But it is not said that He is in things by
 knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28549"><span class=
-"ref">[28549] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28549"><span class="ref">[28549] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
 Deus est principium omnium rerum per suam potentiam, ita per
 scientiam et voluntatem. Sed non dicitur Deus esse in rebus per
 scientiam et voluntatem. Ergo nec per potentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as grace is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as grace is
 a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other
 perfections are likewise added. Therefore if God is said to be in
 certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to
 every perfection there ought to be a special mode of God's existence
 in things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28550"><span class=
-"ref">[28550] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28550"><span class="ref">[28550] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
 gratia est quaedam perfectio superaddita substantiae rei, ita
 multae sunt aliae perfectiones superadditae. Si ergo Deus dicitur
 esse speciali modo in quibusdam per gratiam, videtur quod secundum
 quamlibet perfectionem debeat accipi specialis modus essendi Deum
 in rebus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that,
 "God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and
 substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by
 grace" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in
 Ezech.)].</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28551"><span class=
-"ref">[28551] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28551"><span class="ref">[28551] Iª q. 8 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod Gregorius dicit, super Cant. Cantic., quod <i>Deus communi
 modo est in omnibus rebus praesentia, potentia et substantia, tamen
 familiari modo dicitur esse in aliquibus per gratiam</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or
   habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12">(Q[12])</a>. He is said to be thus in the saints by grace.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 co."><a name="28552"><span class=
-"ref">[28552] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 co."><a name="28552"><span class="ref">[28552] Iª q. 8 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum
 causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio
 modo, sicut obiectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est
@@ -4786,8 +3692,7 @@
 illum actu vel habitu. Et quia hoc habet rationalis creatura per
 gratiam, ut infra patebit, dicitur esse hoc modo in sanctis per
 gratiam.</p>
-</div>
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p8"> But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that
   place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the
 Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject
@@ -4807,17 +3712,14 @@
 incorporalia, visibilia vero et corporalia subiecta esse dicebant
 potestati principii contrarii. Contra hos ergo oportet dicere quod
 Deus sit in omnibus per potentiam suam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p9"> But
 others, though they believed that all things were subject to the
 divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to
 these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He
 walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our
 things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]"
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.22.14" parsed="vul|Job|22|14|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p9.1" passage="Job 22:14">Job
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.22.14" parsed="vul|Job|22|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p9.1" passage="Job 22:14">Job
 22:14</scripRef>). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in
 all things by His presence.</p>
 <p xml:lang="la">Fuerunt vero alii, qui
@@ -4826,9 +3728,7 @@
 extendebant, ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXII, <i>circa cardines
 caeli perambulat, nec nostra considerat</i>. Et contra hos oportuit
 dicere quod sit in omnibus per suam praesentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p10">
 Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's
 providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but
@@ -4840,9 +3740,7 @@
 posuerunt omnia non immediate esse a Deo creata, sed quod immediate
 creavit primas creaturas, et illae creaverunt alias. Et contra hos
 oportet dicere quod sit in omnibus per essentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p11">
 Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things
 are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all
@@ -4854,190 +3752,129 @@
 Est per praesentiam in omnibus, inquantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta
 oculis eius. Est in omnibus per essentiam, inquantum adest omnibus
 ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said
 to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the
 things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own
 essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause
 of their being.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28553"><span class=
-"ref">[28553] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28553"><span class="ref">[28553] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in omnibus per essentiam, non
 quidem rerum, quasi sit de essentia earum, sed per essentiam suam,
 quia substantia sua adest omnibus ut causa essendi, sicut dictum
 est.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing can
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing can
 be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing
 may be distant in substance, as was shown in this article; and
 therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by
 presence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28554"><span class=
-"ref">[28554] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28554"><span class="ref">[28554] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod aliquid potest dici praesens alicui, inquantum
 subiacet eius conspectui, quod tamen distat ab eo secundum suam
 substantiam, ut dictum est. Et ideo oportuit duos modos poni,
 scilicet per essentiam, et praesentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge
 and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows,
 and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by knowledge and will
 things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the
 principle of acting on another; hence by power the agent is related
 and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said
 to be present to another.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28555"><span class=
-"ref">[28555] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28555"><span class="ref">[28555] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod de ratione scientiae et voluntatis est, quod scitum sit in
 sciente, et volitum in volente, unde secundum scientiam et
 voluntatem, magis res sunt in Deo, quam Deus in rebus. Sed de
 ratione potentiae est, quod sit principium agendi in aliud, unde
 secundum potentiam agens comparatur et applicatur rei exteriori. Et
 sic per potentiam potest dici agens esse in altero.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p15"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No other
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p15"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No other
 perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in
 anything as the object known and loved; therefore only grace
 constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There is,
 however, another special mode of God's existence in man by union,
 which will be treated of in its own place (TP).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28556"><span class=
-"ref">[28556] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28556"><span class="ref">[28556] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
 quod nulla alia perfectio superaddita substantiae, facit Deum esse
 in aliquo sicut obiectum cognitum et amatum, nisi gratia, et ideo
 sola gratia facit singularem modum essendi Deum in rebus. Est autem
 alius singularis modus essendi Deum in homine per unionem, de quo
 modo suo loco agetur.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4" next="FP_Q9" prev="FP_Q8_A3" progress="1.13%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p0.1">Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4" next="FP_Q9" prev="FP_Q8_A3" progress="1.13%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p0.1">Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be
 everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according
 to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere, and always; primary
 matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of
-these is God, as appears from what is said above <a
- id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p2.1"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not
+these is God, as appears from what is said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not
 belong to God alone.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28557"><span class=
-"ref">[28557] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28557"><span class="ref">[28557] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod esse ubique non sit proprium Dei.
 Universale enim, secundum philosophum, est ubique et semper,
 materia etiam prima, cum sit in omnibus corporibus, est ubique.
 Neutrum autem horum est Deus, ut ex praemissis patet. Ergo esse
 ubique non est proprium Dei.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, number is in
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, number is in
 things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as
-appears from the Book of Wisdom (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.21" parsed="vul|Wis|11|21|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p3.1"
-passage="Wis. 11:21">Wis. 11:21</scripRef>). Therefore there is some
+appears from the Book of Wisdom (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.21" parsed="vul|Wis|11|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p3.1" passage="Wis. 11:21">Wis. 11:21</scripRef>). Therefore there is some
 number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28558"><span class=
-"ref">[28558] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28558"><span class="ref">[28558] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 numerus est in numeratis. Sed totum universum est constitutum in
 numero, ut patet Sap. XI. Ergo aliquis numerus est, qui est in toto
 universo, et ita ubique.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the universe
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the universe
 is a kind of "whole perfect body" (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole
 universe is everywhere, because there is no place outside
 it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28559"><span class=
-"ref">[28559] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, totum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28559"><span class="ref">[28559] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, totum
 universum est quoddam totum corpus perfectum, ut dicitur in I caeli
 et mundi. Sed totum universum est ubique, quia extra ipsum nullus
 locus est. Non ergo solus Deus est ubique.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any body
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any body
 were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be
 everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere does not appear to belong to
 God alone.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="28560"><span class=
-"ref">[28560] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="28560"><span class="ref">[28560] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
 aliquod corpus esset infinitum, nullus locus esset extra ipsum.
 Ergo esset ubique. Et sic, esse ubique non videtur proprium
 Dei.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the soul, as
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the soul, as
 Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and
 whole in every one of its parts." Therefore if there was only one
 animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be
 everywhere does not belong to God alone.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="28561"><span class=
-"ref">[28561] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> <i>Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="28561"><span class="ref">[28561] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> <i>Praeterea,
 anima</i>, ut dicit Augustinus, in VI de Trin., <i>est tota in toto
 corpore, et tota in qualibet eius parte</i>. Si ergo non esset in
 mundo nisi unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique. Et sic, esse
 ubique non est proprium Dei.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p7"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, as Augustine
-says (<scripRef id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p7.1"
-passage="Ep. 137">Ep. 137</scripRef>), "The soul feels where it sees,
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p7"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, as Augustine
+says (<scripRef id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p7.1" passage="Ep. 137">Ep. 137</scripRef>), "The soul feels where it sees,
 and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as
 it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it comprehends the
 entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is
 everywhere.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="28562"><span class=
-"ref">[28562] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, ut
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="28562"><span class="ref">[28562] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, ut
 Augustinus dicit in epistola ad Volusianum, <i>anima ubi videt, ibi
 sentit; et ubi sentit, ibi vivit; et ubi vivit, ibi est</i>. Sed
 anima videt quasi ubique, quia successive videt etiam totum caelum.
 Ergo anima est ubique.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p8"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to
 call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and
 always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28563"><span class=
-"ref">[28563] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28563"><span class="ref">[28563] Iª q. 8 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, <i>quis audeat
 creaturam dicere spiritum sanctum, qui in omnibus et ubique et
 semper est; quod utique divinitatis est proprium?</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p9"><b>I answer that,</b> To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is
   everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should be
   in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be
@@ -5045,8 +3882,7 @@
 Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must
 be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to His very
 self.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 co."><a name="28564"><span class=
-"ref">[28564] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 co."><a name="28564"><span class="ref">[28564] Iª q. 8 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod esse ubique primo et per se, est proprium Dei. Dico autem esse
 ubique primo, quod secundum se totum est ubique. Si quid enim esset
 ubique, secundum diversas partes in diversis locis existens, non
@@ -5063,79 +3899,56 @@
 ipsum. Sic igitur esse ubique primo et per se convenit Deo, et est
 proprium eius, quia quotcumque loca ponantur, oportet quod in
 quolibet sit Deus, non secundum partem, sed secundum seipsum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The
 universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not
 according to the same mode of existence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28565"><span class=
-"ref">[28565] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28565"><span class="ref">[28565] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod universale et materia prima sunt quidem ubique, sed
 non secundum idem esse.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Number,
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Number,
 since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but
 accidentally; neither is the whole but only part of it in each of the
 things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and
 absolutely everywhere.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28566"><span class=
-"ref">[28566] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28566"><span class="ref">[28566] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod numerus, cum sit accidens, non est per se sed per
 accidens, in loco. Nec est totus in quolibet numeratorum, sed
 secundum partem. Et sic non sequitur quod sit primo et per se
 ubique.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The whole
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The whole
 body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it
 is not wholly in each place, but according to its parts; nor again is
 it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed
 besides itself, it would not be in them.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28567"><span class=
-"ref">[28567] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28567"><span class="ref">[28567] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod totum corpus universi est ubique, sed non primo, quia non
 totum est in quolibet loco, sed secundum suas partes. Nec iterum
 per se, quia si ponerentur aliqua alia loca, non esset in eis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If an
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If an
 infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its
 parts.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="28568"><span class=
-"ref">[28568] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="28568"><span class="ref">[28568] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
 quod, si esset corpus infinitum, esset ubique; sed secundum suas
 partes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Were there
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Were there
 one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but
 only accidentally.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="28569"><span class=
-"ref">[28569] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="28569"><span class="ref">[28569] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum
 quod, si esset unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique primo
 quidem, sed per accidens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p15"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere" determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another
   sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the
 act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that
 where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives
 according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that
 it is everywhere.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="28570"><span class=
-"ref">[28570] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="28570"><span class="ref">[28570] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
 quod, cum dicitur anima alicubi videre, potest intelligi
 dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium alicubi
 determinat actum videndi ex parte obiecti. Et sic verum est quod,
@@ -5146,96 +3959,56 @@
 secundum quod exit a vidente. Et sic verum est quod anima ubi
 sentit et videt, ibi est et vivit, secundum istum modum loquendi.
 Et ita non sequitur quod sit ubique.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q9" next="FP_Q9_A1" prev="FP_Q8_A4" progress="1.16%" n="viii" title="Question. 9 - THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9-p0.1">Question 9. THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q9" next="FP_Q9_A1" prev="FP_Q8_A4" progress="1.16%" n="viii" title="Question. 9 - THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)"><h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9-p0.1">Question 9. THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)</h3><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9-p2"> We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of inquiry:</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9-p3"> (1) Whether God is altogether immutable?</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9-p4"> (2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</p>
 </div>
 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 pr."><a name="28571"><span class="ref">[28571]
-I&ordf; q. 9 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
+Iª q. 9 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
 immutabilitate et aeternitate divina, quae immutabilitatem
 consequitur. Circa immutabilitatem vero quaeruntur duo. Primo,
 utrum Deus sit omnino immutabilis. Secundo, utrum esse immutabile
 sit proprium Dei.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" next="FP_Q9_A2" prev="FP_Q9" progress="1.17%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is altogether immutable?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p0.1">Whether God is altogether immutable?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+</div><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" next="FP_Q9_A2" prev="FP_Q9" progress="1.17%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is altogether immutable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p0.1">Whether God is altogether immutable?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way
 mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator
 Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is
 in some way mutable.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28572"><span class=
-"ref">[28572] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28572"><span class="ref">[28572] Iª q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino immutabilis. Quidquid
 enim movet seipsum, est aliquo modo mutabile. Sed, sicut dicit
 Augustinus, VIII super Genesim ad litteram, <i>spiritus creator
 movet se nec per tempus nec per locum</i>. Ergo Deus est aliquo
 modo mutabilis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said
 of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active
-[Vulg.'mobilior']" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.7.24"
-parsed="vul|Wis|7|24|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p3.1"
-passage="Wis. 7:24">Wis. 7:24</scripRef>). But God is wisdom itself;
+[Vulg.'mobilior']" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.7.24" parsed="vul|Wis|7|24|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p3.1" passage="Wis. 7:24">Wis. 7:24</scripRef>). But God is wisdom itself;
 therefore God is movable.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28573"><span class=
-"ref">[28573] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Sap.
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28573"><span class="ref">[28573] Iª q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Sap.
 VII dicitur de sapientia quod est <i>mobilior omnibus
 mobilibus</i>. Sed Deus est ipsa sapientia. Ergo Deus est
 mobilis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to approach
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to approach
 and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in
-Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to you" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.4.8" parsed="vul|Jas|4|8|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p4.1" passage="James 4:8">James
+Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to you" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.4.8" parsed="vul|Jas|4|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p4.1" passage="James 4:8">James
 4:8</scripRef>). Therefore God is mutable.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28574"><span class=
-"ref">[28574] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28574"><span class="ref">[28574] Iª q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 appropinquari et elongari motum significant. Huiusmodi autem
 dicuntur de Deo in Scriptura, Iac. IV, <i>appropinquate Deo, et
 appropinquabit vobis</i>. Ergo Deus est mutabilis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not"
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Mal.3.6" parsed="vul|Mal|3|6|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p5.1" passage="Malachi 3:6">Malachi
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Mal.3.6" parsed="vul|Mal|3|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p5.1" passage="Malachi 3:6">Malachi
 3:6</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28575"><span class=
-"ref">[28575] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28575"><span class="ref">[28575] Iª q. 9 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Malach. III, <i>ego Deus, et non mutor</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.
   Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3], A[7]</a>) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something
   by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained
@@ -5245,8 +4018,7 @@
 previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the
 ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the
 first principle was immovable.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 co."><a name="28576"><span class=
-"ref">[28576] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 co."><a name="28576"><span class="ref">[28576] Iª q. 9 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod ex praemissis ostenditur Deum esse omnino immutabilem. Primo
 quidem, quia supra ostensum est esse aliquod primum ens, quod Deum
 dicimus, et quod huiusmodi primum ens oportet esse purum actum
@@ -5266,9 +4038,7 @@
 prius non pertingebat. Unde nullo modo sibi competit motus. Et inde
 est quod quidam antiquorum, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti,
 posuerunt primum principium esse immobile.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p7"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato,
 who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a
@@ -5277,8 +4047,7 @@
 Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not,
 however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in
 potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28577"><span class=
-"ref">[28577] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28577"><span class="ref">[28577] Iª q. 9 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum modum quo Plato
 dicebat primum movens movere seipsum, omnem operationem nominans
 motum; secundum quod etiam ipsum intelligere et velle et amare
@@ -5286,9 +4055,7 @@
 secundum hoc dixerunt quod Deus movet seipsum, non autem secundum
 quod motus et mutatio est existentis in potentia, ut nunc loquimur
 de mutatione et motu.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which
   participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which
 participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of
@@ -5297,8 +4064,7 @@
 touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the
 matter, that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us
 from the movement of the Father of light.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28578"><span class=
-"ref">[28578] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28578"><span class="ref">[28578] Iª q. 9 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod sapientia dicitur mobilis esse similitudinarie,
 secundum quod suam similitudinem diffundit usque ad ultima rerum.
 Nihil enim esse potest, quod non procedat a divina sapientia per
@@ -5312,99 +4078,68 @@
 terram pertingit. Et hoc modo exponit Dionysius, cap. I Cael.
 Hier., dicens quod <i>omnis processus divinae manifestationis venit
 ad nos a patre luminum moto</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 3:</b> These things are said of God in Scripture
 metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out,
 according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to
 us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness,
 or decline from Him.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28579"><span class=
-"ref">[28579] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28579"><span class="ref">[28579] Iª q. 9 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod huiusmodi dicuntur de Deo in Scripturis metaphorice. Sicut
 enim dicitur sol intrare domum vel exire, inquantum radius eius
 pertingit ad domum; sic dicitur Deus appropinquare ad nos vel
 recedere a nobis, inquantum percipimus influentiam bonitatis
 ipsius, vel ab eo deficimus.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2" next="FP_Q10" prev="FP_Q9_A1" progress="1.19%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p0.1">Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2" next="FP_Q10" prev="FP_Q9_A1" progress="1.19%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p0.1">Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be
 immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says
 (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in everything which is moved." But,
 according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls,
 have not matter. Therefore to be immutable does not belong to God
 alone.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28580"><span class=
-"ref">[28580] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28580"><span class="ref">[28580] Iª q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod esse immutabile non sit proprium Dei.
 Dicit enim philosophus, in II Metaphys., quod materia est in omni
 eo quod movetur. Sed substantiae quaedam creatae, sicut Angeli et
 animae, non habent materiam, ut quibusdam videtur. Ergo esse
 immutabile non est proprium Dei.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything
 in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its
 ultimate end, is not in motion. But some creatures have already
 attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in
 heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28581"><span class=
-"ref">[28581] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28581"><span class="ref">[28581] Iª q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
 quod movetur, movetur propter aliquem finem, quod ergo iam pervenit
 ad ultimum finem, non movetur. Sed quaedam creaturae iam
 pervenerunt ad ultimum finem, sicut omnes beati. Ergo aliquae
 creaturae sunt immobiles.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything
 which is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said
 (Sex Princip. i) that "form is essence consisting of the simple and
 invariable." Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be
 immutable.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28582"><span class=
-"ref">[28582] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28582"><span class="ref">[28582] Iª q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
 quod est mutabile, est variabile. Sed formae sunt invariabiles,
 dicitur enim in libro sex principiorum, quod <i>forma est simplici
 et invariabili essentia consistens</i>. Ergo non est solius Dei
 proprium esse immutabile.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is
 immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are
 mutable."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28583"><span class=
-"ref">[28583] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28583"><span class="ref">[28583] Iª q. 9 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, <i>solus Deus
 immutabilis est; quae autem fecit, quia ex nihilo sunt, mutabilia
 sunt</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed, were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence
   depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed in themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In
   this way therefore, by the power of another---namely, of God---they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 co."><a name="28584"><span class=
-"ref">[28584] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 co."><a name="28584"><span class="ref">[28584] Iª q. 9 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod solus Deus est omnino immutabilis, omnis autem creatura aliquo
 modo est mutabilis. Sciendum est enim quod mutabile potest aliquid
 dici dupliciter, uno modo, per potentiam quae in ipso est; alio
@@ -5422,16 +4157,13 @@
 igitur per potentiam quae est in altero, scilicet in Deo, sunt
 mutabiles, inquantum ab ipso ex nihilo potuerunt produci in esse,
 et de esse possunt reduci in non esse.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p7"> If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent
   with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with privation of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with "not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed from white to not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject,
   then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place. On the
   other hand incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual
   created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances." Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills
-  all places, as was shown above (<a
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2">Q[8],
+  all places, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2">Q[8],
 A[2]</a>).</p>
 <p xml:lang="la">Si autem dicatur aliquid
 mutabile per potentiam in ipso existentem, sic etiam aliquo modo
@@ -5470,9 +4202,7 @@
 possunt attingere quaedam loca quae prius non attingebant, quod de
 Deo dici non potest, qui sua infinitate omnia loca replet, ut supra
 dictum est.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p8"> Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in
   none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether
 immutable.</p>
@@ -5484,65 +4214,39 @@
 secundum potentiam creantis, in cuius potestate est esse et non
 esse earum. Unde, cum Deus nullo istorum modorum sit mutabilis,
 proprium eius est omnino immutabilem esse.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 1:</b> This objection proceeds from mutability as regards
 substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such
 movement.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28585"><span class=
-"ref">[28585] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28585"><span class="ref">[28585] Iª q. 9 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de eo quod est mutabile
 secundum esse substantiale vel accidentale, de tali enim motu
 philosophi tractaverunt.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good
 angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have
 also immutability of election by divine power; nevertheless there
 remains in them mutability as regards place.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28586"><span class=
-"ref">[28586] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28586"><span class="ref">[28586] Iª q. 9 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod Angeli boni, supra immutabilitatem essendi, quae
 competit eis secundum naturam, habent immutabilitatem electionis ex
 divina virtute, tamen remanet in eis mutabilitas secundum
 locum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms are
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms are
 called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation;
 but they are subject to variation because by them their subject is
 variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for
 they are not called beings as though they were the subject of being,
 but because through them something has being.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28587"><span class=
-"ref">[28587] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28587"><span class="ref">[28587] Iª q. 9 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod formae dicuntur invariabiles, quia non possunt esse subiectum
 variationis, subiiciuntur tamen variationi, inquantum subiectum
 secundum eas variatur. Unde patet quod secundum quod sunt, sic
 variantur, non enim dicuntur entia quasi sint subiectum essendi,
 sed quia eis aliquid est.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10" next="FP_Q10_A1" prev="FP_Q9_A2" progress="1.23%" n="ix" title="Question. 10 - THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10-p0.1">Question 10. THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10" next="FP_Q10_A1" prev="FP_Q9_A2" progress="1.23%" n="ix" title="Question. 10 - THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)"><h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10-p0.1">Question 10. THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10-p2"> We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry:</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10-p3"> (1) What is eternity?</p>
@@ -5552,115 +4256,79 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10-p7"> (5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity?</p>
 </div>
 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 pr."><a name="28588"><span class="ref">[28588]
-I&ordf; q. 10 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de aeternitate. Et
+Iª q. 10 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de aeternitate. Et
 circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, quid sit aeternitas. Secundo,
 utrum Deus sit aeternus. Tertio, utrum esse aeternum sit proprium
 Dei. Quarto, utrum aeternitas differat a tempore. Quinto, de
 differentia aevi et temporis. Sexto, utrum sit unum aevum tantum,
 sicut est unum tempus et una aeternitas.</p>
-</div>
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1" next="FP_Q10_A2" prev="FP_Q10" progress="1.24%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether this is a good definition of eternity, “The simultaneously-whole  and perfect possession of interminable life”?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p0.1">Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
+</div><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1" next="FP_Q10_A2" prev="FP_Q10" progress="1.24%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether this is a good definition of eternity, “The simultaneously-whole  and perfect possession of interminable life”?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p0.1">Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
 definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good
 one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of
 interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But
 negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong
 to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word
 "interminable" ought not to be found.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28589"><span class=
-"ref">[28589] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28589"><span class="ref">[28589] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio aeternitatis,
 quam Boetius ponit V de consolatione, dicens quod <i>aeternitas est
 interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio</i>.
 Interminabile enim negative dicitur. Sed negatio non est de ratione
 nisi eorum quae sunt deficientia, quod aeternitati non competit.
 Ergo in definitione aeternitatis non debet poni interminabile.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, eternity
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, eternity
 signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence
 rather than life. Therefore the word "life" ought not to come into the
 definition of eternity; but rather the word "existence."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28590"><span class=
-"ref">[28590] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28590"><span class="ref">[28590] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 aeternitas durationem quandam significat. Duratio autem magis
 respicit esse quam vitam. Ergo non debuit poni in definitione
 aeternitatis vita, sed magis esse.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a whole is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a whole is
 what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is
 simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be "whole."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28591"><span class=
-"ref">[28591] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, totum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28591"><span class="ref">[28591] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, totum
 dicitur quod habet partes. Hoc autem aeternitati non convenit, cum
 sit simplex. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur tota.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Many days cannot
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Many days cannot
 occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity,
 days and times are in the plural, for it is said, "His going forth is
-from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Mic.5.2" parsed="vul|Mic|5|2|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p5.1" passage="Micah 5:2">Micah
+from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Mic.5.2" parsed="vul|Mic|5|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p5.1" passage="Micah 5:2">Micah
 5:2</scripRef>); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of
-the mystery hidden from eternity" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.16.25" parsed="vul|Rom|16|25|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p5.2"
-passage="Rom. 16:25">Rom. 16:25</scripRef>). Therefore eternity is not
+the mystery hidden from eternity" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.16.25" parsed="vul|Rom|16|25|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p5.2" passage="Rom. 16:25">Rom. 16:25</scripRef>). Therefore eternity is not
 omni-simultaneous.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28592"><span class=
-"ref">[28592] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28592"><span class="ref">[28592] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
 plures dies non possunt esse simul, nec plura tempora. Sed in
 aeternitate pluraliter dicuntur dies et tempora, dicitur enim
 Micheae V, <i>egressus eius ab initio, a diebus aeternitatis</i>;
 et ad Rom., XVI cap., <i>secundum revelationem mysterii temporibus
 aeternis taciti</i>. Ergo aeternitas non est tota simul.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the whole
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the whole
 and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is
 "whole," it is superfluously described as "perfect."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="28593"><span class=
-"ref">[28593] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, totum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="28593"><span class="ref">[28593] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, totum
 et perfectum sunt idem. Posito igitur quod sit tota, superflue
 additur quod sit perfecta.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p7"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, duration
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p7"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, duration
 does not imply "possession." But eternity is a kind of
 duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="28594"><span class=
-"ref">[28594] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="28594"><span class="ref">[28594] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
 possessio ad durationem non pertinet. Aeternitas autem quaedam
 duratio est. Ergo aeternitas non est possessio.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p8"><b>I answer that,</b> As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and "after." For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft
   of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or
 after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of
 before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the
 uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of
 eternity.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 co."><a name="28595"><span class=
-"ref">[28595] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 co."><a name="28595"><span class="ref">[28595] Iª q. 10 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod, sicut in cognitionem simplicium oportet nos venire per
 composita, ita in cognitionem aeternitatis oportet nos venire per
 tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus motus secundum prius et
@@ -5672,9 +4340,7 @@
 ratio temporis consistit in numeratione prioris et posterioris in
 motu, ita in apprehensione uniformitatis eius quod est omnino extra
 motum, consistit ratio aeternitatis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p9">
 Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a
 beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved
@@ -5687,9 +4353,7 @@
 accipere aliquod principium et aliquem finem. Quod vero est omnino
 immutabile, sicut nec successionem, ita nec principium aut finem
 habere potest.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p10"> Thus
 eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is
 interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term
@@ -5700,178 +4364,120 @@
 principio et fine carens (ut terminus ad utrumque referatur).
 Secundo, per hoc quod ipsa aeternitas successione caret, tota simul
 existens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Simple
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Simple
 things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a point is that
 which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken as if the negation
 belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first
 apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the knowledge of simple
 things except by removing the opposite.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28596"><span class=
-"ref">[28596] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28596"><span class="ref">[28596] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod simplicia consueverunt per negationem definiri, sicut
 punctus est cuius pars non est. Quod non ideo est, quod negatio sit
 de essentia eorum, sed quia intellectus noster, qui primo
 apprehendit composita, in cognitionem simplicium pervenire non
 potest, nisi per remotionem compositionis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is
 truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to
 operation, which is not true of being. Now the protraction of duration
 seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the
 numbering of movement.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28597"><span class=
-"ref">[28597] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28597"><span class="ref">[28597] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod illud quod est vere aeternum, non solum est ens, sed
 vivens, et ipsum vivere se extendit quodammodo ad operationem, non
 autem esse. Protensio autem durationis videtur attendi secundum
 operationem, magis quam secundum esse, unde et tempus est numerus
 motus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity
 is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting
 in nothing.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28598"><span class=
-"ref">[28598] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28598"><span class="ref">[28598] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod aeternitas dicitur tota, non quia habet partes, sed
 inquantum nihil ei deest.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As God,
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As God,
 although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by
 corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously whole, is called by
 names implying time and succession.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28599"><span class=
-"ref">[28599] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28599"><span class="ref">[28599] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
 dicendum quod, sicut Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nominibus rerum
 corporalium metaphorice in Scripturis nominatur, sic aeternitas,
 tota simul existens, nominibus temporalibus successivis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p15"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Two
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p15"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Two
 things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive;
 and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence the expression
 "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and the
 word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="28600"><span class=
-"ref">[28600] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="28600"><span class="ref">[28600] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
 dicendum quod in tempore est duo considerare, scilicet ipsum
 tempus, quod est successivum; et nunc temporis, quod est
 imperfectum. Dicit ergo tota simul, ad removendum tempus, et
 perfecta, ad excludendum nunc temporis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p16"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Whatever
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p16"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Whatever
 is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the
 immutability and permanence of eternity, we use the word
 "possession."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="28601"><span class=
-"ref">[28601] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="28601"><span class="ref">[28601] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
 quod illud quod possidetur, firmiter et quiete habetur. Ad
 designandam ergo immutabilitatem et indeficientiam aeternitatis,
 usus est nomine possessionis.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2" next="FP_Q10_A3" prev="FP_Q10_A1" progress="1.27%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God is eternal?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p0.1">Whether God is eternal?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2" next="FP_Q10_A3" prev="FP_Q10_A1" progress="1.27%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God is eternal?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p0.1">Whether God is eternal?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
 is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for
 Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that flows away makes time,
 the now that stands still makes eternity;" and Augustine says
 (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of eternity."
 Therefore God is not eternal.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28602"><span class=
-"ref">[28602] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28602"><span class="ref">[28602] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit aeternus. Nihil enim factum
 potest dici de Deo. Sed aeternitas est aliquid factum, dicit enim
 Boetius quod <i>nunc fluens facit tempus, nunc stans facit
 aeternitatem</i>; et Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium
 quaest., quod Deus est auctor aeternitatis. Ergo Deus non est
 aeternus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is
 before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But,
 as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God is before eternity and He is after
 eternity": for it is written that "the Lord shall reign for eternity,
-and beyond [*Douay: 'for ever and ever']" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.15.18" parsed="vul|Exod|15|18|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p3.1"
-passage="Ex. 15:18">Ex. 15:18</scripRef>). Therefore to be eternal
+and beyond [*Douay: 'for ever and ever']" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.15.18" parsed="vul|Exod|15|18|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p3.1" passage="Ex. 15:18">Ex. 15:18</scripRef>). Therefore to be eternal
 does not belong to God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28603"><span class=
-"ref">[28603] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28603"><span class="ref">[28603] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
 est ante aeternitatem et post aeternitatem, non mensuratur
 aeternitate. Sed Deus est ante aeternitatem, ut dicitur in libro de
 causis, et post aeternitatem; dicitur enim Exod. XV, quod
 <i>dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra</i>. Ergo esse aeternum
 non convenit Deo.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, eternity
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, eternity
 is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore
 it does not belong to Him to be eternal.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28604"><span class=
-"ref">[28604] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28604"><span class="ref">[28604] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 aeternitas mensura quaedam est. Sed Deo non convenit esse
 mensuratum. Ergo non competit ei esse aeternum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in
 eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is
 simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article. But words
 denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in
 Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28605"><span class=
-"ref">[28605] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28605"><span class="ref">[28605] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
 aeternitate non est praesens, praeteritum vel futurum cum sit tota
 simul, ut dictum est. Sed de Deo dicuntur in Scripturis verba
 praesentis temporis, praeteriti vel futuri. Ergo Deus non est
 aeternus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is
 eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28606"><span class=
-"ref">[28606] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28606"><span class="ref">[28606] Iª q. 10 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Athanasius, <i>aeternus pater, aeternus filius, aeternus
 spiritus sanctus</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p7"><b>I
 answer that,</b> The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the
 idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding
@@ -5880,21 +4486,17 @@
 whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own
 being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own
 essence, so He is His own eternity.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 co."><a name="28607"><span class=
-"ref">[28607] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 co."><a name="28607"><span class="ref">[28607] Iª q. 10 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod ratio aeternitatis consequitur immutabilitatem, sicut ratio
 temporis consequitur motum, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, cum Deus sit
 maxime immutabilis, sibi maxime competit esse aeternum. Nec solum
 est aeternus, sed est sua aeternitas, cum tamen nulla alia res sit
 sua duratio, quia non est suum esse. Deus autem est suum esse
 uniforme, unde, sicut est sua essentia, ita est sua aeternitas.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the "now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of eternity," this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He
   communicates His immutability.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28608"><span class=
-"ref">[28608] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28608"><span class="ref">[28608] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod nunc stans dicitur facere aeternitatem, secundum
 nostram apprehensionem. Sicut enim causatur in nobis apprehensio
 temporis, eo quod apprehendimus fluxum ipsius nunc, ita causatur in
@@ -5903,9 +4505,7 @@
 aeternitatis</i>, intelligitur de aeternitate participata, eo enim
 modo communicat Deus suam aeternitatem aliquibus, quo et suam
 immutabilitatem.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that "intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of Exodus, "The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age,
   i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the
 period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign
@@ -5913,8 +4513,7 @@
 conceived to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according
 to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as
 His reign is simultaneously whole.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28609"><span class=
-"ref">[28609] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28609"><span class="ref">[28609] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet
 solutio ad secundum. Nam Deus dicitur esse ante aeternitatem, prout
 participatur a substantiis immaterialibus. Unde et ibidem dicitur,
 quod <i>intelligentia parificatur aeternitati</i>. Quod autem
@@ -5927,116 +4526,73 @@
 regnare, quia, si etiam aliquid aliud semper esset (ut motus caeli
 secundum quosdam philosophos), tamen Deus ultra regnat, inquantum
 eius regnum est totum simul.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity
 is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as
 if He were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement is there
 taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28610"><span class=
-"ref">[28610] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28610"><span class="ref">[28610] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod aeternitas non est aliud quam ipse Deus. Unde non
 dicitur Deus aeternus, quasi sit aliquo modo mensuratus, sed
 accipitur ibi ratio mensurae secundum apprehensionem nostram
 tantum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Words
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Words
 denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity
 includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered through present,
 past and future.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28611"><span class=
-"ref">[28611] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28611"><span class="ref">[28611] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
 dicendum quod verba diversorum temporum attribuuntur Deo, inquantum
 eius aeternitas omnia tempora includit, non quod ipse varietur per
 praesens, praeteritum et futurum.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3" next="FP_Q10_A4" prev="FP_Q10_A2" progress="1.29%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p0.1">Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3" next="FP_Q10_A4" prev="FP_Q10_A2" progress="1.29%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p0.1">Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it
 does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that
 "those who instruct many to justice," shall be "as stars unto
-perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all eternity']" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Dan.12.3" parsed="vul|Dan|12|3|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p2.1"
-passage="Dan. 12:3">Dan. 12:3</scripRef>). Now if God alone were
+perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all eternity']" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Dan.12.3" parsed="vul|Dan|12|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p2.1" passage="Dan. 12:3">Dan. 12:3</scripRef>). Now if God alone were
 eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is
 not the only eternal.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28612"><span class=
-"ref">[28612] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28612"><span class="ref">[28612] Iª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod esse aeternum non sit soli Deo proprium.
