Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
changeset 70:176b0e713f8f
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| author | ht |
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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 18:47:31 +0000 |
| parents | 52063d0f8985 |
| children | d8c190e4b9ef |
| files | summa/bilingual/FP_ii.html |
| diffstat | 1 files changed, 17161 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) [+] |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/FP_ii.html Sun Jan 03 18:47:31 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,17161 @@ + + <html xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> + <style> + h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} + .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} + div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} + div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} + @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm} + </style> + </head> + <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.ii" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q1_A10.html"/> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"/> + <h2 id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2> + <div id="FP_Q2" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q2-p0.1">Q. 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q2-p2"> Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is + the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, + therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards + God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God. + </p><p id="FP_Q2-p3"> In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) + Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him. + </p><p id="FP_Q2-p4"> Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what + is NOT the manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations---namely, His knowledge, will, power. + </p><p id="FP_Q2-p5"> Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q2-p6"> (1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?</p><p id="FP_Q2-p7"> (2) Whether it is demonstrable?</p><p id="FP_Q2-p8"> (3) Whether God exists?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 pr."><a name="28298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28298] +Iª q. 2 pr.</span></a> Quia igitur principalis intentio huius +sacrae doctrinae est Dei cognitionem tradere, et non solum secundum +quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et +finis earum, et specialiter rationalis creaturae, ut ex dictis est +manifestum; ad huius doctrinae expositionem intendentes, primo +tractabimus de Deo; secundo, de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum; +tertio, de Christo, qui, secundum quod homo, via est nobis tendendi +in Deum. Consideratio autem de Deo tripartita erit. Primo namque +considerabimus ea quae ad essentiam divinam pertinent; secundo, ea +quae pertinent ad distinctionem personarum; tertio, ea quae +pertinent ad processum creaturarum ab ipso. Circa essentiam vero +divinam, primo considerandum est an Deus sit; secundo, quomodo sit, +vel potius quomodo non sit; tertio considerandum erit de his quae +ad operationem ipsius pertinent, scilicet de scientia et de +voluntate et potentia. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum +Deum esse sit per se notum. Secundo, utrum sit demonstrabile. +Tertio, an Deus sit.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q2_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q2_A1-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 1. Whether the existence of God is self-evident?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which + is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the + knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28299] Iª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse sit per se notum. Illa enim +nobis dicuntur per se nota, quorum cognitio nobis naturaliter +inest, sicut patet de primis principiis. Sed, sicut dicit +Damascenus in principio libri sui, <i>omnibus cognitio existendi +Deum naturaliter est inserta</i>. Ergo Deum esse est per se +notum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 + Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, + it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is + understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than + which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only + mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. + Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28300] Iª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illa +dicuntur esse per se nota, quae statim, cognitis terminis, +cognoscuntur, quod philosophus attribuit primis demonstrationis +principiis, in I Poster., scito enim quid est totum et quid pars, +statim scitur quod omne totum maius est sua parte. Sed intellecto +quid significet hoc nomen Deus, statim habetur quod Deus est. +Significatur enim hoc nomine id quo maius significari non potest, +maius autem est quod est in re et intellectu, quam quod est in +intellectu tantum, unde cum, intellecto hoc nomine Deus, statim sit +in intellectu, sequitur etiam quod sit in re. Ergo Deum esse est +per se notum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: + and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must + be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28301] Iª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +veritatem esse est per se notum, quia qui negat veritatem esse, +concedit veritatem esse, si enim veritas non est, verum est +veritatem non esse. Si autem est aliquid verum, oportet quod +veritas sit. Deus autem est ipsa veritas, Ioann. XIV, <i>ego sum +via, veritas et vita</i>. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning + the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said + in his heart, There is no God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.52.1" target="asv">Ps. 52:1</a>). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28302] Iª q. 2 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, nullus +potest cogitare oppositum eius quod est per se notum ut patet per +philosophum, in IV Metaphys. et I Poster., circa prima +demonstrationis principia. Cogitari autem potest oppositum eius +quod est Deum esse, secundum illud Psalmi LII, <i>dixit insipiens +in corde suo, non est Deus</i>. Ergo Deum esse non est per se +notum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, + self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, + as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject + be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with + regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as + being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject + is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate + and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that + is, + is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in + space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the + subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown ( + <a id="FP_Q2_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated + by things that are more + known to us, though less known in their nature---namely, by effects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="28303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28303] Iª q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter, uno modo, +secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos. +Ex hoc enim aliqua propositio est per se nota, quod praedicatum +includitur in ratione subiecti, ut homo est animal, nam animal est +de ratione hominis. Si igitur notum sit omnibus de praedicato et de +subiecto quid sit, propositio illa erit omnibus per se nota, sicut +patet in primis demonstrationum principiis, quorum termini sunt +quaedam communia quae nullus ignorat, ut ens et non ens, totum et +pars, et similia. Si autem apud aliquos notum non sit de praedicato +et subiecto quid sit, propositio quidem quantum in se est, erit per +se nota, non tamen apud illos qui praedicatum et subiectum +propositionis ignorant. Et ideo contingit, ut dicit Boetius in +libro de hebdomadibus, quod quaedam sunt communes animi +conceptiones et per se notae, apud sapientes tantum, ut +incorporalia in loco non esse. Dico ergo quod haec propositio, Deus +est, quantum in se est, per se nota est, quia praedicatum est idem +cum subiecto; Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. Sed quia +nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed +indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, et minus +nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For + man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not + to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, + even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who + imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28304] Iª q. 2 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam +confusione, est nobis naturaliter insertum, inquantum scilicet Deus +est hominis beatitudo, homo enim naturaliter desiderat +beatitudinem, et quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine, +naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem. Sed hoc non est simpliciter +cognoscere Deum esse; sicut cognoscere venientem, non est +cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Petrus veniens, multi enim perfectum +hominis bonum, quod est beatitudo, existimant divitias; quidam vero +voluptates; quidam autem aliquid aliud.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, + seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified + something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what + the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can + it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater + can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28305] Iª q. 2 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod forte ille qui audit hoc nomen Deus, non intelligit +significari aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, cum quidam +crediderint Deum esse corpus. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat +hoc nomine Deus significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud quo +maius cogitari non potest; non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod +intelligat id quod significatur per nomen, esse in rerum natura; +sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum. Nec potest argui quod sit +in re, nisi daretur quod sit in re aliquid quo maius cogitari non +potest, quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28306] Iª q. 2 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod veritatem esse in communi, est per se notum, sed primam +veritatem esse, hoc non est per se notum quoad nos.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q2_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q2_A2-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 2. Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of + faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28307] Iª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse non sit demonstrabile. Deum enim +esse est articulus fidei. Sed ea quae sunt fidei, non sunt +demonstrabilia, quia demonstratio facit scire, fides autem de non +apparentibus est, ut patet per apostolum, ad Hebr. XI. Ergo Deum +esse non est demonstrabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in + what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28308] Iª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, medium +demonstrationis est quod quid est. Sed de Deo non possumus scire +quid est, sed solum quid non est, ut dicit Damascenus. Ergo non +possumus demonstrare Deum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate + to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, + since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28309] Iª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +demonstraretur Deum esse, hoc non esset nisi ex effectibus eius. +Sed effectus eius non sunt proportionati ei, cum ipse sit +infinitus, et effectus finiti; finiti autem ad infinitum non est +proportio. Cum ergo causa non possit demonstrari per effectum sibi +non proportionatum, videtur quod Deum esse non possit +demonstrari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first + thing we must know of anything is whether it exists. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28310] Iª q. 2 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea quae +facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>. Sed hoc non esset, nisi +per ea quae facta sunt, posset demonstrari Deum esse, primum enim +quod oportet intelligi de aliquo, est an sit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what + is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from + what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the + knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be + demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect + exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated + from those of His effects which are known to us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 co."><a name="28311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28311] Iª q. 2 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod duplex est demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur +propter quid, et haec est per priora simpliciter. Alia est per +effectum, et dicitur demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae +sunt priora quoad nos, cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est +manifestior quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem +causae. Ex quolibet autem effectu potest demonstrari propriam +causam eius esse (si tamen eius effectus sint magis noti quoad +nos), quia, cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito effectu necesse +est causam praeexistere. Unde Deum esse, secundum quod non est per +se notum quoad nos, demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but + are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes + something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as + a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically + known and demonstrated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28312] Iª q. 2 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Deum esse, et alia huiusmodi quae per rationem +naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur Rom. I non sunt +articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos, sic enim fides +praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam, et ut +perfectio perfectibile. Nihil tamen prohibet illud quod secundum se +demonstrabile est et scibile, ab aliquo accipi ut credibile, qui +demonstrationem non capit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause + in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence + of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of + its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are + derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle + term the meaning of the word "God". + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28313] Iª q. 2 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse est uti +effectu loco definitionis causae, ad probandum causam esse, et hoc +maxime contingit in Deo. Quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse +est accipere pro medio quid significet nomen non autem quod quid +est, quia quaestio quid est, sequitur ad quaestionem an est. Nomina +autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendetur, unde, +demonstrando Deum esse per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio +quid significet hoc nomen Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the + existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though + from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28314] Iª q. 2 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod per effectus non proportionatos causae, non potest perfecta +cognitio de causa haberi, sed tamen ex quocumque effectu potest +manifeste nobis demonstrari causam esse, ut dictum est. Et sic ex +effectibus Dei potest demonstrari Deum esse, licet per eos non +perfecte possimus eum cognoscere secundum suam essentiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q2_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q2_A3-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 3. Whether God exists?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. + But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but + there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28315] Iª q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit. Quia si unum contrariorum +fuerit infinitum, totaliter destruetur aliud. Sed hoc intelligitur +in hoc nomine Deus, scilicet quod sit quoddam bonum infinitum. Si +ergo Deus esset, nullum malum inveniretur. Invenitur autem malum in +mundo. Ergo Deus non est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it + seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural + things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is + human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28316] Iª q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod +potest compleri per pauciora principia, non fit per plura. Sed +videtur quod omnia quae apparent in mundo, possunt compleri per +alia principia, supposito quod Deus non sit, quia ea quae sunt +naturalia, reducuntur in principium quod est natura; ea vero quae +sunt a proposito, reducuntur in principium quod est ratio humana +vel voluntas. Nulla igitur necessitas est ponere Deum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.14" target="asv">Ex. 3:14</a>) + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28317] Iª q. 2 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Exodi III, ex persona Dei, <i>ego sum qui sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The existence of God can be proved in five ways. + </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p6"> The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world + some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is + in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing + else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality + to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is + potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be + at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot + simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same + respect + and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion + must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs + be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no + first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion + by the + first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first + mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. + </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p7"> The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. + There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for + so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because + in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the + intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away + the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, + nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient + cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. + Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. + </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p8"> The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and + not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. + But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything + is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, + even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already + existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to + exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but + there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused + by + another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, + as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having + of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men + speak of as God. + </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p9"> The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, + noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different + ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; + so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, + something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in + Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause + of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every + other perfection; and this we call God. + </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p10"> The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, + act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best + result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence + cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the + arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to + their end; and this being we call God. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 co."><a name="28318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28318] Iª q. 2 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deum esse quinque viis probari potest. Prima autem et +manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim, +et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod +movetur, ab alio movetur. Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod +est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur, movet autem aliquid +secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere +aliquid de potentia in actum, de potentia autem non potest aliquid +reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu, sicut calidum in +actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse +actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum. Non autem est +possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et potentia secundum idem, sed +solum secundum diversa, quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest +simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. +Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem modo, aliquid sit +movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Omne ergo quod movetur, +oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet +et ipsum ab alio moveri et illud ab alio. Hic autem non est +procedere in infinitum, quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens; +et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda +non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut +baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu. Ergo necesse +est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur, et hoc +omnes intelligunt Deum. Secunda via est ex ratione causae +efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem +causarum efficientium, nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod +aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius +seipso, quod est impossibile. Non autem est possibile quod in +causis efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia in omnibus +causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et medium +est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum, remota +autem causa, removetur effectus, ergo, si non fuerit primum in +causis efficientibus, non erit ultimum nec medium. Sed si +procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus, non erit prima +causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae +efficientes mediae, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere +aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum nominant. Tertia +via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario, quae talis est. +Invenimus enim in rebus quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non +esse, cum quaedam inveniantur generari et corrumpi, et per +consequens possibilia esse et non esse. Impossibile est autem omnia +quae sunt, talia esse, quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque +non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil +fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset, quia +quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est; si igitur +nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid inciperet esse, et +sic modo nihil esset, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia entia +sunt possibilia, sed oportet aliquid esse necessarium in rebus. +Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde, +vel non habet. Non est autem possibile quod procedatur in infinitum +in necessariis quae habent causam suae necessitatis, sicut nec in +causis efficientibus, ut probatum est. Ergo necesse est ponere +aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis +aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis, quod omnes dicunt +Deum. Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. +Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et +nobile, et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de +diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod +maxime est, sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime +calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et +nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens, nam quae sunt maxime +vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaphys. Quod autem dicitur +maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius +generis, sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium +calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus +entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis, +et hoc dicimus Deum. Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum. +Videmus enim quod aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet corpora +naturalia, operantur propter finem, quod apparet ex hoc quod semper +aut frequentius eodem modo operantur, ut consequantur id quod est +optimum; unde patet quod non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt +ad finem. Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in +finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut +sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res +naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless + His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that + He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28319] Iª q. 2 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio, <i>Deus, cum +sit summe bonus, nullo modo sineret aliquid mali esse in operibus +suis, nisi esset adeo omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de +malo</i>. Hoc ergo ad infinitam Dei bonitatem pertinet, ut esse +permittat mala, et ex eis eliciat bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be + traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause + other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect + must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown + in the body of the Article. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28320] Iª q. 2 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum natura propter determinatum finem operetur ex +directione alicuius superioris agentis, necesse est ea quae a +natura fiunt, etiam in Deum reducere, sicut in primam causam. +Similiter etiam quae ex proposito fiunt, oportet reducere in +aliquam altiorem causam, quae non sit ratio et voluntas humana, +quia haec mutabilia sunt et defectibilia; oportet autem omnia +mobilia et deficere possibilia reduci in aliquod primum principium +immobile et per se necessarium, sicut ostensum est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q3" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q3-p0.1">Q. 3. OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q3-p2"> When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in + order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for + considering how God is, but rather how He is not. + </p><p id="FP_Q3-p3"> Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.</p><p id="FP_Q3-p4"> Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and + the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple + in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His + immutability; (5) His unity. + </p><p id="FP_Q3-p5"> Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q3-p6"> (1) Whether God is a body?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p7"> (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p8"> (3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p9"> (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p10"> (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p11"> (6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p12"> (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p13"> (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 pr."><a name="28321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28321] +Iª q. 3 pr.</span></a> Cognito de aliquo an sit, inquirendum +restat quomodo sit, ut sciatur de eo quid sit. Sed quia de Deo +scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus +considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non sit. Primo +ergo considerandum est quomodo non sit; secundo, quomodo a nobis +cognoscatur; tertio, quomodo nominetur. Potest autem ostendi de Deo +quomodo non sit, removendo ab eo ea quae ei non conveniunt, utpote +compositionem, motum, et alia huiusmodi. Primo ergo inquiratur de +simplicitate ipsius, per quam removetur ab eo compositio. Et quia +simplicia in rebus corporalibus sunt imperfecta et partes, secundo +inquiretur de perfectione ipsius; tertio, de infinitate eius; +quarto, de immutabilitate; quinto, de unitate. Circa primum +quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum Deus sit corpus. Secundo, utrum sit +in eo compositio formae et materiae. Tertio, utrum sit in eo +compositio quidditatis, sive essentiae, vel naturae, et subiecti. +Quarto, utrum sit in eo compositio quae est ex essentia et esse. +Quinto, utrum sit in eo compositio generis et differentiae. Sexto, +utrum sit in eo compositio subiecti et accidentis. Septimo, utrum +sit quocumque modo compositus, vel totaliter simplex. Octavo, utrum +veniat in compositionem cum aliis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q3_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A1-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 1. Whether God is a body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions + to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? + The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.11.8" target="asv">Job 11:8,9</a>). Therefore God is a body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28322] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit corpus. Corpus enim est quod +habet trinam dimensionem. Sed sacra Scriptura attribuit Deo trinam +dimensionem, dicitur enim Iob XI, <i>excelsior caelo est, et quid +facies? Profundior Inferno, et unde cognosces? Longior terra +mensura eius, et latior mari</i>. Ergo Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it + is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the + image, "of His substance" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>). Therefore God is a body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28323] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne +figuratum est corpus, cum figura sit qualitas circa quantitatem. +Sed Deus videtur esse figuratus, cum scriptum sit Gen. I, +<i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram</i>, +figura enim imago dicitur, secundum illud Hebr. I, <i>cum sit +splendor gloriae, et figura substantiae eius</i>, idest imago. Ergo +Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like + God?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.40.4" target="asv">Job 40:4</a>); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.16" target="asv">Ps. 33:16</a>); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.117.16" target="asv">Ps. 117:16</a>). Therefore God is a body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28324] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod habet partes corporeas, est corpus. Sed Scriptura attribuit +Deo partes corporeas, dicitur enim Iob XL, <i>si habes brachium ut +Deus</i>; et in Psalmo, <i>oculi domini super iustos; et, dextera +domini fecit virtutem</i>. Ergo Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the + Lord sitting" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>), and "He standeth up to judge" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.13" target="asv">Is. 3:13</a>). Therefore God is a body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28325] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, situs +non convenit nisi corpori. Sed ea quae ad situm pertinent, in +Scripturis dicuntur de Deo, dicitur enim Isaiae VI, <i>vidi dominum +sedentem</i>; et Isaiae III, <i>stat ad iudicandum dominus</i>. +Ergo Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term "wherefrom" or "whereto." But in the Scriptures God is spoken + of as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be enlightened" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.6" target="asv">Ps. 33:6</a>), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.17.13" target="asv">Jer. 17:13</a>). Therefore God is a body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="28326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28326] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, nihil +potest esse terminus localis a quo vel ad quem, nisi sit corpus vel +aliquod corporeum. Sed Deus in Scriptura dicitur esse terminus +localis ut ad quem, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>accedite ad eum, et +illuminamini</i>; et ut a quo, secundum illud Hierem. XVII, +recedentes a te in terra scribentur. Ergo Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the Gospel of St. John ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>): "God is a spirit." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28327] Iª q. 3 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Ioan. IV, <i>spiritus est Deus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless + it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the + first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any + single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, + absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only + by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in + God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to + infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is + impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body + is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would + be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence + that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 co."><a name="28328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28328] Iª q. 3 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +absolute Deum non esse corpus. Quod tripliciter ostendi potest. +Primo quidem, quia nullum corpus movet non motum, ut patet +inducendo per singula. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est +primum movens immobile. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est +corpus. Secundo, quia necesse est id quod est primum ens, esse in +actu, et nullo modo in potentia. Licet enim in uno et eodem quod +exit de potentia in actum, prius sit potentia quam actus tempore, +simpliciter tamen actus prior est potentia, quia quod est in +potentia, non reducitur in actum nisi per ens actu. Ostensum est +autem supra quod Deus est primum ens. Impossibile est igitur quod +in Deo sit aliquid in potentia. Omne autem corpus est in potentia, +quia continuum, inquantum huiusmodi, divisibile est in infinitum. +Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus. Tertio, quia Deus est id +quod est nobilissimum in entibus, ut ex dictis patet. Impossibile +est autem aliquod corpus esse nobilissimum in entibus. Quia corpus +aut est vivum, aut non vivum. Corpus autem vivum, manifestum est +quod est nobilius corpore non vivo. Corpus autem vivum non vivit +inquantum corpus, quia sic omne corpus viveret, oportet igitur quod +vivat per aliquid aliud, sicut corpus nostrum vivit per animam. +Illud autem per quod vivit corpus, est nobilius quam corpus. +Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q1_A9.html">Q[1], A[9]</a>), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes + to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it + signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration + of His existence; by + breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility + of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as + all things lie under His protection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28329] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sacra Scriptura tradit nobis +spiritualia et divina sub similitudinibus corporalium. Unde, cum +trinam dimensionem Deo attribuit, sub similitudine quantitatis +corporeae, quantitatem virtualem ipsius designat, utpote per +profunditatem, virtutem ad cognoscendum occulta; per altitudinem, +excellentiam virtutis super omnia; per longitudinem, durationem sui +esse; per latitudinem, affectum dilectionis ad omnia. Vel, ut dicit +Dionysius, cap. IX de Div. Nom., per profunditatem Dei intelligitur +incomprehensibilitas ipsius essentiae; per longitudinem, processus +virtutis eius, omnia penetrantis; per latitudinem vero, +superextensio eius ad omnia, inquantum scilicet sub eius +protectione omnia continentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, + when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the + sea" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which + are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28330] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod homo dicitur esse ad imaginem Dei, non secundum +corpus, sed secundum id quo homo excellit alia animalia, unde, Gen. +I, postquam dictum est, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et +similitudinem nostram</i>, subditur, <i>ut praesit piscibus +maris,</i> et cetera. Excellit autem homo omnia animalia quantum ad +rationem et intellectum. Unde secundum intellectum et rationem, +quae sunt incorporea, homo est ad imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For + instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; + and so on with the other parts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28331] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod partes corporeae attribuuntur Deo in Scripturis ratione suorum +actuum, secundum quandam similitudinem. Sicut actus oculi est +videre, unde oculus de Deo dictus, significat virtutem eius ad +videndum modo intelligibili, non sensibili. Et simile est de aliis +partibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account + of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28332] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum +quod etiam ea quae ad situm pertinent, non attribuuntur Deo nisi +secundum quandam similitudinem, sicut dicitur sedens, propter suam +immobilitatem et auctoritatem; et stans, propter suam fortitudinem +ad debellandum omne quod adversatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions + of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on + the metaphor of local motion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="28333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28333] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum +quod ad Deum non acceditur passibus corporalibus, cum ubique sit, +sed affectibus mentis, et eodem modo ab eo receditur. Et sic +accessus et recessus, sub similitudine localis motus, designant +spiritualem affectum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A2-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 2. Whether God is composed of matter and form?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul + is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.38" target="asv">Heb. 10:38</a>), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God + is composed of matter and form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28334] Iª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae. +Omne enim quod habet animam, est compositum ex materia et forma, +quia anima est forma corporis. Sed Scriptura attribuit animam Deo, +introducitur enim ad Hebr. X, ex persona Dei, <i>iustus autem meus +ex fide vivit; quod si subtraxerit se, non placebit animae +meae</i>. Ergo Deus est compositus ex materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was + exceeding angry with His people" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.105.40" target="asv">Ps. 105:40</a>). Therefore God is composed of matter and form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28335] Iª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ira, +gaudium, et huiusmodi, sunt passiones coniuncti, ut dicitur I de +anima. Sed huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo in Scriptura dicitur enim in +Psalmo, <i>iratus est furore dominus in populum suum</i>. Ergo Deus +ex materia et forma est compositus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. + Therefore He is composed of matter and form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28336] Iª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +materia est principium individuationis. Sed Deus videtur esse +individuum, non enim de multis praedicatur. Ergo est compositus ex +materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not + a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28337] Iª q. 3 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne +compositum ex materia et forma est corpus, quantitas enim dimensiva +est quae primo inhaeret materiae. Sed Deus non est corpus, ut +ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est compositus ex materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, + because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, + inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the + first good and the best---viz. God---is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. + Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence + the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially + an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is + therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 co."><a name="28338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28338] Iª q. 3 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod impossibile est in Deo esse materiam. Primo quidem, quia +materia est id quod est in potentia. Ostensum est autem quod Deus +est purus actus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate. Unde +impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex materia et forma. +Secundo, quia omne compositum ex materia et forma est perfectum et +bonum per suam formam, unde oportet quod sit bonum per +participationem, secundum quod materia participat formam. Primum +autem quod est bonum et optimum, quod Deus est, non est bonum per +participationem, quia bonum per essentiam, prius est bono per +participationem. Unde impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex +materia et forma. Tertio, quia unumquodque agens agit per suam +formam, unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad suam formam, sic se +habet ad hoc quod sit agens. Quod igitur primum est et per se +agens, oportet quod sit primo et per se forma. Deus autem est +primum agens, cum sit prima causa efficiens, ut ostensum est. Est +igitur per essentiam suam forma; et non compositus ex materia et +forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. + Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28339] Iª q. 3 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod anima attribuitur Deo per similitudinem actus. Quod +enim volumus aliquid nobis, ex anima nostra est, unde illud dicitur +esse placitum animae Dei, quod est placitum voluntati ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act + of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28340] Iª q. 3 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ira et huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo secundum +similitudinem effectus, quia enim proprium est irati punire, ira +eius punitio metaphorice vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is + the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that + form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received + in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28341] Iª q. 3 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod formae quae sunt receptibiles in materia individuantur per +materiam, quae non potest esse in alio, cum sit primum subiectum +substans, forma vero, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid aliud +impediat, recipi potest a pluribus. Sed illa forma quae non est +receptibilis in materia, sed est per se subsistens, ex hoc ipso +individuatur, quod non potest recipi in alio, et huiusmodi forma +est Deus. Unde non sequitur quod habeat materiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A3-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 3. Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of + God---i.e. the Godhead---is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28342] Iª q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non sit idem Deus quod sua essentia vel +natura. Nihil enim est in seipso. Sed essentia vel natura Dei, quae +est deitas, dicitur esse in Deo. Ergo videtur quod Deus non sit +idem quod sua essentia vel natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" + is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28343] Iª q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +effectus assimilatur suae causae, quia omne agens agit sibi simile. +Sed in rebus creatis non est idem suppositum quod sua natura, non +enim idem est homo quod sua humanitas. Ergo nec Deus est idem quod +sua deitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is + His very Godhead. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28344] Iª q. 3 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Contra, de Deo +dicitur quod est vita, et non solum quod est vivens, ut patet Ioan. +XIV, <i>ego sum via, veritas et vita</i>. Sicut autem se habet vita +ad viventem, ita deitas ad Deum. Ergo Deus est ipsa deitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, + the nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the + definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man + is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now + individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular + flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, + these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they + are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity. + Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because + the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. + On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter---that + is to say, to "this" matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is necessary the forms themselves should + be subsisting "supposita." Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter + and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 co."><a name="28345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28345] Iª q. 3 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus est idem quod sua essentia vel natura. Ad cuius +intellectum sciendum est, quod in rebus compositis ex materia et +forma, necesse est quod differant natura vel essentia et +suppositum. Quia essentia vel natura comprehendit in se illa tantum +quae cadunt in definitione speciei, sicut humanitas comprehendit in +se ea quae cadunt in definitione hominis, his enim homo est homo, +et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet quo homo est homo. Sed +materia individualis, cum accidentibus omnibus individuantibus +ipsam, non cadit in definitione speciei, non enim cadunt in +definitione hominis hae carnes et haec ossa, aut albedo vel +nigredo, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Unde hae carnes et haec ossa, et +accidentia designantia hanc materiam, non concluduntur in +humanitate. Et tamen in eo quod est homo, includuntur, unde id quod +est homo, habet in se aliquid quod non habet humanitas. Et propter +hoc non est totaliter idem homo et humanitas, sed humanitas +significatur ut pars formalis hominis; quia principia definientia +habent se formaliter, respectu materiae individuantis. In his +igitur quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma, in quibus +individuatio non est per materiam individualem, idest per hanc +materiam, sed ipsae formae per se individuantur, oportet quod ipsae +formae sint supposita subsistentia. Unde in eis non differt +suppositum et natura. Et sic, cum Deus non sit compositus ex +materia et forma, ut ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit sua +deitas, sua vita, et quidquid aliud sic de Deo praedicatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore + in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are + composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are + in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not + that there is any composition in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28346] Iª q. 3 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod de rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus, nisi per +modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accipimus. Et ideo, de Deo +loquentes, utimur nominibus concretis, ut significemus eius +subsistentiam, quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita, et +utimur nominibus abstractis, ut significemus eius simplicitatem. +Quod ergo dicitur deitas vel vita, vel aliquid huiusmodi, esse in +Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptione +intellectus nostri; et non ad aliquam diversitatem rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely + because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, + and therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28347] Iª q. 3 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod effectus Dei imitantur ipsum, non perfecte, sed +secundum quod possunt. Et hoc ad defectum imitationis pertinet, +quod id quod est simplex et unum, non potest repraesentari nisi per +multa, et sic accidit in eis compositio, ex qua provenit quod in +eis non est idem suppositum quod natura.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A4-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 4. Whether essence and existence are the same in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to + it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that + God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to + stones and wood" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.21" target="asv">Wis. 14:21</a>). Therefore God's existence is not His + essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28348] Iª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit idem essentia et esse. Si +enim hoc sit, tunc ad esse divinum nihil additur. Sed esse cui +nulla fit additio, est esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur, +sequitur ergo quod Deus sit ens commune praedicabile de omnibus. +Hoc autem est falsum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile +nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt</i>. Ergo esse Dei non est +eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2], A[2]</a>); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or + nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28349] Iª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de Deo +scire possumus an sit, ut supra dictum est. Non autem possumus +scire quid sit. Ergo non est idem esse Dei, et quod quid est eius, +sive quidditas vel natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in + God is His existence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28350] Iª q. 3 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Hilarius dicit in VII de Trin., <i>esse non est accidens in +Deo, sed subsistens veritas</i>. Id ergo quod subsistit in Deo, est +suum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several + ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence + (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species---as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man---and is caused + by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent---as heat is caused + in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by + some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential + constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore + that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of + God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from + His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of + as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is + a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above + + <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, + just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, + is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above + <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">(A[3])</a> if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not + therefore be the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="28351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28351] Iª q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est, sed etiam +suum esse. Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, +quia quidquid est in aliquo quod est praeter essentiam eius, +oportet esse causatum vel a principiis essentiae, sicut accidentia +propria consequentia speciem, ut risibile consequitur hominem et +causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei; vel ab aliquo +exteriori, sicut calor in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum +esse rei sit aliud ab eius essentia, necesse est quod esse illius +rei vel sit causatum ab aliquo exteriori, vel a principiis +essentialibus eiusdem rei. Impossibile est autem quod esse sit +causatum tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, quia nulla res +sufficit quod sit sibi causa essendi, si habeat esse causatum. +Oportet ergo quod illud cuius esse est aliud ab essentia sua, +habeat esse causatum ab alio. Hoc autem non potest dici de Deo, +quia Deum dicimus esse primam causam efficientem. Impossibile est +ergo quod in Deo sit aliud esse, et aliud eius essentia. Secundo, +quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae, non enim bonitas +vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam +esse. Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae +est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam. Cum igitur in Deo +nihil sit potentiale, ut ostensum est supra, sequitur quod non sit +aliud in eo essentia quam suum esse. Sua igitur essentia est suum +esse. Tertio, quia sicut illud quod habet ignem et non est ignis, +est ignitum per participationem, ita illud quod habet esse et non +est esse, est ens per participationem. Deus autem est sua essentia, +ut ostensum est. Si igitur non sit suum esse, erit ens per +participationem, et non per essentiam. Non ergo erit primum ens, +quod absurdum est dicere. Est igitur Deus suum esse, et non solum +sua essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it + is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, + inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because + it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to + lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added + to it in the second sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28352] Iª q. 3 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod aliquid cui non fit additio potest intelligi +dupliciter. Uno modo, ut de ratione eius sit quod non fiat ei +additio; sicut de ratione animalis irrationalis est, ut sit sine +ratione. Alio modo intelligitur aliquid cui non fit additio, quia +non est de ratione eius quod sibi fiat additio, sicut animal +commune est sine ratione, quia non est de ratione animalis communis +ut habeat rationem; sed nec de ratione eius est ut careat ratione. +Primo igitur modo, esse sine additione, est esse divinum, secundo +modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected + by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor + His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is + true; and this we know from His effects ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2], + A[2] + </a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28353] Iª q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum +essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam +anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo +accipiendo esse, non possumus scire esse Dei, sicut nec eius +essentiam, sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio +quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus Deus est, vera est. Et hoc scimus +ex eius effectibus, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A5-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 5. Whether God is contained in a genus?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true + of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28354] Iª q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit in genere aliquo. Substantia enim +est ens per se subsistens. Hoc autem maxime convenit Deo. Ergo Deus +est in genere substantiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. + But God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28355] Iª q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +unumquodque mensuratur per aliquid sui generis; sicut longitudines +per longitudinem, et numeri per numerum. Sed Deus est mensura +omnium substantiarum, ut patet per Commentatorem, X Metaphys. Ergo +Deus est in genere substantiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is + not in any genus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28356] Iª q. 3 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, genus +est prius, secundum intellectum, eo quod in genere continetur. Sed +nihil est prius Deo, nec secundum rem, nec secundum intellectum. +Ergo Deus non est in aliquo genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being + reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its + principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. + That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a + species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is + always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from + sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other + hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is + compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality + is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence + of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus is predicated as an essential + it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for + every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being + cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity + or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence + of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and + quiddity---i.e. essence---must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain + that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can + there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and + difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, + is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle + of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is + not contained in any genus as its principle. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 co."><a name="28357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28357] Iª q. 3 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod aliquid est in genere dupliciter. Uno modo simpliciter et +proprie; sicut species, quae sub genere continentur. Alio modo, per +reductionem, sicut principia et privationes, sicut punctus et +unitas reducuntur ad genus quantitatis, sicut principia; caecitas +autem, et omnis privatio, reducitur ad genus sui habitus. Neutro +autem modo Deus est in genere. Quod enim non possit esse species +alicuius generis, tripliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia +species constituitur ex genere et differentia. Semper autem id a +quo sumitur differentia constituens speciem, se habet ad illud unde +sumitur genus, sicut actus ad potentiam. Animal enim sumitur a +natura sensitiva per modum concretionis; hoc enim dicitur animal, +quod naturam sensitivam habet, rationale vero sumitur a natura +intellectiva, quia rationale est quod naturam intellectivam habet, +intellectivum autem comparatur ad sensitivum, sicut actus ad +potentiam. Et similiter manifestum est in aliis. Unde, cum in Deo +non adiungatur potentia actui, impossibile est quod sit in genere +tanquam species. Secundo, quia, cum esse Dei sit eius essentia, ut +ostensum est, si Deus esset in aliquo genere, oporteret quod genus +eius esset ens, nam genus significat essentiam rei, cum praedicetur +in eo quod quid est. Ostendit autem philosophus in III Metaphys., +quod ens non potest esse genus alicuius, omne enim genus habet +differentias quae sunt extra essentiam generis; nulla autem +differentia posset inveniri, quae esset extra ens; quia non ens non +potest esse differentia. Unde relinquitur quod Deus non sit in +genere. Tertio, quia omnia quae sunt in genere uno, communicant in +quidditate vel essentia generis, quod praedicatur de eis in eo quod +quid est. Differunt autem secundum esse, non enim idem est esse +hominis et equi, nec huius hominis et illius hominis. Et sic +oportet quod quaecumque sunt in genere, differant in eis esse et +quod quid est, idest essentia. In Deo autem non differt, ut +ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est in genere sicut +species. Et ex hoc patet quod non habet genus, neque differentias; +neque est definitio ipsius; neque demonstratio, nisi per effectum, +quia definitio est ex genere et differentia, demonstrationis autem +medium est definitio. Quod autem Deus non sit in genere per +reductionem ut principium, manifestum est ex eo quod principium +quod reducitur in aliquod genus, non se extendit ultra genus illud, +sicut punctum non est principium nisi quantitatis continuae, et +unitas quantitatis discretae. Deus autem est principium totius +esse, ut infra ostendetur. Unde non continetur in aliquo genere +sicut principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself---for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the + body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way---namely, of existing + of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28358] Iª q. 3 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod substantiae nomen non significat hoc solum quod est +per se esse, quia hoc quod est esse, non potest per se esse genus, +ut ostensum est. Sed significat essentiam cui competit sic esse, +idest per se esse, quod tamen esse non est ipsa eius essentia. Et +sic patet quod Deus non est in genere substantiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure + proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only according + as it resembles Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28359] Iª q. 3 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de mensura proportionata, hanc +enim oportet esse homogeneam mensurato. Deus autem non est mensura +proportionata alicui. Dicitur tamen mensura omnium, ex eo quod +unumquodque tantum habet de esse, quantum ei appropinquat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A6-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 6. Whether in God there are any accidents?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that + which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form + of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributes + of God. Therefore in God there are accidents. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28360] Iª q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sint aliqua accidentia. Substantia +enim nulli est accidens, ut dicitur in I Physic. Quod ergo in uno +est accidens, non potest in alio esse substantia, sicut probatur +quod calor non sit forma substantialis ignis, quia in aliis est +accidens. Sed sapientia, virtus, et huiusmodi, quae in nobis sunt +accidentia, Deo attribuuntur. Ergo et in Deo sunt accidentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members + of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than God---which is absurd. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28361] Iª q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in +quolibet genere est unum primum. Multa autem sunt genera +accidentium. Si igitur prima illorum generum non sunt in Deo, erunt +multa prima extra Deum, quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De + Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28362] Iª q. 3 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne +accidens in subiecto est. Deus autem non potest esse subiectum, +quia <i>forma simplex non potest esse subiectum</i>, ut dicit +Boetius in Lib. de Trin. Ergo in Deo non potest esse accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents + as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality + in God, as was shown ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded + to it, this cannot apply to + absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute + heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is + absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability + of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the + subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 co."><a name="28363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28363] Iª q. 3 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, secundum praemissa, manifeste apparet quod in Deo accidens +esse non potest. Primo quidem, quia subiectum comparatur ad +accidens, sicut potentia ad actum, subiectum enim secundum accidens +est aliquo modo in actu. Esse autem in potentia, omnino removetur a +Deo, ut ex praedictis patet. Secundo, quia Deus est suum esse, et, +ut Boetius dicit in Lib. de Hebdomad., <i>licet id quod est, +aliquid aliud possit habere adiunctum, tamen ipsum esse nihil aliud +adiunctum habere potest</i>, sicut quod est calidum, potest habere +aliquid extraneum quam calidum, ut albedinem; sed ipse calor nihil +habet praeter calorem. Tertio, quia omne quod est per se, prius est +eo quod est per accidens. Unde, cum Deus sit simpliciter primum +ens, in eo non potest esse aliquid per accidens. Sed nec accidentia +per se in eo esse possunt, sicut risibile est per se accidens +hominis. Quia huiusmodi accidentia causantur ex principiis +subiecti, in Deo autem nihil potest esse causatum, cum sit causa +prima. Unde relinquitur quod in Deo nullum sit accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God + as there are in us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28364] Iª q. 3 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod virtus et sapientia non univoce dicuntur de Deo et de +nobis, ut infra patebit. Unde non sequitur quod accidentia sint in +Deo, sicut in nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as + to that which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to + all being, outside of every genus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28365] Iª q. 3 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum substantia sit prior accidentibus, principia +accidentium reducuntur in principia substantiae sicut in priora. +Quamvis Deus non sit primum contentum in genere substantiae, sed +primum extra omne genus, respectu totius esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A7-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 7. Whether God is altogether simple?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all + beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore + neither is God altogether simple. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28366] Iª q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino simplex. Ea enim quae +sunt a Deo, imitantur ipsum, unde a primo ente sunt omnia entia, et +a primo bono sunt omnia bona. Sed in rebus quae sunt a Deo, nihil +est omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non est omnino simplex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple; + thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot + be said that God is altogether simple. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28367] Iª q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod est melius, Deo attribuendum est. Sed, apud nos, composita +sunt meliora simplicibus, sicut corpora mixta elementis, et +elementa suis partibus. Ergo non est dicendum quod Deus sit omnino +simplex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and absolutely simple." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28368] Iª q. 3 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod Deus vere et summe simplex +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is + neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His + nature differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and + difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, + but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; + but God is the first being, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them + to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must + be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all + the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. + And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, + a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a + part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which + cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two + cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has + a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to + the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, + or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, + Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 co."><a name="28369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28369] Iª q. 3 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deum omnino esse simplicem, multipliciter potest esse +manifestum. Primo quidem per supradicta. Cum enim in Deo non sit +compositio, neque quantitativarum partium, quia corpus non est; +neque compositio formae et materiae, neque in eo sit aliud natura +et suppositum; neque aliud essentia et esse, neque in eo sit +compositio generis et differentiae; neque subiecti et accidentis, +manifestum est quod Deus nullo modo compositus est, sed est omnino +simplex. Secundo, quia omne compositum est posterius suis +componentibus, et dependens ex eis. Deus autem est primum ens, ut +supra ostensum est. Tertio, quia omne compositum causam habet, quae +enim secundum se diversa sunt, non conveniunt in aliquod unum nisi +per aliquam causam adunantem ipsa. Deus autem non habet causam, ut +supra ostensum est, cum sit prima causa efficiens. Quarto, quia in +omni composito oportet esse potentiam et actum, quod in Deo non +est, quia vel una partium est actus respectu alterius; vel saltem +omnes partes sunt sicut in potentia respectu totius. Quinto, quia +omne compositum est aliquid quod non convenit alicui suarum +partium. Et quidem in totis dissimilium partium, manifestum est, +nulla enim partium hominis est homo, neque aliqua partium pedis est +pes. In totis vero similium partium, licet aliquid quod dicitur de +toto, dicatur de parte, sicut pars aeris est aer, et aquae aqua; +aliquid tamen dicitur de toto, quod non convenit alicui partium, +non enim si tota aqua est bicubita, et pars eius. Sic igitur in +omni composito est aliquid quod non est ipsum. Hoc autem etsi +possit dici de habente formam, quod scilicet habeat aliquid quod +non est ipsum (puta in albo est aliquid quod non pertinet ad +rationem albi), tamen in ipsa forma nihil est alienum. Unde, cum +Deus sit ipsa forma, vel potius ipsum esse, nullo modo compositus +esse potest. Et hanc rationem tangit Hilarius, VII de Trin., +dicens, <i>Deus, qui virtus est, ex infirmis non continetur, neque +qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in + some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28370] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ea quae sunt a Deo, imitantur Deum sicut causata +primam causam. Est autem hoc de ratione causati, quod sit aliquo +modo compositum, quia ad minus esse eius est aliud quam quod quid +est, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one + simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a> and + <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28371] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod apud nos composita sunt meliora simplicibus, quia +perfectio bonitatis creaturae non invenitur in uno simplici, sed in +multis. Sed perfectio divinae bonitatis invenitur in uno simplici, +ut infra ostendetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A8-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 8. Whether God enters into the composition of other things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things + is that which is above being---the Godhead." But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore + God enters into the composition of other things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28372] Iª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat. +Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier., <i>esse omnium est, quae +super esse est deitas</i>. Sed esse omnium intrat compositionem +uniuscuiusque. Ergo Deus in compositionem aliorum venit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., [*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an + uncreated form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28373] Iª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +est forma, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de verbis domini, quod +verbum Dei (quod est Deus) est forma quaedam non formata. Sed forma +est pars compositi. Ergo Deus est pars alicuius compositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and + in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition things. + Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must + be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ + from each other. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28374] Iª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quaecumque sunt et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et +materia prima sunt, et nullo modo differunt. Ergo penitus sunt +idem. Sed materia prima intrat compositionem rerum. Ergo et Deus. +Probatio mediae, quaecumque differunt, aliquibus differentiis +differunt, et ita oportet ea esse composita; sed Deus et materia +prima sunt omnino simplicia; ergo nullo modo differunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q3_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part with + part." + </p><p id="FP_Q3_A8-p6"> Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).</p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1"><a name="28375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28375] Iª q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod neque tactus est +eius (scilicet Dei), <i>neque alia quaedam ad partes commiscendi +communio</i>.</p><p title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2"><a name="28376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28376] Iª q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +dicitur in libro de causis, quod <i>causa prima regit omnes res, +praeterquam commisceatur eis</i>.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De + Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. + Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third + error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. + Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either + as a formal or a material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical + numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither + numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is + actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that + which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for + the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, + because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal + parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear + from the foregoing ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which + is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially + such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="28377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28377] Iª q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod circa hoc fuerunt tres errores. Quidam enim posuerunt quod +Deus esset anima mundi, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. VII de +civitate Dei, et ad hoc etiam reducitur, quod quidam dixerunt Deum +esse animam primi caeli. Alii autem dixerunt Deum esse principium +formale omnium rerum. Et haec dicitur fuisse opinio Almarianorum. +Sed tertius error fuit David de Dinando, qui stultissime posuit +Deum esse materiam primam. Omnia enim haec manifestam continent +falsitatem, neque est possibile Deum aliquo modo in compositionem +alicuius venire, nec sicut principium formale, nec sicut principium +materiale. Primo quidem, quia supra diximus Deum esse primam causam +efficientem. Causa autem efficiens cum forma rei factae non incidit +in idem numero, sed solum in idem specie, homo enim generat +hominem. Materia vero cum causa efficiente non incidit in idem +numero, nec in idem specie, quia hoc est in potentia, illud vero in +actu. Secundo, quia cum Deus sit prima causa efficiens, eius est +primo et per se agere. Quod autem venit in compositionem alicuius, +non est primo et per se agens, sed magis compositum, non enim manus +agit, sed homo per manum; et ignis calefacit per calorem. Unde Deus +non potest esse pars alicuius compositi. Tertio, quia nulla pars +compositi potest esse simpliciter prima in entibus; neque etiam +materia et forma, quae sunt primae partes compositorum. Nam materia +est in potentia, potentia autem est posterior actu simpliciter, ut +ex dictis patet. Forma autem quae est pars compositi, est forma +participata, sicut autem participans est posterius eo quod est per +essentiam, ita et ipsum participatum; sicut ignis in ignitis est +posterior eo quod est per essentiam. Ostensum est autem quod Deus +est primum ens simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28378] Iª q. 3 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod deitas dicitur esse omnium effective et exemplariter, +non autem per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28379] Iª q. 3 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod verbum est forma exemplaris, non autem forma quae est +pars compositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Simple things do not differ by added differences---for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their + differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence, + to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. + x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are + different differ by something." Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very + being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28380] Iª q. 3 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod simplicia non differunt aliquibus aliis differentiis, hoc enim +compositorum est. Homo enim et equus differunt rationali et +irrationali differentiis, quae quidem differentiae non differunt +amplius ab invicem aliis differentiis. Unde, si fiat vis in verbo, +non proprie dicuntur differre, sed diversa esse, nam, secundum +philosophum X Metaphys., diversum absolute dicitur, sed omne +differens aliquo differt. Unde, si fiat vis in verbo, materia prima +et Deus non differunt, sed sunt diversa seipsis. Unde non sequitur +quod sint idem.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q4" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q4-p0.1">Q. 4. THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q4-p2"> Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect + is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness. + </p><p id="FP_Q4-p3"> Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q4-p4"> (1) Whether God is perfect?</p><p id="FP_Q4-p5"> (2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things?</p><p id="FP_Q4-p6"> (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 pr."><a name="28381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28381] +Iª q. 4 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae +simplicitatis, de perfectione ipsius Dei dicendum est. Et quia +unumquodque, secundum quod perfectum est, sic dicitur bonum, primo +agendum est de perfectione divina; secundo de eius bonitate. Circa +primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum Deus sit perfectus. Secundo, +utrum Deus sit universaliter perfectus omnium in se perfectiones +habens. Tertio, utrum creaturae similes Deo dici possint.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q4_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q4_A1-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 1. Whether God is perfect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not + befit God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28382] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod esse perfectum non conveniat Deo. +Perfectum enim dicitur quasi totaliter factum. Sed Deo non convenit +esse factum. Ergo nec esse perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning + of animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28383] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +est primum rerum principium. Sed principia rerum videntur esse +imperfecta, semen enim est principium animalium et plantarum. Ergo +Deus est imperfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q4_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification. + Therefore God is imperfect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28384] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ostensum est supra quod essentia Dei est ipsum esse. Sed ipsum esse +videtur esse imperfectissimum, cum sit communissimum, et recipiens +omnium additiones. Ergo Deus est imperfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.48" target="asv">Mat. 5:48</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28385] Iª q. 4 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Matt. V, <i>estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester +caelestis perfectus est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate + "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material + principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle + must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, + not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, + an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore + most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing + of the mode of its perfection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 co."><a name="28386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28386] Iª q. 4 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut philosophus narrat in XII Metaphys., quidam antiqui +philosophi, scilicet Pythagorici et Speusippus, non attribuerunt +optimum et perfectissimum primo principio. Cuius ratio est, quia +philosophi antiqui consideraverunt principium materiale tantum, +primum autem principium materiale imperfectissimum est. Cum enim +materia, inquantum huiusmodi, sit in potentia, oportet quod primum +principium materiale sit maxime in potentia; et ita maxime +imperfectum. Deus autem ponitur primum principium, non materiale, +sed in genere causae efficientis, et hoc oportet esse +perfectissimum. Sicut enim materia, inquantum huiusmodi, est in +potentia; ita agens, inquantum huiusmodi, est in actu. Unde primum +principium activum oportet maxime esse in actu, et per consequens +maxime esse perfectum. Secundum hoc enim dicitur aliquid esse +perfectum, secundum quod est actu, nam perfectum dicitur, cui nihil +deest secundum modum suae perfectionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that which + is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality + they are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way + of perfection or not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28387] Iª q. 4 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut dicit Gregorius, <i>balbutiendo ut possumus, +excelsa Dei resonamus, quod enim factum non est, perfectum proprie +dici non potest</i>. Sed quia in his quae fiunt, tunc dicitur esse +aliquid perfectum, cum de potentia educitur in actum; transumitur +hoc nomen perfectum ad significandum omne illud cui non deest esse +in actu, sive hoc habeat per modum factionis, sive non.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The material principle which with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by something + perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant + from which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is actual; since a potential being can + only be reduced into act by some being already actual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28388] Iª q. 4 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod principium materiale, quod apud nos imperfectum +invenitur, non potest esse simpliciter primum, sed praeceditur ab +alio perfecto. Nam semen, licet sit principium animalis generati ex +semine, tamen habet ante se animal vel plantam unde deciditur. +Oportet enim ante id quod est in potentia, esse aliquid actu, cum +ens in potentia non reducatur in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in +actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for + nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore + it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore + I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is + considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28389] Iª q. 4 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium, comparatur enim ad omnia +ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde +ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. +Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis +sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi, +vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et +receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q4_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q4_A2-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 2. Whether the perfections of all things are in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28390] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sint perfectiones omnium rerum. +Deus enim simplex est, ut ostensum est. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt +multae et diversae. Ergo in Deo non sunt omnes perfectiones +rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by + its specific difference. But the differences by which "genera" are divided, and "species" constituted, are opposed to each + other. Therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are not + in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28391] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +opposita non possunt esse in eodem. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt +oppositae, unaquaeque enim species perficitur per suam differentiam +specificam; differentiae autem quibus dividitur genus et +constituuntur species, sunt oppositae. Cum ergo opposita non +possint simul esse in eodem, videtur quod non omnes rerum +perfectiones sint in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore + life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has + not the perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28392] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, vivens +est perfectius quam ens, et sapiens quam vivens, ergo et vivere est +perfectius quam esse, et sapere quam vivere. Sed essentia Dei est +ipsum esse. Ergo non habet in se perfectionem vitae et sapientiae, +et alias huiusmodi perfectiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one existence prepossesses all things." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28393] Iª q. 4 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., quod Deus in uno +existentia omnia praehabet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator, + Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever + perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent---as + when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal + agent---thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists + virtually in the efficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more + imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient + cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective + cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line + of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all." + Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent ( + <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has + not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, + nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection + of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, + precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one + thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists + not in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards + he adds that, "He is the very existence to subsisting things." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 co."><a name="28394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28394] Iª q. 4 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in Deo sunt perfectiones omnium rerum. Unde et dicitur +universaliter perfectus, quia non deest ei aliqua nobilitas quae +inveniatur in aliquo genere, ut dicit Commentator in V Metaphys. Et +hoc quidem ex duobus considerari potest. Primo quidem, per hoc quod +quidquid perfectionis est in effectu, oportet inveniri in causa +effectiva, vel secundum eandem rationem, si sit agens univocum, ut +homo generat hominem; vel eminentiori modo, si sit, agens +aequivocum, sicut in sole est similitudo eorum quae generantur per +virtutem solis. Manifestum est enim quod effectus praeexistit +virtute in causa agente, praeexistere autem in virtute causae +agentis, non est praeexistere imperfectiori modo, sed perfectiori; +licet praeexistere in potentia causae materialis, sit praeexistere +imperfectiori modo, eo quod materia, inquantum huiusmodi, est +imperfecta; agens vero, inquantum huiusmodi, est perfectum. Cum +ergo Deus sit prima causa effectiva rerum, oportet omnium rerum +perfectiones praeexistere in Deo secundum eminentiorem modum. Et +hanc rationem tangit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., dicens de Deo +quod <i>non hoc quidem est, hoc autem non est, sed omnia est, ut +omnium causa</i>. Secundo vero, ex hoc quod supra ostensum est, +quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens, ex quo oportet quod +totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat. Manifestum est enim +quod, si aliquod calidum non habeat totam perfectionem calidi, hoc +ideo est, quia calor non participatur secundum perfectam rationem, +sed si calor esset per se subsistens, non posset ei aliquid deesse +de virtute caloris. Unde, cum Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens, nihil +de perfectione essendi potest ei deesse. Omnium autem perfectiones +pertinent ad perfectionem essendi, secundum hoc enim aliqua +perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent. Unde sequitur quod +nullius rei perfectio Deo desit. Et hanc etiam rationem tangit +Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., dicens quod <i>Deus non quodammodo +est existens, sed simpliciter et incircumscripte totum in seipso +uniformiter esse praeaccipit</i>, et postea subdit quod <i>ipse est +esse subsistentibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself + first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; "a fortiori" should all things in a + kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, + pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28395] Iª q. 4 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, <i>sicut sol</i>, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. +Nom., <i>sensibilium substantias et qualitates multas et +differentes, ipse unus existens et uniformiter lucendo, in seipso +uniformiter praeaccipit; ita multo magis in causa omnium necesse +est praeexistere omnia secundum naturalem unionem</i>. Et sic, quae +sunt diversa et opposita in seipsis, in Deo praeexistunt ut unum, +absque detrimento simplicitatis ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p7a"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply + to the Second Objection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28396] Iª q. 4 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet +solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that, although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are + considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living + things also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, + because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of + existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can + be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28397] Iª q. 4 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod, sicut in eodem capite idem Dionysius dicit, licet ipsum esse +sit perfectius quam vita, et ipsa vita quam ipsa sapientia, si +considerentur secundum quod distinguuntur ratione, tamen vivens est +perfectius quam ens tantum, quia vivens etiam est ens; et sapiens +est ens et vivens. Licet igitur ens non includat in se vivens et +sapiens, quia non oportet quod illud quod participat esse, +participet ipsum secundum omnem modum essendi, tamen ipsum esse Dei +includit in se vitam et sapientiam; quia nulla de perfectionibus +essendi potest deesse ei quod est ipsum esse subsistens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q4_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q4_A3-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 3. Whether any creature can be like God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.85.8" target="asv">Ps. 85:8</a>): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called + participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28398] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod nulla creatura possit esse similis Deo. +Dicitur enim in Psalmo, <i>non est similis tui in diis, domine</i>. +Sed inter omnes creaturas, excellentiores sunt quae dicuntur dii +participative. Multo ergo minus aliae creaturae possunt dici Deo +similes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore neither + can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as + God: since God is no "genus," as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q4_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore no creature is like God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28399] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +similitudo est comparatio quaedam. Non est autem comparatio eorum +quae sunt diversorum generum; ergo nec similitudo, non enim dicimus +quod dulcedo sit similis albedini. Sed nulla creatura est eiusdem +generis cum Deo, cum Deus non sit in genere, ut supra ostensum est. +Ergo nulla creatura est similis Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone, + essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28400] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +similia dicuntur quae conveniunt in forma. Sed nihil convenit cum +Deo in forma, nullius enim rei essentia est ipsum esse, nisi solius +Dei. Ergo nulla creatura potest esse similis Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God + will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To whom have you likened God?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.18" target="asv">Is. 40:18</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28401] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in +similibus est mutua similitudo, nam simile est simili simile. Si +igitur aliqua creatura est similis Deo, et Deus erit similis alicui +creaturae. Quod est contra id quod dicitur Isaiae XL, <i>cui +similem fecistis Deum?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28402] Iª q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et +similitudinem nostram</i>; et I Ioann. III, <i>cum apparuerit, +similes ei erimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in + form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to + the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said + to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of + things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according + to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a + third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as + we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts + according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is + contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made, + according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained + in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as things generated + by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific + likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any "genus," its effect will still + more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent's form according + to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all. + In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 co."><a name="28403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28403] Iª q. 4 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum similitudo attendatur secundum convenientiam vel +communicationem in forma, multiplex est similitudo, secundum multos +modos communicandi in forma. Quaedam enim dicuntur similia, quae +communicant in eadem forma secundum eandem rationem, et secundum +eundem modum, et haec non solum dicuntur similia, sed aequalia in +sua similitudine; sicut duo aequaliter alba, dicuntur similia in +albedine. Et haec est perfectissima similitudo. Alio modo dicuntur +similia, quae communicant in forma secundum eandem rationem, et non +secundum eundem modum, sed secundum magis et minus; ut minus album +dicitur simile magis albo. Et haec est similitudo imperfecta. +Tertio modo dicuntur aliqua similia, quae communicant in eadem +forma, sed non secundum eandem rationem; ut patet in agentibus non +univocis. Cum enim omne agens agat sibi simile inquantum est agens, +agit autem unumquodque secundum suam formam, necesse est quod in +effectu sit similitudo formae agentis. Si ergo agens sit contentum +in eadem specie cum suo effectu, erit similitudo inter faciens et +factum in forma, secundum eandem rationem speciei; sicut homo +generat hominem. Si autem agens non sit contentum in eadem specie, +erit similitudo, sed non secundum eandem rationem speciei, sicut ea +quae generantur ex virtute solis, accedunt quidem ad aliquam +similitudinem solis, non tamen ut recipiant formam solis secundum +similitudinem speciei, sed secundum similitudinem generis. Si +igitur sit aliquod agens, quod non in genere contineatur, effectus +eius adhuc magis accedent remote ad similitudinem formae agentis, +non tamen ita quod participent similitudinem formae agentis +secundum eandem rationem speciei aut generis, sed secundum +aliqualem analogiam, sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus. Et hoc +modo illa quae sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei inquantum sunt entia, ut +primo et universali principio totius esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness + to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not + perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission, + as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because + they are not in agreement, specifically or generically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28404] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom., cum +sacra Scriptura dicit aliquid non esse simile Deo, <i>non est +contrarium assimilationi ad ipsum. Eadem enim sunt similia Deo, et +dissimilia, similia quidem secundum quod imitantur ipsum, prout +contingit eum imitari qui non perfecte imitabilis est dissimilia +vero, secundum quod deficiunt a sua causa</i>; non solum secundum +intensionem et remissionem, sicut minus album deficit a magis albo; +sed quia non est convenientia nec secundum speciem nec secundum +genus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus," and as the + principle of all "genera." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28405] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Deus non se habet ad creaturas sicut res diversorum +generum, sed sicut id quod est extra omne genus, et principium +omnium generum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus + or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28406] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod non dicitur esse similitudo creaturae ad Deum propter +communicantiam in forma secundum eandem rationem generis et +speciei, sed secundum analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens +per essentiam, et alia per participationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures; + because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between + a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be + spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28407] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum +quod, licet aliquo modo concedatur quod creatura sit similis Deo, +nullo tamen modo concedendum est quod Deus sit similis creaturae, +quia, ut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom., <i>in his quae unius +ordinis sunt, recipitur mutua similitudo, non autem in causa et +causato</i>, dicimus enim quod imago sit similis homini, et non e +converso. Et similiter dici potest aliquo modo quod creatura sit +similis Deo, non tamen quod Deus sit similis creaturae.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q5" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q5-p0.1">Q. 5. OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q5-p2"> We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God.</p><p id="FP_Q5-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q5-p4"> (1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?</p><p id="FP_Q5-p5"> (2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?</p><p id="FP_Q5-p6"> (3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?</p><p id="FP_Q5-p7"> (4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?</p><p id="FP_Q5-p8"> (5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?</p><p id="FP_Q5-p9"> (6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 pr."><a name="28408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28408] +Iª q. 5 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de bono, et primo de +bono in communi; secundo de bonitate Dei. Circa primum quaeruntur +sex. Primo, utrum bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem. Secundo, +supposito quod differant ratione tantum, quid sit prius secundum +rationem, utrum bonum vel ens. Tertio, supposito quod ens sit +prius, utrum omne ens sit bonum. Quarto, ad quam causam ratio boni +reducatur. Quinto, utrum ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et +ordine. Sexto, quomodo dividatur bonum in honestum, utile et +delectabile.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q5_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A1-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 1. Whether goodness differs really from being?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that + things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really differ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28409] Iª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod bonum differat secundum rem ab ente. Dicit +enim Boetius, in libro de Hebdom., <i>intueor in rebus aliud esse +quod sunt bona, et aliud esse quod sunt</i>. Ergo bonum et ens +differunt secundum rem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of being", according to the commentary + on De Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28410] Iª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil +informatur seipso. Sed bonum dicitur per informationem entis, ut +habetur in commento libri de causis. Ergo bonum differt secundum +rem ab ente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28411] Iª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum +suscipit magis et minus. Esse autem non suscipit magis et minus. +Ergo bonum differt secundum rem ab ente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that, "inasmuch as we exist we are good." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28412] Iª q. 5 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de doctrina Christiana, quod +<i>inquantum sumus, boni sumus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence + of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all + desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But + everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect + so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing ( + <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which + being does not present. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 co."><a name="28413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28413] Iª q. 5 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum +rationem tantum. Quod sic patet. Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, +quod aliquid sit appetibile, unde philosophus, in I Ethic., dicit +quod <i>bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>. Manifestum est autem +quod unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum, nam +omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. Intantum est autem perfectum +unumquodque, inquantum est actu, unde manifestum est quod intantum +est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens, esse enim est actualitas +omnis rei, ut ex superioribus patet. Unde manifestum est quod bonum +et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed bonum dicit rationem +appetibilis, quam non dicit ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a + thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates + to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from + that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial + being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to + have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential + being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which + is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; + but + that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), + is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e. + substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in + its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.), + "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another," is to be referred to a thing's + goodness simply, and having being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in + its complete actuality, it is good simply---in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even + in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28414] Iª q. 5 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem, quia +tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid +ens simpliciter, et bonum simpliciter. Nam cum ens dicat aliquid +proprie esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad +potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum +quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem +est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse +substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem +superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, sicut esse album +significat esse secundum quid, non enim esse album aufert esse in +potentia simpliciter, cum adveniat rei iam praeexistenti in actu. +Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile, et per +consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo +perfectum, dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam +perfectionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfectionem +inquantum est actu, non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec +bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sic ergo secundum primum +esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et +bonum secundum quid, idest inquantum est ens, secundum vero ultimum +actum dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter. Sic +ergo quod dicit Boetius, quod <i>in rebus aliud est quod sunt bona, +et aliud quod sunt</i>, referendum est ad esse bonum et ad esse +simpliciter, quia secundum primum actum est aliquid ens +simpliciter; et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter. Et tamen +secundum primum actum est quodammodo bonum, et secundum ultimum +actum est quodammodo ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28415] Iª q. 5 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum dicitur per informationem, prout accipitur +bonum simpliciter, secundum ultimum actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or + virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28416] Iª q. 5 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum ad tertium, quod bonum dicitur secundum magis et minus, +secundum actum supervenientem; puta secundum scientiam vel +virtutem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A2-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 2. Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified + by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather + than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28417] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam +ens. Ordo enim nominum est secundum ordinem rerum significatarum +per nomina. Sed Dionysius, inter alia nomina Dei, prius ponit bonum +quam ens, ut patet, in III cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo bonum secundum +rationem est prius quam ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius + notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things + alone." Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28418] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud +est prius secundum rationem, quod ad plura se extendit. Sed bonum +ad plura se extendit quam ens, quia, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de +Div. Nom., <i>bonum se extendit ad existentia et non existentia, +ens vero ad existentia tantum</i>. Ergo bonum est prius secundum +rationem quam ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness + has the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas: "It were better for him, + if that man had not been born" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.24" target="asv">Mat. 26:24</a>). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28419] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod +est universalius, est prius secundum rationem. Sed bonum videtur +universalius esse quam ens, quia bonum habet rationem appetibilis; +quibusdam autem appetibile est ipsum non esse; dicitur enim, Matth. +XXVI, de Iuda, <i>bonum erat ei, si natus non fuisset</i> et +cetera. Ergo bonum est prius quam ens, secundum rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence + is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28420] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non +solum esse est appetibile, sed et vita et sapientia, et multa +huiusmodi, et sic videtur quod esse sit quoddam particulare +appetibile, et bonum, universale. Bonum ergo simpliciter est prius +secundum rationem quam ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of created things is being." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28421] Iª q. 5 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in libro de causis, quod <i>prima rerum creatarum est +esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of + the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. + Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. + Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as + sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 co."><a name="28422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28422] Iª q. 5 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ens secundum rationem est prius quam bonum. Ratio enim +significata per nomen, est id quod concipit intellectus de re, et +significat illud per vocem, illud ergo est prius secundum rationem, +quod prius cadit in conceptione intellectus. Primo autem in +conceptione intellectus cadit ens, quia secundum hoc unumquodque +cognoscibile est, inquantum est actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. +Unde ens est proprium obiectum intellectus, et sic est primum +intelligibile, sicut sonus est primum audibile. Ita ergo secundum +rationem prius est ens quam bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says, + from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final + cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter + is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus + goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality, + goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation, + said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in goodness + as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. + Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28423] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Dionysius determinat de divinis nominibus secundum +quod important circa Deum habitudinem causae, nominamus enim Deum, +ut ipse dicit, ex creaturis, sicut causam ex effectibus. Bonum +autem, cum habeat rationem appetibilis, importat habitudinem causae +finalis, cuius causalitas prima est, quia agens non agit nisi +propter finem, et ab agente materia movetur ad formam, unde dicitur +quod finis est causa causarum. Et sic, in causando, bonum est prius +quam ens, sicut finis quam forma, et hac ratione, inter nomina +significantia causalitatem divinam, prius ponitur bonum quam ens. +Et iterum quia, secundum Platonicos, qui, materiam a privatione non +distinguentes, dicebant materiam esse non ens, ad plura se extendit +participatio boni quam participatio entis. Nam materia prima +participat bonum, cum appetat ipsum (nihil autem appetit nisi +simile sibi), non autem participat ens, cum ponatur non ens. Et +ideo dicit Dionysius quod <i>bonum extenditur ad non +existentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, + not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not + simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the + end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which + tend even those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only, + either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28424] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet solutio +ad secundum. Vel dicendum quod bonum extenditur ad existentia et +non existentia, non secundum praedicationem, sed secundum +causalitatem, ut per non existentia intelligamus, non ea +simpliciter quae penitus non sunt, sed ea quae sunt in potentia et +non in actu, quia bonum habet rationem finis, in quo non solum +quiescunt quae sunt in actu, sed ad ipsum etiam ea moventur quae in +actu non sunt sed in potentia tantum. Ens autem non importat +habitudinem causae nisi formalis tantum, vel inhaerentis vel +exemplaris, cuius causalitas non se extendit nisi ad ea quae sunt +in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively---i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed + by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of + some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being + of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as + relatively good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28425] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod non esse secundum se non est appetibile, sed per accidens, +inquantum scilicet ablatio alicuius mali est appetibilis, quod +malum quidem aufertur per non esse. Ablatio vero mali non est +appetibilis, nisi inquantum per malum privatur quodam esse. Illud +igitur quod per se est appetibile, est esse, non esse vero per +accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet quoddam esse appetitur, quo +homo non sustinet privari. Et sic etiam per accidens non esse +dicitur bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is + desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is good except being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28426] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum +quod vita et scientia, et alia huiusmodi, sic appetuntur ut sunt in +actu, unde in omnibus appetitur quoddam esse. Et sic nihil est +appetibile nisi ens, et per consequens nihil est bonum nisi +ens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A3-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 3. Whether every being is good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from A[1]. But whatever + is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being + is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28427] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non omne ens sit bonum. Bonum enim addit +supra ens, ut ex dictis patet. Ea vero quae addunt aliquid supra +ens, contrahunt ipsum, sicut substantia, quantitas, qualitas, et +alia huiusmodi. Ergo bonum contrahit ens. Non igitur omne ens est +bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.20" target="asv">Is. 5:20</a>). But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28428] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nullum +malum est bonum, Isaiae V, <i>vae qui dicitis malum bonum, et bonum +malum</i>. Sed aliquod ens dicitur malum. Ergo non omne ens est +bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore + primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28429] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum +habet rationem appetibilis. Sed materia prima non habet rationem +appetibilis, sed appetentis tantum. Ergo materia prima non habet +rationem boni. Non igitur omne ens est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities; + otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28430] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in III Metaphys., quod in mathematicis non est +bonum. Sed mathematica sunt quaedam entia, alioquin de eis non +esset scientia. Ergo non omne ens est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now every creature of God is good ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>): and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28431] Iª q. 5 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne +ens quod non est Deus, est Dei creatura. Sed omnis creatura Dei est +bona, ut dicitur I ad Tim., IV cap., Deus vero est maxime bonus. +Ergo omne ens est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies + some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every + being as such is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 co."><a name="28432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28432] Iª q. 5 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod omne ens, inquantum est ens, est bonum. Omne enim ens, +inquantum est ens, est in actu, et quodammodo perfectum, quia omnis +actus perfectio quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem +appetibilis et boni, ut ex dictis patet. Unde sequitur omne ens, +inquantum huiusmodi, bonum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now + in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper + to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28433] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod substantia, quantitas et qualitas, et ea quae sub eis +continentur, contrahunt ens applicando ens ad aliquam quidditatem +seu naturam. Sic autem non addit aliquid bonum super ens, sed +rationem tantum appetibilis et perfectionis, quod convenit ipsi +esse in quacumque natura sit. Unde bonum non contrahit ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because + he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28434] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod nullum ens dicitur malum inquantum est ens, sed +inquantum caret quodam esse, sicut homo dicitur malus inquantum +caret esse virtutis, et oculus dicitur malus inquantum caret +acumine visus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary + matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain + extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, + but to desire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28435] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod materia prima, sicut non est ens nisi in potentia, ita nec +bonum nisi in potentia. Licet, secundum Platonicos, dici possit +quod materia prima est non ens, propter privationem adiunctam. Sed +tamen participat aliquid de bono, scilicet ipsum ordinem vel +aptitudinem ad bonum. Et ideo non convenit sibi quod sit +appetibile, sed quod appetat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have + only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, + which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness + nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, + as was said in the preceding article. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28436] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum +quod mathematica non subsistunt separata secundum esse, quia si +subsisterent, esset in eis bonum, scilicet ipsum esse ipsorum. Sunt +autem mathematica separata secundum rationem tantum, prout +abstrahuntur a motu et a materia, et sic abstrahuntur a ratione +finis, qui habet rationem moventis. Non est autem inconveniens quod +in aliquo ente secundum rationem non sit bonum vel ratio boni, cum +ratio entis sit prior quam ratio boni, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A4-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 4. Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect + of a formal cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28437] Iª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod bonum non habeat rationem causae finalis, +sed magis aliarum. Ut enim dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., +<i>bonum laudatur ut pulchrum</i>. Sed pulchrum importat rationem +causae formalis. Ergo bonum habet rationem causae formalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, + and are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient + cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28438] Iª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum +est diffusivum sui esse, ut ex verbis Dionysii accipitur, quibus +dicit quod <i>bonum est ex quo omnia subsistunt et sunt</i>. Sed +esse diffusivum importat rationem causae efficientis. Ergo bonum +habet rationem causae efficientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we exist because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as + the efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28439] Iª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, dicit +Augustinus in I de Doctr. Christ., quod <i>quia Deus bonus est, nos +sumus</i>. Sed ex Deo sumus sicut ex causa efficiente. Ergo bonum +importat rationem causae efficientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which + something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28440] Iª q. 5 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod <i>illud cuius causa +est, est sicut finis et bonum aliorum</i>. Bonum ergo habet +rationem causae finalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies + the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal + cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first of all before it reproduces + the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in + causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to + the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be + first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for + a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality + of + goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 co."><a name="28441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28441] Iª q. 5 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem +finis; manifestum est quod bonum rationem finis importat. Sed tamen +ratio boni praesupponit rationem causae efficientis, et rationem +causae formalis. Videmus enim quod id quod est primum in causando, +ultimum est in causato, ignis enim primo calefacit quam formam +ignis inducat, cum tamen calor in igne consequatur formam +substantialem. In causando autem, primum invenitur bonum et finis, +qui movet efficientem; secundo, actio efficientis, movens ad +formam; tertio advenit forma. Unde e converso esse oportet in +causato, quod primum sit ipsa forma, per quam est ens; secundo +consideratur in ea virtus effectiva, secundum quod est perfectum in +esse (quia unumquodque tunc perfectum est, quando potest sibi +simile facere, ut dicit philosophus in IV Meteor.); tertio +consequitur ratio boni, per quam in ente perfectio fundatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and + consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness + being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a + thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful + things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, + as in what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since + knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28442] Iª q. 5 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia +super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, +bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. Sed ratione differunt. Nam bonum +proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et +ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad +rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim +dicuntur quae visa placent. Unde pulchrum in debita proportione +consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, +sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis +virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem, +similitudo autem respicit formam, pulchrum proprie pertinet ad +rationem causae formalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28443] Iª q. 5 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum dicitur diffusivum sui esse, eo modo quo finis +dicitur movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers + we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to + the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good" has reference to the final cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28444] Iª q. 5 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod quilibet habens voluntatem, dicitur bonus inquantum habet +bonam voluntatem, quia per voluntatem utimur omnibus quae in nobis +sunt. Unde non dicitur bonus homo, qui habet bonum intellectum, sed +qui habet bonam voluntatem. Voluntas autem respicit finem ut +obiectum proprium, et sic, quod dicitur, quia Deus est bonus, +sumus, refertur ad causam finalem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A5-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 5. Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. + But mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, + and number, and weight" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the mode + of everything, number gives it + its species, and weight gives it rest and stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species + and order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28445] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod ratio boni non consistat in modo, specie +et ordine. Bonum enim et ens ratione differunt, ut supra dictum +est. Sed modus, species et ordo pertinere ad rationem entis +videntur, quia, sicut dicitur Sap. XI, <i>omnia in numero, pondere +et mensura disposuisti</i>, ad quae tria reducuntur species, modus +et ordo, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, IV super Gen. ad litteram, +<i>mensura omni rei modum praefigit, et numerus omni rei speciem +praebet, et pondus omnem rem ad quietem et stabilitatem trahit</i>. +Ergo ratio boni non consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mode, species and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and + order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless + succession. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28446] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ipse +modus, species et ordo bona quaedam sunt. Si ergo ratio boni +consistit in modo, specie et ordine, oportet etiam quod modus +habeat modum, speciem et ordinem, et similiter species et ordo. +Ergo procederetur in infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence + of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28447] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, malum +est privatio modi et speciei et ordinis. Sed malum non tollit +totaliter bonum. Ergo ratio boni non consistit in modo, specie et +ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species + and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="28448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28448] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, illud +in quo consistit ratio boni, non potest dici malum. Sed dicitur +malus modus, mala species, malus ordo. Ergo ratio boni non +consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight, number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. + But not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not + to have been created in number, weight and measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and + order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="28449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28449] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, modus, +species et ordo ex pondere, numero et mensura causantur, ut ex +auctoritate Augustini inducta patet. Non autem omnia bona habent +pondus, numerum et mensuram, dicit enim Ambrosius, in Hexaemeron, +quod <i>lucis natura est, ut non in numero, non in pondere, non in +mensura creata sit</i>. Non ergo ratio boni consistit in modo, +specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in everything God + has made; thus, where these three abound the things are very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they + do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore + the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28450] Iª q. 5 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, <i>haec tria, +modus, species et ordo, tanquam generalia bona sunt in rebus a Deo +factis, et ita, haec tria ubi magna sunt, magna bona sunt; ubi +parva, parva bona sunt; ubi nulla, nullum bonum est</i>. Quod non +esset, nisi ratio boni in eis consisteret. Ergo ratio boni +consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above + <a id="FP_Q5_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is + what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), + in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together + with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, + whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the + form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to + give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a + unit + added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its species. + Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so + far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order. + Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 co."><a name="28451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28451] Iª q. 5 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod unumquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum, sic enim +est appetibile, ut supra dictum est. Perfectum autem dicitur, cui +nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem unumquodque +sit id quod est, per suam formam; forma autem praesupponit quaedam, +et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur; ad hoc quod +aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, necesse est quod formam habeat, et +ea quae praeexiguntur ad eam, et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam. +Praeexigitur autem ad formam determinatio sive commensuratio +principiorum, seu materialium, seu efficientium ipsam, et hoc +significatur per modum, unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit. +Ipsa autem forma significatur per speciem, quia per formam +unumquodque in specie constituitur. Et propter hoc dicitur quod +numerus speciem praebet, quia definitiones significantes speciem +sunt sicut numeri, secundum philosophum in VIII Metaphys.; sicut +enim unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem numeri, ita in +definitionibus differentia apposita vel subtracta. Ad formam autem +consequitur inclinatio ad finem, aut ad actionem, aut ad aliquid +huiusmodi, quia unumquodque, inquantum est actu, agit, et tendit in +id quod sibi convenit secundum suam formam. Et hoc pertinet ad +pondus et ordinem. Unde ratio boni, secundum quod consistit in +perfectione, consistit etiam in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28452] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ista tria non consequuntur ens, nisi inquantum est +perfectum, et secundum hoc est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because + it is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: + for they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but as formally constituting others + good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything + else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object that is white. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28453] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod modus, species et ordo eo modo dicuntur bona, sicut +et entia, non quia ipsa sint quasi subsistentia, sed quia eis alia +sunt et entia et bona. Unde non oportet quod ipsa habeant aliqua +alia, quibus sint bona. Non enim sic dicuntur bona, quasi +formaliter aliis sint bona; sed quia ipsis formaliter aliqua sunt +bona; sicut albedo non dicitur ens quia ipsa aliquo sit, sed quia +ipsa aliquid est secundum quid, scilicet album.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has + a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil + deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every + mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28454] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod quodlibet esse est secundum formam aliquam, unde secundum +quodlibet esse rei, consequuntur ipsam modus, species et ordo, +sicut homo habet speciem, modum et ordinem, inquantum est homo; et +similiter inquantum est albus, habet similiter modum, speciem et +ordinem; et inquantum est virtuosus, et inquantum est sciens, et +secundum omnia quae de ipso dicuntur. Malum autem privat quodam +esse, sicut caecitas privat esse visus, unde non tollit omnem +modum, speciem et ordinem; sed solum modum, speciem et ordinem quae +consequuntur esse visus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and order). "But + an evil mode, species and order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they + ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28455] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum +quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de natura boni, <i>omnis +modus, inquantum modus, bonus est</i> (et sic potest dici de specie +et ordine), <i>sed malus modus, vel mala species, vel malus ordo, +aut ideo dicuntur quia minora sunt quam esse debuerunt; aut quia +non his rebus accommodantur, quibus accommodanda sunt; ut ideo +dicantur mala, quia sunt aliena et incongrua</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The nature of light is spoken of as being without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal + things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body + that causes change, i.e. the heavens. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="28456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28456] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum +quod natura lucis dicitur esse sine numero et pondere et mensura, +non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad corporalia, quia virtus +lucis ad omnia corporalia se extendit, inquantum est qualitas +activa primi corporis alterantis, scilicet caeli.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A6-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 6. Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and the pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good + considered as fitting. (cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])] + </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by + the ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under + one predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28457] Iª q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non convenienter dividatur bonum per +honestum, utile et delectabile. Bonum enim, sicut dicit philosophus +in I Ethic., dividitur per decem praedicamenta. Honestum autem, +utile et delectabile inveniri possunt in uno praedicamento. Ergo +non convenienter per haec dividitur bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, + and no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous + and the useful would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is incorrect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28458] Iª q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis +divisio fit per opposita. Sed haec tria non videntur esse opposita, +nam honesta sunt delectabilia, nullumque inhonestum est utile (quod +tamen oportet, si divisio fieret per opposita, ut opponerentur +honestum et utile), ut etiam dicit Tullius, in libro de officiis. +Ergo praedicta divisio non est conveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far + as it is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the pleasant and the virtuous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28459] Iª q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ubi +unum propter alterum, ibi unum tantum est. Sed utile non est bonum +nisi propter delectabile vel honestum. Ergo non debet utile dividi +contra delectabile et honestum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De Offic. i, 9) + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28460] Iª q. 5 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Ambrosius, in libro de officiis, utitur ista divisione +boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal + point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is + desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the + movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end + absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called + a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two + ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in + the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which + something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the + movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous + is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the + thing desired, is called the pleasant. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 co."><a name="28461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28461] Iª q. 5 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod haec divisio proprie videtur esse boni humani. Si tamen altius +et communius rationem boni consideremus, invenitur haec divisio +proprie competere bono, secundum quod bonum est. Nam bonum est +aliquid, inquantum est appetibile, et terminus motus appetitus. +Cuius quidem motus terminatio considerari potest ex consideratione +motus corporis naturalis. Terminatur autem motus corporis +naturalis, simpliciter quidem ad ultimum; secundum quid autem etiam +ad medium, per quod itur ad ultimum quod terminat motum, et dicitur +aliquis terminus motus, inquantum aliquam partem motus terminat. Id +autem quod est ultimus terminus motus, potest accipi dupliciter, +vel ipsa res in quam tenditur, utpote locus vel forma; vel quies in +re illa. Sic ergo in motu appetitus, id quod est appetibile +terminans motum appetitus secundum quid, ut medium per quod +tenditur in aliud, vocatur utile. Id autem quod appetitur ut +ultimum, terminans totaliter motum appetitus, sicut quaedam res in +quam per se appetitus tendit, vocatur honestum, quia honestum +dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod terminat motum +appetitus ut quies in re desiderata, est delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according + to its proper formality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28462] Iª q. 5 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod bonum, inquantum est idem subiecto cum ente, +dividitur per decem praedicamenta, sed secundum propriam rationem, +competit sibi ista divisio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other + formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the + useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the + taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable + in themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28463] Iª q. 5 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod haec divisio non est per oppositas res, sed per +oppositas rationes. Dicuntur tamen illa proprie delectabilia, quae +nullam habent aliam rationem appetibilitatis nisi delectationem, +cum aliquando sint et noxia et inhonesta. Utilia vero dicuntur, +quae non habent in se unde desiderentur; sed desiderantur solum ut +sunt ducentia in alterum, sicut sumptio medicinae amarae. Honesta +vero dicuntur, quae in seipsis habent unde desiderentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something analogical + to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the + pleasant; and lastly of the useful. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28464] Iª q. 5 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod bonum non dividitur in ista tria sicut univocum aequaliter de +his praedicatum, sed sicut analogum, quod praedicatur secundum +prius et posterius. Per prius enim praedicatur de honesto; et +secundario de delectabili; tertio de utili.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q6" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q6-p0.1">Q. 6. THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q6-p2"> We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q6-p3"> (1) Whether goodness belongs to God?</p><p id="FP_Q6-p4"> (2) Whether God is the supreme good?</p><p id="FP_Q6-p5"> (3) Whether He alone is essentially good?</p><p id="FP_Q6-p6"> (4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 pr."><a name="28465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28465] +Iª q. 6 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de bonitate Dei. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum esse bonum conveniat +Deo. Secundo, utrum Deus sit summum bonum. Tertio, utrum ipse solus +sit bonus per suam essentiam. Quarto, utrum omnia sint bona +bonitate divina.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q6_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A1-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 1. Whether God is good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem + to belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28466] Iª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum non conveniat Deo. Ratio enim +boni consistit in modo, specie et ordine. Haec autem non videntur +Deo convenire, cum Deus immensus sit, et ad aliquid non ordinetur. +Ergo esse bonum non convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and nothing + is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28467] Iª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum +est quod omnia appetunt. Sed Deum non omnia appetunt, quia non +omnia cognoscunt ipsum, nihil autem appetitur nisi notum. Ergo esse +bonum non convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q6_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lam.3.25" target="asv">Lam. 3:25</a>): "The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28468] Iª q. 6 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Thren. III, <i>bonus est dominus sperantibus in eum, +animae quaerenti illum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its + own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes + its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it + is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of + all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) + attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 co."><a name="28469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28469] Iª q. 6 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod bonum esse praecipue Deo convenit. Bonum enim aliquid est, +secundum quod est appetibile. Unumquodque autem appetit suam +perfectionem. Perfectio autem et forma effectus est quaedam +similitudo agentis, cum omne agens agat sibi simile. Unde ipsum +agens est appetibile, et habet rationem boni, hoc enim est quod de +ipso appetitur, ut eius similitudo participetur. Cum ergo Deus sit +prima causa effectiva omnium, manifestum est quod sibi competit +ratio boni et appetibilis. Unde Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., +attribuit bonum Deo sicut primae causae efficienti, dicens quod +bonus dicitur Deus, <i>sicut ex quo omnia subsistunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To have mode, species and order belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs + to Him to impose mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28470] Iª q. 6 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod habere modum, speciem et ordinem, pertinet ad +rationem boni causati. Sed bonum in Deo est sicut in causa, unde ad +eum pertinet imponere aliis modum, speciem et ordinem. Unde ista +tria sunt in Deo sicut in causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes + of the divine being; as appears from what is said above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4] , A[3]</a>). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others + know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a + natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28471] Iª q. 6 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnia, appetendo proprias perfectiones, appetunt +ipsum Deum, inquantum perfectiones omnium rerum sunt quaedam +similitudines divini esse, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic eorum quae +Deum appetunt, quaedam cognoscunt ipsum secundum seipsum, quod est +proprium creaturae rationalis. Quaedam vero cognoscunt aliquas +participationes suae bonitatis, quod etiam extenditur usque ad +cognitionem sensibilem. Quaedam vero appetitum naturalem habent +absque cognitione, utpote inclinata ad suos fines ab alio superiori +cognoscente.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A2-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 2. Whether God is the supreme good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every + good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. + But God is supremely simple; as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the supreme good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28472] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit summum bonum. Summum enim +bonum addit aliquid supra bonum, alioquin omni bono conveniret. Sed +omne quod se habet ex additione ad aliquid, est compositum. Ergo +summum bonum est compositum. Sed Deus est summe simplex, ut supra +ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est summum bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is + the end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q6_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.19" target="asv">Lk. 18:19</a>): "None is good but God alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison + with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28473] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> <i>Praeterea, +bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>, ut dicit philosophus. Sed nihil +aliud est quod omnia appetunt, nisi solus Deus, qui est finis +omnium. Ergo nihil aliud est bonum nisi Deus. Quod etiam videtur +per id quod dicitur Matth. XIX, <i>nemo bonus nisi solus Deus</i>. +Sed summum dicitur in comparatione aliorum; sicut summum calidum in +comparatione ad omnia calida. Ergo Deus non potest dici summum +bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater + or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28474] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, summum +comparationem importat. Sed quae non sunt unius generis, non sunt +comparabilia; sicut dulcedo inconvenienter dicitur maior vel minor +quam linea. Cum igitur Deus non sit in eodem genere cum aliis +bonis, ut ex superioribus patet, videtur quod Deus non possit dici +summum bonum respectu eorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28475] Iª q. 6 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, I de Trin., quod <i>Trinitas divinarum +personarum est summum bonum, quod purgatissimis mentibus +cernitur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, + as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not, + however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an + effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the + sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, + it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 co."><a name="28476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28476] Iª q. 6 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus est summum bonum simpliciter, et non solum in aliquo +genere vel ordine rerum. Sic enim bonum Deo attribuitur, ut dictum +est, inquantum omnes perfectiones desideratae effluunt ab eo, sicut +a prima causa. Non autem effluunt ab eo sicut ab agente univoco, ut +ex superioribus patet, sed sicut ab agente quod non convenit cum +suis effectibus, neque in ratione speciei, nec in ratione generis. +Similitudo autem effectus in causa quidem univoca invenitur +uniformiter, in causa autem aequivoca invenitur excellentius, sicut +calor excellentiori modo est in sole quam in igne. Sic ergo oportet +quod cum bonum sit in Deo sicut in prima causa omnium non univoca, +quod sit in eo excellentissimo modo. Et propter hoc dicitur summum +bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not + a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation + to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should + be composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are deficient in + comparison with it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28477] Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod summum bonum addit super bonum, non rem aliquam +absolutam, sed relationem tantum. Relatio autem qua aliquid de Deo +dicitur relative ad creaturas, non est realiter in Deo, sed in +creatura; in Deo vero secundum rationem; sicut scibile relative +dicitur ad scientiam, non quia ad ipsam referatur, sed quia +scientia refertur ad ipsum. Et sic non oportet quod in summo bono +sit aliqua compositio, sed solum quod alia deficiant ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all; but + that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood + of essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28478] Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum dicitur <i>bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>, +non sic intelligitur quasi unumquodque bonum ab omnibus appetatur, +sed quia quidquid appetitur, rationem boni habet. Quod autem +dicitur, <i>nemo bonus nisi solus Deus</i>, intelligitur de bono +per essentiam, ut post dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that + God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is + the principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good + implies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28479] Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod ea quae non sunt in eodem genere, si quidem sint in diversis +generibus contenta, nullo modo comparabilia sunt. De Deo autem +negatur esse in eodem genere cum aliis bonis, non quod ipse sit in +quodam alio genere; sed quia ipse est extra genus, et principium +omnis generis. Et sic comparatur ad alia per excessum. Et huiusmodi +comparationem importat summum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A3-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 3. Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good"; + as we said above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28480] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum per essentiam non sit proprium +Dei. Sicut enim unum convertitur cum ente, ita et bonum, ut supra +habitum est. Sed omne ens est unum per suam essentiam, ut patet per +philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne ens est bonum per suam +essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good. + But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good essentially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28481] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si +bonum est quod omnia appetunt, cum ipsum esse sit desideratum ab +omnibus, ipsum esse cuiuslibet rei est eius bonum. Sed quaelibet +res est ens per suam essentiam. Ergo quaelibet res est bona per +suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary + to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good + by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or + come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first + supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28482] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis +res per suam bonitatem est bona. Si igitur aliqua res est quae non +sit bona per suam essentiam, oportebit quod eius bonitas non sit +sua essentia. Illa ergo bonitas, cum sit ens quoddam, oportet quod +sit bona, et si quidem alia bonitate, iterum de illa bonitate +quaeretur. Aut ergo erit procedere in infinitum, aut venire ad +aliquam bonitatem quae non erit bona per aliam bonitatem. Eadem +ergo ratione standum est in primo. Res igitur quaelibet est bona +per suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28483] Iª q. 6 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quod alia omnia a Deo +sunt bona per participationem. Non igitur per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold: + first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for + its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the + first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own + substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is + to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom + alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; + as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html">Q[3], A[6]</a>); and + He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God + alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 co."><a name="28484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28484] Iª q. 6 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod solus Deus est bonus per suam essentiam. Unumquodque enim +dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfectum. Perfectio autem +alicuius rei triplex est. Prima quidem, secundum quod in suo esse +constituitur. Secunda vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia +superadduntur, ad suam perfectam operationem necessaria. Tertia +vero perfectio alicuius est per hoc, quod aliquid aliud attingit +sicut finem. Utpote prima perfectio ignis consistit in esse, quod +habet per suam formam substantialem, secunda vero eius perfectio +consistit in caliditate, levitate et siccitate, et huiusmodi, +tertia vero perfectio eius est secundum quod in loco suo quiescit. +Haec autem triplex perfectio nulli creato competit secundum suam +essentiam, sed soli Deo, cuius solius essentia est suum esse; et +cui non adveniunt aliqua accidentia; sed quae de aliis dicuntur +accidentaliter, sibi conveniunt essentialiter, ut esse potentem, +sapientem, et huiusmodi, sicut ex dictis patet. Ipse etiam ad nihil +aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus finis omnium +rerum. Unde manifestum est quod solus Deus habet omnimodam +perfectionem secundum suam essentiam. Et ideo ipse solus est bonus +per suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "One" does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence. + Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided + only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28485] Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod unum non importat rationem perfectionis, sed +indivisionis tantum, quae unicuique rei competit secundum suam +essentiam. Simplicium autem essentiae sunt indivisae et actu et +potentia, compositorum vero essentiae sunt indivisae secundum actum +tantum. Et ideo oportet quod quaelibet res sit una per suam +essentiam, non autem bona, ut ostensum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does + not follow that a creature is good essentially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28486] Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, licet unumquodque sit bonum inquantum habet esse, +tamen essentia rei creatae non est ipsum esse, et ideo non sequitur +quod res creata sit bona per suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection, + or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called + being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being through something else: hence for this reason is + it called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself + has some other goodness whereby it is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28487] Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod bonitas rei creatae non est ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid +superadditum; vel ipsum esse eius, vel aliqua perfectio +superaddita, vel ordo ad finem. Ipsa tamen bonitas sic superaddita +dicitur bona sicut et ens, hac autem ratione dicitur ens, quia ea +est aliquid, non quia ipsa aliquo alio sit. Unde hac ratione +dicitur bona, quia ea est aliquid bonum, non quia ipsa habeat +aliquam aliam bonitatem, qua sit bona.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A4-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 4. Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take + away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good + of every good." But everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28488] Iª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod omnia sint bona bonitate divina. Dicit +enim Augustinus, VII de Trin., <i>bonum hoc et bonum illud, tolle +hoc et tolle illud, et vide ipsum bonum, si potes, ita Deum +videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni</i>. Sed +unumquodque est bonum suo bono. Ergo unumquodque est bonum ipso +bono quod est Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is + by reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the divine goodness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28489] Iª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., omnia dicuntur bona inquantum +ordinantur ad Deum, et hoc ratione bonitatis divinae. Ergo omnia +sunt bona bonitate divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their + own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28490] Iª q. 6 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod omnia sunt bona inquantum sunt. Sed non dicuntur omnia entia +per esse divinum, sed per esse proprium. Ergo non omnia sunt bona +bonitate divina, sed bonitate propria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and "measured" + from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A4.html">Q[84], A[4]</a>) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that + Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now + just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid + down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation + of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme + good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are + called good by way of participation. + </p><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p6"> Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as + Aristotle argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and + essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and + a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears + from the above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). + </p><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p7"> Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of + all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, + which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many + goodnesses. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 co."><a name="28491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28491] Iª q. 6 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod nihil prohibet in his quae relationem important, aliquid ab +extrinseco denominari; sicut aliquid denominatur locatum a loco, et +mensuratum a mensura. Circa vero ea quae absolute dicuntur, diversa +fuit opinio. Plato enim posuit omnium rerum species separatas; et +quod ab eis individua denominantur, quasi species separatas +participando; ut puta quod Socrates dicitur homo secundum ideam +hominis separatam. Et sicut ponebat ideam hominis et equi +separatam, quam vocabat per se hominem et per se equum, ita ponebat +ideam entis et ideam unius separatam, quam dicebat per se ens et +per se unum, et eius participatione unumquodque dicitur ens vel +unum. Hoc autem quod est per se bonum et per se unum, ponebat esse +summum Deum, a quo omnia dicuntur bona per modum participationis. +Et quamvis haec opinio irrationabilis videatur quantum ad hoc, quod +ponebat species rerum naturalium separatas per se subsistentes, ut +Aristoteles multipliciter probat; tamen hoc absolute verum est, +quod est aliquod unum per essentiam suam bonum, quod dicimus Deum, +ut ex superioribus patet. Huic etiam sententiae concordat +Aristoteles. A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono, +unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, inquantum participat ipsum +per modum cuiusdam assimilationis, licet remote et deficienter, ut +ex superioribus patet. Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate +divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius +bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine +divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas +denominans ipsum. Et sic est bonitas una omnium; et etiam multae +bonitates.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A4-p8"><b>Reply to objections.</b> This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 ad arg."><a name="28492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28492] Iª q. 6 a. 4 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc patet +responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q7" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q7-p0.1">Q. 7. THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q7-p2"> After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, + and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite. + </p><p id="FP_Q7-p3"> Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q7-p4"> (1) Whether God is infinite?</p><p id="FP_Q7-p5"> (2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?</p><p id="FP_Q7-p6"> (3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?</p><p id="FP_Q7-p7"> (4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 pr."><a name="28493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28493] +Iª q. 7 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae +perfectionis, considerandum est de eius infinitate, et de +existentia eius in rebus, attribuitur enim Deo quod sit ubique et +in omnibus rebus, inquantum est incircumscriptibilis et infinitus. +Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit infinitus. +Secundo, utrum aliquid praeter ipsum sit infinitum secundum +essentiam. Tertio, utrum aliquid possit esse infinitum secundum +magnitudinem. Quarto, utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum +multitudinem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q7_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q7_A1-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 1. Whether God is infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and + matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28494] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit infinitus. Omne enim +infinitum est imperfectum, quia habet rationem partis et materiae, +ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed Deus est perfectissimus. Ergo non est +infinitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, + for He is not a body, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28495] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum philosophum in I Physic., finitum et infinitum conveniunt +quantitati. Sed in Deo non est quantitas, cum non sit corpus, ut +supra ostensum est. Ergo non competit sibi esse infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing + in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not + a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28496] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod +ita est hic quod non alibi, est finitum secundum locum, ergo quod +ita est hoc quod non est aliud, est finitum secundum substantiam. +Sed Deus est hoc, et non est aliud, non enim est lapis nec lignum. +Ergo Deus non est infinitus secundum substantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is infinite and eternal, and boundless." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28497] Iª q. 7 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Damascenus, quod <i>Deus est infinitus et aeternus et +incircumscriptibilis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q7_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they + considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the nature of the + first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the + first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to + the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things. + </p><p id="FP_Q7_A1-p7"> We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by + form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in + potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch + as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to + this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed + to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made + perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined + by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown + above ( + <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>, OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was + shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 co."><a name="28498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28498] Iª q. 7 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod omnes antiqui philosophi attribuunt infinitum primo principio, +ut dicitur in III Physic., et hoc rationabiliter, considerantes res +effluere a primo principio in infinitum. Sed quia quidam erraverunt +circa naturam primi principii, consequens fuit ut errarent circa +infinitatem ipsius. Quia enim ponebant primum principium materiam, +consequenter attribuerunt primo principio infinitatem materialem; +dicentes aliquod corpus infinitum esse primum principium rerum. +Considerandum est igitur quod infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod +non est finitum. Finitur autem quodammodo et materia per formam, et +forma per materiam. Materia quidem per formam, inquantum materia, +antequam recipiat formam, est in potentia ad multas formas, sed cum +recipit unam, terminatur per illam. Forma vero finitur per +materiam, inquantum forma, in se considerata, communis est ad +multa, sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia, fit forma determinate +huius rei. Materia autem perficitur per formam per quam finitur, et +ideo infinitum secundum quod attribuitur materiae, habet rationem +imperfecti; est enim quasi materia non habens formam. Forma autem +non perficitur per materiam, sed magis per eam eius amplitudo +contrahitur, unde infinitum secundum quod se tenet ex parte formae +non determinatae per materiam, habet rationem perfecti. Illud autem +quod est maxime formale omnium, est ipsum esse, ut ex superioribus +patet. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed +ipse sit suum esse subsistens, ut supra ostensum est; manifestum +est quod ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28499] Iª q. 7 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet +responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is + a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed + to God; as was said above, in this article. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28500] Iª q. 7 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod terminus quantitatis est sicut forma ipsius, cuius +signum est, quod figura, quae consistit in terminatione +quantitatis, est quaedam forma circa quantitatem. Unde infinitum +quod competit quantitati, est infinitum quod se tenet ex parte +materiae, et tale infinitum non attribuitur Deo, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be + distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting + whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing + in a subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28501] Iª q. 7 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod, ex hoc ipso quod esse Dei est per se subsistens non receptum +in aliquo, prout dicitur infinitum, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis, +et alia removentur ab eo, sicut, si esset albedo subsistens, ex hoc +ipso quod non esset in alio, differret ab omni albedine existente +in subiecto.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q7_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q7_A2-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 2. Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence. + Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since + the extent of a power is known by its effect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28502] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse +infinitum per essentiam. Virtus enim rei proportionatur essentiae +eius. Si igitur essentia Dei est infinita, oportet quod eius virtus +sit infinita. Ergo potest producere effectum infinitum, cum +quantitas virtutis per effectum cognoscatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends + the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance + is infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28503] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid habet virtutem infinitam, habet essentiam infinitam. Sed +intellectus creatus habet virtutem infinitam, apprehendit enim +universale, quod se potest extendere ad infinita singularia. Ergo +omnis substantia intellectualis creata est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q7_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28504] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +materia prima aliud est a Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Sed materia +prima est infinita. Ergo aliquid aliud praeter Deum potest esse +infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle. + Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28505] Iª q. 7 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod infinitum non potest esse ex principio aliquo, ut dicitur in +III Physic. Omne autem quod est praeter Deum, est ex Deo sicut ex +primo principio. Ergo nihil quod est praeter Deum, potest esse +infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to + matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But + because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which + is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to + its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But + if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are + absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, + as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated, + nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows + that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 co."