 Dicitur enim Danielis XII, quod <i>qui ad iustitiam erudiunt
 plurimos, erunt quasi stellae in perpetuas aeternitates</i>. Non
 autem essent plures aeternitates, si solus Deus esset aeternus. Non
 igitur solus Deus est aeternus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is
 written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay: 'everlasting'] fire"
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.25.41" parsed="vul|Matt|25|41|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p3.1"
-passage="Mat. 25:41">Mat. 25:41</scripRef>). Therefore God is not the
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.25.41" parsed="vul|Matt|25|41|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p3.1" passage="Mat. 25:41">Mat. 25:41</scripRef>). Therefore God is not the
 only eternal.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28613"><span class=
-"ref">[28613] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28613"><span class="ref">[28613] Iª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 Matth. XXV dicitur, <i>ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum</i>. Non
 igitur solus Deus est aeternus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every
 necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as,
 for instance, all principles of demonstration and all demonstrative
 propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28614"><span class=
-"ref">[28614] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28614"><span class="ref">[28614] Iª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
 necessarium est aeternum. Sed multa sunt necessaria; sicut omnia
 principia demonstrationis, et omnes propositiones demonstrativae.
 Ergo non solus Deus est aeternus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the
 only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not
 eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28615"><span class=
-"ref">[28615] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28615"><span class="ref">[28615] Iª q. 10 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Hieronymus, ad Marcellam, <i>Deus solus est qui exordium
 non habet</i>. Quidquid autem exordium habet, non est aeternum.
 Solus ergo Deus est aeternus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever"
   (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eccl.1.4" parsed="vul|Eccl|1|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6.2" passage="Eccles. 1:4">Eccles. 1:4</scripRef>). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.75.5" parsed="vul|Ps|75|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6.3" passage="Ps. 75:5">Ps. 75:5</scripRef>) the hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal hills." (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Deut.33.15" parsed="vul|Deut|33|15|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6.4" passage="Dt. 33:15">Dt. 33:15</scripRef>). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in being or further still in operation; like the angels, and
   the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of
 the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says
 (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life;
 according to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee
-the only true God," etc. (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.17.3"
-parsed="vul|John|17|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6.5"
-passage="Jn. 17:3">Jn. 17:3</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 co."><a name="28616"><span class=
-"ref">[28616] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+the only true God," etc. (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.17.3" parsed="vul|John|17|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6.5" passage="Jn. 17:3">Jn. 17:3</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 co."><a name="28616"><span class="ref">[28616] Iª q. 10 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod aeternitas vere et proprie in solo Deo est. Quia aeternitas
 immutabilitatem consequitur, ut ex dictis patet. Solus autem Deus
 est omnino immutabilis, ut est superius ostensum. Secundum tamen
@@ -6055,75 +4611,46 @@
 Unde et videntes Deum dicuntur habere vitam aeternam, secundum
 illud Ioann. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant</i> et
 cetera.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are
 said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by
 the contemplation of God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28617"><span class=
-"ref">[28617] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28617"><span class="ref">[28617] Iª q. 10 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod dicuntur multae aeternitates, secundum quod sunt
 multi participantes aeternitatem ex ipsa Dei contemplatione.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fire
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fire
 of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is
 change in the pains of the lost, according to the words "To extreme
-heat they will pass from snowy waters" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.24.19" parsed="vul|Job|24|19|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p8.1" passage="Job 24:19">Job
+heat they will pass from snowy waters" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.24.19" parsed="vul|Job|24|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p8.1" passage="Job 24:19">Job
 24:19</scripRef>). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but
 rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be
-for ever" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.80.16"
-parsed="vul|Ps|80|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p8.2"
-passage="Ps. 80:16">Ps. 80:16</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28618"><span class=
-"ref">[28618] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+for ever" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.80.16" parsed="vul|Ps|80|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p8.2" passage="Ps. 80:16">Ps. 80:16</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28618"><span class="ref">[28618] Iª q. 10 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod ignis Inferni dicitur aeternus propter
 interminabilitatem tantum. Est tamen in poenis eorum transmutatio,
 secundum illud Iob XXIV, <i>ad nimium calorem transibunt ab aquis
 nivium</i>. Unde in Inferno non est vera aeternitas, sed magis
 tempus; secundum illud Psalmi, <i>erit tempus eorum in
 saecula</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Necessary
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Necessary
 means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher
 (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore in this sense the true and
 necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is
 the divine intellect alone; hence it does not follow that anything
 beside God is eternal.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28619"><span class=
-"ref">[28619] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28619"><span class="ref">[28619] Iª q. 10 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod necessarium significat quendam modum veritatis. Verum
 autem, secundum philosophum, VI Metaphys., est in intellectu.
 Secundum hoc igitur vera et necessaria sunt aeterna, quia sunt in
 intellectu aeterno, qui est intellectus divinus solus. Unde non
 sequitur quod aliquid extra Deum sit aeternum.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4" next="FP_Q10_A5" prev="FP_Q10_A3" progress="1.31%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether eternity differs from time?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p0.1">Whether eternity differs from time?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4" next="FP_Q10_A5" prev="FP_Q10_A3" progress="1.31%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether eternity differs from time?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p0.1">Whether eternity differs from time?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and
   includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a
 different thing from eternity.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28620"><span class=
-"ref">[28620] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28620"><span class="ref">[28620] Iª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod aeternitas non sit aliud a tempore.
 Impossibile est enim duas esse mensuras durationis simul, nisi una
 sit pars alterius, non enim sunt simul duo dies vel duae horae; sed
@@ -6132,30 +4659,23 @@
 importat. Cum igitur aeternitas non sit pars temporis, quia
 aeternitas excedit tempus et includit ipsum; videtur quod tempus
 sit pars aeternitatis, et non aliud ab aeternitate.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according
 to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now" of time remains the same in
 the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that it is
 the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore
 eternity is the "now" of time. But the "now" of time is not
 substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not
 substantially different from time.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28621"><span class=
-"ref">[28621] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28621"><span class="ref">[28621] Iª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 secundum philosophum in IV Physic., nunc temporis manet idem in
 toto tempore. Sed hoc videtur constituere rationem aeternitatis,
 quod sit idem indivisibiliter se habens in toto decursu temporis.
 Ergo aeternitas est nunc temporis. Sed nunc temporis non est aliud
 secundum substantiam a tempore. Ergo aeternitas non est aliud
 secundum substantiam a tempore.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the
 measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as
 said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that the measure of the first being
 is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first
@@ -6163,36 +4683,29 @@
 measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is
 measured by time. Time therefore is either eternity or is a part of
 eternity.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28622"><span class=
-"ref">[28622] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28622"><span class="ref">[28622] Iª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
 mensura primi motus est mensura omnium motuum, ut dicitur in IV
 Physic., ita videtur quod mensura primi esse sit mensura omnis
 esse. Sed aeternitas est mensura primi esse, quod est esse divinum.
 Ergo aeternitas est mensura omnis esse. Sed esse rerum
 corruptibilium mensuratur tempore. Ergo tempus vel est aeternitas,
 vel aliquid aeternitatis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a
 "before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same
 thing.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28623"><span class=
-"ref">[28623] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28623"><span class="ref">[28623] Iª q. 10 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod aeternitas est tota simul, in tempore autem est prius et
 posterius. Ergo tempus et aeternitas non sunt idem.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity
   and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of
   the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as
 regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not
 measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution
 which has beginning and end in time.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 co."><a name="28624"><span class=
-"ref">[28624] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 co."><a name="28624"><span class="ref">[28624] Iª q. 10 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod manifestum est tempus et aeternitatem non esse idem. Sed huius
 diversitatis rationem quidam assignaverunt ex hoc quod aeternitas
 caret principio et fine, tempus autem habet principium et finem.
@@ -6210,9 +4723,7 @@
 mensuraret ipsum secundum suam totam durationem, cum infinitum non
 sit mensurabile; sed mensuraret quamlibet circulationem, quae habet
 principium et finem in tempore.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p7"> Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is
   simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.</p>
 <p xml:lang="la">Potest tamen et aliam rationem
@@ -6224,27 +4735,20 @@
 differentiae consequuntur eam quae est per se et primo,
 differentiam, per hoc quod aeternitas est tota simul, non autem
 tempus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such a
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such a
 reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of
 measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those
 things of which the respective measures are time and eternity.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28625"><span class=
-"ref">[28625] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28625"><span class="ref">[28625] Iª q. 10 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si tempus et aeternitas essent
 mensurae unius generis, quod patet esse falsum, ex his quorum est
 tempus et aeternitas mensura.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject
   and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of
 time.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28626"><span class=
-"ref">[28626] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28626"><span class="ref">[28626] Iª q. 10 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod nunc temporis est idem subiecto in toto tempore, sed
 differens ratione, eo quod, sicut tempus respondet motui, ita nunc
 temporis respondet mobili; mobile autem est idem subiecto in toto
@@ -6253,14 +4757,11 @@
 secundum quod alternatur ratione, est tempus. Aeternitas autem
 manet eadem et subiecto et ratione. Unde aeternitas non est idem
 quod nunc temporis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only
   measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to
 whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28627"><span class=
-"ref">[28627] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28627"><span class="ref">[28627] Iª q. 10 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod, sicut aeternitas est propria mensura ipsius esse,
 ita tempus est propria mensura motus. Unde secundum quod aliquod
 esse recedit a permanentia essendi et subditur transmutationi,
@@ -6270,100 +4771,65 @@
 transmutantur in actu, sed quae sunt transmutabilia. Unde non solum
 mensurat motum, sed etiam quietem; quae est eius quod natum est
 moveri, et non movetur.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5" next="FP_Q10_A6" prev="FP_Q10_A4" progress="1.34%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - The difference of aeviternity and time">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p0.1">The difference of aeviternity and time</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5" next="FP_Q10_A6" prev="FP_Q10_A4" progress="1.34%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - The difference of aeviternity and time"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p0.1">The difference of aeviternity and time</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
 aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad
 lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the spiritual through time." But
 aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual
 substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28628"><span class=
-"ref">[28628] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28628"><span class="ref">[28628] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod aevum non sit aliud a tempore. Dicit enim
 Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>Deus movet creaturam
 spiritualem per tempus</i>. Sed aevum dicitur esse mensura
 spiritualium substantiarum. Ergo tempus non differt ab aevo.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is
 essential to time to have "before" and "after"; but it is essential to
 eternity to be simultaneously whole, as was shown above in the first
-article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.1.1" parsed="vul|Sir|1|1|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p3.1"
-passage="Ecclus. 1:1">Ecclus. 1:1</scripRef>) that eternal "Wisdom is
+article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.1.1" parsed="vul|Sir|1|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p3.1" passage="Ecclus. 1:1">Ecclus. 1:1</scripRef>) that eternal "Wisdom is
 before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before"
 and "after"; and thus it is the same as time.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28629"><span class=
-"ref">[28629] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28629"><span class="ref">[28629] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de
 ratione temporis est quod habeat prius et posterius, de ratione
 vero aeternitatis est quod sit tota simul, ut dictum est. Sed aevum
 non est aeternitas, dicitur enim Eccli. I, quod sapientia aeterna
 est ante aevum. Ergo non est totum simul, sed habet prius et
 posterius, et ita est tempus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there
 is no "before" and "after" in aeviternity, it follows that in
 aeviternal things there is no difference between being, having been,
 or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not
 to have been, it follows that it is impossible for them not to be in
 the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28630"><span class=
-"ref">[28630] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si in
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28630"><span class="ref">[28630] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si in
 aevo non est prius et posterius, sequitur quod in aeviternis non
 differat esse vel fuisse vel futurum esse. Cum igitur sit
 impossibile aeviterna non fuisse, sequitur quod impossibile sit ea
 non futura esse. Quod falsum est, cum Deus possit ea reducere in
 nihilum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since the
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since the
 duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration,
 if aeviternity is simultaneously whole, it follows that some creature
 is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity does
 not differ from time.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="28631"><span class=
-"ref">[28631] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, cum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="28631"><span class="ref">[28631] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, cum
 duratio aeviternorum sit infinita ex parte post, si aevum sit totum
 simul, sequitur quod aliquod creatum sit infinitum in actu, quod
 est impossibile. Non igitur aevum differt a tempore.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time
 to be separate from aeviternity."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28632"><span class=
-"ref">[28632] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28632"><span class="ref">[28632] Iª q. 10 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Boetius, <i>qui tempus ab aevo ire iubes</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they
   might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even
 granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity,
 and from time.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 co."><a name="28633"><span class=
-"ref">[28633] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 co."><a name="28633"><span class="ref">[28633] Iª q. 10 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod aevum differt a tempore et ab aeternitate, sicut medium
 existens inter illa. Sed horum differentiam aliqui sic assignant,
 dicentes quod aeternitas principio et fine caret; aevum habet
@@ -6373,9 +4839,7 @@
 aliqui ponunt; vel etiam si quandoque deficerent, quod Deo
 possibile esset, adhuc aevum distingueretur ab aeternitate et
 tempore.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p8"> Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that time has both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has "before" and "after" without innovation and veteration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For since "before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity has
   "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to the things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure,
   as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain "before" and "after." We say then that since eternity is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these
@@ -6419,39 +4883,29 @@
 prius et posterius, aevum autem non habet in se prius et posterius,
 sed ei coniungi possunt, aeternitas autem non habet prius neque
 posterius, neque ea compatitur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spiritual
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spiritual
 creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are
 measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii,
 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by
 affections. But as regards their nature they are measured by
 aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share
 of eternity.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28634"><span class=
-"ref">[28634] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28634"><span class="ref">[28634] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod creaturae spirituales, quantum ad affectiones et
 intelligentias, in quibus est successio, mensurantur tempore. Unde
 et Augustinus ibidem dicit quod per tempus moveri, est per
 affectiones moveri. Quantum vero ad eorum esse naturale,
 mensurantur aevo. Sed quantum ad visionem gloriae, participant
 aeternitatem.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b>
 Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because
 "before" and "after" are compatible with it.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28635"><span class=
-"ref">[28635] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28635"><span class="ref">[28635] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod aevum est totum simul, non tamen est aeternitas, quia
 compatitur secum prius et posterius.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not
   subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do
 not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and
@@ -6459,8 +4913,7 @@
 divine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but
 He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after
 he has been.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28636"><span class=
-"ref">[28636] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28636"><span class="ref">[28636] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod in ipso esse Angeli in se considerato, non est
 differentia praeteriti et futuri, sed solum secundum adiunctas
 mutationes. Sed quod dicimus Angelum esse vel fuisse vel futurum
@@ -6472,120 +4925,82 @@
 subsit divinae potentiae, absolute considerando, potest Deus facere
 quod esse Angeli non sit futurum, tamen non potest facere quod non
 sit dum est, vel quod non fuerit postquam fuit.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The
 duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished
 by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying that a creature is
 infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28637"><span class=
-"ref">[28637] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28637"><span class="ref">[28637] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
 dicendum quod duratio aevi est infinita, quia non finitur tempore.
 Sic autem esse aliquod creatum infinitum, quod non finiatur quodam
 alio, non est inconveniens.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6" next="FP_Q11" prev="FP_Q10_A5" progress="1.38%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether there is only one aeviternity?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one aeviternity?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6" next="FP_Q11" prev="FP_Q10_A5" progress="1.38%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether there is only one aeviternity?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one aeviternity?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there
 is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books
 of Esdras: "Majesty and power of ages are with Thee, O Lord."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28638"><span class=
-"ref">[28638] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28638"><span class="ref">[28638] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod non sit tantum unum aevum. Dicitur enim in
 apocryphis Esdrae, <i>maiestas et potestas aevorum est apud te,
 domine</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different
 genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to
 the corporeal genus, as the heavenly bodies; and others are spiritual
 substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only one
 aeviternity.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28639"><span class=
-"ref">[28639] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28639"><span class="ref">[28639] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 diversorum generum diversae sunt mensurae. Sed quaedam aeviterna
 sunt in genere corporalium, scilicet corpora caelestia, quaedam
 vero sunt spirituales substantiae, scilicet Angeli. Non ergo est
 unum aevum tantum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since
 aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity,
 there is also one duration. But not all aeviternal things have one
 duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case
 especially of human souls. Therefore there is not only one
 aeviternity.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28640"><span class=
-"ref">[28640] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28640"><span class="ref">[28640] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cum
 aevum sit nomen durationis, quorum est unum aevum, est una duratio.
 Sed non omnium aeviternorum est una duratio, quia quaedam post alia
 esse incipiunt, ut maxime patet in animabus humanis. Non est ergo
 unum aevum tantum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, things not
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, things not
 dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration;
 for there appears to be one time for all temporal things; since the
 first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all
 movement. But aeviternal things do not depend on each other, for one
 angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only
 one aeviternity.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="28641"><span class=
-"ref">[28641] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ea
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="28641"><span class="ref">[28641] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ea
 quae non dependent ab invicem, non videntur habere unam mensuram
 durationis, propter hoc enim omnium temporalium videtur esse unum
 tempus, quia omnium motuum quodammodo causa est primus motus, qui
 prius tempore mensuratur. Sed aeviterna non dependent ab invicem,
 quia unus Angelus non est causa alterius. Non ergo est unum aevum
 tantum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is
 nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is
 aeviternity one only.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28642"><span class=
-"ref">[28642] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, aevum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28642"><span class="ref">[28642] Iª q. 10 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, aevum
 est simplicius tempore, et propinquius se habens ad aeternitatem.
 Sed tempus est unum tantum. Ergo multo magis aevum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p7"><b>I
 answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say
 there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many
 aeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the
 cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the
 knowledge of spiritual things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 co."><a name="28643"><span class=
-"ref">[28643] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 co."><a name="28643"><span class="ref">[28643] Iª q. 10 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod circa hoc est duplex opinio, quidam enim dicunt quod est unum
 aevum tantum; quidam quod multa. Quid autem horum verius sit,
 oportet considerare ex causa unitatis temporis, in cognitionem enim
 spiritualium per corporalia devenimus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p8"> Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it
   exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first
   subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as
@@ -6617,15 +5032,11 @@
 alios autem motus comparatur solum ut mensura ad mensuratum. Unde
 secundum eorum multitudinem non multiplicatur, quia una mensura
 separata multa mensurari possunt.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p9"> This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the
   last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more
   simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second
-opinion is truer, as will be shown later (<a
- id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p9.1"
-href="#FP.v.FP_Q47.FP_Q47_A2">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present
+opinion is truer, as will be shown later (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p9.1" href="#FP.v.FP_Q47.FP_Q47_A2">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present
 that there is only one aeviternity.</p>
 <p xml:lang="la">Hoc igitur habito, sciendum quod
 de substantiis spiritualibus duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim
@@ -6643,72 +5054,43 @@
 primi aeviterni, quod tanto est simplicius, quanto prius. Et quia
 secunda opinio verior est, ut infra ostendetur, concedimus ad
 praesens unum esse aevum tantum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b>
 Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing's
 duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we mean ages.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28644"><span class=
-"ref">[28644] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28644"><span class="ref">[28644] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod aevum aliquando accipitur pro saeculo, quod est
 periodus durationis alicuius rei, et sic dicuntur multa aeva, sicut
 multa saecula.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although
 the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their
 nature, still they agree in having a changeless being, and are thus
 measured by aeviternity.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28645"><span class=
-"ref">[28645] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28645"><span class="ref">[28645] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod, licet corpora caelestia et spiritualia differant in
 genere naturae, tamen conveniunt in hoc, quod habent esse
 intransmutabile. Et sic mensurantur aevo.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All
 temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time
 for all of them, by reason of the first measured by time; and thus all
 aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though
 all did not begin together.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28646"><span class=
-"ref">[28646] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28646"><span class="ref">[28646] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod nec omnia temporalia simul incipiunt, et tamen omnium
 est unum tempus, propter primum quod mensuratur tempore. Et sic
 omnia aeviterna habent unum aevum propter primum, etiam si non
 omnia simul incipiant.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> For
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> For
 things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should
 be the cause of all, but that it be more simple than the rest.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="28647"><span class=
-"ref">[28647] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="28647"><span class="ref">[28647] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
 dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliqua mensurentur per aliquod unum, non
 requiritur quod illud unum sit causa omnium eorum; sed quod sit
 simplicius.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q11" next="FP_Q11_A1" prev="FP_Q10_A6" progress="1.42%" n="x" title="Question. 11 - THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11-p0.1">Question 11. THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q11" next="FP_Q11_A1" prev="FP_Q10_A6" progress="1.42%" n="x" title="Question. 11 - THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)"><h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11-p0.1">Question 11. THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11-p2"> After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11-p3"> (1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</p>
@@ -6717,78 +5099,56 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11-p6"> (4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?</p>
 </div>
 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 pr."><a name="28648"><span class="ref">[28648]
-I&ordf; q. 11 pr.</span></a> Post praemissa, considerandum est de
+Iª q. 11 pr.</span></a> Post praemissa, considerandum est de
 divina unitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum unum
 addat aliquid supra ens. Secundo, utrum opponantur unum et multa.
 Tertio, utrum Deus sit unus. Quarto, utrum sit maxime unus.</p>
-</div>
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1" next="FP_Q11_A2" prev="FP_Q11" progress="1.42%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether “one” adds anything to “being”?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p0.1">Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one"
+</div><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1" next="FP_Q11_A2" prev="FP_Q11" progress="1.42%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether “one” adds anything to “being”?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p0.1">Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one"
 adds something to "being." For everything is in a determinate genus by
 addition to being, which penetrates all "genera." But "one" is a
 determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a
 species of quantity. Therefore "one" adds something to "being."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28649"><span class=
-"ref">[28649] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28649"><span class="ref">[28649] Iª q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod unum addat aliquid supra ens. Omne enim
 quod est in aliquo genere determinato, se habet ex additione ad
 ens, quod circuit omnia genera. Sed unum est in genere determinato,
 est enim principium numeri, qui est species quantitatis. Ergo unum
 addit aliquid supra ens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what
 divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But "being" is
 divided by "one" and by "many." Therefore "one" is an addition to
 "being."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28650"><span class=
-"ref">[28650] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28650"><span class="ref">[28650] Iª q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
 dividit aliquod commune, se habet ex additione ad illud. Sed ens
 dividitur per unum et multa. Ergo unum addit aliquid supra ens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if "one"
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if "one"
 is not an addition to "being," "one" and "being" must have the same
 meaning. But it would be nugatory to call "being" by the name of
 "being"; therefore it would be equally so to call being "one." Now
 this is false. Therefore "one" is an addition to "being."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28651"><span class=
-"ref">[28651] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28651"><span class="ref">[28651] Iª q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
 unum non addit supra ens, idem esset dicere unum et ens. Sed
 nugatorie dicitur ens ens. Ergo nugatio esset dicere ens unum, quod
 falsum est. Addit igitur unum supra ens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which
 exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an
 addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is
 not an addition to "being."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28652"><span class=
-"ref">[28652] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28652"><span class="ref">[28652] Iª q. 11 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Dionysius, ult. cap. de Div. Nom., <i>nihil est
 existentium non participans uno</i>, quod non esset, si unum
 adderet supra ens quod contraheret ipsum. Ergo unum non habet se ex
 additione ad ens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is the very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision;
   and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its
 being.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 co."><a name="28653"><span class=
-"ref">[28653] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 co."><a name="28653"><span class="ref">[28653] Iª q. 11 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod unum non addit supra ens rem aliquam, sed tantum negationem
 divisionis, unum enim nihil aliud significat quam ens indivisum. Et
 ex hoc ipso apparet quod unum convertitur cum ente. Nam omne ens
@@ -6799,9 +5159,7 @@
 cuiuslibet rei consistit in indivisione. Et inde est quod
 unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam
 unitatem.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being," but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same applied to the "one" which is the principle of number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers
   were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that "one" which is the principle of number, added a reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought that the "one" convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its
   substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were again
@@ -6810,8 +5168,7 @@
 "one" which is convertible with "being," does not add a reality to
 being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a
 reality to "being," belonging to the genus of quantity.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28654"><span class=
-"ref">[28654] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum igitur
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28654"><span class="ref">[28654] Iª q. 11 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum igitur
 dicendum quod quidam, putantes idem esse unum quod convertitur cum
 ente, et quod est principium numeri, divisi sunt in contrarias
 positiones. Pythagoras enim et Plato, videntes quod unum quod
@@ -6831,16 +5188,13 @@
 igitur dicendum est quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, non addit
 aliquam rem supra ens, sed unum quod est principium numeri, addit
 aliquid supra ens, ad genus quantitatis pertinens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents;
   or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being
   is divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not be contained under "being," unless it were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that "there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are
   one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in
 principle."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28655"><span class=
-"ref">[28655] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28655"><span class="ref">[28655] Iª q. 11 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est uno modo divisum, esse
 alio modo indivisum; sicut quod est divisum numero, est indivisum
 secundum speciem, et sic contingit aliquid esse uno modo unum, alio
@@ -6863,69 +5217,40 @@
 accidentibus, sunt unum subiecto; et quae sunt multa numero, sunt
 unum specie; et quae sunt speciebus multa, sunt unum genere; et
 quae sunt multa processibus, sunt unum principio</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does
 not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is "one"; forasmuch as
 "one" adds an idea to "being."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28656"><span class=
-"ref">[28656] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28656"><span class="ref">[28656] Iª q. 11 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod ideo non est nugatio cum dicitur ens unum, quia unum
 addit aliquid secundum rationem supra ens.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2" next="FP_Q11_A3" prev="FP_Q11_A1" progress="1.45%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether “one” and “many” are opposed to each other?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p0.1">Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one"
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2" next="FP_Q11_A3" prev="FP_Q11_A1" progress="1.45%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether “one” and “many” are opposed to each other?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p0.1">Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one"
 and "many" are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is
 predicated of its opposite. But every "multitude" is in a certain way
 "one," as appears from the preceding article. Therefore "one" is not
 opposed to "multitude."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28657"><span class=
-"ref">[28657] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28657"><span class="ref">[28657] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod unum et multa non opponantur. Nullum enim
 oppositum praedicatur de suo opposito. Sed omnis multitudo est
 quodammodo unum, ut ex praedictis patet. Ergo unum non opponitur
 multitudini.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no
 opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But "multitude" is
 constituted by "one." Therefore it is not opposed to "multitude."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28658"><span class=
-"ref">[28658] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28658"><span class="ref">[28658] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 nullum oppositum constituitur ex suo opposito. Sed unum constituit
 multitudinem. Ergo non opponitur multitudini.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one" is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one" is
 opposed to "one." But the idea of "few" is opposed to "many."
 Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28659"><span class=
-"ref">[28659] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28659"><span class="ref">[28659] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unum
 uni est oppositum. Sed multo opponitur paucum. Ergo non opponitur
 ei unum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if "one"
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if "one"
 is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed as the undivided is to the
 divided; and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit. But this
 appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that "one" comes
@@ -6933,30 +5258,24 @@
 "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence there would be a vicious circle
 in the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many"
 are not opposed.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28660"><span class=
-"ref">[28660] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28660"><span class="ref">[28660] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
 unum opponitur multitudini, opponitur ei sicut indivisum diviso, et
 sic opponetur ei ut privatio habitui. Hoc autem videtur
 inconveniens, quia sequeretur quod unum sit posterius multitudine,
 et definiatur per eam; cum tamen multitudo definiatur per unum.
 Unde erit circulus in definitione, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo
 unum et multa sunt opposita.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves
 opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in
 indivisibility; and the idea of "multitude" contains
 division. Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28661"><span class=
-"ref">[28661] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28661"><span class="ref">[28661] Iª q. 11 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
 quorum rationes sunt oppositae, ipsa sunt opposita. Sed ratio unius
 consistit in indivisibilitate, ratio vero multitudinis divisionem
 continet. Ergo unum et multa sunt opposita.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p7"><b>I
 answer that,</b> "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The
 "one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which
@@ -6965,25 +5284,21 @@
 "one," as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible
 with "being" is opposed to "multitude" by way of privation; as the
 undivided is to the thing divided.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 co."><a name="28662"><span class=
-"ref">[28662] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 co."><a name="28662"><span class="ref">[28662] Iª q. 11 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod unum opponitur multis, sed diversimode. Nam unum quod est
 principium numeri, opponitur multitudini quae est numerus, ut
 mensura mensurato, unum enim habet rationem primae mensurae, et
 numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum, ut patet ex X Metaphys.
 Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, opponitur multitudini per
 modum privationis, ut indivisum diviso.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and
   to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being in
   the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some
 accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good is
 absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely "one" is
 relatively "many," and vice versa.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28663"><span class=
-"ref">[28663] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28663"><span class="ref">[28663] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod nulla privatio tollit totaliter esse, quia privatio
 est negatio in subiecto, secundum philosophum. Sed tamen omnis
 privatio tollit aliquod esse. Et ideo in ente, ratione suae
@@ -7002,14 +5317,11 @@
 secundum quid, est malum simpliciter; vel e converso. Et similiter
 quod est unum simpliciter, est multa secundum quid; et e
 converso.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A "whole" is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance, every part of water is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole;
   as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole. Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings, not
   by the fact that they are not houses.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28664"><span class=
-"ref">[28664] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28664"><span class="ref">[28664] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod duplex est totum, quoddam homogeneum, quod componitur
 ex similibus partibus; quoddam vero heterogeneum, quod componitur
 ex dissimilibus partibus. In quolibet autem toto homogeneo, totum
@@ -7024,24 +5336,18 @@
 indivisionis, prout opponuntur multitudini; sed secundum hoc quod
 habent de entitate, sicut et partes domus constituunt domum per hoc
 quod sunt quaedam corpora, non per hoc quod sunt non domus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Many" is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Many" is
 taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to
 "one"; in another way as importing some kind of excess, in which sense
 it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first sense two are many but not
 in the second sense.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28665"><span class=
-"ref">[28665] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28665"><span class="ref">[28665] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod multum accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo, absolute, et
 sic opponitur uni. Alio modo, secundum quod importat excessum
 quendam, et sic opponitur pauco. Unde primo modo duo sunt multa;
 non autem secundo.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of a line." "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on "one"; because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude
   except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence
 "one" is placed in the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude" is
@@ -7050,8 +5356,7 @@
 mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus
 we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of
 one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28666"><span class=
-"ref">[28666] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28666"><span class="ref">[28666] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
 dicendum quod unum opponitur privative multis, inquantum in ratione
 multorum est quod sint divisa. Unde oportet quod divisio sit prius
 unitate, non simpliciter, sed secundum rationem nostrae
@@ -7065,70 +5370,42 @@
 quod primo cadit in intellectu ens; secundo, quod hoc ens non est
 illud ens, et sic secundo apprehendimus divisionem; tertio, unum;
 quarto, multitudinem.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3" next="FP_Q11_A4" prev="FP_Q11_A2" progress="1.49%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is one?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p0.1">Whether God is one?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3" next="FP_Q11_A4" prev="FP_Q11_A2" progress="1.49%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is one?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p0.1">Whether God is one?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
 is not one. For it is written "For there be many gods and many lords"
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.8.5" parsed="vul|1Cor|8|5|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p2.1" passage="1 Cor. 8:5">1
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.8.5" parsed="vul|1Cor|8|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p2.1" passage="1 Cor. 8:5">1
 Cor. 8:5</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28667"><span class=
-"ref">[28667] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28667"><span class="ref">[28667] Iª q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit unus. Dicitur enim I ad Cor.
 VIII, <i>siquidem sunt dii multi et domini multi</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "One," as
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "One," as
 the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity
 is not predicated of God; likewise, neither can "one" which is
 convertible with "being" be predicated of God, because it imports
 privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which cannot apply
 to God. Therefore God is not one.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28668"><span class=
-"ref">[28668] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28668"><span class="ref">[28668] Iª q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unum
 quod est principium numeri, non potest praedicari de Deo, cum nulla
 quantitas de Deo praedicetur. Similiter nec unum quod convertitur
 cum ente, quia importat privationem, et omnis privatio imperfectio
 est, quae Deo non competit. Non est igitur dicendum quod Deus sit
 unus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p4"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is
-one Lord" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Deut.6.4"
-parsed="vul|Deut|6|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p4.1"
-passage="Dt. 6:4">Dt. 6:4</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28669"><span class=
-"ref">[28669] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+one Lord" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Deut.6.4" parsed="vul|Deut|6|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p4.1" passage="Dt. 6:4">Dt. 6:4</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28669"><span class="ref">[28669] Iª q. 11 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Deut. VI, <i>audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus unus
 est</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> It can be shown from these three sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many
   Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this
 belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown
-above (<a
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3">Q[3],
+above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3">Q[3],
 A[3]</a>). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this
 God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 co."><a name="28670"><span class=
-"ref">[28670] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 co."><a name="28670"><span class="ref">[28670] Iª q. 11 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod Deum esse unum, ex tribus demonstratur. Primo quidem ex eius
 simplicitate. Manifestum est enim quod illud unde aliquod singulare
 est hoc aliquid, nullo modo est multis communicabile. Illud enim
@@ -7139,9 +5416,7 @@
 convenit Deo, nam ipse Deus est sua natura, ut supra ostensum est.
 Secundum igitur idem est Deus, et hic Deus. Impossibile est igitur
 esse plures deos.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p6"> Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible
   for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers,
 constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite
@@ -7155,9 +5430,7 @@
 perfectio, alteri eorum deesset. Impossibile est ergo esse plures
 deos. Unde et antiqui philosophi, quasi ab ipsa coacti veritate,
 ponentes principium infinitum, posuerunt unum tantum principium.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p7"> Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the "per se" cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect,
   and is so "per se" and not accidentally, it must be that the first
 which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this one is
@@ -7172,31 +5445,24 @@
 perfectissimum et per se, non per accidens, oportet quod primum
 reducens omnia in unum ordinem, sit unum tantum. Et hoc est
 Deus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gods are
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gods are
 called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking
 as they did that the planets and other stars were gods, and also the
 separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: "Our God is one,"
 etc.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28671"><span class=
-"ref">[28671] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28671"><span class="ref">[28671] Iª q. 11 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod dicuntur dii multi secundum errorem quorundam qui
 multos deos colebant, existimantes planetas et alias stellas esse
 deos, vel etiam singulas partes mundi. Unde subdit, <i>nobis autem
 unus Deus,</i> et cetera.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "One" which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the principle of number belongs to the "genus" of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one" which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to
   us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason
 why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for
 instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it
 is said of God that He is one.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28672"><span class=
-"ref">[28672] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28672"><span class="ref">[28672] Iª q. 11 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod unum secundum quod est principium numeri, non
 praedicatur de Deo; sed solum de his quae habent esse in materia.
 Unum enim quod est principium numeri, est de genere mathematicorum;
@@ -7208,83 +5474,54 @@
 privationis et remotionis. Et sic nihil prohibet aliqua privative
 dicta de Deo praedicari; sicut quod est incorporeus, infinitus. Et
 similiter de Deo dicitur quod sit unus.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4" next="FP_Q12" prev="FP_Q11_A3" progress="1.51%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether God is supremely one?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p0.1">Whether God is supremely one?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4" next="FP_Q12" prev="FP_Q11_A3" progress="1.51%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether God is supremely one?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p0.1">Whether God is supremely one?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
 is not supremely "one." For "one" is so called from the privation of
 division. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore God is
 not more "one" than other things which are called "one."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28673"><span class=
-"ref">[28673] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28673"><span class="ref">[28673] Iª q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit maxime unus. Unum enim
 dicitur secundum privationem divisionis. Sed privatio non recipit
 magis et minus. Ergo Deus non dicitur magis unus quam alia quae
 sunt unum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing
 seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially
 indivisible; such as a point and unity. But a thing is said to be more
 "one" according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more "one"
 than unity is "one" and a point is "one."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28674"><span class=
-"ref">[28674] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28674"><span class="ref">[28674] Iª q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
 videtur esse magis indivisibile quam id quod est indivisibile actu
 et potentia, cuiusmodi est punctus et unitas. Sed intantum dicitur
 aliquid magis unum, inquantum est indivisibile. Ergo Deus non est
 magis unum quam unitas et punctus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is
 essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially
 "one" is supremely "one." But every being is essentially "one," as the
 Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely
 "one"; and therefore God is not "one" more than any other being is
 "one."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28675"><span class=
-"ref">[28675] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28675"><span class="ref">[28675] Iª q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
 est per essentiam bonum, est maxime bonum, ergo quod est per
 essentiam suam unum, est maxime unum. Sed omne ens est unum per
 suam essentiam, ut patet per philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne
 ens est maxime unum. Deus igitur non est magis unum quam alia
 entia.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things
 called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first
 place."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28676"><span class=
-"ref">[28676] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28676"><span class="ref">[28676] Iª q. 11 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Bernardus, quod <i>inter omnia quae unum dicuntur, arcem
 tenet unitas divinae Trinitatis</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether
-  simple, as was shown above (<a
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3],
+  simple, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3],
 A[7]</a>). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme
 degree.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 co."><a name="28677"><span class=
-"ref">[28677] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 co."><a name="28677"><span class="ref">[28677] Iª q. 11 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, ad hoc quod aliquid sit maxime
 unum, oportet quod sit et maxime ens et maxime indivisum. Utrumque
 autem competit Deo. Est enim maxime ens, inquantum est non habens
@@ -7294,69 +5531,45 @@
 secundum quemcunque modum divisionis, cum sit omnibus modis
 simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod Deus est
 maxime unus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although
 privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less,
 still according as its opposite is subject to more or less, privation
 also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore
 according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible, either less or
 not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely,
 "one."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28678"><span class=
-"ref">[28678] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28678"><span class="ref">[28678] Iª q. 11 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, licet privatio secundum se non recipiat magis et
 minus, tamen secundum quod eius oppositum recipit magis et minus,
 etiam ipsa privativa dicuntur secundum magis et minus. Secundum
 igitur quod aliquid est magis divisum vel divisibile, vel minus,
 vel nullo modo, secundum hoc aliquid dicitur magis et minus vel
 maxime unum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point
 and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being,
 inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. Hence neither of
 them can be supremely "one." For as a subject cannot be supremely
 "one," because of the difference within it of accident and subject, so
 neither can an accident.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28679"><span class=
-"ref">[28679] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28679"><span class="ref">[28679] Iª q. 11 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod punctus et unitas quae est principium numeri, non
 sunt maxime entia, cum non habeant esse nisi in subiecto aliquo.
 Unde neutrum eorum est maxime unum. Sicut enim subiectum non est
 maxime unum, propter diversitatem accidentis et subiecti, ita nec
 accidens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although
 every being is "one" by its substance, still every such substance is
 not equally the cause of unity; for the substance of some things is
 compound and of others simple.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28680"><span class=
-"ref">[28680] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28680"><span class="ref">[28680] Iª q. 11 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod, licet omne ens sit unum per suam substantiam, non
 tamen se habet aequaliter substantia cuiuslibet ad causandam
 unitatem, quia substantia quorundam est ex multis composita,
 quorundam vero non.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12" next="FP_Q12_A1" prev="FP_Q11_A4" progress="1.53%" n="xi" title="Question. 12 - HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12-p0.1">Question 12. HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12" next="FP_Q12_A1" prev="FP_Q11_A4" progress="1.53%" n="xi" title="Question. 12 - HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)"><h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12-p0.1">Question 12. HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12-p2"> As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry:</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12-p3"> (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</p>
@@ -7374,7 +5587,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12-p15"> (13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?</p>
 </div>
 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 pr."><a name="28681"><span class="ref">[28681]
-I&ordf; q. 12 pr.</span></a> Quia in superioribus consideravimus
+Iª q. 12 pr.</span></a> Quia in superioribus consideravimus
 qualiter Deus sit secundum seipsum, restat considerandum qualiter
 sit in cognitione nostra, idest quomodo cognoscatur a creaturis. Et
 circa hoc quaeruntur tredecim. Primo, utrum aliquis intellectus
@@ -7394,26 +5607,16 @@
 Deum in hac vita possimus cognoscere. Tertiodecimo, utrum, supra
 cognitionem naturalis rationis, sit in praesenti vita aliqua
 cognitio Dei per gratiam.</p>
-</div>
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1" next="FP_Q12_A2" prev="FP_Q12" progress="1.54%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p0.1">Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no
+</div><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1" next="FP_Q12_A2" prev="FP_Q12" progress="1.54%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p0.1">Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no
 created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom
-(Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:John.1.18" parsed="vul|John|1|18|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p2.1" passage=" Jn. 1:18, "> Jn. 1:18,
+(Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.1.18" parsed="vul|John|1|18|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p2.1" passage=" Jn. 1:18, "> Jn. 1:18,
 </scripRef> "No man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets
 only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a
 creature see what is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i),
 speaking of God: "Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor
 reason, nor knowledge of Him."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28682"><span class=
-"ref">[28682] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28682"><span class="ref">[28682] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod nullus intellectus creatus possit Deum per
 essentiam videre. Chrysostomus enim, super Ioannem, exponens illud
 quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>Deum nemo vidit unquam</i>, sic dicit,
@@ -7422,65 +5625,46 @@
 videre poterit quod increabile est?</i> Dionysius etiam, I cap. de
 Div. Nom., loquens de Deo, dicit, <i>neque sensus est eius, neque
 phantasia, neque opinio, nec ratio, nec scientia</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything
 infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above
-(<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p3.1"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore in Himself He
+(<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore in Himself He
 is unknown.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28683"><span class=
-"ref">[28683] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28683"><span class="ref">[28683] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
 infinitum, inquantum huiusmodi, est ignotum. Sed Deus est
 infinitus, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo secundum se est ignotus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the
 created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first
 under the apprehension of the intellect is being. Now God is not
 something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius
 says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but above all
 intellect.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28684"><span class=
-"ref">[28684] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28684"><span class="ref">[28684] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 intellectus creatus non est cognoscitivus nisi existentium, primum
 enim quod cadit in apprehensione intellectus, est ens. Sed Deus non
 est existens, sed supra existentia. Ut dicit Dionysius. Ergo non
 est intelligibilis; sed est supra omnem intellectum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there must
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there must
 be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known
 is the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists between the
 created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between
 them. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of
 God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28685"><span class=
-"ref">[28685] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28685"><span class="ref">[28685] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
 cognoscentis ad cognitum oportet esse aliquam proportionem, cum
 cognitum sit perfectio cognoscentis. Sed nulla est proportio
 intellectus creati ad Deum, quia in infinitum distant. Ergo
 intellectus creatus non potest videre essentiam Dei.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is written: "We shall see Him as He is"
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1John.2.2" parsed="vul|1John|2|2|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p6.1" passage="1 Jn. 2:2">1
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1John.2.2" parsed="vul|1John|2|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p6.1" passage="1 Jn. 2:2">1
 Jn. 2:2</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28686"><span class=
-"ref">[28686] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28686"><span class="ref">[28686] Iª q. 12 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>videbimus eum sicuti est</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p7"><b>I
 answer that,</b> Since everything is knowable according as it is
@@ -7494,8 +5678,7 @@
   the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p9"> Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.</p>
 </div>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 co."><a name="28687"><span class=
-"ref">[28687] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 co."><a name="28687"><span class="ref">[28687] Iª q. 12 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod, cum unumquodque sit cognoscibile secundum quod est in actu,
 Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentiae,
 quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime
@@ -7517,19 +5700,15 @@
 intellectus rationalis creaturae pertingere non possit ad primam
 causam rerum, remanebit inane desiderium naturae. Unde simpliciter
 concedendum est quod beati Dei essentiam videant.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both of
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both of
 these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence
 Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited, "He is
 universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom likewise after
 the words quoted says: "He says this of the most certain vision of the
 Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the
 Father has of the Son."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28688"><span class=
-"ref">[28688] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28688"><span class="ref">[28688] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod utraque auctoritas loquitur de visione
 comprehensionis. Unde praemittit Dionysius immediate ante verba
 proposita, dicens, <i>omnibus ipse est universaliter
@@ -7537,49 +5716,37 @@
 Chrysostomus parum post verba praedicta subdit, <i>visionem hic
 dicit certissimam patris considerationem et comprehensionem, tantam
 quantam pater habet de filio</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The
 infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself,
 because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the infinity of the
 form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is
 Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as appears from what
-was said above (<a
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1">Q[7],
+was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1">Q[7],
 A[1]</a>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28689"><span class=
-"ref">[28689] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28689"><span class="ref">[28689] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae non
 perfectae per formam, ignotum est secundum se, quia omnis cognitio
 est per formam. Sed infinitum quod se tenet ex parte formae non
 limitatae per materiam, est secundum se maxime notum. Sic autem
 Deus est infinitus, et non primo modo, ut ex superioribus
 patet.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is
 not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because
 He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as He is His own
 existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all,
 but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which means that He is
 not comprehended.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28690"><span class=
-"ref">[28690] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28690"><span class="ref">[28690] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod Deus non sic dicitur non existens, quasi nullo modo
 sit existens, sed quia est supra omne existens, inquantum est suum
 esse. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod nullo modo possit cognosci, sed
 quod omnem cognitionem excedat, quod est ipsum non comprehendi.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned
   to know God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28691"><span class=
-"ref">[28691] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28691"><span class="ref">[28691] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
 dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, certa
 habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram; secundum quod duplum,
 triplum et aequale sunt species proportionis. Alio modo, quaelibet
@@ -7588,65 +5755,39 @@
 effectus ad causam, et ut potentia ad actum. Et secundum hoc,
 intellectus creatus proportionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum
 Deum.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2" next="FP_Q12_A3" prev="FP_Q12_A1" progress="1.57%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an  image?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p0.1">Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2" next="FP_Q12_A3" prev="FP_Q12_A1" progress="1.57%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an  image?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p0.1">Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
 essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For
 it is written: "We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to
-Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:1John.3.2" parsed="vul|1John|3|2|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p2.1" passage="1 Jn. 3:2">1
+Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1John.3.2" parsed="vul|1John|3|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p2.1" passage="1 Jn. 3:2">1
 Jn. 3:2</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28692"><span class=
-"ref">[28692] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28692"><span class="ref">[28692] Iª q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod essentia Dei ab intellectu creato per
 aliquam similitudinem videatur. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, <i>scimus
 quoniam, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti
 est</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine
 says (De Trin. v): "When we know God, some likeness of God is made in
 us."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28693"><span class=
-"ref">[28693] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28693"><span class="ref">[28693] Iª q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 Augustinus dicit, IX de Trin., <i>cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua Dei
 similitudo in nobis</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the
 intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as sense in act is the
 actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch as sense is informed
 with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the
 likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God is seen by the
 created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some
 similitude.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28694"><span class=
-"ref">[28694] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28694"><span class="ref">[28694] Iª q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 intellectus in actu est intelligibile in actu, sicut sensus in actu
 est sensibile in actu. Hoc autem non est nisi inquantum informatur
 sensus similitudine rei sensibilis, et intellectus similitudine rei
 intellectae. Ergo, si Deus ab intellectu creato videtur in actu,
 oportet quod per aliquam similitudinem videatur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle
 says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark
@@ -7655,8 +5796,7 @@
 see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision,
 but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine
 essence is not seen through a similitude.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28695"><span class=
-"ref">[28695] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28695"><span class="ref">[28695] Iª q. 12 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., quod cum apostolus dicit
 <i>videmus nunc per speculum et in aenigmate, speculi et aenigmatis
 nomine, quaecumque similitudines ab ipso significatae intelligi
@@ -7664,9 +5804,7 @@
 videre Deum per essentiam non est visio aenigmatica vel specularis,
 sed contra eam dividitur. Ergo divina essentia non videtur per
 similitudines.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision---viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not
   there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen
@@ -7679,8 +5817,7 @@
   can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness; for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p8"> Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.35.10" parsed="vul|Ps|35|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p8.1" passage=" Ps. 35:10, "> Ps. 35:10, </scripRef> "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the divine essence itself as it really is.</p>
 </div>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 co."><a name="28696"><span class=
-"ref">[28696] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 co."><a name="28696"><span class="ref">[28696] Iª q. 12 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod ad visionem, tam sensibilem quam intellectualem, duo
 requiruntur, scilicet virtus visiva, et unio rei visae cum visu,
 non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visa quodammodo
@@ -7723,82 +5860,49 @@
 <i>in lumine tuo videbimus lumen</i>. Non autem per aliquam
 similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest, quae ipsam
 divinam essentiam repraesentet ut in se est.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That
 authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of
 the light of glory.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28697"><span class=
-"ref">[28697] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28697"><span class="ref">[28697] Iª q. 12 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de similitudine quae est per
 participationem luminis gloriae.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine
 speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28698"><span class=
-"ref">[28698] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28698"><span class="ref">[28698] Iª q. 12 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de cognitione Dei quae
 habetur in via.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The
 divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms
 which are not their own existence are united to the intellect by means
 of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made in
 act; so the divine essence is united to the created intellect, as the
 object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of
 itself.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28699"><span class=
-"ref">[28699] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28699"><span class="ref">[28699] Iª q. 12 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod divina essentia est ipsum esse. Unde, sicut aliae
 formae intelligibiles quae non sunt suum esse, uniuntur intellectui
 secundum aliquod esse quo informant ipsum intellectum et faciunt
 ipsum in actu; ita divina essentia unitur intellectui creato ut
 intellectum in actu, per seipsam faciens intellectum in actu.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3" next="FP_Q12_A4" prev="FP_Q12_A2" progress="1.60%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p0.1">Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3" next="FP_Q12_A4" prev="FP_Q12_A2" progress="1.60%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p0.1">Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
 essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.19.26" parsed="vul|Job|19|26|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p2.1" passage="Job 19:26">Job
-19:26</scripRef>): "In my flesh I shall see . . . God," and (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.42.5" parsed="vul|Job|42|5|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p2.2" passage="Job 42:5">Job
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.19.26" parsed="vul|Job|19|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p2.1" passage="Job 19:26">Job
+19:26</scripRef>): "In my flesh I shall see . . . God," and (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.42.5" parsed="vul|Job|42|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p2.2" passage="Job 42:5">Job
 42:5</scripRef>), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but
 now my eye seeth Thee."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28700"><span class=
-"ref">[28700] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28700"><span class="ref">[28700] Iª q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod essentia Dei videri possit oculo
 corporali. Dicitur enim Iob XIX, <i>in carne mea videbo Deum,</i>
 etc.; et XLII, <i>auditu auris audivi te, nunc autem oculus meus
 videt te</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those eyes" (namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things." Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see
   God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28701"><span class=
-"ref">[28701] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28701"><span class="ref">[28701] Iª q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 Augustinus dicit, ultimo de civitate Dei, cap. XXIX, <i>vis itaque
 praepollentior oculorum erit illorum</i> (scilicet glorificatorum),
 <i>non ut acutius videant quam quidam perhibentur videre serpentes
@@ -7807,45 +5911,32 @@
 et incorporalia</i>. Quicumque autem potest videre incorporalia,
 potest elevari ad videndum Deum. Ergo oculus glorificatus potest
 videre Deum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God can be
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God can be
 seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: "I
-saw the Lord sitting upon a throne," etc. (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.6.1" parsed="vul|Isa|6|1|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p4.1"
-passage="Is. 6:1">Is. 6:1</scripRef>). But an imaginary vision
+saw the Lord sitting upon a throne," etc. (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.6.1" parsed="vul|Isa|6|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p4.1" passage="Is. 6:1">Is. 6:1</scripRef>). But an imaginary vision
 originates from sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to
 act. Therefore God can be seen by a vision of sense.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28702"><span class=
-"ref">[28702] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28702"><span class="ref">[28702] Iª q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
 potest videri ab homine visione imaginaria, dicitur enim Isaiae VI,
 <i>vidi dominum sedentem super solium,</i> et cetera. Sed visio
 imaginaria a sensu originem habet, <i>phantasia enim est motus
 factus a sensu secundum actum</i>, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo
 Deus sensibili visione videri potest.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one
 has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic
 life, as visible things are seen by corporeal vision."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28703"><span class=
-"ref">[28703] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28703"><span class="ref">[28703] Iª q. 12 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de videndo Deum ad Paulinam,
 <i>Deum nemo vidit unquam, vel in hac vita, sicut ipse est; vel in
 Angelorum vita, sicut visibilia ista quae corporali visione
 cernuntur</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ix.FP_Q78">(Q[78])</a>. Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Hence He cannot be seen by the
   sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 co."><a name="28704"><span class=
-"ref">[28704] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 co."><a name="28704"><span class="ref">[28704] Iª q. 12 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod impossibile est Deum videri sensu visus, vel quocumque alio
 sensu aut potentia sensitivae partis. Omnis enim potentia huiusmodi
 est actus corporalis organi, ut infra dicetur. Actus autem
@@ -7853,13 +5944,10 @@
 potest se extendere ultra corporalia. Deus autem incorporeus est,
 ut supra ostensum est. Unde nec sensu nec imaginatione videri
 potest, sed solo intellectu.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour," do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood of the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart" may be "enlightened" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.17-Eph.1.18" parsed="vul|Eph|1|17|1|18" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p7.1" passage="Eph. 1:17,18">Eph.
   1:17,18</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28705"><span class=
-"ref">[28705] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28705"><span class="ref">[28705] Iª q. 12 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, cum dicitur <i>in carne mea videbo Deum, salvatorem
 meum</i>, non intelligitur quod oculo carnis sit Deum visurus, sed
 quod in carne existens, post resurrectionem, visurus sit Deum.
@@ -7867,9 +5955,7 @@
 intelligitur de oculo mentis, sicut Ephes. I dicit apostolus,
 <i>det vobis spiritum sapientiae in agnitione eius, illuminatos
 oculos cordis vestri</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore they will have an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains this, saying: "It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we
   now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it." Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some
   other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the
@@ -7877,8 +5963,7 @@
 happens from two causes---viz. from the perspicuity of the intellect,
 and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused into the body
 after its renovation.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28706"><span class=
-"ref">[28706] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28706"><span class="ref">[28706] Iª q. 12 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur inquirendo in verbis illis, et
 sub conditione. Quod patet ex hoc quod praemittitur, longe itaque
 potentiae alterius erunt (scilicet oculi glorificati), si per eos
@@ -7898,36 +5983,19 @@
 praesentia ex eis cognoscatur per intellectum, ex duobus contingit,
 scilicet ex perspicacitate intellectus; et ex refulgentia divinae
 claritatis in corporibus innovatis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The
 essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the
 imagination receives some form representing God according to some mode
 of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine things are
 metaphorically described by means of sensible things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28707"><span class=
-"ref">[28707] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28707"><span class="ref">[28707] Iª q. 12 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod in visione imaginaria non videtur Dei essentia, sed
 aliqua forma in imaginatione formatur, repraesentans Deum secundum
 aliquem modum similitudinis, prout in Scripturis divinis divina per
 res sensibiles metaphorice describuntur.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4" next="FP_Q12_A5" prev="FP_Q12_A3" progress="1.63%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine  essence?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p0.1">Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4" next="FP_Q12_A5" prev="FP_Q12_A3" progress="1.63%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine  essence?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p0.1">Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a
 created intellect can see the Divine essence by its own natural
 power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "An angel is a pure mirror,
 most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of
@@ -7935,8 +6003,7 @@
 seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power understands
 himself, it seems that by his own natural power he understands the
 Divine essence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28708"><span class=
-"ref">[28708] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28708"><span class="ref">[28708] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis intellectus creatus per sua
 naturalia divinam essentiam videre possit. Dicit enim Dionysius,
 cap. IV de Div. Nom., quod Angelus est speculum purum, clarissimum,
@@ -7944,40 +6011,30 @@
 unumquodque videtur dum videtur eius speculum. Cum igitur Angelus
 per sua naturalia intelligat seipsum, videtur quod etiam per sua
 naturalia intelligat divinam essentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is
 supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our
 defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But the angelic intellect
 has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in
 Himself, it seems that in like manner He is supremely so to an
 angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by
 his own natural power, much more can he understand God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28709"><span class=
-"ref">[28709] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28709"><span class="ref">[28709] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud
 quod est maxime visibile, fit minus visibile nobis propter defectum
 nostri visus, vel corporalis vel intellectualis. Sed intellectus
 Angeli non patitur aliquem defectum. Cum ergo Deus secundum se sit
 maxime intelligibilis, videtur quod ab Angelo sit maxime
 intelligibilis. Si igitur alia intelligibilia per sua naturalia
 intelligere potest, multo magis Deum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal
 sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which
 is above its nature. Therefore if to see the essence of God is above
 the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created
 intellect can reach up to see the essence of God at all. But this is
-false, as appears from what is said above <a
- id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p4.1"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it
+false, as appears from what is said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A1">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it
 is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28710"><span class=
-"ref">[28710] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28710"><span class="ref">[28710] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 sensus corporeus non potest elevari ad intelligendam substantiam
 incorpoream, quia est supra eius naturam. Si igitur videre Deum per
 essentiam sit supra naturam cuiuslibet intellectus creati, videtur
@@ -7985,31 +6042,22 @@
 pertingere possit, quod est erroneum, ut ex supradictis patet.
 Videtur ergo quod intellectui creato sit naturale divinam essentiam
 videre.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is written: "The grace of God is life
-everlasting" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.6.23"
-parsed="vul|Rom|6|23|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p5.1"
-passage="Rom. 6:23">Rom. 6:23</scripRef>). But life everlasting
+everlasting" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.6.23" parsed="vul|Rom|6|23|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p5.1" passage="Rom. 6:23">Rom. 6:23</scripRef>). But life everlasting
 consists in the vision of the Divine essence, according to the words:
 "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God,"
-etc. (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.17.3"
-parsed="vul|John|17|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p5.2"
-passage="Jn. 17:3">Jn. 17:3</scripRef>). Therefore to see the essence
+etc. (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.17.3" parsed="vul|John|17|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p5.2" passage="Jn. 17:3">Jn. 17:3</scripRef>). Therefore to see the essence
 of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by
 nature.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28711"><span class=
-"ref">[28711] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28711"><span class="ref">[28711] Iª q. 12 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Rom. VI, <i>gratia Dei vita aeterna</i>. Sed vita
 aeterna consistit in visione divinae essentiae, secundum illud
 Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum
 Deum,</i> et cetera. Ergo videre Dei essentiam convenit intellectui
 creato per gratiam, et non per naturam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of
   the knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own existence, but receive it; and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form
   of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted
@@ -8019,8 +6067,7 @@
 created intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His
 grace unites Himself to the created intellect, as an object made
 intelligible to it.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 co."><a name="28712"><span class=
-"ref">[28712] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 co."><a name="28712"><span class="ref">[28712] Iª q. 12 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus per sua
 naturalia essentiam Dei videat. Cognitio enim contingit secundum
 quod cognitum est in cognoscente. Cognitum autem est in cognoscente
@@ -8057,54 +6104,41 @@
 esse participatum. Non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per
 essentiam videre, nisi inquantum Deus per suam gratiam se
 intellectui creato coniungit, ut intelligibile ab ipso.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This mode
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This mode
 of knowing God is natural to an angel---namely, to know Him by His own
 likeness refulgent in the angel himself. But to know God by any
 created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown
-above <a
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p7.1"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2">(A[2])</a>. Hence it does not follow
+above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2">(A[2])</a>. Hence it does not follow
 that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28713"><span class=
-"ref">[28713] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28713"><span class="ref">[28713] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod iste modus cognoscendi Deum, est Angelo connaturalis,
 ut scilicet cognoscat eum per similitudinem eius in ipso Angelo
 refulgentem. Sed cognoscere Deum per aliquam similitudinem creatam,
 non est cognoscere essentiam Dei, ut supra ostensum est. Unde non
 sequitur quod Angelus per sua naturalia possit cognoscere essentiam
 Dei.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The
 angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean
 privation, as if it were without anything which it ought to have. But
 if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is
 defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it does not possess
 the excellence which is in God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28714"><span class=
-"ref">[28714] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28714"><span class="ref">[28714] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod intellectus Angeli non habet defectum, si defectus
 accipiatur privative, ut scilicet careat eo quod habere debet. Si
 vero accipiatur negative, sic quaelibet creatura invenitur
 deficiens, Deo comparata, dum non habet illam excellentiam quae
 invenitur in Deo.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to
   consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the created
   intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form,
 and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of resolution of
 parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting
 substance, and separate subsisting existence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28715"><span class=
-"ref">[28715] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28715"><span class="ref">[28715] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod sensus visus, quia omnino materialis est, nullo modo
 elevari potest ad aliquid immateriale. Sed intellectus noster vel
 angelicus, quia secundum naturam a materia aliqualiter elevatus
@@ -8123,93 +6157,59 @@
 in abstractione, per modum resolutionis cuiusdam, potest per
 gratiam elevari ut cognoscat substantiam separatam subsistentem, et
 esse separatum subsistens.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5" next="FP_Q12_A6" prev="FP_Q12_A4" progress="1.67%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the  essence of God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p0.1">Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5" next="FP_Q12_A6" prev="FP_Q12_A4" progress="1.67%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the  essence of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p0.1">Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
 created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the
 essence of God. For what is of itself lucid in sensible things does
 not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same
 applies to intelligible things. Now God is intelligible
 light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created light.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28716"><span class=
-"ref">[28716] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28716"><span class="ref">[28716] Iª q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus creatus ad videndum essentiam
 Dei aliquo lumine creato non indigeat. Illud enim quod est per se
 lucidum in rebus sensibilibus, alio lumine non indiget ut videatur,
 ergo nec in intelligibilibus. Sed Deus est lux intelligibilis. Ergo
 non videtur per aliquod lumen creatum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God is
 seen through a medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by
 any created light, He is seen through a medium. Therefore He is not
 seen in His essence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28717"><span class=
-"ref">[28717] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, cum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28717"><span class="ref">[28717] Iª q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, cum
 Deus videtur per medium, non videtur per suam essentiam. Sed cum
 videtur per aliquod lumen creatum, videtur per medium. Ergo non
 videtur per suam essentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is
 created can be natural to some creature. Therefore if the essence of
 God is seen through any created light, such a light can be made
 natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need
 any other light to see God; which is impossible. Therefore it is not
 necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in
 order to see the essence of God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28718"><span class=
-"ref">[28718] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28718"><span class="ref">[28718] Iª q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud
 quod est creatum, nihil prohibet alicui creaturae esse naturale. Si
 ergo per aliquod lumen creatum Dei essentia videtur, poterit illud
 lumen esse naturale alicui creaturae. Et ita illa creatura non
 indigebit aliquo alio lumine ad videndum Deum, quod est
 impossibile. Non est ergo necessarium quod omnis creatura ad
 videndum Dei essentiam lumen superadditum requirat.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light"
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.35.10" parsed="vul|Ps|35|10|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p5.1"
-passage="Ps. 35:10">Ps. 35:10</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28719"><span class=
-"ref">[28719] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.35.10" parsed="vul|Ps|35|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p5.1" passage="Ps. 35:10">Ps. 35:10</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28719"><span class="ref">[28719] Iª q. 12 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur in Psalmo, <i>in lumine tuo videbimus lumen</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it
   may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the
-  Apocalypse (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rev.21.23"
-parsed="vul|Rev|21|23|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p6.1"
-passage="Apoc. 21:23">Apoc. 21:23</scripRef>): "The glory of God hath
+  Apocalypse (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rev.21.23" parsed="vul|Rev|21|23|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p6.1" passage="Apoc. 21:23">Apoc. 21:23</scripRef>): "The glory of God hath
 enlightened it"---viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this
 light the blessed are made "deiform"---i.e. like to God, according to
 the saying: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.:
-'because'] we shall see Him as He is" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:1John.2.2" parsed="vul|1John|2|2|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p6.2" passage="1 Jn. 2:2">1
+'because'] we shall see Him as He is" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1John.2.2" parsed="vul|1John|2|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p6.2" passage="1 Jn. 2:2">1
 Jn. 2:2</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 co."><a name="28720"><span class=
-"ref">[28720] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 co."><a name="28720"><span class="ref">[28720] Iª q. 12 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod omne quod elevatur ad aliquid quod excedit suam naturam,
 oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione quae sit supra suam
 naturam, sicut, si aer debeat accipere formam ignis, oportet quod
@@ -8227,19 +6227,15 @@
 Et secundum hoc lumen efficiuntur deiformes, idest Deo similes;
 secundum illud I Ioan. III, <i>cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus,
 et videbimus eum sicuti est</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The
 created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to
 make the essence of God intelligible, which is of itself intelligible,
 but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as
 a habit makes a power abler to act. Even so corporeal light is
 necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium
 actually transparent, and susceptible of color.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28721"><span class=
-"ref">[28721] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28721"><span class="ref">[28721] Iª q. 12 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod lumen creatum est necessarium ad videndum Dei
 essentiam, non quod per hoc lumen Dei essentia intelligibilis fiat,
 quae secundum se intelligibilis est, sed ad hoc quod intellectus
@@ -8247,89 +6243,59 @@
 ad operandum per habitum, sicut etiam et lumen corporale
 necessarium est in visu exteriori, inquantum facit medium
 transparens in actu, ut possit moveri a colore.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This light
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This light
 is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which
 God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect, strengthening it to
 see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described
 not as a medium in which God is seen, but as one by which He is seen;
 and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28722"><span class=
-"ref">[28722] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28722"><span class="ref">[28722] Iª q. 12 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod lumen istud non requiritur ad videndum Dei essentiam
 quasi similitudo in qua Deus videatur, sed quasi perfectio quaedam
 intellectus, confortans ipsum ad videndum Deum. Et ideo potest dici
 quod non est medium in quo Deus videatur, sed sub quo videtur. Et
 hoc non tollit immediatam visionem Dei.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A5-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The
 disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of
 that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature
 unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by
 this light the rational creature is made deiform, as is said in this
 article.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28723"><span class=
-"ref">[28723] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28723"><span class="ref">[28723] Iª q. 12 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod dispositio ad formam ignis non potest esse naturalis
 nisi habenti formam ignis. Unde lumen gloriae non potest esse
 naturale creaturae, nisi creatura esset naturae divinae, quod est
 impossibile. Per hoc enim lumen fit creatura rationalis deiformis,
 ut dictum est.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6" next="FP_Q12_A7" prev="FP_Q12_A5" progress="1.69%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than  another?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p0.1">Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that of
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6" next="FP_Q12_A7" prev="FP_Q12_A5" progress="1.69%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than  another?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p0.1">Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that of
 those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than
-another. For it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1John.3.2"
-parsed="vul|1John|3|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p2.1" passage="1
-Jn. 3:2">1 Jn. 3:2</scripRef>): "We shall see Him as He is." But He is
+another. For it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1John.3.2" parsed="vul|1John|3|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p2.1" passage="1 Jn. 3:2">1 Jn. 3:2</scripRef>): "We shall see Him as He is." But He is
 only in one way. Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and
 therefore He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly
 by another.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28724"><span class=
-"ref">[28724] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28724"><span class="ref">[28724] Iª q. 12 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod videntium essentiam Dei unus alio
 perfectius non videat. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, <i>videbimus eum
 sicuti est</i>. Sed ipse uno modo est. Ergo uno modo videbitur ab
 omnibus. Non ergo perfectius et minus perfecte.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine
 says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii): "One person cannot see one and
 the same thing more perfectly than another." But all who see the
 essence of God, understand the Divine essence, for God is seen by the
 intellect and not by sense, as was shown above (A[3] ). Therefore of
 those who see the divine essence, one does not see more clearly than
 another.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28725"><span class=
-"ref">[28725] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28725"><span class="ref">[28725] Iª q. 12 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium qq., quod unam rem non
 potest unus alio plus intelligere. Sed omnes videntes Deum per
 essentiam, intelligunt Dei essentiam, intellectu enim videtur Deus,
 non sensu, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videntium divinam essentiam
 unus alio non clarius videt.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does not apply to the present question, for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude,
   but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more
 perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference of
@@ -8337,8 +6303,7 @@
 intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly; and this
 is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as their
 beatitude.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28726"><span class=
-"ref">[28726] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28726"><span class="ref">[28726] Iª q. 12 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
 aliquid altero perfectius videatur, ex duobus contingere potest,
 vel ex parte obiecti visibilis; vel ex parte potentiae visivae
 videntis. Ex parte autem obiecti, per hoc quod obiectum perfectius
@@ -8351,37 +6316,28 @@
 naturaliter est sublimior, clarius eum videat. Quod est
 inconveniens, cum hominibus promittatur in beatitudine aequalitas
 Angelorum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Eternal life consists in the vision of God,
-according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.17.3"
-parsed="vul|John|17|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p5.1" passage="
-Jn. 17:3"> Jn. 17:3</scripRef>: "This is eternal life, that they may
+according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.17.3" parsed="vul|John|17|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p5.1" passage=" Jn. 17:3"> Jn. 17:3</scripRef>: "This is eternal life, that they may
 know Thee the only true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of
 God equally in eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which
 is declared by the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory"
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.15.41" parsed="vul|1Cor|15|41|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p5.2" passage="1 Cor. 15:41">1
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.15.41" parsed="vul|1Cor|15|41|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p5.2" passage="1 Cor. 15:41">1
 Cor. 15:41</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28727"><span class=
-"ref">[28727] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28727"><span class="ref">[28727] Iª q. 12 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod vita aeterna in visione Dei consistit, secundum illud Ioan.
 XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna,</i> et cetera. Ergo, si omnes
 aequaliter Dei essentiam vident, in vita aeterna omnes erunt
 aequales. Cuius contrarium dicit apostolus, I Cor. XV, <i>stella
 differt a stella in claritate</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of
   glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p7"> Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.</p>
 </div>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 co."><a name="28728"><span class=
-"ref">[28728] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 co."><a name="28728"><span class="ref">[28728] Iª q. 12 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod videntium Deum per essentiam unus alio perfectius eum videbit.
 Quod quidem non erit per aliquam Dei similitudinem perfectiorem in
 uno quam in alio, cum illa visio non sit futura per aliquam
@@ -8396,11 +6352,8 @@
 ibi est maius desiderium; et desiderium quodammodo facit
 desiderantem aptum et paratum ad susceptionem desiderati. Unde qui
 plus habebit de caritate, perfectius Deum videbit, et beatior
-erit.</p></div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the
+erit.</p></div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the
 words,"We shall see Him as He is," the conjunction "as" determines the
 mode of vision on the part of the object seen, so that the meaning is,
 we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall see His existence,
@@ -8408,17 +6361,14 @@
 the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that the mode of
 seeing God will be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God's
 existence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28729"><span class=
-"ref">[28729] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28729"><span class="ref">[28729] Iª q. 12 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, cum dicitur videbimus eum sicuti est, hoc adverbium
 sicuti determinat modum visionis ex parte rei visae ut sit sensus,
 videbimus eum ita esse sicuti est, quia ipsum esse eius videbimus,
 quod est eius essentia. Non autem determinat modum visionis ex
 parte videntis, ut sit sensus, quod ita erit perfectus modus
 videndi, sicut est in Deo perfectus modus essendi.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p9"> Thus
 appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said that
 one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better than
@@ -8427,80 +6377,55 @@
 does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of
 understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the
 understanding of another.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28730"><span class=
-"ref">[28730] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc etiam
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28730"><span class="ref">[28730] Iª q. 12 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc etiam
 patet solutio ad secundum. Cum enim dicitur quod rem unam unus alio
 melius non intelligit, hoc habet veritatem si referatur ad modum
 rei intellectae, quia quicumque intelligit rem esse aliter quam
 sit, non vere intelligit. Non autem si referatur ad modum
 intelligendi, quia intelligere unius est perfectius quam
 intelligere alterius.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A6-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The
 diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for
 the same object will be presented to all---viz. the essence of God;
 nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by
 different similitudes; but it will arise on the part of the diverse
 faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the
 glorified faculty.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28731"><span class=
-"ref">[28731] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28731"><span class="ref">[28731] Iª q. 12 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod diversitas videndi non erit ex parte obiecti, quia
 idem obiectum omnibus praesentabitur, scilicet Dei essentia, nec ex
 diversa participatione obiecti per differentes similitudines, sed
 erit per diversam facultatem intellectus, non quidem naturalem, sed
 gloriosam, ut dictum est.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7" next="FP_Q12_A8" prev="FP_Q12_A6" progress="1.72%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7" next="FP_Q12_A8" prev="FP_Q12_A6" progress="1.72%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Phil.3.12" parsed="vul|Phil|3|12|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p2.1" passage="Phil. 3:12">Phil. 3:12</scripRef>): "But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']." But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for he said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.9.26" parsed="vul|1Cor|9|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p2.2" passage="1 Cor. 9:26">1 Cor. 9:26</scripRef>): "I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: "So run that you may
   comprehend."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28732"><span class=
-"ref">[28732] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28732"><span class="ref">[28732] Iª q. 12 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam ipsum
 comprehendant. Dicit enim apostolus, Philipp. III, <i>sequor autem
 si quo modo comprehendam</i>. Non autem frustra sequebatur, dicit
 enim ipse, I Cor. IX, <i>sic curro, non quasi in incertum</i>. Ergo
 ipse comprehendit, et eadem ratione alii, quos ad hoc invitat,
 dicens, <i>sic currite, ut comprehendatis</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine
 says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That is comprehended which is so
 seen as a whole, that nothing of it is hidden from the seer." But if
 God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is
 hidden from the seer, since God is simple. Therefore whoever sees His
 essence, comprehends Him.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28733"><span class=
-"ref">[28733] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ut
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28733"><span class="ref">[28733] Iª q. 12 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ut
 dicit Augustinus in libro de videndo Deum ad Paulinam, <i>illud
 comprehenditur, quod ita totum videtur, ut nihil eius lateat
 videntem</i>. Sed si Deus per essentiam videtur, totus videtur, et
 nihil eius latet videntem; cum Deus sit simplex. Ergo a quocumque
 videtur per essentiam, comprehenditur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not "wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence.
   Therefore all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore
 they comprehend Him.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28734"><span class=
-"ref">[28734] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur quod
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28734"><span class="ref">[28734] Iª q. 12 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur quod
 videtur totus, sed non totaliter, contra, totaliter vel dicit modum
 videntis, vel modum rei visae. Sed ille qui videt Deum per
 essentiam, videt eum totaliter, si significetur modus rei visae,
@@ -8508,32 +6433,24 @@
 totaliter, si significetur modus videntis, quia tota virtute sua
 intellectus Dei essentiam videbit. Quilibet ergo videns Deum per
 essentiam, totaliter eum videbit. Ergo eum comprehendet.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful,
 the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible
-in thought" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.32.18-Jer.32.19"
-parsed="vul|Jer|32|18|32|19" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p5.1"
-passage="Jer. 32:18,19">Jer. 32:18,19</scripRef>). Therefore He cannot
+in thought" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.32.18-Jer.32.19" parsed="vul|Jer|32|18|32|19" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p5.1" passage="Jer. 32:18,19">Jer. 32:18,19</scripRef>). Therefore He cannot
 be comprehended.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28735"><span class=
-"ref">[28735] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28735"><span class="ref">[28735] Iª q. 12 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Ierem. XXXII, <i>fortissime, magne, potens, dominus
 exercituum nomen tibi; magnus consilio, et incomprehensibilis
 cogitatu</i>. Ergo comprehendi non potest.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii).</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p7"> In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a
   probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears---Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7">(Q[7])</a> is
   infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.</p>
 </div>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 co."><a name="28736"><span class=
-"ref">[28736] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 co."><a name="28736"><span class="ref">[28736] Iª q. 12 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod comprehendere Deum impossibile est cuicumque intellectui
 creato, <i>attingere vero mente Deum qualitercumque, magna est
 beatitudo</i>, ut dicit Augustinus. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum
@@ -8559,16 +6476,14 @@
 infinitum, impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus Deum
 infinite cognoscat. Unde impossibile est quod Deum
 comprehendat.</p>
-</div>
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension"
   is taken more largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him. And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, "I held him, and I will not let him go" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Song.3.4" parsed="vul|Song|3|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p8.1" passage="Cant 3:4">Cant 3:4</scripRef>); in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way "comprehension" is one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision
   responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him,
   possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and
 possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of
 desire.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28737"><span class=
-"ref">[28737] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28737"><span class="ref">[28737] Iª q. 12 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod comprehensio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, stricte et
 proprie, secundum quod aliquid includitur in comprehendente. Et sic
 nullo modo Deus comprehenditur, nec intellectu nec aliquo alio,
@@ -8590,17 +6505,14 @@
 videndo, tenent sibi praesentem, in potestate habentes semper eum
 videre; et tenentes, fruuntur sicut ultimo fine desiderium
 implente.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says
   the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing
 of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries can be
 completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to
 be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is
 attained.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28738"><span class=
-"ref">[28738] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28738"><span class="ref">[28738] Iª q. 12 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod non propter hoc Deus incomprehensibilis dicitur,
 quasi aliquid eius sit quod non videatur, sed quia non ita perfecte
 videtur, sicut visibilis est. Sicut cum aliqua demonstrabilis
@@ -8612,14 +6524,11 @@
 nihil eius lateat videntem; aut cuius fines circumspici
 possunt</i>, tunc enim fines alicuius circumspiciuntur, quando ad
 finem in modo cognoscendi illam rem pervenitur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is
   demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as
 demonstrated.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28739"><span class=
-"ref">[28739] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28739"><span class="ref">[28739] Iª q. 12 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod totaliter dicit modum obiecti, non quidem ita quod
 totus modus obiecti non cadat sub cognitione; sed quia modus
 obiecti non est modus cognoscentis. Qui igitur videt Deum per
@@ -8628,79 +6537,51 @@
 scilicet ipse infinite cognoscat, sicut aliquis probabiliter scire
 potest aliquam propositionem esse demonstrabilem, licet ipse eam
 demonstrative non cognoscat.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8" next="FP_Q12_A9" prev="FP_Q12_A7" progress="1.77%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8" next="FP_Q12_A9" prev="FP_Q12_A7" progress="1.77%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those
 who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says
 (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see, who see Him Who sees all things?"
 But God sees all things. Therefore those who see God see all
 things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28740"><span class=
-"ref">[28740] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28740"><span class="ref">[28740] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam omnia in Deo
 videant. Dicit enim Gregorius, in IV Dialog. <i>quid est quod non
 videant, qui videntem omnia vident?</i> Sed Deus est videns omnia.
 Ergo qui vident Deum, omnia vident.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever
 sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or
 possible things shine forth in God as in a mirror; for He knows all
 things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees all actual things
 in Him, and also all possible things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28741"><span class=
-"ref">[28741] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Item, quicumque
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28741"><span class="ref">[28741] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Item, quicumque
 videt speculum, videt ea quae in speculo resplendent. Sed omnia
 quaecumque fiunt vel fieri possunt, in Deo resplendent sicut in
 quodam speculo, ipse enim omnia in seipso cognoscit. Ergo quicumque
 videt Deum, videt omnia quae sunt et quae fieri possunt.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever
 understands the greater, can understand the least, as is said in De
 Anima iii. But all that God does, or can do, are less than His
 essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can understand all that
 God does, or can do.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28742"><span class=
-"ref">[28742] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, qui
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28742"><span class="ref">[28742] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, qui
 intelligit id quod est maius, potest intelligere minima, ut dicitur
 III de anima. Sed omnia quae Deus facit vel facere potest, sunt
 minus quam eius essentia. Ergo quicumque intelligit Deum, potest
 intelligere omnia quae Deus facit vel facere potest.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the
 rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore if
 in seeing God it does not know all things, its natural desire will not
 rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which
 is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows all things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="28743"><span class=
-"ref">[28743] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="28743"><span class="ref">[28743] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
 rationalis creatura omnia naturaliter scire desiderat. Si igitur
 videndo Deum non omnia sciat, non quietatur eius naturale
 desiderium, et ita, videndo Deum non erit beata. Quod est
 inconveniens. Videndo igitur Deum, omnia scit.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not
 know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the
@@ -8708,23 +6589,19 @@
 Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret
 thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever
 sees the essence of God, does not know all things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28744"><span class=
-"ref">[28744] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28744"><span class="ref">[28744] Iª q. 12 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod Angeli vident Deum per essentiam, et tamen non omnia sciunt.
 Inferiores enim Angeli purgantur a superioribus a nescientia, ut
 dicit Dionysius, VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ipsi etiam nesciunt futura
 contingentia et cogitationes cordium, hoc enim solius Dei est. Non
 ergo quicumque vident Dei essentiam, vident omnia.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon
   as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A7">(A[7])</a>. Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know
   all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His
 power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more,
 the more perfectly it sees God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 co."><a name="28745"><span class=
-"ref">[28745] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 co."><a name="28745"><span class="ref">[28745] Iª q. 12 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod intellectus creatus, videndo divinam essentiam, non videt in
 ipsa omnia quae facit Deus vel facere potest. Manifestum est enim
 quod sic aliqua videntur in Deo, secundum quod sunt in ipso. Omnia
@@ -8744,59 +6621,44 @@
 virtutem. Sed horum quae Deus facit vel facere potest, tanto
 aliquis intellectus plura cognoscit, quanto perfectius Deum
 videt.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory
 speaks as regards the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in
 Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all things; but it does
 not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he does not
 perfectly comprehend Him.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28746"><span class=
-"ref">[28746] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28746"><span class="ref">[28746] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur quantum ad sufficientiam obiecti,
 scilicet Dei, quod, quantum in se est, sufficienter continet omnia
 et demonstrat. Non tamen sequitur quod unusquisque videns Deum
 omnia cognoscat, quia non perfecte comprehendit ipsum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not
 necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the
 mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror itself.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28747"><span class=
-"ref">[28747] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28747"><span class="ref">[28747] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod videns speculum, non est necessarium quod omnia in
 speculo videat, nisi speculum visu suo comprehendat.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although
 it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a
 greater thing to see Him so that all things are known in Him, than to
 see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more,
 are known in Him. For it has been shown in this article that the more
 things are known in God according as He is seen more or less
 perfectly.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28748"><span class=
-"ref">[28748] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28748"><span class="ref">[28748] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod, licet maius sit videre Deum quam omnia alia, tamen
 maius est videre sic Deum quod omnia in eo cognoscantur, quam
 videre sic ipsum quod non omnia, sed pauciora vel plura
 cognoscantur in eo. Iam enim ostensum est quod multitudo cognitorum
 in Deo, consequitur modum videndi ipsum vel magis perfectum vel
 minus perfectum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A8-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely, the species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know
   things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures) "and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is
   not the happier for them, but for Thee alone."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="28749"><span class=
-"ref">[28749] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="28749"><span class="ref">[28749] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
 dicendum quod naturale desiderium rationalis creaturae est ad
 sciendum omnia illa quae pertinent ad perfectionem intellectus; et
 haec sunt species et genera rerum, et rationes earum, quae in Deo
@@ -8811,24 +6673,11 @@
 <i>te autem nescit, beatus autem qui te scit, etiam si illa
 nesciat. Qui vero te et illa novit, non propter illa beatior est,
 sed propter te solum beatus</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A9" next="FP_Q12_A10" prev="FP_Q12_A8" progress="1.80%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen  through any similitude?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A9-p0.1">Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A9" next="FP_Q12_A10" prev="FP_Q12_A8" progress="1.80%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen  through any similitude?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A9-p0.1">Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A9-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude of color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine
   essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by
 their similitudes.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28750"><span class=
-"ref">[28750] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28750"><span class="ref">[28750] Iª q. 12 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae videntur in Deo, a videntibus
 divinam essentiam per aliquas similitudines videantur. Omnis enim
 cognitio est per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum, sic enim
@@ -8837,14 +6686,11 @@
 pupilla similitudine coloris. Si igitur intellectus videntis Deum
 per essentiam intelligat in Deo aliquas creaturas, oportet quod
 earum similitudinibus informetur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A9-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Cor.12.4" parsed="vul|2Cor|12|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A9-p3.1" passage="2 Cor. 12:4">2 Cor. 12:4</scripRef>). Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the same way,
   when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain similitudes
 or ideas of what he actually saw in it.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28751"><span class=
-"ref">[28751] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ea
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28751"><span class="ref">[28751] Iª q. 12 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ea
 quae prius vidimus, memoriter tenemus. Sed Paulus, videns in raptu
 essentiam Dei, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad litteram,
 postquam desiit essentiam Dei videre, recordatus est multorum quae
@@ -8854,25 +6700,20 @@
 eius intellectu remanserint. Et eadem ratione, quando
 praesentialiter videbat Dei essentiam, eorum quae in ipsa videbat,
 aliquas similitudines vel species habebat.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A9-p4"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one
 likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible
 mirror. Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by
 His own essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any
 similitudes or ideas.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28752"><span class=
-"ref">[28752] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28752"><span class="ref">[28752] Iª q. 12 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod per unam speciem videtur speculum, et ea quae in speculo
 apparent. Sed omnia sic videntur in Deo sicut in quodam speculo
 intelligibili. Ergo, si ipse Deus non videtur per aliquam
 similitudinem, sed per suam essentiam; nec ea quae in ipso
 videntur, per aliquas similitudines sive species videntur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A9-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is
   directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes
   pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a
@@ -8881,8 +6722,7 @@
 God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other similitudes but by
 the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God
 Himself is seen.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 9 co."><a name="28753"><span class=
-"ref">[28753] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 9 co."><a name="28753"><span class="ref">[28753] Iª q. 12 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod videntes Deum per essentiam, ea quae in ipsa essentia Dei
 vident, non vident per aliquas species, sed per ipsam essentiam
 divinam intellectui eorum unitam. Sic enim cognoscitur unumquodque,
@@ -8903,30 +6743,23 @@
 essentiam in ipso Deo, non videntur per aliquas similitudines
 alias; sed per solam essentiam divinam intellectui praesentem, per
 quam et Deus videtur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A9-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A9-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The
 created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to what is seen
 in God, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine essence, in which the
 similitudes of all things pre-exist.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28754"><span class=
-"ref">[28754] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28754"><span class="ref">[28754] Iª q. 12 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod intellectus videntis Deum assimilatur rebus quae
 videntur in Deo, inquantum unitur essentiae divinae, in qua rerum
 omnium similitudines praeexistunt.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A9-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees
   God, by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself
 the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained
 in Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this
 kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus
 conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28755"><span class=
-"ref">[28755] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28755"><span class="ref">[28755] Iª q. 12 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod aliquae potentiae cognoscitivae sunt, quae ex
 speciebus primo conceptis alias formare possunt. Sicut imaginatio
 ex praeconceptis speciebus montis et auri, format speciem montis
@@ -8939,66 +6772,43 @@
 postquam desiit Dei essentiam videre. Ista tamen visio, qua
 videntur res per huiusmodi species sic conceptas, est alia a
 visione qua videntur res in Deo.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10" next="FP_Q12_A11" prev="FP_Q12_A9" progress="1.82%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the  same time?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10" next="FP_Q12_A11" prev="FP_Q12_A9" progress="1.82%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the  same time?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
 those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one
 and the same time. For according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It
 may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood."
 But what is seen in God, is understood; for God is seen by the
 intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in Him at the
 same time.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28756"><span class=
-"ref">[28756] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28756"><span class="ref">[28756] Iª q. 12 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam non simul
 videant omnia quae in ipso vident. Quia, secundum philosophum,
 contingit multa scire, intelligere vero unum. Sed ea quae videntur
 in Deo, intelliguntur, intellectu enim videtur Deus. Ergo non
 contingit a videntibus Deum simul multa videri in Deo.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine
 says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), "God moves the spiritual creature
 according to time"---i.e. by intelligence and affection. But the
 spiritual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore those who see
 God understand and are affected successively; for time means
 succession.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28757"><span class=
-"ref">[28757] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28757"><span class="ref">[28757] Iª q. 12 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad litteram, quod <i>Deus movet
 creaturam spiritualem per tempus</i>, hoc est per intelligentiam et
 affectionem. Sed creatura spiritualis est Angelus, qui Deum videt.
 Ergo videntes Deum, successive intelligunt et afficiuntur, tempus
 enim successionem importat.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10-p4"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will
 not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we
 shall see all we know at one glance."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 10 s. c."><a name="28758"><span class=
-"ref">[28758] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 10 s. c."><a name="28758"><span class="ref">[28758] Iª q. 12 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod Augustinus dicit, ultimo de Trin., <i>non erunt volubiles
 nostrae cogitationes, ab aliis in alia euntes atque redeuntes; sed
 omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same
   time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not
 all at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea;
@@ -9007,8 +6817,7 @@
 in God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen
 by the one essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not
 successively.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 10 co."><a name="28759"><span class=
-"ref">[28759] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 10 co."><a name="28759"><span class="ref">[28759] Iª q. 12 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod ea quae videntur in verbo, non successive, sed simul videntur.
 Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod ideo nos simul non
 possumus multa intelligere, quia multa per diversas species
@@ -9022,100 +6831,62 @@
 intelliguntur. Ostensum est autem quod ea quae videntur in Deo, non
 videntur singula per suas similitudines, sed omnia per unam
 essentiam Dei. Unde simul, et non successive videntur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We
 understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; but many
 things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously, as in the
 idea of a man we understand "animal" and "rational"; and in the idea
 of a house we understand the wall and the roof.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28760"><span class=
-"ref">[28760] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28760"><span class="ref">[28760] Iª q. 12 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod sic unum tantum intelligimus, inquantum una specie
 intelligimus. Sed multa una specie intellecta simul intelliguntur,
 sicut in specie hominis intelligimus animal et rationale, et in
 specie domus parietem et tectum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A10-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As
 regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse
 ideas given them, the angels do not know all things simultaneously,
 and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time;
 but as regards what they see in God, they see all at the same
 time.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28761"><span class=
-"ref">[28761] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28761"><span class="ref">[28761] Iª q. 12 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod Angeli, quantum ad cognitionem naturalem qua
 cognoscunt res per species diversas eis inditas, non simul omnia
 cognoscunt, et sic moventur, secundum intelligentiam, per tempus.
 Sed secundum quod vident res in Deo, simul eas vident.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11" next="FP_Q12_A12" prev="FP_Q12_A10" progress="1.84%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p0.1">Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that one
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11" next="FP_Q12_A12" prev="FP_Q12_A10" progress="1.84%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p0.1">Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that one
 can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen
-God face to face" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.32.30"
-parsed="vul|Gen|32|30|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p2.1"
-passage="Gn. 32:30">Gn. 32:30</scripRef>). But to see Him face to face
+God face to face" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.32.30" parsed="vul|Gen|32|30|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p2.1" passage="Gn. 32:30">Gn. 32:30</scripRef>). But to see Him face to face
 is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We see now in a
-glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.13.12" parsed="vul|1Cor|13|12|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p2.2" passage="1 Cor. 13:12">1
+glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.13.12" parsed="vul|1Cor|13|12|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p2.2" passage="1 Cor. 13:12">1
 Cor. 13:12</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28762"><span class=
-"ref">[28762] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28762"><span class="ref">[28762] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
 sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis in hac vita possit Deum per
 essentiam videre. Dicit enim Iacob, Gen. XXXII, <i>vidi Deum facie
 ad faciem</i>. Sed videre facie ad faciem, est videre per
 essentiam, ut patet per illud quod dicitur I Cor. XIII, <i>videmus
 nunc per speculum et in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem</i>.
 Ergo Deus in hac vita per essentiam videri potest.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Lord
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Lord
 said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by
-riddles and figures doth he see the Lord" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.12.8" parsed="vul|Num|12|8|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p3.1"
-passage="Num. 12:8">Num. 12:8</scripRef>); but this is to see God in
+riddles and figures doth he see the Lord" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.12.8" parsed="vul|Num|12|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p3.1" passage="Num. 12:8">Num. 12:8</scripRef>); but this is to see God in
 His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in
 this life.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28763"><span class=
-"ref">[28763] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Num.
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28763"><span class="ref">[28763] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Num.
 XII dicit dominus de Moyse, <i>ore ad os loquor ei, et palam, et
 non per aenigmata et figuras, videt Deum</i>. Sed hoc est videre
 Deum per essentiam. Ergo aliquis in statu huius vitae potest Deum
 per essentiam videre.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all
   things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it
 is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to
 the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the
 mind could not be incommutable." Therefore even in this life we see
 God Himself.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28764"><span class=
-"ref">[28764] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28764"><span class="ref">[28764] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 illud in quo alia omnia cognoscimus, et per quod de aliis
 iudicamus, est nobis secundum se notum. Sed omnia etiam nunc in Deo
 cognoscimus. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII Conf., <i>si ambo videmus
@@ -9128,52 +6899,40 @@
 incorporales et sempiternas, quae nisi supra mentem essent,
 incommutabiles profecto non essent</i>. Ergo et in hac vita ipsum
 Deum videmus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according
 to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the
 soul by their essence are seen by intellectual vision. But
 intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but
 by their very essences, as he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii,
 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows
 that He is seen by us in His essence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 4"><a name="28765"><span class=
-"ref">[28765] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 11 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 4"><a name="28765"><span class="ref">[28765] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
 secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., visione intellectuali
 videntur ea quae sunt in anima per suam essentiam. Sed visio
 intellectualis est de rebus intelligibilibus, non per aliquas
 similitudines, sed per suas essentias, ut ipse ibidem dicit. Ergo,
 cum Deus sit per essentiam suam in anima nostra, per essentiam suam
 videtur a nobis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live"
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.32.20" parsed="vul|Exod|32|20|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p6.1"
-passage="Ex. 32:20">Ex. 32:20</scripRef>), and a gloss upon this says,
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.32.20" parsed="vul|Exod|32|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p6.1" passage="Ex. 32:20">Ex. 32:20</scripRef>), and a gloss upon this says,
 "In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the
 likeness itself of His own nature."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28766"><span class=
-"ref">[28766] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28766"><span class="ref">[28766] Iª q. 12 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Exod. XXXIII, <i>non videbit me homo et vivet</i>.
 Glossa, <i>quandiu hic mortaliter vivitur, videri per quasdam
 imagines Deus potest; sed per ipsam naturae suae speciem non
 potest</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, as was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4">(A[4])</a>, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it is evident that the Divine essence
   cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A2">AA[2]</a>,9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily senses
   divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the
 more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this
 mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible
 objects, i.e. to the divine essence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 co."><a name="28767"><span class=
-"ref">[28767] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 co."><a name="28767"><span class="ref">[28767] Iª q. 12 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod ab homine puro Deus videri per essentiam non potest, nisi ab
 hac vita mortali separetur. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut supra
 dictum est, modus cognitionis sequitur modum naturae rei
@@ -9191,17 +6950,12 @@
 percipiuntur, et praevisiones futurorum. Quod ergo anima elevetur
 usque ad supremum intelligibilium, quod est essentia divina, esse
 non potest quandiu hac mortali vita utitur.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I have seen God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary
-  vision; as will later be explained (SS, <a
- id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p8.1"
-href="#FP_Q174">Q[174])</a> in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We
+  vision; as will later be explained (SS, <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p8.1" href="#FP_Q174">Q[174])</a> in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We
 may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted
 intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28768"><span class=
-"ref">[28768] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28768"><span class="ref">[28768] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. Cael. Hier., sic in
 Scripturis dicitur aliquis Deum vidisse, inquantum formatae sunt
 aliquae figurae, vel sensibiles vel imaginariae, secundum aliquam
@@ -9213,21 +6967,15 @@
 cum de gradibus prophetiae loquemur. Vel hoc dicit Iacob ad
 designandam quandam eminentiam intelligibilis contemplationis,
 supra communem statum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God
 works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural
 wonders above the common order, raising the minds of some living in
 the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own
 essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the
 teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This
-will be treated more fully in the question of rapture (SS, <a
- id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p9.1"
-href="#FP_Q175">Q[175])</a>.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28769"><span class=
-"ref">[28769] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+will be treated more fully in the question of rapture (SS, <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p9.1" href="#FP_Q175">Q[175])</a>.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28769"><span class="ref">[28769] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod, sicut Deus miraculose aliquid supernaturaliter in
 rebus corporeis operatur, ita etiam et supernaturaliter, et praeter
 communem ordinem, mentes aliquorum in hac carne viventium, sed non
@@ -9236,16 +6984,13 @@
 libro de videndo Deum de Moyse, qui fuit magister Iudaeorum, et
 Paulo, qui fuit magister gentium. Et de hoc plenius tractabitur,
 cum de raptu agemus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things are said to be seen in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As
   therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to
 see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see any
 intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of
 God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28770"><span class=
-"ref">[28770] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28770"><span class="ref">[28770] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod omnia dicimur in Deo videre, et secundum ipsum de
 omnibus iudicare, inquantum per participationem sui luminis omnia
 cognoscimus et diiudicamus, nam et ipsum lumen naturale rationis
@@ -9257,107 +7002,70 @@
 sensibiliter, non est necesse quod videatur substantia solis, ita
 ad videndum aliquid intelligibiliter, non est necessarium quod
 videatur essentia Dei.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b>
 Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their
 essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect. And thus God is
 in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by
 presence, essence and power.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 4"><a name="28771"><span class=
-"ref">[28771] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 11 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 4"><a name="28771"><span class="ref">[28771] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
 dicendum quod visio intellectualis est eorum quae sunt in anima per
 suam essentiam sicut intelligibilia in intellectu. Sic autem Deus
 est in anima beatorum, non autem in anima nostra; sed per
 praesentiam, essentiam, et potentiam.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12" next="FP_Q12_A13" prev="FP_Q12_A11" progress="1.87%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p0.1">Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12" next="FP_Q12_A13" prev="FP_Q12_A11" progress="1.87%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p0.1">Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by
 natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De
 Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp simple form." But God is a
-supremely simple form, as was shown above (<a
- id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p2.1"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3], A[7]</a> ). Therefore natural
+supremely simple form, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3], A[7]</a> ). Therefore natural
 reason cannot attain to know Him.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28772"><span class=
-"ref">[28772] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28772"><span class="ref">[28772] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
 sic proceditur. Videtur quod per naturalem rationem Deum in hac
 vita cognoscere non possimus. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de
 Consol., quod <i>ratio non capit simplicem formam</i>. Deus autem
 maxime est simplex forma, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo ad eius
 cognitionem ratio naturalis pervenire non potest.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul
 understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the
 imagination. But we cannot have an imagination of God, Who is
 incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28773"><span class=
-"ref">[28773] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28773"><span class="ref">[28773] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 ratione naturali sine phantasmate nihil intelligit anima, ut
 dicitur in III de anima. Sed Dei, cum sit incorporeus, phantasma in
 nobis esse non potest. Ergo cognosci non potest a nobis cognitione
 naturali.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the
 knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as
 they have a common nature. But the knowledge of God belongs only to
 the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The weak eye of the human
 mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by the
 justice of faith." Therefore God cannot be known by natural
 reason.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28774"><span class=
-"ref">[28774] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28774"><span class="ref">[28774] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 cognitio quae est per rationem naturalem, communis est bonis et
 malis, sicut natura eis communis est. Sed cognitio Dei competit
 tantum bonis, dicit enim Augustinus, I de Trin., quod <i>mentis
 humanae acies in tam excellenti luce non figitur, nisi per
 iustitiam fidei emundetur</i>. Ergo Deus per rationem naturalem
 cognosci non potest.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p5"><b>On
-the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.1.19" parsed="vul|Rom|1|19|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p5.1"
-passage="Rom. 1:19">Rom. 1:19</scripRef>), "That which is known of
+the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.1.19" parsed="vul|Rom|1|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p5.1" passage="Rom. 1:19">Rom. 1:19</scripRef>), "That which is known of
 God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest
 in them."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28775"><span class=
-"ref">[28775] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28775"><span class="ref">[28775] Iª q. 12 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Rom. I, <i>quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in
 illis</i>, idest, quod cognoscibile est de Deo per rationem
 naturalem.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we
   can be led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p7"> Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all.</p>
 </div>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 co."><a name="28776"><span class=
-"ref">[28776] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 co."><a name="28776"><span class="ref">[28776] Iª q. 12 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod naturalis nostra cognitio a sensu principium sumit, unde
 tantum se nostra naturalis cognitio extendere potest, inquantum
 manuduci potest per sensibilia. Ex sensibilibus autem non potest
@@ -9373,32 +7081,22 @@
 differentiam creaturarum ab ipso, quod scilicet ipse non est
 aliquid eorum quae ab eo causantur; et quod haec non removentur ab
 eo propter eius defectum, sed quia superexcedit.</p>
-</div>
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason
 cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know "what it is"; but it can
 know "whether it is."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28777"><span class=
-"ref">[28777] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28777"><span class="ref">[28777] Iª q. 12 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod ratio ad formam simplicem pertingere non potest, ut
 sciat de ea quid est, potest tamen de ea cognoscere, ut sciat an
 est.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is
 known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28778"><span class=
-"ref">[28778] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28778"><span class="ref">[28778] Iª q. 12 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod Deus naturali cognitione cognoscitur per phantasmata
 effectus sui.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the
 knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good;
 but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both good and
 bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), retracting what he had
@@ -9406,8 +7104,7 @@
 that only the pure should know truth.' For it can be answered that
 many who are not pure can know many truths," i.e. by natural
 reason.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28779"><span class=
-"ref">[28779] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28779"><span class="ref">[28779] Iª q. 12 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod cognitio Dei per essentiam, cum sit per gratiam, non
 competit nisi bonis, sed cognitio eius quae est per rationem
 naturalem, potest competere bonis et malis. Unde dicit Augustinus,
@@ -9415,23 +7112,10 @@
 Deus, qui non nisi mundos verum scire voluisti, responderi enim
 potest, multos etiam non mundos multa scire vera</i>, scilicet per
 rationem naturalem.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13" next="FP_Q13" prev="FP_Q12_A12" progress="1.89%" n="xiii" title="Article. 13 - Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by  natural reason?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p0.1">Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13" next="FP_Q13" prev="FP_Q12_A12" progress="1.89%" n="xiii" title="Article. 13 - Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by  natural reason?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p0.1">Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol. i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him "what He is," comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more
   known to us by grace than by natural reason.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28780"><span class=
-"ref">[28780] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28780"><span class="ref">[28780] Iª q. 12 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
 decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod per gratiam non
 habeatur altior cognitio Dei, quam ea quae habetur per naturalem
 rationem. Dicit enim Dionysius, in libro de mystica theologia, quod
@@ -9441,65 +7125,49 @@
 quid est, hoc contingit etiam per rationem naturalem. Ergo per
 gratiam non plenius cognoscitur a nobis Deus, quam per rationem
 naturalem.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can
 acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through
 the imagination; and the same applies to the knowledge given by
 grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is impossible for
 the divine ray to shine upon us except as screened round about by the
 many colored sacred veils." Therefore we cannot know God more fully by
 grace than by natural reason.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="28781"><span class=
-"ref">[28781] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, per
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="28781"><span class="ref">[28781] Iª q. 12 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, per
 rationem naturalem in cognitionem divinorum pervenire non possumus,
 nisi per phantasmata, sic etiam nec secundum cognitionem gratiae.
 Dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. de Cael. Hier., quod <i>impossibile
 est nobis aliter lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum
 velaminum circumvelatum</i>. Ergo per gratiam non plenius
 cognoscimus Deum, quam per rationem naturalem.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our
 intellect adheres to God by grace of faith. But faith does not seem to
 be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Ev.) that "things not
 seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge." Therefore there
 is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of God by grace.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="28782"><span class=
-"ref">[28782] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="28782"><span class="ref">[28782] Iª q. 12 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 intellectus noster per gratiam fidei Deo adhaeret. Fides autem non
 videtur esse cognitio, dicit enim Gregorius, in Homil., quod ea
 quae non videntur fidem habent, et non agnitionem. Ergo per gratiam
 non additur nobis aliqua excellentior cognitio de Deo.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His
-spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.2.10" parsed="vul|1Cor|2|10|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p5.1" passage="1 Cor. 2:10">1
+spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.2.10" parsed="vul|1Cor|2|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p5.1" passage="1 Cor. 2:10">1
 Cor. 2:10</scripRef>), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss
 expounds.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 s. c."><a name="28783"><span class=
-"ref">[28783] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 s. c."><a name="28783"><span class="ref">[28783] Iª q. 12 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit apostolus, I Cor. II, <i>nobis revelavit Deus per
 spiritum suum</i>, illa scilicet quae nemo principum huius saeculi
 novit, idest philosophorum, ut exponit Glossa.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p7"> Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the
   Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.3.17" parsed="vul|Matt|3|17|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p7.1" passage="Mat. 3:17">Mat. 3:17</scripRef>).</p>
 </div>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 co."><a name="28784"><span class=
-"ref">[28784] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 co."><a name="28784"><span class="ref">[28784] Iª q. 12 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod per gratiam perfectior cognitio de Deo habetur a nobis, quam
 per rationem naturalem. Quod sic patet. Cognitio enim quam per
 naturalem rationem habemus, duo requirit, scilicet, phantasmata ex
@@ -9514,47 +7182,37 @@
 divinitus, aut etiam voces, ad aliquid divinum exprimendum; sicut
 in Baptismo visus est spiritus sanctus in specie columbae, et vox
 patris audita est, <i>hic est filius meus dilectus</i>.</p>
-</div>
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although
 by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God "what He
 is," and thus are united to Him as to one unknown; still we know Him
 more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are
 demonstrated to us, and according as we attribute to Him some things
 known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as,
 for instance, that God is Three and One.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="28785"><span class=
-"ref">[28785] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="28785"><span class="ref">[28785] Iª q. 12 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, licet per revelationem gratiae in hac vita non
 cognoscamus de Deo quid est, et sic ei quasi ignoto coniungamur;
 tamen plenius ipsum cognoscimus, inquantum plures et excellentiores
 effectus eius nobis demonstrantur; et inquantum ei aliqua
 attribuimus ex revelatione divina, ad quae ratio naturalis non
 pertingit, ut Deum esse trinum et unum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the
 images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely
 formed in the imagination, we have so much the more excellent
 intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man;
 and thus through the revelation given by the images a fuller knowledge
 is received by the infusion of the divine light.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="28786"><span class=
-"ref">[28786] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="28786"><span class="ref">[28786] Iª q. 12 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod ex phantasmatibus, vel a sensu acceptis secundum
 naturalem ordinem, vel divinitus in imaginatione formatis, tanto
 excellentior cognitio intellectualis habetur, quanto lumen
 intelligibile in homine fortius fuerit. Et sic per revelationem ex
 phantasmatibus plenior cognitio accipitur, ex infusione divini
 luminis.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith is
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A13-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith is
 a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith
 to some knowable object. But this determination to one object does not
 proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him
@@ -9562,8 +7220,7 @@
 short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science
 determines the intellect to one object by the vision and understanding
 of first principles.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="28787"><span class=
-"ref">[28787] I&ordf; q. 12 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="28787"><span class="ref">[28787] Iª q. 12 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod fides cognitio quaedam est, inquantum intellectus
 determinatur per fidem ad aliquod cognoscibile. Sed haec
 determinatio ad unum non procedit ex visione credentis, sed a
@@ -9571,3810 +7228,3392 @@
 ratione cognitionis quae est in scientia, nam scientia determinat
 intellectum ad unum per visionem et intellectum primorum
 principiorum.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-<!-- merged down to here -->
+</div></div4></div3>
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13" next="FP_Q13_A1" prev="FP_Q12_A13" progress="1.92%" n="xii" title="Question. 13 - THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p0.1">Question 13. THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p2"> After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p3"> Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p4"> (1) Whether God can be named by us?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p5"> (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p6"> (3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p7"> (4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p8"> (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p9"> (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p10"> (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p11"> (8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p12"> (9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p13"> (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p14"> (11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of God?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p15"> (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1" next="FP_Q13_A2" prev="FP_Q13" progress="1.93%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether a name can be given to God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p0.1">Whether a name can be given to God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.30.4" parsed="vul|Prov|30|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p2.1" passage="Prov. 30:4">Prov. 30:4</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p0.1">Question 13. THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p2"> After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p3"> Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p4"> (1) Whether God can be named by us?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p5"> (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p6"> (3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p7"> (4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p8"> (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p9"> (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p10"> (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p11"> (8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p12"> (9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p13"> (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p14"> (11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p15"> (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</p>
+</div>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 pr."><a name="28788"><span class="ref">[28788]
+I&ordf; q. 13 pr.</span></a> Consideratis his quae ad divinam
+cognitionem pertinent, procedendum est ad considerationem divinorum
+nominum, unumquodque enim nominatur a nobis, secundum quod ipsum
+cognoscimus. Circa hoc ergo quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, utrum Deus
+sit nominabilis a nobis. Secundo, utrum aliqua nomina dicta de Deo,
+praedicentur de ipso substantialiter. Tertio, utrum aliqua nomina
+dicta de Deo, proprie dicantur de ipso; an omnia attribuantur ei
+metaphorice. Quarto, utrum multa nomina dicta de Deo, sint
+synonyma. Quinto, utrum nomina aliqua dicantur de Deo et creaturis
+univoce, vel aequivoce. Sexto, supposito quod dicantur analogice,
+utrum dicantur de Deo per prius, vel de creaturis. Septimo, utrum
+aliqua nomina dicantur de Deo ex tempore. Octavo, utrum hoc nomen
+Deus sit nomen naturae, vel operationis. Nono, utrum hoc nomen Deus
+sit nomen communicabile. Decimo, utrum accipiatur univoce vel
+aequivoce, secundum quod significat Deum per naturam, et per
+participationem, et secundum opinionem. Undecimo, utrum hoc nomen
+qui est sit maxime proprium nomen Dei. Duodecimo, utrum
+propositiones affirmativae possint formari de Deo.</p>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1" next="FP_Q13_A2" prev="FP_Q13" progress="1.93%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether a name can be given to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p0.1">Whether a name can be given to God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says
+(Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be
+found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the
+name of His Son, if thou knowest?" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.30.4" parsed="vul|Prov|30|4|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p2.1"
+passage="Prov. 30:4">Prov. 30:4</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28789"><span class=
+"ref">[28789] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen Deo conveniat. Dicit enim
+Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., quod neque nomen eius est, neque
+opinio. Et Prov. XXX dicitur, <i>quod nomen eius, et quod nomen
+filii eius, si nosti?</i></p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names
+do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract names belong
+to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting
+thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28790"><span class=
+"ref">[28790] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+nomen aut dicitur in abstracto, aut in concreto. Sed nomina
+significantia in concreto, non competunt Deo, cum simplex sit,
+neque nomina significantia in abstracto, quia non significant
+aliquid perfectum subsistens. Ergo nullum nomen potest dici de
+Deo.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore
   God cannot in any way be named by us.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.15.3" parsed="vul|Exod|15|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p5.1" passage="Ex. 15:3">Ex. 15:3</scripRef>): "The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28791"><span class=
+"ref">[28791] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+nomina significant substantiam cum qualitate; verba autem et
+participia significant cum tempore; pronomina autem cum
+demonstratione vel relatione. Quorum nihil competit Deo, quia sine
+qualitate est et sine omni accidente, et sine tempore; et sentiri
+non potest, ut demonstrari possit; nec relative significari, cum
+relativa sint aliquorum antedictorum recordativa, vel nominum, vel
+participiorum, vel pronominum demonstrativorum. Ergo Deus nullo
+modo potest nominari a nobis.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p5"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.15.3"
+parsed="vul|Exod|15|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p5.1"
+passage="Ex. 15:3">Ex. 15:3</scripRef>): "The Lord is a man of war,
+Almighty is His name."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28792"><span class=
+"ref">[28792] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Exod. XV, <i>dominus quasi vir pugnator, omnipotens
+nomen eius</i>.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A11">Q[12], AA[11]</a>,12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God
-  from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by the name is the definition.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand about God, and signify in word.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+  from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and
+remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures,
+yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine
+essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses the essence of man in
+himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his
+essence; for the idea expressed by the name is the definition.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 1 co."><a name="28793"><span class=
+"ref">[28793] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, secundum philosophum, voces sunt signa intellectuum, et
+intellectus sunt rerum similitudines. Et sic patet quod voces
+referuntur ad res significandas, mediante conceptione intellectus.
+Secundum igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest,
+sic a nobis potest nominari. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in
+hac vita non potest a nobis videri per suam essentiam; sed
+cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis, secundum habitudinem principii,
+et per modum excellentiae et remotionis. Sic igitur potest nominari
+a nobis ex creaturis, non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum,
+exprimat divinam essentiam secundum quod est, sicut hoc nomen homo
+exprimit sua significatione essentiam hominis secundum quod est,
+significat enim eius definitionem, declarantem eius essentiam;
+ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection
+1:</b> The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being
+named, is because His essence is above all that we understand about
+God, and signify in word.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28794"><span class=
+"ref">[28794] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod ea ratione dicitur Deus non habere nomen, vel esse
+supra nominationem, quia essentia eius est supra id quod de Deo
+intelligimus et voce significamus.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as
   applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life
   as He is.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28795"><span class=
+"ref">[28795] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, quia ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem venimus, et ex
+ipsis eum nominamus, nomina quae Deo attribuimus, hoc modo
+significant, secundum quod competit creaturis materialibus, quarum
+cognitio est nobis connaturalis, ut supra dictum est. Et quia in
+huiusmodi creaturis, ea quae sunt perfecta et subsistentia sunt
+composita; forma autem in eis non est aliquid completum subsistens,
+sed magis quo aliquid est, inde est quod omnia nomina a nobis
+imposita ad significandum aliquid completum subsistens, significant
+in concretione, prout competit compositis; quae autem imponuntur ad
+significandas formas simplices, significant aliquid non ut
+subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo significat ut quo
+aliquid est album. Quia igitur et Deus simplex est, et subsistens
+est, attribuimus ei et nomina abstracta, ad significandam
+simplicitatem eius; et nomina concreta, ad significandum
+subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, quamvis utraque nomina
+deficiant a modo ipsius, sicut intellectus noster non cognoscit eum
+ut est, secundum hanc vitam.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To signify substance with quality is to signify the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple
   subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative
   pronouns.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2" next="FP_Q13_A3" prev="FP_Q13_A1" progress="1.96%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p0.1">Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation."</p>
-</div>
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28796"><span class=
+"ref">[28796] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod significare substantiam cum qualitate, est
+significare suppositum cum natura vel forma determinata in qua
+subsistit. Unde, sicut de Deo dicuntur aliqua in concretione, ad
+significandum subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, sicut iam
+dictum est, ita dicuntur de Deo nomina significantia substantiam
+cum qualitate. Verba vero et participia consignificantia tempus
+dicuntur de ipso, ex eo quod aeternitas includit omne tempus, sicut
+enim simplicia subsistentia non possumus apprehendere et
+significare nisi per modum compositorum, ita simplicem aeternitatem
+non possumus intelligere vel voce exprimere, nisi per modum
+temporalium rerum; et hoc propter connaturalitatem intellectus
+nostri ad res compositas et temporales. Pronomina vero
+demonstrativa dicuntur de Deo, secundum quod faciunt
+demonstrationem ad id quod intelligitur, non ad id quod sentitur,
+secundum enim quod a nobis intelligitur, secundum hoc sub
+demonstratione cadit. Et sic, secundum illum modum quo nomina et
+participia et pronomina demonstrativa de Deo dicuntur, secundum hoc
+et pronominibus relativis significari potest.</p>
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2" next="FP_Q13_A3" prev="FP_Q13_A1" progress="1.96%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p0.1">Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?</h4>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene
+says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God signifies not His
+substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some
+relation, or something following from His nature or operation."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28797"><span class=
+"ref">[28797] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo
+substantialiter. Dicit enim Damascenus, <i>oportet singulum eorum
+quae de Deo dicuntur, non quid est secundum substantiam
+significare, sed quid non est ostendere, aut habitudinem quandam,
+aut aliquid eorum quae assequuntur naturam vel operationem</i>.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God." Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him
   substantially.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p7"> But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good," "wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like
-  manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other names.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p8"> Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28798"><span class=
+"ref">[28798] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dicit
+Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., <i>omnem sanctorum theologorum
+hymnum invenies, ad bonos thearchiae processus, manifestative et
+laudative Dei nominationes dividentem</i>, et est sensus, quod
+nomina quae in divinam laudem sancti doctores assumunt, secundum
+processus ipsius Dei distinguuntur. Sed quod significat processum
+alicuius rei, nihil significat ad eius essentiam pertinens. Ergo
+nomina dicta de Deo, non dicuntur de ipso substantialiter.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God
+is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore
+neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28799"><span class=
+"ref">[28799] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum hoc nominatur aliquid a nobis, secundum quod intelligitur.
+Sed non intelligitur Deus a nobis in hac vita secundum suam
+substantiam. Ergo nec aliquod nomen impositum a nobis, dicitur de
+Deo secundum suam substantiam.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p5"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the
+being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that
+simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of
+this kind signify the divine substance.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28800"><span class=
+"ref">[28800] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Augustinus, VI de Trin., <i>Deo hoc est esse, quod
+fortem esse vel sapientem esse, et si quid de illa simplicitate
+dixeris, quo eius substantia significatur</i>. Ergo omnia nomina
+huiusmodi significant divinam substantiam.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p7"> But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good," "wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like
+  manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other names.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p8"> Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He
   is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the
-  He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p9"> Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God prepossesses in Himself all the
+  He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p9"> Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God prepossesses in Himself all the
   perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p9.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4], A[3]</a>), in treating
   of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes
   goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we are."</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.</p>
-</div>
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 2 co."><a name="28801"><span class=
+"ref">[28801] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod de nominibus quae de Deo dicuntur negative, vel quae
+relationem ipsius ad creaturam significant, manifestum est quod
+substantiam eius nullo modo significant; sed remotionem alicuius ab
+ipso, vel relationem eius ad alium, vel potius alicuius ad ipsum.
+Sed de nominibus quae absolute et affirmative de Deo dicuntur,
+sicut bonus, sapiens, et huiusmodi, multipliciter aliqui sunt
+opinati. Quidam enim dixerunt quod haec omnia nomina, licet
+affirmative de Deo dicantur, tamen magis inventa sunt ad aliquid
+removendum a Deo, quam ad aliquid ponendum in ipso. Unde dicunt
+quod, cum dicimus Deum esse viventem, significamus quod Deus non
+hoc modo est, sicut res inanimatae, et similiter accipiendum est in
+aliis. Et hoc posuit Rabbi Moyses. Alii vero dicunt quod haec
+nomina imposita sunt ad significandum habitudinem eius ad creata,
+ut, cum dicimus Deus est bonus, sit sensus, Deus est causa
+bonitatis in rebus. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Sed utrumque
+istorum videtur esse inconveniens, propter tria. Primo quidem, quia
+secundum neutram harum positionum posset assignari ratio quare
+quaedam nomina magis de Deo dicerentur quam alia. Sic enim est
+causa corporum, sicut est causa bonorum, unde, si nihil aliud
+significatur, cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nisi Deus est causa
+bonorum, poterit similiter dici quod Deus est corpus, quia est
+causa corporum. Item, per hoc quod dicitur quod est corpus,
+removetur quod non sit ens in potentia tantum, sicut materia prima.
+Secundo, quia sequeretur quod omnia nomina dicta de Deo, per
+posterius dicerentur de ipso, sicut sanum per posterius dicitur de
+medicina, eo quod significat hoc tantum quod sit causa sanitatis in
+animali, quod per prius dicitur sanum. Tertio, quia hoc est contra
+intentionem loquentium de Deo. Aliud enim intendunt dicere, cum
+dicunt Deum viventem, quam quod sit causa vitae nostrae, vel quod
+differat a corporibus inanimatis. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod
+huiusmodi quidem nomina significant substantiam divinam, et
+praedicantur de Deo substantialiter, sed deficiunt a
+repraesentatione ipsius. Quod sic patet. Significant enim sic
+nomina Deum, secundum quod intellectus noster cognoscit ipsum.
+Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, sic
+cognoscit ipsum, secundum quod creaturae ipsum repraesentant.
+Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in se praehabet omnes
+perfectiones creaturarum, quasi simpliciter et universaliter
+perfectus. Unde quaelibet creatura intantum eum repraesentat, et
+est ei similis, inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet, non tamen ita
+quod repraesentet eum sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis,
+sed sicut excellens principium, a cuius forma effectus deficiunt,
+cuius tamen aliqualem similitudinem effectus consequuntur; sicut
+formae corporum inferiorum repraesentant virtutem solarem. Et hoc
+supra expositum est, cum de perfectione divina agebatur. Sic igitur
+praedicta nomina divinam substantiam significant, imperfecte tamen,
+sicut et creaturae imperfecte eam repraesentant. Cum igitur dicitur
+Deus est bonus, non est sensus, Deus est causa bonitatis, vel Deus
+non est malus, sed est sensus, id quod bonitatem dicimus in
+creaturis, praeexistit in Deo, et hoc quidem secundum modum
+altiorem. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod Deo competat esse bonum
+inquantum causat bonitatem, sed potius e converso, quia est bonus,
+bonitatem rebus diffundit, secundum illud Augustini, de Doct.
+Christ., <i>inquantum bonus est, sumus</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection
+1:</b> Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is,
+forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is;
+but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures
+represent Him imperfectly.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28802"><span class=
+"ref">[28802] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Damascenus ideo dicit quod haec nomina non
+significant quid est Deus, quia a nullo istorum nominum exprimitur
+quid est Deus perfecte, sed unumquodque imperfecte eum significat,
+sicut et creaturae imperfecte eum repraesentant.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis"
   which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from
-  Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" next="FP_Q13_A4" prev="FP_Q13_A2" progress="2.00%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p0.1">Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1">(A[1])</a>. But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude." Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+  Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as
+life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more
+eminent way than can be understood or signified.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28803"><span class=
+"ref">[28803] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod in significatione nominum, aliud est quandoque a quo
+imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod significandum nomen
+imponitur, sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur ab eo quod laedit pedem,
+non tamen imponitur ad hoc significandum quod significet laedens
+pedem, sed ad significandam quandam speciem corporum; alioquin omne
+laedens pedem esset lapis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod huiusmodi
+divina nomina imponuntur quidem a processibus deitatis, sicut enim
+secundum diversos processus perfectionum, creaturae Deum
+repraesentant, licet imperfecte; ita intellectus noster, secundum
+unumquemque processum, Deum cognoscit et nominat. Sed tamen haec
+nomina non imponit ad significandum ipsos processus, ut, cum
+dicitur Deus est vivens, sit sensus, ab eo procedit vita, sed ad
+significandum ipsum rerum principium, prout in eo praeexistit vita,
+licet eminentiori modo quam intelligatur vel significetur.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection
+3:</b> We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is
+in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented in the
+perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him
+in that manner only.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28804"><span class=
+"ref">[28804] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod essentiam Dei in hac vita cognoscere non possumus
+secundum quod in se est, sed cognoscimus eam secundum quod
+repraesentatur in perfectionibus creaturarum. Et sic nomina a nobis
+imposita eam significant.</p>
+</div>
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" next="FP_Q13_A4" prev="FP_Q13_A2" progress="2.00%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p0.1">Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we
+apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained above <a
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p2.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1">(A[1])</a>. But the names of creatures
+are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or
+a lion, or the like. Therefore names are applied to God in a
+metaphorical sense.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28805"><span class=
+"ref">[28805] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo proprie. Omnia
+enim nomina quae de Deo dicimus, sunt a creaturis accepta, ut
+dictum est. Sed nomina creaturarum metaphorice dicuntur de Deo,
+sicut cum dicitur Deus est lapis, vel leo, vel aliquid huiusmodi.
+Ergo omnia nomina dicta de Deo, dicuntur metaphorice.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be
+withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such names as
+"good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God than
+given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says
+(Coel. Hier. ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their
+literal sense.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28806"><span class=
+"ref">[28806] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullum nomen proprie dicitur de aliquo, a quo verius removetur quam
+de eo praedicetur. Sed omnia huiusmodi nomina, bonus sapiens, et
+similia, verius removentur a Deo quam de eo praedicentur, ut patet
+per Dionysium, II cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo nullum istorum nominum
+proprie dicitur de Deo.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense
+only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some kind of
+corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and
+composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these names
+are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28807"><span class=
+"ref">[28807] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+nomina corporum non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice, cum sit
+incorporeus. Sed omnia huiusmodi nomina implicant quasdam
+corporales conditiones, significant enim cum tempore, et cum
+compositione, et cum aliis huiusmodi, quae sunt conditiones
+corporum. Ergo omnia huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo
+metaphorice.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p5"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which
+express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express
+the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are
+applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude." Therefore not all
+names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some
+which are said of Him in their literal sense.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28808"><span class=
+"ref">[28808] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Ambrosius, in Lib. II de fide, <i>sunt quaedam nomina,
+quae evidenter proprietatem divinitatis ostendunt; et quaedam quae
+perspicuam divinae maiestatis exprimunt veritatem; alia vero sunt,
+quae translative per similitudinem de Deo dicuntur</i>. Non igitur
+omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo metaphorice, sed aliqua dicuntur
+proprie.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God---viz. the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification.
-  As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+  As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to
+God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied
+primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do
+not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of
+signification applies to creatures.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 3 co."><a name="28809"><span class=
+"ref">[28809] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, sicut dictum est, Deum cognoscimus ex perfectionibus
+procedentibus in creaturas ab ipso; quae quidem perfectiones in Deo
+sunt secundum eminentiorem modum quam in creaturis. Intellectus
+autem noster eo modo apprehendit eas, secundum quod sunt in
+creaturis, et secundum quod apprehendit, ita significat per nomina.
+In nominibus igitur quae Deo attribuimus, est duo considerare,
+scilicet, perfectiones ipsas significatas, ut bonitatem, vitam, et
+huiusmodi; et modum significandi. Quantum igitur ad id quod
+significant huiusmodi nomina, proprie competunt Deo, et magis
+proprie quam ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de eo. Quantum
+vero ad modum significandi, non proprie dicuntur de Deo, habent
+enim modum significandi qui creaturis competit.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their
-  signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and all life.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4" next="FP_Q13_A5" prev="FP_Q13_A3" progress="2.02%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether names applied to God are synonymous?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p0.1">Whether names applied to God are synonymous?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are vain notions.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy name" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.32.18" parsed="vul|Jer|32|18|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p5.1" passage="Jer. 32:18">Jer. 32:18</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
+  signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like,
+and such names can be literally applied to God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28810"><span class=
+"ref">[28810] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod quaedam nomina significant huiusmodi perfectiones a
+Deo procedentes in res creatas, hoc modo quod ipse modus
+imperfectus quo a creatura participatur divina perfectio, in ipso
+nominis significato includitur, sicut lapis significat aliquid
+materialiter ens, et huiusmodi nomina non possunt attribui Deo nisi
+metaphorice. Quaedam vero nomina significant ipsas perfectiones
+absolute, absque hoc quod aliquis modus participandi claudatur in
+eorum significatione, ut ens, bonum vivens, et huiusmodi, et talia
+proprie dicuntur de Deo.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for
+the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to Him in the
+ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence
+Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and all life.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28811"><span class=
+"ref">[28811] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ideo huiusmodi nomina dicit Dionysius negari a Deo,
+quia id quod significatur per nomen, non convenit eo modo ei, quo
+nomen significat, sed excellentiori modo. Unde ibidem dicit
+Dionysius quod Deus est super omnem substantiam et vitam.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection
+3:</b> These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal
+conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their mode of
+signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically
+imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28812"><span class=
+"ref">[28812] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ista nomina quae proprie dicuntur de Deo important
+conditiones corporales, non in ipso significato nominis, sed
+quantum ad modum significandi. Ea vero quae metaphorice de Deo
+dicuntur, important conditionem corporalem in ipso suo
+significato.</p>
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4" next="FP_Q13_A5" prev="FP_Q13_A3" progress="2.02%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether names applied to God are synonymous?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p0.1">Whether names applied to God are synonymous?</h4>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For
+synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these
+names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the
+goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His
+wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28813"><span class=
+"ref">[28813] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod ista nomina dicta de Deo, sint nomina
+synonyma. Synonyma enim nomina dicuntur, quae omnino idem
+significant. Sed ista nomina dicta de Deo, omnino idem significant
+in Deo, quia bonitas Dei est eius essentia, et similiter sapientia.
+Ergo ista nomina sunt omnino synonyma.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in
+reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea to which
+no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are
+many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are
+vain notions.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28814"><span class=
+"ref">[28814] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod
+ista nomina significant idem secundum rem, sed secundum rationes
+diversas, contra, ratio cui non respondet aliquid in re, est vana;
+si ergo istae rationes sunt multae, et res est una, videtur quod
+rationes istae sint vanae.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than
+what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is supremely
+one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in
+idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify different
+ideas; and thus they are synonymous.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28815"><span class=
+"ref">[28815] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, magis
+est unum quod est unum re et ratione, quam quod est unum re et
+multiplex ratione. Sed Deus est maxime unus. Ergo videtur quod non
+sit unus re et multiplex ratione. Et sic nomina dicta de Deo non
+significant rationes diversas, et ita sunt synonyma.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p5"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as
+when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to God
+are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet
+it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts
+is Thy name" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.32.18"
+parsed="vul|Jer|32|18|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p5.1"
+passage="Jer. 32:18">Jer. 32:18</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28816"><span class=
+"ref">[28816] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnia
+synonyma, sibi invicem adiuncta, nugationem adducunt, sicut si
+dicatur vestis indumentum. Si igitur omnia nomina dicta de Deo sunt
+synonyma, non posset convenienter dici Deus bonus, vel aliquid
+huiusmodi; cum tamen scriptum sit Ierem. XXXII, <i>fortissime,
+magne, potens, dominus exercituum nomen tibi</i>.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2">(A[2])</a>, that these names signify the divine substance, although in an
   imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As
   therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied to God signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not
   synonymous.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p7"> Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things represent Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5" next="FP_Q13_A6" prev="FP_Q13_A4" progress="2.05%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of  them?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p0.1">Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?</h4>
-
-
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 4 co."><a name="28817"><span class=
+"ref">[28817] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo, non sunt synonyma. Quod quidem
+facile esset videre, si diceremus quod huiusmodi nomina sunt
+inducta ad removendum, vel ad designandum habitudinem causae
+respectu creaturarum, sic enim essent diversae rationes horum
+nominum secundum diversa negata, vel secundum diversos effectus
+connotatos. Sed secundum quod dictum est huiusmodi nomina
+substantiam divinam significare, licet imperfecte, etiam plane
+apparet, secundum praemissa, quod habent rationes diversas. Ratio
+enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de re
+significata per nomen. Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum
+ex creaturis, format ad intelligendum Deum conceptiones
+proportionatas perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas.
+Quae quidem perfectiones in Deo praeexistunt unite et simpliciter,
+in creaturis vero recipiuntur divise et multipliciter. Sicut igitur
+diversis perfectionibus creaturarum respondet unum simplex
+principium, repraesentatum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum
+varie et multipliciter; ita variis et multiplicibus conceptibus
+intellectus nostri respondet unum omnino simplex, secundum
+huiusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Et ideo nomina Deo
+attributa, licet significent unam rem, tamen, quia significant eam
+sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p7"> Thus appears the
+solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one
+thing under one aspect; for words which signify different aspects of
+one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because
+the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the
+intellectual conception, as was said above.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28818"><span class=
+"ref">[28818] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et sic patet
+solutio ad primum, quia nomina synonyma dicuntur, quae significant
+unum secundum unam rationem. Quae enim significant rationes
+diversas unius rei, non primo et per se unum significant, quia
+nomen non significat rem, nisi mediante conceptione intellectus, ut
+dictum est.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for
+there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by
+them in a manifold and imperfect manner.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28819"><span class=
+"ref">[28819] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod rationes plures horum nominum non sunt cassae et
+vanae, quia omnibus eis respondet unum quid simplex, per omnia
+huiusmodi multipliciter et imperfecte repraesentatum.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection
+3:</b> The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and
+divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it
+comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea,
+because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things
+represent Him.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28820"><span class=
+"ref">[28820] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod hoc ipsum ad perfectam Dei unitatem pertinet, quod ea
+quae sunt multipliciter et divisim in aliis, in ipso sunt
+simpliciter et unite. Et ex hoc contingit quod est unus re et
+plures secundum rationem, quia intellectus noster ita multipliciter
+apprehendit eum, sicut res multipliciter ipsum repraesentant.</p>
+</div>
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5" next="FP_Q13_A6" prev="FP_Q13_A4" progress="2.05%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of  them?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p0.1">Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally---viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some
-  agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is predicated univocally.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the word of Genesis (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.1.26" parsed="vul|Gen|1|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p3.1" passage="Gn. 1:26">Gn. 1:26</scripRef>), "Let us make man to our image and likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p6"> Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+  agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although
+the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the
+first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal
+agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is predicated
+univocally.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28821"><span class=
+"ref">[28821] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis,
+univoce de ipsis dicantur. Omne enim aequivocum reducitur ad
+univocum, sicut multa ad unum. Nam si hoc nomen canis aequivoce
+dicitur de latrabili et marino, oportet quod de aliquibus univoce
+dicatur, scilicet de omnibus latrabilibus, aliter enim esset
+procedere in infinitum. Inveniuntur autem quaedam agentia univoca,
+quae conveniunt cum suis effectibus in nomine et definitione, ut
+homo generat hominem; quaedam vero agentia aequivoca, sicut sol
+causat calidum, cum tamen ipse non sit calidus nisi aequivoce.
+Videtur igitur quod primum agens, ad quod omnia agentia reducuntur,
+sit agens univocum. Et ita, quae de Deo et creaturis dicuntur,
+univoce praedicantur.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as
+creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the word of
+Genesis (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.1.26"
+parsed="vul|Gen|1|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p3.1"
+passage="Gn. 1:26">Gn. 1:26</scripRef>), "Let us make man to our image
+and likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and
+creatures univocally.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28822"><span class=
+"ref">[28822] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum aequivoca non attenditur aliqua similitudo. Cum igitur
+creaturae ad Deum sit aliqua similitudo, secundum illud Genes. I,
+<i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram</i>,
+videtur quod aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis dicatur.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is
+the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous with
+creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to
+creatures.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28823"><span class=
+"ref">[28823] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+mensura est homogenea mensurato, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed Deus
+est prima mensura omnium entium, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo Deus est
+homogeneus creaturis. Et ita aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis
+dici potest.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p6"> Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.</p>
+</div>
+<div xml:lang="la">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 1"><a name="28824"><span class=
+"ref">[28824] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra,
+quidquid praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen et non
+secundum eandem rationem, praedicatur de eis aequivoce. Sed nullum
+nomen convenit Deo secundum illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur
+de creatura, nam sapientia in creaturis est qualitas, non autem in
+Deo; genus autem variatum mutat rationem, cum sit pars
+definitionis. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Quidquid ergo de Deo et
+creaturis dicitur, aequivoce dicitur.</p>
+<p title="I q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 2"><a name="28825"><span class=
+"ref">[28825] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
+plus distat a creaturis, quam quaecumque creaturae ab invicem. Sed
+propter distantiam quarundam creaturarum, contingit quod nihil
+univoce de eis praedicari potest; sicut de his quae non conveniunt
+in aliquo genere. Ergo multo minus de Deo et creaturis aliquid
+univoce praedicatur, sed omnia praedicantur aequivoce.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms
   in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we
   apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms.
-  Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p8"> Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by
-  the things that are made" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.1.20" parsed="vul|Rom|1|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p8.1" passage="Rom. 1:20">Rom. 1:20</scripRef>). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p9"> Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures
+  Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p8"> Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by
+  the things that are made" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.1.20" parsed="vul|Rom|1|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p8.1" passage="Rom. 1:20">Rom. 1:20</scripRef>). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p9"> Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures
   analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1">(A[1])</a>. Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the
   same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.</p>
 </div>
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 5 co."><a name="28826"><span class=
+"ref">[28826] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis
+univoce. Quia omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis,
+recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed
+deficienter, ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in
+effectibus, in causa est simpliciter et eodem modo; sicut sol
+secundum unam virtutem, multiformes et varias formas in istis
+inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est, omnes rerum
+perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter,
+in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad
+perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam
+perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis,
+puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam
+perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab
+esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo
+dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia
+vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen sapiens de
+homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem
+significatam, non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem
+significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis
+significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc
+nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de
+aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur.
+Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum
+hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari;
+sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam
+contra philosophos, qui multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam
+etiam contra apostolum dicentem, Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea
+quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>. Dicendum est igitur
+quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum
+analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in
+nominibus, vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum
+dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et
+proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est,
+illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad
+alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum
+medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo
+aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce
+pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex
+creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et
+creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad
+Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter
+omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus communitatis medius est
+inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim
+in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in
+univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen
+quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad
+aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dictum, significat signum
+sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam
+eiusdem sanitatis.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a
   particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal
   analogical predication, which is being.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4], A[3]</a>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the same genus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p13"> The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6" next="FP_Q13_A7" prev="FP_Q13_A5" progress="2.10%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p0.1">Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.3.14-Eph.3.15" parsed="vul|Eph|3|14|3|15" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p5.1" passage="Eph. 3:14,15">Eph. 3:14,15</scripRef>); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28827"><span class=
+"ref">[28827] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, licet in praedicationibus oporteat aequivoca ad
+univoca reduci, tamen in actionibus agens non univocum ex
+necessitate praecedit agens univocum. Agens enim non univocum est
+causa universalis totius speciei, ut sol est causa generationis
+omnium hominum. Agens vero univocum non est causa agens universalis
+totius speciei (alioquin esset causa sui ipsius, cum sub specie
+contineatur), sed est causa particularis respectu huius individui,
+quod in participatione speciei constituit. Causa igitur universalis
+totius speciei non est agens univocum. Causa autem universalis est
+prior particulari. Hoc autem agens universale, licet non sit
+univocum, non tamen est omnino aequivocum, quia sic non faceret
+sibi simile; sed potest dici agens analogicum, sicut in
+praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum, non
+univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p11"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does
+not represent one and the same generic thing (<a
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4],
+A[3]</a>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28828"><span class=
+"ref">[28828] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod similitudo creaturae ad Deum est imperfecta, quia
+etiam nec idem secundum genus repraesentat, ut supra dictum
+est.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p12"><b>Reply to Objection
+3:</b> God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence
+it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the same
+genus.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A5-p13"> The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.</p>
+</div>
+<div xml:lang="la">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28829"><span class=
+"ref">[28829] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod Deus non est mensura proportionata mensuratis. Unde
+non oportet quod Deus et creaturae sub uno genere contineantur.</p>
+<p title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28830"><span class=
+"ref">[28830] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ea vero quae sunt
+in contrarium, concludunt quod non univoce huiusmodi nomina de Deo
+et creaturis praedicentur, non autem quod aequivoce.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6" next="FP_Q13_A7" prev="FP_Q13_A5" progress="2.10%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p0.1">Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?</h4><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of
+God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since "names", as
+the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know creatures
+before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are predicated
+primarily of creatures rather than of God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28831"><span class=
+"ref">[28831] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod nomina per prius dicantur de creaturis
+quam de Deo. Secundum enim quod cognoscimus aliquid, secundum hoc
+illud nominamus; cum nomina, secundum philosophum, sint signa
+intellectuum. Sed per prius cognoscimus creaturam quam Deum. Ergo
+nomina a nobis imposita, per prius conveniunt creaturis quam
+Deo.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from creatures."
+But names transferred from creatures to God, are said primarily of
+creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the
+like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied
+primarily to creatures rather than to God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28832"><span class=
+"ref">[28832] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum Dionysium, in libro de Div. Nom., Deum ex creaturis
+nominamus. Sed nomina a creaturis translata in Deum, per prius
+dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo; sicut leo, lapis, et huiusmodi.
+Ergo omnia nomina quae de Deo et de creaturis dicuntur, per prius
+de creaturis quam de Deo dicuntur.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied
+to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De Mystica
+Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied
+to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily predicated of animal
+rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these
+names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28833"><span class=
+"ref">[28833] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnia
+nomina quae communiter de Deo et creaturis dicuntur, dicuntur de
+Deo sicut de causa omnium, ut dicit Dionysius. Sed quod dicitur de
+aliquo per causam, per posterius de illo dicitur, per prius enim
+dicitur animal sanum quam medicina, quae est causa sanitatis. Ergo
+huiusmodi nomina per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p5"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our
+Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named"
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.3.14-Eph.3.15"
+parsed="vul|Eph|3|14|3|15" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p5.1"
+passage="Eph. 3:14,15">Eph. 3:14,15</scripRef>); and the same applies
+to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names
+are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28834"><span class=
+"ref">[28834] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Ephes. III, <i>flecto genua mea ad patrem domini
+nostri Iesu, ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra
+nominatur</i>. Et eadem ratio videtur de nominibus aliis quae de
+Deo et creaturis dicuntur. Ergo huiusmodi nomina per prius de Deo
+quam de creaturis dicuntur.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first.
   Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For
   as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as
   the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A2">(A[2])</a>, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that
-  He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3">(A[3])</a>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection refers to the imposition of the name.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as "healthy" is applied to medicine.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7" next="FP_Q13_A8" prev="FP_Q13_A6" progress="2.13%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God  temporally?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p0.1">Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?</h4>
-
-
-
+  He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him
+in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies,
+these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures,
+because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards
+the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to
+creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification
+which belongs to creatures, as said above <a
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p6.2"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3">(A[3])</a>.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 6 co."><a name="28835"><span class=
+"ref">[28835] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur,
+necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum, et ideo
+illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia
+ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV
+Metaphys., necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de eo
+quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis,
+secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud primum vel magis vel
+minus, sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione
+sani quod dicitur de medicina, quae dicitur sana inquantum causat
+sanitatem in animali; et in definitione sani quod dicitur de urina,
+quae dicitur sana inquantum est signum sanitatis animalis. Sic ergo
+omnia nomina quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, per prius de
+creaturis dicuntur quam de Deo, quia dicta de Deo, nihil aliud
+significant quam similitudines ad tales creaturas. Sicut enim
+ridere, dictum de prato, nihil aliud significat quam quod pratum
+similiter se habet in decore cum floret, sicut homo cum ridet,
+secundum similitudinem proportionis; sic nomen leonis, dictum de
+Deo, nihil aliud significat quam quod Deus similiter se habet ut
+fortiter operetur in suis operibus, sicut leo in suis. Et sic patet
+quod, secundum quod dicuntur de Deo, eorum significatio definiri
+non potest, nisi per illud quod de creaturis dicitur. De aliis
+autem nominibus, quae non metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, esset etiam
+eadem ratio, si dicerentur de Deo causaliter tantum, ut quidam
+posuerunt. Sic enim. Cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nihil aliud esset
+quam Deus est causa bonitatis creaturae, et sic hoc nomen bonum,
+dictum de Deo, clauderet in suo intellectu bonitatem creaturae.
+Unde bonum per prius diceretur de creatura quam de Deo. Sed supra
+ostensum est quod huiusmodi nomina non solum dicuntur de Deo
+causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter. Cum enim dicitur Deus est
+bonus, vel sapiens, non solum significatur quod ipse sit causa
+sapientiae vel bonitatis, sed quod haec in eo eminentius
+praeexistunt. Unde, secundum hoc, dicendum est quod, quantum ad rem
+significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de
+creaturis, quia a Deo huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant.
+Sed quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur
+creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus. Unde et modum significandi
+habent qui competit creaturis, ut supra dictum est.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p7"><b>Reply to Objection
+1:</b> This objection refers to the imposition of the name.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28836"><span class=
+"ref">[28836] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quantum ad impositionem
+nominis.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p8"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other
+names, as said above.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28837"><span class=
+"ref">[28837] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de nominibus quae metaphorice de
+Deo dicuntur, et de aliis, ut dictum est.</p>
+</div><div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A6-p9"><b>Reply to Objection
+3:</b> This objection would be valid if these names were applied to
+God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as "healthy"
+is applied to medicine.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28838"><span class=
+"ref">[28838] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod obiectio illa procederet, si huiusmodi nomina solum
+de Deo causaliter dicerentur et non essentialiter, sicut sanum de
+medicina.</p>
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7" next="FP_Q13_A8" prev="FP_Q13_A6" progress="2.13%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God  temporally?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p0.1">Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but
   eternally.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally.</p>
-</div>
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28839"><span class=
+"ref">[28839] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod nomina quae important relationem ad
+creaturas, non dicantur de Deo ex tempore. Omnia enim huiusmodi
+nomina significant divinam substantiam, ut communiter dicitur. Unde
+et Ambrosius dicit quod hoc nomen dominus est nomen potestatis,
+quae est divina substantia, et creator significat Dei actionem,
+quae est eius essentia. Sed divina substantia non est temporalis,
+sed aeterna. Ergo huiusmodi nomina non dicuntur de Deo ex tempore,
+sed ab aeterno.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described
+as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to make does
+no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God
+temporally.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28840"><span class=
+"ref">[28840] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+cuicumque convenit aliquid ex tempore, potest dici factum, quod
+enim ex tempore est album, fit album. Sed Deo non convenit esse
+factum. Ergo de Deo nihil praedicatur ex tempore.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.31.3" parsed="vul|Jer|31|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p4.1" passage="Jer. 31:3">Jer. 31:3</scripRef>). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as
   "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from eternity.</p>
-</div>
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28841"><span class=
+"ref">[28841] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
+aliqua nomina dicuntur de Deo ex tempore propter hoc quod important
+relationem ad creaturas, eadem ratio videtur de omnibus quae
+relationem ad creaturas important. Sed quaedam nomina importantia
+relationem ad creaturas, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, ab aeterno
+enim scivit creaturam et dilexit, secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, <i>in
+caritate perpetua dilexi te</i>. Ergo et alia nomina quae important
+relationem ad creaturas, ut dominus et creator, dicuntur de Deo ab
+aeterno.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied
   to God temporally.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.</p>
-</div>
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="28842"><span class=
+"ref">[28842] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+huiusmodi nomina relationem significant. Oportet igitur quod
+relatio illa vel sit aliquid in Deo, vel in creatura tantum. Sed
+non potest esse quod sit in creatura tantum, quia sic Deus
+denominaretur dominus a relatione opposita, quae est in creaturis;
+nihil autem denominatur a suo opposito. Relinquitur ergo quod
+relatio est etiam aliquid in Deo. Sed in Deo nihil potest esse ex
+tempore, cum ipse sit supra tempus. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi
+nomina non dicantur de Deo ex tempore.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b>
+Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord
+from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of
+lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God
+is not really Lord, which is plainly false.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 5"><a name="28843"><span class=
+"ref">[28843] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum relationem dicitur aliquid relative, puta secundum
+dominium dominus, sicut secundum albedinem albus. Si igitur relatio
+dominii non est in Deo secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem,
+sequitur quod Deus non sit realiter dominus, quod patet esse
+falsum.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p7"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from
   eternity, and not temporally.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p8"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p9"><b>I answer that,</b> The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 6"><a name="28844"><span class=
+"ref">[28844] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, in
+relativis quae non sunt simul natura, unum potest esse, altero non
+existente, sicut scibile existit, non existente scientia, ut
+dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed relativa quae dicuntur de Deo et
+creaturis, non sunt simul natura. Ergo potest aliquid dici relative
+de Deo ad creaturam, etiam creatura non existente. Et sic huiusmodi
+nomina, dominus et creator, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, et non ex
+tempore.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p8"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative
+appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28845"><span class=
+"ref">[28845] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Augustinus, V de Trin., quod haec relativa appellatio
+dominus Deo convenit ex tempore.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p9"><b>I answer that,</b>
+The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God
+temporally, and not from eternity.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p10"> To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension
-  of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between "being" and "non-being" formed by reason, apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p11"> Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p12"> Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge
+  of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between "being" and "non-being" formed by reason, apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p11"> Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p12"> Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge
   or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a
-  column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p13"> Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason
+  column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p13"> Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason
   of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.</p>
 </div>
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 co."><a name="28846"><span class=
+"ref">[28846] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod quaedam nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam, ex tempore
+de Deo dicuntur, et non ab aeterno. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum
+est quod quidam posuerunt relationem non esse rem naturae, sed
+rationis tantum. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum, ex hoc quod ipsae
+res naturalem ordinem et habitudinem habent ad invicem. Veruntamen
+sciendum est quod, cum relatio requirat duo extrema, tripliciter se
+habere potest ad hoc quod sit res naturae et rationis. Quandoque
+enim ex utraque parte est res rationis tantum, quando scilicet ordo
+vel habitudo non potest esse inter aliqua, nisi secundum
+apprehensionem rationis tantum, utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem.
+Nam secundum quod ratio apprehendit bis aliquod unum, statuit illud
+ut duo; et sic apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum.
+Et similiter est de omnibus relationibus quae sunt inter ens et non
+ens; quas format ratio, inquantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam
+extremum. Et idem est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur
+actum rationis, ut genus et species, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero
+relationes sunt, quantum ad utrumque extremum, res naturae, quando
+scilicet est habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter
+conveniens utrique. Sicut patet de omnibus relationibus quae
+consequuntur quantitatem, ut magnum et parvum, duplum et dimidium,
+et huiusmodi, nam quantitas est in utroque extremorum. Et simile
+est de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem et passionem, ut
+motivum et mobile, pater et filius, et similia. Quandoque vero
+relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae, et in altero est res
+rationis tantum. Et hoc contingit quandocumque duo extrema non sunt
+unius ordinis. Sicut sensus et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et
+scibile, quae quidem, inquantum sunt res quaedam in esse naturali
+existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et intelligibilis,
+et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio realis, secundum
+quod ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res ipsae in se
+consideratae, sunt extra ordinem huiusmodi. Unde in eis non est
+aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum; sed secundum
+rationem tantum, inquantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos
+relationum scientiae et sensus. Unde philosophus dicit, in V
+Metaphys., quod non dicuntur relative eo quod ipsa referantur ad
+alia, sed quia alia referuntur ad ipsa. Et similiter dextrum non
+dicitur de columna, nisi inquantum ponitur animali ad dextram, unde
+huiusmodi relatio non est realiter in columna, sed in animali. Cum
+igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes creaturae
+ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converso, manifestum est quod
+creaturae realiter referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est
+aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem
+tantum, inquantum creaturae referuntur ad ipsum. Et sic nihil
+prohibet huiusmodi nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam,
+praedicari de Deo ex tempore, non propter aliquam mutationem
+ipsius, sed propter creaturae mutationem; sicut columna fit dextera
+animali, nulla mutatione circa ipsam existente, sed animali
+translato.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and "son," and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the
   same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are
-  said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly.</p>
-</div>
+  said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either
+principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either
+directly or indirectly.</p>
 
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p15"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.89.1" parsed="vul|Ps|89|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p15.1" passage="Ps. 89:1">Ps. 89:1</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p16"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like.</p>
-</div>
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28847"><span class=
+"ref">[28847] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas
+habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater et filius, et
+huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundum esse. Quaedam vero
+sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam
+habitudines, sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia
+huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum dici. Sic igitur et
+circa nomina divina haec differentia est consideranda. Nam quaedam
+significant ipsam habitudinem ad creaturam, ut dominus. Et
+huiusmodi non significant substantiam divinam directe, sed
+indirecte, inquantum praesupponunt ipsam, sicut dominium
+praesupponit potestatem, quae est divina substantia. Quaedam vero
+significant directe essentiam divinam, et ex consequenti important
+habitudinem; sicut salvator, creator, et huiusmodi, significant
+actionem Dei, quae est eius essentia. Utraque tamen nomina ex
+tempore de Deo dicuntur quantum ad habitudinem quam important, vel
+principaliter vel consequenter, non autem quantum ad hoc quod
+significant essentiam, vel directe vel indirecte.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p15"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our
+idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only in idea,
+with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art
+become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.89.1" parsed="vul|Ps|89|1|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p15.1"
+passage="Ps. 89:1">Ps. 89:1</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28848"><span class=
+"ref">[28848] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut relationes quae de Deo dicuntur ex tempore,
+non sunt in Deo nisi secundum rationem, ita nec fieri nec factum
+esse dicitur de Deo, nisi secundum rationem, nulla mutatione circa
+ipsum existente, sicut est id, <i>domine refugium factus es
+nobis</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p16"><b>Reply to Objection
+3:</b> The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator,
+therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the
+intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those
+following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of
+thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as
+"Saviour," "Creator," and the like.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28849"><span class=
+"ref">[28849] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod operatio intellectus et voluntatis est in operante,
+et ideo nomina quae significant relationes consequentes actionem
+intellectus vel voluntatis, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno. Quae vero
+consequuntur actiones procedentes, secundum modum intelligendi, ad
+exteriores effectus, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, ut salvator,
+creator, et huiusmodi.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p17"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the
-  Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p18"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.</p>
-</div>
-
+  Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable
+relatively because knowledge relates to it.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="28850"><span class=
+"ref">[28850] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod relationes significatae per huiusmodi nomina quae
+dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum,
+oppositae autem relationes in creaturis sunt secundum rem. Nec est
+inconveniens quod a relationibus realiter existentibus in re, Deus
+denominetur, tamen secundum quod cointelliguntur per intellectum
+nostrum oppositae relationes in Deo. Ut sic Deus dicatur relative
+ad creaturam, quia creatura refertur ad ipsum, sicut philosophus
+dicit, in V Metaphys., quod scibile dicitur relative, quia scientia
+refertur ad ipsum.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p18"><b>Reply to Objection
+5:</b> Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the
+creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is
+real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only,
+but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which
+the creature is subject to Him.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 5"><a name="28851"><span class=
+"ref">[28851] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod, cum ea ratione referatur Deus ad creaturam, qua
+creatura refertur ad ipsum; cum relatio subiectionis realiter sit
+in creatura, sequitur quod Deus non secundum rationem tantum, sed
+realiter sit dominus. Eo enim modo dicitur dominus, quo creatura ei
+subiecta est.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A7-p19"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science
   and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms,
   "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8" next="FP_Q13_A9" prev="FP_Q13_A7" progress="2.19%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether this name “God” is a name of the nature?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God {Theos} is so called from the {theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the {aithein}, that is to burn, for our God is a fire consuming all malice; or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all things." But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name "God" signifies His operation and not His nature.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not signify the divine nature.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the nature.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 6"><a name="28852"><span class=
+"ref">[28852] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 7 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
+quod, ad cognoscendum utrum relativa sint simul natura vel non, non
+oportet considerare ordinem rerum de quibus relativa dicuntur, sed
+significationes ipsorum relativorum. Si enim unum in sui intellectu
+claudat aliud et e converso, tunc sunt simul natura, sicut duplum
+et dimidium, pater et filius, et similia. Si autem unum in sui
+intellectu claudat aliud, et non e converso, tunc non sunt simul
+natura. Et hoc modo se habent scientia et scibile. Nam scibile
+dicitur secundum potentiam, scientia autem secundum habitum, vel
+secundum actum. Unde scibile, secundum modum suae significationis,
+praeexistit scientiae. Sed si accipiatur scibile secundum actum,
+tunc est simul cum scientia secundum actum, nam scitum non est
+aliquid nisi sit eius scientia. Licet igitur Deus sit prior
+creaturis, quia tamen in significatione domini clauditur quod
+habeat servum, et e converso, ista duo relativa, dominus et servus,
+sunt simul natura. Unde Deus non fuit dominus, antequam haberet
+creaturam sibi subiectam.</p>
+</div>
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8" next="FP_Q13_A9" prev="FP_Q13_A7" progress="2.19%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether this name “God” is a name of the nature?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?</h4>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the nature. For
+Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God {Theos} is so called from
+the {theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all things; or
+from the {aithein}, that is to burn, for our God is a fire consuming
+all malice; or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all things."
+But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name "God"
+signifies His operation and not His nature.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28853"><span class=
+"ref">[28853] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus non sit nomen naturae.
+Dicit enim Damascenus, in I libro, quod <i>Deus dicitur a
+theein</i>, quod est currere, et fovere universa; <i>vel ab
+aethein, idest ardere (Deus enim noster ignis consumens est omnem
+malitiam); vel a theasthai</i>, quod est considerare, omnia. Haec
+autem omnia ad operationem pertinent. Ergo hoc nomen Deus
+operationem significat, et non naturam.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature
+is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not signify the
+divine nature.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28854"><span class=
+"ref">[28854] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum hoc aliquid nominatur a nobis, secundum quod cognoscitur.
+Sed divina natura est nobis ignota. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non
+significat naturam divinam.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p4"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the
+nature.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28855"><span class=
+"ref">[28855] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro I de fide, quod Deus est nomen
+naturae.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in
-  themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p6"> Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as said in A[1]; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect
+  themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p6"> Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as said in A[1]; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect
   providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name "God" is imposed to signify the divine nature.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name "God."</p>
-</div>
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 8 co."><a name="28856"><span class=
+"ref">[28856] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod non est semper idem id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum,
+et id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Sicut enim substantiam
+rei ex proprietatibus vel operationibus eius cognoscimus, ita
+substantiam rei denominamus quandoque ab aliqua eius operatione vel
+proprietate, sicut substantiam lapidis denominamus ab aliqua
+actione eius, quia laedit pedem; non tamen hoc nomen impositum est
+ad significandum hanc actionem, sed substantiam lapidis. Si qua
+vero sunt quae secundum se sunt nota nobis, ut calor, frigus,
+albedo, et huiusmodi, non ab aliis denominantur. Unde in talibus
+idem est quod nomen significat, et id a quo imponitur nomen ad
+significandum. Quia igitur Deus non est notus nobis in sui natura,
+sed innotescit nobis ex operationibus vel effectibus eius, ex his
+possumus eum nominare, ut supra dictum est. Unde hoc nomen Deus est
+nomen operationis, quantum ad id a quo imponitur ad significandum.
+Imponitur enim hoc nomen ab universali rerum providentia, omnes
+enim loquentes de Deo, hoc intendunt nominare Deum, quod habet
+providentiam universalem de rebus. Unde dicit Dionysius, XII cap.
+de Div. Nom., quod <i>deitas est quae omnia videt providentia et
+bonitate perfecta</i>. Ex hac autem operatione hoc nomen Deus
+assumptum, impositum est ad significandum divinam naturam.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p7"><b>Reply to Objection
+1:</b> All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the
+source of the signification of the name "God."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28857"><span class=
+"ref">[28857] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod omnia quae posuit Damascenus, pertinent ad
+providentiam, a qua imponitur hoc nomen Deus ad significandum.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone" signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in
-  itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9" next="FP_Q13_A10" prev="FP_Q13_A8" progress="2.21%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether this name “God” is communicable?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is communicable?</h4>
-
-
-
+  itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and
+by way of causality, and of negation as stated above (<a
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8-p8.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Thus the name "God"
+signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify
+something existing above all things, the principle of all things and
+removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all
+this.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28858"><span class=
+"ref">[28858] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, secundum quod naturam alicuius rei ex eius
+proprietatibus et effectibus cognoscere possumus, sic eam nomine
+possumus significare. Unde, quia substantiam lapidis ex eius
+proprietate possumus cognoscere secundum seipsam, sciendo quid est
+lapis, hoc nomen lapis ipsam lapidis naturam, secundum quod in se
+est, significat, significat enim definitionem lapidis, per quam
+scimus quid est lapis. Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est
+definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. Sed ex effectibus divinis
+divinam naturam non possumus cognoscere secundum quod in se est, ut
+sciamus de ea quid est; sed per modum eminentiae et causalitatis et
+negationis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic hoc nomen Deus significat
+naturam divinam. Impositum est enim nomen hoc ad aliquid
+significandum supra omnia existens, quod est principium omnium, et
+remotum ab omnibus. Hoc enim intendunt significare nominantes
+Deum.</p>
+</div>
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9" next="FP_Q13_A10" prev="FP_Q13_A8" progress="2.21%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether this name “God” is communicable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is communicable?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Pet.1.4" parsed="vul|2Pet|1|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p2.1" passage="2 Pet. 1:4">2 Pet. 1:4</scripRef>). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to
   others.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.81.6" parsed="vul|Ps|81|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p3.1" passage="Ps. 81:6">Ps. 81:6</scripRef>). Therefore this name "God" is communicable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is communicable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.14.21" parsed="vul|Wis|14|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p5.1" passage="Wis. 14:21">Wis. 14:21</scripRef>), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28859"><span class=
+"ref">[28859] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus sit communicabile.
+Cuicumque enim communicatur res significata per nomen, communicatur
+et nomen ipsum. Sed hoc nomen Deus, ut dictum est, significat
+divinam naturam, quae est communicabilis aliis, secundum illud II
+Pet. I, <i>magna et pretiosa promissa nobis donavit, ut per hoc
+efficiamur divinae consortes naturae</i>. Ergo hoc nomen Deus est
+communicabile.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God"
+is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the fact
+that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are
+gods" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.81.6" parsed="vul|Ps|81|6|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p3.1"
+passage="Ps. 81:6">Ps. 81:6</scripRef>). Therefore this name "God" is
+communicable.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28860"><span class=
+"ref">[28860] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sola
+nomina propria non sunt communicabilia. Sed hoc nomen Deus non est
+nomen proprium, sed appellativum, quod patet ex hoc quod habet
+plurale, secundum illud Psalmi LXXXI, <i>ego dixi, dii estis</i>.
+Ergo hoc nomen Deus est communicabile.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other
+names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable; as
+"good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is
+communicable.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="28861"><span class=
+"ref">[28861] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, hoc
+nomen Deus imponitur ab operatione, ut dictum est. Sed alia nomina
+quae imponuntur Deo ab operationibus, sive ab effectibus, sunt
+communicabilia, ut bonus, sapiens et huiusmodi. Ergo et hoc nomen
+Deus est communicabile.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p5"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to
+wood and stones" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.14.21"
+parsed="vul|Wis|14|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p5.1"
+passage="Wis. 14:21">Wis. 14:21</scripRef>), in reference to the
+divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28862"><span class=
+"ref">[28862] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus
+imposuerunt</i>; et loquitur de nomine deitatis. Ergo hoc nomen
+Deus est nomen incommunicabile.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or
   strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the
   reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing
   cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum," but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be
   communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound
-  things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: "You served them who
-  by nature are not gods," (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gal.4.8" parsed="vul|Gal|4|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" passage="Gal. 4:8">Gal. 4:8</scripRef>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.81.6" parsed="vul|Ps|81|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.4" passage="Ps. 81:6">Ps. 81:6</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p8"> But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name "sun."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine nature.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10" next="FP_Q13_A11" prev="FP_Q13_A9" progress="2.25%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether this name “God” is applied to God univocally by nature, by  participation, and according to opinion?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is God." Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken of univocally.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God." Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied equivocally.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p6"> Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+  things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: "You served them who
+  by nature are not gods," (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gal.4.8" parsed="vul|Gal|4|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" passage="Gal. 4:8">Gal. 4:8</scripRef>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.81.6" parsed="vul|Ps|81|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.4" passage="Ps. 81:6">Ps. 81:6</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p8"> But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.</p>
+</div>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 co."><a name="28863"><span class=
+"ref">[28863] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod aliquod nomen potest esse communicabile dupliciter, uno modo,
+proprie; alio modo, per similitudinem. Proprie quidem communicabile
+est, quod secundum totam significationem nominis, est communicabile
+multis. Per similitudinem autem communicabile est, quod est
+communicabile secundum aliquid eorum quae includuntur in nominis
+significatione. Hoc enim nomen leo proprie communicatur omnibus
+illis in quibus invenitur natura quam significat hoc nomen leo, per
+similitudinem vero communicabile est illis qui participant aliquid
+leoninum, ut puta audaciam vel fortitudinem, qui metaphorice leones
+dicuntur. Ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt
+communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito
+singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel
+secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem, sicut natura humana
+communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solis
+non est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum;
+potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis
+existens. Et hoc ideo, quia intellectus intelligit naturam
+cuiuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari, unde esse in uno
+supposito singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectum
+naturae speciei, unde, servato intellectu naturae speciei, potest
+intelligi ut in pluribus existens. Sed singulare, ex hoc ipso quod
+est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. Unde omne nomen
+impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare, est incommunicabile
+et re et ratione, non enim potest nec in apprehensione cadere
+pluralitas huius individui. Unde nullum nomen significans aliquod
+individuum, est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum
+similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles,
+inquantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achillis, scilicet
+fortitudinem. Formae vero quae non individuantur per aliquod
+suppositum, sed per seipsas (quia scilicet sunt formae
+subsistentes), si intelligerentur secundum quod sunt in seipsis,
+non possent communicari nec re neque ratione; sed forte per
+similitudinem, sicut dictum est de individuis. Sed quia formas
+simplices per se subsistentes non possumus intelligere secundum
+quod sunt, sed intelligimus eas ad modum rerum compositarum
+habentium formas in materia; ideo, ut dictum est, imponimus eis
+nomina concreta significantia naturam in aliquo supposito. Unde,
+quantum pertinet ad rationem nominum, eadem ratio est de nominibus
+quae a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas rerum
+compositarum, et de nominibus quae a nobis imponuntur ad
+significandum naturas simplices subsistentes. Unde, cum hoc nomen
+Deus impositum sit ad significandum naturam divinam, ut dictum est;
+natura autem divina multiplicabilis non est, ut supra ostensum est,
+sequitur quod hoc nomen Deus incommunicabile quidem sit secundum
+rem, sed communicabile sit secundum opinionem, quemadmodum hoc
+nomen sol esset communicabile secundum opinionem ponentium multos
+soles. Et secundum hoc dicitur Gal. IV, <i>his qui natura non sunt
+dii, serviebatis</i>; Glossa, <i>non sunt dii natura, sed opinione
+hominum</i>. Est nihilominus communicabile hoc nomen Deus, non
+secundum suam totam significationem, sed secundum aliquid eius, per
+quandam similitudinem, ut dii dicantur, qui participant aliquid
+divinum per similitudinem, secundum illud, <i>ego dixi, dii
+estis</i>. Si vero esset aliquod nomen impositum ad significandum
+Deum non ex parte naturae, sed ex parte suppositi, secundum quod
+consideratur ut hoc aliquid, illud nomen esset omnibus modis
+incommunicabile, sicut forte est nomen tetragrammaton apud
+Hebraeos. Et est simile si quis imponeret nomen soli designans hoc
+individuum.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p9"><b>Reply to Objection
+1:</b> The divine nature is only communicable according to the
+participation of some similitude.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28864"><span class=
+"ref">[28864] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod natura divina non est communicabilis nisi secundum
+similitudinis participationem.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p10"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name,
+for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although God
+Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do
+not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of
+being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to
+the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name
+"sun."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28865"><span class=
+"ref">[28865] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus est nomen appellativum, et non
+proprium, quia significat naturam divinam ut in habente; licet ipse
+Deus, secundum rem, non sit nec universalis nec particularis.
+Nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum
+essendi secundum quod in cognitione nostra est. Et tamen, secundum
+rei veritatem, est incommunicabile, secundum quod dictum est de hoc
+nomine sol.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p11"><b>Reply to Objection
+3:</b> These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the
+perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify
+the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves
+absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But
+this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which
+we experience continually, to signify the divine nature.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="28866"><span class=
+"ref">[28866] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod haec nomina bonus, sapiens, et similia, imposita
+quidem sunt a perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas, non
+tamen sunt imposita ad significandum divinam naturam, sed ad
+significandum ipsas perfectiones absolute. Et ideo etiam secundum
+rei veritatem sunt communicabilia multis. Sed hoc nomen Deus
+impositum est ab operatione propria Deo, quam experimur continue,
+ad significandum divinam naturam.</p>
+</div>
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10" next="FP_Q13_A11" prev="FP_Q13_A9" progress="2.25%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether this name “God” is applied to God univocally by nature, by  participation, and according to opinion?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?</h4>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b>
+It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature,
+by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse
+signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and
+negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who
+says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is
+God." Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken of univocally.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28867"><span class=
+"ref">[28867] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus univoce dicatur de Deo per
+naturam, et per participationem, et secundum opinionem. Ubi enim
+est diversa significatio, non est contradictio affirmantis et
+negantis, aequivocatio enim impedit contradictionem sed Catholicus
+dicens idolum non est Deus, contradicit Pagano dicenti idolum est
+Deus. Ergo Deus utrobique sumptum univoce dicitur.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the
+enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not
+in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this
+supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this
+name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in
+opinion.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28868"><span class=
+"ref">[28868] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut idolum est Deus secundum opinionem et non secundum veritatem,
+ita fruitio carnalium delectationum dicitur felicitas secundum
+opinionem, et non secundum veritatem. Sed hoc nomen beatitudo
+univoce dicitur de hac beatitudine opinata, et de hac beatitudine
+vera. Ergo et hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur de Deo secundum
+veritatem, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now
+when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by the name
+God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the
+heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God." Therefore
+this name "God" is applied univocally to both.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28869"><span class=
+"ref">[28869] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+univoca dicuntur quorum est ratio una. Sed Catholicus, cum dicit
+unum esse Deum, intelligit nomine Dei rem omnipotentem, et super
+omnia venerandam, et hoc idem intelligit gentilis, cum dicit idolum
+esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur utrobique.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied equivocally.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p6"> Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion.</p>
+</div>
+<div xml:lang="la">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1"><a name="28870"><span class=
+"ref">[28870] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra,
+illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius quod est in re,
+ut dicitur in I Periherm. Sed animal, dictum de animali vero et de
+animali picto, aequivoce dicitur. Ergo hoc nomen Deus, dictum de
+Deo vero et de Deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur.</p>
+<p title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2"><a name="28871"><span class=
+"ref">[28871] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullus potest significare id quod non cognoscit, sed gentilis non
+cognoscit naturam divinam, ergo, cum dicit idolum est Deus, non
+significat veram deitatem. Hanc autem significat Catholicus dicens
+unum esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non dicitur univoce, sed
+aequivoce, de Deo vero, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition
-  of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p8"> The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
+  of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p8"> The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
   comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 co."><a name="28872"><span class=
+"ref">[28872] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod hoc nomen Deus, in praemissis tribus significationibus, non
+accipitur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice. Quod ex hoc
+patet. Quia univocorum est omnino eadem ratio, aequivocorum est
+omnino ratio diversa, in analogicis vero, oportet quod nomen
+secundum unam significationem acceptum, ponatur in definitione
+eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti. Sicut ens
+de substantia dictum, ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de
+accidente dicitur; et sanum dictum de animali, ponitur in
+definitione sani secundum quod dicitur de urina et de medicina;
+huius enim sani quod est in animali, urina est significativa, et
+medicina factiva. Sic accidit in proposito. Nam hoc nomen Deus,
+secundum quod pro Deo vero sumitur, in ratione Dei sumitur secundum
+quod dicitur Deus secundum opinionem vel participationem. Cum enim
+aliquem nominamus Deum secundum participationem, intelligimus
+nomine Dei aliquid habens similitudinem veri Dei. Similiter cum
+idolum nominamus Deum, hoc nomine Deus intelligimus significari
+aliquid, de quo homines opinantur quod sit Deus. Et sic manifestum
+est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis, sed una illarum
+significationum clauditur in significationibus aliis. Unde
+manifestum est quod analogice dicitur.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it
-  is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.95.5" parsed="vul|Ps|95|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p9.1" passage="Ps. 95:5">Ps. 95:5</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p10"> The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of different predicaments.</p>
-</div>
-
+  is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.95.5" parsed="vul|Ps|95|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p9.1" passage="Ps. 95:5">Ps. 95:5</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p10"> The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations.</p>
+</div>
+<div xml:lang="la">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28873"><span class=
+"ref">[28873] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod nominum multiplicitas non attenditur secundum nominis
+praedicationem, sed secundum significationem, hoc enim nomen homo,
+de quocumque praedicetur, sive vere sive false, dicitur uno modo.
+Sed tunc multipliciter diceretur, si per hoc nomen homo
+intenderemus significare diversa, puta, si unus intenderet
+significare per hoc nomen homo id quod vere est homo, et alius
+intenderet significare eodem nomine lapidem, vel aliquid aliud.
+Unde patet quod Catholicus dicens idolum non esse Deum, contradicit
+Pagano hoc asserenti, quia uterque utitur hoc nomine Deus ad
+significandum verum Deum. Cum enim Paganus dicit idolum esse Deum,
+non utitur hoc nomine secundum quod significat Deum opinabilem, sic
+enim verum diceret, cum etiam Catholici interdum in tali
+significatione hoc nomine utantur, ut cum dicitur, <i>omnes dii
+gentium Daemonia</i>.</p>
+<p title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28874"><span class=
+"ref">[28874] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter
+dicendum ad secundum et tertium. Nam illae rationes procedunt
+secundum diversitatem praedicationis nominis, et non secundum
+diversam significationem.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p11"><b>Reply to
+Objection 4:</b> The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured
+animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal
+names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being,
+which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated
+equivocally of different predicaments.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 4"><a name="28875"><span class=
+"ref">[28875] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et de picto, non
+dicitur pure aequivoce; sed philosophus largo modo accipit
+aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod
+analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de
+diversis praedicamentis.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
   names the meaning of which we know not.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11" next="FP_Q13_A12" prev="FP_Q13_A10" progress="2.29%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p0.1">Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE WHO IS.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.3.13-Exod.3.14" parsed="vul|Exod|3|13|3|14" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p5.1" passage="Ex. 3:13,14">Ex. 3:13,14</scripRef>). Therefor this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p7"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p8"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 5"><a name="28876"><span class=
+"ref">[28876] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 10 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque Catholicus
+neque Paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam
+rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis, ut supra
+dictum est. Et secundum hoc, in eadem significatione accipere
+potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum dicit idolum est Deus, in qua
+accipit ipsum Catholicus dicens idolum non est Deus. Si vero
+aliquis esset qui secundum nullam rationem Deum cognosceret, nec
+ipsum nominaret, nisi forte sicut proferimus nomina quorum
+significationem ignoramus.</p>
+</div>
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11" next="FP_Q13_A12" prev="FP_Q13_A10" progress="2.29%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p0.1">Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?</h4>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b>
+It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of
+God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this name HE
+WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS
+is not the most proper name of God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28877"><span class=
+"ref">[28877] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen qui est non sit maxime
+proprium nomen Dei. Hoc enim nomen Deus est nomen incommunicabile,
+ut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen qui est non est nomen incommunicabile.
+Ergo hoc nomen qui est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good
+excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it especially
+belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore
+this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE WHO
+IS.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28878"><span class=
+"ref">[28878] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Dionysius dicit, III cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>boni nominatio est
+manifestativa omnium Dei processionum</i>. Sed hoc maxime Deo
+convenit, quod sit universale rerum principium. Ergo hoc nomen
+bonum est maxime proprium Dei, et non hoc nomen qui est.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for
+God is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS
+imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not
+the most applicable to God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28879"><span class=
+"ref">[28879] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+nomen divinum videtur importare relationem ad creaturas, cum Deus
+non cognoscatur a nobis nisi per creaturas. Sed hoc nomen qui est
+nullam importat habitudinem ad creaturas. Ergo hoc nomen qui est
+non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p5"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say
+to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered
+him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you"
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.3.13-Exod.3.14"
+parsed="vul|Exod|3|13|3|14" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p5.1"
+passage="Ex. 3:13,14">Ex. 3:13,14</scripRef>). Therefor this name HE
+WHO IS most properly belongs to God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28880"><span class=
+"ref">[28880] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Exod. III, quod Moysi quaerenti, <i>si dixerint mihi,
+quod est nomen eius? Quid dicam eis?</i> Et respondit ei dominus,
+<i>sic dices eis, qui est misit me ad vos</i>. Ergo hoc nomen qui
+est est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p7"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p8"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the
   more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean of
-  substance."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p9"> Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).</p>
-</div>
-
+  substance."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p9"> Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).</p>
+</div>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 co."><a name="28881"><span class=
+"ref">[28881] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod hoc nomen qui est triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen
+Dei. Primo quidem, propter sui significationem. Non enim significat
+formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde, cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius
+essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat, ut supra ostensum est,
+manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominat
+Deum, unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma. Secundo, propter
+eius universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus
+communia; vel, si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra
+ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant
+ipsum. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam
+cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se est, sed quemcumque
+modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo
+quo Deus in se est. Et ideo, quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus
+determinata, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie
+dicuntur de Deo a nobis. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod
+<i>principalius omnibus quae de Deo dicuntur nominibus, est qui
+est, totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut
+quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum</i>.
+Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae
+rei, sed hoc nomen qui est nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se
+habet indeterminate ad omnes; et ideo nominat ipsum <i>pelagus
+substantiae infinitum</i>. Tertio vero, ex eius consignificatione.
+Significat enim esse in praesenti, et hoc maxime proprie de Deo
+dicitur, cuius esse non novit praeteritum vel futurum, ut dicit
+Augustinus in V de Trin.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak,
   singular.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of cause.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12" next="FP_Q14" prev="FP_Q13_A11" progress="2.31%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p0.1">Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about God are true; but affirmations are vague."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Q[3] ): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28882"><span class=
+"ref">[28882] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod hoc nomen qui est est magis proprium nomen Dei quam
+hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et
+quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est.
+Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, est
+magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum
+naturam divinam. Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragrammaton,
+quod est impositum ad significandam ipsam Dei substantiam
+incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p11"><b>Reply to
+Objection 2:</b> This name "good" is the principal name of God in so
+far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered
+absolutely comes before the idea of cause.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28883"><span class=
+"ref">[28883] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod hoc nomen bonum est principale nomen Dei inquantum
+est causa, non tamen simpliciter, nam esse absolute
+praeintelligitur causae.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p12"><b>Reply to
+Objection 3:</b> It is not necessary that all the divine names should
+import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed
+from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the
+first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28884"><span class=
+"ref">[28884] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod non est necessarium quod omnia nomina divina
+importent habitudinem ad creaturas; sed sufficit quod imponantur ab
+aliquibus perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Inter
+quas prima est ipsum esse, a qua sumitur hoc nomen qui est.</p>
+</div>
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12" next="FP_Q14" prev="FP_Q13_A11" progress="2.31%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p0.1">Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</h4>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b>
+It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For
+Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about God are true;
+but affirmations are vague."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28885"><span class=
+"ref">[28885] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod propositiones affirmativae non possunt
+formari de Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II cap. Cael. Hier., quod
+<i>negationes de Deo sunt verae, affirmationes autem
+incompactae</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a
+subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Q[3]
+): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an
+affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an
+affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28886"><span class=
+"ref">[28886] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod <i>forma simplex subiectum
+esse non potest</i>. Sed Deus maxime est forma simplex, ut supra
+ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo
+propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de
+Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise
+than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown
+above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p4.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every
+affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows
+that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28887"><span class=
+"ref">[28887] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed
+Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est.
+Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum
+compositione, videtur quod propositio affirmativa vere de Deo
+formari non possit.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p5"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative
+propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He
+is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed
+about God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28888"><span class=
+"ref">[28888] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod fidei non subest falsum. Sed propositiones quaedam
+affirmativae subduntur fidei, utpote quod Deus est trinus et unus,
+et quod est omnipotens. Ergo propositiones affirmativae possunt
+vere formari de Deo.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for
   the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in
-  some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p7"> God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and attributes something else to it.</p>
-</div>
-
+  some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p7"> God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.</p>
+</div>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 co."><a name="28889"><span class=
+"ref">[28889] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo. Ad
+cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione
+affirmativa vera, oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent
+idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et
+hoc patet tam in propositionibus quae sunt de praedicato
+accidentali, quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato substantiali.
+Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subiecto, et
+differunt ratione, alia enim est ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi.
+Et similiter cum dico homo est animal, illud enim ipsum quod est
+homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura
+sensibilis, a qua dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur
+homo. Unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem supposito,
+sed diversa ratione. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem
+praedicatur de seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; inquantum
+intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad partem
+suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati, trahit ad naturam
+formae in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod
+praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta materialiter. Huic vero
+diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas
+praedicati et subiecti, identitatem vero rei significat intellectus
+per ipsam compositionem. Deus autem, in se consideratus, est omnino
+unus et simplex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas
+conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum ut in seipso
+est, videre. Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis
+conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod omnibus suis conceptionibus
+respondet una et eadem res simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae
+est secundum rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem praedicati et
+subiecti, unitatem vero repraesentat intellectus per
+compositionem.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p8"><b>Reply to Objection
+1:</b> Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or,
+according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as no name
+can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28890"><span class=
+"ref">[28890] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Dionysius dicit affirmationes de Deo esse
+incompactas, vel inconvenientes secundum aliam translationem,
+inquantum nullum nomen Deo competit secundum modum significandi, ut
+supra dictum est.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p9"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as
+they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound
+things in which there is something taken as subject and something that
+is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and
+attributes something else to it.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28891"><span class=
+"ref">[28891] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod intellectus noster non potest formas simplices
+subsistentes secundum quod in seipsis sunt, apprehendere, sed
+apprehendit eas secundum modum compositorum, in quibus est aliquid
+quod subiicitur, et est aliquid quod inest. Et ideo apprehendit
+formam simplicem in ratione subiecti, et attribuit ei aliquid.</p>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this
   does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but
-  its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
+  its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it
+understands simple things above itself, it understands them according
+to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to
+understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not
+false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28892"><span class=
+"ref">[28892] I&ordf; q. 13 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod haec propositio, intellectus intelligens rem aliter
+quam sit, est falsus, est duplex, ex eo quod hoc adverbium aliter
+potest determinare hoc verbum intelligit ex parte intellecti, vel
+ex parte intelligentis. Si ex parte intellecti, sic propositio vera
+est, et est sensus, quicumque intellectus intelligit rem esse
+aliter quam sit, falsus est. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito,
+quia intellectus noster, formans propositionem de Deo, non dicit
+eum esse compositum, sed simplicem. Si vero ex parte intelligentis,
+sic propositio falsa est. Alius est enim modus intellectus in
+intelligendo, quam rei in essendo. Manifestum est enim quod
+intellectus noster res materiales infra se existentes intelligit
+immaterialiter; non quod intelligat eas esse immateriales, sed
+habet modum immaterialem in intelligendo. Et similiter, cum
+intelligit simplicia quae sunt supra se, intelligit ea secundum
+modum suum, scilicet composite, non tamen ita quod intelligat ea
+esse composita. Et sic intellectus noster non est falsus, formans
+compositionem de Deo.</p>
+</div>
+</div4></div3>
+<!-- merged down to here -->
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14" next="FP_Q14_A1" prev="FP_Q13_A12" progress="2.35%" n="xiii" title="Question. 14 - OF GOD’S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p0.1">Question 14. OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p0.1">Question 14. OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p2"> Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of
-life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas.</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p3"> Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p4"> (1) Whether there is knowledge in God?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p5"> (2) Whether God understands Himself?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p6"> (3) Whether He comprehends Himself?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p7"> (4) Whether His understanding is His substance?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p8"> (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p9"> (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p10"> (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p11"> (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p12"> (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p13"> (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p14"> (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p15"> (12) Whether He knows the infinite?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p16"> (13) Whether He knows future contingent things?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p17"> (14) Whether He knows enunciable things?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p18"> (15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p19"> (16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1" next="FP_Q14_A2" prev="FP_Q14" progress="2.36%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is knowledge [*Scientia]?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p0.1">Whether there is knowledge [*Scientia]?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p3"> Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p4"> (1) Whether there is knowledge in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p5"> (2) Whether God understands Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p6"> (3) Whether He comprehends Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p7"> (4) Whether His understanding is His substance?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p8"> (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p9"> (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p10"> (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p11"> (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p12"> (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p13"> (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p14"> (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p15"> (12) Whether He knows the infinite?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p16"> (13) Whether He knows future contingent things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p17"> (14) Whether He knows enunciable things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p18"> (15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p19"> (16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1" next="FP_Q14_A2" prev="FP_Q14" progress="2.36%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is knowledge [*Scientia]?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p0.1">Whether there is knowledge [*Scientia]?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.11.33" parsed="vul|Rom|11|33|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p5.1" passage="Rom. 11:33">Rom. 11:33</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of
   intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1">Q[7], A[1]</a>) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is
   the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1">Q[7], A[1]</a>), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2">Q[4], A[2]</a>), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4">Q[13], A[4]</a>). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to
   be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p8.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7">(A[7])</a>. Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding"
   (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.12.13" parsed="vul|Job|12|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p8.3" passage="Job 12:13">Job 12:13</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2" next="FP_Q14_A3" prev="FP_Q14_A1" progress="2.39%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God understands Himself?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2-p0.1">Whether God understands Himself?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2" next="FP_Q14_A3" prev="FP_Q14_A1" progress="2.39%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God understands Himself?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2-p0.1">Whether God understands Himself?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his own essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing its own likeness." Therefore God does not understand Himself.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in De Anima iii. Therefore God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.2.11" parsed="vul|1Cor|2|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2-p5.1" passage="1 Cor. 2:11">1 Cor. 2:11</scripRef>).</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii)
-  that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act." For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2-p7"> Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God
+  that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act." For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2-p7"> Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God
   understands Himself through Himself.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know
   themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, "whoever knows his essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as stated in De Anima iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is
   sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own perfection, and its
   own intelligible object.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the
   intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A3" next="FP_Q14_A4" prev="FP_Q14_A2" progress="2.42%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God comprehends Himself?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A3-p0.1">Whether God comprehends Himself?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A3" next="FP_Q14_A4" prev="FP_Q14_A2" progress="2.42%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God comprehends Himself?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A3-p0.1">Whether God comprehends Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is against what was laid down above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A3-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A3-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A3-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything
   is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1">AA[1]</a>,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that
   reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A3-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself,
   forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4" next="FP_Q14_A5" prev="FP_Q14_A3" progress="2.44%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the act of God’s intellect is His substance?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p0.1">Whether the act of God's intellect is His substance?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4" next="FP_Q14_A5" prev="FP_Q14_A3" progress="2.44%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the act of God’s intellect is His substance?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p0.1">Whether the act of God's intellect is His substance?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, and but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not be something great.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how
   this is. As was laid down above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2">(A[2])</a>, to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3">(Q[3])</a>. Hence as His essence itself is also
-  His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p7"> Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance.</p>
-</div>
-
+  His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p7"> Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in him.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p10"> Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" next="FP_Q14_A6" prev="FP_Q14_A4" progress="2.46%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God knows things other than Himself?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself?</h4>
-
-
-
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4-p10"> Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" next="FP_Q14_A6" prev="FP_Q14_A4" progress="2.46%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God knows things other than Himself?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other than Himself.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "All things are naked and open to His eyes" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.4.13" parsed="vul|Heb|4|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p5.1" passage="Heb. 4:13">Heb. 4:13</scripRef>).</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact
   that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for
-  everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p7"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the
-  mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p8"> So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
+  everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p7"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the
+  mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p8"> So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above explained.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image." Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the
   divine intellect other than the divine essence.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible
   form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6" next="FP_Q14_A7" prev="FP_Q14_A5" progress="2.50%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6" next="FP_Q14_A7" prev="FP_Q14_A5" progress="2.50%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper
   knowledge.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge
   of it.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible in His sight" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.4.12-Heb.4.13" parsed="vul|Heb|4|12|4|13" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p5.1" passage="Heb. 4:12,13">Heb. 4:12,13</scripRef>).</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p7"> But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p7"> But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His
   understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for
-  instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know all colors.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p8"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity
+  instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know all colors.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p8"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity
   of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes
   them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of God
   is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge;
-  and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p9"> As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly,
+  and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p9"> As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly,
   unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each other.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone
   according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to
-  import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of knowledge.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p11"> We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.</p>
-</div>
-
+  import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of knowledge.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p11"> We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in, and imitate it.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7" next="FP_Q14_A8" prev="FP_Q14_A6" progress="2.55%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7" next="FP_Q14_A8" prev="FP_Q14_A6" progress="2.55%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (AA 2,5), it seems that He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there; but He sees all things together at once."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things,
   which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever
   proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in
   Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Altogether there is only one act of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium), as shown above.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His knowledge is not discursive.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" next="FP_Q14_A9" prev="FP_Q14_A7" progress="2.57%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" next="FP_Q14_A9" prev="FP_Q14_A7" progress="2.57%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.30" parsed="vul|Rom|8|30|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p2.1" passage=" Rom. 8:30, "> Rom. 8:30, </scripRef> "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists."</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are."</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that
   remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a
   determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the "knowledge of approbation."</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p8"> But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.</p>
-</div>
-
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p8"> But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who
   gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" next="FP_Q14_A10" prev="FP_Q14_A8" progress="2.60%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p0.1">Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" next="FP_Q14_A10" prev="FP_Q14_A8" progress="2.60%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p0.1">Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and "being" are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.4.17" parsed="vul|Rom|4|17|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p5.1" passage="Rom. 4:17">Rom. 4:17</scripRef>).</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by
-  the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p7"> Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time,
+  the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p7"> Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time,
   as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by God.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not that they be, but that they be possible.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10" next="FP_Q14_A11" prev="FP_Q14_A9" progress="2.62%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God knows evil things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p0.1">Whether God knows evil things?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10" next="FP_Q14_A11" prev="FP_Q14_A9" progress="2.62%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God knows evil things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p0.1">Whether God knows evil things?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A[2] ), it seems that God does not know evil things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.15.11" parsed="vul|Prov|15|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p6.1" passage="Prov. 15:11">Prov. 15:11</scripRef>), "Hell and destruction are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness.
   Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through light."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by
   privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except by good.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11" next="FP_Q14_A12" prev="FP_Q14_A10" progress="2.64%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether God knows singular things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p0.1">Whether God knows singular things?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11" next="FP_Q14_A12" prev="FP_Q14_A10" progress="2.64%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether God knows singular things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p0.1">Whether God knows singular things?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not know singular things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.16.2" parsed="vul|Prov|16|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p5.1" passage="Prov. 16:2">Prov. 16:2</scripRef>), "All the ways of a man are open to His eyes."</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if
-  He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p7"> Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined
-  together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p8"> singular things in their singularity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p9"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" href="#FP.iv.FP_Q44.FP_Q44_A2">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since
+  He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p7"> Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined
+  together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p8"> singular things in their singularity.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p9"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" href="#FP.iv.FP_Q44.FP_Q44_A2">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since
   He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition
   of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also singular things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12" next="FP_Q14_A13" prev="FP_Q14_A11" progress="2.68%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether God can know infinite things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p0.1">Whether God can know infinite things?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12" next="FP_Q14_A13" prev="FP_Q14_A11" progress="2.68%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether God can know infinite things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p0.1">Whether God can know infinite things?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of
   God.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in
   God's knowledge, which is infinite.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds."</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so
-  that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p7"> The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible
+  that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p7"> The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible
   species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal
   principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after
   part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not
   as if it were traversable.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous
   quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of God.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13" next="FP_Q14_A14" prev="FP_Q14_A12" progress="2.71%" n="xiii" title="Article. 13 - Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13" next="FP_Q14_A14" prev="FP_Q14_A12" progress="2.71%" n="xiii" title="Article. 13 - Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the
   antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by God.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.32.15" parsed="vul|Ps|32|15|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p5.1" passage="Ps. 32:15">Ps. 32:15</scripRef>), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p7"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p7"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
   another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as
   each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only
   because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as
   this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies
   to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass
-  will grow."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p10"> Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew
+  will grow."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p10"> Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew
   anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling
   by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it
-  refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p12"> Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,
+  refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p12"> Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,
   "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus
   material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14" next="FP_Q14_A15" prev="FP_Q14_A13" progress="2.77%" n="xiv" title="Article. 14 - Whether God knows enunciable things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p0.1">Whether God knows enunciable things?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div>
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14" next="FP_Q14_A15" prev="FP_Q14_A13" progress="2.77%" n="xiv" title="Article. 14 - Whether God knows enunciable things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p0.1">Whether God knows enunciable things?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.93.11" parsed="vul|Ps|93|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p4.1" passage="Ps. 93:11">Ps. 93:11</scripRef>). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable things.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p6"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p6"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our
   intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine
   intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection would avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" next="FP_Q14_A16" prev="FP_Q14_A14" progress="2.79%" n="xv" title="Article. 15 - Whether the knowledge of God is variable?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" next="FP_Q14_A16" prev="FP_Q14_A14" progress="2.79%" n="xv" title="Article. 15 - Whether the knowledge of God is variable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the variation of creatures.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, that in God "there is no change nor shadow of alteration" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.1.17" parsed="vul|Jas|1|17|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p5.1" passage="James 1:17">James 1:17</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1">Q[9], A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent
   upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable manner.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His
   knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because
   such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because the same thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes
   a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God is
   variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for
   example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of which can be in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16" next="FP_Q15" prev="FP_Q14_A15" progress="2.82%" n="xvi" title="Article. 16 - Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16" next="FP_Q15" prev="FP_Q14_A15" progress="2.82%" n="xvi" title="Article. 16 - Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing---as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing,
   and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the
   end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative
-  and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p6"> In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p7"> Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the
+  and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p6"> In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p7"> Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the
   physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is, of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can make, and which nevertheless are never made.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as it is human.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p10"> In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as it is human.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p10"> In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He
   knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q15" next="FP_Q15_A1" prev="FP_Q14_A16" progress="2.85%" n="xiv" title="Question. 15 - OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p0.1">Question 15. OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p2"> After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p3"> (1) Whether there are ideas?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p4"> (2) Whether they are many, or one only?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p5"> (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1" next="FP_Q15_A2" prev="FP_Q15" progress="2.86%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there are ideas?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Whether there are ideas?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div>
+</div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q15" next="FP_Q15_A1" prev="FP_Q14_A16" progress="2.85%" n="xiv" title="Question. 15 - OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p0.1">Question 15. OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p2"> After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p3"> (1) Whether there are ideas?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p4"> (2) Whether they are many, or one only?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p5"> (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1" next="FP_Q15_A2" prev="FP_Q15" progress="2.86%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there are ideas?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Whether there are ideas?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood."</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in
-  him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p7"> In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made
+  him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p7"> In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made
   pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.iv.FP_Q46.FP_Q46_A1">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the
   world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2" next="FP_Q15_A3" prev="FP_Q15_A1" progress="2.88%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether ideas are many?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Whether ideas are many?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2" next="FP_Q15_A3" prev="FP_Q15_A1" progress="2.88%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether ideas are many?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Whether ideas are many?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one,
   except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the
   accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot
   be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily
   be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it
   would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to
   which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house,
   as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3" next="FP_Q16" prev="FP_Q15_A2" progress="2.92%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3" next="FP_Q16" prev="FP_Q15_A2" progress="2.92%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" href="#FP_Q15_A9">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to
   everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;
   whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved.
   However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3">Q[22], A[3]</a> ).</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16" next="FP_Q16_A1" prev="FP_Q15_A3" progress="2.95%" n="xv" title="Question. 16 - OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p0.1">Question 16. OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p2"> Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p3"> (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p4"> (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p5"> (3) On the comparison of the true to being.</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p6"> (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p7"> (5) Whether God is truth?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p8"> (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p9"> (7) On the eternity of truth.</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p10"> (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" next="FP_Q16_A2" prev="FP_Q16" progress="2.95%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16" next="FP_Q16_A1" prev="FP_Q15_A3" progress="2.95%" n="xv" title="Question. 16 - OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p0.1">Question 16. OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p2"> Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p3"> (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p4"> (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p5"> (3) On the comparison of the true to being.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p6"> (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p7"> (5) Whether God is truth?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p8"> (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p9"> (7) On the eternity of truth.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p10"> (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" next="FP_Q16_A2" prev="FP_Q16" progress="2.95%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true,
   unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect."</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect,
   namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite---and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be
-  true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p7"> Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
+  true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p7"> Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
   intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera
   Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone";
   for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their
   relation to the divine intellect.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought
   or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true."</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" next="FP_Q16_A3" prev="FP_Q16_A1" progress="2.99%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" next="FP_Q16_A3" prev="FP_Q16_A1" progress="2.99%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the intellect nor in things."</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For
   although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing:
   for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the
-  thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p6"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3" next="FP_Q16_A4" prev="FP_Q16_A2" progress="3.01%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether the true and being are convertible terms?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+  thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p6"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3" next="FP_Q16_A4" prev="FP_Q16_A2" progress="3.01%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether the true and being are convertible terms?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the
   intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be
   apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4" next="FP_Q16_A5" prev="FP_Q16_A3" progress="3.03%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether good is logically prior to the true?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Whether good is logically prior to the true?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4" next="FP_Q16_A5" prev="FP_Q16_A3" progress="3.03%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether good is logically prior to the true?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Whether good is logically prior to the true?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident
   from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the
   fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he
   fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" next="FP_Q16_A6" prev="FP_Q16_A4" progress="3.05%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God is truth?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Whether God is truth?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" next="FP_Q16_A6" prev="FP_Q16_A4" progress="3.05%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God is truth?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Whether God is truth?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.14.6" parsed="vul|John|14|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" passage="Jn. 14:6">Jn. 14:6</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> As said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His
   own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot
   understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6" next="FP_Q16_A7" prev="FP_Q16_A5" progress="3.07%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6" next="FP_Q16_A7" prev="FP_Q16_A5" progress="3.07%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things." But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4.1" passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So
   healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the
   intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" passage=" Ps. 11:2, "> Ps. 11:2, </scripRef> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror,
   so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
   science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7" next="FP_Q16_A8" prev="FP_Q16_A6" progress="3.10%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether created truth is eternal?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Whether created truth is eternal?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7" next="FP_Q16_A8" prev="FP_Q16_A6" progress="3.10%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether created truth is eternal?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Whether created truth is eternal?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most universal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is
   eternal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> God alone is eternal, as laid down before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3">Q[10], A[3]</a>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but
   from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5">(A[5])</a>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere
   and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by
   reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8" next="FP_Q17" prev="FP_Q16_A7" progress="3.13%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether truth is immutable?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Whether truth is immutable?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8" next="FP_Q17" prev="FP_Q16_A7" progress="3.13%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether truth is immutable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Whether truth is immutable?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit.
   Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6.1" passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in
   one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said
   before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of divine truth.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore
   this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains invariable.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17" next="FP_Q17_A1" prev="FP_Q16_A8" progress="3.16%" n="xvi" title="Question. 17 - CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p0.1">Question 17. CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p2"> We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p3"> (1) Whether falsity exists in things?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p4"> (2) Whether it exists in the sense?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p5"> (3) Whether it exists in the intellect?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p6"> (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1" next="FP_Q17_A2" prev="FP_Q17" progress="3.16%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether falsity exists in things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether falsity exists in things?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17" next="FP_Q17_A1" prev="FP_Q16_A8" progress="3.16%" n="xvi" title="Question. 17 - CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p0.1">Question 17. CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p2"> We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p3"> (1) Whether falsity exists in things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p4"> (2) Whether it exists in the sense?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p5"> (3) Whether it exists in the intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p6"> (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1" next="FP_Q17_A2" prev="FP_Q17" progress="3.16%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether falsity exists in things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether falsity exists in things?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary."</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity." But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when
   compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper
-  operation of his art.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7"> In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love
-  vanity, and seek after lying?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.4.3" parsed="vul|Ps|4|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7.1" passage="Ps. 4:3">Ps. 4:3</scripRef>): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.3.21" parsed="vul|John|3|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7.2" passage="Jn. 3:21">Jn. 3:21</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p8"> But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the
+  operation of his art.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7"> In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love
+  vanity, and seek after lying?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.4.3" parsed="vul|Ps|4|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7.1" passage="Ps. 4:3">Ps. 4:3</scripRef>): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.3.21" parsed="vul|John|3|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7.2" passage="Jn. 3:21">Jn. 3:21</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p8"> But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the
   Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and
   naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In this
   way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are not.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p12"> To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in the majority of instances.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" next="FP_Q17_A3" prev="FP_Q17_A1" progress="3.20%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether there is falsity in the senses?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether there is falsity in the senses?</h4>
-
-
-
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p12"> To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in the majority of instances.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" next="FP_Q17_A3" prev="FP_Q17_A1" progress="3.20%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether there is falsity in the senses?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether there is falsity in the senses?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really
-  are.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p7"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly,
-  neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p8"> Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed
+  are.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p7"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly,
+  neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p8"> Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed
   sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason
   the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3" next="FP_Q17_A4" prev="FP_Q17_A2" progress="3.22%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether falsity is in the intellect?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether falsity is in the intellect?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3" next="FP_Q17_A4" prev="FP_Q17_A2" progress="3.22%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether falsity is in the intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether falsity is in the intellect?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the intellect.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood." But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail
   with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the
   sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can
-  exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2">(A[2])</a>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p6"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another.
+  exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2">(A[2])</a>.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p6"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another.
   In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at
   all.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4" next="FP_Q18" prev="FP_Q17_A3" progress="3.25%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether true and false are contraries?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Whether true and false are contraries?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4" next="FP_Q18" prev="FP_Q17_A3" progress="3.25%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether true and false are contraries?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Whether true and false are contraries?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.8.5" parsed="vul|Jer|8|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4.1" passage="Jer. 8:5">Jer. 8:5</scripRef>), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said
   except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false
   opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18" next="FP_Q18_A1" prev="FP_Q17_A4" progress="3.28%" n="xvii" title="Question. 18 - THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p0.1">Question 18. THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p2"> Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p3"> (1) To whom does it belong to live?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p4"> (2) What is life?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p5"> (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p6"> (4) Whether all things in God are life?</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1" next="FP_Q18_A2" prev="FP_Q18" progress="3.28%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether to live belongs to all natural things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether to live belongs to all natural things?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18" next="FP_Q18_A1" prev="FP_Q17_A4" progress="3.28%" n="xvii" title="Question. 18 - THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p0.1">Question 18. THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p2"> Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p3"> (1) To whom does it belong to live?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p4"> (2) What is life?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p5"> (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p6"> (4) Whether all things in God are life?</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1" next="FP_Q18_A2" prev="FP_Q18" progress="3.28%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether to live belongs to all natural things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether to live belongs to all natural things?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake of life.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal
   begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is
   called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals.
   Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from
   such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living bodies.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the
   case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" next="FP_Q18_A3" prev="FP_Q18_A1" progress="3.31%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether life is an operation?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether life is an operation?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" next="FP_Q18_A3" prev="FP_Q18_A1" progress="3.31%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether life is an operation?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether life is an operation?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.18.3" parsed="vul|John|18|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4.1" passage=" Jn. 18:3, "> Jn. 18:3, </scripRef> "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be."</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the
   dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running"
-  denotes "to run" in the abstract.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p7"> Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.</p>
-</div>
-
+  denotes "to run" in the abstract.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p7"> Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in
   this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by
-  a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p10"> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3" next="FP_Q18_A4" prev="FP_Q18_A2" progress="3.34%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether life is properly attributed to God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4>
-
-
-
+  a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p10"> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3" next="FP_Q18_A4" prev="FP_Q18_A2" progress="3.34%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether life is properly attributed to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.83.3" parsed="vul|Ps|83|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5.1" passage="Ps. 83:3">Ps. 83:3</scripRef>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God."</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and
   sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their
-  inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p7"> Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move
+  inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p7"> Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move
   only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of
   their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible
-  beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p8"> But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect
+  beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p8"> But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect
   degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in
   movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself
   is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle of life.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold good with incorruptible natures.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4" next="FP_Q19" prev="FP_Q18_A3" progress="3.38%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all things are life in God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are life in God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4" next="FP_Q19" prev="FP_Q18_A3" progress="3.38%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all things are life in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are life in God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Acts.17.28" parsed="vul|Acts|17|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2.1" passage="Acts 17:28">Acts 17:28</scripRef>), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.1.3-John.1.4" parsed="vul|John|1|3|1|4" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6.1" passage="Jn. 1:3,4">Jn. 1:3,4</scripRef>), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> In God to live is to understand, as before stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In
   another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind,
   as having a divine existence in that mind.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more
   truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the
   mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so
   far as life implies a principle of operation.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" next="FP_Q19_A2" prev="FP_Q19" progress="3.42%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is will in God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether there is will in God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" next="FP_Q19_A2" prev="FP_Q19" progress="3.42%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is will in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether there is will in God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is not will in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.12.2" parsed="vul|Rom|12|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5.1" passage="Rom. 12:2">Rom. 12:2</scripRef>): "That you may prove what is the will of God."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
   without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
   will.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2" next="FP_Q19_A3" prev="FP_Q19_A1" progress="3.44%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God wills things apart from Himself?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2" next="FP_Q19_A3" prev="FP_Q19_A1" progress="3.44%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God wills things apart from Himself?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Thess.4.3" parsed="vul|1Thess|4|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" passage="1 Thess. 4:3">1 Thess. 4:3</scripRef>): "This is the will of God, your sanctification."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces
   its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other
   things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from
   Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its
   own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" next="FP_Q19_A4" prev="FP_Q19_A2" progress="3.47%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" next="FP_Q19_A4" prev="FP_Q19_A2" progress="3.47%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p7"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11" parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8.1" passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p9"><b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not
   necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we
   will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship
   in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for
   supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the
   divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p15"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute
   necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" next="FP_Q19_A5" prev="FP_Q19_A3" progress="3.51%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the will of God is the cause of things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" next="FP_Q19_A5" prev="FP_Q19_A3" progress="3.51%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the will of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6.1" passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?"</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p8"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He
-  must act by intellect and will.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
-  the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p10"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p8"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He
+  must act by intellect and will.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
+  the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p10"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
   for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and will.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God
   all these things are one.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" next="FP_Q19_A6" prev="FP_Q19_A4" progress="3.55%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" next="FP_Q19_A6" prev="FP_Q19_A4" progress="3.55%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes
   to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known.
   If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
-  premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p7"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the
+  premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p7"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the
   cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly
   unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God."</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this
   cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6" next="FP_Q19_A7" prev="FP_Q19_A5" progress="3.58%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6" next="FP_Q19_A7" prev="FP_Q19_A5" progress="3.58%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.2.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|2|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" passage="1 Tim. 2:4">1 Tim. 2:4</scripRef>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.113.11" parsed="vul|Ps|113|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5.1" passage="Ps. 113:11">Ps. 113:11</scripRef>): "God hath done all things, whatsoever He would."</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence
   the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
   For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as
   does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every
   class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent,
-  but to the things willed.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p8"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or
+  but to the things willed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p8"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or
   dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in
   themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills
   takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said above.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8" prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the will of God is changeable?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8" prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the will of God is changeable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.6.7" parsed="vul|Gen|6|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" passage="Gn. 6:7">Gn. 6:7</scripRef>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a changeable will.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.18.7-Jer.18.8" parsed="vul|Jer|18|7|18|8" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" passage="Jer. 18:7,8">Jer. 18:7,8</scripRef>) Therefore God has a changeable will.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.23.19" parsed="vul|Num|23|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" passage="Num. 23:19">Num. 23:19</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless
   we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
   hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
   He had made.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
   rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
   and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.38.1" parsed="vul|Isa|38|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" passage="Is. 38:1">Is. 38:1</scripRef>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For
   men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3">(A[3])</a>.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.19" parsed="vul|Rom|9|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" passage="Rom. 9:19">Rom. 9:19</scripRef>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
   necessary absolutely.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
   referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that
   belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise
   contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10" prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God wills evils?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10" prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God wills evils?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and
   beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
   corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not
   even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
   willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is
   beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9" progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has free-will?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9" progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
   necessarily will.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2"> Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
   punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat.
   6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called
   will.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3.1" passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for
   what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept,
-  counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. 6:10</scripRef>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p7"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.</p>
-</div>
-
+  counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. 6:10</scripRef>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p7"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter
   the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and
   these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q20" next="FP_Q20_A1" prev="FP_Q19_A12" progress="3.78%" n="xix" title="Question. 20 - GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p0.1">Question 20. GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p2"> We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p3"> (1) Whether love exists in God?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p4"> (2) Whether He loves all things?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p5"> (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p6"> (4) Whether He loves more the better things?</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1" next="FP_Q20_A2" prev="FP_Q20" progress="3.78%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether love exists in God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Whether love exists in God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q20" next="FP_Q20_A1" prev="FP_Q19_A12" progress="3.78%" n="xix" title="Question. 20 - GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p0.1">Question 20. GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p2"> We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p3"> (1) Whether love exists in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p4"> (2) Whether He loves all things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p5"> (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p6"> (4) Whether He loves more the better things?</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1" next="FP_Q20_A2" prev="FP_Q20" progress="3.78%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether love exists in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Whether love exists in God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "God is love" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.4.16" parsed="vul|John|4|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p5.1" passage="Jn. 4:16">Jn. 4:16</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite
   that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy
   and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love.
   Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always
   accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It
   is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily change---and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is
   implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11">Q[19], A[11]</a>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence,
   as above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" next="FP_Q20_A3" prev="FP_Q20_A1" progress="3.82%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God loves all things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Whether God loves all things?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" next="FP_Q20_A3" prev="FP_Q20_A1" progress="3.82%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God loves all things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Whether God loves all things?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.5.7" parsed="vul|Ps|5|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p5.1" passage="Ps. 5:7">Ps. 5:7</scripRef>): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.25" parsed="vul|Wis|11|25|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p6.1" passage="Wis. 11:25">Wis. 11:25</scripRef>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some
   good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides
   the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore,
   God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3" next="FP_Q20_A4" prev="FP_Q20_A2" progress="3.86%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God loves all things equally?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Whether God loves all things equally?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3" next="FP_Q20_A4" prev="FP_Q20_A2" progress="3.86%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God loves all things equally?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Whether God loves all things equally?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.6.8" parsed="vul|Wis|6|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p2.1" passage="Wis. 6:8">Wis. 6:8</scripRef>). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not therefore love some things more than others.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more
   than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4" next="FP_Q21" prev="FP_Q20_A3" progress="3.87%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether God always loves more the better things?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p0.1">Whether God always loves more the better things?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4" next="FP_Q21" prev="FP_Q20_A3" progress="3.87%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether God always loves more the better things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p0.1">Whether God always loves more the better things?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.32" parsed="vul|Rom|8|32|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p2.1" passage="Rom. 8:32">Rom. 8:32</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.8.6" parsed="vul|Ps|8|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3.1" passage="Ps. 8:6">Ps. 8:6</scripRef>). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.2.16" parsed="vul|Heb|2|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3.2" passage="Heb. 2:16">Heb. 2:16</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore
   God does not always love more the better things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.15.7" parsed="vul|Luke|15|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p5.1" passage="Lk. 15:7">Lk. 15:7</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more
   the better things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p7"><b>On the contrary,</b> Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.13.19" parsed="vul|Sir|13|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p7.1" passage="Ecclus. 13:19">Ecclus. 13:19</scripRef>): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more loved by God.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p8"><b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the
   better things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder,"
   according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.9.6" parsed="vul|Isa|9|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p9.1" passage=" Is. 9:6."> Is. 9:6.</scripRef></p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rev.21.17" parsed="vul|Rev|21|17|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p10.1" passage=" Rev 21:17, "> Rev 21:17, </scripRef> the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this
   respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For
-  it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p12"> Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life.
+  it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p12"> Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life.
   Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was
   loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the weigher of spirits" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.16.2" parsed="vul|Prov|16|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p12.1" passage="Prov. 16:2">Prov. 16:2</scripRef>).</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In
-  battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p14"> Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king.</p>
-</div>
-
+  battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p14"> Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p15"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q21" next="FP_Q21_A1" prev="FP_Q20_A4" progress="3.92%" n="xx" title="Question. 21 - THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p0.1">Question 21. THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p2"> After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p3"> (1) Whether there is justice in God?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p4"> (2) Whether His justice can be called truth?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p5"> (3) Whether there is mercy in God?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p6"> (4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1" next="FP_Q21_A2" prev="FP_Q21" progress="3.92%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is justice in God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p0.1">Whether there is justice in God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q21" next="FP_Q21_A1" prev="FP_Q20_A4" progress="3.92%" n="xx" title="Question. 21 - THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p0.1">Question 21. THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p2"> After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p3"> (1) Whether there is justice in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p4"> (2) Whether His justice can be called truth?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p5"> (3) Whether there is mercy in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p6"> (4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1" next="FP_Q21_A2" prev="FP_Q21" progress="3.92%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is justice in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p0.1">Whether there is justice in God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God: neither therefore does justice.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh all things according to the counsel of His will" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11" parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p3.1" passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.10.8" parsed="vul|Ps|10|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p6.1" passage="Ps. 10:8">Ps. 10:8</scripRef>): "The Lord is just, and hath loved justice."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.11.35" parsed="vul|Rom|11|35|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p7.1" passage="Rom. 11:35">Rom. 11:35</scripRef>). The other consists in distribution, and
   is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the
   condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1">Q[20], A[1]</a> ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral
   virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power, God is a law unto Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to
   substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. In this respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is
   also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is
   not directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10): "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the just, as the general to the special.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2" next="FP_Q21_A3" prev="FP_Q21_A1" progress="3.96%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the justice of God is truth?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p0.1">Whether the justice of God is truth?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2" next="FP_Q21_A3" prev="FP_Q21_A1" progress="3.96%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the justice of God is truth?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p0.1">Whether the justice of God is truth?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore justice does not appertain to truth.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain to the idea of justice.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.84.11" parsed="vul|Ps|84|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p4.1" passage="Ps. 84:11">Ps. 84:11</scripRef>): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not,
-  our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p6"> Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.</p>
-</div>
-
+  our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p6"> Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed according to the law, it resides in the will.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3" next="FP_Q21_A4" prev="FP_Q21_A2" progress="3.98%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether mercy can be attributed to God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p0.1">Whether mercy can be attributed to God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3" next="FP_Q21_A4" prev="FP_Q21_A2" progress="3.98%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether mercy can be attributed to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p0.1">Whether mercy can be attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Tim.2.13" parsed="vul|2Tim|2|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p3.1" passage="2 Tim. 2:13">2 Tim. 2:13</scripRef>): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.4" parsed="vul|Ps|110|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p4.1" passage="Ps. 110:4">Ps. 110:4</scripRef>): "He is a merciful and gracious Lord."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To
   sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4">Q[6] , A[4]</a>). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality, and
   mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p5.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1">(A[1])</a>; in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by God
   expel defects, it belongs to mercy.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one
   another, as Christ has forgiven you" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.4.32" parsed="vul|Eph|4|32|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p7.1" passage="Eph. 4:32">Eph. 4:32</scripRef>). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy exalteth itself above judgement" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.2.13" parsed="vul|Jas|2|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p7.2" passage="James 2:13">James 2:13</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4" next="FP_Q22" prev="FP_Q21_A3" progress="4.00%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p0.1">Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4" next="FP_Q22" prev="FP_Q21_A3" progress="4.00%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p0.1">Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.2.13" parsed="vul|Jas|2|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p2.1" passage="James 2:13">James 2:13</scripRef>). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.15" parsed="vul|Rom|15|0|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p3.1" passage="Rom. 15">Rom. 15</scripRef>). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.24.10" parsed="vul|Ps|24|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p6.1" passage="Ps. 24:10">Ps. 24:10</scripRef>): "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth."</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be
   lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except
@@ -13382,569 +10621,269 @@
   in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness
   confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p9"> In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.7.47" parsed="vul|Luke|7|47|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p9.1" passage="Lk. 7:47">Lk. 7:47</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p9"> In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.7.47" parsed="vul|Luke|7|47|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p9.1" passage="Lk. 7:47">Lk. 7:47</scripRef>).</p>
+</div>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account of the promises made to the fathers.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils that press on us in this world force us to go to God."</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q22" next="FP_Q22_A1" prev="FP_Q21_A4" progress="4.03%" n="xxi" title="Question. 22 - THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p0.1">Question 22. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
+</div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q22" next="FP_Q22_A1" prev="FP_Q21_A4" progress="4.03%" n="xxi" title="Question. 22 - THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p0.1">Question 22. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p2"> Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong.
-Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p3"> (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p4"> (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p5"> (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p6"> (4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1" next="FP_Q22_A2" prev="FP_Q22" progress="4.04%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p0.1">Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p3"> (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p4"> (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p5"> (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p6"> (4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1" next="FP_Q22_A2" prev="FP_Q22" progress="4.04%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p0.1">Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is no providence in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.14.3" parsed="vul|Wis|14|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p5.1" passage="Wis. 14:3">Wis. 14:3</scripRef>): "But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.']."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4">Q[6], A[4]</a>). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4">Q[21], A[4]</a>). This good of order existing in things created, is
   itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4">Q[19], A[4]</a>), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other parts are
   directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself---as for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a
   family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.24.45" parsed="vul|Matt|24|45|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6.4" passage="Mat. 24:45">Mat. 24:45</scripRef>), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence is the divine type itself, seated in
   the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p7.1" href="#FS.v.FS_Q57.FS_Q57_A6">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He
   possesses, does belong to God, according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.148.6" parsed="vul|Ps|148|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p7.2" passage=" Ps. 148:6"> Ps. 148:6</scripRef>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of
   His will" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11" parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p7.3" passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things pertain to the care of providence---namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition; and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect
   are one and the same thing, as we have said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19">(Q[19])</a>.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2" next="FP_Q22_A3" prev="FP_Q22_A1" progress="4.07%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p0.1">Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2" next="FP_Q22_A3" prev="FP_Q22_A1" progress="4.07%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p0.1">Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.15.14" parsed="vul|Sir|15|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p5.1" passage="Ecclus. 15:14">Ecclus. 15:14</scripRef>). And particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.80.13" parsed="vul|Ps|80|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p5.2" passage="Ps. 80:13">Ps. 80:13</scripRef>). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine
   providence.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.9.9" parsed="vul|1Cor|9|9|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p6.1" passage="1 Cor. 9:9">1 Cor. 9:9</scripRef>): "God doth not care for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p7"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.8.1" parsed="vul|Wis|8|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p7.1" passage="Wis. 8:1">Wis. 8:1</scripRef>).</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p8"><b>I answer that,</b> Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.22.14" parsed="vul|Job|22|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p8.1" passage="Job 22:14">Job 22:14</scripRef>): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not
-  consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p9"> We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual selves. This is mad evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the
+  consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p9"> We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual selves. This is mad evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the
   intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.'Those powers that are, are ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt, a
   Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.13.1" parsed="vul|Rom|13|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p9.1" passage="Rom. 13:1">Rom. 13:1</scripRef>). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also been shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p9.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6">Q[14], AA[6]</a>,11) that God knows all
   things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be
   that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one
   place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the
   plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the
   universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things---e.g. casual
   and evil things---as removed from the care of divine providence.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and
   others of the ancients.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which
   these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over
   the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that love God, all things work together unto good" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.28" parsed="vul|Rom|8|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p13.1" passage="Rom. 8:28">Rom. 8:28</scripRef>). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had weight with
   Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p14.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10">Q[19], A[10]</a>), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape
   the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3" next="FP_Q22_A4" prev="FP_Q22_A2" progress="4.13%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God has immediate providence over everything?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p0.1">Whether God has immediate providence over everything?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3" next="FP_Q22_A4" prev="FP_Q22_A2" progress="4.13%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God has immediate providence over everything?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p0.1">Whether God has immediate providence over everything?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.34.13" parsed="vul|Job|34|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p5.1" passage="Job 34:13">Job 34:13</scripRef>): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Two things belong to providence---namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand
   the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and
   foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the
   gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5">Q[19], AA[5]</a>,8).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4" next="FP_Q23" prev="FP_Q22_A3" progress="4.16%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p0.1">Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4" next="FP_Q23" prev="FP_Q22_A3" progress="4.16%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p0.1">Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a "per se" cause, either present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns the stability of necessity to things provided.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has
   prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that properly speaking 'necessary' and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for
   all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23" next="FP_Q23_A1" prev="FP_Q22_A4" progress="4.18%" n="xxii" title="Question. 23 - OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p0.1">Question 23. OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p2"> After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p3"> (1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p4"> (2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p5"> (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p6"> (4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p7"> (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p8"> (6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p9"> (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p10"> (8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1" next="FP_Q23_A2" prev="FP_Q23" progress="4.19%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether men are predestined by God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p0.1">Whether men are predestined by God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23" next="FP_Q23_A1" prev="FP_Q22_A4" progress="4.18%" n="xxii" title="Question. 23 - OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p0.1">Question 23. OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p2"> After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p3"> (1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p4"> (2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p5"> (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p6"> (4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p7"> (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p8"> (6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p9"> (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p10"> (8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1" next="FP_Q23_A2" prev="FP_Q23" progress="4.19%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether men are predestined by God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p0.1">Whether men are predestined by God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done
   away.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to take pity [miserendi]" [*See <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3">Q[22], A[3]</a>]. Therefore men are not predestined.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.2.12" parsed="vul|1Cor|2|12|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p5.1" passage="1 Cor. 2:12">1 Cor. 2:12</scripRef>): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.30" parsed="vul|Rom|8|30|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p6.1" passage="Rom. 8:30">Rom. 8:30</scripRef>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing
   God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p7.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it,
   directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that
   predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not excluded by Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of
   misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p10.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3">Q[21], AA[3]</a>,4).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2" next="FP_Q23_A3" prev="FP_Q23_A1" progress="4.22%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p0.1">Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2" next="FP_Q23_A3" prev="FP_Q23_A1" progress="4.22%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p0.1">Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc. (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.1.4" parsed="vul|Rom|1|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p3.1" passage="Rom. 1:4">Rom. 1:4</scripRef>): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something in the predestined.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1">Q[22], A[1]</a>). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor.
   Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.30" parsed="vul|Rom|8|30|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p7.2" passage="Rom. 8:30">Rom. 8:30</scripRef>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2">Q[14], A[2]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p8.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3">Q[18], A[3]</a>, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things, has
   an effect in them.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Macc.6.20" parsed="vul|2Macc|6|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p9.1" passage="2 Macc. 6:20">2 Macc.
   6:20</scripRef>). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3" next="FP_Q23_A4" prev="FP_Q23_A2" progress="4.25%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God reprobates any man?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p0.1">Whether God reprobates any man?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3" next="FP_Q23_A4" prev="FP_Q23_A2" progress="4.25%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God reprobates any man?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p0.1">Whether God reprobates any man?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.25" parsed="vul|Wis|11|25|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p2.1" passage="Wis. 11:25">Wis. 11:25</scripRef>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Hos.13.9" parsed="vul|Hos|13|9|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p3.1" passage="Osee 13:9">Osee 13:9</scripRef>): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate
   any man.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eccl.7.14" parsed="vul|Eccl|7|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p4.1" passage="Eccles. 7:14">Eccles. 7:14</scripRef>): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Mal.1.2-Mal.1.3" parsed="vul|Mal|1|2|1|3" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p5.1" passage="Malachi 1:2,3">Malachi 1:2,3</scripRef>): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> God does reprobate some. For it was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1">(A[1])</a> that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called
   reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1">Q[22], A[1]</a>). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into
   sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good---namely, eternal life---He is said to hate or reprobated them.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined---namely, glory---and of what is received in this life---namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present---namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future---namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from
   the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true---namely, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although
   anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4" next="FP_Q23_A5" prev="FP_Q23_A3" progress="4.27%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*“Eligantur.”]">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p0.1">Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4" next="FP_Q23_A5" prev="FP_Q23_A3" progress="4.27%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*“Eligantur.”]"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p0.1">Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.2.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|2|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p4.1" passage="1 Tim. 2:4">1 Tim. 2:4</scripRef>). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.4" parsed="vul|Eph|1|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p5.1" passage="Eph. 1:4">Eph. 1:4</scripRef>): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1">(A[1])</a>, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2">Q[22], A[2]</a>). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end
   already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2">Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6.4" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3">(A[3])</a>. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love
   precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the
   conferring of grace and glory election is implied.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2">Q[20], A[2]</a>). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5" next="FP_Q23_A6" prev="FP_Q23_A4" progress="4.30%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p0.1">Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5" next="FP_Q23_A6" prev="FP_Q23_A4" progress="4.30%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p0.1">Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.29" parsed="vul|Rom|8|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p2.1" passage="Rom. 8:29">Rom. 8:29</scripRef>): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.15" parsed="vul|Rom|9|15|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p2.2" passage=" Rom. 9:15"> Rom. 9:15</scripRef>: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "There is no injustice in God" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.14" parsed="vul|Rom|9|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p4.1" passage="Rom. 9:14">Rom. 9:14</scripRef>). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Titus.3.5" parsed="vul|Titus|3|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p5.1" passage="Titus 3:5">Titus 3:5</scripRef>): "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since predestination includes will, as was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4">(A[4])</a>, the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5">Q[19], A[5]</a> ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else.
-  Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p7"> Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.11-Rom.9.12" parsed="vul|Rom|9|11|9|12" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p7.1" passage="Rom. 9:11,12">Rom. 9:11,12</scripRef>): "For when they were
-  not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the younger."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p8"> Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Cor.3.5" parsed="vul|2Cor|3|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p8.1" passage="2 Cor. 3:5">2 Cor. 3:5</scripRef>), that "we are not
-  sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p9"> And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as
+  Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p7"> Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.11-Rom.9.12" parsed="vul|Rom|9|11|9|12" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p7.1" passage="Rom. 9:11,12">Rom. 9:11,12</scripRef>): "For when they were
+  not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the younger."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p8"> Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Cor.3.5" parsed="vul|2Cor|3|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p8.1" passage="2 Cor. 3:5">2 Cor. 3:5</scripRef>), that "we are not
+  sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p9"> And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as
   if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a
   secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent
   effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have
   any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Lam.5.21" parsed="vul|Lam|5|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p9.2" passage="Lam. 5:21">Lam. 5:21</scripRef>): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of
   predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was explained above.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that
   for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p12.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines,
@@ -13954,852 +10893,406 @@
   the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody
   of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.20.14-Matt.20.15" parsed="vul|Matt|20|14|20|15" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p12.4" passage="Mat. 20:14,15">Mat. 20:14,15</scripRef>).</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6" next="FP_Q23_A7" prev="FP_Q23_A5" progress="4.36%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether predestination is certain?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p0.1">Whether predestination is certain?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6" next="FP_Q23_A7" prev="FP_Q23_A5" progress="4.36%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether predestination is certain?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p0.1">Whether predestination is certain?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown," (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rev.3.11" parsed="vul|Rev|3|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p2.1" passage="Rev 3:11">Rev 3:11</scripRef>), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e.g. Peter---may sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.29" parsed="vul|Rom|8|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p5.1" passage=" Rom. 8:29"> Rom. 8:29</scripRef>: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1">(A[1])</a>, that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet
   the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4">Q[22], A[4]</a>). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13">Q[14], A[13]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6.4" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4">Q[19], A[4]</a>) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are
   most certain and infallible.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others; according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.34.24" parsed="vul|Job|34|24|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p7.1" passage=" Job 34:24"> Job 34:24</scripRef>: "He shall
   break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by others.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4">(A[4])</a>: and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense,
   thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7" next="FP_Q23_A8" prev="FP_Q23_A6" progress="4.39%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the number of the predestined is certain?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p0.1">Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7" next="FP_Q23_A8" prev="FP_Q23_A6" progress="4.39%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the number of the predestined is certain?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p0.1">Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain. But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Deut.1.11" parsed="vul|Deut|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p2.1" passage="Dt. 1:11">Dt. 1:11</scripRef>): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him." Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by God cannot be certain.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.7.13-Matt.7.14" parsed="vul|Matt|7|13|7|14" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p4.1" passage=" Mat. 7:13,14"> Mat. 7:13,14</scripRef>: "For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow
   is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not certain.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished."</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6">(A[6])</a>. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It
   must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the
   infinite (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally, but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder
   thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and what
   number would befit the essential parts of that universe---that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such
   like, is not pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal
-  pre-ordination.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p7"> It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.28" parsed="vul|Rom|8|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p7.1" passage="Rom. 8:28">Rom. 8:28</scripRef>). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is
+  pre-ordination.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p7"> It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.28" parsed="vul|Rom|8|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p7.1" passage="Rom. 8:28">Rom. 8:28</scripRef>). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is
   known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']"</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge
   of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall
   short.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8" next="FP_Q24" prev="FP_Q23_A7" progress="4.44%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p0.1">Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8" next="FP_Q24" prev="FP_Q23_A7" progress="4.44%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p0.1">Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been His counsellor?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.11.34" parsed="vul|Rom|11|34|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p3.1" passage="Rom. 11:34">Rom. 11:34</scripRef>). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it cannot be furthered by anything.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.25.21" parsed="vul|Gen|25|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p5.1" passage="Gn. 25:21">Gn. 25:21</scripRef>). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p7"> Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Kgs.15.29" parsed="vul|1Kgs|15|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p7.1" passage="1 Kings 15:29">1 Kings 15:29</scripRef>); and that "the gifts and the calling of God are
-  without repentance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.11.29" parsed="vul|Rom|11|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p7.2" passage="Rom. 11:29">Rom. 11:29</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p8"> Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p7"> Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Kgs.15.29" parsed="vul|1Kgs|15|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p7.1" passage="1 Kings 15:29">1 Kings 15:29</scripRef>); and that "the gifts and the calling of God are
+  without repentance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.11.29" parsed="vul|Rom|11|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p7.2" passage="Rom. 11:29">Rom. 11:29</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p8"> Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does
   not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of
   another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Pet.1.10" parsed="vul|2Pet|1|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p8.1" passage="2 Pet. 1:10">2 Pet. 1:10</scripRef>).</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to
   <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.3.9" parsed="vul|1Cor|3|9|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p10.1" passage="1 Cor. 3:9">1 Cor. 3:9</scripRef>: "We are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6">Q[19], A[6]</a>), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q24" next="FP_Q24_A1" prev="FP_Q23_A8" progress="4.47%" n="xxiii" title="Question. 24 - THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p0.1">Question 24. THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p2"> We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p3"> (1) What is the book of life?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p4"> (2) Of what life is it the book?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p5"> (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1" next="FP_Q24_A2" prev="FP_Q24" progress="4.47%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p0.1">Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q24" next="FP_Q24_A1" prev="FP_Q23_A8" progress="4.47%" n="xxiii" title="Question. 24 - THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p0.1">Question 24. THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p2"> We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p3"> (1) What is the book of life?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p4"> (2) Of what life is it the book?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p5"> (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1" next="FP_Q24_A2" prev="FP_Q24" progress="4.47%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p0.1">Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.4.32" parsed="vul|Sir|4|32|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p2.1" passage="Ecclus. 4:32">Ecclus. 4:32</scripRef>)---i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not predestination.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be a book of death, as there is a book of life.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in a gloss upon<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.68.29" parsed="vul|Ps|68|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p5.1" passage=" Ps. 68:29, "> Ps. 68:29, </scripRef> "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew."</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4">Q[23], A[4]</a>) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore,
   of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory, according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.3.3" parsed="vul|Prov|3|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p6.2" passage=" Prov. 3:3"> Prov. 3:3</scripRef>: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has predestined some to eternal life, is called
   the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Tim.11.19" parsed="vul|2Tim|11|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p6.3" passage="2 Tim. 11:19">2 Tim. 11:19</scripRef>: "The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His."</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens
-  that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p8"> Hence the solution of the Second Objection.</p>
-</div>
-
+  that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p8"> Hence the solution of the Second Objection.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2" next="FP_Q24_A3" prev="FP_Q24_A1" progress="4.50%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the  predestined?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p0.1">Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2" next="FP_Q24_A3" prev="FP_Q24_A1" progress="4.50%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the  predestined?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p0.1">Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: "Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.6.71" parsed="vul|John|6|71|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p4.1" passage="Jn. 6:71">Jn. 6:71</scripRef>). But the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1">(A[1])</a>. But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> The book of life, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1">(A[1])</a>, implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of glory is an end exceeding
   human nature, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are consequent on nature.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p8"> From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.</p>
-</div>
-
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are consequent on nature.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p8"> From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and
   knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3" next="FP_Q25" prev="FP_Q24_A2" progress="4.52%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p0.1">Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3" next="FP_Q25" prev="FP_Q24_A2" progress="4.52%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p0.1">Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither therefore can he be blotted out.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of the living" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.68.29" parsed="vul|Ps|68|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p5.1" passage="Ps. 68:29">Ps. 68:29</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from
   that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living." But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just, according to the text, "He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out of the book of life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rev.3.5" parsed="vul|Rev|3|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p6.1" passage="Apoc. 3:5">Apoc. 3:5</scripRef>) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the
   opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because some
   are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because they are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who are ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of life
   not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of the book of life refers.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew; either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included in the knowledge of God, although not anew.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25" next="FP_Q25_A1" prev="FP_Q24_A3" progress="4.54%" n="xxiv" title="Question. 25 - THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p0.1">Question 25. THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p2"> After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God. About this are six points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p3"> (1) Whether there is power in God?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p4"> (2) Whether His power is infinite?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p5"> (3) Whether He is almighty?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p6"> (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p7"> (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p8"> (6) Whether what He makes He could make better?</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1" next="FP_Q25_A2" prev="FP_Q25" progress="4.55%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is power in God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p0.1">Whether there is power in God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25" next="FP_Q25_A1" prev="FP_Q24_A3" progress="4.54%" n="xxiv" title="Question. 25 - THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p0.1">Question 25. THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p2"> After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God. About this are six points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p3"> (1) Whether there is power in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p4"> (2) Whether His power is infinite?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p5"> (3) Whether He is almighty?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p6"> (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p7"> (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p8"> (6) Whether what He makes He could make better?</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1" next="FP_Q25_A2" prev="FP_Q25" progress="4.55%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is power in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p0.1">Whether there is power in God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3">Q[3] , A[3]</a>). Therefore, there is no power in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8">Q[14], A[8]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.88.9" parsed="vul|Ps|88|9|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p6.1" passage="Ps. 88:9">Ps. 88:9</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2">Q[3], A[2]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1">Q[4], AA[1]</a>, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all
   ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the
   highest degree.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only active power.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in God nobler than His power.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In creatures, power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the
   notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of "suppositum" possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle of an effect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of
   the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2" next="FP_Q25_A3" prev="FP_Q25_A1" progress="4.58%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the power of God is infinite?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p0.1">Whether the power of God is infinite?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2" next="FP_Q25_A3" prev="FP_Q25_A1" progress="4.58%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the power of God is infinite?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p0.1">Whether the power of God is infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23). Therefore, His power is not infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1">(A[1])</a>, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine essence (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the
   more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1">Q[7], A[1]</a>) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1">Q[7], A[1]</a>); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with
   Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5">Q[3], A[5]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p8.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4], A[3]</a>). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But the
   power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one body moving another is a
   univocal agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and
   especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3" next="FP_Q25_A4" prev="FP_Q25_A2" progress="4.60%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is omnipotent?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Whether God is omnipotent?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3" next="FP_Q25_A4" prev="FP_Q25_A2" progress="4.60%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is omnipotent?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Whether God is omnipotent?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for He is immovable, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore He is not omnipotent.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Tim.2.13" parsed="vul|2Tim|2|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p3.1" passage="2 Tim. 2:13.">2 Tim. 2:13.</scripRef> Therefore He is not omnipotent.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.1.20" parsed="vul|1Cor|1|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p5.1" passage="1 Cor. 1:20">1 Cor. 1:20</scripRef>), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those things to be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If
   God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.1.37" parsed="vul|Luke|1|37|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p6.1" passage="Lk. 1:37">Lk. 1:37</scripRef>).</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said
   to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say
-  that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able to do.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p8"> It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for
-  instance, that a man is a donkey.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p9"> It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
+  that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able to do.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p8"> It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for
+  instance, that a man is a donkey.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p9"> It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
   being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence,
   not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do
   them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.</p>
 </div>
-
+</div>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p10.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1">(A[1])</a>. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible---as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things
   if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p12.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4">Q[21],
   A[4]</a>), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the first foundation of all good things.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as
   to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p13.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1">Q[14], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and
   necessity.</p>
 </div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4" next="FP_Q25_A5" prev="FP_Q25_A3" progress="4.66%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether God can make the past not to have been?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p0.1">Whether God can make the past not to have been?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4" next="FP_Q25_A5" prev="FP_Q25_A3" progress="4.66%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether God can make the past not to have been?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p0.1">Whether God can make the past not to have been?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from
   the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (<scripRef id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p5.1" passage="Ep. 22">Ep. 22</scripRef> ad Eustoch.): "Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted." Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2">Q[7], A[2]</a>), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that
   it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely, to make
   undone the things that have been done."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible
   in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So
   is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5" next="FP_Q25_A6" prev="FP_Q25_A4" progress="4.69%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God can do what He does not?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p0.1">Whether God can do what He does not?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5" next="FP_Q25_A6" prev="FP_Q25_A4" progress="4.69%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God can do what He does not?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p0.1">Whether God can do what He does not?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.26.53" parsed="vul|Matt|26|53|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p5.1" passage="Mat. 26:53">Mat. 26:53</scripRef>). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3">Q[19], A[3]</a>) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God
   does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2">Q[21], A[2]</a>), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine
   wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could
   happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because
   His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3">Q[19], A[3]</a>), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things. Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the
   intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3">(A[3])</a>. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by
   His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is false;
   for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the verb "can" (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them another order.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6" next="FP_Q26" prev="FP_Q25_A5" progress="4.73%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether God can do better than what He does?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p0.1">Whether God can do better than what He does?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6" next="FP_Q26" prev="FP_Q25_A5" progress="4.73%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether God can do better than what He does?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p0.1">Whether God can do better than what He does?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): "If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been envious." For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better than He does.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made them.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.3.20" parsed="vul|Eph|3|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p6.1" passage="Eph. 3:20">Eph. 3:20</scripRef>): "God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is
   after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, "better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because
   He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the substance.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be
   another and a better universe.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything better than God.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-
-<div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q26" next="FP_Q26_A1" prev="FP_Q25_A6" progress="4.76%" n="xxv" title="Question. 26 - OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) ">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p0.1">Question 26. OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
-
-			 
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p2"> After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this, there are four points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p3"> (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p4"> (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p5"> (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p6"> (4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?</p>
-</div>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1" next="FP_Q26_A2" prev="FP_Q26" progress="4.76%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether beatitude belongs to God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p0.1">Whether beatitude belongs to God?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4></div3><div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q26" next="FP_Q26_A1" prev="FP_Q25_A6" progress="4.76%" n="xxv" title="Question. 26 - OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) ">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p0.1">Question 26. OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p2"> After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p3"> (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p4"> (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p5"> (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p6"> (4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1" next="FP_Q26_A2" prev="FP_Q26" progress="4.76%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether beatitude belongs to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p0.1">Whether beatitude belongs to God?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude does not belong to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords." (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.6.15" parsed="vul|1Tim|6|15|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p4.1" passage="1 Tim. 6:15">1 Tim. 6:15</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence.
   Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2">Q[4], A[2]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4">Q[13], A[4]</a>), in simplicity and unity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit.</p>
-</div>
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-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2" next="FP_Q26_A3" prev="FP_Q26_A1" progress="4.77%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p0.1">Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2" next="FP_Q26_A3" prev="FP_Q26_A1" progress="4.77%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p0.1">Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1">(A[1])</a>, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. Now in God, to be and to
   understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation to His beatitude.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect.</p>
-</div>
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-
-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3" next="FP_Q26_A4" prev="FP_Q26_A2" progress="4.79%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?</h4>
-
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3" next="FP_Q26_A4" prev="FP_Q26_A2" progress="4.79%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?</h4><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p2.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3">Q[11], A[3]</a>). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God Himself.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.15.41" parsed="vul|1Cor|15|41|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p4.1" passage="1 Cor. 15:41">1 Cor. 15:41</scripRef>: "Star differeth from star in glory." But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth
   Thee, though he know nought else." But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+</div><div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> End is twofold, namely, "objective" and "subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing itself" and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing.</p>
-</div>
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-
-
-			 </div4>
-
-<div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4" next="FP.iii" prev="FP_Q26_A3" progress="4.81%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?">
-<h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p0.1">Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?</h4>
-
-
-
+</div></div4><div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4" next="FP.iii" prev="FP_Q26_A3" progress="4.81%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p0.1">Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?</h4>
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2">Q[4], A[2]</a> ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol.
   iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures.</p>
 </div>
-
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p8"> We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.</p>
-</div>
-
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-
-
-			 </div4>
-		  </div3>
-		</div2>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p8"> We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+</div4></div3></div2>