><a name="28506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28506] Iª q. 7 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod aliquid praeter Deum potest esse infinitum secundum quid, sed +non simpliciter. Si enim loquamur de infinito secundum quod +competit materiae, manifestum est quod omne existens in actu, habet +aliquam formam, et sic materia eius est terminata per formam. Sed +quia materia, secundum quod est sub una forma substantiali, remanet +in potentia ad multas formas accidentales; quod est finitum +simpliciter, potest esse infinitum secundum quid, utpote lignum est +finitum secundum suam formam, sed tamen est infinitum secundum +quid, inquantum est in potentia ad figuras infinitas. Si autem +loquamur de infinito secundum quod convenit formae, sic manifestum +est quod illa quorum formae sunt in materia, sunt simpliciter +finita, et nullo modo infinita. Si autem sint aliquae formae +creatae non receptae in materia, sed per se subsistentes, ut quidam +de Angelis opinantur, erunt quidem infinitae secundum quid, +inquantum huiusmodi formae non terminantur neque contrahuntur per +aliquam materiam, sed quia forma creata sic subsistens habet esse, +et non est suum esse, necesse est quod ipsum eius esse sit receptum +et contractum ad determinatam naturam. Unde non potest esse +infinitum simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created being; + hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, + cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise + He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28507] Iª q. 7 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod hoc est contra rationem facti, quod essentia rei sit +ipsum esse eius, quia esse subsistens non est esse creatum, unde +contra rationem facti est, quod sit simpliciter infinitum. Sicut +ergo Deus, licet habeat potentiam infinitam, non tamen potest +facere aliquid non factum (hoc enim esset contradictoria esse +simul); ita non potest facere aliquid infinitum simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form not + in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which + is not the act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28508] Iª q. 7 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod virtus intellectus extendit se +quodammodo ad infinita, procedit ex hoc quod intellectus est forma +non in materia; sed vel totaliter separata, sicut sunt substantiae +Angelorum; vel ad minus potentia intellectiva, quae non est actus +alicuius organi, in anima intellectiva corpori coniuncta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is something + concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively, + because its potentiality extends only to natural forms. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28509] Iª q. 7 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod materia prima non existit in rerum natura per seipsam, cum non +sit ens in actu, sed potentia tantum, unde magis est aliquid +concreatum, quam creatum. Nihilominus tamen materia prima, etiam +secundum potentiam, non est infinita simpliciter, sed secundum +quid, quia eius potentia non se extendit nisi ad formas +naturales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q7_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q7_A3-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 3. Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is + no lie in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the + geometrician in his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite + in magnitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28510] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod possit esse aliquid infinitum actu +secundum magnitudinem. In scientiis enim mathematicis non invenitur +falsum, <i>quia abstrahentium non est mendacium</i>, ut dicitur in +II Physic. Sed scientiae mathematicae utuntur infinito secundum +magnitudinem, dicit enim geometra in suis demonstrationibus, sit +linea talis infinita. Ergo non est impossibile aliquid esse +infinitum secundum magnitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude; + but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude + to be infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28511] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id +quod non est contra rationem alicuius, non est impossibile +convenire sibi. Sed esse infinitum non est contra rationem +magnitudinis, sed magis finitum et infinitum videntur esse +passiones quantitatis. Ergo non est impossibile aliquam +magnitudinem esse infinitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear + from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, + and increase opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude + to be infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28512] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +magnitudo divisibilis est in infinitum, sic enim definitur +continuum, quod est in infinitum divisibile, ut patet in III +Physic. Sed contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Cum ergo +divisioni opponatur additio, et diminutioni augmentum, videtur quod +magnitudo possit crescere in infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse +magnitudinem infinitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said + in Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every determinate indivisible in + time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28513] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, motus +et tempus habent quantitatem et continuitatem a magnitudine super +quam transit motus, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Sed non est contra +rationem temporis et motus quod sint infinita, cum unumquodque +indivisibile signatum in tempore et motu circulari, sit principium +et finis. Ergo nec contra rationem magnitudinis erit quod sit +infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore + all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28514] Iª q. 7 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne +corpus superficiem habet. Sed omne corpus superficiem habens est +finitum, quia superficies est terminus corporis finiti. Ergo omne +corpus est finitum. Et similiter potest dici de superficie et +linea. Nihil est ergo infinitum secundum magnitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q7_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite + in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species + by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in + essence, it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in + magnitude. + </p><p id="FP_Q7_A3-p8"> We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect + to its quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form. + </p><p id="FP_Q7_A3-p9"> Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial + form. Since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow + upon a determinate form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate + quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because + every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement; neither direct, + because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infinite + body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move circularly; + forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by + another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the + farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would + be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other. + </p><p id="FP_Q7_A3-p10"> The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under + some form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such is figure, such a body + must have some figure, and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 co."><a name="28515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28515] Iª q. 7 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod aliud est esse infinitum secundum suam essentiam, et secundum +magnitudinem. Dato enim quod esset aliquod corpus infinitum +secundum magnitudinem, utpote ignis vel aer, non tamen esset +infinitum secundum essentiam, quia essentia sua esset terminata ad +aliquam speciem per formam, et ad aliquod individuum per materiam. +Et ideo, habito ex praemissis quod nulla creatura est infinita +secundum essentiam, adhuc restat inquirere utrum aliquid creatum +sit infinitum secundum magnitudinem. Sciendum est igitur quod +corpus, quod est magnitudo completa, dupliciter sumitur, scilicet +mathematice, secundum quod consideratur in eo sola quantitas; et +naturaliter, secundum quod consideratur in eo materia et forma. Et +de corpore quidem naturali, quod non possit esse infinitum in actu, +manifestum est. Nam omne corpus naturale aliquam formam +substantialem habet determinatam, cum igitur ad formam +substantialem consequantur accidentia, necesse est quod ad +determinatam formam consequantur determinata accidentia; inter quae +est quantitas. Unde omne corpus naturale habet determinatam +quantitatem et in maius et in minus. Unde impossibile est aliquod +corpus naturale infinitum esse. Hoc etiam ex motu patet. Quia omne +corpus naturale habet aliquem motum naturalem. Corpus autem +infinitum non posset habere aliquem motum naturalem, nec rectum, +quia nihil movetur naturaliter motu recto, nisi cum est extra suum +locum, quod corpori infinito accidere non posset; occuparet enim +omnia loca, et sic indifferenter quilibet locus esset locus eius. +Et similiter etiam neque secundum motum circularem. Quia in motu +circulari oportet quod una pars corporis transferatur ad locum in +quo fuit alia pars; quod in corpore circulari, si ponatur +infinitum, esse non posset, quia duae lineae protractae a centro, +quanto longius protrahuntur a centro, tanto longius distant ab +invicem; si ergo corpus esset infinitum, in infinitum lineae +distarent ab invicem, et sic una nunquam posset pervenire ad locum +alterius. De corpore etiam mathematico eadem ratio est. Quia si +imaginemur corpus mathematicum existens actu, oportet quod +imaginemur ipsum sub aliqua forma, quia nihil est actu nisi per +suam formam. Unde, cum forma quanti, inquantum huiusmodi, sit +figura, oportebit quod habeat aliquam figuram. Et sic erit finitum, +est enim figura, quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts + whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28516] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod geometer non indiget sumere aliquam lineam esse +infinitam actu, sed indiget accipere aliquam lineam finitam actu, a +qua possit subtrahi quantum necesse est, et hanc nominat lineam +infinitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species of + it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and + so on. Now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since + no species of magnitude is infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28517] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, licet infinitum non sit contra rationem magnitudinis +in communi, est tamen contra rationem cuiuslibet speciei eius, +scilicet contra rationem magnitudinis bicubitae vel tricubitae, +sive circularis vel triangularis, et similium. Non autem est +possibile in genere esse quod in nulla specie est. Unde non est +possibile esse aliquam magnitudinem infinitam, cum nulla species +magnitudinis sit infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch + as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the + infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28518] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod infinitum quod convenit quantitati, ut dictum est, se tenet ex +parte materiae. Per divisionem autem totius acceditur ad materiam, +nam partes se habent in ratione materiae, per additionem autem +acceditur ad totum, quod se habet in ratione formae. Et ideo non +invenitur infinitum in additione magnitudinis, sed in divisione +tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Movement and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude + is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude; + yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28519] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum +quod motus et tempus non sunt secundum totum in actu, sed +successive, unde habent potentiam permixtam actui. Sed magnitudo +est tota in actu. Et ideo infinitum quod convenit quantitati, et se +tenet ex parte materiae, repugnat totalitati magnitudinis, non +autem totalitati temporis vel motus, esse enim in potentia convenit +materiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q7_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q7_A4-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 4. Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. + But number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28520] Iª q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod possibile sit esse multitudinem infinitam +secundum actum. Non enim est impossibile id quod est in potentia +reduci ad actum. Sed numerus est in infinitum multiplicabilis. Ergo +non est impossibile esse multitudinem infinitam in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore + an infinite number of actual figures is possible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28521] Iª q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +cuiuslibet speciei possibile est esse aliquod individuum in actu. +Sed species figurae sunt infinitae. Ergo possibile est esse +infinitas figuras in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there + can still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so + on to infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28522] Iª q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ea +quae non opponuntur ad invicem, non impediunt se invicem. Sed, +posita aliqua multitudine rerum, adhuc possunt fieri alia multa +quae eis non opponuntur, ergo non est impossibile aliqua iterum +simul esse cum eis, et sic in infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse +infinita in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q7_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28523] Iª q. 7 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>omnia in pondere, numero et mensura +disposuisti</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q7_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite + multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite + absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail + something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation + could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. + </p><p id="FP_Q7_A4-p7"> A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be + shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, the movement + of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be + finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as + one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and + it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. + In this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude. + </p><p id="FP_Q7_A4-p8"> This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude + are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured + by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude + in nature is created; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator; + for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible + for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite multitude is possible; because + the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number of + things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach + matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition + of multitude. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 co."><a name="28524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28524] Iª q. 7 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod circa hoc fuit duplex opinio. Quidam enim, sicut Avicenna et +Algazel, dixerunt quod impossibile est esse multitudinem actu +infinitam per se, sed infinitam per accidens multitudinem esse, non +est impossibile. Dicitur enim multitudo esse infinita per se, +quando requiritur ad aliquid ut multitudo infinita sit. Et hoc est +impossibile esse, quia sic oporteret quod aliquid dependeret ex +infinitis; unde eius generatio nunquam compleretur, cum non sit +infinita pertransire. Per accidens autem dicitur multitudo +infinita, quando non requiritur ad aliquid infinitas multitudinis, +sed accidit ita esse. Et hoc sic manifestari potest in operatione +fabri, ad quam quaedam multitudo requiritur per se, scilicet quod +sit ars in anima, et manus movens, et martellus. Et si haec in +infinitum multiplicarentur, nunquam opus fabrile compleretur, quia +dependeret ex infinitis causis. Sed multitudo martellorum quae +accidit ex hoc quod unum frangitur et accipitur aliud, est +multitudo per accidens, accidit enim quod multis martellis +operetur; et nihil differt utrum uno vel duobus vel pluribus +operetur, vel infinitis, si infinito tempore operaretur. Per hunc +igitur modum, posuerunt quod possibile est esse actu multitudinem +infinitam per accidens. Sed hoc est impossibile. Quia omnem +multitudinem oportet esse in aliqua specie multitudinis. Species +autem multitudinis sunt secundum species numerorum. Nulla autem +species numeri est infinita, quia quilibet numerus est multitudo +mensurata per unum. Unde impossibile est esse multitudinem +infinitam actu, sive per se, sive per accidens. Item, multitudo in +rerum natura existens est creata, et omne creatum sub aliqua certa +intentione creantis comprehenditur, non enim in vanum agens aliquod +operatur. Unde necesse est quod sub certo numero omnia creata +comprehendantur. Impossibile est ergo esse multitudinem infinitam +in actu, etiam per accidens. Sed esse multitudinem infinitam in +potentia, possibile est. Quia augmentum multitudinis consequitur +divisionem magnitudinis, quanto enim aliquid plus dividitur, tanto +plura secundum numerum resultant. Unde, sicut infinitum invenitur +in potentia in divisione continui, quia proceditur ad materiam, ut +supra ostensum est; eadem ratione etiam infinitum invenitur in +potentia in additione multitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and + not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude + can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28525] Iª q. 7 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod unumquodque quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum +secundum modum sui esse, dies enim non reducitur in actum ut sit +tota simul, sed successive. Et similiter infinitum multitudinis non +reducitur in actum ut sit totum simul, sed successive, quia post +quamlibet multitudinem, potest sumi alia multitudo in +infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral + and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28526] Iª q. 7 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod species figurarum habent infinitatem ex infinitate +numeri, sunt enim species figurarum, trilaterum, quadrilaterum, et +sic inde. Unde, sicut multitudo infinita numerabilis non reducitur +in actum quod sit tota simul, ita nec multitudo figurarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite + number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28527] Iª q. 7 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod, licet, quibusdam positis, alia poni non sit eis oppositum; +tamen infinita poni opponitur cuilibet speciei multitudinis. Unde +non est possibile esse aliquam multitudinem actu infinitam.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q8" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q8-p0.1">Q. 8. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q8-p2"> Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs + to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q8-p3"> (1) Whether God is in all things?</p><p id="FP_Q8-p4"> (2) Whether God is everywhere?</p><p id="FP_Q8-p5"> (3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?</p><p id="FP_Q8-p6"> (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 pr."><a name="28528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28528] +Iª q. 8 pr.</span></a> Quia vero infinito convenire videtur +quod ubique et in omnibus sit, considerandum est utrum hoc Deo +conveniat. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit +in omnibus rebus. Secundo, utrum Deus sit ubique. Tertio, utrum +Deus sit ubique per essentiam et potentiam et praesentiam. Quarto, +utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q8_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A1-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 1. Whether God is in all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according + to the Psalm ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.112.4" target="asv">Ps. 112:4</a>), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore God is not in all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28529] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit in omnibus rebus. Quod enim +est supra omnia, non est in omnibus rebus. Sed Deus est supra +omnia, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>excelsus super omnes gentes +dominus,</i> et cetera. Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore + God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things + are, rather than He is in any place." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28530] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod +est in aliquo, continetur ab eo. Sed Deus non continetur a rebus, +sed magis continet res. Ergo Deus non est in rebus, sed magis res +sunt in eo. Unde Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., +dicit quod <i>in ipso potius sunt omnia, quam ipse alicubi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore + His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28531] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quanto +aliquod agens est virtuosius, tanto ad magis distans eius actio +procedit. Sed Deus est virtuosissimum agens. Ergo eius actio +pertingere potest ad ea etiam quae ab ipso distant, nec oportet +quod sit in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:14</a>). Therefore God is not in all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28532] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Daemones res aliquae sunt. Nec tamen Deus est in Daemonibus, non +enim est conventio lucis ad tenebras, ut dicitur II ad Cor. VI. +Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.12" target="asv"> Is. 26:12, </a> "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28533] Iª q. 8 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ubicumque operatur aliquid, ibi est. Sed Deus operatur in omnibus, +secundum illud Isaiae XXVI, <i>omnia opera nostra operatus es in +nobis, domine</i>. Ergo Deus est in omnibus rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon + which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved + in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created + being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God + causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is + caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present + to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things + since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q8_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Hence + it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 co."><a name="28534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28534] Iª q. 8 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae, +vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet +enim omne agens coniungi ei in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute +illud contingere, unde in VII Physic. probatur quod motum et movens +oportet esse simul. Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam +essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius; +sicut ignire est proprius effectus ignis. Hunc autem effectum +causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt, sed +quandiu in esse conservantur; sicut lumen causatur in aere a sole +quandiu aer illuminatus manet. Quandiu igitur res habet esse, +tandiu oportet quod Deus adsit ei, secundum modum quo esse habet. +Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod +profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in +re sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde oportet quod Deus sit in +omnibus rebus, et intime.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all + things; as was shown above in this article. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28535] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Deus est supra omnia per excellentiam suae naturae, +et tamen est in omnibus rebus, ut causans omnium esse, ut supra +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain + those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, + by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28536] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, licet corporalia dicantur esse in aliquo sicut in +continente, tamen spiritualia continent ea in quibus sunt, sicut +anima continet corpus. Unde et Deus est in rebus sicut continens +res. Tamen, per quandam similitudinem corporalium, dicuntur omnia +esse in Deo, inquantum continentur ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great + power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. + But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence + of His own nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28537] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod nullius agentis, quantumcumque virtuosi, actio procedit ad +aliquid distans, nisi inquantum in illud per media agit. Hoc autem +ad maximam virtutem Dei pertinet, quod immediate in omnibus agit. +Unde nihil est distans ab eo, quasi in se illud Deum non habeat. +Dicuntur tamen res distare a Deo per dissimilitudinem naturae vel +gratiae, sicut et ipse est super omnia per excellentiam suae +naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it + is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But in + things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28538] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum +quod in Daemonibus intelligitur et natura, quae est a Deo, et +deformitas culpae, quae non est ab ipso. Et ideo non est absolute +concedendum quod Deus sit in Daemonibus, sed cum hac additione, +inquantum sunt res quaedam. In rebus autem quae nominant naturam +non deformatam, absolute dicendum est Deum esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q8_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A2-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 2. Whether God is everywhere?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong + to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not + in a place." Therefore God is not everywhere. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28539] Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit ubique. Esse enim ubique +significat esse in omni loco. Sed esse in omni loco non convenit +Deo, cui non convenit esse in loco, nam incorporalia, ut dicit +Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., non sunt in loco. Ergo Deus non est +ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part + of action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent + things be in every place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many places; and thus + He is not everywhere. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28540] Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +se habet tempus ad successiva, ita se habet locus ad permanentia. +Sed unum indivisibile actionis vel motus, non potest esse in +diversis temporibus. Ergo nec unum indivisibile in genere rerum +permanentium, potest esse in omnibus locis. Esse autem divinum non +est successivum, sed permanens. Ergo Deus non est in pluribus +locis. Et ita non est ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He + has no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28541] Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod +est totum alicubi, nihil eius est extra locum illum. Sed Deus, si +est in aliquo loco, totus est ibi, non enim habet partes. Ergo +nihil eius est extra locum illum. Ergo Deus non est ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.23.24" target="asv">Jer. 23:24</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28542] Iª q. 8 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Ierem. XXIII, <i>caelum et terram ego impleo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things---i.e. as one + thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; + and thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. + First, as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every + place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills + every place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another + body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being + to the things that fill every place, He Himself fills every place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 co."><a name="28543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28543] Iª q. 8 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum locus sit res quaedam, esse aliquid in loco potest +intelligi dupliciter, vel per modum aliarum rerum, idest sicut +dicitur aliquid esse in aliis rebus quocumque modo, sicut +accidentia loci sunt in loco; vel per modum proprium loci, sicut +locata sunt in loco. Utroque autem modo, secundum aliquid, Deus est +in omni loco, quod est esse ubique. Primo quidem, sicut est in +omnibus rebus, ut dans eis esse et virtutem et operationem, sic +enim est in omni loco, ut dans ei esse et virtutem locativam. Item, +locata sunt in loco inquantum replent locum, et Deus omnem locum +replet. Non sicut corpus, corpus enim dicitur replere locum, +inquantum non compatitur secum aliud corpus; sed per hoc quod Deus +est in aliquo loco, non excluditur quin alia sint ibi, imo per hoc +replet omnia loca, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quae replent +omnia loca.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28544] Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod incorporalia non sunt in loco per contactum +quantitatis dimensivae, sicut corpora, sed per contactum +virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession; + and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, + or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or + action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is + outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called + indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; + hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is + in one or in many places, and in a small or large place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28545] Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod indivisibile est duplex. Unum quod est terminus +continui, ut punctus in permanentibus, et momentum in successivis. +Et huiusmodi indivisibile, in permanentibus, quia habet +determinatum situm, non potest esse in pluribus partibus loci, vel +in pluribus locis, et similiter indivisibile actionis vel motus, +quia habet determinatum ordinem in motu vel actione, non potest +esse in pluribus partibus temporis. Aliud autem indivisibile est, +quod est extra totum genus continui, et hoc modo substantiae +incorporeae, ut Deus, Angelus et anima, dicuntur esse +indivisibiles. Tale igitur indivisibile non applicatur ad continuum +sicut aliquid eius, sed inquantum contingit illud sua virtute. Unde +secundum quod virtus sua se potest extendere ad unum vel multa, ad +parvum vel magnum, secundum hoc est in uno vel pluribus locis, et +in loco parvo vel magno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter + are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity + into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that + place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of + the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate + to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at + all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole + in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it + is + found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally, + then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves + or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the + body, so is God whole in all things and in each one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28546] Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod totum dicitur respectu partium. Est autem duplex pars, +scilicet pars essentiae, ut forma et materia dicuntur partes +compositi, et genus et differentia partes speciei; et etiam pars +quantitatis, in quam scilicet dividitur aliqua quantitas. Quod ergo +est totum in aliquo loco totalitate quantitatis, non potest esse +extra locum illum, quia quantitas locati commensuratur quantitati +loci, unde non est totalitas quantitatis, si non sit totalitas +loci. Sed totalitas essentiae non commensuratur totalitati loci. +Unde non oportet quod illud quod est totum totalitate essentiae in +aliquo, nullo modo sit extra illud. Sicut apparet etiam in formis +accidentalibus, quae secundum accidens quantitatem habent, albedo +enim est tota in qualibet parte superficiei, si accipiatur +totalitas essentiae, quia secundum perfectam rationem suae speciei +invenitur in qualibet parte superficiei, si autem accipiatur +totalitas secundum quantitatem, quam habet per accidens, sic non +est tota in qualibet parte superficiei. In substantiis autem +incorporeis non est totalitas, nec per se nec per accidens, nisi +secundum perfectam rationem essentiae. Et ideo, sicut anima est +tota in qualibet parte corporis, ita Deus totus est in omnibus et +singulis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q8_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A3-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 3. Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. + For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to + the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28547] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod male assignentur modi existendi Deum in +rebus, cum dicitur quod Deus est in omnibus rebus per essentiam, +potentiam et praesentiam. Id enim per essentiam est in aliquo, quod +essentialiter est in eo. Deus autem non est essentialiter in rebus, +non enim est de essentia alicuius rei. Ergo non debet dici quod +Deus sit in rebus per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His + essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the + same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28548] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, hoc +est esse praesentem alicui rei, scilicet non deesse illi. Sed hoc +est Deum esse per essentiam in rebus, scilicet non deesse alicui +rei. Ergo idem est esse Deum in omnibus per essentiam et +praesentiam. Superfluum ergo fuit dicere quod Deus sit in rebus per +essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it + is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28549] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +Deus est principium omnium rerum per suam potentiam, ita per +scientiam et voluntatem. Sed non dicitur Deus esse in rebus per +scientiam et voluntatem. Ergo nec per potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore + if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought + to be a special mode of God's existence in things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28550] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +gratia est quaedam perfectio superaddita substantiae rei, ita +multae sunt aliae perfectiones superadditae. Si ergo Deus dicitur +esse speciali modo in quibusdam per gratiam, videtur quod secundum +quamlibet perfectionem debeat accipi specialis modus essendi Deum +in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that, "God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and substance; + still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28551] Iª q. 8 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Gregorius dicit, super Cant. Cantic., quod <i>Deus communi +modo est in omnibus rebus praesentia, potentia et substantia, tamen +familiari modo dicitur esse in aliquibus per gratiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things + created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations + of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second + way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or + habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later + <a id="FP_Q8_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12.html">(Q[12])</a>. He is said to be thus in the saints by grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 co."><a name="28552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28552] Iª q. 8 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum +causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio +modo, sicut obiectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est +in operationibus animae, secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, +et desideratum in desiderante. Hoc igitur secundo modo, Deus +specialiter est in rationali creatura, quae cognoscit et diligit +illum actu vel habitu. Et quia hoc habet rationalis creatura per +gratiam, ut infra patebit, dicitur esse hoc modo in sanctis per +gratiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p8"> But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in + the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other + things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not + be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that + place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were + subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore + against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">In rebus vero aliis ab ipso creatis quomodo sit, +considerandum est ex his quae in rebus humanis esse dicuntur. Rex +enim dicitur esse in toto regno suo per suam potentiam, licet non +sit ubique praesens. Per praesentiam vero suam, dicitur aliquid +esse in omnibus quae in prospectu ipsius sunt; sicut omnia quae +sunt in aliqua domo, dicuntur esse praesentia alicui, qui tamen non +est secundum substantiam suam in qualibet parte domus. Secundum +vero substantiam vel essentiam, dicitur aliquid esse in loco in quo +eius substantia habetur. Fuerunt ergo aliqui, scilicet Manichaei, +qui dixerunt divinae potestati subiecta spiritualia esse et +incorporalia, visibilia vero et corporalia subiecta esse dicebant +potestati principii contrarii. Contra hos ergo oportet dicere quod +Deus sit in omnibus per potentiam suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p9"> But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence + extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and + He doth not consider our things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Job.22.14" target="asv">Job 22:14</a>). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His presence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Fuerunt vero alii, qui +licet crederent omnia esse subiecta divinae potentiae, tamen +providentiam divinam usque ad haec inferiora corpora non +extendebant, ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXII, <i>circa cardines +caeli perambulat, nec nostra considerat</i>. Et contra hos oportuit +dicere quod sit in omnibus per suam praesentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p10"> Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's providence, still all things are not immediately created + by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to + say that He is in all things by His essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Fuerunt vero alii, +qui licet dicerent omnia ad Dei providentiam pertinere, tamen +posuerunt omnia non immediate esse a Deo creata, sed quod immediate +creavit primas creaturas, et illae creaverunt alias. Et contra hos +oportet dicere quod sit in omnibus per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p11"> Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all + things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all + as the cause of their being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic ergo est in +omnibus per potentiam, inquantum omnia eius potestati subduntur. +Est per praesentiam in omnibus, inquantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta +oculis eius. Est in omnibus per essentiam, inquantum adest omnibus +ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; + but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28553] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in omnibus per essentiam, non +quidem rerum, quasi sit de essentia earum, sed per essentiam suam, +quia substantia sua adest omnibus ut causa essendi, sicut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown + in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28554] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquid potest dici praesens alicui, inquantum +subiacet eius conspectui, quod tamen distat ab eo secundum suam +substantiam, ut dictum est. Et ideo oportuit duos modos poni, +scilicet per essentiam, et praesentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills. + Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; + hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to + another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28555] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod de ratione scientiae et voluntatis est, quod scitum sit in +sciente, et volitum in volente, unde secundum scientiam et +voluntatem, magis res sunt in Deo, quam Deus in rebus. Sed de +ratione potentiae est, quod sit principium agendi in aliud, unde +secundum potentiam agens comparatur et applicatur rei exteriori. Et +sic per potentiam potest dici agens esse in altero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore + only grace constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's existence + in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (TP). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28556] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum +quod nulla alia perfectio superaddita substantiae, facit Deum esse +in aliquo sicut obiectum cognitum et amatum, nisi gratia, et ideo +sola gratia facit singularem modum essendi Deum in rebus. Est autem +alius singularis modus essendi Deum in homine per unionem, de quo +modo suo loco agetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q8_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A4-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 4. Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), + is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as + appears from what is said above + <a id="FP_Q8_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28557] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod esse ubique non sit proprium Dei. +Universale enim, secundum philosophum, est ubique et semper, +materia etiam prima, cum sit in omnibus corporibus, est ubique. +Neutrum autem horum est Deus, ut ex praemissis patet. Ergo esse +ubique non est proprium Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28558] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +numerus est in numeratis. Sed totum universum est constitutum in +numero, ut patet Sap. XI. Ergo aliquis numerus est, qui est in toto +universo, et ita ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body" (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because + there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28559] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, totum +universum est quoddam totum corpus perfectum, ut dicitur in I caeli +et mundi. Sed totum universum est ubique, quia extra ipsum nullus +locus est. Non ergo solus Deus est ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere + does not appear to belong to God alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="28560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28560] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si +aliquod corpus esset infinitum, nullus locus esset extra ipsum. +Ergo esset ubique. Et sic, esse ubique non videtur proprium +Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts." + Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong + to God alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="28561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28561] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> <i>Praeterea, +anima</i>, ut dicit Augustinus, in VI de Trin., <i>est tota in toto +corpore, et tota in qualibet eius parte</i>. Si ergo non esset in +mundo nisi unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique. Et sic, esse +ubique non est proprium Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, as Augustine says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 137</a>), "The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as it were everywhere: + for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="28562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28562] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, ut +Augustinus dicit in epistola ad Volusianum, <i>anima ubi videt, ibi +sentit; et ubi sentit, ibi vivit; et ubi vivit, ibi est</i>. Sed +anima videt quasi ubique, quia successive videt etiam totum caelum. +Ergo anima est ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and + always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28563] Iª q. 8 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, <i>quis audeat +creaturam dicere spiritum sanctum, qui in omnibus et ubique et +semper est; quod utique divinitatis est proprium?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its + whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily + everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white + teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is + everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as + a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere + absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of + places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should + be + in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and + is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of + Him, but as to His very self. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 co."><a name="28564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28564] Iª q. 8 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod esse ubique primo et per se, est proprium Dei. Dico autem esse +ubique primo, quod secundum se totum est ubique. Si quid enim esset +ubique, secundum diversas partes in diversis locis existens, non +esset primo ubique, quia quod convenit alicui ratione partis suae, +non convenit ei primo; sicut si homo est albus dente, albedo non +convenit primo homini, sed denti. Esse autem ubique per se dico id +cui non convenit esse ubique per accidens, propter aliquam +suppositionem factam, quia sic granum milii esset ubique, supposito +quod nullum aliud corpus esset. Per se igitur convenit esse ubique +alicui, quando tale est quod, qualibet positione facta, sequitur +illud esse ubique. Et hoc proprie convenit Deo. Quia quotcumque +loca ponantur, etiam si ponerentur infinita praeter ista quae sunt, +oporteret in omnibus esse Deum, quia nihil potest esse nisi per +ipsum. Sic igitur esse ubique primo et per se convenit Deo, et est +proprium eius, quia quotcumque loca ponantur, oportet quod in +quolibet sit Deus, non secundum partem, sed secundum seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28565] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod universale et materia prima sunt quidem ubique, sed +non secundum idem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part + of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28566] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod numerus, cum sit accidens, non est per se sed per +accidens, in loco. Nec est totus in quolibet numeratorum, sed +secundum partem. Et sic non sequitur quod sit primo et per se +ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according + to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would + not be in them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28567] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod totum corpus universi est ubique, sed non primo, quia non +totum est in quolibet loco, sed secundum suas partes. Nec iterum +per se, quia si ponerentur aliqua alia loca, non esset in eis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="28568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28568] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum +quod, si esset corpus infinitum, esset ubique; sed secundum suas +partes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="28569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28569] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum +quod, si esset unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique primo +quidem, sed per accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere" determines + the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; + and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live + and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another + sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it + is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it + does not follow that it is everywhere. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="28570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28570] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum +quod, cum dicitur anima alicubi videre, potest intelligi +dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium alicubi +determinat actum videndi ex parte obiecti. Et sic verum est quod, +dum caelum videt, in caelo videt, et eadem ratione in caelo sentit. +Non tamen sequitur quod in caelo vivat vel sit, quia vivere et esse +non important actum transeuntem in exterius obiectum. Alio modo +potest intelligi secundum quod adverbium determinat actum videntis, +secundum quod exit a vidente. Et sic verum est quod anima ubi +sentit et videt, ibi est et vivit, secundum istum modum loquendi. +Et ita non sequitur quod sit ubique.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q9" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q9-p0.1">Q. 9. THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q9-p2"> We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of God there are + two points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q9-p3"> (1) Whether God is altogether immutable?</p><p id="FP_Q9-p4"> (2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 pr."><a name="28571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28571] +Iª q. 9 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +immutabilitate et aeternitate divina, quae immutabilitatem +consequitur. Circa immutabilitatem vero quaeruntur duo. Primo, +utrum Deus sit omnino immutabilis. Secundo, utrum esse immutabile +sit proprium Dei.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q9_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q9_A1-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 1. Whether God is altogether immutable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen. + ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28572] Iª q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino immutabilis. Quidquid +enim movet seipsum, est aliquo modo mutabile. Sed, sicut dicit +Augustinus, VIII super Genesim ad litteram, <i>spiritus creator +movet se nec per tempus nec per locum</i>. Ergo Deus est aliquo +modo mutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active [Vulg.'mobilior']" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.24" target="asv">Wis. 7:24</a>). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is movable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28573] Iª q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Sap. +VII dicitur de sapientia quod est <i>mobilior omnibus +mobilibus</i>. Sed Deus est ipsa sapientia. Ergo Deus est +mobilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will + draw nigh to you" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.8" target="asv">James 4:8</a>). Therefore God is mutable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28574] Iª q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +appropinquari et elongari motum significant. Huiusmodi autem +dicuntur de Deo in Scriptura, Iac. IV, <i>appropinquate Deo, et +appropinquabit vobis</i>. Ergo Deus est mutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.3.6" target="asv">Malachi 3:6</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28575] Iª q. 9 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Malach. III, <i>ego Deus, et non mutor</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first + being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason + that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. + Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. + Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness + to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be + found. But it has been shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q9_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, + because everything which is moved acquires something + by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all + the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not + extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, + decided that the first principle was immovable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 co."><a name="28576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28576] Iª q. 9 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ex praemissis ostenditur Deum esse omnino immutabilem. Primo +quidem, quia supra ostensum est esse aliquod primum ens, quod Deum +dicimus, et quod huiusmodi primum ens oportet esse purum actum +absque permixtione alicuius potentiae, eo quod potentia simpliciter +est posterior actu. Omne autem quod quocumque modo mutatur, est +aliquo modo in potentia. Ex quo patet quod impossibile est Deum +aliquo modo mutari. Secundo, quia omne quod movetur, quantum ad +aliquid manet, et quantum ad aliquid transit, sicut quod movetur de +albedine in nigredinem, manet secundum substantiam. Et sic in omni +eo quod movetur, attenditur aliqua compositio. Ostensum est autem +supra quod in Deo nulla est compositio, sed est omnino simplex. +Unde manifestum est quod Deus moveri non potest. Tertio, quia omne +quod movetur, motu suo aliquid acquirit, et pertingit ad illud ad +quod prius non pertingebat. Deus autem, cum sit infinitus, +comprehendens in se omnem plenitudinem perfectionis totius esse, +non potest aliquid acquirere, nec extendere se in aliquid ad quod +prius non pertingebat. Unde nullo modo sibi competit motus. Et inde +est quod quidam antiquorum, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti, +posuerunt primum principium esse immobile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a + movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands + and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing + existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28577] Iª q. 9 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum modum quo Plato +dicebat primum movens movere seipsum, omnem operationem nominans +motum; secundum quod etiam ipsum intelligere et velle et amare +motus quidam dicuntur. Quia ergo Deus intelligit et amat seipsum, +secundum hoc dixerunt quod Deus movet seipsum, non autem secundum +quod motus et mutatio est existentis in potentia, ut nunc loquimur +de mutatione et motu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for + nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective + and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the + similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which + participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to + be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch + as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of + the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28578] Iª q. 9 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sapientia dicitur mobilis esse similitudinarie, +secundum quod suam similitudinem diffundit usque ad ultima rerum. +Nihil enim esse potest, quod non procedat a divina sapientia per +quandam imitationem, sicut a primo principio effectivo et formali; +prout etiam artificiata procedunt a sapientia artificis. Sic igitur +inquantum similitudo divinae sapientiae gradatim procedit a +supremis, quae magis participant de eius similitudine, usque ad +infima rerum, quae minus participant dicitur esse quidam processus +et motus divinae sapientiae in res, sicut si dicamus solem +procedere usque ad terram, inquantum radius luminis eius usque ad +terram pertingit. Et hoc modo exponit Dionysius, cap. I Cael. +Hier., dicens quod <i>omnis processus divinae manifestationis venit +ad nos a patre luminum moto</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according + as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, + or decline from Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28579] Iª q. 9 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod huiusmodi dicuntur de Deo in Scripturis metaphorice. Sicut +enim dicitur sol intrare domum vel exire, inquantum radius eius +pertingit ad domum; sic dicitur Deus appropinquare ad nos vel +recedere a nobis, inquantum percipimus influentiam bonitatis +ipsius, vel ab eo deficimus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q9_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q9_A2-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 2. Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in everything + which is moved." But, according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be + immutable does not belong to God alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28580] Iª q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod esse immutabile non sit proprium Dei. +Dicit enim philosophus, in II Metaphys., quod materia est in omni +eo quod movetur. Sed substantiae quaedam creatae, sicut Angeli et +animae, non habent materiam, ut quibusdam videtur. Ergo esse +immutabile non est proprium Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. + But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are + immovable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28581] Iª q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod movetur, movetur propter aliquem finem, quod ergo iam pervenit +ad ultimum finem, non movetur. Sed quaedam creaturae iam +pervenerunt ad ultimum finem, sicut omnes beati. Ergo aliquae +creaturae sunt immobiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is + essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28582] Iª q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod est mutabile, est variabile. Sed formae sunt invariabiles, +dicitur enim in libro sex principiorum, quod <i>forma est simplici +et invariabili essentia consistens</i>. Ergo non est solius Dei +proprium esse immutabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28583] Iª q. 9 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, <i>solus Deus +immutabilis est; quae autem fecit, quia ex nihilo sunt, mutabilia +sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable thing + can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed, + were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could + produce them into existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence + depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them + otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing, + as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed + in themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In + this way therefore, by the power of another---namely, of God---they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing + by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 co."><a name="28584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28584] Iª q. 9 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod solus Deus est omnino immutabilis, omnis autem creatura aliquo +modo est mutabilis. Sciendum est enim quod mutabile potest aliquid +dici dupliciter, uno modo, per potentiam quae in ipso est; alio +modo, per potentiam quae in altero est. Omnes enim creaturae, +antequam essent, non erant possibiles esse per aliquam potentiam +creatam, cum nullum creatum sit aeternum, sed per solam potentiam +divinam, inquantum Deus poterat eas in esse producere. Sicut autem +ex voluntate Dei dependet quod res in esse producit, ita ex +voluntate eius dependet quod res in esse conservat, non enim aliter +eas in esse conservat, quam semper eis esse dando; unde si suam +actionem eis subtraheret, omnia in nihilum redigerentur, ut patet +per Augustinum, IV super Gen. ad Litt. Sicut igitur in potentia +creatoris fuit ut res essent, antequam essent in seipsis, ita in +potentia creatoris est, postquam sunt in seipsis, ut non sint. Sic +igitur per potentiam quae est in altero, scilicet in Deo, sunt +mutabiles, inquantum ab ipso ex nihilo potuerunt produci in esse, +et de esse possunt reduci in non esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p7"> If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every + creature has a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection + either in being, or in attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being, + in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent + with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter + can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist + with privation of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with "not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed + from white to not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject, + then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that + kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation + of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial + being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place. On the + other hand incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality + to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts + except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of substances are + immutable and invariable as regards their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual + created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances." + Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is + in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, + inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills + all places, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html">Q[8], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Si autem dicatur aliquid +mutabile per potentiam in ipso existentem, sic etiam aliquo modo +omnis creatura est mutabilis. Est enim in creatura duplex potentia, +scilicet activa et passiva. Dico autem potentiam passivam, secundum +quam aliquid assequi potest suam perfectionem, vel in essendo vel +in consequendo finem. Si igitur attendatur mutabilitas rei secundum +potentiam ad esse, sic non in omnibus creaturis est mutabilitas, +sed in illis solum in quibus illud quod est possibile in eis, +potest stare cum non esse. Unde in corporibus inferioribus est +mutabilitas et secundum esse substantiale, quia materia eorum +potest esse cum privatione formae substantialis ipsorum, et quantum +ad esse accidentale, si subiectum compatiatur secum privationem +accidentis; sicut hoc subiectum, homo, compatitur secum non album, +et ideo potest mutari de albo in non album. Si vero sit tale +accidens quod consequatur principia essentialia subiecti, privatio +illius accidentis non potest stare cum subiecto, unde subiectum non +potest mutari secundum illud accidens, sicut nix non potest fieri +nigra. In corporibus vero caelestibus, materia non compatitur secum +privationem formae, quia forma perficit totam potentialitatem +materiae, et ideo non sunt mutabilia secundum esse substantiale; +sed secundum esse locale, quia subiectum compatitur secum +privationem huius loci vel illius. Substantiae vero incorporeae, +quia sunt ipsae formae subsistentes, quae tamen se habent ad esse +ipsarum sicut potentia ad actum, non compatiuntur secum privationem +huius actus, quia esse consequitur formam, et nihil corrumpitur +nisi per hoc quod amittit formam. Unde in ipsa forma non est +potentia ad non esse, et ideo huiusmodi substantiae sunt +immutabiles et invariabiles secundum esse. Et hoc est quod dicit +Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>substantiae intellectuales +creatae mundae sunt a generatione et ab omni variatione, sicut +incorporales et immateriales</i>. Sed tamen remanet in eis duplex +mutabilitas. Una secundum quod sunt in potentia ad finem, et sic +est in eis mutabilitas secundum electionem de bono in malum, ut +Damascenus dicit. Alia secundum locum, inquantum virtute sua finita +possunt attingere quaedam loca quae prius non attingebant, quod de +Deo dici non potest, qui sua infinitate omnia loca replet, ut supra +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p8"> Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; + or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application + of their powers to divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by + the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in + none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic igitur in omni creatura est potentia ad mutationem, +vel secundum esse substantiale, sicut corpora corruptibilia; vel +secundum esse locale tantum, sicut corpora caelestia, vel secundum +ordinem ad finem et applicationem virtutis ad diversa, sicut in +Angelis. Et universaliter omnes creaturae communiter sunt mutabiles +secundum potentiam creantis, in cuius potestate est esse et non +esse earum. Unde, cum Deus nullo istorum modorum sit mutabilis, +proprium eius est omnino immutabilem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28585] Iª q. 9 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de eo quod est mutabile +secundum esse substantiale vel accidentale, de tali enim motu +philosophi tractaverunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine power; + nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28586] Iª q. 9 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Angeli boni, supra immutabilitatem essendi, quae +competit eis secundum naturam, habent immutabilitatem electionis ex +divina virtute, tamen remanet in eis mutabilitas secundum +locum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation because + by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings + as though they were the subject of being, but because through them something has being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28587] Iª q. 9 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum +quod formae dicuntur invariabiles, quia non possunt esse subiectum +variationis, subiiciuntur tamen variationi, inquantum subiectum +secundum eas variatur. Unde patet quod secundum quod sunt, sic +variantur, non enim dicuntur entia quasi sint subiectum essendi, +sed quia eis aliquid est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q10" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q10-p0.1">Q. 10. THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q10-p2"> We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q10-p3"> (1) What is eternity?</p><p id="FP_Q10-p4"> (2) Whether God is eternal?</p><p id="FP_Q10-p5"> (3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</p><p id="FP_Q10-p6"> (4) Whether eternity differs from time?</p><p id="FP_Q10-p7"> (5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity?</p><p id="FP_Q10-p8"> (6) Whether there is only one aeviternity?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 pr."><a name="28588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28588] +Iª q. 10 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de aeternitate. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, quid sit aeternitas. Secundo, +utrum Deus sit aeternus. Tertio, utrum esse aeternum sit proprium +Dei. Quarto, utrum aeternitas differat a tempore. Quinto, de +differentia aevi et temporis. Sexto, utrum sit unum aevum tantum, +sicut est unum tempus et una aeternitas.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q10_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A1-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 1. Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole + and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to + what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought + not to be found. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28589] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio aeternitatis, +quam Boetius ponit V de consolatione, dicens quod <i>aeternitas est +interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio</i>. +Interminabile enim negative dicitur. Sed negatio non est de ratione +nisi eorum quae sunt deficientia, quod aeternitati non competit. +Ergo in definitione aeternitatis non debet poni interminabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word + "life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word "existence." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28590] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +aeternitas durationem quandam significat. Duratio autem magis +respicit esse quam vitam. Ergo non debuit poni in definitione +aeternitatis vita, sed magis esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be + "whole." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28591] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, totum +dicitur quod habet partes. Hoc autem aeternitati non convenit, cum +sit simplex. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur tota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, + for it is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mic.5.2" target="asv">Micah 5:2</a>); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.16.25" target="asv">Rom. 16:25</a>). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28592] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +plures dies non possunt esse simul, nec plura tempora. Sed in +aeternitate pluraliter dicuntur dies et tempora, dicitur enim +Micheae V, <i>egressus eius ab initio, a diebus aeternitatis</i>; +et ad Rom., XVI cap., <i>secundum revelationem mysterii temporibus +aeternis taciti</i>. Ergo aeternitas non est tota simul.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described + as "perfect." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="28593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28593] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, totum +et perfectum sunt idem. Posito igitur quod sit tota, superflue +additur quod sit perfecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="28594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28594] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +possessio ad durationem non pertinet. Aeternitas autem quaedam +duratio est. Ergo aeternitas non est possessio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by + means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and "after." For since succession occurs in every + movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, + which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft + of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering + of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists + the idea of eternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 co."><a name="28595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28595] Iª q. 10 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut in cognitionem simplicium oportet nos venire per +composita, ita in cognitionem aeternitatis oportet nos venire per +tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus motus secundum prius et +posterius. Cum enim in quolibet motu sit successio, et una pars +post alteram, ex hoc quod numeramus prius et posterius in motu, +apprehendimus tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus prioris et +posterioris in motu. In eo autem quod caret motu, et semper eodem +modo se habet, non est accipere prius et posterius. Sicut igitur +ratio temporis consistit in numeratione prioris et posterioris in +motu, ita in apprehensione uniformitatis eius quod est omnino extra +motum, consistit ratio aeternitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p9"> Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which + is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has + no beginning, and no end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Item, ea dicuntur tempore +mensurari, quae principium et finem habent in tempore, ut dicitur +in IV Physic., et hoc ideo, quia in omni eo quod movetur est +accipere aliquod principium et aliquem finem. Quod vero est omnino +immutabile, sicut nec successionem, ita nec principium aut finem +habere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p10"> Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end + (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic ergo ex duobus notificatur aeternitas. Primo, ex +hoc quod id quod est in aeternitate, est interminabile, idest +principio et fine carens (ut terminus ad utrumque referatur). +Secundo, per hoc quod ipsa aeternitas successione caret, tota simul +existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken + as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain + to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28596] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod simplicia consueverunt per negationem definiri, sicut +punctus est cuius pars non est. Quod non ideo est, quod negatio sit +de essentia eorum, sed quia intellectus noster, qui primo +apprehendit composita, in cognitionem simplicium pervenire non +potest, nisi per remotionem compositionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now + the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28597] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod est vere aeternum, non solum est ens, sed +vivens, et ipsum vivere se extendit quodammodo ad operationem, non +autem esse. Protensio autem durationis videtur attendi secundum +operationem, magis quam secundum esse, unde et tempus est numerus +motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28598] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aeternitas dicitur tota, non quia habet partes, sed +inquantum nihil ei deest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously + whole, is called by names implying time and succession. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28599] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nominibus rerum +corporalium metaphorice in Scripturis nominatur, sic aeternitas, +tota simul existens, nominibus temporalibus successivis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence + the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" + of time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="28600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28600] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod in tempore est duo considerare, scilicet ipsum +tempus, quod est successivum; et nunc temporis, quod est +imperfectum. Dicit ergo tota simul, ad removendum tempus, et +perfecta, ad excludendum nunc temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we + use the word "possession." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="28601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28601] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum +quod illud quod possidetur, firmiter et quiete habetur. Ad +designandam ergo immutabilitatem et indeficientiam aeternitatis, +usus est nomine possessionis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A2-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 2. Whether God is eternal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now + that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that + God is the author of eternity." Therefore God is not eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28602] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit aeternus. Nihil enim factum +potest dici de Deo. Sed aeternitas est aliquid factum, dicit enim +Boetius quod <i>nunc fluens facit tempus, nunc stans facit +aeternitatem</i>; et Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium +quaest., quod Deus est auctor aeternitatis. Ergo Deus non est +aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God + is before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: + 'for ever and ever']" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.18" target="asv">Ex. 15:18</a>). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28603] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod +est ante aeternitatem et post aeternitatem, non mensuratur +aeternitate. Sed Deus est ante aeternitatem, ut dicitur in libro de +causis, et post aeternitatem; dicitur enim Exod. XV, quod +<i>dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra</i>. Ergo esse aeternum +non convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be + eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28604] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +aeternitas mensura quaedam est. Sed Deo non convenit esse +mensuratum. Ergo non competit ei esse aeternum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding + article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28605] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in +aeternitate non est praesens, praeteritum vel futurum cum sit tota +simul, ut dictum est. Sed de Deo dicuntur in Scripturis verba +praesentis temporis, praeteriti vel futuri. Ergo Deus non est +aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28606] Iª q. 10 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Athanasius, <i>aeternus pater, aeternus filius, aeternus +spiritus sanctus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, + as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; + whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as + He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 co."><a name="28607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28607] Iª q. 10 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ratio aeternitatis consequitur immutabilitatem, sicut ratio +temporis consequitur motum, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, cum Deus sit +maxime immutabilis, sibi maxime competit esse aeternum. Nec solum +est aeternus, sed est sua aeternitas, cum tamen nulla alia res sit +sua duratio, quia non est suum esse. Deus autem est suum esse +uniforme, unde, sicut est sua essentia, ita est sua aeternitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused + in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending + the "now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of eternity," this is to be understood of participated + eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He + communicates His immutability. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28608] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod nunc stans dicitur facere aeternitatem, secundum +nostram apprehensionem. Sicut enim causatur in nobis apprehensio +temporis, eo quod apprehendimus fluxum ipsius nunc, ita causatur in +nobis apprehensio aeternitatis, inquantum apprehendimus nunc stans. +Quod autem dicit Augustinus, quod <i>Deus est auctor +aeternitatis</i>, intelligitur de aeternitate participata, eo enim +modo communicat Deus suam aeternitatem aliquibus, quo et suam +immutabilitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by + immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that "intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of + Exodus, "The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is + said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, + i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo + i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement + of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously + whole. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28609] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet +solutio ad secundum. Nam Deus dicitur esse ante aeternitatem, prout +participatur a substantiis immaterialibus. Unde et ibidem dicitur, +quod <i>intelligentia parificatur aeternitati</i>. Quod autem +dicitur in Exodo, <i>dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra</i> +sciendum quod aeternum accipitur ibi pro saeculo, sicut habet alia +translatio. Sic igitur dicitur quod regnabit ultra aeternum, quia +durat ultra quodcumque saeculum, idest ultra quamcumque durationem +datam, nihil est enim aliud saeculum quam periodus cuiuslibet rei, +ut dicitur in libro I de caelo. Vel dicitur etiam ultra aeternum +regnare, quia, si etiam aliquid aliud semper esset (ut motus caeli +secundum quosdam philosophos), tamen Deus ultra regnat, inquantum +eius regnum est totum simul.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea + of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28610] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aeternitas non est aliud quam ipse Deus. Unde non +dicitur Deus aeternus, quasi sit aliquo modo mensuratus, sed +accipitur ibi ratio mensurae secundum apprehensionem nostram +tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered + through present, past and future. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28611] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod verba diversorum temporum attribuuntur Deo, inquantum +eius aeternitas omnia tempora includit, non quod ipse varietur per +praesens, praeteritum et futurum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A3-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 3. Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice," + shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all eternity']" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.12.3" target="asv">Dan. 12:3</a>). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28612] Iª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod esse aeternum non sit soli Deo proprium. +Dicitur enim Danielis XII, quod <i>qui ad iustitiam erudiunt +plurimos, erunt quasi stellae in perpetuas aeternitates</i>. Non +autem essent plures aeternitates, si solus Deus esset aeternus. Non +igitur solus Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv">Mat. 25:41</a>). Therefore God is not the only eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28613] Iª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Matth. XXV dicitur, <i>ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum</i>. Non +igitur solus Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration + and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28614] Iª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne +necessarium est aeternum. Sed multa sunt necessaria; sicut omnia +principia demonstrationis, et omnes propositiones demonstrativae. +Ergo non solus Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal. + Therefore God is the only one eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28615] Iª q. 10 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Hieronymus, ad Marcellam, <i>Deus solus est qui exordium +non habet</i>. Quidquid autem exordium habet, non est aeternum. +Solus ergo Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first + article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability + from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.4" target="asv">Eccles. 1:4</a>). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature + corruptible; thus ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.75.5" target="asv">Ps. 75:5</a>) the hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal hills." ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.33.15" target="asv">Dt. 33:15</a>). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in + being or further still in operation; like the angels, and + the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as + Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, "This is eternal + life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.5" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 co."><a name="28616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28616] Iª q. 10 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod aeternitas vere et proprie in solo Deo est. Quia aeternitas +immutabilitatem consequitur, ut ex dictis patet. Solus autem Deus +est omnino immutabilis, ut est superius ostensum. Secundum tamen +quod aliqua ab ipso immutabilitatem percipiunt, secundum hoc aliqua +eius aeternitatem participant. Quaedam ergo quantum ad hoc +immutabilitatem sortiuntur a Deo, quod nunquam esse desinunt, et +secundum hoc dicitur Eccle. I de terra, quod in aeternum stat. +Quaedam etiam aeterna in Scripturis dicuntur propter diuturnitatem +durationis, licet corruptibilia sint, sicut in Psalmo dicuntur +montes aeterni; et Deuter. XXXIII etiam dicitur, de pomis collium +aeternorum. Quaedam autem amplius participant de ratione +aeternitatis, inquantum habent intransmutabilitatem vel secundum +esse, vel ulterius secundum operationem, sicut Angeli et beati, qui +verbo fruuntur, quia quantum ad illam visionem verbi, non sunt in +sanctis volubiles cogitationes, ut dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin. +Unde et videntes Deum dicuntur habere vitam aeternam, secundum +illud Ioann. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant</i> et +cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28617] Iª q. 10 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod dicuntur multae aeternitates, secundum quod sunt +multi participantes aeternitatem ex ipsa Dei contemplatione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according + to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.24.19" target="asv">Job 24:19</a>). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for + ever" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.80.16" target="asv">Ps. 80:16</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28618] Iª q. 10 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ignis Inferni dicitur aeternus propter +interminabilitatem tantum. Est tamen in poenis eorum transmutatio, +secundum illud Iob XXIV, <i>ad nimium calorem transibunt ab aquis +nivium</i>. Unde in Inferno non est vera aeternitas, sed magis +tempus; secundum illud Psalmi, <i>erit tempus eorum in +saecula</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore + in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; + hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28619] Iª q. 10 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod necessarium significat quendam modum veritatis. Verum +autem, secundum philosophum, VI Metaphys., est in intellectu. +Secundum hoc igitur vera et necessaria sunt aeterna, quia sunt in +intellectu aeterno, qui est intellectus divinus solus. Unde non +sequitur quod aliquid extra Deum sit aeternum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A4-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 4. Whether eternity differs from time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part + of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, + considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. + Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and + includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28620] Iª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod aeternitas non sit aliud a tempore. +Impossibile est enim duas esse mensuras durationis simul, nisi una +sit pars alterius, non enim sunt simul duo dies vel duae horae; sed +dies et hora sunt simul, quia hora est pars diei. Sed aeternitas et +tempus sunt simul, quorum utrumque mensuram quandam durationis +importat. Cum igitur aeternitas non sit pars temporis, quia +aeternitas excedit tempus et includit ipsum; videtur quod tempus +sit pars aeternitatis, et non aliud ab aeternitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature + of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" + of time. But the "now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different + from time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28621] Iª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum philosophum in IV Physic., nunc temporis manet idem in +toto tempore. Sed hoc videtur constituere rationem aeternitatis, +quod sit idem indivisibiliter se habens in toto decursu temporis. +Ergo aeternitas est nunc temporis. Sed nunc temporis non est aliud +secundum substantiam a tempore. Ergo aeternitas non est aliud +secundum substantiam a tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that + the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being---that is, of the divine + being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore + is either eternity or is a part of eternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28622] Iª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +mensura primi motus est mensura omnium motuum, ut dicitur in IV +Physic., ita videtur quod mensura primi esse sit mensura omnis +esse. Sed aeternitas est mensura primi esse, quod est esse divinum. +Ergo aeternitas est mensura omnis esse. Sed esse rerum +corruptibilium mensuratur tempore. Ergo tempus vel est aeternitas, +vel aliquid aeternitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a "before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28623] Iª q. 10 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod aeternitas est tota simul, in tempore autem est prius et +posterius. Ergo tempus et aeternitas non sunt idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither + beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute + difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement + of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity + and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied + to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the + aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some + reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of + the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not + measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 co."><a name="28624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28624] Iª q. 10 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod manifestum est tempus et aeternitatem non esse idem. Sed huius +diversitatis rationem quidam assignaverunt ex hoc quod aeternitas +caret principio et fine, tempus autem habet principium et finem. +Sed haec est differentia per accidens, et non per se. Quia dato +quod tempus semper fuerit et semper futurum sit, secundum +positionem eorum qui motum caeli ponunt sempiternum, adhuc +remanebit differentia inter aeternitatem et tempus, ut dicit +Boetius in libro de Consolat., ex hoc quod aeternitas est tota +simul, quod tempori non convenit, quia aeternitas est mensura esse +permanentis, tempus vero est mensura motus. Si tamen praedicta +differentia attendatur quantum ad mensurata, et non quantum ad +mensuras, sic habet aliquam rationem, quia solum illud mensuratur +tempore, quod habet principium et finem in tempore, ut dicitur in +IV Physic. Unde si motus caeli semper duraret, tempus non +mensuraret ipsum secundum suam totam durationem, cum infinitum non +sit mensurabile; sed mensuraret quamlibet circulationem, quae habet +principium et finem in tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p7"> Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; + because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering + its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these + differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is + simultaneously whole, but that time is not so. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Potest tamen et aliam rationem +habere ex parte istarum mensurarum, si accipiatur finis et +principium in potentia. Quia etiam dato quod tempus semper duret, +tamen possibile est signare in tempore et principium et finem, +accipiendo aliquas partes ipsius, sicut dicimus principium et finem +diei vel anni, quod non contingit in aeternitate. Sed tamen istae +differentiae consequuntur eam quae est per se et primo, +differentiam, per hoc quod aeternitas est tota simul, non autem +tempus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case + when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28625] Iª q. 10 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si tempus et aeternitas essent +mensurae unius generis, quod patet esse falsum, ex his quorum est +tempus et aeternitas mensura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch + as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject + in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" + as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject + and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28626] Iª q. 10 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod nunc temporis est idem subiecto in toto tempore, sed +differens ratione, eo quod, sicut tempus respondet motui, ita nunc +temporis respondet mobili; mobile autem est idem subiecto in toto +decursu temporis, sed differens ratione, inquantum est hic et ibi. +Et ista alternatio est motus. Similiter fluxus ipsius nunc, +secundum quod alternatur ratione, est tempus. Aeternitas autem +manet eadem et subiecto et ratione. Unde aeternitas non est idem +quod nunc temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as + any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore + the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not + only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only + measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28627] Iª q. 10 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut aeternitas est propria mensura ipsius esse, +ita tempus est propria mensura motus. Unde secundum quod aliquod +esse recedit a permanentia essendi et subditur transmutationi, +secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate et subditur tempori. Esse ergo +rerum corruptibilium, quia est transmutabile, non mensuratur +aeternitate, sed tempore. Tempus enim mensurat non solum quae +transmutantur in actu, sed quae sunt transmutabilia. Unde non solum +mensurat motum, sed etiam quietem; quae est eius quod natum est +moveri, et non movetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A5-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 5. The difference of aeviternity and time</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the spiritual + through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28628] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod aevum non sit aliud a tempore. Dicit enim +Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>Deus movet creaturam +spiritualem per tempus</i>. Sed aevum dicitur esse mensura +spiritualium substantiarum. Ergo tempus non differt ab aevo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and "after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, + as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:1</a>) that eternal "Wisdom is before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after"; and thus it + is the same as time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28629] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de +ratione temporis est quod habeat prius et posterius, de ratione +vero aeternitatis est quod sit tota simul, ut dictum est. Sed aevum +non est aeternitas, dicitur enim Eccli. I, quod sapientia aeterna +est ante aevum. Ergo non est totum simul, sed habet prius et +posterius, et ita est tempus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference + between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows + that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28630] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si in +aevo non est prius et posterius, sequitur quod in aeviternis non +differat esse vel fuisse vel futurum esse. Cum igitur sit +impossibile aeviterna non fuisse, sequitur quod impossibile sit ea +non futura esse. Quod falsum est, cum Deus possit ea reducere in +nihilum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously + whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from + time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="28631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28631] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, cum +duratio aeviternorum sit infinita ex parte post, si aevum sit totum +simul, sequitur quod aliquod creatum sit infinitum in actu, quod +est impossibile. Non igitur aevum differt a tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28632] Iª q. 10 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Boetius, <i>qui tempus ab aevo ire iubes</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to + consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning + and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if + aeviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they + might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished + from eternity, and from time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 co."><a name="28633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28633] Iª q. 10 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod aevum differt a tempore et ab aeternitate, sicut medium +existens inter illa. Sed horum differentiam aliqui sic assignant, +dicentes quod aeternitas principio et fine caret; aevum habet +principium, sed non finem; tempus autem habet principium et finem. +Sed haec differentia est per accidens, sicut supra dictum est, quia +si etiam semper aeviterna fuissent et semper futura essent, ut +aliqui ponunt; vel etiam si quandoque deficerent, quod Deo +possibile esset, adhuc aevum distingueretur ab aeternitate et +tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p8"> Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that + time has both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has "before" and "after" without innovation and + veteration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred + to the measure itself. For since "before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity has + "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity + must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to the + things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has + a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure, + as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes + from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain "before" and "after." We say then that since eternity + is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now + some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these + things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from + permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they + have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of + which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, + who have + an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of + intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean + between eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this + way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no "before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it; + while eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such at all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Alii vero assignant differentiam inter haec tria, per hoc +quod aeternitas non habet prius et posterius; tempus autem habet +prius et posterius cum innovatione et veteratione; aevum habet +prius et posterius sine innovatione et veteratione. Sed haec +positio implicat contradictoria. Quod quidem manifeste apparet, si +innovatio et veteratio referantur ad ipsam mensuram. Cum enim prius +et posterius durationis non possint esse simul, si aevum habet +prius et posterius, oportet quod, priore parte aevi recedente, +posterior de novo adveniat, et sic erit innovatio in ipso aevo, +sicut in tempore. Si vero referantur ad mensurata, adhuc sequitur +inconveniens. Ex hoc enim res temporalis inveteratur tempore, quod +habet esse transmutabile, et ex transmutabilitate mensurati, est +prius et posterius in mensura, ut patet ex IV Physic. Si igitur +ipsum aeviternum non sit inveterabile nec innovabile, hoc erit quia +esse eius est intransmutabile. Mensura ergo eius non habebit prius +et posterius. Est ergo dicendum quod, cum aeternitas sit mensura +esse permanentis, secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia +essendi, secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate. Quaedam autem sic +recedunt a permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum est subiectum +transmutationis, vel in transmutatione consistit, et huiusmodi +mensurantur tempore; sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium +corruptibilium. Quaedam vero recedunt minus a permanentia essendi, +quia esse eorum nec in transmutatione consistit, nec est subiectum +transmutationis, tamen habent transmutationem adiunctam, vel in +actu vel in potentia. Sicut patet in corporibus caelestibus, quorum +esse substantiale est intransmutabile; tamen esse intransmutabile +habent cum transmutabilitate secundum locum. Et similiter patet de +Angelis, quod habent esse intransmutabile cum transmutabilitate +secundum electionem, quantum ad eorum naturam pertinet; et cum +transmutabilitate intelligentiarum et affectionum, et locorum suo +modo. Et ideo huiusmodi mensurantur aevo, quod est medium inter +aeternitatem et tempus. Esse autem quod mensurat aeternitas, nec +est mutabile, nec mutabilitati adiunctum. Sic ergo tempus habet +prius et posterius, aevum autem non habet in se prius et posterius, +sed ei coniungi possunt, aeternitas autem non habet prius neque +posterius, neque ea compatitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen. + ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are + measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28634] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod creaturae spirituales, quantum ad affectiones et +intelligentias, in quibus est successio, mensurantur tempore. Unde +et Augustinus ibidem dicit quod per tempus moveri, est per +affectiones moveri. Quantum vero ad eorum esse naturale, +mensurantur aevo. Sed quantum ad visionem gloriae, participant +aeternitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28635] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aevum est totum simul, non tamen est aeternitas, quia +compatitur secum prius et posterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental + change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation + of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that + an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not + subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence + and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel + not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28636] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in ipso esse Angeli in se considerato, non est +differentia praeteriti et futuri, sed solum secundum adiunctas +mutationes. Sed quod dicimus Angelum esse vel fuisse vel futurum +esse, differt secundum acceptionem intellectus nostri, qui accipit +esse Angeli per comparationem ad diversas partes temporis. Et cum +dicit Angelum esse vel fuisse, supponit aliquid cum quo eius +oppositum non subditur divinae potentiae, cum vero dicit futurum +esse, nondum supponit aliquid. Unde, cum esse et non esse Angeli +subsit divinae potentiae, absolute considerando, potest Deus facere +quod esse Angeli non sit futurum, tamen non potest facere quod non +sit dum est, vel quod non fuerit postquam fuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying + that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28637] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod duratio aevi est infinita, quia non finitur tempore. +Sic autem esse aliquod creatum infinitum, quod non finiatur quodam +alio, non est inconveniens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A6-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 6. Whether there is only one aeviternity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power + of ages are with Thee, O Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28638] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non sit tantum unum aevum. Dicitur enim in +apocryphis Esdrae, <i>maiestas et potestas aevorum est apud te, +domine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly + bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28639] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +diversorum generum diversae sunt mensurae. Sed quaedam aeviterna +sunt in genere corporalium, scilicet corpora caelestia, quaedam +vero sunt spirituales substantiae, scilicet Angeli. Non ergo est +unum aevum tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all + aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. + Therefore there is not only one aeviternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28640] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cum +aevum sit nomen durationis, quorum est unum aevum, est una duratio. +Sed non omnium aeviternorum est una duratio, quia quaedam post alia +esse incipiunt, ut maxime patet in animabus humanis. Non est ergo +unum aevum tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time + for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal + things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="28641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28641] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ea +quae non dependent ab invicem, non videntur habere unam mensuram +durationis, propter hoc enim omnium temporalium videtur esse unum +tempus, quia omnium motuum quodammodo causa est primus motus, qui +prius tempore mensuratur. Sed aeviterna non dependent ab invicem, +quia unus Angelus non est causa alterius. Non ergo est unum aevum +tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is aeviternity + one only. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28642] Iª q. 10 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, aevum +est simplicius tempore, et propinquius se habens ad aeternitatem. +Sed tempus est unum tantum. Ergo multo magis aevum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities. + Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge + of spiritual things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 co."><a name="28643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28643] Iª q. 10 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod circa hoc est duplex opinio, quidam enim dicunt quod est unum +aevum tantum; quidam quod multa. Quid autem horum verius sit, +oportet considerare ex causa unitatis temporis, in cognitionem enim +spiritualium per corporalia devenimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p8"> Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as + time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not + a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for + ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it + exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that + the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that + view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx + of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first + subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which + are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason + why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements + are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as + accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is + to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Dicunt autem quidam esse +unum tempus omnium temporalium, propter hoc quod est unus numerus +omnium numeratorum, cum tempus sit numerus, secundum philosophum. +Sed hoc non sufficit, quia tempus non est numerus ut abstractus +extra numeratum, sed ut in numerato existens, alioquin non esset +continuus; quia decem ulnae panni continuitatem habent, non ex +numero, sed ex numerato. Numerus autem in numerato existens non est +idem omnium, sed diversus diversorum. Unde alii assignant causam +unitatis temporis ex unitate aeternitatis, quae est principium +omnis durationis. Et sic, omnes durationes sunt unum, si +consideretur earum principium, sunt vero multae, si consideretur +diversitas eorum quae recipiunt durationem ex influxu primi +principii. Alii vero assignant causam unitatis temporis ex parte +materiae primae, quae est primum subiectum motus, cuius mensura est +tempus. Sed neutra assignatio sufficiens videtur, quia ea quae sunt +unum principio vel subiecto, et maxime remoto, non sunt unum +simpliciter sed secundum quid. Est ergo ratio unitatis temporis, +unitas primi motus, secundum quem, cum sit simplicissimus, omnes +alii mensurantur, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sic ergo tempus ad +illum motum comparatur non solum ut mensura ad mensuratum, sed +etiam ut accidens ad subiectum; et sic ab eo recipit unitatem. Ad +alios autem motus comparatur solum ut mensura ad mensuratum. Unde +secundum eorum multitudinem non multiplicatur, quia una mensura +separata multa mensurari possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p9"> This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all + proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought. + Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) + seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the + last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as + there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there + is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the + existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more + simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later ( + <a id="FP_Q10_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Hoc igitur habito, sciendum quod +de substantiis spiritualibus duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim +dixerunt quod omnes processerunt a Deo in quadam aequalitate, ut +Origenes dixit; vel etiam multae earum, ut quidam posuerunt. Alii +vero dixerunt quod omnes substantiae spirituales processerunt a Deo +quodam gradu et ordine et hoc videtur sentire Dionysius, qui dicit, +cap. X Cael. Hier., quod inter substantias spirituales sunt primae, +mediae et ultimae, etiam in uno ordine Angelorum. Secundum igitur +primam opinionem, necesse est dicere quod sunt plura aeva, secundum +quod sunt plura aeviterna prima aequalia. Secundum autem secundam +opinionem, oportet dicere quod sit unum aevum tantum, quia, cum +unumquodque mensuretur simplicissimo sui generis, ut dicitur in X +Metaphys., oportet quod esse omnium aeviternorum mensuretur esse +primi aeviterni, quod tanto est simplicius, quanto prius. Et quia +secunda opinio verior est, ut infra ostendetur, concedimus ad +praesens unum esse aevum tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we + mean ages. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28644] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod aevum aliquando accipitur pro saeculo, quod est +periodus durationis alicuius rei, et sic dicuntur multa aeva, sicut +multa saecula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless + being, and are thus measured by aeviternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28645] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, licet corpora caelestia et spiritualia differant in +genere naturae, tamen conveniunt in hoc, quod habent esse +intransmutabile. Et sic mensurantur aevo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured + by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28646] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nec omnia temporalia simul incipiunt, et tamen omnium +est unum tempus, propter primum quod mensuratur tempore. Et sic +omnia aeviterna habent unum aevum propter primum, etiam si non +omnia simul incipiant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple + than the rest. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="28647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28647] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliqua mensurentur per aliquod unum, non +requiritur quod illud unum sit causa omnium eorum; sed quod sit +simplicius.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q11" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q11-p0.1">Q. 11. THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q11-p2"> After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q11-p3"> (1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</p><p id="FP_Q11-p4"> (2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</p><p id="FP_Q11-p5"> (3) Whether God is one?</p><p id="FP_Q11-p6"> (4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 pr."><a name="28648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28648] +Iª q. 11 pr.</span></a> Post praemissa, considerandum est de +divina unitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum unum +addat aliquid supra ens. Secundo, utrum opponantur unum et multa. +Tertio, utrum Deus sit unus. Quarto, utrum sit maxime unus.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q11_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q11_A1-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 1. Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates + all "genera." But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore + "one" adds something to "being." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28649] Iª q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod unum addat aliquid supra ens. Omne enim +quod est in aliquo genere determinato, se habet ex additione ad +ens, quod circuit omnia genera. Sed unum est in genere determinato, +est enim principium numeri, qui est species quantitatis. Ergo unum +addit aliquid supra ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many." Therefore + "one" is an addition to "being." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28650] Iª q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod +dividit aliquod commune, se habet ex additione ad illud. Sed ens +dividitur per unum et multa. Ergo unum addit aliquid supra ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and "being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to + call "being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so to call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one" + is an addition to "being." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28651] Iª q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +unum non addit supra ens, idem esset dicere unum et ens. Sed +nugatorie dicitur ens ens. Ergo nugatio esset dicere ens unum, quod +falsum est. Addit igitur unum supra ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an + addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is not an addition to "being." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28652] Iª q. 11 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Dionysius, ult. cap. de Div. Nom., <i>nihil est +existentium non participans uno</i>, quod non esset, si unum +adderet supra ens quod contraheret ipsum. Ergo unum non habet se ex +additione ad ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is + the very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, + both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up + and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision; + and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 co."><a name="28653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28653] Iª q. 11 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod unum non addit supra ens rem aliquam, sed tantum negationem +divisionis, unum enim nihil aliud significat quam ens indivisum. Et +ex hoc ipso apparet quod unum convertitur cum ente. Nam omne ens +aut est simplex, aut compositum. Quod autem est simplex, est +indivisum et actu et potentia. Quod autem est compositum, non habet +esse quandiu partes eius sunt divisae, sed postquam constituunt et +componunt ipsum compositum. Unde manifestum est quod esse +cuiuslibet rei consistit in indivisione. Et inde est quod +unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam +unitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were divided + into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being," + but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same applied to the "one" which is the principle of + number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers + were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that "one" which is the principle of number, + added a reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought + that the "one" convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This, however, is + manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its + substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. + Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with "being," does + not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging + to the genus of quantity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28654] Iª q. 11 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum igitur +dicendum quod quidam, putantes idem esse unum quod convertitur cum +ente, et quod est principium numeri, divisi sunt in contrarias +positiones. Pythagoras enim et Plato, videntes quod unum quod +convertitur cum ente, non addit aliquam rem supra ens, sed +significat substantiam entis prout est indivisa, existimaverunt sic +se habere de uno quod est principium numeri. Et quia numerus +componitur ex unitatibus, crediderunt quod numeri essent +substantiae omnium rerum. E contrario autem Avicenna, considerans +quod unum quod est principium numeri, addit aliquam rem supra +substantiam entis (alias numerus ex unitatibus compositus non esset +species quantitatis), credidit quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, +addat rem aliquam supra substantiam entis, sicut album supra +hominem. Sed hoc manifeste falsum est, quia quaelibet res est una +per suam substantiam. Si enim per aliquid aliud esset una quaelibet +res, cum illud iterum sit unum, si esset iterum unum per aliquid +aliud, esset abire in infinitum. Unde standum est in primo. Sic +igitur dicendum est quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, non addit +aliquam rem supra ens, sed unum quod est principium numeri, addit +aliquid supra ens, ad genus quantitatis pertinens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in + number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if + it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as + regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents; + or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such + a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided + absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely + and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being + is divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not + be contained under "being," unless it were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that + "there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what + are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, + are + one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28655] Iª q. 11 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est uno modo divisum, esse +alio modo indivisum; sicut quod est divisum numero, est indivisum +secundum speciem, et sic contingit aliquid esse uno modo unum, alio +modo multa. Sed tamen si sit indivisum simpliciter; vel quia est +indivisum secundum id quod pertinet ad essentiam rei, licet sit +divisum quantum ad ea quae sunt extra essentiam rei, sicut quod est +unum subiecto et multa secundum accidentia; vel quia est indivisum +in actu, et divisum in potentia, sicut quod est unum toto et multa +secundum partes, huiusmodi erit unum simpliciter, et multa secundum +quid. Si vero aliquid e converso sit indivisum secundum quid, et +divisum simpliciter; utpote quia est divisum secundum essentiam, et +indivisum secundum rationem, vel secundum principium sive causam, +erit multa simpliciter, et unum secundum quid; ut quae sunt multa +numero et unum specie, vel unum principio. Sic igitur ens dividitur +per unum et multa, quasi per unum simpliciter, et multa secundum +quid. Nam et ipsa multitudo non contineretur sub ente, nisi +contineretur aliquo modo sub uno. Dicit enim Dionysius, ult. cap. +de Div. Nom., quod <i>non est multitudo non participans uno, sed +quae sunt multa partibus, sunt unum toto; et quae sunt multa +accidentibus, sunt unum subiecto; et quae sunt multa numero, sunt +unum specie; et quae sunt speciebus multa, sunt unum genere; et +quae sunt multa processibus, sunt unum principio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28656] Iª q. 11 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ideo non est nugatio cum dicitur ens unum, quia unum +addit aliquid secundum rationem supra ens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q11_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q11_A2-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 2. Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every "multitude" + is in a certain way "one," as appears from the preceding article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28657] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod unum et multa non opponantur. Nullum enim +oppositum praedicatur de suo opposito. Sed omnis multitudo est +quodammodo unum, ut ex praedictis patet. Ergo unum non opponitur +multitudini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But "multitude" is constituted by "one." Therefore it is not opposed + to "multitude." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28658] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nullum oppositum constituitur ex suo opposito. Sed unum constituit +multitudinem. Ergo non opponitur multitudini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few" is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28659] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unum +uni est oppositum. Sed multo opponitur paucum. Ergo non opponitur +ei unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it + as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that "one" comes after "multitude," + and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence there would be a vicious circle in + the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28660] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si +unum opponitur multitudini, opponitur ei sicut indivisum diviso, et +sic opponetur ei ut privatio habitui. Hoc autem videtur +inconveniens, quia sequeretur quod unum sit posterius multitudine, +et definiatur per eam; cum tamen multitudo definiatur per unum. +Unde erit circulus in definitione, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo +unum et multa sunt opposita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in indivisibility; + and the idea of "multitude" contains division. Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28661] Iª q. 11 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +quorum rationes sunt oppositae, ipsa sunt opposita. Sed ratio unius +consistit in indivisibilitate, ratio vero multitudinis divisionem +continet. Ergo unum et multa sunt opposita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The "one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which + is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is "multitude" + measured by "one," as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible with "being" is opposed to "multitude" by way + of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 co."><a name="28662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28662] Iª q. 11 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod unum opponitur multis, sed diversimode. Nam unum quod est +principium numeri, opponitur multitudini quae est numerus, ut +mensura mensurato, unum enim habet rationem primae mensurae, et +numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum, ut patet ex X Metaphys. +Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, opponitur multitudini per +modum privationis, ut indivisum diviso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to + the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, + the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or + of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and + to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity + is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being + is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is + relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being + in + the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good + is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely "one" is relatively "many," and vice versa. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28663] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod nulla privatio tollit totaliter esse, quia privatio +est negatio in subiecto, secundum philosophum. Sed tamen omnis +privatio tollit aliquod esse. Et ideo in ente, ratione suae +communitatis, accidit quod privatio entis fundatur in ente, quod +non accidit in privationibus formarum specialium, ut visus vel +albedinis, vel alicuius huiusmodi. Et sicut est de ente, ita est de +uno et bono, quae convertuntur cum ente, nam privatio boni fundatur +in aliquo bono, et similiter remotio unitatis fundatur in aliquo +uno. Et exinde contingit quod multitudo est quoddam unum, et malum +est quoddam bonum, et non ens est quoddam ens. Non tamen oppositum +praedicatur de opposito, quia alterum horum est simpliciter, et +alterum secundum quid. Quod enim secundum quid est ens, ut in +potentia, est non ens simpliciter, idest actu, vel quod est ens +simpliciter in genere substantiae, est non ens secundum quid, +quantum ad aliquod esse accidentale. Similiter ergo quod est bonum +secundum quid, est malum simpliciter; vel e converso. Et similiter +quod est unum simpliciter, est multa secundum quid; et e +converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A "whole" is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed + of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance, + every part of water is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous + whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole; + as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole. + Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed + of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided, in which way they are opposed + to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings, + not + by the fact that they are not houses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28664] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod duplex est totum, quoddam homogeneum, quod componitur +ex similibus partibus; quoddam vero heterogeneum, quod componitur +ex dissimilibus partibus. In quolibet autem toto homogeneo, totum +constituitur ex partibus habentibus formam totius, sicut quaelibet +pars aquae est aqua, et talis est constitutio continui ex suis +partibus. In quolibet autem toto heterogeneo, quaelibet pars caret +forma totius, nulla enim pars domus est domus, nec aliqua pars +hominis est homo. Et tale totum est multitudo. Inquantum ergo pars +eius non habet formam multitudinis, componitur multitudo ex +unitatibus, sicut domus ex non domibus, non quod unitates +constituant multitudinem secundum id quod habent de ratione +indivisionis, prout opponuntur multitudini; sed secundum hoc quod +habent de entitate, sicut et partes domus constituunt domum per hoc +quod sunt quaedam corpora, non per hoc quod sunt non domus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some kind + of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first sense two are many but not in the second sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28665] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod multum accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo, absolute, et +sic opponitur uni. Alio modo, secundum quod importat excessum +quendam, et sic opponitur pauco. Unde primo modo duo sunt multa; +non autem secundo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to + unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; + and hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of a line." "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on + "one"; because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude + except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one" is placed in the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude" + is not placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so what first + comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, + comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28666] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod unum opponitur privative multis, inquantum in ratione +multorum est quod sint divisa. Unde oportet quod divisio sit prius +unitate, non simpliciter, sed secundum rationem nostrae +apprehensionis. Apprehendimus enim simplicia per composita, unde +definimus punctum, cuius pars non est, vel principium lineae. Sed +multitudo, etiam secundum rationem, consequenter se habet ad unum, +quia divisa non intelligimus habere rationem multitudinis, nisi per +hoc quod utrique divisorum attribuimus unitatem. Unde unum ponitur +in definitione multitudinis, non autem multitudo in definitione +unius. Sed divisio cadit in intellectu ex ipsa negatione entis. Ita +quod primo cadit in intellectu ens; secundo, quod hoc ens non est +illud ens, et sic secundo apprehendimus divisionem; tertio, unum; +quarto, multitudinem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q11_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q11_A3-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 3. Whether God is one?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For there be many gods and many lords" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q11_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:5</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28667] Iª q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit unus. Dicitur enim I ad Cor. +VIII, <i>siquidem sunt dii multi et domini multi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise, + neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation + is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28668] Iª q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unum +quod est principium numeri, non potest praedicari de Deo, cum nulla +quantitas de Deo praedicetur. Similiter nec unum quod convertitur +cum ente, quia importat privationem, et omnis privatio imperfectio +est, quae Deo non competit. Non est igitur dicendum quod Deus sit +unus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q11_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.4" target="asv">Dt. 6:4</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28669] Iª q. 11 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Deut. VI, <i>audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus unus +est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It can be shown from these three sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why + any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is + a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if + Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many + Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as + was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 co."><a name="28670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28670] Iª q. 11 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deum esse unum, ex tribus demonstratur. Primo quidem ex eius +simplicitate. Manifestum est enim quod illud unde aliquod singulare +est hoc aliquid, nullo modo est multis communicabile. Illud enim +unde Socrates est homo, multis communicari potest, sed id unde est +hic homo, non potest communicari nisi uni tantum. Si ergo Socrates +per id esset homo, per quod est hic homo, sicut non possunt esse +plures Socrates, ita non possent esse plures homines. Hoc autem +convenit Deo, nam ipse Deus est sua natura, ut supra ostensum est. +Secundum igitur idem est Deus, et hic Deus. Impossibile est igitur +esse plures deos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p6"> Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ + from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one + of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible + for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite + principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Secundo vero, ex infinitate eius perfectionis. +Ostensum est enim supra quod Deus comprehendit in se totam +perfectionem essendi. Si ergo essent plures dii, oporteret eos +differre. Aliquid ergo conveniret uni, quod non alteri. Et si hoc +esset privatio, non esset simpliciter perfectus, si autem hoc esset +perfectio, alteri eorum deesset. Impossibile est ergo esse plures +deos. Unde et antiqui philosophi, quasi ab ipsa coacti veritate, +ponentes principium infinitum, posuerunt unum tantum principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p7"> Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since + some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. + For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the "per se" cause of one, and many are only + the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, + and is so "per se" and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And + this one is God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Tertio, ab unitate mundi. Omnia enim quae sunt, inveniuntur esse +ordinata ad invicem, dum quaedam quibusdam deserviunt. Quae autem +diversa sunt, in unum ordinem non convenirent, nisi ab aliquo uno +ordinarentur. Melius enim multa reducuntur in unum ordinem per +unum, quam per multa, quia per se unius unum est causa, et multa +non sunt causa unius nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet sunt +aliquo modo unum. Cum igitur illud quod est primum, sit +perfectissimum et per se, non per accidens, oportet quod primum +reducens omnia in unum ordinem, sit unum tantum. Et hoc est +Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars + were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28671] Iª q. 11 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod dicuntur dii multi secundum errorem quorundam qui +multos deos colebant, existimantes planetas et alias stellas esse +deos, vel etiam singulas partes mundi. Unde subdit, <i>nobis autem +unus Deus,</i> et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "One" which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the principle of + number belongs to the "genus" of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one" + which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there + is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to + us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated + of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28672] Iª q. 11 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod unum secundum quod est principium numeri, non +praedicatur de Deo; sed solum de his quae habent esse in materia. +Unum enim quod est principium numeri, est de genere mathematicorum; +quae habent esse in materia, sed sunt secundum rationem a materia +abstracta. Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, est quoddam +metaphysicum, quod secundum esse non dependet a materia. Et licet +in Deo non sit aliqua privatio, tamen, secundum modum +apprehensionis nostrae, non cognoscitur a nobis nisi per modum +privationis et remotionis. Et sic nihil prohibet aliqua privative +dicta de Deo praedicari; sicut quod est incorporeus, infinitus. Et +similiter de Deo dicitur quod sit unus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q11_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q11_A4-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 4. Whether God is supremely one?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not supremely "one." For "one" is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be + greater or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are called "one." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28673] Iª q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit maxime unus. Unum enim +dicitur secundum privationem divisionis. Sed privatio non recipit +magis et minus. Ergo Deus non dicitur magis unus quam alia quae +sunt unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity. + But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more "one" than unity is "one" and + a point is "one." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28674] Iª q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil +videtur esse magis indivisibile quam id quod est indivisibile actu +et potentia, cuiusmodi est punctus et unitas. Sed intantum dicitur +aliquid magis unum, inquantum est indivisibile. Ergo Deus non est +magis unum quam unitas et punctus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially "one" is supremely "one." But every being + is essentially "one," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely "one"; and therefore God is + not "one" more than any other being is "one." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28675] Iª q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod +est per essentiam bonum, est maxime bonum, ergo quod est per +essentiam suam unum, est maxime unum. Sed omne ens est unum per +suam essentiam, ut patet per philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne +ens est maxime unum. Deus igitur non est magis unum quam alia +entia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28676] Iª q. 11 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Bernardus, quod <i>inter omnia quae unum dicuntur, arcem +tenet unitas divinae Trinitatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now + both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it + is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is + divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether + simple, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme degree. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 co."><a name="28677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28677] Iª q. 11 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, ad hoc quod aliquid sit maxime +unum, oportet quod sit et maxime ens et maxime indivisum. Utrumque +autem competit Deo. Est enim maxime ens, inquantum est non habens +aliquod esse determinatum per aliquam naturam cui adveniat, sed est +ipsum esse subsistens, omnibus modis indeterminatum. Est autem +maxime indivisum, inquantum neque dividitur actu neque potentia, +secundum quemcunque modum divisionis, cum sit omnibus modis +simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod Deus est +maxime unus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to + more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more + divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, "one." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28678] Iª q. 11 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, licet privatio secundum se non recipiat magis et +minus, tamen secundum quod eius oppositum recipit magis et minus, +etiam ipsa privativa dicuntur secundum magis et minus. Secundum +igitur quod aliquid est magis divisum vel divisibile, vel minus, +vel nullo modo, secundum hoc aliquid dicitur magis et minus vel +maxime unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. + Hence neither of them can be supremely "one." For as a subject cannot be supremely "one," because of the difference within + it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28679] Iª q. 11 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod punctus et unitas quae est principium numeri, non +sunt maxime entia, cum non habeant esse nisi in subiecto aliquo. +Unde neutrum eorum est maxime unum. Sicut enim subiectum non est +maxime unum, propter diversitatem accidentis et subiecti, ita nec +accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every being is "one" by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance + of some things is compound and of others simple. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28680] Iª q. 11 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet omne ens sit unum per suam substantiam, non +tamen se habet aequaliter substantia cuiuslibet ad causandam +unitatem, quia substantia quorundam est ex multis composita, +quorundam vero non.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q12" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q12-p0.1">Q. 12. HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q12-p2"> As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of + creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q12-p3"> (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p4"> (2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p5"> (3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p6"> (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p7"> (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p8"> (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p9"> (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p10"> (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p11"> (9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p12"> (10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p13"> (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p14"> (12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p15"> (13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 pr."><a name="28681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28681] +Iª q. 12 pr.</span></a> Quia in superioribus consideravimus +qualiter Deus sit secundum seipsum, restat considerandum qualiter +sit in cognitione nostra, idest quomodo cognoscatur a creaturis. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur tredecim. Primo, utrum aliquis intellectus +creatus possit videre essentiam Dei. Secundo, utrum Dei essentia +videatur ab intellectu per aliquam speciem creatam. Tertio, utrum +oculo corporeo Dei essentia possit videri. Quarto, utrum aliqua +substantia intellectualis creata ex suis naturalibus sufficiens sit +videre Dei essentiam. Quinto, utrum intellectus creatus ad videndam +Dei essentiam indigeat aliquo lumine creato. Sexto, utrum videntium +essentiam Dei unus alio perfectius videat. Septimo, utrum aliquis +intellectus creatus possit comprehendere Dei essentiam. Octavo, +utrum intellectus creatus videns Dei essentiam, omnia in ipsa +cognoscat. Nono, utrum ea quae ibi cognoscit, per aliquas +similitudines cognoscat. Decimo, utrum simul cognoscat omnia quae +in Deo videt. Undecimo, utrum in statu huius vitae possit aliquis +homo essentiam Dei videre. Duodecimo, utrum per rationem naturalem +Deum in hac vita possimus cognoscere. Tertiodecimo, utrum, supra +cognitionem naturalis rationis, sit in praesenti vita aliqua +cognitio Dei per gratiam.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q12_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A1-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 1. Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv"> Jn. 1:18, </a> "No man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can + a creature see what is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God: "Neither is there sense, nor image, + nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28682] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod nullus intellectus creatus possit Deum per +essentiam videre. Chrysostomus enim, super Ioannem, exponens illud +quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>Deum nemo vidit unquam</i>, sic dicit, +<i>ipsum quod est Deus, non solum prophetae, sed nec Angeli +viderunt nec Archangeli, quod enim creabilis est naturae, qualiter +videre poterit quod increabile est?</i> Dionysius etiam, I cap. de +Div. Nom., loquens de Deo, dicit, <i>neque sensus est eius, neque +phantasia, neque opinio, nec ratio, nec scientia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore in Himself He is unknown. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28683] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne +infinitum, inquantum huiusmodi, est ignotum. Sed Deus est +infinitus, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo secundum se est ignotus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is + being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God + is not intelligible; but above all intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28684] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectus creatus non est cognoscitivus nisi existentium, primum +enim quod cadit in apprehensione intellectus, est ens. Sed Deus non +est existens, sed supra existentia. Ut dicit Dionysius. Ergo non +est intelligibilis; sed est supra omnem intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. + But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore + the created intellect cannot see the essence of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28685] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +cognoscentis ad cognitum oportet esse aliquam proportionem, cum +cognitum sit perfectio cognoscentis. Sed nulla est proportio +intellectus creati ad Deum, quia in infinitum distant. Ergo +intellectus creatus non potest videre essentiam Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28686] Iª q. 12 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>videbimus eum sicuti est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in + Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account + of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot + be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light. + </p><p id="FP_Q12_A1-p8"> Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is + not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his + intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its + beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of + the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains + to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know + the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could + not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void. + </p><p id="FP_Q12_A1-p9"> Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 co."><a name="28687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28687] Iª q. 12 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum unumquodque sit cognoscibile secundum quod est in actu, +Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentiae, +quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime +cognoscibile in se, alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est, +propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum, sicut sol, qui +est maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione, propter +excessum luminis. Hoc igitur attendentes, quidam posuerunt quod +nullus intellectus creatus essentiam Dei videre potest. Sed hoc +inconvenienter dicitur. Cum enim ultima hominis beatitudo in +altissima eius operatione consistat, quae est operatio intellectus, +si nunquam essentiam Dei videre potest intellectus creatus, vel +nunquam beatitudinem obtinebit, vel in alio eius beatitudo +consistet quam in Deo. Quod est alienum a fide. In ipso enim est +ultima perfectio rationalis creaturae, quia est ei principium +essendi, intantum enim unumquodque perfectum est, inquantum ad suum +principium attingit. Similiter etiam est praeter rationem. Inest +enim homini naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam, cum intuetur +effectum; et ex hoc admiratio in hominibus consurgit. Si igitur +intellectus rationalis creaturae pertingere non possit ad primam +causam rerum, remanebit inane desiderium naturae. Unde simpliciter +concedendum est quod beati Dei essentiam videant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited, + "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most + certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28688] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod utraque auctoritas loquitur de visione +comprehensionis. Unde praemittit Dionysius immediate ante verba +proposita, dicens, <i>omnibus ipse est universaliter +incomprehensibilis, et nec sensus est</i>, et cetera. Et +Chrysostomus parum post verba praedicta subdit, <i>visionem hic +dicit certissimam patris considerationem et comprehensionem, tantam +quantam pater habet de filio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the + infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first + way: as appears from what was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28689] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae non +perfectae per formam, ignotum est secundum se, quia omnis cognitio +est per formam. Sed infinitum quod se tenet ex parte formae non +limitatae per materiam, est secundum se maxime notum. Sic autem +Deus est infinitus, et non primo modo, ut ex superioribus +patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as + He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; + which means that He is not comprehended. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28690] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus non sic dicitur non existens, quasi nullo modo +sit existens, sed quia est supra omne existens, inquantum est suum +esse. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod nullo modo possit cognosci, sed +quod omnem cognitionem excedat, quod est ipsum non comprehendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and + equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this + sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as + potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned + to know God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28691] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, certa +habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram; secundum quod duplum, +triplum et aequale sunt species proportionis. Alio modo, quaelibet +habitudo unius ad alterum proportio dicitur. Et sic potest esse +proportio creaturae ad Deum, inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut +effectus ad causam, et ut potentia ad actum. Et secundum hoc, +intellectus creatus proportionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum +Deum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A2-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 2. Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when + He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28692] Iª q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod essentia Dei ab intellectu creato per +aliquam similitudinem videatur. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, <i>scimus +quoniam, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti +est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28693] Iª q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, IX de Trin., <i>cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua Dei +similitudo in nobis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch + as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. + Therefore, if God is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some similitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28694] Iª q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectus in actu est intelligibile in actu, sicut sensus in actu +est sensibile in actu. Hoc autem non est nisi inquantum informatur +sensus similitudine rei sensibilis, et intellectus similitudine rei +intellectae. Ergo, si Deus ab intellectu creato videtur in actu, +oportet quod per aliquam similitudinem videatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark manner']," + "by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God." + But to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. + Therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28695] Iª q. 12 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., quod cum apostolus dicit +<i>videmus nunc per speculum et in aenigmate, speculi et aenigmatis +nomine, quaecumque similitudines ab ipso significatae intelligi +possunt, quae accommodatae sunt ad intelligendum Deum</i>. Sed +videre Deum per essentiam non est visio aenigmatica vel specularis, +sed contra eam dividitur. Ergo divina essentia non videtur per +similitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision---viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen + with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things + it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone + is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not + there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow + that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing. + </p><p id="FP_Q12_A2-p7"> Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellect power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since + the intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness + of Him who is the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it + were, derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection + superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual + faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be + united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. + i), "by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known;" as by the likeness of a + body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created + likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q12_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God + to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever + can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness; + for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like + thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false. + </p><p id="FP_Q12_A2-p8"> Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, + the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv"> Ps. 35:10, </a> "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the + divine essence itself as it really is. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 co."><a name="28696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28696] Iª q. 12 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ad visionem, tam sensibilem quam intellectualem, duo +requiruntur, scilicet virtus visiva, et unio rei visae cum visu, +non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visa quodammodo +est in vidente. Et in rebus quidem corporalibus, apparet quod res +visa non potest esse in vidente per suam essentiam, sed solum per +suam similitudinem, sicut similitudo lapidis est in oculo, per quam +fit visio in actu, non autem ipsa substantia lapidis. Si autem +esset una et eadem res, quae esset principium visivae virtutis, et +quae esset res visa, oporteret videntem ab illa re et virtutem +visivam habere, et formam per quam videret. Manifestum est autem +quod Deus et est auctor intellectivae virtutis, et ab intellectu +videri potest. Et cum ipsa intellectiva virtus creaturae non sit +Dei essentia, relinquitur quod sit aliqua participata similitudo +ipsius, qui est primus intellectus. Unde et virtus intellectualis +creaturae lumen quoddam intelligibile dicitur, quasi a prima luce +derivatum, sive hoc intelligatur de virtute naturali, sive de +aliqua perfectione superaddita gratiae vel gloriae. Requiritur ergo +ad videndum Deum aliqua Dei similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae, +qua scilicet intellectus sit efficax ad videndum Deum. Sed ex parte +visae rei, quam necesse est aliquo modo uniri videnti per nullam +similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest. Primo quidem, +quia, sicut dicit Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., per similitudines +inferioris ordinis rerum nullo modo superiora possunt cognosci, +sicut per speciem corporis non potest cognosci essentia rei +incorporeae. Multo igitur minus per speciem creatam quamcumque +potest essentia Dei videri. Secundo, quia essentia Dei est ipsum +esse eius, ut supra ostensum est, quod nulli formae creatae +competere potest. Non potest igitur aliqua forma creata esse +similitudo repraesentans videnti Dei essentiam. Tertio, quia divina +essentia est aliquod incircumscriptum, continens in se +supereminenter quidquid potest significari vel intelligi ab +intellectu creato. Et hoc nullo modo per aliquam speciem creatam +repraesentari potest, quia omnis forma creata est determinata +secundum aliquam rationem vel sapientiae, vel virtutis, vel ipsius +esse, vel alicuius huiusmodi. Unde dicere Deum per similitudinem +videri, est dicere divinam essentiam non videri, quod est erroneum. +Dicendum ergo quod ad videndum Dei essentiam requiritur aliqua +similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae, scilicet lumen gloriae, +confortans intellectum ad videndum Deum, de quo dicitur in Psalmo, +<i>in lumine tuo videbimus lumen</i>. Non autem per aliquam +similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest, quae ipsam +divinam essentiam repraesentet ut in se est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28697] Iª q. 12 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de similitudine quae est per +participationem luminis gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28698] Iª q. 12 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de cognitione Dei quae +habetur in via.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to + the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is + united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28699] Iª q. 12 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod divina essentia est ipsum esse. Unde, sicut aliae +formae intelligibiles quae non sunt suum esse, uniuntur intellectui +secundum aliquod esse quo informant ipsum intellectum et faciunt +ipsum in actu; ita divina essentia unitur intellectui creato ut +intellectum in actu, per seipsam faciens intellectum in actu.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A3-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 3. Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.19.26" target="asv">Job 19:26</a>): "In my flesh I shall see . . . God," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Job.42.5" target="asv">Job 42:5</a>), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28700] Iª q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod essentia Dei videri possit oculo +corporali. Dicitur enim Iob XIX, <i>in carne mea videbo Deum,</i> +etc.; et XLII, <i>auditu auris audivi te, nunc autem oculus meus +videt te</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those eyes" (namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power + of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of + vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things." Now whoever + can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28701] Iª q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, ultimo de civitate Dei, cap. XXIX, <i>vis itaque +praepollentior oculorum erit illorum</i> (scilicet glorificatorum), +<i>non ut acutius videant quam quidam perhibentur videre serpentes +vel aquilae (quantalibet enim acrimonia cernendi eadem animalia +vigeant, nihil aliud possunt videre quam corpora), sed ut videant +et incorporalia</i>. Quicumque autem potest videre incorporalia, +potest elevari ad videndum Deum. Ergo oculus glorificatus potest +videre Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne," + etc. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen + by a vision of sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28702] Iª q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +potest videri ab homine visione imaginaria, dicitur enim Isaiae VI, +<i>vidi dominum sedentem super solium,</i> et cetera. Sed visio +imaginaria a sensu originem habet, <i>phantasia enim est motus +factus a sensu secundum actum</i>, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo +Deus sensibili visione videri potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life, + as visible things are seen by corporeal vision." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28703] Iª q. 12 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de videndo Deum ad Paulinam, +<i>Deum nemo vidit unquam, vel in hac vita, sicut ipse est; vel in +Angelorum vita, sicut visibilia ista quae corporali visione +cernuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For + every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later + <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78.html">(Q[78])</a>. Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For + God is incorporeal, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Hence He cannot be seen by the + sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 co."><a name="28704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28704] Iª q. 12 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod impossibile est Deum videri sensu visus, vel quocumque alio +sensu aut potentia sensitivae partis. Omnis enim potentia huiusmodi +est actus corporalis organi, ut infra dicetur. Actus autem +proportionatur ei cuius est actus. Unde nulla huiusmodi potentia +potest se extendere ultra corporalia. Deus autem incorporeus est, +ut supra ostensum est. Unde nec sensu nec imaginatione videri +potest, sed solo intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour," do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that + man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood + of the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the + eyes of your heart" may be "enlightened" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.17" target="asv">Eph. + 1:17,18 + </a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28705] Iª q. 12 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, cum dicitur <i>in carne mea videbo Deum, salvatorem +meum</i>, non intelligitur quod oculo carnis sit Deum visurus, sed +quod in carne existens, post resurrectionem, visurus sit Deum. +Similiter quod dicitur, <i>nunc oculus meus videt te</i>, +intelligitur de oculo mentis, sicut Ephes. I dicit apostolus, +<i>det vobis spiritum sapientiae in agnitione eius, illuminatos +oculos cordis vestri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore they will have + an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains + this, saying: "It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see + most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we + now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising + the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it." Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see + God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but + as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some + other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal + things, happens from two causes---viz. from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory + infused into the body after its renovation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28706] Iª q. 12 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur inquirendo in verbis illis, et +sub conditione. Quod patet ex hoc quod praemittitur, longe itaque +potentiae alterius erunt (scilicet oculi glorificati), si per eos +videbitur incorporea illa natura. Sed postmodum hoc determinat, +dicens, <i>valde credibile est sic nos visuros mundana tunc corpora +caeli novi et terrae novae, ut Deum ubique praesentem, et universa +etiam corporalia gubernantem, clarissima perspicuitate videamus; +non sicut nunc invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta +conspiciuntur; sed sicut homines, inter quos viventes motusque +vitales exerentes vivimus, mox ut aspicimus, non credimus vivere, +sed videmus</i>. Ex quo patet quod hoc modo intelligit oculos +glorificatos Deum visuros, sicut nunc oculi nostri vident alicuius +vitam. Vita autem non videtur oculo corporali, sicut per se +visibile, sed sicut sensibile per accidens, quod quidem a sensu non +cognoscitur, sed statim cum sensu ab aliqua alia virtute +cognoscitiva. Quod autem statim, visis corporibus, divina +praesentia ex eis cognoscatur per intellectum, ex duobus contingit, +scilicet ex perspicacitate intellectus; et ex refulgentia divinae +claritatis in corporibus innovatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God according + to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28707] Iª q. 12 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in visione imaginaria non videtur Dei essentia, sed +aliqua forma in imaginatione formatur, repraesentans Deum secundum +aliquem modum similitudinis, prout in Scripturis divinis divina per +res sensibiles metaphorice describuntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A4-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 4. Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): + "An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection + is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it seems that by his + own natural power he understands the Divine essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28708] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis intellectus creatus per sua +naturalia divinam essentiam videre possit. Dicit enim Dionysius, +cap. IV de Div. Nom., quod Angelus est speculum purum, clarissimum, +<i>suscipiens totam, si fas est dicere, pulchritudinem Dei</i>. Sed +unumquodque videtur dum videtur eius speculum. Cum igitur Angelus +per sua naturalia intelligat seipsum, videtur quod etiam per sua +naturalia intelligat divinam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. + But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in + like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power, + much more can he understand God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28709] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud +quod est maxime visibile, fit minus visibile nobis propter defectum +nostri visus, vel corporalis vel intellectualis. Sed intellectus +Angeli non patitur aliquem defectum. Cum ergo Deus secundum se sit +maxime intelligibilis, videtur quod ab Angelo sit maxime +intelligibilis. Si igitur alia intelligibilia per sua naturalia +intelligere potest, multo magis Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if + to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up + to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above + <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28710] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sensus corporeus non potest elevari ad intelligendam substantiam +incorpoream, quia est supra eius naturam. Si igitur videre Deum per +essentiam sit supra naturam cuiuslibet intellectus creati, videtur +quod nullus intellectus creatus ad videndum Dei essentiam +pertingere possit, quod est erroneum, ut ex supradictis patet. +Videtur ergo quod intellectui creato sit naturale divinam essentiam +videre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that + they may know Thee the only true God," etc. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>). Therefore to see the essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28711] Iª q. 12 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Rom. VI, <i>gratia Dei vita aeterna</i>. Sed vita +aeterna consistit in visione divinae essentiae, secundum illud +Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum +Deum,</i> et cetera. Ergo videre Dei essentiam convenit intellectui +creato per gratiam, et non per naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated + according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence + the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the + mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of + the knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being only in this one individual matter; as + all bodies. But others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own existence, + but receive it; and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent + being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form + of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows + things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in + the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures + which exist only in individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted + therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects + as universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in + matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the + body. It follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond + the + natural power of any created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated. + Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect, + as an object made intelligible to it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 co."><a name="28712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28712] Iª q. 12 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus per sua +naturalia essentiam Dei videat. Cognitio enim contingit secundum +quod cognitum est in cognoscente. Cognitum autem est in cognoscente +secundum modum cognoscentis. Unde cuiuslibet cognoscentis cognitio +est secundum modum suae naturae. Si igitur modus essendi alicuius +rei cognitae excedat modum naturae cognoscentis, oportet quod +cognitio illius rei sit supra naturam illius cognoscentis. Est +autem multiplex modus essendi rerum. Quaedam enim sunt, quorum +natura non habet esse nisi in hac materia individuali, et huiusmodi +sunt omnia corporalia. Quaedam vero sunt, quorum naturae sunt per +se subsistentes, non in materia aliqua, quae tamen non sunt suum +esse, sed sunt esse habentes, et huiusmodi sunt substantiae +incorporeae, quas Angelos dicimus. Solius autem Dei proprius modus +essendi est, ut sit suum esse subsistens. Ea igitur quae non habent +esse nisi in materia individuali, cognoscere est nobis connaturale, +eo quod anima nostra, per quam cognoscimus, est forma alicuius +materiae. Quae tamen habet duas virtutes cognoscitivas. Unam, quae +est actus alicuius corporei organi. Et huic connaturale est +cognoscere res secundum quod sunt in materia individuali, unde +sensus non cognoscit nisi singularia. Alia vero virtus cognoscitiva +eius est intellectus, qui non est actus alicuius organi corporalis. +Unde per intellectum connaturale est nobis cognoscere naturas, quae +quidem non habent esse nisi in materia individuali; non tamen +secundum quod sunt in materia individuali, sed secundum quod +abstrahuntur ab ea per considerationem intellectus. Unde secundum +intellectum possumus cognoscere huiusmodi res in universali, quod +est supra facultatem sensus. Intellectui autem angelico connaturale +est cognoscere naturas non in materia existentes. Quod est supra +naturalem facultatem intellectus animae humanae, secundum statum +praesentis vitae, quo corpori unitur. Relinquitur ergo quod +cognoscere ipsum esse subsistens, sit connaturale soli intellectui +divino, et quod sit supra facultatem naturalem cuiuslibet +intellectus creati, quia nulla creatura est suum esse, sed habet +esse participatum. Non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per +essentiam videre, nisi inquantum Deus per suam gratiam se +intellectui creato coniungit, ut intelligibile ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself. + But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28713] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod iste modus cognoscendi Deum, est Angelo connaturalis, +ut scilicet cognoscat eum per similitudinem eius in ipso Angelo +refulgentem. Sed cognoscere Deum per aliquam similitudinem creatam, +non est cognoscere essentiam Dei, ut supra ostensum est. Unde non +sequitur quod Angelus per sua naturalia possit cognoscere essentiam +Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought + to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch + as it does not possess the excellence which is in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28714] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus Angeli non habet defectum, si defectus +accipiatur privative, ut scilicet careat eo quod habere debet. Si +vero accipiatur negative, sic quaelibet creatura invenitur +deficiens, Deo comparata, dum non habet illam excellentiam quae +invenitur in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic + intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level + by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive + a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to + consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it + resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect + of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect; + since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the created + intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of + resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28715] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sensus visus, quia omnino materialis est, nullo modo +elevari potest ad aliquid immateriale. Sed intellectus noster vel +angelicus, quia secundum naturam a materia aliqualiter elevatus +est, potest ultra suam naturam per gratiam ad aliquid altius +elevari. Et huius signum est, quia visus nullo modo potest in +abstractione cognoscere id quod in concretione cognoscit, nullo +enim modo potest percipere naturam, nisi ut hanc. Sed intellectus +noster potest in abstractione considerare quod in concretione +cognoscit. Etsi enim cognoscat res habentes formam in materia, +tamen resolvit compositum in utrumque, et considerat ipsam formam +per se. Et similiter intellectus Angeli, licet connaturale sit ei +cognoscere esse concretum in aliqua natura, tamen potest ipsum esse +secernere per intellectum, dum cognoscit quod aliud est ipse, et +aliud est suum esse. Et ideo, cum intellectus creatus per suam +naturam natus sit apprehendere formam concretam et esse concretum +in abstractione, per modum resolutionis cuiusdam, potest per +gratiam elevari ut cognoscat substantiam separatam subsistentem, et +esse separatum subsistens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A5-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 5. Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself + lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible + things. Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created light. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28716] Iª q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus creatus ad videndum essentiam +Dei aliquo lumine creato non indigeat. Illud enim quod est per se +lucidum in rebus sensibilibus, alio lumine non indiget ut videatur, +ergo nec in intelligibilibus. Sed Deus est lux intelligibilis. Ergo +non videtur per aliquod lumen creatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through + a medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28717] Iª q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, cum +Deus videtur per medium, non videtur per suam essentiam. Sed cum +videtur per aliquod lumen creatum, videtur per medium. Ergo non +videtur per suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is created can be natural to some creature. Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light, + such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see God; + which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the + essence of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28718] Iª q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud +quod est creatum, nihil prohibet alicui creaturae esse naturale. Si +ergo per aliquod lumen creatum Dei essentia videtur, poterit illud +lumen esse naturale alicui creaturae. Et ita illa creatura non +indigebit aliquo alio lumine ad videndum Deum, quod est +impossibile. Non est ergo necessarium quod omnis creatura ad +videndum Dei essentiam lumen superadditum requirat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28719] Iª q. 12 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Psalmo, <i>in lumine tuo videbimus lumen</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for + example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created + intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary + that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it + may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to + enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding + should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, + as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the + Apocalypse ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.23" target="asv">Apoc. 21:23</a>): "The glory of God hath enlightened it"---viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are made + "deiform"---i.e. like to God, according to the saying: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] + we shall see Him as He is" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 co."><a name="28720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28720] Iª q. 12 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod omne quod elevatur ad aliquid quod excedit suam naturam, +oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione quae sit supra suam +naturam, sicut, si aer debeat accipere formam ignis, oportet quod +disponatur aliqua dispositione ad talem formam. Cum autem aliquis +intellectus creatus videt Deum per essentiam, ipsa essentia Dei fit +forma intelligibilis intellectus. Unde oportet quod aliqua +dispositio supernaturalis ei superaddatur, ad hoc quod elevetur in +tantam sublimitatem. Cum igitur virtus naturalis intellectus creati +non sufficiat ad Dei essentiam videndam, ut ostensum est, oportet +quod ex divina gratia superaccrescat ei virtus intelligendi. Et hoc +augmentum virtutis intellectivae illuminationem intellectus +vocamus; sicut et ipsum intelligibile vocatur lumen vel lux. Et +istud est lumen de quo dicitur Apoc. XXI, <i>quod claritas Dei +illuminabit eam</i>, scilicet societatem beatorum Deum videntium. +Et secundum hoc lumen efficiuntur deiformes, idest Deo similes; +secundum illud I Ioan. III, <i>cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, +et videbimus eum sicuti est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is + of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler + to act. Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, + and susceptible of color. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28721] Iª q. 12 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod lumen creatum est necessarium ad videndum Dei +essentiam, non quod per hoc lumen Dei essentia intelligibilis fiat, +quae secundum se intelligibilis est, sed ad hoc quod intellectus +fiat potens ad intelligendum, per modum quo potentia fit potentior +ad operandum per habitum, sicut etiam et lumen corporale +necessarium est in visu exteriori, inquantum facit medium +transparens in actu, ut possit moveri a colore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect, + strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, + but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28722] Iª q. 12 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lumen istud non requiritur ad videndum Dei essentiam +quasi similitudo in qua Deus videatur, sed quasi perfectio quaedam +intellectus, confortans ipsum ad videndum Deum. Et ideo potest dici +quod non est medium in quo Deus videatur, sed sub quo videtur. Et +hoc non tollit immediatam visionem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural + to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is made + deiform, as is said in this article. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28723] Iª q. 12 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod dispositio ad formam ignis non potest esse naturalis +nisi habenti formam ignis. Unde lumen gloriae non potest esse +naturale creaturae, nisi creatura esset naturae divinae, quod est +impossibile. Per hoc enim lumen fit creatura rationalis deiformis, +ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A6-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 6. Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>): "We shall see Him as He is." But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore + He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28724] Iª q. 12 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod videntium essentiam Dei unus alio +perfectius non videat. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, <i>videbimus eum +sicuti est</i>. Sed ipse uno modo est. Ergo uno modo videbitur ab +omnibus. Non ergo perfectius et minus perfecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii): "One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than + another." But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, + as was shown above (A[3] ). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one does not see more clearly than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28725] Iª q. 12 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium qq., quod unam rem non +potest unus alio plus intelligere. Sed omnes videntes Deum per +essentiam, intelligunt Dei essentiam, intellectu enim videtur Deus, +non sensu, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videntium divinam essentiam +unus alio non clarius videt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, + or on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received + more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does not apply to the + present question, for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude, + but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference + of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly; + and this is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28726] Iª q. 12 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod +aliquid altero perfectius videatur, ex duobus contingere potest, +vel ex parte obiecti visibilis; vel ex parte potentiae visivae +videntis. Ex parte autem obiecti, per hoc quod obiectum perfectius +in vidente recipitur, scilicet secundum perfectiorem similitudinem. +Quod in proposito locum non habet, Deus enim non per aliquam +similitudinem, sed per eius essentiam praesens est intellectui +essentiam eius videnti. Relinquitur ergo quod, si unus alio +perfectius eum videat, quod hoc sit secundum differentiam potentiae +intellectivae. Et ita sequitur quod cuius potentia intellectiva +naturaliter est sublimior, clarius eum videat. Quod est +inconveniens, cum hominibus promittatur in beatitudine aequalitas +Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally + in eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28727] Iª q. 12 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod vita aeterna in visione Dei consistit, secundum illud Ioan. +XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna,</i> et cetera. Ergo, si omnes +aequaliter Dei essentiam vident, in vita aeterna omnes erunt +aequales. Cuius contrarium dicit apostolus, I Cor. XV, <i>stella +differt a stella in claritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one + had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any similitude; but it will take + place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty of seeing God, however, + does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of + glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article. + </p><p id="FP_Q12_A6-p7"> Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation + of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire + in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more + charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 co."><a name="28728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28728] Iª q. 12 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod videntium Deum per essentiam unus alio perfectius eum videbit. +Quod quidem non erit per aliquam Dei similitudinem perfectiorem in +uno quam in alio, cum illa visio non sit futura per aliquam +similitudinem, ut ostensum est. Sed hoc erit per hoc, quod +intellectus unius habebit maiorem virtutem seu facultatem ad +videndum Deum, quam alterius. Facultas autem videndi Deum non +competit intellectui creato secundum suam naturam, sed per lumen +gloriae, quod intellectum in quadam deiformitate constituit, ut ex +superioribus patet. Unde intellectus plus participans de lumine +gloriae, perfectius Deum videbit. Plus autem participabit de lumine +gloriae, qui plus habet de caritate, quia ubi est maior caritas, +ibi est maius desiderium; et desiderium quodammodo facit +desiderantem aptum et paratum ad susceptionem desiderati. Unde qui +plus habebit de caritate, perfectius Deum videbit, et beatior +erit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the words,"We shall see Him as He is," the conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen, + so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it + does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will + be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God's existence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28729] Iª q. 12 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, cum dicitur videbimus eum sicuti est, hoc adverbium +sicuti determinat modum visionis ex parte rei visae ut sit sensus, +videbimus eum ita esse sicuti est, quia ipsum esse eius videbimus, +quod est eius essentia. Non autem determinat modum visionis ex +parte videntis, ut sit sensus, quod ita erit perfectus modus +videndi, sicut est in Deo perfectus modus essendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same + thing better than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for whoever understands it + otherwise than it really is, does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of understanding, for the understanding + of one is more perfect than the understanding of another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28730] Iª q. 12 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc etiam +patet solutio ad secundum. Cum enim dicitur quod rem unam unus alio +melius non intelligit, hoc habet veritatem si referatur ad modum +rei intellectae, quia quicumque intelligit rem esse aliter quam +sit, non vere intelligit. Non autem si referatur ad modum +intelligendi, quia intelligere unius est perfectius quam +intelligere alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all---viz. + the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will + arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28731] Iª q. 12 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod diversitas videndi non erit ex parte obiecti, quia +idem obiectum omnibus praesentabitur, scilicet Dei essentia, nec ex +diversa participatione obiecti per differentes similitudines, sed +erit per diversam facultatem intellectus, non quidem naturalem, sed +gloriosam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A7-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 7. Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.12" target="asv">Phil. 3:12</a>): "But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']." But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for + he said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.26" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:26</a>): "I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others also, whom he invites + to do the same, saying: "So run that you may + comprehend." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28732] Iª q. 12 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam ipsum +comprehendant. Dicit enim apostolus, Philipp. III, <i>sequor autem +si quo modo comprehendam</i>. Non autem frustra sequebatur, dicit +enim ipse, I Cor. IX, <i>sic curro, non quasi in incertum</i>. Ergo +ipse comprehendit, et eadem ratione alii, quos ad hoc invitat, +dicens, <i>sic currite, ut comprehendatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it + is hidden from the seer." But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, + since God is simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28733] Iª q. 12 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ut +dicit Augustinus in libro de videndo Deum ad Paulinam, <i>illud +comprehenditur, quod ita totum videtur, ut nihil eius lateat +videntem</i>. Sed si Deus per essentiam videtur, totus videtur, et +nihil eius latet videntem; cum Deus sit simplex. Ergo a quocumque +videtur per essentiam, comprehenditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not "wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either + to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode + of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the + seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence. + Therefore all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28734] Iª q. 12 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur quod +videtur totus, sed non totaliter, contra, totaliter vel dicit modum +videntis, vel modum rei visae. Sed ille qui videt Deum per +essentiam, videt eum totaliter, si significetur modus rei visae, +quia videt eum sicuti est, ut dictum est. Similiter videt eum +totaliter, si significetur modus videntis, quia tota virtute sua +intellectus Dei essentiam videbit. Quilibet ergo videns Deum per +essentiam, totaliter eum videbit. Ergo eum comprehendet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible + in thought" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.18" target="asv">Jer. 32:18,19</a>). Therefore He cannot be comprehended. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28735] Iª q. 12 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Ierem. XXXII, <i>fortissime, magne, potens, dominus +exercituum nomen tibi; magnus consilio, et incomprehensibilis +cogitatu</i>. Ergo comprehendi non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great + beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii). + </p><p id="FP_Q12_A7-p7"> In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known + so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting + on a probably proof, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle + has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a + probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does + not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to + that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears---Everything + is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q12_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7.html">(Q[7])</a> is + infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence + more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light + of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know + God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 co."><a name="28736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28736] Iª q. 12 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod comprehendere Deum impossibile est cuicumque intellectui +creato, <i>attingere vero mente Deum qualitercumque, magna est +beatitudo</i>, ut dicit Augustinus. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum +est quod illud comprehenditur, quod perfecte cognoscitur. Perfecte +autem cognoscitur, quod tantum cognoscitur, quantum est +cognoscibile. Unde si id quod est cognoscibile per scientiam +demonstrativam, opinione teneatur ex aliqua ratione probabili +concepta, non comprehenditur. Puta, si hoc quod est triangulum +habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, aliquis sciat per +demonstrationem, comprehendit illud, si vero aliquis eius opinionem +accipiat probabiliter, per hoc quod a sapientibus vel pluribus ita +dicitur, non comprehendet ipsum, quia non pertingit ad illum +perfectum modum cognitionis, quo cognoscibilis est. Nullus autem +intellectus creatus pertingere potest ad illum perfectum modum +cognitionis divinae essentiae, quo cognoscibilis est. Quod sic +patet. Unumquodque enim sic cognoscibile est, secundum quod est ens +actu. Deus igitur, cuius esse est infinitum, ut supra ostensum est, +infinite cognoscibilis est. Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest +Deum infinite cognoscere. Intantum enim intellectus creatus divinam +essentiam perfectius vel minus perfecte cognoscit, inquantum maiori +vel minori lumine gloriae perfunditur. Cum igitur lumen gloriae +creatum, in quocumque intellectu creato receptum, non possit esse +infinitum, impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus Deum +infinite cognoscat. Unde impossibile est quod Deum +comprehendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one + comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite + and cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. + In this sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension" + is taken more largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains + to him. And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, "I held him, and I will not let him + go" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Song.3.4" target="asv">Cant 3:4</a>); in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way "comprehension" + is one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision + responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch + as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy + what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, + so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him, + possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment + of desire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28737] Iª q. 12 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod comprehensio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, stricte et +proprie, secundum quod aliquid includitur in comprehendente. Et sic +nullo modo Deus comprehenditur, nec intellectu nec aliquo alio, +quia, cum sit infinitus, nullo finito includi potest, ut aliquid +finitum eum infinite capiat, sicut ipse infinite est. Et sic de +comprehensione nunc quaeritur. Alio modo comprehensio largius +sumitur, secundum quod comprehensio insecutioni opponitur. Qui enim +attingit aliquem, quando iam tenet ipsum, comprehendere eum +dicitur. Et sic Deus comprehenditur a beatis, secundum illud Cant. +III, <i>tenui eum, nec dimittam</i>. Et sic intelliguntur +auctoritates apostoli de comprehensione. Et hoc modo comprehensio +est una de tribus dotibus animae, quae respondet spei; sicut visio +fidei, et fruitio caritati. Non enim, apud nos, omne quod videtur, +iam tenetur vel habetur, quia videntur interdum distantia, vel quae +non sunt in potestate nostra. Neque iterum omnibus quae habemus, +fruimur, vel quia non delectamur in eis; vel quia non sunt ultimus +finis desiderii nostri, ut desiderium nostrum impleant et quietent. +Sed haec tria habent beati in Deo, quia et vident ipsum; et +videndo, tenent sibi praesentem, in potestate habentes semper eum +videre; et tenentes, fruuntur sicut ultimo fine desiderium +implente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is + capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any + part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as + it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says + the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries + can be completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge + of it is attained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28738] Iª q. 12 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non propter hoc Deus incomprehensibilis dicitur, +quasi aliquid eius sit quod non videatur, sed quia non ita perfecte +videtur, sicut visibilis est. Sicut cum aliqua demonstrabilis +propositio per aliquam probabilem rationem cognoscitur, non est +aliquid eius quod non cognoscatur, nec subiectum, nec praedicatum, +nec compositio, sed tota non ita perfecte cognoscitur, sicut +cognoscibilis est. Unde Augustinus, definiendo comprehensionem, +dicit quod <i>totum comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut +nihil eius lateat videntem; aut cuius fines circumspici +possunt</i>, tunc enim fines alicuius circumspiciuntur, quando ad +finem in modo cognoscendi illam rem pervenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode + of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, + and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, + for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is + demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28739] Iª q. 12 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod totaliter dicit modum obiecti, non quidem ita quod +totus modus obiecti non cadat sub cognitione; sed quia modus +obiecti non est modus cognoscentis. Qui igitur videt Deum per +essentiam, videt hoc in eo, quod infinite existit, et infinite +cognoscibilis est, sed hic infinitus modus non competit ei, ut +scilicet ipse infinite cognoscat, sicut aliquis probabiliter scire +potest aliquam propositionem esse demonstrabilem, licet ipse eam +demonstrative non cognoscat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A8-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 8. Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see, + who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore those who see God see all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28740] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam omnia in Deo +videant. Dicit enim Gregorius, in IV Dialog. <i>quid est quod non +videant, qui videntem omnia vident?</i> Sed Deus est videns omnia. +Ergo qui vident Deum, omnia vident.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God + as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all + possible things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28741] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Item, quicumque +videt speculum, videt ea quae in speculo resplendent. Sed omnia +quaecumque fiunt vel fieri possunt, in Deo resplendent sicut in +quodam speculo, ipse enim omnia in seipso cognoscit. Ergo quicumque +videt Deum, videt omnia quae sunt et quae fieri possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or + can do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28742] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, qui +intelligit id quod est maius, potest intelligere minima, ut dicitur +III de anima. Sed omnia quae Deus facit vel facere potest, sunt +minus quam eius essentia. Ergo quicumque intelligit Deum, potest +intelligere omnia quae Deus facit vel facere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, + its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore + he who sees God knows all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="28743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28743] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +rationalis creatura omnia naturaliter scire desiderat. Si igitur +videndo Deum non omnia sciat, non quietatur eius naturale +desiderium, et ita, videndo Deum non erit beata. Quod est +inconveniens. Videndo igitur Deum, omnia scit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the inferior + angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels." Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret + thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the essence of God, does not know all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28744] Iª q. 12 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Angeli vident Deum per essentiam, et tamen non omnia sciunt. +Inferiores enim Angeli purgantur a superioribus a nescientia, ut +dicit Dionysius, VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ipsi etiam nesciunt futura +contingentia et cogitationes cordium, hoc enim solius Dei est. Non +ergo quicumque vident Dei essentiam, vident omnia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that + things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore + all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the + more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon + as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a + weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a + cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect + can comprehend God wholly, as shown above + <a id="FP_Q12_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know + all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know + the more, the more perfectly it sees God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 co."><a name="28745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28745] Iª q. 12 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod intellectus creatus, videndo divinam essentiam, non videt in +ipsa omnia quae facit Deus vel facere potest. Manifestum est enim +quod sic aliqua videntur in Deo, secundum quod sunt in ipso. Omnia +autem alia sunt in Deo, sicut effectus sunt virtute in sua causa. +Sic igitur videntur alia in Deo, sicut effectus in sua causa. Sed +manifestum est quod quanto aliqua causa perfectius videtur, tanto +plures eius effectus in ipsa videri possunt. Qui enim habet +intellectum elevatum, statim uno principio demonstrativo proposito, +ex ipso multarum conclusionum cognitionem accipit, quod non +convenit ei qui debilioris intellectus est, sed oportet quod ei +singula explanentur. Ille igitur intellectus potest in causa +cognoscere omnes causae effectus, et omnes rationes effectuum, qui +causam totaliter comprehendit. Nullus autem intellectus creatus +totaliter Deum comprehendere potest, ut ostensum est. Nullus igitur +intellectus creatus, videndo Deum, potest cognoscere omnia quae +Deus facit vel potest facere, hoc enim esset comprehendere eius +virtutem. Sed horum quae Deus facit vel facere potest, tanto +aliquis intellectus plura cognoscit, quanto perfectius Deum +videt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth + all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28746] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur quantum ad sufficientiam obiecti, +scilicet Dei, quod, quantum in se est, sufficienter continet omnia +et demonstrat. Non tamen sequitur quod unusquisque videns Deum +omnia cognoscat, quia non perfecte comprehendit ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror + itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28747] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod videns speculum, non est necessarium quod omnia in +speculo videat, nisi speculum visu suo comprehendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are + known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been + shown in this article that the more things are known in God according as He is seen more or less perfectly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28748] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet maius sit videre Deum quam omnia alia, tamen +maius est videre sic Deum quod omnia in eo cognoscantur, quam +videre sic ipsum quod non omnia, sed pauciora vel plura +cognoscantur in eo. Iam enim ostensum est quod multitudo cognitorum +in Deo, consequitur modum videndi ipsum vel magis perfectum vel +minus perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely, + the species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But + to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does + its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know + things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle + of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the + seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures) + "and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is + not the happier for them, but for Thee alone." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="28749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28749] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod naturale desiderium rationalis creaturae est ad +sciendum omnia illa quae pertinent ad perfectionem intellectus; et +haec sunt species et genera rerum, et rationes earum, quae in Deo +videbit quilibet videns essentiam divinam. Cognoscere autem alia +singularia, et cogitata et facta eorum, non est de perfectione +intellectus creati, nec ad hoc eius naturale desiderium tendit, nec +iterum cognoscere illa quae nondum sunt, sed fieri a Deo possunt. +Si tamen solus Deus videretur, qui est fons et principium totius +esse et veritatis, ita repleret naturale desiderium sciendi, quod +nihil aliud quaereretur, et beatus esset. Unde dicit Augustinus, V +Confess., infelix homo qui scit omnia illa (scilicet creaturas), +<i>te autem nescit, beatus autem qui te scit, etiam si illa +nesciat. Qui vero te et illa novit, non propter illa beatior est, +sed propter te solum beatus</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A9-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 9. Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind + of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual + intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the object, + as the eye by the similitude of color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine + essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their similitudes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28750] Iª q. 12 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae videntur in Deo, a videntibus +divinam essentiam per aliquas similitudines videantur. Omnis enim +cognitio est per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum, sic enim +intellectus in actu fit intellectum in actu, et sensus in actu +sensibile in actu, inquantum eius similitudine informatur, ut +pupilla similitudine coloris. Si igitur intellectus videntis Deum +per essentiam intelligat in Deo aliquas creaturas, oportet quod +earum similitudinibus informetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased + to see the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; + hence he said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:4</a>). Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the same way, + when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28751] Iª q. 12 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ea +quae prius vidimus, memoriter tenemus. Sed Paulus, videns in raptu +essentiam Dei, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad litteram, +postquam desiit essentiam Dei videre, recordatus est multorum quae +in illo raptu viderat, unde ipse dicit quod <i>audivit arcana +verba, quae non licet homini loqui</i>, II Cor. XII. Ergo oportet +dicere quod aliquae similitudines eorum quae recordatus est, in +eius intellectu remanserint. Et eadem ratione, quando +praesentialiter videbat Dei essentiam, eorum quae in ipsa videbat, +aliquas similitudines vel species habebat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror. + Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by + any similitudes or ideas. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28752] Iª q. 12 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod per unam speciem videtur speculum, et ea quae in speculo +apparent. Sed omnia sic videntur in Deo sicut in quodam speculo +intelligibili. Ergo, si ipse Deus non videtur per aliquam +similitudinem, sed per suam essentiam; nec ea quae in ipso +videntur, per aliquas similitudines sive species videntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to + their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. + For as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any + knowable object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is + directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which + resembles the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For + the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know things thus by their likeness + in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes + pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according + to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other + similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God Himself is seen. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 co."><a name="28753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28753] Iª q. 12 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod videntes Deum per essentiam, ea quae in ipsa essentia Dei +vident, non vident per aliquas species, sed per ipsam essentiam +divinam intellectui eorum unitam. Sic enim cognoscitur unumquodque, +secundum quod similitudo eius est in cognoscente. Sed hoc contingit +dupliciter. Cum enim quaecumque uni et eidem sunt similia, sibi +invicem sint similia, virtus cognoscitiva dupliciter assimilari +potest alicui cognoscibili. Uno modo, secundum se, quando directe +eius similitudine informatur, et tunc cognoscitur illud secundum +se. Alio modo, secundum quod informatur specie alicuius quod est ei +simile, et tunc non dicitur res cognosci in seipsa, sed in suo +simili. Alia enim est cognitio qua cognoscitur aliquis homo in +seipso, et alia qua cognoscitur in sua imagine. Sic ergo, +cognoscere res per earum similitudines in cognoscente existentes, +est cognoscere eas in seipsis, seu in propriis naturis, sed +cognoscere eas prout earum similitudines praeexistunt in Deo, est +videre eas in Deo. Et hae duae cognitiones differunt. Unde secundum +illam cognitionem qua res cognoscuntur a videntibus Deum per +essentiam in ipso Deo, non videntur per aliquas similitudines +alias; sed per solam essentiam divinam intellectui praesentem, per +quam et Deus videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine essence, + in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28754] Iª q. 12 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod intellectus videntis Deum assimilatur rebus quae +videntur in Deo, inquantum unitur essentiae divinae, in qua rerum +omnium similitudines praeexistunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived + images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas + of genus and difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds + the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees + God, by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, + which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind of vision whereby things are seen + by this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28755] Iª q. 12 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquae potentiae cognoscitivae sunt, quae ex +speciebus primo conceptis alias formare possunt. Sicut imaginatio +ex praeconceptis speciebus montis et auri, format speciem montis +aurei, et intellectus ex praeconceptis speciebus generis et +differentiae, format rationem speciei. Et similiter ex similitudine +imaginis formare possumus in nobis similitudinem eius cuius est +imago. Et sic Paulus, vel quicumque alius videns Deum, ex ipsa +visione essentiae divinae potest formare in se similitudines rerum +quae in essentia divina videntur, quae remanserunt in Paulo etiam +postquam desiit Dei essentiam videre. Ista tamen visio, qua +videntur res per huiusmodi species sic conceptas, est alia a +visione qua videntur res in Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A10-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 10. Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to + the Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood." But what is seen in God, + is understood; for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in Him at the same time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28756] Iª q. 12 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam non simul +videant omnia quae in ipso vident. Quia, secundum philosophum, +contingit multa scire, intelligere vero unum. Sed ea quae videntur +in Deo, intelliguntur, intellectu enim videtur Deus. Ergo non +contingit a videntibus Deum simul multa videri in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), "God moves the spiritual creature according to time"---i.e. by intelligence + and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore those who see God understand and are affected + successively; for time means succession. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28757] Iª q. 12 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad litteram, quod <i>Deus movet +creaturam spiritualem per tempus</i>, hoc est per intelligentiam et +affectionem. Sed creatura spiritualis est Angelus, qui Deum videt. +Ergo videntes Deum, successive intelligunt et afficiuntur, tempus +enim successionem importat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall + see all we know at one glance." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 s. c."><a name="28758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28758] Iª q. 12 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, ultimo de Trin., <i>non erunt volubiles +nostrae cogitationes, ab aliis in alia euntes atque redeuntes; sed +omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many + things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed + by many diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. + Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same + time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all at the same time, if each one is understood by its + own idea; whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. Now it was shown + above that things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence + they are seen simultaneously, and not successively. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 co."><a name="28759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28759] Iª q. 12 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ea quae videntur in verbo, non successive, sed simul videntur. +Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod ideo nos simul non +possumus multa intelligere, quia multa per diversas species +intelligimus; diversis autem speciebus non potest intellectus unus +simul actu informari ad intelligendum per eas, sicut nec unum +corpus potest simul diversis figuris figurari. Unde contingit quod, +quando aliqua multa una specie intelligi possunt, simul +intelliguntur, sicut diversae partes alicuius totius, si singulae +propriis speciebus intelligantur, successive intelliguntur, et non +simul; si autem omnes intelligantur una specie totius, simul +intelliguntur. Ostensum est autem quod ea quae videntur in Deo, non +videntur singula per suas similitudines, sed omnia per unam +essentiam Dei. Unde simul, et non successive videntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously, + as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and "rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28760] Iª q. 12 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod sic unum tantum intelligimus, inquantum una specie +intelligimus. Sed multa una specie intellecta simul intelliguntur, +sicut in specie hominis intelligimus animal et rationale, et in +specie domus parietem et tectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things + simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God, + they see all at the same time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28761] Iª q. 12 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Angeli, quantum ad cognitionem naturalem qua +cognoscunt res per species diversas eis inditas, non simul omnia +cognoscunt, et sic moventur, secundum intelligentiam, per tempus. +Sed secundum quod vident res in Deo, simul eas vident.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A11-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 11. Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.30" target="asv">Gn. 32:30</a>). But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, + but then face to face" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28762] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis in hac vita possit Deum per +essentiam videre. Dicit enim Iacob, Gen. XXXII, <i>vidi Deum facie +ad faciem</i>. Sed videre facie ad faciem, est videre per +essentiam, ut patet per illud quod dicitur I Cor. XIII, <i>videmus +nunc per speculum et in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem</i>. +Ergo Deus in hac vita per essentiam videri potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see + the Lord" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Num.12.8" target="asv">Num. 12:8</a>); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28763] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Num. +XII dicit dominus de Moyse, <i>ore ad os loquor ei, et palam, et +non per aenigmata et figuras, videt Deum</i>. Sed hoc est videre +Deum per essentiam. Ergo aliquis in statu huius vitae potest Deum +per essentiam videre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even + now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we both see that what you say is true, and we both + see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable + truth itself above our minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all + things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things + according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable." Therefore + even in this life we see God Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28764] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud in quo alia omnia cognoscimus, et per quod de aliis +iudicamus, est nobis secundum se notum. Sed omnia etiam nunc in Deo +cognoscimus. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII Conf., <i>si ambo videmus +verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico, ubi +quaeso illud videmus? Nec ego in te, nec tu in me, sed ambo in ipsa +quae supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili veritate</i>. Idem +etiam, in libro de vera religione, dicit quod secundum veritatem +divinam de omnibus iudicamus. Et XII de Trin. dicit quod +<i>rationis est iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes +incorporales et sempiternas, quae nisi supra mentem essent, +incommutabiles profecto non essent</i>. Ergo et in hac vita ipsum +Deum videmus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by + intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as + he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows that He is seen by + us in His essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 4"><a name="28765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28765] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., visione intellectuali +videntur ea quae sunt in anima per suam essentiam. Sed visio +intellectualis est de rebus intelligibilibus, non per aliquas +similitudines, sed per suas essentias, ut ipse ibidem dicit. Ergo, +cum Deus sit per essentiam suam in anima nostra, per essentiam suam +videtur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.20" target="asv">Ex. 32:20</a>), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His + own nature." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28766] Iª q. 12 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Exod. XXXIII, <i>non videbit me homo et vivet</i>. +Glossa, <i>quandiu hic mortaliter vivitur, videri per quasdam +imagines Deus potest; sed per ipsam naturae suae speciem non +potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, + as was said above + <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its + being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now + it is evident that the Divine essence + cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible + for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted + from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of + the bodily senses + divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the + soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 co."><a name="28767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28767] Iª q. 12 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ab homine puro Deus videri per essentiam non potest, nisi ab +hac vita mortali separetur. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut supra +dictum est, modus cognitionis sequitur modum naturae rei +cognoscentis. Anima autem nostra, quandiu in hac vita vivimus, +habet esse in materia corporali, unde naturaliter non cognoscit +aliqua nisi quae habent formam in materia, vel quae per huiusmodi +cognosci possunt. Manifestum est autem quod per naturas rerum +materialium divina essentia cognosci non potest. Ostensum est enim +supra quod cognitio Dei per quamcumque similitudinem creatam, non +est visio essentiae ipsius. Unde impossibile est animae hominis +secundum hanc vitam viventis, essentiam Dei videre. Et huius signum +est, quod anima nostra, quanto magis a corporalibus abstrahitur, +tanto intelligibilium abstractorum fit capacior. Unde in somniis et +alienationibus a sensibus corporis, magis divinae revelationes +percipiuntur, et praevisiones futurorum. Quod ergo anima elevetur +usque ad supremum intelligibilium, quod est essentia divina, esse +non potest quandiu hac mortali vita utitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are + formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I + have seen God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred + to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary + vision; as will later be explained (SS, + <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q174.html">Q[174])</a> in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, + above the ordinary state. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28768] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. Cael. Hier., sic in +Scripturis dicitur aliquis Deum vidisse, inquantum formatae sunt +aliquae figurae, vel sensibiles vel imaginariae, secundum aliquam +similitudinem aliquod divinum repraesentantes. Quod ergo dicit +Iacob, vidi Deum facie ad faciem, referendum est, non ad ipsam +divinam essentiam, sed ad figuram in qua repraesentabatur Deus. Et +hoc ipsum ad quandam prophetiae eminentiam pertinet, ut videatur +persona Dei loquentis, licet imaginaria visione, ut infra patebit, +cum de gradibus prophetiae loquemur. Vel hoc dicit Iacob ad +designandam quandam eminentiam intelligibilis contemplationis, +supra communem statum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds + of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad + lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more + fully in the question of rapture (SS, + <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q175.html">Q[175])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28769] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Deus miraculose aliquid supernaturaliter in +rebus corporeis operatur, ita etiam et supernaturaliter, et praeter +communem ordinem, mentes aliquorum in hac carne viventium, sed non +sensibus carnis utentium, usque ad visionem suae essentiae +elevavit; ut dicit Augustinus, XII super Genes. ad Litt., et in +libro de videndo Deum de Moyse, qui fuit magister Iudaeorum, et +Paulo, qui fuit magister gentium. Et de hoc plenius tractabitur, +cum de raptu agemus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things are said to be seen in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know + and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said + to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons + of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As + therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see + any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28770] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia dicimur in Deo videre, et secundum ipsum de +omnibus iudicare, inquantum per participationem sui luminis omnia +cognoscimus et diiudicamus, nam et ipsum lumen naturale rationis +participatio quaedam est divini luminis; sicut etiam omnia +sensibilia dicimus videre et iudicare in sole, idest per lumen +solis. Unde dicit Augustinus, I Soliloquiorum, <i>disciplinarum +spectamina videri non possunt, nisi aliquo velut suo sole +illustrentur, videlicet Deo</i>. Sicut ergo ad videndum aliquid +sensibiliter, non est necesse quod videatur substantia solis, ita +ad videndum aliquid intelligibiliter, non est necessarium quod +videatur essentia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect. + And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence and power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 4"><a name="28771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28771] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod visio intellectualis est eorum quae sunt in anima per +suam essentiam sicut intelligibilia in intellectu. Sic autem Deus +est in anima beatorum, non autem in anima nostra; sed per +praesentiam, essentiam, et potentiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A12-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 12. Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp + simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q12_A12-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a> ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28772] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod per naturalem rationem Deum in hac +vita cognoscere non possimus. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de +Consol., quod <i>ratio non capit simplicem formam</i>. Deus autem +maxime est simplex forma, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo ad eius +cognitionem ratio naturalis pervenire non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination + of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28773] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ratione naturali sine phantasmate nihil intelligit anima, ut +dicitur in III de anima. Sed Dei, cum sit incorporeus, phantasma in +nobis esse non potest. Ergo cognosci non potest a nobis cognitione +naturali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge + of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent + light unless purified by the justice of faith." Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28774] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +cognitio quae est per rationem naturalem, communis est bonis et +malis, sicut natura eis communis est. Sed cognitio Dei competit +tantum bonis, dicit enim Augustinus, I de Trin., quod <i>mentis +humanae acies in tam excellenti luce non figitur, nisi per +iustitiam fidei emundetur</i>. Ergo Deus per rationem naturalem +cognosci non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A12-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv">Rom. 1:19</a>), "That which is known of God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest in them." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28775] Iª q. 12 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Rom. I, <i>quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in +illis</i>, idest, quod cognoscibile est de Deo per rationem +naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But + our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the + power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore + can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we + can be led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, + as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him. + </p><p id="FP_Q12_A12-p7"> Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from + Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason + of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 co."><a name="28776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28776] Iª q. 12 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod naturalis nostra cognitio a sensu principium sumit, unde +tantum se nostra naturalis cognitio extendere potest, inquantum +manuduci potest per sensibilia. Ex sensibilibus autem non potest +usque ad hoc intellectus noster pertingere, quod divinam essentiam +videat, quia creaturae sensibiles sunt effectus Dei virtutem causae +non adaequantes. Unde ex sensibilium cognitione non potest tota Dei +virtus cognosci, et per consequens nec eius essentia videri. Sed +quia sunt eius effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perduci +possumus, ut cognoscamus de Deo an est; et ut cognoscamus de ipso +ea quae necesse est ei convenire secundum quod est prima omnium +causa, excedens omnia sua causata. Unde cognoscimus de ipso +habitudinem ipsius ad creaturas, quod scilicet omnium est causa; et +differentiam creaturarum ab ipso, quod scilicet ipse non est +aliquid eorum quae ab eo causantur; et quod haec non removentur ab +eo propter eius defectum, sed quia superexcedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28777] Iª q. 12 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ratio ad formam simplicem pertingere non potest, ut +sciat de ea quid est, potest tamen de ea cognoscere, ut sciat an +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28778] Iª q. 12 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Deus naturali cognitione cognoscitur per phantasmata +effectus sui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can + belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve + what I said in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.' For it can be answered that many who are not + pure can know many truths," i.e. by natural reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28779] Iª q. 12 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod cognitio Dei per essentiam, cum sit per gratiam, non +competit nisi bonis, sed cognitio eius quae est per rationem +naturalem, potest competere bonis et malis. Unde dicit Augustinus, +in libro Retractationum, <i>non approbo quod in oratione dixi, +Deus, qui non nisi mundos verum scire voluisti, responderi enim +potest, multos etiam non mundos multa scire vera</i>, scilicet per +rationem naturalem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A13" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A13-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 13. Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol. + i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, + who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring + of Him "what He is," comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more + known to us by grace than by natural reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28780] Iª q. 12 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod per gratiam non +habeatur altior cognitio Dei, quam ea quae habetur per naturalem +rationem. Dicit enim Dionysius, in libro de mystica theologia, quod +ille qui melius unitur Deo in hac vita, unitur ei sicut omnino +ignoto, quod etiam de Moyse dicit, qui tamen excellentiam quandam +obtinuit in gratiae cognitione. Sed coniungi Deo ignorando de eo +quid est, hoc contingit etiam per rationem naturalem. Ergo per +gratiam non plenius cognoscitur a nobis Deus, quam per rationem +naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies + to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon + us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than + by natural reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="28781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28781] Iª q. 12 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, per +rationem naturalem in cognitionem divinorum pervenire non possumus, +nisi per phantasmata, sic etiam nec secundum cognitionem gratiae. +Dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. de Cael. Hier., quod <i>impossibile +est nobis aliter lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum +velaminum circumvelatum</i>. Ergo per gratiam non plenius +cognoscimus Deum, quam per rationem naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. + xxvi in Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more + excellent knowledge of God by grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="28782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28782] Iª q. 12 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectus noster per gratiam fidei Deo adhaeret. Fides autem non +videtur esse cognitio, dicit enim Gregorius, in Homil., quod ea +quae non videntur fidem habent, et non agnitionem. Ergo per gratiam +non additur nobis aliqua excellentior cognitio de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A13-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 s. c."><a name="28783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28783] Iª q. 12 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit apostolus, I Cor. II, <i>nobis revelavit Deus per +spiritum suum</i>, illa scilicet quae nemo principum huius saeculi +novit, idest philosophorum, ut exponit Glossa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A13-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have + by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling + us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions. + </p><p id="FP_Q12_A13-p7"> Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened + by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to + express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in prophetic visions; while + sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the + Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A13-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.17" target="asv">Mat. 3:17</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 co."><a name="28784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28784] Iª q. 12 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod per gratiam perfectior cognitio de Deo habetur a nobis, quam +per rationem naturalem. Quod sic patet. Cognitio enim quam per +naturalem rationem habemus, duo requirit, scilicet, phantasmata ex +sensibilibus accepta, et lumen naturale intelligibile, cuius +virtute intelligibiles conceptiones ab eis abstrahimus. Et quantum +ad utrumque, iuvatur humana cognitio per revelationem gratiae. Nam +et lumen naturale intellectus confortatur per infusionem luminis +gratuiti. Et interdum etiam phantasmata in imaginatione hominis +formantur divinitus, magis exprimentia res divinas, quam ea quae +naturaliter a sensibilibus accipimus; sicut apparet in visionibus +prophetalibus. Et interdum etiam aliquae res sensibiles formantur +divinitus, aut etiam voces, ad aliquid divinum exprimendum; sicut +in Baptismo visus est spiritus sanctus in specie columbae, et vox +patris audita est, <i>hic est filius meus dilectus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one + unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according + as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that + God is Three and One. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="28785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28785] Iª q. 12 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, licet per revelationem gratiae in hac vita non +cognoscamus de Deo quid est, et sic ei quasi ignoto coniungamur; +tamen plenius ipsum cognoscimus, inquantum plures et excellentiores +effectus eius nobis demonstrantur; et inquantum ei aliqua +attribuimus ex revelatione divina, ad quae ratio naturalis non +pertingit, ut Deum esse trinum et unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the + more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given + by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="28786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28786] Iª q. 12 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex phantasmatibus, vel a sensu acceptis secundum +naturalem ordinem, vel divinitus in imaginatione formatis, tanto +excellentior cognitio intellectualis habetur, quanto lumen +intelligibile in homine fortius fuerit. Et sic per revelationem ex +phantasmatibus plenior cognitio accipitur, ex infusione divini +luminis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination + to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as + faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect + to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="28787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28787] Iª q. 12 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod fides cognitio quaedam est, inquantum intellectus +determinatur per fidem ad aliquod cognoscibile. Sed haec +determinatio ad unum non procedit ex visione credentis, sed a +visione eius cui creditur. Et sic, inquantum deest visio, deficit a +ratione cognitionis quae est in scientia, nam scientia determinat +intellectum ad unum per visionem et intellectum primorum +principiorum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q13" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q13-p0.1">Q. 13. THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q13-p2"> After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the + divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it. + </p><p id="FP_Q13-p3"> Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q13-p4"> (1) Whether God can be named by us?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p5"> (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p6"> (3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p7"> (4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p8"> (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p9"> (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p10"> (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p11"> (8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p12"> (9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p13"> (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p14"> (11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of God?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p15"> (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 pr."><a name="28788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28788] +Iª q. 13 pr.</span></a> Consideratis his quae ad divinam +cognitionem pertinent, procedendum est ad considerationem divinorum +nominum, unumquodque enim nominatur a nobis, secundum quod ipsum +cognoscimus. Circa hoc ergo quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, utrum Deus +sit nominabilis a nobis. Secundo, utrum aliqua nomina dicta de Deo, +praedicentur de ipso substantialiter. Tertio, utrum aliqua nomina +dicta de Deo, proprie dicantur de ipso; an omnia attribuantur ei +metaphorice. Quarto, utrum multa nomina dicta de Deo, sint +synonyma. Quinto, utrum nomina aliqua dicantur de Deo et creaturis +univoce, vel aequivoce. Sexto, supposito quod dicantur analogice, +utrum dicantur de Deo per prius, vel de creaturis. Septimo, utrum +aliqua nomina dicantur de Deo ex tempore. Octavo, utrum hoc nomen +Deus sit nomen naturae, vel operationis. Nono, utrum hoc nomen Deus +sit nomen communicabile. Decimo, utrum accipiatur univoce vel +aequivoce, secundum quod significat Deum per naturam, et per +participationem, et secundum opinionem. Undecimo, utrum hoc nomen +qui est sit maxime proprium nomen Dei. Duodecimo, utrum +propositiones affirmativae possint formari de Deo.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q13_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A1-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 1. Whether a name can be given to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can + one be found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.30.4" target="asv">Prov. 30:4</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28789] Iª q. 13 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen Deo conveniat. Dicit enim +Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., quod neque nomen eius est, neque +opinio. Et Prov. XXX dicitur, <i>quod nomen eius, et quod nomen +filii eius, si nosti?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract + names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28790] Iª q. 13 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne +nomen aut dicitur in abstracto, aut in concreto. Sed nomina +significantia in concreto, non competunt Deo, cum simplex sit, +neque nomina significantia in abstracto, quia non significant +aliquid perfectum subsistens. Ergo nullum nomen potest dici de +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the + same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; + moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to + recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore + God cannot in any way be named by us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28791] Iª q. 13 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nomina significant substantiam cum qualitate; verba autem et +participia significant cum tempore; pronomina autem cum +demonstratione vel relatione. Quorum nihil competit Deo, quia sine +qualitate est et sine omni accidente, et sine tempore; et sentiri +non potest, ut demonstrari possit; nec relative significari, cum +relativa sint aliquorum antedictorum recordativa, vel nominum, vel +participiorum, vel pronominum demonstrativorum. Ergo Deus nullo +modo potest nominari a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.3" target="asv">Ex. 15:3</a>): "The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28792] Iª q. 13 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Exod. XV, <i>dominus quasi vir pugnator, omnipotens +nomen eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident + that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore + that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html">Q[12], AA[11]</a>,12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God + from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us + from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses + the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed + by the name is the definition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 co."><a name="28793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28793] Iª q. 13 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, secundum philosophum, voces sunt signa intellectuum, et +intellectus sunt rerum similitudines. Et sic patet quod voces +referuntur ad res significandas, mediante conceptione intellectus. +Secundum igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, +sic a nobis potest nominari. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in +hac vita non potest a nobis videri per suam essentiam; sed +cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis, secundum habitudinem principii, +et per modum excellentiae et remotionis. Sic igitur potest nominari +a nobis ex creaturis, non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum, +exprimat divinam essentiam secundum quod est, sicut hoc nomen homo +exprimit sua significatione essentiam hominis secundum quod est, +significat enim eius definitionem, declarantem eius essentiam; +ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand + about God, and signify in word. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28794] Iª q. 13 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ea ratione dicitur Deus non habere nomen, vel esse +supra nominationem, quia essentia eius est supra id quod de Deo +intelligimus et voce significamus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of + which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas + their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used + by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as + applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that + whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, + we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection, + although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this + life + as He is. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28795] Iª q. 13 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quia ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem venimus, et ex +ipsis eum nominamus, nomina quae Deo attribuimus, hoc modo +significant, secundum quod competit creaturis materialibus, quarum +cognitio est nobis connaturalis, ut supra dictum est. Et quia in +huiusmodi creaturis, ea quae sunt perfecta et subsistentia sunt +composita; forma autem in eis non est aliquid completum subsistens, +sed magis quo aliquid est, inde est quod omnia nomina a nobis +imposita ad significandum aliquid completum subsistens, significant +in concretione, prout competit compositis; quae autem imponuntur ad +significandas formas simplices, significant aliquid non ut +subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo significat ut quo +aliquid est album. Quia igitur et Deus simplex est, et subsistens +est, attribuimus ei et nomina abstracta, ad significandam +simplicitatem eius; et nomina concreta, ad significandum +subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, quamvis utraque nomina +deficiant a modo ipsius, sicut intellectus noster non cognoscit eum +ut est, secundum hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To signify substance with quality is to signify the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence, + as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied + to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His + eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple + subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things, + because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God + as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according + as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative + pronouns. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28796] Iª q. 13 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod significare substantiam cum qualitate, est +significare suppositum cum natura vel forma determinata in qua +subsistit. Unde, sicut de Deo dicuntur aliqua in concretione, ad +significandum subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, sicut iam +dictum est, ita dicuntur de Deo nomina significantia substantiam +cum qualitate. Verba vero et participia consignificantia tempus +dicuntur de ipso, ex eo quod aeternitas includit omne tempus, sicut +enim simplicia subsistentia non possumus apprehendere et +significare nisi per modum compositorum, ita simplicem aeternitatem +non possumus intelligere vel voce exprimere, nisi per modum +temporalium rerum; et hoc propter connaturalitatem intellectus +nostri ad res compositas et temporales. Pronomina vero +demonstrativa dicuntur de Deo, secundum quod faciunt +demonstrationem ad id quod intelligitur, non ad id quod sentitur, +secundum enim quod a nobis intelligitur, secundum hoc sub +demonstratione cadit. Et sic, secundum illum modum quo nomina et +participia et pronomina demonstrativa de Deo dicuntur, secundum hoc +et pronominibus relativis significari potest.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A2-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 2. Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God + signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from + His nature or operation." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28797] Iª q. 13 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo +substantialiter. Dicit enim Damascenus, <i>oportet singulum eorum +quae de Deo dicuntur, non quid est secundum substantiam +significare, sed quid non est ostendere, aut habitudinem quandam, +aut aliquid eorum quae assequuntur naturam vel operationem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly + and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God." Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising + God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does + not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him + substantially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28798] Iª q. 13 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dicit +Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., <i>omnem sanctorum theologorum +hymnum invenies, ad bonos thearchiae processus, manifestative et +laudative Dei nominationes dividentem</i>, et est sensus, quod +nomina quae in divinam laudem sancti doctores assumunt, secundum +processus ipsius Dei distinguuntur. Sed quod significat processum +alicuius rei, nihil significat ad eius essentiam pertinens. Ergo +nomina dicta de Deo, non dicuntur de ipso substantialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. + Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28799] Iª q. 13 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum hoc nominatur aliquid a nobis, secundum quod intelligitur. +Sed non intelligitur Deus a nobis in hac vita secundum suam +substantiam. Ergo nec aliquod nomen impositum a nobis, dicitur de +Deo secundum suam substantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that + simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28800] Iª q. 13 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, VI de Trin., <i>Deo hoc est esse, quod +fortem esse vel sapientem esse, et si quid de illa simplicitate +dixeris, quo eius substantia significatur</i>. Ergo omnia nomina +huiusmodi significant divinam substantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but + rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures + to Himself. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p7"> But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good," "wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been + given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought + into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they + assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like + manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His + relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the + same rule applies to other names. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p8"> Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned + why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause + of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might + in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He + is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names + applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, + forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this + is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the + He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p9"> Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially + of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far + as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. + Now it is shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God prepossesses in Himself all the + perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him + so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling + principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior + bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>), in treating + of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as + creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or + "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent + and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes + goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we + are." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 co."><a name="28801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28801] Iª q. 13 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod de nominibus quae de Deo dicuntur negative, vel quae +relationem ipsius ad creaturam significant, manifestum est quod +substantiam eius nullo modo significant; sed remotionem alicuius ab +ipso, vel relationem eius ad alium, vel potius alicuius ad ipsum. +Sed de nominibus quae absolute et affirmative de Deo dicuntur, +sicut bonus, sapiens, et huiusmodi, multipliciter aliqui sunt +opinati. Quidam enim dixerunt quod haec omnia nomina, licet +affirmative de Deo dicantur, tamen magis inventa sunt ad aliquid +removendum a Deo, quam ad aliquid ponendum in ipso. Unde dicunt +quod, cum dicimus Deum esse viventem, significamus quod Deus non +hoc modo est, sicut res inanimatae, et similiter accipiendum est in +aliis. Et hoc posuit Rabbi Moyses. Alii vero dicunt quod haec +nomina imposita sunt ad significandum habitudinem eius ad creata, +ut, cum dicimus Deus est bonus, sit sensus, Deus est causa +bonitatis in rebus. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Sed utrumque +istorum videtur esse inconveniens, propter tria. Primo quidem, quia +secundum neutram harum positionum posset assignari ratio quare +quaedam nomina magis de Deo dicerentur quam alia. Sic enim est +causa corporum, sicut est causa bonorum, unde, si nihil aliud +significatur, cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nisi Deus est causa +bonorum, poterit similiter dici quod Deus est corpus, quia est +causa corporum. Item, per hoc quod dicitur quod est corpus, +removetur quod non sit ens in potentia tantum, sicut materia prima. +Secundo, quia sequeretur quod omnia nomina dicta de Deo, per +posterius dicerentur de ipso, sicut sanum per posterius dicitur de +medicina, eo quod significat hoc tantum quod sit causa sanitatis in +animali, quod per prius dicitur sanum. Tertio, quia hoc est contra +intentionem loquentium de Deo. Aliud enim intendunt dicere, cum +dicunt Deum viventem, quam quod sit causa vitae nostrae, vel quod +differat a corporibus inanimatis. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod +huiusmodi quidem nomina significant substantiam divinam, et +praedicantur de Deo substantialiter, sed deficiunt a +repraesentatione ipsius. Quod sic patet. Significant enim sic +nomina Deum, secundum quod intellectus noster cognoscit ipsum. +Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, sic +cognoscit ipsum, secundum quod creaturae ipsum repraesentant. +Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in se praehabet omnes +perfectiones creaturarum, quasi simpliciter et universaliter +perfectus. Unde quaelibet creatura intantum eum repraesentat, et +est ei similis, inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet, non tamen ita +quod repraesentet eum sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis, +sed sicut excellens principium, a cuius forma effectus deficiunt, +cuius tamen aliqualem similitudinem effectus consequuntur; sicut +formae corporum inferiorum repraesentant virtutem solarem. Et hoc +supra expositum est, cum de perfectione divina agebatur. Sic igitur +praedicta nomina divinam substantiam significant, imperfecte tamen, +sicut et creaturae imperfecte eam repraesentant. Cum igitur dicitur +Deus est bonus, non est sensus, Deus est causa bonitatis, vel Deus +non est malus, sed est sensus, id quod bonitatem dicimus in +creaturis, praeexistit in Deo, et hoc quidem secundum modum +altiorem. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod Deo competat esse bonum +inquantum causat bonitatem, sed potius e converso, quia est bonus, +bonitatem rebus diffundit, secundum illud Augustini, de Doct. +Christ., <i>inquantum bonus est, sumus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what + He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28802] Iª q. 13 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Damascenus ideo dicit quod haec nomina non +significant quid est Deus, quia a nullo istorum nominum exprimitur +quid est Deus perfecte, sed unumquodque imperfecte eum significat, +sicut et creaturae imperfecte eum repraesentant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, + as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed + to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot + would be a stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis" + which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for + as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect + manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are + not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from + Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in + a more eminent way than can be understood or signified. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28803] Iª q. 13 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in significatione nominum, aliud est quandoque a quo +imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod significandum nomen +imponitur, sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur ab eo quod laedit pedem, +non tamen imponitur ad hoc significandum quod significet laedens +pedem, sed ad significandam quandam speciem corporum; alioquin omne +laedens pedem esset lapis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod huiusmodi +divina nomina imponuntur quidem a processibus deitatis, sicut enim +secundum diversos processus perfectionum, creaturae Deum +repraesentant, licet imperfecte; ita intellectus noster, secundum +unumquemque processum, Deum cognoscit et nominat. Sed tamen haec +nomina non imponit ad significandum ipsos processus, ut, cum +dicitur Deus est vivens, sit sensus, ab eo procedit vita, sed ad +significandum ipsum rerum principium, prout in eo praeexistit vita, +licet eminentiori modo quam intelligatur vel significetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented + in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28804] Iª q. 13 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod essentiam Dei in hac vita cognoscere non possumus +secundum quod in se est, sed cognoscimus eam secundum quod +repraesentatur in perfectionibus creaturarum. Et sic nomina a nobis +imposita eam significant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A3-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 3. Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained + above + <a id="FP_Q13_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore + names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28805] Iª q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo proprie. Omnia +enim nomina quae de Deo dicimus, sunt a creaturis accepta, ut +dictum est. Sed nomina creaturarum metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, +sicut cum dicitur Deus est lapis, vel leo, vel aliquid huiusmodi. +Ergo omnia nomina dicta de Deo, dicuntur metaphorice.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such + names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. + Hier. ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28806] Iª q. 13 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nullum nomen proprie dicitur de aliquo, a quo verius removetur quam +de eo praedicetur. Sed omnia huiusmodi nomina, bonus sapiens, et +similia, verius removentur a Deo quam de eo praedicentur, ut patet +per Dionysium, II cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo nullum istorum nominum +proprie dicitur de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply + some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore + all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28807] Iª q. 13 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nomina corporum non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice, cum sit +incorporeus. Sed omnia huiusmodi nomina implicant quasdam +corporales conditiones, significant enim cum tempore, et cum +compositione, et cum aliis huiusmodi, quae sunt conditiones +corporum. Ergo omnia huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo +metaphorice.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express + the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude." + Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal + sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28808] Iª q. 13 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Ambrosius, in Lib. II de fide, <i>sunt quaedam nomina, +quae evidenter proprietatem divinitatis ostendunt; et quaedam quae +perspicuam divinae maiestatis exprimunt veritatem; alia vero sunt, +quae translative per similitudinem de Deo dicuntur</i>. Non igitur +omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo metaphorice, sed aliqua dicuntur +proprie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, + which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, + and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God---viz. the perfections which + they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. + As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, + and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; + for their mode of signification applies to creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 co."><a name="28809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28809] Iª q. 13 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut dictum est, Deum cognoscimus ex perfectionibus +procedentibus in creaturas ab ipso; quae quidem perfectiones in Deo +sunt secundum eminentiorem modum quam in creaturis. Intellectus +autem noster eo modo apprehendit eas, secundum quod sunt in +creaturis, et secundum quod apprehendit, ita significat per nomina. +In nominibus igitur quae Deo attribuimus, est duo considerare, +scilicet, perfectiones ipsas significatas, ut bonitatem, vitam, et +huiusmodi; et modum significandi. Quantum igitur ad id quod +significant huiusmodi nomina, proprie competunt Deo, et magis +proprie quam ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de eo. Quantum +vero ad modum significandi, non proprie dicuntur de Deo, habent +enim modum significandi qui creaturis competit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in + which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a + material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these + perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their + signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28810] Iª q. 13 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod quaedam nomina significant huiusmodi perfectiones a +Deo procedentes in res creatas, hoc modo quod ipse modus +imperfectus quo a creatura participatur divina perfectio, in ipso +nominis significato includitur, sicut lapis significat aliquid +materialiter ens, et huiusmodi nomina non possunt attribui Deo nisi +metaphorice. Quaedam vero nomina significant ipsas perfectiones +absolute, absque hoc quod aliquis modus participandi claudatur in +eorum significatione, ut ens, bonum vivens, et huiusmodi, et talia +proprie dicuntur de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to + Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all + substance and all life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28811] Iª q. 13 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ideo huiusmodi nomina dicit Dionysius negari a Deo, +quia id quod significatur per nomen, non convenit eo modo ei, quo +nomen significat, sed excellentiori modo. Unde ibidem dicit +Dionysius quod Deus est super omnem substantiam et vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their + mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing + signified. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28812] Iª q. 13 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ista nomina quae proprie dicuntur de Deo important +conditiones corporales, non in ipso significato nominis, sed +quantum ad modum significandi. Ea vero quae metaphorice de Deo +dicuntur, important conditionem corporalem in ipso suo +significato.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A4-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 4. Whether names applied to God are synonymous?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. + But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it + is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28813] Iª q. 13 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod ista nomina dicta de Deo, sint nomina +synonyma. Synonyma enim nomina dicuntur, quae omnino idem +significant. Sed ista nomina dicta de Deo, omnino idem significant +in Deo, quia bonitas Dei est eius essentia, et similiter sapientia. +Ergo ista nomina sunt omnino synonyma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that + an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems + also that all these ideas are vain notions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28814] Iª q. 13 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod +ista nomina significant idem secundum rem, sed secundum rationes +diversas, contra, ratio cui non respondet aliquid in re, est vana; +si ergo istae rationes sunt multae, et res est una, videtur quod +rationes istae sint vanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is + supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not + signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28815] Iª q. 13 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, magis +est unum quod est unum re et ratione, quam quod est unum re et +multiplex ratione. Sed Deus est maxime unus. Ergo videtur quod non +sit unus re et multiplex ratione. Et sic nomina dicta de Deo non +significant rationes diversas, et ita sunt synonyma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to + God are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, + the Lord of hosts is Thy name" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.18" target="asv">Jer. 32:18</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28816] Iª q. 13 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnia +synonyma, sibi invicem adiuncta, nugationem adducunt, sicut si +dicatur vestis indumentum. Si igitur omnia nomina dicta de Deo sunt +synonyma, non posset convenienter dici Deus bonus, vel aliquid +huiusmodi; cum tamen scriptum sit Ierem. XXXII, <i>fortissime, +magne, potens, dominus exercituum nomen tibi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, + or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse + things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above + <a id="FP_Q13_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, that these names signify the divine substance, although in an + imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified + by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from + creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which + perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As + therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections + of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds + one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied + to God signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not + synonymous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 co."><a name="28817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28817] Iª q. 13 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo, non sunt synonyma. Quod quidem +facile esset videre, si diceremus quod huiusmodi nomina sunt +inducta ad removendum, vel ad designandum habitudinem causae +respectu creaturarum, sic enim essent diversae rationes horum +nominum secundum diversa negata, vel secundum diversos effectus +connotatos. Sed secundum quod dictum est huiusmodi nomina +substantiam divinam significare, licet imperfecte, etiam plane +apparet, secundum praemissa, quod habent rationes diversas. Ratio +enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de re +significata per nomen. Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum +ex creaturis, format ad intelligendum Deum conceptiones +proportionatas perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. +Quae quidem perfectiones in Deo praeexistunt unite et simpliciter, +in creaturis vero recipiuntur divise et multipliciter. Sicut igitur +diversis perfectionibus creaturarum respondet unum simplex +principium, repraesentatum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum +varie et multipliciter; ita variis et multiplicibus conceptibus +intellectus nostri respondet unum omnino simplex, secundum +huiusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Et ideo nomina Deo +attributa, licet significent unam rem, tamen, quia significant eam +sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p7"> Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which + signify different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies + the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28818] Iª q. 13 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et sic patet +solutio ad primum, quia nomina synonyma dicuntur, quae significant +unum secundum unam rationem. Quae enim significant rationes +diversas unius rei, non primo et per se unum significant, quia +nomen non significat rem, nisi mediante conceptione intellectus, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented + by them in a manifold and imperfect manner. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28819] Iª q. 13 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod rationes plures horum nominum non sunt cassae et +vanae, quia omnibus eis respondet unum quid simplex, per omnia +huiusmodi multipliciter et imperfecte repraesentatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus + it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, + as things represent Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28820] Iª q. 13 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod hoc ipsum ad perfectam Dei unitatem pertinet, quod ea +quae sunt multipliciter et divisim in aliis, in ipso sunt +simpliciter et unite. Et ex hoc contingit quod est unus re et +plures secundum rationem, quia intellectus noster ita multipliciter +apprehendit eum, sicut res multipliciter ipsum repraesentant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A5-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 5. Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, + as many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said + of some univocally---viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which + agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some + agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it + seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, + is predicated univocally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28821] Iª q. 13 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, +univoce de ipsis dicantur. Omne enim aequivocum reducitur ad +univocum, sicut multa ad unum. Nam si hoc nomen canis aequivoce +dicitur de latrabili et marino, oportet quod de aliquibus univoce +dicatur, scilicet de omnibus latrabilibus, aliter enim esset +procedere in infinitum. Inveniuntur autem quaedam agentia univoca, +quae conveniunt cum suis effectibus in nomine et definitione, ut +homo generat hominem; quaedam vero agentia aequivoca, sicut sol +causat calidum, cum tamen ipse non sit calidus nisi aequivoce. +Videtur igitur quod primum agens, ad quod omnia agentia reducuntur, +sit agens univocum. Et ita, quae de Deo et creaturis dicuntur, +univoce praedicantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according + to the word of Genesis ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>), "Let us make man to our image and likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28822] Iª q. 13 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum aequivoca non attenditur aliqua similitudo. Cum igitur +creaturae ad Deum sit aliqua similitudo, secundum illud Genes. I, +<i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram</i>, +videtur quod aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis dicatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous + with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28823] Iª q. 13 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +mensura est homogenea mensurato, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed Deus +est prima mensura omnium entium, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo Deus est +homogeneus creaturis. Et ita aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis +dici potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no + name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not + in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other + things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p6"> Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes + any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much + less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 1"><a name="28824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28824] Iª q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra, +quidquid praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen et non +secundum eandem rationem, praedicatur de eis aequivoce. Sed nullum +nomen convenit Deo secundum illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur +de creatura, nam sapientia in creaturis est qualitas, non autem in +Deo; genus autem variatum mutat rationem, cum sit pars +definitionis. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Quidquid ergo de Deo et +creaturis dicitur, aequivoce dicitur.</p><p title="I q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 2"><a name="28825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28825] Iª q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +plus distat a creaturis, quam quaecumque creaturae ab invicem. Sed +propter distantiam quarundam creaturarum, contingit quod nihil +univoce de eis praedicari potest; sicut de his quae non conveniunt +in aliquo genere. Ergo multo minus de Deo et creaturis aliquid +univoce praedicatur, sed omnia praedicantur aequivoce.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate + result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure + that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; + as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms + in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and + multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that + perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection + distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we + apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term + "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when + it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. + Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other + terms. + Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p8"> Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because + if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning + would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about + God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by + the things that are made" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p9"> Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" + predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the + latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since + medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures + analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures + <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and + cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure + equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the + same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various + proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine + signifies the cause of the same health. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 co."><a name="28826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28826] Iª q. 13 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis +univoce. Quia omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, +recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed +deficienter, ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in +effectibus, in causa est simpliciter et eodem modo; sicut sol +secundum unam virtutem, multiformes et varias formas in istis +inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est, omnes rerum +perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, +in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad +perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam +perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis, +puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam +perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab +esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo +dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia +vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen sapiens de +homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem +significatam, non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem +significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis +significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc +nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de +aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur. +Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum +hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari; +sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam +contra philosophos, qui multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam +etiam contra apostolum dicentem, Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea +quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>. Dicendum est igitur +quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum +analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in +nominibus, vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum +dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et +proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, +illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad +alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum +medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo +aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce +pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex +creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et +creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad +Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter +omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus communitatis medius est +inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim +in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in +univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen +quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad +aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dictum, significat signum +sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam +eiusdem sanitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal + agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the + generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it + would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a + particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause + of the whole species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal + agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, + but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal + analogical predication, which is being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28827] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, licet in praedicationibus oporteat aequivoca ad +univoca reduci, tamen in actionibus agens non univocum ex +necessitate praecedit agens univocum. Agens enim non univocum est +causa universalis totius speciei, ut sol est causa generationis +omnium hominum. Agens vero univocum non est causa agens universalis +totius speciei (alioquin esset causa sui ipsius, cum sub specie +contineatur), sed est causa particularis respectu huius individui, +quod in participatione speciei constituit. Causa igitur universalis +totius speciei non est agens univocum. Causa autem universalis est +prior particulari. Hoc autem agens universale, licet non sit +univocum, non tamen est omnino aequivocum, quia sic non faceret +sibi simile; sed potest dici agens analogicum, sicut in +praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum, non +univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28828] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod similitudo creaturae ad Deum est imperfecta, quia +etiam nec idem secundum genus repraesentat, ut supra dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the + same genus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28829] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus non est mensura proportionata mensuratis. Unde +non oportet quod Deus et creaturae sub uno genere contineantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p13"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; + yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28830] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ea vero quae sunt +in contrarium, concludunt quod non univoce huiusmodi nomina de Deo +et creaturis praedicentur, non autem quod aequivoce.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A6-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 6. Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know + it, since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the + names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28831] Iª q. 13 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod nomina per prius dicantur de creaturis +quam de Deo. Secundum enim quod cognoscimus aliquid, secundum hoc +illud nominamus; cum nomina, secundum philosophum, sint signa +intellectuum. Sed per prius cognoscimus creaturam quam Deum. Ergo +nomina a nobis imposita, per prius conveniunt creaturis quam +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said + primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures + are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28832] Iª q. 13 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum Dionysium, in libro de Div. Nom., Deum ex creaturis +nominamus. Sed nomina a creaturis translata in Deum, per prius +dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo; sicut leo, lapis, et huiusmodi. +Ergo omnia nomina quae de Deo et de creaturis dicuntur, per prius +de creaturis quam de Deo dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says + (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily + predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures + rather than of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28833] Iª q. 13 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnia +nomina quae communiter de Deo et creaturis dicuntur, dicuntur de +Deo sicut de causa omnium, ut dicit Dionysius. Sed quod dicitur de +aliquo per causam, per posterius de illo dicitur, per prius enim +dicitur animal sanum quam medicina, quae est causa sanitatis. Ergo +huiusmodi nomina per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.14" target="asv">Eph. 3:14,15</a>); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God + rather than to creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28834] Iª q. 13 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Ephes. III, <i>flecto genua mea ad patrem domini +nostri Iesu, ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra +nominatur</i>. Et eadem ratio videtur de nominibus aliis quae de +Deo et creaturis dicuntur. Ergo huiusmodi nomina per prius de Deo +quam de creaturis dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and + this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the + Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other + things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first. + Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called + healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which + is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied + to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For + as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile + by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a + lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. + But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as + the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the + creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" + would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify + not only that + He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name + signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; + but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they + have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above + <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 co."><a name="28835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28835] Iª q. 13 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, +necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum, et ideo +illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia +ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV +Metaphys., necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de eo +quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis, +secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud primum vel magis vel +minus, sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione +sani quod dicitur de medicina, quae dicitur sana inquantum causat +sanitatem in animali; et in definitione sani quod dicitur de urina, +quae dicitur sana inquantum est signum sanitatis animalis. Sic ergo +omnia nomina quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, per prius de +creaturis dicuntur quam de Deo, quia dicta de Deo, nihil aliud +significant quam similitudines ad tales creaturas. Sicut enim +ridere, dictum de prato, nihil aliud significat quam quod pratum +similiter se habet in decore cum floret, sicut homo cum ridet, +secundum similitudinem proportionis; sic nomen leonis, dictum de +Deo, nihil aliud significat quam quod Deus similiter se habet ut +fortiter operetur in suis operibus, sicut leo in suis. Et sic patet +quod, secundum quod dicuntur de Deo, eorum significatio definiri +non potest, nisi per illud quod de creaturis dicitur. De aliis +autem nominibus, quae non metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, esset etiam +eadem ratio, si dicerentur de Deo causaliter tantum, ut quidam +posuerunt. Sic enim. Cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nihil aliud esset +quam Deus est causa bonitatis creaturae, et sic hoc nomen bonum, +dictum de Deo, clauderet in suo intellectu bonitatem creaturae. +Unde bonum per prius diceretur de creatura quam de Deo. Sed supra +ostensum est quod huiusmodi nomina non solum dicuntur de Deo +causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter. Cum enim dicitur Deus est +bonus, vel sapiens, non solum significatur quod ipse sit causa +sapientiae vel bonitatis, sed quod haec in eo eminentius +praeexistunt. Unde, secundum hoc, dicendum est quod, quantum ad rem +significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de +creaturis, quia a Deo huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant. +Sed quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur +creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus. Unde et modum significandi +habent qui competit creaturis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection refers to the imposition of the name. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28836] Iª q. 13 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quantum ad impositionem +nominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28837] Iª q. 13 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de nominibus quae metaphorice de +Deo dicuntur, et de aliis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as + "healthy" is applied to medicine. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28838] Iª q. 13 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod obiectio illa procederet, si huiusmodi nomina solum +de Deo causaliter dicerentur et non essentialiter, sicut sanum de +medicina.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A7-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 7. Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the + divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which + is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not + temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but + eternally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28839] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod nomina quae important relationem ad +creaturas, non dicantur de Deo ex tempore. Omnia enim huiusmodi +nomina significant divinam substantiam, ut communiter dicitur. Unde +et Ambrosius dicit quod hoc nomen dominus est nomen potestatis, +quae est divina substantia, et creator significat Dei actionem, +quae est eius essentia. Sed divina substantia non est temporalis, +sed aeterna. Ergo huiusmodi nomina non dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, +sed ab aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. + But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28840] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +cuicumque convenit aliquid ex tempore, potest dici factum, quod +enim ex tempore est album, fit album. Sed Deo non convenit esse +factum. Ergo de Deo nihil praedicatur ex tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things + that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for + from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.3" target="asv">Jer. 31:3</a>). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as + "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from eternity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28841] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +aliqua nomina dicuntur de Deo ex tempore propter hoc quod important +relationem ad creaturas, eadem ratio videtur de omnibus quae +relationem ad creaturas important. Sed quaedam nomina importantia +relationem ad creaturas, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, ab aeterno +enim scivit creaturam et dilexit, secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, <i>in +caritate perpetua dilexi te</i>. Ergo et alia nomina quae important +relationem ad creaturas, ut dominus et creator, dicuntur de Deo ab +aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. + But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite + relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. + But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied + to God temporally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="28842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28842] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +huiusmodi nomina relationem significant. Oportet igitur quod +relatio illa vel sit aliquid in Deo, vel in creatura tantum. Sed +non potest esse quod sit in creatura tantum, quia sic Deus +denominaretur dominus a relatione opposita, quae est in creaturis; +nihil autem denominatur a suo opposito. Relinquitur ergo quod +relatio est etiam aliquid in Deo. Sed in Deo nihil potest esse ex +tempore, cum ipse sit supra tempus. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi +nomina non dicantur de Deo ex tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if + the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly + false. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 5"><a name="28843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28843] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum relationem dicitur aliquid relative, puta secundum +dominium dominus, sicut secundum albedinem albus. Si igitur relatio +dominii non est in Deo secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem, +sequitur quod Deus non sit realiter dominus, quod patet esse +falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can + exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures + are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of + the creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from + eternity, and not temporally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 6"><a name="28844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28844] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, in +relativis quae non sunt simul natura, unum potest esse, altero non +existente, sicut scibile existit, non existente scientia, ut +dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed relativa quae dicuntur de Deo et +creaturis, non sunt simul natura. Ergo potest aliquid dici relative +de Deo ad creaturam, etiam creatura non existente. Et sic huiusmodi +nomina, dominus et creator, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, et non ex +tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28845] Iª q. 13 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, V de Trin., quod haec relativa appellatio +dominus Deo convenit ex tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p10"> To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen + to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary + to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from + both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension + of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it + apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between "being" and "non-being" formed + by reason, apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus + and species, and the like. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p11"> Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between + two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great + and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent + upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p12"> Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens + whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual + things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. + Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge + or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them + there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the + relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they + are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a + column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p13"> Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it + is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a + relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import + relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason + of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 co."><a name="28846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28846] Iª q. 13 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quaedam nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam, ex tempore +de Deo dicuntur, et non ab aeterno. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum +est quod quidam posuerunt relationem non esse rem naturae, sed +rationis tantum. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum, ex hoc quod ipsae +res naturalem ordinem et habitudinem habent ad invicem. Veruntamen +sciendum est quod, cum relatio requirat duo extrema, tripliciter se +habere potest ad hoc quod sit res naturae et rationis. Quandoque +enim ex utraque parte est res rationis tantum, quando scilicet ordo +vel habitudo non potest esse inter aliqua, nisi secundum +apprehensionem rationis tantum, utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem. +Nam secundum quod ratio apprehendit bis aliquod unum, statuit illud +ut duo; et sic apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum. +Et similiter est de omnibus relationibus quae sunt inter ens et non +ens; quas format ratio, inquantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam +extremum. Et idem est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur +actum rationis, ut genus et species, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero +relationes sunt, quantum ad utrumque extremum, res naturae, quando +scilicet est habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter +conveniens utrique. Sicut patet de omnibus relationibus quae +consequuntur quantitatem, ut magnum et parvum, duplum et dimidium, +et huiusmodi, nam quantitas est in utroque extremorum. Et simile +est de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem et passionem, ut +motivum et mobile, pater et filius, et similia. Quandoque vero +relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae, et in altero est res +rationis tantum. Et hoc contingit quandocumque duo extrema non sunt +unius ordinis. Sicut sensus et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et +scibile, quae quidem, inquantum sunt res quaedam in esse naturali +existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et intelligibilis, +et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio realis, secundum +quod ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res ipsae in se +consideratae, sunt extra ordinem huiusmodi. Unde in eis non est +aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum; sed secundum +rationem tantum, inquantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos +relationum scientiae et sensus. Unde philosophus dicit, in V +Metaphys., quod non dicuntur relative eo quod ipsa referantur ad +alia, sed quia alia referuntur ad ipsa. Et similiter dextrum non +dicitur de columna, nisi inquantum ponitur animali ad dextram, unde +huiusmodi relatio non est realiter in columna, sed in animali. Cum +igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes creaturae +ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converso, manifestum est quod +creaturae realiter referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est +aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem +tantum, inquantum creaturae referuntur ad ipsum. Et sic nihil +prohibet huiusmodi nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam, +praedicari de Deo ex tempore, non propter aliquam mutationem +ipsius, sed propter creaturae mutationem; sicut columna fit dextera +animali, nulla mutatione circa ipsam existente, sed animali +translato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and "son," + and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from + which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and + these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the + same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not + signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes + power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, + as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are + said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, + either directly or indirectly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28847] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas +habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater et filius, et +huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundum esse. Quaedam vero +sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam +habitudines, sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia +huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum dici. Sic igitur et +circa nomina divina haec differentia est consideranda. Nam quaedam +significant ipsam habitudinem ad creaturam, ut dominus. Et +huiusmodi non significant substantiam divinam directe, sed +indirecte, inquantum praesupponunt ipsam, sicut dominium +praesupponit potestatem, quae est divina substantia. Quaedam vero +significant directe essentiam divinam, et ex consequenti important +habitudinem; sicut salvator, creator, et huiusmodi, significant +actionem Dei, quae est eius essentia. Utraque tamen nomina ex +tempore de Deo dicuntur quantum ad habitudinem quam important, vel +principaliter vel consequenter, non autem quantum ad hoc quod +significant essentiam, vel directe vel indirecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only + in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A7-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.89.1" target="asv">Ps. 89:1</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28848] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut relationes quae de Deo dicuntur ex tempore, +non sunt in Deo nisi secundum rationem, ita nec fieri nec factum +esse dicitur de Deo, nisi secundum rationem, nulla mutatione circa +ipsum existente, sicut est id, <i>domine refugium factus es +nobis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action + of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according + to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28849] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod operatio intellectus et voluntatis est in operante, +et ideo nomina quae significant relationes consequentes actionem +intellectus vel voluntatis, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno. Quae vero +consequuntur actiones procedentes, secundum modum intelligendi, ad +exteriores effectus, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, ut salvator, +creator, et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations + in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet + so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of + relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the + Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="28850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28850] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod relationes significatae per huiusmodi nomina quae +dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum, +oppositae autem relationes in creaturis sunt secundum rem. Nec est +inconveniens quod a relationibus realiter existentibus in re, Deus +denominetur, tamen secundum quod cointelliguntur per intellectum +nostrum oppositae relationes in Deo. Ut sic Deus dicatur relative +ad creaturam, quia creatura refertur ad ipsum, sicut philosophus +dicit, in V Metaphys., quod scibile dicitur relative, quia scientia +refertur ad ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection + is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to + the manner in which the creature is subject to Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 5"><a name="28851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28851] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, cum ea ratione referatur Deus ad creaturam, qua +creatura refertur ad ipsum; cum relatio subiectionis realiter sit +in creatura, sequitur quod Deus non secundum rationem tantum, sed +realiter sit dominus. Eo enim modo dicitur dominus, quo creatura ei +subiecta est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to + which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then + they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, + and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science + and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the + knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is + simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to + the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, + "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 6"><a name="28852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28852] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum +quod, ad cognoscendum utrum relativa sint simul natura vel non, non +oportet considerare ordinem rerum de quibus relativa dicuntur, sed +significationes ipsorum relativorum. Si enim unum in sui intellectu +claudat aliud et e converso, tunc sunt simul natura, sicut duplum +et dimidium, pater et filius, et similia. Si autem unum in sui +intellectu claudat aliud, et non e converso, tunc non sunt simul +natura. Et hoc modo se habent scientia et scibile. Nam scibile +dicitur secundum potentiam, scientia autem secundum habitum, vel +secundum actum. Unde scibile, secundum modum suae significationis, +praeexistit scientiae. Sed si accipiatur scibile secundum actum, +tunc est simul cum scientia secundum actum, nam scitum non est +aliquid nisi sit eius scientia. Licet igitur Deus sit prior +creaturis, quia tamen in significatione domini clauditur quod +habeat servum, et e converso, ista duo relativa, dominus et servus, +sunt simul natura. Unde Deus non fuit dominus, antequam haberet +creaturam sibi subiectam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A8-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 8. Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God {Theos} is so + called from the {theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the {aithein}, that is to burn, for our + God is a fire consuming all malice; or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all things." But all these names belong to + operation. Therefore this name "God" signifies His operation and not His nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28853] Iª q. 13 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus non sit nomen naturae. +Dicit enim Damascenus, in I libro, quod <i>Deus dicitur a +theein</i>, quod est currere, et fovere universa; <i>vel ab +aethein, idest ardere (Deus enim noster ignis consumens est omnem +malitiam); vel a theasthai</i>, quod est considerare, omnia. Haec +autem omnia ad operationem pertinent. Ergo hoc nomen Deus +operationem significat, et non naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not + signify the divine nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28854] Iª q. 13 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum hoc aliquid nominatur a nobis, secundum quod cognoscitur. +Sed divina natura est nobis ignota. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non +significat naturam divinam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28855] Iª q. 13 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro I de fide, quod Deus est nomen +naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A8-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties + and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from + its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular + action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in + themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the + meaning of the name and its source are the same. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A8-p6"> Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him + from these, as said in A[1]; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. + For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising + providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect + providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name "God" is imposed to signify the divine nature. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 co."><a name="28856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28856] Iª q. 13 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod non est semper idem id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, +et id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Sicut enim substantiam +rei ex proprietatibus vel operationibus eius cognoscimus, ita +substantiam rei denominamus quandoque ab aliqua eius operatione vel +proprietate, sicut substantiam lapidis denominamus ab aliqua +actione eius, quia laedit pedem; non tamen hoc nomen impositum est +ad significandum hanc actionem, sed substantiam lapidis. Si qua +vero sunt quae secundum se sunt nota nobis, ut calor, frigus, +albedo, et huiusmodi, non ab aliis denominantur. Unde in talibus +idem est quod nomen significat, et id a quo imponitur nomen ad +significandum. Quia igitur Deus non est notus nobis in sui natura, +sed innotescit nobis ex operationibus vel effectibus eius, ex his +possumus eum nominare, ut supra dictum est. Unde hoc nomen Deus est +nomen operationis, quantum ad id a quo imponitur ad significandum. +Imponitur enim hoc nomen ab universali rerum providentia, omnes +enim loquentes de Deo, hoc intendunt nominare Deum, quod habet +providentiam universalem de rebus. Unde dicit Dionysius, XII cap. +de Div. Nom., quod <i>deitas est quae omnia videt providentia et +bonitate perfecta</i>. Ex hac autem operatione hoc nomen Deus +assumptum, impositum est ad significandum divinam naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name "God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28857] Iª q. 13 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod omnia quae posuit Damascenus, pertinent ad +providentiam, a qua imponitur hoc nomen Deus ad significandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can + know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone" signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies + the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said + in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in + itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, + the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28858] Iª q. 13 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, secundum quod naturam alicuius rei ex eius +proprietatibus et effectibus cognoscere possumus, sic eam nomine +possumus significare. Unde, quia substantiam lapidis ex eius +proprietate possumus cognoscere secundum seipsam, sciendo quid est +lapis, hoc nomen lapis ipsam lapidis naturam, secundum quod in se +est, significat, significat enim definitionem lapidis, per quam +scimus quid est lapis. Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est +definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. Sed ex effectibus divinis +divinam naturam non possumus cognoscere secundum quod in se est, ut +sciamus de ea quid est; sed per modum eminentiae et causalitatis et +negationis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic hoc nomen Deus significat +naturam divinam. Impositum est enim nomen hoc ad aliquid +significandum supra omnia existens, quod est principium omnium, et +remotum ab omnibus. Hoc enim intendunt significare nominantes +Deum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A9-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 9. Whether this name "God" is communicable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. + But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us + great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.4" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:4</a>). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to + others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28859] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus sit communicabile. +Cuicumque enim communicatur res significata per nomen, communicatur +et nomen ipsum. Sed hoc nomen Deus, ut dictum est, significat +divinam naturam, quae est communicabilis aliis, secundum illud II +Pet. I, <i>magna et pretiosa promissa nobis donavit, ut per hoc +efficiamur divinae consortes naturae</i>. Ergo hoc nomen Deus est +communicabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears + from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.6" target="asv">Ps. 81:6</a>). Therefore this name "God" is communicable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28860] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sola +nomina propria non sunt communicabilia. Sed hoc nomen Deus non est +nomen proprium, sed appellativum, quod patet ex hoc quod habet +plurale, secundum illud Psalmi LXXXI, <i>ego dixi, dii estis</i>. +Ergo hoc nomen Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects + are communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is communicable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="28861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28861] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, hoc +nomen Deus imponitur ab operatione, ut dictum est. Sed alia nomina +quae imponuntur Deo ab operationibus, sive ab effectibus, sunt +communicabilia, ut bonus, sapiens et huiusmodi. Ergo et hoc nomen +Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.21" target="asv">Wis. 14:21</a>), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28862] Iª q. 13 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus +imposuerunt</i>; et loquitur de nomine deitatis. Ergo hoc nomen +Deus est nomen incommunicabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole + signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. + For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable + to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or + strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, + we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either + in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common + to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the + reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular + subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood + as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name + imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing + cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, + but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess + something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum," + but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be + communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as + we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having + forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in + some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound + things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A9-p7"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above + <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this + name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: + "You served them who + by nature are not gods," ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.8" target="asv">Gal. 4:8</a>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its + whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, + according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.6" target="asv">Ps. 81:6</a>). + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A9-p8"> But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered + as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the + Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 co."><a name="28863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28863] Iª q. 13 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod aliquod nomen potest esse communicabile dupliciter, uno modo, +proprie; alio modo, per similitudinem. Proprie quidem communicabile +est, quod secundum totam significationem nominis, est communicabile +multis. Per similitudinem autem communicabile est, quod est +communicabile secundum aliquid eorum quae includuntur in nominis +significatione. Hoc enim nomen leo proprie communicatur omnibus +illis in quibus invenitur natura quam significat hoc nomen leo, per +similitudinem vero communicabile est illis qui participant aliquid +leoninum, ut puta audaciam vel fortitudinem, qui metaphorice leones +dicuntur. Ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt +communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito +singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel +secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem, sicut natura humana +communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solis +non est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum; +potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis +existens. Et hoc ideo, quia intellectus intelligit naturam +cuiuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari, unde esse in uno +supposito singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectum +naturae speciei, unde, servato intellectu naturae speciei, potest +intelligi ut in pluribus existens. Sed singulare, ex hoc ipso quod +est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. Unde omne nomen +impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare, est incommunicabile +et re et ratione, non enim potest nec in apprehensione cadere +pluralitas huius individui. Unde nullum nomen significans aliquod +individuum, est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum +similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles, +inquantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achillis, scilicet +fortitudinem. Formae vero quae non individuantur per aliquod +suppositum, sed per seipsas (quia scilicet sunt formae +subsistentes), si intelligerentur secundum quod sunt in seipsis, +non possent communicari nec re neque ratione; sed forte per +similitudinem, sicut dictum est de individuis. Sed quia formas +simplices per se subsistentes non possumus intelligere secundum +quod sunt, sed intelligimus eas ad modum rerum compositarum +habentium formas in materia; ideo, ut dictum est, imponimus eis +nomina concreta significantia naturam in aliquo supposito. Unde, +quantum pertinet ad rationem nominum, eadem ratio est de nominibus +quae a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas rerum +compositarum, et de nominibus quae a nobis imponuntur ad +significandum naturas simplices subsistentes. Unde, cum hoc nomen +Deus impositum sit ad significandum naturam divinam, ut dictum est; +natura autem divina multiplicabilis non est, ut supra ostensum est, +sequitur quod hoc nomen Deus incommunicabile quidem sit secundum +rem, sed communicabile sit secundum opinionem, quemadmodum hoc +nomen sol esset communicabile secundum opinionem ponentium multos +soles. Et secundum hoc dicitur Gal. IV, <i>his qui natura non sunt +dii, serviebatis</i>; Glossa, <i>non sunt dii natura, sed opinione +hominum</i>. Est nihilominus communicabile hoc nomen Deus, non +secundum suam totam significationem, sed secundum aliquid eius, per +quandam similitudinem, ut dii dicantur, qui participant aliquid +divinum per similitudinem, secundum illud, <i>ego dixi, dii +estis</i>. Si vero esset aliquod nomen impositum ad significandum +Deum non ex parte naturae, sed ex parte suppositi, secundum quod +consideratur ut hoc aliquid, illud nomen esset omnibus modis +incommunicabile, sicut forte est nomen tetragrammaton apud +Hebraeos. Et est simile si quis imponeret nomen soli designans hoc +individuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28864] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod natura divina non est communicabilis nisi secundum +similitudinis participationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although + God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but + upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said + above concerning the name "sun." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28865] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus est nomen appellativum, et non +proprium, quia significat naturam divinam ut in habente; licet ipse +Deus, secundum rem, non sit nec universalis nec particularis. +Nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum +essendi secundum quod in cognitione nostra est. Et tamen, secundum +rei veritatem, est incommunicabile, secundum quod dictum est de hoc +nomine sol.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do + not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable + to many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the + divine nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="28866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28866] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod haec nomina bonus, sapiens, et similia, imposita +quidem sunt a perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas, non +tamen sunt imposita ad significandum divinam naturam, sed ad +significandum ipsas perfectiones absolute. Et ideo etiam secundum +rei veritatem sunt communicabilia multis. Sed hoc nomen Deus +impositum est ab operatione propria Deo, quam experimur continue, +ad significandum divinam naturam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A10-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 10. Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where + a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. + But a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is God." Therefore GOD in both senses + is spoken of univocally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28867] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus univoce dicatur de Deo per +naturam, et per participationem, et secundum opinionem. Ubi enim +est diversa significatio, non est contradictio affirmantis et +negantis, aequivocatio enim impedit contradictionem sed Catholicus +dicens idolum non est Deus, contradicit Pagano dicenti idolum est +Deus. Ergo Deus utrobique sumptum univoce dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, + and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. + Therefore also this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28868] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut idolum est Deus secundum opinionem et non secundum veritatem, +ita fruitio carnalium delectationum dicitur felicitas secundum +opinionem, et non secundum veritatem. Sed hoc nomen beatitudo +univoce dicitur de hac beatitudine opinata, et de hac beatitudine +vera. Ergo et hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur de Deo secundum +veritatem, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands + by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: "An + idol is God." Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28869] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +univoca dicuntur quorum est ratio una. Sed Catholicus, cum dicit +unum esse Deum, intelligit nomine Dei rem omnipotentem, et super +omnia venerandam, et hoc idem intelligit gentilis, cum dicit idolum +esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur utrobique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied + to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion + is applied equivocally. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A10-p6"> Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol + is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there + is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to + opinion. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1"><a name="28870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28870] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra, +illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius quod est in re, +ut dicitur in I Periherm. Sed animal, dictum de animali vero et de +animali picto, aequivoce dicitur. Ergo hoc nomen Deus, dictum de +Deo vero et de Deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur.</p><p title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2"><a name="28871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28871] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus potest significare id quod non cognoscit, sed gentilis non +cognoscit naturam divinam, ergo, cum dicit idolum est Deus, non +significat veram deitatem. Hanc autem significat Catholicus dicens +unum esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non dicitur univoce, sed +aequivoce, de Deo vero, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A10-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This + is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas + in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; + as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition + of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine + and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A10-p8"> The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when + it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the + name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify + something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is + comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 co."><a name="28872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28872] Iª q. 13 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod hoc nomen Deus, in praemissis tribus significationibus, non +accipitur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice. Quod ex hoc +patet. Quia univocorum est omnino eadem ratio, aequivocorum est +omnino ratio diversa, in analogicis vero, oportet quod nomen +secundum unam significationem acceptum, ponatur in definitione +eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti. Sicut ens +de substantia dictum, ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de +accidente dicitur; et sanum dictum de animali, ponitur in +definitione sani secundum quod dicitur de urina et de medicina; +huius enim sani quod est in animali, urina est significativa, et +medicina factiva. Sic accidit in proposito. Nam hoc nomen Deus, +secundum quod pro Deo vero sumitur, in ratione Dei sumitur secundum +quod dicitur Deus secundum opinionem vel participationem. Cum enim +aliquem nominamus Deum secundum participationem, intelligimus +nomine Dei aliquid habens similitudinem veri Dei. Similiter cum +idolum nominamus Deum, hoc nomine Deus intelligimus significari +aliquid, de quo homines opinantur quod sit Deus. Et sic manifestum +est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis, sed una illarum +significationum clauditur in significationibus aliis. Unde +manifestum est quod analogice dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man," + of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the + name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really + is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it + is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of + them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning + God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, + "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A10-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.95.5" target="asv">Ps. 95:5</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28873] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod nominum multiplicitas non attenditur secundum nominis +praedicationem, sed secundum significationem, hoc enim nomen homo, +de quocumque praedicetur, sive vere sive false, dicitur uno modo. +Sed tunc multipliciter diceretur, si per hoc nomen homo +intenderemus significare diversa, puta, si unus intenderet +significare per hoc nomen homo id quod vere est homo, et alius +intenderet significare eodem nomine lapidem, vel aliquid aliud. +Unde patet quod Catholicus dicens idolum non esse Deum, contradicit +Pagano hoc asserenti, quia uterque utitur hoc nomine Deus ad +significandum verum Deum. Cum enim Paganus dicit idolum esse Deum, +non utitur hoc nomine secundum quod significat Deum opinabilem, sic +enim verum diceret, cum etiam Catholici interdum in tali +significatione hoc nomine utantur, ut cum dicitur, <i>omnes dii +gentium Daemonia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p10"><b>Reply to Objections 2 and 3:</b> The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the + name, and not from its various significations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28874] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum ad secundum et tertium. Nam illae rationes procedunt +secundum diversitatem praedicationis nominis, et non secundum +diversam significationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names + in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be + predicated equivocally of different predicaments. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 4"><a name="28875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28875] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et de picto, non +dicitur pure aequivoce; sed philosophus largo modo accipit +aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod +analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de +diversis praedicamentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea + of causality, or excellence, or remotion ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol + is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use + names the meaning of which we know not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 5"><a name="28876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28876] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque Catholicus +neque Paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam +rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis, ut supra +dictum est. Et secundum hoc, in eadem significatione accipere +potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum dicit idolum est Deus, in qua +accipit ipsum Catholicus dicens idolum non est Deus. Si vero +aliquis esset qui secundum nullam rationem Deum cognosceret, nec +ipsum nominaret, nisi forte sicut proferimus nomina quorum +significationem ignoramus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A11-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 11. Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But + this name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28877] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen qui est non sit maxime +proprium nomen Dei. Hoc enim nomen Deus est nomen incommunicabile, +ut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen qui est non est nomen incommunicabile. +Ergo hoc nomen qui est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it + especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God, + and not this name HE WHO IS. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28878] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Dionysius dicit, III cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>boni nominatio est +manifestativa omnium Dei processionum</i>. Sed hoc maxime Deo +convenit, quod sit universale rerum principium. Ergo hoc nomen +bonum est maxime proprium Dei, et non hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this + name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28879] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne +nomen divinum videtur importare relationem ad creaturas, cum Deus +non cognoscatur a nobis nisi per creaturas. Sed hoc nomen qui est +nullam importat habitudinem ad creaturas. Ergo hoc nomen qui est +non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered + him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.13" target="asv">Ex. 3:13,14</a>). Therefor this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28880] Iª q. 13 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Exod. III, quod Moysi quaerenti, <i>si dixerint mihi, +quod est nomen eius? Quid dicam eis?</i> Et respondit ei dominus, +<i>sic dices eis, qui est misit me ad vos</i>. Ergo hoc nomen qui +est est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons: + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p7"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence + of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p8"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add + something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the + essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about + God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the + more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, + "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as + an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this + name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean + of + substance." + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p9"> Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose + existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 co."><a name="28881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28881] Iª q. 13 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod hoc nomen qui est triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen +Dei. Primo quidem, propter sui significationem. Non enim significat +formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde, cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius +essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat, ut supra ostensum est, +manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominat +Deum, unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma. Secundo, propter +eius universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus +communia; vel, si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra +ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant +ipsum. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam +cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se est, sed quemcumque +modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo +quo Deus in se est. Et ideo, quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus +determinata, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie +dicuntur de Deo a nobis. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod +<i>principalius omnibus quae de Deo dicuntur nominibus, est qui +est, totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut +quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum</i>. +Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae +rei, sed hoc nomen qui est nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se +habet indeterminate ad omnes; et ideo nominat ipsum <i>pelagus +substantiae infinitum</i>. Tertio vero, ex eius consignificatione. +Significat enim esse in praesenti, et hoc maxime proprie de Deo +dicitur, cuius esse non novit praeteritum vel futurum, ut dicit +Augustinus in V de Trin.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and + as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, + this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, + imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, + singular. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28882] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod hoc nomen qui est est magis proprium nomen Dei quam +hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et +quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est. +Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, est +magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum +naturam divinam. Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragrammaton, +quod est impositum ad significandam ipsam Dei substantiam +incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely + comes before the idea of cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28883] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod hoc nomen bonum est principale nomen Dei inquantum +est causa, non tamen simpliciter, nam esse absolute +praeintelligitur causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from + some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28884] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non est necessarium quod omnia nomina divina +importent habitudinem ad creaturas; sed sufficit quod imponantur ab +aliquibus perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Inter +quas prima est ipsum esse, a qua sumitur hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A12-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 12. Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about + God are true; but affirmations are vague." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28885] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod propositiones affirmativae non possunt +formari de Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II cap. Cael. Hier., quod +<i>negationes de Deo sunt verae, affirmationes autem +incompactae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, + as shown (Q[3] ): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken + as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28886] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod <i>forma simplex subiectum +esse non potest</i>. Sed Deus maxime est forma simplex, ut supra +ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo +propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de +Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition + as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition + about God cannot be made. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28887] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed +Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est. +Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum +compositione, videtur quod propositio affirmativa vere de Deo +formari non possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that + He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28888] Iª q. 13 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod fidei non subest falsum. Sed propositiones quaedam +affirmativae subduntur fidei, utpote quod Deus est trinus et unus, +et quod est omnipotens. Ergo propositiones affirmativae possunt +vere formari de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition + the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears + to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For + it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for + the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the + same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called + animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as + to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule + in + some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in + the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are + to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, + while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself. + </p><p id="FP_Q13_A12-p7"> God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions + because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows + that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents + the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 co."><a name="28889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28889] Iª q. 13 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo. Ad +cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione +affirmativa vera, oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent +idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et +hoc patet tam in propositionibus quae sunt de praedicato +accidentali, quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato substantiali. +Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subiecto, et +differunt ratione, alia enim est ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi. +Et similiter cum dico homo est animal, illud enim ipsum quod est +homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura +sensibilis, a qua dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur +homo. Unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem supposito, +sed diversa ratione. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem +praedicatur de seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; inquantum +intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad partem +suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati, trahit ad naturam +formae in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod +praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta materialiter. Huic vero +diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas +praedicati et subiecti, identitatem vero rei significat intellectus +per ipsam compositionem. Deus autem, in se consideratus, est omnino +unus et simplex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas +conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum ut in seipso +est, videre. Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis +conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod omnibus suis conceptionibus +respondet una et eadem res simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae +est secundum rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem praedicati et +subiecti, unitatem vero repraesentat intellectus per +compositionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as + no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28890] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Dionysius dicit affirmationes de Deo esse +incompactas, vel inconvenientes secundum aliam translationem, +inquantum nullum nomen Deo competit secundum modum significandi, ut +supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound + things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form + as a subject, and attributes something else to it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28891] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus noster non potest formas simplices +subsistentes secundum quod in seipsis sunt, apprehendere, sed +apprehendit eas secundum modum compositorum, in quibus est aliquid +quod subiicitur, et est aliquid quod inest. Et ideo apprehendit +formam simplicem in ratione subiecti, et attribuit ei aliquid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly + as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the + one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect + which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this + does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is + composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode + of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect + understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but + its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according + to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect + is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28892] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod haec propositio, intellectus intelligens rem aliter +quam sit, est falsus, est duplex, ex eo quod hoc adverbium aliter +potest determinare hoc verbum intelligit ex parte intellecti, vel +ex parte intelligentis. Si ex parte intellecti, sic propositio vera +est, et est sensus, quicumque intellectus intelligit rem esse +aliter quam sit, falsus est. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito, +quia intellectus noster, formans propositionem de Deo, non dicit +eum esse compositum, sed simplicem. Si vero ex parte intelligentis, +sic propositio falsa est. Alius est enim modus intellectus in +intelligendo, quam rei in essendo. Manifestum est enim quod +intellectus noster res materiales infra se existentes intelligit +immaterialiter; non quod intelligat eas esse immateriales, sed +habet modum immaterialem in intelligendo. Et similiter, cum +intelligit simplicia quae sunt supra se, intelligit ea secundum +modum suum, scilicet composite, non tamen ita quod intelligat ea +esse composita. Et sic intellectus noster non est falsus, formans +compositionem de Deo.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q14" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q14-p0.1">Q. 14. OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q14-p2"> Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation + is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding + abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the + divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of + life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower, + and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added + the treatment of ideas. + </p><p id="FP_Q14-p3"> Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q14-p4"> (1) Whether there is knowledge in God?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p5"> (2) Whether God understands Himself?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p6"> (3) Whether He comprehends Himself?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p7"> (4) Whether His understanding is His substance?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p8"> (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p9"> (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p10"> (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p11"> (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p12"> (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p13"> (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p14"> (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p15"> (12) Whether He knows the infinite?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p16"> (13) Whether He knows future contingent things?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p17"> (14) Whether He knows enunciable things?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p18"> (15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p19"> (16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 pr."><a name="28893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28893] +Iª q. 14 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad +divinam substantiam pertinent, restat considerandum de his quae +pertinent ad operationem ipsius. Et quia operatio quaedam est quae +manet in operante, quaedam vero quae procedit in exteriorem +effectum, primo agemus de scientia et voluntate (nam intelligere in +intelligente est, et velle in volente); et postmodum de potentia +Dei, quae consideratur ut principium operationis divinae in +effectum exteriorem procedentis. Quia vero intelligere quoddam +vivere est, post considerationem divinae scientiae, considerandum +erit de vita divina. Et quia scientia verorum est, erit etiam +considerandum de veritate et falsitate. Rursum, quia omne cognitum +in cognoscente est, rationes autem rerum secundum quod sunt in Deo +cognoscente, ideae vocantur, cum consideratione scientiae erit +etiam adiungenda consideratio de ideis. Circa scientiam vero +quaeruntur sexdecim. Primo, utrum in Deo sit scientia. Secundo, +utrum Deus intelligat seipsum. Tertio, utrum comprehendat se. +Quarto, utrum suum intelligere sit sua substantia. Quinto, utrum +intelligat alia a se. Sexto, utrum habeat de eis propriam +cognitionem. Septimo, utrum scientia Dei sit discursiva. Octavo, +utrum scientia Dei sit causa rerum. Nono, utrum scientia Dei sit +eorum quae non sunt. Decimo, utrum sit malorum. Undecimo, utrum sit +singularium. Duodecimo, utrum sit infinitorum. Decimotertio, utrum +sit contingentium futurorum. Decimoquarto, utrum sit enuntiabilium. +Decimoquinto, utrum scientia Dei sit variabilis. Decimosexto, utrum +Deus de rebus habeat speculativam scientiam vel practicam.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q14_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A1-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 1. Whether there is knowledge [*Scientia]?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the + mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28894] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit scientia. Scientia enim +habitus est, qui Deo non competit, cum sit medius inter potentiam +et actum. Ergo scientia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of + principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28895] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +scientia, cum sit conclusionum, est quaedam cognitio ab alio +causata, scilicet ex cognitione principiorum. Sed nihil causatum +est in Deo. Ergo scientia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore in God there is not knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28896] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis +scientia vel universalis vel particularis est. Sed in Deo non est +universale et particulare, ut ex superioribus patet; ergo in Deo +non est scientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.33" target="asv">Rom. 11:33</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28897] Iª q. 14 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod apostolus dicit Rom. XI, <i>o altitudo divitiarum sapientiae +et scientiae Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from + non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted + to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the + nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of + intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is + in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that + the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is + the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense + is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more + separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality + as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 co."><a name="28898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28898] Iª q. 14 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in Deo perfectissime est scientia. Ad cuius evidentiam, +considerandum est quod cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc +distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam +tantum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius, +nam species cogniti est in cognoscente. Unde manifestum est quod +natura rei non cognoscentis est magis coarctata et limitata, natura +autem rerum cognoscentium habet maiorem amplitudinem et +extensionem. Propter quod dicit philosophus, III de anima, quod +<i>anima est quodammodo omnia</i>. Coarctatio autem formae est per +materiam. Unde et supra diximus quod formae, secundum quod sunt +magis immateriales, secundum hoc magis accedunt ad quandam +infinitatem. Patet igitur quod immaterialitas alicuius rei est +ratio quod sit cognoscitiva; et secundum modum immaterialitatis est +modus cognitionis. Unde in II de anima dicitur quod plantae non +cognoscunt, propter suam materialitatem. Sensus autem cognoscitivus +est, quia receptivus est specierum sine materia, et intellectus +adhuc magis cognoscitivus, quia magis separatus est a materia et +immixtus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde, cum Deus sit in summo +immaterialitatis, ut ex superioribus patet, sequitur quod ipse sit +in summo cognitionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from + anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but + substance and pure act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28899] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, quia perfectiones procedentes a Deo in creaturas, +altiori modo sunt in Deo, ut supra dictum est, oportet quod, +quandocumque aliquod nomen sumptum a quacumque perfectione +creaturae Deo attribuitur, secludatur ab eius significatione omne +illud quod pertinet ad imperfectum modum qui competit creaturae. +Unde scientia non est qualitas in Deo vel habitus, sed substantia +et actus purus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as + regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he + knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to + be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown + <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from + each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses + perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Job.12.13" target="asv">Job 12:13</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28900] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ea quae sunt divisim et multipliciter in creaturis, +in Deo sunt simpliciter et unite, ut supra dictum est. Homo autem, +secundum diversa cognita, habet diversas cognitiones, nam secundum +quod cognoscit principia, dicitur habere intelligentiam; scientiam +vero, secundum quod cognoscit conclusiones; sapientiam, secundum +quod cognoscit causam altissimam; consilium vel prudentiam, +secundum quod cognoscit agibilia. Sed haec omnia Deus una et +simplici cognitione cognoscit, ut infra patebit. Unde simplex Dei +cognitio omnibus istis nominibus nominari potest, ita tamen quod ab +unoquoque eorum, secundum quod in divinam praedicationem venit, +secludatur quidquid imperfectionis est, et retineatur quidquid +perfectionis est. Et secundum hoc dicitur Iob XII, <i>apud ipsum +est sapientia et fortitudo; ipse habet consilium et +intelligentiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the + knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God + after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according + to any such mode. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28901] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod scientia est secundum modum cognoscentis, scitum enim +est in sciente secundum modum scientis. Et ideo, cum modus divinae +essentiae sit altior quam modus quo creaturae sunt, scientia divina +non habet modum creatae scientiae, ut scilicet sit universalis vel +particularis, vel in habitu vel in potentia, vel secundum aliquem +talem modum disposita.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A2-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 2. Whether God understands Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his + own essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; + thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28902] Iª q. 14 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non intelligat se. Dicitur enim in +libro de causis, quod <i>omnis sciens qui scit suam essentiam, est +rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa</i>. Sed Deus non exit +extra essentiam suam, nec aliquo modo movetur, et sic non competit +sibi redire ad essentiam suam. Ergo ipse non est sciens essentiam +suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a + kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, + or is made perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing its own likeness." Therefore God does not + understand Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28903] Iª q. 14 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +intelligere est quoddam pati et moveri, ut dicitur in III de anima, +scientia etiam est assimilatio ad rem scitam, et scitum etiam est +perfectio scientis. Sed nihil movetur, vel patitur, vel perficitur +a seipso; neque similitudo sibi est, ut Hilarius dicit. Ergo Deus +non est sciens seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen. + ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in De Anima iii. Therefore + God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28904] Iª q. 14 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praecipue Deo sumus similes secundum intellectum, quia secundum +mentem sumus ad imaginem Dei, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed intellectus +noster non intelligit se, nisi sicut intelligit alia, ut dicitur in +III de anima. Ergo nec Deus intelligit se, nisi forte intelligendo +alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28905] Iª q. 14 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur I ad Cor. II, <i>quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi +spiritus Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external + effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that + remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in + the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) + that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act." For the reason why we actually + feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because + of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A2-p7"> Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the + same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; + nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it + understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God + understands Himself through Himself. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 co."><a name="28906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28906] Iª q. 14 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus se per seipsum intelligit. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum +est quod, licet in operationibus quae transeunt in exteriorem +effectum, obiectum operationis, quod significatur ut terminus, sit +aliquid extra operantem; tamen in operationibus quae sunt in +operante, obiectum quod significatur ut terminus operationis, est +in ipso operante; et secundum quod est in eo, sic est operatio in +actu. Unde dicitur in libro de anima, quod sensibile in actu est +sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu. +Ex hoc enim aliquid in actu sentimus vel intelligimus, quod +intellectus noster vel sensus informatur in actu per speciem +sensibilis vel intelligibilis. Et secundum hoc tantum sensus vel +intellectus aliud est a sensibili vel intelligibili, quia utrumque +est in potentia. Cum igitur Deus nihil potentialitatis habeat, sed +sit actus purus, oportet quod in eo intellectus et intellectum sint +idem omnibus modis, ita scilicet, ut neque careat specie +intelligibili, sicut intellectus noster cum intelligit in potentia; +neque species intelligibilis sit aliud a substantia intellectus +divini, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro, cum est actu +intelligens; sed ipsa species intelligibilis est ipse intellectus +divinus. Et sic seipsum per seipsum intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving + it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore + those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of + each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know + themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, "whoever knows his essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God + to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28907] Iª q. 14 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod redire ad essentiam suam nihil aliud est quam rem +subsistere in seipsa. Forma enim, inquantum perficit materiam dando +ei esse, quodammodo supra ipsam effunditur, inquantum vero in +seipsa habet esse, in seipsam redit. Virtutes igitur cognoscitivae +quae non sunt subsistentes, sed actus aliquorum organorum, non +cognoscunt seipsas; sicut patet in singulis sensibus. Sed virtutes +cognoscitivae per se subsistentes, cognoscunt seipsas. Et propter +hoc dicitur in libro de causis, quod <i>sciens essentiam suam, +redit ad essentiam suam</i>. Per se autem subsistere maxime +convenit Deo. Unde secundum hunc modum loquendi, ipse est maxime +rediens ad essentiam suam, et cognoscens seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as + stated in De Anima iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, + but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible + object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is + sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible + object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes + it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way + in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own perfection, and + its + own intelligible object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28908] Iª q. 14 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod moveri et pati sumuntur aequivoce secundum quod +intelligere dicitur esse quoddam moveri vel pati, ut dicitur in III +de anima. Non enim intelligere est motus qui est actus imperfecti, +qui est ab alio in aliud, sed actus perfecti, existens in ipso +agente. Similiter etiam quod intellectus perficiatur ab +intelligibili vel assimiletur ei, hoc convenit intellectui qui +quandoque est in potentia, quia per hoc quod est in potentia, +differt ab intelligibili, et assimilatur ei per speciem +intelligibilem, quae est similitudo rei intellectae; et perficitur +per ipsam, sicut potentia per actum. Sed intellectus divinus, qui +nullo modo est in potentia, non perficitur per intelligibile, neque +assimilatur ei, sed est sua perfectio et suum intelligibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now + our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in + potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can + be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the + intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other + things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by + this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible + objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28909] Iª q. 14 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod esse naturale non est materiae primae, quae est in +potentia, nisi secundum quod est reducta in actum per formam. +Intellectus autem noster possibilis se habet in ordine +intelligibilium, sicut materia prima in ordine rerum naturalium, eo +quod est in potentia ad intelligibilia, sicut materia prima ad +naturalia. Unde intellectus noster possibilis non potest habere +intelligibilem operationem, nisi inquantum perficitur per speciem +intelligibilem alicuius. Et sic intelligit seipsum per speciem +intelligibilem, sicut et alia, manifestum est enim quod ex eo quod +cognoscit intelligibile, intelligit ipsum suum intelligere, et per +actum cognoscit potentiam intellectivam. Deus autem est sicut actus +purus tam in ordine existentium, quam in ordine intelligibilium, et +ideo per seipsum, seipsum intelligit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A3-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 3. Whether God comprehends Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends itself + is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28910] Iª q. 14 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non comprehendat seipsum. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod id quod +comprehendit se, finitum est sibi. Sed Deus est omnibus modis +infinitus. Ergo non comprehendit se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God + is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; + which is against what was laid down above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28911] Iª q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod +Deus infinitus est nobis, sed sibi finitus, contra, verius est +unumquodque secundum quod est apud Deum, quam secundum quod est +apud nos. Si igitur Deus sibi ipsi est finitus, nobis autem +infinitus, verius est Deum esse finitum, quam infinitum. Quod est +contra prius determinata. Non ergo Deus comprehendit seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God understands + Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28912] Iª q. 14 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit ibidem, <i>omne quod intelligit se, +comprehendit se</i>. Sed Deus intelligit se. Ergo comprehendit +se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge + of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable + proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is + manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything + is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but + in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; + because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above + ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that + reason He perfectly comprehends Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 co."><a name="28913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28913] Iª q. 14 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus perfecte comprehendit seipsum. Quod sic patet. Tunc enim +dicitur aliquid comprehendi, quando pervenitur ad finem cognitionis +ipsius, et hoc est quando res cognoscitur ita perfecte, sicut +cognoscibilis est. Sicut propositio demonstrabilis comprehenditur, +quando scitur per demonstrationem, non autem quando cognoscitur per +aliquam rationem probabilem. Manifestum est autem quod Deus ita +perfecte cognoscit seipsum, sicut perfecte cognoscibilis est. Est +enim unumquodque cognoscibile secundum modum sui actus, non enim +cognoscitur aliquid secundum quod in potentia est, sed secundum +quod est in actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Tanta est autem virtus +Dei in cognoscendo, quanta est actualitas eius in existendo, quia +per hoc quod actu est, et ab omni materia et potentia separatus, +Deus cognoscitivus est, ut ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod +tantum seipsum cognoscit, quantum cognoscibilis est. Et propter hoc +seipsum perfecte comprehendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended + is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as + if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are + to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, + forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as + nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is comprehended when seen, + if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28914] Iª q. 14 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod comprehendere, si proprie accipiatur, significat +aliquid habens et includens alterum. Et sic oportet quod omne +comprehensum sit finitum, sicut omne inclusum. Non sic autem +comprehendi dicitur Deus a seipso, ut intellectus suus sit aliud +quam ipse, et capiat ipsum et includat. Sed huiusmodi locutiones +per negationem sunt exponendae. Sicut enim Deus dicitur esse in +seipso, quia a nullo exteriori continetur; ita dicitur comprehendi +a seipso, quia nihil est sui quod lateat ipsum dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro de videndo Deum, quod <i>totum comprehenditur +videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because + He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God + is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28915] Iª q. 14 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum dicitur Deus finitus est sibi, intelligendum est +secundum quandam similitudinem proportionis; quia sic se habet in +non excedendo intellectum suum, sicut se habet aliquod finitum in +non excedendo intellectum finitum. Non autem sic dicitur Deus sibi +finitus, quod ipse intelligat se esse aliquid finitum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A4-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 4. Whether the act of God's intellect is His substance?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies + something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28916] Iª q. 14 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod ipsum intelligere Dei non sit eius +substantia. Intelligere enim est quaedam operatio. Operatio autem +aliquid significat procedens ab operante. Ergo ipsum intelligere +Dei non est ipsa Dei substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, + and but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when + we understand our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not be something great. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28917] Iª q. 14 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, cum +aliquis intelligit se intelligere, hoc non est intelligere aliquid +magnum vel principale intellectum, sed intelligere quoddam +secundarium et accessorium. Si igitur Deus sit ipsum intelligere, +intelligere Deum erit sicut cum intelligimus intelligere. Et sic +non erit aliquid magnum intelligere Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself + is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore + the act of God's intellect is not His substance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28918] Iª q. 14 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne +intelligere est aliquid intelligere. Cum ergo Deus intelligit se, +si ipsemet non est aliud quam suum intelligere, intelligit se +intelligere, et intelligere se intelligere se, et sic in infinitum. +Non ergo ipsum intelligere Dei est eius substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. + Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28919] Iª q. 14 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, Lib. VII de Trin., <i>Deo hoc est esse, quod +sapientem esse</i>. Hoc autem est sapientem esse, quod intelligere. +Ergo Deo hoc est esse, quod intelligere. Sed esse Dei est eius +substantia, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo intelligere Dei est eius +substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, + then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which + the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding + is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how + this is. As was laid down above + <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; + as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand + follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above + + <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Hence as His essence itself is also + His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A4-p7"> Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and + His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity + is attached to His substance. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 co."><a name="28920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28920] Iª q. 14 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod est necesse dicere quod intelligere Dei est eius substantia. +Nam si intelligere Dei sit aliud quam eius substantia, oporteret, +ut dicit philosophus in XII Metaphys., quod aliquid aliud esset +actus et perfectio substantiae divinae, ad quod se haberet +substantia divina sicut potentia ad actum (quod est omnino +impossibile), nam intelligere est perfectio et actus intelligentis. +Hoc autem qualiter sit, considerandum est. Sicut enim supra dictum +est, intelligere non est actio progrediens ad aliquid extrinsecum, +sed manet in operante sicut actus et perfectio eius, prout esse est +perfectio existentis, sicut enim esse consequitur formam, ita +intelligere sequitur speciem intelligibilem. In Deo autem non est +forma quae sit aliud quam suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Unde, +cum ipsa sua essentia sit etiam species intelligibilis, ut dictum +est, ex necessitate sequitur quod ipsum eius intelligere sit eius +essentia et eius esse. Et sic patet ex omnibus praemissis quod in +Deo intellectus, et id quod intelligitur, et species +intelligibilis, et ipsum intelligere, sunt omnino unum et idem. +Unde patet quod per hoc quod Deus dicitur intelligens, nulla +multiplicitas ponitur in eius substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28921] Iª q. 14 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod intelligere non est operatio exiens ab ipso operante, +sed manens in ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand + our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28922] Iª q. 14 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum intelligitur illud intelligere quod non est +subsistens, non intelligitur aliquid magnum; sicut cum intelligimus +intelligere nostrum. Et ideo non est simile de ipso intelligere +divino, quod est subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its + very self and is not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28923] Iª q. 14 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Et per hoc patet +responsio ad tertium. Nam intelligere divinum, quod est in seipso +subsistens, est sui ipsius; et non alicuius alterius, ut sic +oporteat procedere in infinitum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 5. Whether God knows things other than Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says + (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other + than Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28924] Iª q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se. Quaecumque +enim sunt alia a Deo, sunt extra ipsum. Sed Augustinus dicit, in +libro octoginta trium qu., quod <i>neque quidquam Deus extra +seipsum intuetur</i>. Ergo non cognoscit alia a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides + Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28925] Iª q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectum est perfectio intelligentis. Si ergo Deus intelligat +alia a se, aliquid aliud erit perfectio Dei, et nobilius ipso. Quod +est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence + the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore + God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be. + Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28926] Iª q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ipsum +intelligere speciem habet ab intelligibili, sicut et omnis alius +actus a suo obiecto, unde et ipsum intelligere tanto est nobilius, +quanto etiam nobilius est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed Deus est +ipsum suum intelligere, ut ex dictis patet. Si igitur Deus +intelligit aliquid aliud a se, ipse Deus specificatur per aliquid +aliud a se, quod est impossibile. Non igitur intelligit alia a +se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "All things are naked and open to His eyes" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.13" target="asv">Heb. 4:13</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28927] Iª q. 14 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Hebr. IV, <i>omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis +eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His + existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows + of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its + power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact + that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence + of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in + the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for + everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A5-p7"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, + and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when + the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as + when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the + mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A5-p8"> So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in + themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 co."><a name="28928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28928] Iª q. 14 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est Deum cognoscere alia a se. Manifestum est enim +quod seipsum perfecte intelligit, alioquin suum esse non esset +perfectum, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Si autem perfecte +aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod virtus eius perfecte +cognoscatur. Virtus autem alicuius rei perfecte cognosci non +potest, nisi cognoscantur ea ad quae virtus se extendit. Unde, cum +virtus divina se extendat ad alia, eo quod ipsa est prima causa +effectiva omnium entium, ut ex supradictis patet; necesse est quod +Deus alia a se cognoscat. Et hoc etiam evidentius fit, si +adiungatur quod ipsum esse causae agentis primae, scilicet Dei, est +eius intelligere. Unde quicumque effectus praeexistunt in Deo sicut +in causa prima, necesse est quod sint in ipso eius intelligere; et +quod omnia in eo sint secundum modum intelligibilem, nam omne quod +est in altero, est in eo secundum modum eius in quo est. Ad +sciendum autem qualiter alia a se cognoscat, considerandum est quod +dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur, uno modo, in seipso; alio modo, in +altero. In seipso quidem cognoscitur aliquid, quando cognoscitur +per speciem propriam adaequatam ipsi cognoscibili, sicut cum oculus +videt hominem per speciem hominis. In alio autem videtur id quod +videtur per speciem continentis, sicut cum pars videtur in toto per +speciem totius, vel cum homo videtur in speculo per speciem +speculi, vel quocumque alio modo contingat aliquid in alio videri. +Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus seipsum videt in seipso, quia +seipsum videt per essentiam suam. Alia autem a se videt non in +ipsis, sed in seipso, inquantum essentia sua continet similitudinem +aliorum ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as + if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above + explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28929] Iª q. 14 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod verbum Augustini dicentis quod Deus nihil extra se +intuetur, non est sic intelligendum, quasi nihil quod sit extra se +intueatur, sed quia id quod est extra seipsum, non intuetur nisi in +seipso, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which + it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image." + Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above + explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the + divine intellect other than the divine essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28930] Iª q. 14 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis non quidem +secundum suam substantiam, sed secundum suam speciem, secundum quam +est in intellectu, ut forma et perfectio eius, <i>lapis enim non +est in anima, sed species eius</i>, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ea +vero quae sunt alia a Deo, intelliguntur a Deo inquantum essentia +Dei continet species eorum, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod +aliquid aliud sit perfectio divini intellectus, quam ipsa essentia +Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other + things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle + of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating + by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible + form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but + His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act, + or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28931] Iª q. 14 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ipsum intelligere non specificatur per id quod in +alio intelligitur, sed per principale intellectum, in quo alia +intelliguntur. Intantum enim ipsum intelligere specificatur per +obiectum suum, inquantum forma intelligibilis est principium +intellectualis operationis, nam omnis operatio specificatur per +formam quae est principium operationis, sicut calefactio per +calorem. Unde per illam formam intelligibilem specificatur +intellectualis operatio, quae facit intellectum in actu. Et haec +est species principalis intellecti, quae in Deo nihil est aliud +quam essentia sua, in qua omnes species rerum comprehenduntur. Unde +non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse Deus, +specificetur per aliud quam per essentiam divinam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 6. Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown + <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and + universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper + knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper + knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28932] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se propria +cognitione. Sic enim cognoscit alia a se, ut dictum est, secundum +quod alia ab ipso in eo sunt. Sed alia ab eo sunt in ipso sicut in +prima causa communi et universali. Ergo et alia cognoscuntur a Deo, +sicut in causa prima et universali. Hoc autem est cognoscere in +universali, et non secundum propriam cognitionem. Ergo Deus +cognoscit alia a se in universali, et non secundum propriam +cognitionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. + But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created + essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature + is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge + of it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28933] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quantum distat essentia creaturae ab essentia divina, tantum distat +essentia divina ab essentia creaturae. Sed per essentiam creaturae +non potest cognosci essentia divina, ut supra dictum est. Ergo nec +per essentiam divinam potest cognosci essentia creaturae. Et sic, +cum Deus nihil cognoscat nisi per essentiam suam, sequitur quod non +cognoscat creaturam secundum eius essentiam, ut cognoscat de ea +quid est, quod est propriam cognitionem de re habere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence, + it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse + things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by + their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28934] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +propria cognitio non habetur de re, nisi per propriam eius +rationem. Sed cum Deus cognoscat omnia per essentiam suam, non +videtur quod unumquodque per propriam rationem cognoscat, idem enim +non potest esse propria ratio multorum et diversorum. Non ergo +habet propriam cognitionem Deus de rebus, sed communem, nam +cognoscere res non secundum propriam rationem, est cognoscere res +solum in communi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God + knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the + joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible + in His sight" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.12" target="asv">Heb. 4:12,13</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28935] Iª q. 14 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +habere propriam cognitionem de rebus, est cognoscere res non solum +in communi, sed secundum quod sunt ab invicem distinctae. Sic autem +Deus cognoscit res. Unde dicitur Heb. IV, quod <i>pertingit usque +ad divisionem spiritus et animae, compagum quoque et medullarum; et +discretor cogitationum et intentionum cordis; et non est ulla +creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. + For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself + as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p7"> But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, + when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows + them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge + of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His + understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was + said above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is + common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to + show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for + instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it + would know all colors. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p8"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this + respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle + of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light + only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity + of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known + in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above + ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not + only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes + them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from + the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its + own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as + regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of + God + is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of + a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect + number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known + not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; + and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p9"> As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far + more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree + of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways + in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly, + unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction + from each other. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 co."><a name="28936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28936] Iª q. 14 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod circa hoc quidam erraverunt, dicentes quod Deus alia a se non +cognoscit nisi in communi, scilicet inquantum sunt entia. Sicut +enim ignis, si cognosceret seipsum ut est principium caloris, +cognosceret naturam caloris, et omnia alia inquantum sunt calida; +ita Deus, inquantum cognoscit se ut principium essendi, cognoscit +naturam entis, et omnia alia inquantum sunt entia. Sed hoc non +potest esse. Nam intelligere aliquid in communi, et non in +speciali, est imperfecte aliquid cognoscere. Unde intellectus +noster, dum de potentia in actum reducitur, pertingit prius ad +cognitionem universalem et confusam de rebus, quam ad propriam +rerum cognitionem, sicut de imperfecto ad perfectum procedens, ut +patet in I Physic. Si igitur cognitio Dei de rebus aliis a se, +esset in universali tantum, et non in speciali, sequeretur quod +eius intelligere non esset omnibus modis perfectum, et per +consequens nec eius esse, quod est contra ea quae superius ostensa +sunt. Oportet igitur dicere quod alia a se cognoscat propria +cognitione; non solum secundum quod communicant in ratione entis, +sed secundum quod unum ab alio distinguitur. Et ad huius +evidentiam, considerandum est quod quidam, volentes ostendere quod +Deus per unum cognoscit multa, utuntur quibusdam exemplis, ut puta +quod, si centrum cognosceret seipsum, cognosceret omnes lineas +progredientes a centro; vel lux, si cognosceret seipsam, +cognosceret omnes colores. Sed haec exempla, licet quantum ad +aliquid similia sint, scilicet quantum ad universalem causalitatem; +tamen deficiunt quantum ad hoc, quod multitudo et diversitas non +causantur ab illo uno principio universali, quantum ad id quod +principium distinctionis est, sed solum quantum ad id in quo +communicant. Non enim diversitas colorum causatur ex luce solum, +sed ex diversa dispositione diaphani recipientis, et similiter +diversitas linearum ex diverso situ. Et inde est quod huiusmodi +diversitas et multitudo non potest cognosci in suo principio +secundum propriam cognitionem, sed solum in communi. Sed in Deo non +sic est. Supra enim ostensum est quod quidquid perfectionis est in +quacumque creatura, totum praeexistit et continetur in Deo secundum +modum excellentem. Non solum autem id in quo creaturae communicant, +scilicet ipsum esse, ad perfectionem pertinet; sed etiam ea per +quae creaturae ad invicem distinguuntur, sicut vivere, et +intelligere, et huiusmodi, quibus viventia a non viventibus, et +intelligentia a non intelligentibus distinguuntur. Et omnis forma, +per quam quaelibet res in propria specie constituitur, perfectio +quaedam est. Et sic omnia in Deo praeexistunt, non solum quantum ad +id quod commune est omnibus, sed etiam quantum ad ea secundum quae +res distinguuntur. Et sic, cum Deus in se omnes perfectiones +contineat, comparatur Dei essentia ad omnes rerum essentias, non +sicut commune ad propria, ut unitas ad numeros, vel centrum ad +lineas; sed sicut perfectus actus ad imperfectos, ut si dicerem, +homo ad animal, vel senarius, qui est numerus perfectus, ad numeros +imperfectos sub ipso contentos. Manifestum est autem quod per actum +perfectum cognosci possunt actus imperfecti, non solum in communi, +sed etiam propria cognitione. Sicut qui cognoscit hominem, +cognoscit animal propria cognitione, et qui cognoscit senarium, +cognoscit trinarium propria cognitione. Sic igitur, cum essentia +Dei habeat in se quidquid perfectionis habet essentia cuiuscumque +rei alterius, et adhuc amplius, Deus in seipso potest omnia propria +cognitione cognoscere. Propria enim natura uniuscuiusque consistit, +secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem participat. +Non autem Deus perfecte seipsum cognosceret, nisi cognosceret +quomodocumque participabilis est ab aliis sua perfectio, nec etiam +ipsam naturam essendi perfecte sciret, nisi cognosceret omnes modos +essendi. Unde manifestum est quod Deus cognoscit omnes res propria +cognitione, secundum quod ab aliis distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of + knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known + according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in + the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone + according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) + existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; + thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that + it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to + import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the + object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode + of knowledge. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p11"> We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows + them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28937] Iª q. 14 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod sic cognoscere aliquid sicut in cognoscente est, +potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium +sic importat modum cognitionis ex parte rei cognitae. Et sic falsum +est. Non enim semper cognoscens cognoscit cognitum secundum illud +esse quod habet in cognoscente, oculus enim non cognoscit lapidem +secundum esse quod habet in oculo; sed per speciem lapidis quam +habet in se, cognoscit lapidem secundum esse quod habet extra +oculum. Et si aliquis cognoscens cognoscat cognitum secundum esse +quod habet in cognoscente, nihilominus cognoscit ipsum secundum +esse quod habet extra cognoscentem, sicut intellectus cognoscit +lapidem secundum esse intelligibile quod habet in intellectu, +inquantum cognoscit se intelligere; sed nihilominus cognoscit esse +lapidis in propria natura. Si vero intelligatur secundum quod hoc +adverbium sic importat modum ex parte cognoscentis, verum est quod +sic solum cognoscens cognoscit cognitum, secundum quod est in +cognoscente, quia quanto perfectius est cognitum in cognoscente, +tanto perfectior est modus cognitionis. Sic igitur dicendum est +quod Deus non solum cognoscit res esse in seipso; sed per id quod +in seipso continet res, cognoscit eas in propria natura; et tanto +perfectius, quanto perfectius est unumquodque in ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence + cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28938] Iª q. 14 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod essentia creaturae comparatur ad essentiam Dei, ut +actus imperfectus ad perfectum. Et ideo essentia creaturae non +sufficienter ducit in cognitionem essentiae divinae, sed e +converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures. + Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate + in, and imitate it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28939] Iª q. 14 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod idem non potest accipi ut ratio diversorum per modum +adaequationis. Sed divina essentia est aliquid excedens omnes +creaturas. Unde potest accipi ut propria ratio uniuscuiusque, +secundum quod diversimode est participabilis vel imitabilis a +diversis creaturis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A7-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 7. Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. + Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards + only one thing at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (AA 2,5), it seems that + He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28940] Iª q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit discursiva. Scientia enim +Dei non est secundum scire in habitu, sed secundum intelligere in +actu. Sed secundum philosophum, in II Topic., scire in habitu +contingit multa simul, sed intelligere actu unum tantum. Cum ergo +Deus multa cognoscat, quia et se et alia, ut ostensum est, videtur +quod non simul omnia intelligat, sed de uno in aliud discurrat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect + (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28941] Iª q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +cognoscere effectum per causam est scire discurrentis. Sed Deus +cognoscit alia per seipsum, sicut effectum per causam. Ergo +cognitio sua est discursiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus + we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28942] Iª q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +perfectius Deus scit unamquamque creaturam quam nos sciamus. Sed +nos in causis creatis cognoscimus earum effectus, et sic de causis +ad causata discurrimus. Ergo videtur similiter esse in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately + here and there; but He sees all things together at once." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28943] Iª q. 14 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., quod <i>Deus non +particulatim vel singillatim omnia videt, velut alternante +conspectu hinc illuc, et inde huc; sed omnia videt simul</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: + one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something + else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge + of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things, + which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one + thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things + in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of + discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever + proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed + from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the + second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen + in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in + Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 co."><a name="28944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28944] Iª q. 14 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in scientia divina nullus est discursus. Quod sic patet. In +scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus. Unus secundum +successionem tantum, sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in +actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud. Alius discursus est +secundum causalitatem, sicut cum per principia pervenimus in +cognitionem conclusionum. Primus autem discursus Deo convenire non +potest. Multa enim, quae successive intelligimus si unumquodque +eorum in seipso consideretur, omnia simul intelligimus si in aliquo +uno ea intelligamus, puta si partes intelligamus in toto, vel si +diversas res videamus in speculo. Deus autem omnia videt in uno, +quod est ipse, ut habitum est. Unde simul, et non successive omnia +videt. Similiter etiam et secundus discursus Deo competere non +potest. Primo quidem, quia secundus discursus praesupponit primum, +procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones, non simul utrumque +considerant. Deinde, quia discursus talis est procedentis de noto +ad ignotum. Unde manifestum est quod, quando cognoscitur primum, +adhuc ignoratur secundum. Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo, +sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur +in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas, et tunc cessat discursus. +Unde, cum Deus effectus suos in seipso videat sicut in causa, eius +cognitio non est discursiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Altogether there is only one act of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium), + as shown above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28945] Iª q. 14 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, licet sit unum tantum intelligere in seipso, tamen +contingit multa intelligere in aliquo uno, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and + hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28946] Iª q. 14 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Deus non cognoscit per causam quasi prius cognitam, +effectus incognitos, sed eos cognoscit in causa. Unde eius cognitio +est sine discursu, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner + that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence + His knowledge is not discursive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28947] Iª q. 14 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod effectus causarum creatarum videt quidem Deus in +ipsis causis, multo melius quam nos, non tamen ita quod cognitio +effectuum causetur in ipso ex cognitione causarum creatarum, sicut +in nobis. Unde eius scientia non est discursiva.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A8-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 8. Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv"> Rom. 8:30, </a> "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is + future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28948] Iª q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit +enim Origenes, super epistolam ad Rom., <i>non propterea aliquid +erit, quia id scit Deus futurum; sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur +a Deo antequam fiat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the + cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28949] Iª q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +posita causa ponitur effectus. Sed scientia Dei est aeterna. Si +ergo scientia Dei est causa rerum creatarum, videtur quod creaturae +sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior + and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28950] Iª q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +scibile est prius scientia, et mensura eius, ut dicitur in X +Metaphys. Sed id quod est posterius et mensuratum, non potest esse +causa. Ergo scientia Dei non est causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows + them, therefore they are." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28951] Iª q. 14 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., <i>universas creaturas, et +spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt, ideo novit Deus; sed ideo +sunt, quia novit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer + is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact + that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the + principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that + remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; + and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands + unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible + form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a + determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is + manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must + be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually + called the "knowledge of approbation." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 co."><a name="28952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28952] Iª q. 14 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod scientia Dei est causa rerum. Sic enim scientia Dei se habet +ad omnes res creatas, sicut scientia artificis se habet ad +artificiata. Scientia autem artificis est causa artificiatorum, eo +quod artifex operatur per suum intellectum, unde oportet quod forma +intellectus sit principium operationis, sicut calor est principium +calefactionis. Sed considerandum est quod forma naturalis, +inquantum est forma manens in eo cui dat esse, non nominat +principium actionis; sed secundum quod habet inclinationem ad +effectum. Et similiter forma intelligibilis non nominat principium +actionis secundum quod est tantum in intelligente, nisi adiungatur +ei inclinatio ad effectum, quae est per voluntatem. Cum enim forma +intelligibilis ad opposita se habeat (cum sit eadem scientia +oppositorum), non produceret determinatum effectum, nisi +determinaretur ad unum per appetitum, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. +Manifestum est autem quod Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum +suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde necesse est quod sua scientia +sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem coniunctam. Unde +scientia Dei, secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari +scientia approbationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined + to it, as is said above. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A8-p8"> But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to + the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God + knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28953] Iª q. 14 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Origenes locutus est attendens rationem scientiae, +cui non competit ratio causalitatis, nisi adiuncta voluntate, ut +dictum est. Sed quod dicit ideo praescire Deum aliqua, quia sunt +futura, intelligendum est secundum causam consequentiae, non +secundum causam essendi. Sequitur enim, si aliqua sunt futura, quod +Deus ea praescierit, non tamen res futurae sunt causa quod Deus +sciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was + not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28954] Iª q. 14 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa rerum, secundum quod res sunt +in scientia. Non fuit autem in scientia Dei, quod res essent ab +aeterno. Unde, quamvis scientia Dei sit aeterna, non sequitur tamen +quod creaturae sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of + which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its + measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway + between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who + gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28955] Iª q. 14 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod res naturales sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et +scientiam nostram, nos enim scientiam accipimus a rebus +naturalibus, quarum Deus per suam scientiam causa est. Unde, sicut +scibilia naturalia sunt priora quam scientia nostra, et mensura +eius, ita scientia Dei est prior quam res naturales, et mensura +ipsarum. Sicut aliqua domus est media inter scientiam artificis qui +eam fecit, et scientiam illius qui eius cognitionem ex ipsa iam +facta capit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A9-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 9. Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and "being" + are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28956] Iª q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat scientiam non entium. +Scientia enim Dei non est nisi verorum. Sed verum et ens +convertuntur. Ergo scientia Dei non est non entium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any + likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28957] Iª q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +scientia requirit similitudinem inter scientem et scitum. Sed ea +quae non sunt, non possunt habere aliquam similitudinem ad Deum, +qui est ipsum esse. Ergo ea quae non sunt, non possunt sciri a +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because + a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="28958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28958] Iª q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +scientia Dei est causa scitorum ab ipso. Sed non est causa non +entium, quia non ens non habet causam. Ergo Deus non habet +scientiam de non entibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.17" target="asv">Rom. 4:17</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28959] Iª q. 14 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit apostolus ad Rom. IV, <i>qui vocat ea quae non sunt, +tanquam ea quae sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in + a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either + of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of + any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by + the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can + be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A9-p7"> Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them + may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for + since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending + all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, + as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor + will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so + called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 co."><a name="28960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28960] Iª q. 14 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo. Nihil autem +prohibet ea quae non sunt simpliciter, aliquo modo esse. +Simpliciter enim sunt, quae actu sunt. Ea vero quae non sunt actu, +sunt in potentia vel ipsius Dei, vel creaturae; sive in potentia +activa, sive in passiva, sive in potentia opinandi, vel imaginandi, +vel quocumque modo significandi. Quaecumque igitur possunt per +creaturam fieri vel cogitari vel dici, et etiam quaecumque ipse +facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiam si actu non sint. Et pro +tanto dici potest quod habet etiam non entium scientiam. Sed horum +quae actu non sunt, est attendenda quaedam diversitas. Quaedam +enim, licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt vel erunt, et +omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis. Quia, cum +intelligere Dei, quod est eius esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae +sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens +intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in +quocumque tempore, sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter. Quaedam +vero sunt, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nec +sunt nec erunt neque fuerunt. Et respectu horum non dicitur habere +scientiam visionis, sed simplicis intelligentiae. Quod ideo +dicitur, quia ea quae videntur apud nos, habent esse distinctum +extra videntem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; + and as such they are known by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28961] Iª q. 14 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, secundum quod sunt in potentia, sic habent veritatem +ea quae non sunt actu, verum est enim ea esse in potentia. Et sic +sciuntur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far + as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28962] Iª q. 14 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum Deus sit ipsum esse, intantum unumquodque est, +inquantum participat de Dei similitudine, sicut unumquodque +intantum est calidum, inquantum participat calorem. Sic et ea quae +sunt in potentia, etiam si non sunt in actu, cognoscuntur a +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, + or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge + of God not that they be, but that they be possible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="28963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28963] Iª q. 14 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Dei scientia est causa rerum, voluntate adiuncta. +Unde non oportet quod quaecumque scit Deus, sint vel fuerint vel +futura sint, sed solum ea quae vult esse, vel permittit esse. Et +iterum, non est in scientia Dei ut illa sint, sed quod esse +possint.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A10-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 10. Whether God knows evil things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality + does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect + of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A[2] ), it seems that God does not + know evil things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28964] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. Dicit enim +philosophus, in III de anima, quod intellectus qui non est in +potentia, non cognoscit privationem. Sed malum est privatio boni, +ut dicit Augustinus. Igitur, cum intellectus Dei nunquam sit in +potentia, sed semper actu, ut ex dictis patet, videtur quod Deus +non cognoscat mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause + of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28965] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis scientia vel est causa sciti, vel causatur ab eo. Sed +scientia Dei non est causa mali, nec causatur a malo. Ergo scientia +Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His + essence, as is clear from the foregoing + <a id="FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no + contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28966] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum +oppositum. Quidquid autem cognoscit Deus, cognoscit per suam +essentiam, ut ex dictis patet. Divina autem essentia neque est +similitudo mali, neque ei malum opponitur, divinae enim essentiae +nihil est contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo +Deus non cognoscit mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the + thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by + Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4"><a name="28967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28967] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod +cognoscitur non per seipsum, sed per aliud, imperfecte cognoscitur. +Sed malum non cognoscitur a Deo per seipsum, quia sic oporteret +quod malum esset in Deo; oportet enim cognitum esse in cognoscente. +Si ergo cognoscitur per aliud, scilicet per bonum, imperfecte +cognoscetur ab ipso, quod est impossibile, quia nulla cognitio Dei +est imperfecta. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.11" target="asv">Prov. 15:11</a>), "Hell and destruction are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 s. c."><a name="28968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28968] Iª q. 14 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Proverb. XV, <i>Infernus et perditio coram +Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption + by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is + knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact + that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. + Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness + except through light." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 co."><a name="28969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28969] Iª q. 14 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quicumque perfecte cognoscit aliquid, oportet quod cognoscat +omnia quae possunt illi accidere. Sunt autem quaedam bona, quibus +accidere potest ut per mala corrumpantur. Unde Deus non perfecte +cognosceret bona, nisi etiam cognosceret mala. Sic autem est +cognoscibile unumquodque, secundum quod est. Unde, cum hoc sit esse +mali, quod est privatio boni, per hoc ipsum quod Deus cognoscit +bona, cognoscit etiam mala; sicut per lucem cognoscuntur tenebrae. +Unde dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus per +semetipsum tenebrarum accipit visionem, non aliunde videns tenebras +quam a lumine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know + privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing + are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only + potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by + privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing + in Himself, but by the opposite good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28970] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod verbum philosophi est sic intelligendum, quod +intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem per +privationem in ipso existentem. Et hoc congruit cum eo quod supra +dixerat, quod punctum et omne indivisibile per privationem +divisionis cognoscitur. Quod contingit ex hoc, quia formae +simplices et indivisibiles non sunt actu in intellectu nostro, sed +in potentia tantum, nam si essent actu in intellectu nostro, non +per privationem cognoscerentur. Et sic cognoscuntur simplicia a +substantiis separatis. Deus igitur non cognoscit malum per +privationem in se existentem, sed per bonum oppositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28971] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod scientia Dei non est causa mali, sed est causa boni, +per quod cognoscitur malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God, + which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="28972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28972] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet malum non opponatur essentiae divinae, quae +non est corruptibilis per malum, opponitur tamen effectibus Dei; +quos per essentiam suam cognoscit, et eos cognoscens, mala opposita +cognoscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is + not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined + nor known except by good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 4"><a name="28973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28973] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod cognoscere aliquid per aliud tantum, est imperfectae +cognitionis, si illud sit cognoscibile per se. Sed malum non est +per se cognoscibile, quia de ratione mali est, quod sit privatio +boni. Et sic neque definiri, neque cognosci potest, nisi per +bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A11-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 11. Whether God knows singular things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now + the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), + "reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not know singular things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28974] Iª q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat singularia. +Intellectus enim divinus immaterialior est quam intellectus +humanus. Sed intellectus humanus, propter suam immaterialitatem, +non cognoscit singularia, sed, sicut dicitur in II de anima, +<i>ratio est universalium, sensus vero singularium</i>. Ergo Deus +non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. + But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28975] Iª q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illae solae virtutes in nobis sunt singularium cognoscitivae, quae +recipiunt species non abstractas a materialibus conditionibus. Sed +res in Deo sunt maxime abstractae ab omni materialitate. Ergo Deus +non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as + they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality + only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28976] Iª q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis cognitio est per aliquam similitudinem. Sed similitudo +singularium, inquantum sunt singularia, non videtur esse in Deo, +quia principium singularitatis est materia, quae, cum sit ens in +potentia tantum, omnino est dissimilis Deo, qui est actus purus. +Non ergo Deus potest cognoscere singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>), "All the ways of a man are open to His eyes." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28977] Iª q. 14 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur, Proverb. XVI, <i>omnes viae hominum patent oculis +eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the + foregoing ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers + it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. + iii) that God would be most ignorant if + He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, + although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless + God knows both by His simple intellect. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p7"> Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in + any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the + universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for + singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined + together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because + he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular + man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p8"> singular things in their singularity.</p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p9"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. + But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said + application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p10"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which + are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since + He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence + must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The + same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 co."><a name="28978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28978] Iª q. 14 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in +creaturis inventae, in Deo praeexistunt secundum altiorem modum, ut +ex dictis patet. Cognoscere autem singularia pertinet ad +perfectionem nostram. Unde necesse est quod Deus singularia +cognoscat. Nam et philosophus pro inconvenienti habet, quod aliquid +cognoscatur a nobis, quod non cognoscatur a Deo. Unde contra +Empedoclem arguit, in I de anima et in III Metaphys., quod +accideret Deum esse insipientissimum, si discordiam ignoraret. Sed +perfectiones quae in inferioribus dividuntur, in Deo simpliciter et +unite existunt. Unde, licet nos per aliam potentiam cognoscamus +universalia et immaterialia, et per aliam singularia et materialia; +Deus tamen per suum simplicem intellectum utraque cognoscit. Sed +qualiter hoc esse possit, quidam manifestare volentes, dixerunt +quod Deus cognoscit singularia per causas universales, nam nihil +est in aliquo singularium, quod non ex aliqua causa oriatur +universali. Et ponunt exemplum, sicut si aliquis astrologus +cognosceret omnes motus universales caeli, posset praenuntiare +omnes eclipses futuras. Sed istud non sufficit. Quia singularia ex +causis universalibus sortiuntur quasdam formas et virtutes, quae, +quantumcumque ad invicem coniungantur, non individuantur nisi per +materiam individualem. Unde qui cognosceret Socratem per hoc quod +est albus vel Sophronisci filius, vel quidquid aliud sic dicatur, +non cognosceret ipsum inquantum est hic homo. Unde secundum modum +praedictum, Deus non cognosceret singularia in sua singularitate. +Alii vero dixerunt quod Deus cognoscit singularia, applicando +causas universales ad particulares effectus. Sed hoc nihil est. +Quia nullus potest applicare aliquid ad alterum, nisi illud +praecognoscat, unde dicta applicatio non potest esse ratio +cognoscendi particularia, sed cognitionem singularium praesupponit. +Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod, cum Deus sit causa rerum per +suam scientiam, ut dictum est, intantum se extendit scientia Dei, +inquantum se extendit eius causalitas. Unde, cum virtus activa Dei +se extendat non solum ad formas, a quibus accipitur ratio +universalis, sed etiam usque ad materiam, ut infra ostendetur; +necesse est quod scientia Dei usque ad singularia se extendat, quae +per materiam individuantur. Cum enim sciat alia a se per essentiam +suam, inquantum est similitudo rerum velut principium activum +earum, necesse est quod essentia sua sit principium sufficiens +cognoscendi omnia quae per ipsum fiunt, non solum in universali, +sed etiam in singulari. Et esset simile de scientia artificis, si +esset productiva totius rei, et non formae tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our + intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. + But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of + itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition + of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but + also singular things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28979] Iª q. 14 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod intellectus noster speciem intelligibilem abstrahit a +principiis individuantibus, unde species intelligibilis nostri +intellectus non potest esse similitudo principiorum individualium. +Et propter hoc, intellectus noster singularia non cognoscit. Sed +species intelligibilis divini intellectus, quae est Dei essentia, +non est immaterialis per abstractionem, sed per seipsam, principium +existens omnium principiorum quae intrant rei compositionem, sive +sint principia speciei, sive principia individui. Unde per eam Deus +cognoscit non solum universalia, sed etiam singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in + the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28980] Iª q. 14 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quamvis species intellectus divini secundum esse +suum non habeat conditiones materiales, sicut species receptae in +imaginatione et sensu; tamen virtute se extendit ad immaterialia et +materialia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, + it retains a certain likeness to the divine being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28981] Iª q. 14 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod materia, licet recedat a Dei similitudine secundum +suam potentialitatem, tamen inquantum vel sic esse habet, +similitudinem quandam retinet divini esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A12-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 12. Whether God can know infinite things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to + those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite + things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28982] Iª q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit cognoscere infinita. +Infinitum enim, secundum quod est infinitum, est ignotum, quia +infinitum est cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid +extra assumere, ut dicitur in III Physic. Augustinus etiam dicit, +XII de Civ. Dei, quod <i>quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis +comprehensione finitur</i>. Sed infinita non possunt finiri. Ergo +non possunt scientia Dei comprehendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the + essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the + infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot + be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in + God's knowledge, which is infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28983] Iª q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod +ea quae in se sunt infinita, scientiae Dei finita sunt, contra, +ratio infiniti est quod sit impertransibile; et finiti quod sit +pertransibile, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed infinitum non potest +transiri nec a finito, nec ab infinito, ut probatur in VI Physic. +Ergo infinitum non potest esse finitum finito, neque etiam +infinito. Et ita infinita non sunt finita scientiae Dei, quae est +infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it + be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28984] Iª q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +scientia Dei est mensura scitorum. Sed contra rationem infiniti +est, quod sit mensuratum. Ergo infinita non possunt sciri a +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose + knowledge has no bounds." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28985] Iª q. 14 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, <i>quamvis infinitorum +numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei, +cuius scientiae non est numerus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above + <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has + relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the + world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so + that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things + even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity + as rational creatures go on for ever. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A12-p7"> The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which + is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give + the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards + its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible + species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in + the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not + as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the + divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal + principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of + God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 co."><a name="28986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28986] Iª q. 14 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum Deus sciat non solum ea quae sunt actu, sed etiam ea quae +sunt in potentia vel sua vel creaturae, ut ostensum est; haec autem +constat esse infinita; necesse est dicere quod Deus sciat infinita. +Et licet scientia visionis, quae est tantum eorum quae sunt vel +erunt vel fuerunt, non sit infinitorum, ut quidam dicunt, cum non +ponamus mundum ab aeterno fuisse, nec generationem et motum in +aeternum mansura, ut individua in infinitum multiplicentur, tamen, +si diligentius consideretur, necesse est dicere quod Deus etiam +scientia visionis sciat infinita. Quia Deus scit etiam cogitationes +et affectiones cordium, quae in infinitum multiplicabuntur, +creaturis rationalibus permanentibus absque fine. Hoc autem ideo +est, quia cognitio cuiuslibet cognoscentis se extendit secundum +modum formae quae est principium cognitionis. Species enim +sensibilis, quae est in sensu, est similitudo solum unius +individui, unde per eam solum unum individuum cognosci potest. +Species autem intelligibilis intellectus nostri est similitudo rei +quantum ad naturam speciei, quae est participabilis a +particularibus infinitis, unde intellectus noster per speciem +intelligibilem hominis, cognoscit quodammodo homines infinitos. Sed +tamen non inquantum distinguuntur ab invicem, sed secundum quod +communicant in natura speciei; propter hoc quod species +intelligibilis intellectus nostri non est similitudo hominum +quantum ad principia individualia, sed solum quantum ad principia +speciei. Essentia autem divina, per quam intellectus divinus +intelligit, est similitudo sufficiens omnium quae sunt vel esse +possunt, non solum quantum ad principia communia, sed etiam quantum +ad principia propria uniuscuiusque, ut ostensum est. Unde sequitur +quod scientia Dei se extendat ad infinita, etiam secundum quod sunt +ab invicem distincta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order + of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way + the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But + God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after + part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above + <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28987] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod <i>infiniti ratio congruit quantitati</i>, secundum +philosophum in I Physic. De ratione autem quantitatis est ordo +partium. Cognoscere ergo infinitum secundum modum infiniti, est +cognoscere partem post partem. Et sic nullo modo contingit cognosci +infinitum, quia quantacumque quantitas partium accipiatur, semper +remanet aliquid extra accipientem. Deus autem non sic cognoscit +infinitum vel infinita, quasi enumerando partem post partem; cum +cognoscat omnia simul, non successive, ut supra dictum est. Unde +nihil prohibet ipsum cognoscere infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor + by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside + the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite + in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not + as if it were traversable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28988] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod transitio importat quandam successionem in partibus, +et inde est quod infinitum transiri non potest, neque a finito +neque ab infinito. Sed ad rationem comprehensionis sufficit +adaequatio, quia id comprehendi dicitur, cuius nihil est extra +comprehendentem. Unde non est contra rationem infiniti, quod +comprehendatur ab infinito. Et sic, quod in se est infinitum, +potest dici finitum scientiae Dei, tanquam comprehensum, non tamen +tanquam pertransibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; + but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which + it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number + of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous + quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and + finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the + knowledge of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28989] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod scientia Dei est mensura rerum, non quantitativa, qua +quidem mensura carent infinita; sed quia mensurat essentiam et +veritatem rei. Unumquodque enim intantum habet de veritate suae +naturae, inquantum imitatur Dei scientiam; sicut artificiatum +inquantum concordat arti. Dato autem quod essent aliqua infinita +actu secundum numerum, puta infiniti homines; vel secundum +quantitatem continuam, ut si esset aer infinitus, ut quidam antiqui +dixerunt, tamen manifestum est quod haberent esse determinatum et +finitum, quia esse eorum esset limitatum ad aliquas determinatas +naturas. Unde mensurabilia essent secundum scientiam Dei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A13" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 13. Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. + But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above + <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not + of contingent things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28990] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit +futurorum contingentium. A causa enim necessaria procedit effectus +necessarius. Sed scientia Dei est causa scitorum, ut supra dictum +est. Cum ergo ipsa sit necessaria, sequitur scita eius esse +necessaria. Non ergo scientia Dei est contingentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary + consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only + a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that + this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the + antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore + the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not + of contingent things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="28991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28991] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis conditionalis cuius antecedens est necessarium absolute, +consequens est necessarium absolute. Sic enim se habet antecedens +ad consequens, sicut principia ad conclusionem, ex principiis autem +necessariis non sequitur conclusio nisi necessaria, ut in I Poster. +probatur. Sed haec est quaedam conditionalis vera, si Deus scivit +hoc futurum esse, hoc erit, quia scientia Dei non est nisi verorum. +Huius autem conditionalis antecedens est necessarium absolute, tum +quia est aeternum; tum quia significatur ut praeteritum. Ergo et +consequens est necessarium absolute. Igitur quidquid scitur a Deo, +est necessarium. Et sic scientia Dei non est contingentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, + the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent + future thing is known by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="28992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28992] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne +scitum a Deo necesse est esse, quia etiam omne scitum a nobis +necesse est esse, cum tamen scientia Dei certior sit quam scientia +nostra. Sed nullum contingens futurum necesse est esse. Ergo nullum +contingens futurum est scitum a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A13-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.15" target="asv">Ps. 32:15</a>), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men + are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 s. c."><a name="28993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28993] Iª q. 14 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXII, <i>qui finxit singillatim corda +eorum, qui intelligit omnia opera eorum</i>, scilicet hominum. Sed +opera hominum sunt contingentia, utpote libero arbitrio subiecta. +Ergo Deus scit futura contingentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future + contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p7"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far + as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent + (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object + of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In + another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as + a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this + sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, + has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also + as + each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows + contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His + knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said + above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only + because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all + things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch + as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their + own causes. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 co."><a name="28994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28994] Iª q. 14 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum supra ostensum sit quod Deus sciat omnia non solum quae +actu sunt, sed etiam quae sunt in potentia sua vel creaturae; horum +autem quaedam sunt contingentia nobis futura; sequitur quod Deus +contingentia futura cognoscat. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum +est quod contingens aliquod dupliciter potest considerari. Uno +modo, in seipso, secundum quod iam actu est. Et sic non +consideratur ut futurum, sed ut praesens, neque ut ad utrumlibet +contingens, sed ut determinatum ad unum. Et propter hoc, sic +infallibiliter subdi potest certae cognitioni, utpote sensui visus, +sicut cum video Socratem sedere. Alio modo potest considerari +contingens, ut est in sua causa. Et sic consideratur ut futurum, et +ut contingens nondum determinatum ad unum, quia causa contingens se +habet ad opposita. Et sic contingens non subditur per certitudinem +alicui cognitioni. Unde quicumque cognoscit effectum contingentem +in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi coniecturalem +cognitionem. Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum +prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est +actu in seipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non +tamen Deus successive cognoscit contingentia, prout sunt in suo +esse, sicut nos, sed simul. Quia sua cognitio mensuratur +aeternitate, sicut etiam suum esse, aeternitas autem, tota simul +existens, ambit totum tempus, ut supra dictum est. Unde omnia quae +sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea +ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam +dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout +sunt in sua praesentialitate. Unde manifestum est quod contingentia +et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, inquantum subduntur divino +conspectui secundum suam praesentialitatem, et tamen sunt futura +contingentia, suis causis comparata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as + the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which + is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while + the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="28995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28995] Iª q. 14 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, licet causa suprema sit necessaria, tamen effectus +potest esse contingens, propter causam proximam contingentem, sicut +germinatio plantae est contingens propter causam proximam +contingentem, licet motus solis, qui est causa prima, sit +necessarius. Et similiter scita a Deo sunt contingentia propter +causas proximas, licet scientia Dei, quae est causa prima, sit +necessaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although + it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had + relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this + antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as + this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent + to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence + its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or + false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies + to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some + say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent + by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote + necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass + will grow." + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p10"> Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent + must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the + existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood + that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew + anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. + And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the + Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="28996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28996] Iª q. 14 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod hoc antecedens, Deus scivit hoc +contingens futurum, non est necessarium, sed contingens, quia, +licet sit praeteritum, tamen importat respectum ad futurum. Sed hoc +non tollit ei necessitatem, quia id quod habuit respectum ad +futurum, necesse est habuisse, licet etiam futurum non sequatur +quandoque. Alii vero dicunt hoc antecedens esse contingens, quia +est compositum ex necessario et contingenti; sicut istud dictum est +contingens, Socratem esse hominem album. Sed hoc etiam nihil est. +Quia cum dicitur, Deus scivit esse futurum hoc contingens, +contingens non ponitur ibi nisi ut materia verbi, et non sicut +principalis pars propositionis, unde contingentia eius vel +necessitas nihil refert ad hoc quod propositio sit necessaria vel +contingens, vera vel falsa. Ita enim potest esse verum me dixisse +hominem esse asinum, sicut me dixisse Socratem currere, vel Deum +esse, et eadem ratio est de necessario et contingenti. Unde +dicendum est quod hoc antecedens est necessarium absolute. Nec +tamen sequitur, ut quidam dicunt, quod consequens sit necessarium +absolute, quia antecedens est causa remota consequentis, quod +propter causam proximam contingens est. Sed hoc nihil est. Esset +enim conditionalis falsa, cuius antecedens esset causa remota +necessaria, et consequens effectus contingens, ut puta si dicerem, +si sol movetur, herba germinabit. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod +quando in antecedente ponitur aliquid pertinens ad actum animae, +consequens est accipiendum non secundum quod in se est, sed +secundum quod est in anima, aliud enim est esse rei in seipsa, et +esse rei in anima. Ut puta, si dicam, si anima intelligit aliquid, +illud est immateriale, intelligendum est quod illud est immateriale +secundum quod est in intellectu, non secundum quod est in seipso. +Et similiter si dicam, si Deus scivit aliquid, illud erit, +consequens intelligendum est prout subest divinae scientiae, +scilicet prout est in sua praesentialitate. Et sic necessarium est, +sicut et antecedens, <i>quia omne quod est, dum est, necesse est +esse</i>, ut dicitur in I Periherm.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. + Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God + alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after + him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling + by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, + cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the + divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything + known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it + refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of + the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary." + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p12"> Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; + thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied + to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. + But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, + "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what + is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition + inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself + (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus + material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="28997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28997] Iª q. 14 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ea quae temporaliter in actum reducuntur, a nobis +successive cognoscuntur in tempore, sed a Deo in aeternitate, quae +est supra tempus. Unde nobis, quia cognoscimus futura contingentia +inquantum talia sunt, certa esse non possunt, sed soli Deo, cuius +intelligere est in aeternitate supra tempus. Sicut ille qui vadit +per viam, non videt illos qui post eum veniunt, sed ille qui ab +aliqua altitudine totam viam intuetur, simul videt omnes +transeuntes per viam. Et ideo illud quod scitur a nobis, oportet +esse necessarium etiam secundum quod in se est, quia ea quae in se +sunt contingentia futura, a nobis sciri non possunt. Sed ea quae +sunt scita a Deo, oportet esse necessaria secundum modum quo +subsunt divinae scientiae, ut dictum est, non autem absolute, +secundum quod in propriis causis considerantur. Unde et haec +propositio, omne scitum a Deo necessarium est esse, consuevit +distingui. Quia potest esse de re, vel de dicto. Si intelligatur de +re, est divisa et falsa, et est sensus, omnis res quam Deus scit, +est necessaria. Vel potest intelligi de dicto, et sic est composita +et vera; et est sensus, hoc dictum, scitum a Deo esse, est +necessarium. Sed obstant quidam, dicentes quod ista distinctio +habet locum in formis separabilibus a subiecto; ut si dicam, album +possibile est esse nigrum. Quae quidem de dicto est falsa, et de re +est vera, res enim quae est alba, potest esse nigra; sed hoc +dictum, album esse nigrum, nunquam potest esse verum. In formis +autem inseparabilibus a subiecto, non habet locum praedicta +distinctio; ut si dicam, corvum nigrum possibile est esse album, +quia in utroque sensu est falsa. Esse autem scitum a Deo, est +inseparabile a re, quia quod est scitum a Deo, non potest esse non +scitum. Haec autem instantia locum haberet, si hoc quod dico +scitum, importaret aliquam dispositionem subiecto inhaerentem. Sed +cum importet actum scientis, ipsi rei scitae, licet semper sciatur, +potest aliquid attribui secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei +inquantum stat sub actu sciendi, sicut esse materiale attribuitur +lapidi secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei secundum quod est +intelligibile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A14" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A14-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 14. Whether God knows enunciable things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes + and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1"><a name="28998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28998] Iª q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +decimumquartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat +enuntiabilia. Cognoscere enim enuntiabilia convenit intellectui +nostro, secundum quod componit et dividit. Sed in intellectu divino +nulla est compositio. Ergo Deus non cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since + He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2"><a name="28999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28999] Iª q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Sed in Deo nulla est +similitudo enuntiabilium, cum sit omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non +cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A14-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.11" target="asv">Ps. 93:11</a>). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 s. c."><a name="29000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29000] Iª q. 14 a. 14 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, <i>dominus scit cogitationes +hominum</i>. Sed enuntiabilia continentur in cogitationibus +hominum. Ergo Deus cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A14-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that + of creatures, as said above + <a id="FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A14-p6"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not + after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows + each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand + what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our + intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such + a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which + belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand + as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine + intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences + of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 co."><a name="29001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29001] Iª q. 14 a. 14 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum formare enuntiabilia sit in potestate intellectus nostri; +Deus autem scit quidquid est in potentia sua vel creaturae, ut +supra dictum est; necesse est quod Deus sciat omnia enuntiabilia +quae formari possunt. Sed, sicut scit materialia immaterialiter, et +composita simpliciter, ita scit enuntiabilia non per modum +enuntiabilium, quasi scilicet in intellectu eius sit compositio vel +divisio enuntiabilium; sed unumquodque cognoscit per simplicem +intelligentiam, intelligendo essentiam uniuscuiusque. Sicut si nos +in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid est homo, intelligeremus omnia +quae de homine praedicari possunt. Quod quidem in intellectu nostro +non contingit, qui de uno in aliud discurrit, propter hoc quod +species intelligibilis sic repraesentat unum, quod non repraesentat +aliud. Unde, intelligendo quid est homo, non ex hoc ipso alia quae +ei insunt, intelligimus; sed divisim, secundum quandam +successionem. Et propter hoc, ea quae seorsum intelligimus, oportet +nos in unum redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis, +enuntiationem formando. Sed species intellectus divini, scilicet +eius essentia, sufficit ad demonstrandum omnia. Unde, intelligendo +essentiam suam, cognoscit essentias omnium, et quaecumque eis +accidere possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection would avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 1"><a name="29002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29002] Iª q. 14 a. 14 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus cognosceret +enuntiabilia per modum enuntiabilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the + similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 2"><a name="29003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29003] Iª q. 14 a. 14 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod compositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod esse rei, +et sic Deus per suum esse, quod est eius essentia, est similitudo +omnium eorum quae per enuntiabilia significantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A15" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A15-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 15. Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation + to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of + God is variable according to the variation of creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1"><a name="29004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29004] Iª q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +decimumquintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit +variabilis. Scientia enim relative dicitur ad scibile. Sed ea quae +important relationem ad creaturam, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, et +variantur secundum variationem creaturarum. Ergo scientia Dei est +variabilis, secundum variationem creaturarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. + Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2"><a name="29005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29005] Iª q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid potest Deus facere, potest scire. Sed Deus potest plura +facere quam faciat. Ergo potest plura scire quam sciat. Et sic +scientia sua potest variari secundum augmentum et diminutionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to + be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3"><a name="29006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29006] Iª q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +scivit Christum nasciturum. Nunc autem nescit Christum nasciturum, +quia Christus nasciturus non est. Ergo non quidquid Deus scivit, +scit. Et ita scientia Dei videtur esse variabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, that in God "there is no change nor shadow of alteration" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A15-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.17" target="asv">James 1:17</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 s. c."><a name="29007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29007] Iª q. 14 a. 15 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Iac. I, quod <i>apud Deum non est transmutatio, neque +vicissitudinis obumbratio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing + <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 co."><a name="29008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29008] Iª q. 14 a. 15 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum scientia Dei sit eius substantia, ut ex dictis patet; +sicut substantia eius est omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum +est, ita oportet scientiam eius omnino invariabilem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God + imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in + the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We + may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent + upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations + are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import + relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable + manner. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 1"><a name="29009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29009] Iª q. 14 a. 15 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod dominus et creator, et huiusmodi, important +relationes ad creaturas secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Sed scientia +Dei importat relationem ad creaturas secundum quod sunt in Deo, +quia secundum hoc est unumquodque intellectum in actu quod est in +intelligente. Res autem creatae sunt in Deo invariabiliter, in +seipsis autem variabiliter. Vel aliter dicendum est, quod dominus +et creator, et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur +actus qui intelliguntur terminari ad ipsas creaturas secundum quod +in seipsis sunt, et ideo huiusmodi relationes varie de Deo +dicuntur, secundum variationem creaturarum. Sed scientia et amor, +et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur actus qui +intelliguntur in Deo esse, et ideo invariabiliter praedicantur de +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not + follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said + to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are + not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His + knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not + previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can + be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, + it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because + such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 2"><a name="29010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29010] Iª q. 14 a. 15 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Deus scit etiam ea quae potest facere et non facit. +Unde ex hoc quod potest plura facere quam facit, non sequitur quod +possit plura scire quam sciat, nisi hoc referatur ad scientiam +visionis, secundum quam dicitur scire ea quae sunt in actu secundum +aliquod tempus. Ex hoc tamen quod scit quod aliqua possunt esse +quae non sunt, vel non esse quae sunt, non sequitur quod scientia +sua sit variabilis, sed quod cognoscat rerum variabilitatem. Si +tamen aliquid esset quod prius Deus nescivisset et postea sciret, +esset eius scientia variabilis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia +quidquid est vel potest esse secundum aliquod tempus, Deus in +aeterno suo scit. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod ponitur aliquid esse +secundum quodcumque tempus, oportet poni quod ab aeterno sit scitum +a Deo. Et ideo non debet concedi quod Deus possit plura scire quam +sciat, quia haec propositio implicat quod ante nesciverit et postea +sciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because + the same thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God + knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, + however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes + a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which + is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when + he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God + knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God + is + variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and + sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime + true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, + by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for + example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion + about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was + not sitting; neither of which can be in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 3"><a name="29011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29011] Iª q. 14 a. 15 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod antiqui nominales dixerunt idem esse enuntiabile, +Christum nasci, et esse nasciturum, et esse natum, quia eadem res +significatur per haec tria, scilicet nativitas Christi. Et secundum +hoc sequitur quod Deus quidquid scivit, sciat, quia modo scit +Christum natum, quod significat idem ei quod est Christum esse +nasciturum. Sed haec opinio falsa est. Tum quia diversitas partium +orationis diversitatem enuntiabilium causat. Tum etiam quia +sequeretur quod propositio quae semel est vera, esset semper vera, +quod est contra philosophum, qui dicit quod haec oratio, Socrates +sedet, vera est eo sedente, et eadem falsa est, eo surgente. Et +ideo concedendum est quod haec non est vera, quidquid Deus scivit, +scit, si ad enuntiabilia referatur. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod +scientia Dei sit variabilis. Sicut enim absque variatione divinae +scientiae est, quod sciat unam et eandem rem quandoque esse et +quandoque non esse; ita absque variatione divinae scientiae est, +quod scit aliquod enuntiabile quandoque esse verum, et quandoque +esse falsum. Esset autem ex hoc scientia Dei variabilis, si +enuntiabilia cognosceret per modum enuntiabilium, componendo et +dividendo, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro. Unde cognitio nostra +variatur, vel secundum veritatem et falsitatem, puta si, mutata re, +eandem opinionem de re illa retineamus, vel secundum diversas +opiniones, ut si primo opinemur aliquem sedere, et postea opinemur +eum non sedere. Quorum neutrum potest esse in Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A16" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 16. Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above + + <a id="FP_Q14_A16-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1"><a name="29012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29012] Iª q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +decimumsextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus de rebus non habeat +scientiam speculativam. Scientia enim Dei est causa rerum, ut supra +ostensum est. Sed scientia speculativa non est causa rerum +scitarum. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore + the knowledge of God is not speculative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2"><a name="29013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29013] Iª q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea. +Scientia speculativa est per abstractionem a rebus, quod divinae +scientiae non competit. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge, + as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 s. c."><a name="29014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29014] Iª q. 14 a. 16 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne +quod est nobilius, Deo est attribuendum. Sed scientia speculativa +est nobilior quam practica, ut patet per philosophum, in principio +Metaphys. Ergo Deus habet de rebus scientiam speculativam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A16-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof + whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, + which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the + manner of knowing---as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, + and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as + practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its + universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative," + as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the + end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, + not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations + as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing + itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative + and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A16-p6"> In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself + is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as + regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly. + </p><p id="FP_Q14_A16-p7"> Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge + is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards + evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch + as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the + physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 co."><a name="29015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29015] Iª q. 14 a. 16 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod aliqua scientia est speculativa tantum, aliqua practica +tantum, aliqua vero secundum aliquid speculativa et secundum +aliquid practica. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod aliqua +scientia potest dici speculativa tripliciter. Primo, ex parte rerum +scitarum, quae non sunt operabiles a sciente, sicut est scientia +hominis de rebus naturalibus vel divinis. Secundo, quantum ad modum +sciendi, ut puta si aedificator consideret domum definiendo et +dividendo et considerando universalia praedicata ipsius. Hoc +siquidem est operabilia modo speculativo considerare, et non +secundum quod operabilia sunt, operabile enim est aliquid per +applicationem formae ad materiam, non per resolutionem compositi in +principia universalia formalia. Tertio, quantum ad finem, <i>nam +intellectus practicus differt fine a speculativo</i>, sicut dicitur +in III de anima. Intellectus enim practicus ordinatur ad finem +operationis, finis autem intellectus speculativi est consideratio +veritatis. Unde, si quis aedificator consideret qualiter posset +fieri aliqua domus, non ordinans ad finem operationis, sed ad +cognoscendum tantum, erit, quantum ad finem, speculativa +consideratio, tamen de re operabili. Scientia igitur quae est +speculativa ratione ipsius rei scitae, est speculativa tantum. Quae +vero speculativa est vel secundum modum vel secundum finem, est +secundum quid speculativa et secundum quid practica. Cum vero +ordinatur ad finem operationis, est simpliciter practica. Secundum +hoc ergo, dicendum est quod Deus de seipso habet scientiam +speculativam tantum, ipse enim operabilis non est. De omnibus vero +aliis habet scientiam et speculativam et practicam. Speculativam +quidem, quantum ad modum, quidquid enim in rebus nos speculative +cognoscimus definiendo et dividendo, hoc totum Deus multo +perfectius novit. Sed de his quae potest quidem facere, sed +secundum nullum tempus facit, non habet practicam scientiam, +secundum quod practica scientia dicitur a fine. Sic autem habet +practicam scientiam de his quae secundum aliquod tempus facit. Mala +vero, licet ab eo non sint operabilia, tamen sub cognitione +practica ipsius cadunt, sicut et bona, inquantum permittit vel +impedit vel ordinat ea, sicut et aegritudines cadunt sub practica +scientia medici, inquantum per artem suam curat eas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is, + of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can + make, and which nevertheless are never made. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 1"><a name="29016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29016] Iª q. 14 a. 16 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa, non quidem sui ipsius, sed +aliorum, quorundam quidem actu, scilicet eorum quae secundum +aliquod tempus fiunt; quorundam vero virtute, scilicet eorum quae +potest facere, et tamen nunquam fiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally + in so far as it is human. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 2"><a name="29017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29017] Iª q. 14 a. 16 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod scientiam esse acceptam a rebus scitis, non per se +convenit scientiae speculativae, sed per accidens, inquantum est +humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p10"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> + In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if + they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know + what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair + the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He + knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge + of all other things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 3"><a name="29018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29018] Iª q. 14 a. 16 ad 3</span></a> Ad id vero quod +in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod de operabilibus perfecta +scientia non habetur, nisi sciantur inquantum operabilia sunt. Et +ideo, cum scientia Dei sit omnibus modis perfecta, oportet quod +sciat ea quae sunt a se operabilia, inquantum huiusmodi, et non +solum secundum quod sunt speculabilia. Sed tamen non receditur a +nobilitate speculativae scientiae, quia omnia alia a se videt in +seipso, seipsum autem speculative cognoscit; et sic in speculativa +sui ipsius scientia, habet cognitionem et speculativam et practicam +omnium aliorum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q15" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q15-p0.1">Q. 15. OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q15-p2"> After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q15-p3"> (1) Whether there are ideas?</p><p id="FP_Q15-p4"> (2) Whether they are many, or one only?</p><p id="FP_Q15-p5"> (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 pr."><a name="29019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29019] +Iª q. 15 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem de scientia Dei, +restat considerare de ideis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, +an sint ideae. Secundo, utrum sint plures, vel una tantum. Tertio, +utrum sint omnium quae cognoscuntur a Deo.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q15_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 1. Whether there are ideas?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are + for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29020] Iª q. 15 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod ideae non sint. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII +cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus non cognoscit res secundum ideam. Sed +ideae non ponuntur ad aliud, nisi ut per eas cognoscantur res. Ergo +ideae non sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said ( + <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29021] Iª q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +in seipso cognoscit omnia, ut supra dictum est. Sed seipsum non +cognoscit per ideam. Ergo nec alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle + of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29022] Iª q. 15 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, idea +ponitur ut principium cognoscendi et operandi. Sed essentia divina +est sufficiens principium cognoscendi et operandi omnia. Non ergo +necesse est ponere ideas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are + understood." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29023] Iª q. 15 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>tanta +vis in ideis constituitur, ut, nisi his intellectis, sapiens esse +nemo possit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q15_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood + the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself + can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge + of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in + him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason: + </p><p id="FP_Q15_A1-p7"> In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on + account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some + agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as + a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made + pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists + in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like + to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear + later ( + <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the + world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 co."><a name="29024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29024] Iª q. 15 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est ponere in mente divina ideas. Idea enim Graece, +Latine forma dicitur, unde per ideas intelliguntur formae aliarum +rerum, praeter ipsas res existentes. Forma autem alicuius rei +praeter ipsam existens, ad duo esse potest, vel ut sit exemplar +eius cuius dicitur forma; vel ut sit principium cognitionis ipsius, +secundum quod formae cognoscibilium dicuntur esse in cognoscente. +Et quantum ad utrumque est necesse ponere ideas. Quod sic patet. In +omnibus enim quae non a casu generantur, necesse est formam esse +finem generationis cuiuscumque. Agens autem non ageret propter +formam, nisi inquantum similitudo formae est in ipso. Quod quidem +contingit dupliciter. In quibusdam enim agentibus praeexistit forma +rei fiendae secundum esse naturale, sicut in his quae agunt per +naturam; sicut homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. In quibusdam +vero secundum esse intelligibile, ut in his quae agunt per +intellectum; sicut similitudo domus praeexistit in mente +aedificatoris. Et haec potest dici idea domus, quia artifex +intendit domum assimilare formae quam mente concepit. Quia igitur +mundus non est casu factus, sed est factus a Deo per intellectum +agente, ut infra patebit, necesse est quod in mente divina sit +forma, ad similitudinem cuius mundus est factus. Et in hoc +consistit ratio ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion + of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29025] Iª q. 15 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Deus non intelligit res secundum ideam extra se +existentem. Et sic etiam Aristoteles improbat opinionem Platonis de +ideis, secundum quod ponebat eas per se existentes, non in +intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except + of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29026] Iª q. 15 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, licet Deus per essentiam suam se et alia cognoscat, +tamen essentia sua est principium operativum aliorum, non autem sui +ipsius, et ideo habet rationem ideae secundum quod ad alia +comparatur, non autem secundum quod comparatur ad ipsum Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29027] Iª q. 15 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo omnium +rerum. Unde idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q15_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 2. Whether ideas are many?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only + one idea. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29028] Iª q. 15 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non sint plures ideae. Idea enim in Deo +est eius essentia. Sed essentia Dei est una tantum. Ergo et idea +est una.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts + or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29029] Iª q. 15 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +idea est principium cognoscendi et operandi, ita ars et sapientia. +Sed in Deo non sunt plures artes et sapientiae. Ergo nec plures +ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on + the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must + be the cause of the eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29030] Iª q. 15 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur quod +ideae multiplicantur secundum respectus ad diversas creaturas, +contra, pluralitas idearum est ab aeterno. Si ergo ideae sunt +plures, creaturae autem sunt temporales, ergo temporale erit causa +aeterni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not + from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. + But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this + is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, + except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29031] Iª q. 15 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +respectus isti aut sunt secundum rem in creaturis tantum, aut etiam +in Deo. Si in creaturis tantum, cum creaturae non sint ab aeterno, +pluralitas idearum non erit ab aeterno, si multiplicentur solum +secundum huiusmodi respectus. Si autem realiter sunt in Deo, +sequitur quod alia pluralitas realis sit in Deo quam pluralitas +personarum, quod est contra Damascenum, dicentem quod in divinis +omnia unum sunt, praeter ingenerationem, generationem et +processionem. Sic igitur non sunt plures ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, + they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the + divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with + them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29032] Iª q. 15 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>ideae +sunt principales quaedam formae vel rationes rerum stabiles atque +incommutabiles, quia ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae +ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae divina intelligentia +continentur. Sed cum ipsae neque oriantur neque intereant, secundum +eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et +omne quod oritur et interit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate + end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now + the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. + xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the + accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first + creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. + According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe + was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot + be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot + conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind + there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created + by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily + be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator + as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. + For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the + house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it + would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist + in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He + knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can + be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according + to + which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable + of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards + other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 co."><a name="29033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29033] Iª q. 15 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est ponere plures ideas. Ad cuius evidentiam, +considerandum est quod in quolibet effectu illud quod est ultimus +finis, proprie est intentum a principali agente; sicut ordo +exercitus a duce. Illud autem quod est optimum in rebus existens, +est bonum ordinis universi, ut patet per philosophum in XII +Metaphys. Ordo igitur universi est proprie a Deo intentus, et non +per accidens proveniens secundum successionem agentium, prout +quidam dixerunt quod Deus creavit primum creatum tantum, quod +creatum creavit secundum creatum, et sic inde quousque producta est +tanta rerum multitudo, secundum quam opinionem, Deus non haberet +nisi ideam primi creati. Sed si ipse ordo universi est per se +creatus ab eo, et intentus ab ipso, necesse est quod habeat ideam +ordinis universi. Ratio autem alicuius totius haberi non potest, +nisi habeantur propriae rationes eorum ex quibus totum +constituitur, sicut aedificator speciem domus concipere non posset, +nisi apud ipsum esset propria ratio cuiuslibet partium eius. Sic +igitur oportet quod in mente divina sint propriae rationes omnium +rerum. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., +quod <i>singula propriis rationibus a Deo creata sunt</i>. Unde +sequitur quod in mente divina sint plures ideae. Hoc autem quomodo +divinae simplicitati non repugnet, facile est videre, si quis +consideret ideam operati esse in mente operantis sicut quod +intelligitur; non autem sicut species qua intelligitur, quae est +forma faciens intellectum in actu. Forma enim domus in mente +aedificatoris est aliquid ab eo intellectum, ad cuius similitudinem +domum in materia format. Non est autem contra simplicitatem divini +intellectus, quod multa intelligat, sed contra simplicitatem eius +esset, si per plures species eius intellectus formaretur. Unde +plures ideae sunt in mente divina ut intellectae ab ipso. Quod hoc +modo potest videri. Ipse enim essentiam suam perfecte cognoscit, +unde cognoscit eam secundum omnem modum quo cognoscibilis est. +Potest autem cognosci non solum secundum quod in se est, sed +secundum quod est participabilis secundum aliquem modum +similitudinis a creaturis. Unaquaeque autem creatura habet propriam +speciem, secundum quod aliquo modo participat divinae essentiae +similitudinem. Sic igitur inquantum Deus cognoscit suam essentiam +ut sic imitabilem a tali creatura, cognoscit eam ut propriam +rationem et ideam huius creaturae. Et similiter de aliis. Et sic +patet quod Deus intelligit plures rationes proprias plurium rerum; +quae sunt plures ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type + of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29034] Iª q. 15 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod idea non nominat divinam essentiam inquantum est +essentia, sed inquantum est similitudo vel ratio huius vel illius +rei. Unde secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectae ex una +essentia, secundum hoc dicuntur plures ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands + many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this + is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands + the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, + as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of + the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things + by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as + understood by Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29035] Iª q. 15 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sapientia et ars significantur ut quo Deus +intelligit, sed idea ut quod Deus intelligit. Deus autem uno +intelligit multa; et non solum secundum quod in seipsis sunt, sed +etiam secundum quod intellecta sunt; quod est intelligere plures +rationes rerum. Sicut artifex, dum intelligit formam domus in +materia, dicitur intelligere domum, dum autem intelligit formam +domus ut a se speculatam, ex eo quod intelligit se intelligere eam, +intelligit ideam vel rationem domus. Deus autem non solum +intelligit multas res per essentiam suam, sed etiam intelligit se +intelligere multa per essentiam suam. Sed hoc est intelligere +plures rationes rerum; vel, plures ideas esse in intellectu eius ut +intellectas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing + its own essence with these things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29036] Iª q. 15 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod huiusmodi respectus, quibus multiplicantur ideae, non +causantur a rebus, sed ab intellectu divino, comparante essentiam +suam ad res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby + the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29037] Iª q. 15 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod respectus multiplicantes ideas, non sunt in rebus +creatis, sed in Deo. Non tamen sunt reales respectus, sicut illi +quibus distinguuntur personae, sed respectus intellecti a Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q15_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 3. Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would + follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29038] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium quae cognoscit Deus, sint ideae +in ipso. Mali enim idea non est in Deo, quia sequeretur malum esse +in Deo. Sed mala cognoscuntur a Deo. Ergo non omnium quae +cognoscuntur a Deo, sunt ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above + <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining + and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29039] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +cognoscit ea quae nec sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt, ut supra dictum +est. Sed horum non sunt ideae, quia dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div. +Nom., quod <i>exemplaria sunt divinae voluntates, determinativae et +effectivae rerum</i>. Ergo non omnium quae a Deo cognoscuntur, sunt +ideae in ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29040] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +cognoscit materiam primam, quae non potest habere ideam, cum nullam +habeat formam. Ergo idem quod prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas + of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore + there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="29041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29041] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +constat quod Deus scit non solum species, sed etiam genera et +singularia et accidentia. Sed horum non sunt ideae, secundum +positionem Platonis, qui primus ideas introduxit, ut dicit +Augustinus. Non ergo omnium cognitorum a Deo sunt ideae in +ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper + types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29042] Iª q. 15 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, ideae +sunt rationes in mente divina existentes, ut per Augustinum patet. +Sed omnium quae cognoscit, Deus habet proprias rationes. Ergo +omnium quae cognoscit, habet ideam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold + office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an + "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type," + and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to + everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, + even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they + are known by Him in a speculative manner. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 co."><a name="29043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29043] Iª q. 15 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum ideae a Platone ponerentur principia cognitionis rerum et +generationis ipsarum, ad utrumque se habet idea, prout in mente +divina ponitur. Et secundum quod est principium factionis rerum, +exemplar dici potest, et ad practicam cognitionem pertinet. +Secundum autem quod principium cognoscitivum est, proprie dicitur +ratio; et potest etiam ad scientiam speculativam pertinere. +Secundum ergo quod exemplar est, secundum hoc se habet ad omnia +quae a Deo fiunt secundum aliquod tempus. Secundum vero quod +principium cognoscitivum est, se habet ad omnia quae cognoscuntur a +Deo, etiam si nullo tempore fiant; et ad omnia quae a Deo +cognoscuntur secundum propriam rationem, et secundum quod +cognoscuntur ab ipso per modum speculationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither + in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29044] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod malum cognoscitur a Deo non per propriam rationem, +sed per rationem boni. Et ideo malum non habet in Deo ideam, neque +secundum quod idea est exemplar, neque secundum quod est ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect + to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29045] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod eorum quae neque sunt neque erunt neque fuerunt, Deus +non habet practicam cognitionem, nisi virtute tantum. Unde respectu +eorum non est idea in Deo, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, +sed solum secundum quod significat rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause + with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; + but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29046] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Plato, secundum quosdam, posuit materiam non creatam, +et ideo non posuit ideam esse materiae, sed materiae concausam. Sed +quia nos ponimus materiam creatam a Deo, non tamen sine forma, +habet quidem materia ideam in Deo, non tamen aliam ab idea +compositi. Nam materia secundum se neque esse habet, neque +cognoscibilis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except + in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being + along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces + through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; + whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through + some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular + things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because + the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. + However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later ( + <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a> ). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29047] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod genera non possunt habere ideam aliam ab idea +speciei, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, quia nunquam genus +fit nisi in aliqua specie. Similiter etiam est de accidentibus quae +inseparabiliter concomitantur subiectum, quia haec simul fiunt cum +subiecto. Accidentia autem quae superveniunt subiecto, specialem +ideam habent. Artifex enim per formam domus facit omnia accidentia +quae a principio concomitantur domum, sed ea quae superveniunt +domui iam factae, ut picturae vel aliquid aliud, facit per aliquam +aliam formam. Individua vero, secundum Platonem, non habebant aliam +ideam quam ideam speciei, tum quia singularia individuantur per +materiam, quam ponebat esse increatam, ut quidam dicunt, et +concausam ideae; tum quia intentio naturae consistit in speciebus, +nec particularia producit, nisi ut in eis species salventur. Sed +providentia divina non solum se extendit ad species, sed ad +singularia, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q16" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q16-p0.1">Q. 16. OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q16-p2"> Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. + About this there are eight points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q16-p3"> (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?</p><p id="FP_Q16-p4"> (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</p><p id="FP_Q16-p5"> (3) On the comparison of the true to being.</p><p id="FP_Q16-p6"> (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.</p><p id="FP_Q16-p7"> (5) Whether God is truth?</p><p id="FP_Q16-p8"> (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?</p><p id="FP_Q16-p9"> (7) On the eternity of truth.</p><p id="FP_Q16-p10"> (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 pr."><a name="29048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29048] +Iª q. 16 pr.</span></a> Quoniam autem scientia verorum est, +post considerationem scientiae Dei, de veritate inquirendum est. +Circa quam quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum veritas sit in re, vel +tantum in intellectu. Secundo, utrum sit tantum in intellectu +componente et dividente. Tertio, de comparatione veri ad ens. +Quarto, de comparatione veri ad bonum. Quinto, utrum Deus sit +veritas. Sexto, utrum omnia sint vera veritate una, vel pluribus. +Septimo, de aeternitate veritatis. Octavo, de incommutabilitate +ipsius.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q16_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 1. Whether truth resides only in the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns + this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth + would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the + knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, + unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides + in things, and not in the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29049] Iª q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit tantum in intellectu, sed +magis in rebus. Augustinus enim, in libro Soliloq., reprobat hanc +notificationem veri, verum est id quod videtur, quia secundum hoc, +lapides qui sunt in abditissimo terrae sinu, non essent veri +lapides, quia non videntur. Reprobat etiam istam, verum est quod +ita se habet ut videtur cognitori, si velit et possit cognoscere, +quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod nihil esset verum, si nullus +posset cognoscere. Et definit sic verum, verum est id quod est. Et +sic videtur quod veritas sit in rebus, et non in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except + in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true + is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29050] Iª q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid est verum, veritate verum est. Si igitur veritas est in +intellectu solo, nihil erit verum nisi secundum quod intelligitur, +quod est error antiquorum philosophorum, qui dicebant omne quod +videtur, esse verum. Ad quod sequitur contradictoria simul esse +vera, cum contradictoria simul a diversis vera esse videantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But + it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. + iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29051] Iª q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, +propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis</i>, ut patet I Poster. +<i>Sed ex eo quod res est vel non est, est opinio vel oratio vera +vel falsa</i>, secundum philosophum in praedicamentis. Ergo veritas +magis est in rebus quam in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29052] Iª q. 16 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, VI Metaphys., quod <i>verum et falsum non +sunt in rebus, sed in intellectu</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q16_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now + there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according + as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the + term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, + namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite---and + hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good + if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect + of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be + true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either + essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally + to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, + but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend. + </p><p id="FP_Q16_A1-p7"> Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said + to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things + are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form + in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the + intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are + in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception + in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they + are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera + Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being + clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as + they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without + any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; + for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each + thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought + and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 co."><a name="29053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29053] Iª q. 16 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum +nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter +appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia +cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, appetitus +autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam. +Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili, +sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu. +Sicut autem bonum est in re, inquantum habet ordinem ad appetitum; +et propter hoc ratio bonitatis derivatur a re appetibili in +appetitum, secundum quod appetitus dicitur bonus, prout est boni, +ita, cum verum sit in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei +intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem +intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur, +secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum. Res autem +intellecta ad intellectum aliquem potest habere ordinem vel per se, +vel per accidens. Per se quidem habet ordinem ad intellectum a quo +dependet secundum suum esse, per accidens autem ad intellectum a +quo cognoscibilis est. Sicut si dicamus quod domus comparatur ad +intellectum artificis per se, per accidens autem comparatur ad +intellectum a quo non dependet. Iudicium autem de re non sumitur +secundum id quod inest ei per accidens, sed secundum id quod inest +ei per se. Unde unaquaeque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum +ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet. Et inde est quod res +artificiales dicuntur verae per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, +dicitur enim domus vera, quae assequitur similitudinem formae quae +est in mente artificis; et dicitur oratio vera, inquantum est +signum intellectus veri. Et similiter res naturales dicuntur esse +verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt +in mente divina, dicitur enim verus lapis, qui assequitur propriam +lapidis naturam, secundum praeconceptionem intellectus divini. Sic +ergo veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in +rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium. +Et secundum hoc, veritas diversimode notificatur. Nam Augustinus, +in libro de vera Relig., dicit quod <i>veritas est, qua ostenditur +id quod est</i>. Et Hilarius dicit quod <i>verum est declarativum +aut manifestativum esse</i>. Et hoc pertinet ad veritatem secundum +quod est in intellectu. Ad veritatem autem rei secundum ordinem ad +intellectum, pertinet definitio Augustini in libro de vera Relig., +<i>veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla +dissimilitudine est</i>. Et quaedam definitio Anselmi, <i>veritas +est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis</i>; nam rectum est, quod +principio concordat. Et quaedam definitio Avicennae, <i>veritas +uniuscuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est +ei</i>. Quod autem dicitur quod veritas est adaequatio rei et +intellectus potest ad utrumque pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for + what is accidental is excluded from every definition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29054] Iª q. 16 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate rei; et excludit a +ratione huius veritatis, comparationem ad intellectum nostrum. Nam +id quod est per accidens, ab unaquaque definitione excluditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by + chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their + relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. + iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their + relation to the divine intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29055] Iª q. 16 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod antiqui philosophi species rerum naturalium non +dicebant procedere ab aliquo intellectu, sed eas provenire a casu, +et quia considerabant quod verum importat comparationem ad +intellectum, cogebantur veritatem rerum constituere in ordine ad +intellectum nostrum. Ex quo inconvenientia sequebantur quae +philosophus prosequitur in IV Metaphys. Quae quidem inconvenientia +non accidunt, si ponamus veritatem rerum consistere in comparatione +ad intellectum divinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, + any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not + its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, + is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought + or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29056] Iª q. 16 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non +tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis, +sicut neque in medicina per prius invenitur ratio sanitatis quam in +animali; virtus enim medicinae, non sanitas eius, causat sanitatem, +cum non sit agens univocum. Et similiter esse rei, non veritas +eius, causat veritatem intellectus. Unde philosophus dicit quod +opinio et oratio vera est <i>ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res +vera est</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 2. Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) + that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing + is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth + does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29057] Iª q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit solum in intellectu +componente et dividente. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima, +quod sicut sensus propriorum sensibilium semper veri sunt, ita et +intellectus eius quod quid est. Sed compositio et divisio non est +neque in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est. Ergo +veritas non solum est in compositione et divisione intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect + with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense + apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29058] Iª q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Isaac +dicit, in libro de definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei +et intellectus. Sed sicut intellectus complexorum potest adaequari +rebus, ita intellectus incomplexorum, et etiam sensus sentiens rem +ut est. Ergo veritas non est solum in compositione et divisione +intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the + intellect nor in things." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29059] Iª q. 16 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit philosophus, in VI Metaphys., quod circa simplicia et +quod quid est non est veritas, nec in intellectu neque in +rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has + the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the + thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and + hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For + although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen + and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; + yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to + the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: + for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by + the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a + thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. + Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not + as the + thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, + properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing + "what a thing is." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 co."><a name="29060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29060] Iª q. 16 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod verum, sicut dictum est, secundum sui primam rationem est in +intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet +propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, +inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habet similitudinem +rei cognitae, quae est forma eius inquantum est cognoscens. Et +propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur. +Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc +autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit, licet enim visus habeat +similitudinem visibilis, non tamen cognoscit comparationem quae est +inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea. Intellectus +autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest, +sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo +quod quid est; sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma +quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc +facit componendo et dividendo, nam in omni propositione aliquam +formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei +significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea. Et ideo bene +invenitur quod sensus est verus de aliqua re, vel intellectus +cognoscendo quod quid est, sed non quod cognoscat aut dicat verum. +Et similiter est de vocibus complexis aut incomplexis. Veritas +quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente +quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in +cognoscente, quod importat nomen veri; perfectio enim intellectus +est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, veritas est in +intellectu componente et dividente, non autem in sensu, neque in +intellectu cognoscente quod quid est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p6"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="29061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29061] Iª q. 16 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 3. Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated + <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29062] Iª q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim +est proprie in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in +rebus. Ergo non convertuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; + for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29063] Iª q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id +quod se extendit ad ens et non ens, non convertitur cum ente. Sed +verum se extendit ad ens et non ens, nam verum est quod est esse, +et quod non est non esse. Ergo verum et ens non convertuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true + appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are + not convertible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29064] Iª q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quae +se habent secundum prius et posterius, non videntur converti. Sed +verum videtur prius esse quam ens, nam ens non intelligitur nisi +sub ratione veri. Ergo videtur quod non sint convertibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29065] Iª q. 16 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit philosophus, II Metaphys., quod eadem est dispositio +rerum in esse et veritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, + so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses + and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion + of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 co."><a name="29066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29066] Iª q. 16 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut bonum habet rationem appetibilis, ita verum habet +ordinem ad cognitionem. Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse, +intantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc dicitur in III de anima, +quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum. Et +ideo, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen, +sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum +comparationem ad intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before + <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible + with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already + <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the + intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29067] Iª q. 16 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est. +Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum +substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum +ente, ut manifestativum cum manifestato. Hoc enim est de ratione +veri, ut dictum est. Quamvis posset dici quod etiam ens est in +rebus et in intellectu, sicut et verum; licet verum principaliter +in intellectu, ens vero principaliter in rebus. Et hoc accidit +propter hoc, quod verum et ens differunt ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. + Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29068] Iª q. 16 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non ens non habet in se unde cognoscatur, sed +cognoscitur inquantum intellectus facit illud cognoscibile. Unde +verum fundatur in ente, inquantum non ens est quoddam ens rationis, +apprehensum scilicet a ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. + In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and + this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended + also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be + apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object + with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility + is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29069] Iª q. 16 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine +ratione veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod +non apprehendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur apprehensionem +entis. Et sic locutio habet veritatem. Alio modo posset sic +intelligi, quod ens non posset apprehendi, nisi apprehenderetur +ratio veri. Et hoc falsum est. Sed verum non potest apprehendi, +nisi apprehendatur ratio entis, quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et +est simile sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim +potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile, sed tamen potest +intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas. Et +similiter ens intellectum est verum, non tamen intelligendo ens, +intelligitur verum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 4. Whether good is logically prior to the true?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. + i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the + good is logically prior to the true. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29070] Iª q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam +verum. Quod enim est universalius, secundum rationem prius est, ut +patet ex I Physic. Sed bonum est universalius quam verum, nam verum +est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo bonum prius est +secundum rationem quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above + <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29071] Iª q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum +est in rebus, verum autem in compositione et divisione intellectus, +ut dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt in re, sunt priora his quae sunt in +intellectu. Ergo prius est secundum rationem bonum quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine + says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29072] Iª q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +veritas est quaedam species virtutis, ut patet in IV Ethic. Sed +virtus continetur sub bono, est enim bona qualitas mentis, ut dicit +Augustinus. Ergo bonum est prius quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. + Therefore the true is prior to good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29073] Iª q. 16 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, quod +est in pluribus, est prius secundum rationem. Sed verum est in +quibusdam in quibus non est bonum, scilicet in mathematicis. Ergo +verum est prius quam bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner + the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related + to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in + so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident + from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the + appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 co."><a name="29074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29074] Iª q. 16 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, licet bonum et verum supposito convertantur cum ente, tamen +ratione differunt. Et secundum hoc verum, absolute loquendo, prius +est quam bonum. Quod ex duobus apparet. Primo quidem ex hoc, quod +verum propinquius se habet ad ens, quod est prius, quam bonum. Nam +verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate, ratio autem +boni consequitur esse, secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum; sic +enim appetibile est. Secundo apparet ex hoc, quod cognitio +naturaliter praecedit appetitum. Unde, cum verum respiciat +cognitionem, bonum autem appetitum, prius erit verum quam bonum +secundum rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect + to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; + and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas + in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the + fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that + it is prior absolutely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29075] Iª q. 16 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod voluntas et intellectus mutuo se includunt, nam +intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et voluntas vult intellectum +intelligere. Sic ergo inter illa quae ordinantur ad obiectum +voluntatis, continentur etiam ea quae sunt intellectus; et e +converso. Unde in ordine appetibilium, bonum se habet ut +universale, et verum ut particulare, in ordine autem +intelligibilium est e converso. Ex hoc ergo quod verum est quoddam +bonum, sequitur quod bonum sit prius in ordine appetibilium, non +autem quod sit prius simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; + secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being + is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29076] Iª q. 16 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod secundum hoc est aliquid prius ratione, quod prius +cadit in intellectu. Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum +ens; et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens; et tertio +apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo +ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself + in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills + in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things + <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he + fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29077] Iª q. 16 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtus quae dicitur veritas, non est veritas +communis, sed quaedam veritas secundum quam homo in dictis et +factis ostendit se ut est. Veritas autem vitae dicitur +particulariter, secundum quod homo in vita sua implet illud ad quod +ordinatur per intellectum divinum, sicut etiam dictum est veritatem +esse in ceteris rebus. Veritas autem iustitiae est secundum quod +homo servat id quod debet alteri secundum ordinem legum. Unde ex +his particularibus veritatibus non est procedendum ad veritatem +communem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 5. Whether God is truth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition + and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29078] Iª q. 16 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit veritas. Veritas enim +consistit in compositione et divisione intellectus. Sed in Deo non +est compositio et divisio. Ergo non est ibi veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness + to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29079] Iª q. 16 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +veritas, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera Relig., est +similitudo principii. Sed Dei non est similitudo ad principium. +Ergo in Deo non est veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause + of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But + it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29080] Iª q. 16 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid dicitur de Deo, dicitur de eo ut de prima causa omnium, +sicut esse Dei est causa omnis esse, et bonitas eius est causa +omnis boni. Si ergo in Deo sit veritas, ergo omne verum erit ab +ipso. Sed aliquem peccare est verum. Ergo hoc erit a Deo. Quod +patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29081] Iª q. 16 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit dominus, Ioan. XIV, <i>ego sum via, veritas et +vita</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As said above + <a id="FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being + conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, + but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of + every other intellect, and He Himself is His + own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and + the sovereign and first truth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 co."><a name="29082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29082] Iª q. 16 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut dictum est, veritas invenitur in intellectu secundum +quod apprehendit rem ut est, et in re secundum quod habet esse +conformabile intellectui. Hoc autem maxime invenitur in Deo. Nam +esse suum non solum est conforme suo intellectui, sed etiam est +ipsum suum intelligere; et suum intelligere est mensura et causa +omnis alterius esse, et omnis alterius intellectus; et ipse est +suum esse et intelligere. Unde sequitur quod non solum in ipso sit +veritas, sed quod ipse sit ipsa summa et prima veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges + of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29083] Iª q. 16 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, licet in intellectu divino non sit compositio et +divisio, tamen secundum suam simplicem intelligentiam iudicat de +omnibus, et cognoscit omnia complexa. Et sic in intellectu eius est +veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it + receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. + Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, + Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot + understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because + He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence + is not dissimilar to His intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29084] Iª q. 16 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod verum intellectus nostri est secundum quod +conformatur suo principio, scilicet rebus, a quibus cognitionem +accipit. Veritas etiam rerum est secundum quod conformantur suo +principio, scilicet intellectui divino. Sed hoc, proprie loquendo, +non potest dici in veritate divina, nisi forte secundum quod +veritas appropriatur filio, qui habet principium. Sed si de +veritate essentialiter dicta loquamur, non potest intelligi, nisi +resolvatur affirmativa in negativam, sicut cum dicitur, pater est a +se, quia non est ab alio. Et similiter dici potest similitudo +principii veritas divina, inquantum esse suum non est suo +intellectui dissimile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension + of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is + entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29085] Iª q. 16 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non ens et privationes non habent ex seipsis +veritatem, sed solum ex apprehensione intellectus. Omnis autem +apprehensio intellectus a Deo est, unde quidquid est veritatis in +hoc quod dico, istum fornicari est verum, totum est a Deo. Sed si +arguatur, ergo istum fornicari est a Deo, est fallacia +accidentis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 6. Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), + "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would + be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore + God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29086] Iª q. 16 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod una sola sit veritas, secundum quam omnia +sunt vera. Quia, secundum Augustinum, nihil est maius mente humana, +nisi Deus. Sed veritas est maior mente humana, alioquin mens +iudicaret de veritate; nunc autem omnia iudicat secundum veritatem, +et non secundum seipsam. Ergo solus Deus est veritas. Ergo non est +alia veritas quam Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things." + But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29087] Iª q. 16 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Anselmus dicit, in libro de veritate, quod sicut tempus se habet ad +temporalia, ita veritas ad res veras. Sed unum est tempus omnium +temporalium. Ergo una est veritas, qua omnia vera sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29088] Iª q. 16 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod in Psalmo XI dicitur, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis +hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider + that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as + animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only + one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So + healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health + of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far + as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby + the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said + <a id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the + intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, + as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and + even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv"> Ps. 11:2, </a> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, + so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are + true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or + forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 co."><a name="29089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29089] Iª q. 16 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quodammodo una est veritas, qua omnia sunt vera, et quodammodo +non. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, quando aliquid +praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum +propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie +animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud +invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo +alia denominantur. Sicut sanum dicitur de animali et urina et +medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a +sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, inquantum est illius +sanitatis effectiva, et urina, inquantum est illius sanitatis +significativa. Et quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina neque in +urina, tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod hoc quidem facit, +illud autem significat sanitatem. Dictum est autem quod veritas per +prius est in intellectu, et per posterius in rebus, secundum quod +ordinantur ad intellectum divinum. Si ergo loquamur de veritate +prout existit in intellectu, secundum propriam rationem, sic in +multis intellectibus creatis sunt multae veritates; etiam in uno et +eodem intellectu, secundum plura cognita. Unde dicit Glossa super +illud Psalmi XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum</i> +etc., quod sicut ab una facie hominis resultant plures +similitudines in speculo, sic ab una veritate divina resultant +plures veritates. Si vero loquamur de veritate secundum quod est in +rebus, sic omnes sunt verae una prima veritate, cui unumquodque +assimilatur secundum suam entitatem. Et sic, licet plures sint +essentiae vel formae rerum, tamen una est veritas divini +intellectus, secundum quam omnes res denominantur verae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected + in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary + truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not + simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as + science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, + except God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29090] Iª q. 16 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod anima non secundum quamcumque veritatem iudicat de +rebus omnibus; sed secundum veritatem primam, inquantum resultat in +ea sicut in speculo, secundum prima intelligibilia. Unde sequitur +quod veritas prima sit maior anima. Et tamen etiam veritas creata, +quae est in intellectu nostro, est maior anima, non simpliciter, +sed secundum quid, inquantum est perfectio eius; sicut etiam +scientia posset dici maior anima. Sed verum est quod nihil +subsistens est maius mente rationali, nisi Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29091] Iª q. 16 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod dictum Anselmi veritatem habet, secundum quod res +dicuntur verae per comparationem ad intellectum divinum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 7. Whether created truth is eternal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature + of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is + eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29092] Iª q. 16 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod veritas creata sit aeterna. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod nihil est magis +aeternum quam ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque. Sed horum +veritas est veritas creata. Ergo veritas creata est aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore + is truth, which is the most universal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29093] Iª q. 16 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod est semper, est aeternum. Sed universalia sunt ubique et +semper. Ergo sunt aeterna. Ergo et verum, quod est maxime +universale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding + the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29094] Iª q. 16 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id +quod est verum in praesenti, semper fuit verum esse futurum. Sed +sicut veritas propositionis de praesenti est veritas creata, ita +veritas propositionis de futuro. Ergo aliqua veritas creata est +aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for + if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of + truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is + after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is + eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29095] Iª q. 16 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod caret principio et fine, est aeternum. Sed veritas +enuntiabilium caret principio et fine. Quia, si veritas incoepit +cum ante non esset, verum erat veritatem non esse, et utique aliqua +veritate verum erat, et sic veritas erat antequam inciperet. Et +similiter si ponatur veritatem habere finem, sequitur quod sit +postquam desierit, verum enim erit veritatem non esse. Ergo veritas +est aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> God alone is eternal, as laid down before ( + <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html">Q[10], A[3]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29096] Iª q. 16 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod solus Deus est aeternus, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in + speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable + truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as + though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but + from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from + the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect + is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the + truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already + <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 co."><a name="29097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29097] Iª q. 16 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod veritas enuntiabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus. +Enuntiabile enim et est in intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum +autem quod est in intellectu, habet per se veritatem. Sed secundum +quod est in voce, dicitur verum enuntiabile, secundum quod +significat aliquam veritatem intellectus; non propter aliquam +veritatem in enuntiabili existentem sicut in subiecto. Sicut urina +dicitur sana, non a sanitate quae in ipsa sit, sed a sanitate +animalis, quam significat. Similiter etiam supra dictum est quod +res denominantur verae a veritate intellectus. Unde si nullus +intellectus esset aeternus, nulla veritas esset aeterna. Sed quia +solus intellectus divinus est aeternus, in ipso solo veritas +aeternitatem habet. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit +aeternum quam Deus, quia veritas intellectus divini est ipse Deus, +ut supra ostensum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29098] Iª q. 16 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent +aeternitatem in mente divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension + to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself + determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of + all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere + and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are + eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29099] Iª q. 16 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquid esse semper et ubique, potest intelligi +dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet in se unde se extendat ad omne +tempus et ad omnem locum, sicut Deo competit esse ubique et semper. +Alio modo, quia non habet in se quo determinetur ad aliquem locum +vel tempus, sicut materia prima dicitur esse una, non quia habet +unam formam, sicut homo est unus ab unitate unius formae, sed per +remotionem omnium formarum distinguentium. Et per hunc modum, +quodlibet universale dicitur esse ubique et semper, inquantum +universalia abstrahunt ab hic et nunc. Sed ex hoc non sequitur ea +esse aeterna, nisi in intellectu, si quis sit aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause + were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that + it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone + is such a cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29100] Iª q. 16 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud quod nunc est, ex eo futurum fuit antequam +esset, quia in causa sua erat ut fieret. Unde, sublata causa, non +esset futurum illud fieri. Sola autem causa prima est aeterna. Unde +ex hoc non sequitur quod ea quae sunt, semper fuerit verum ea esse +futura, nisi quatenus in causa sempiterna fuit ut essent futura. +Quae quidem causa solus Deus est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but + it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason + of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and + this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by + reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only + so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being + as preceding its being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29101] Iª q. 16 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, quia intellectus noster non est aeternus, nec +veritas enuntiabilium quae a nobis formantur, est aeterna, sed +quandoque incoepit. Et antequam huiusmodi veritas esset, non erat +verum dicere veritatem talem non esse, nisi ab intellectu divino, +in quo solum veritas est aeterna. Sed nunc verum est dicere +veritatem tunc non fuisse. Quod quidem non est verum nisi veritate +quae nunc est in intellectu nostro, non autem per aliquam veritatem +ex parte rei. Quia ista est veritas de non ente; non ens autem non +habet ex se ut sit verum, sed solummodo ex intellectu apprehendente +ipsum. Unde intantum est verum dicere veritatem non fuisse, +inquantum apprehendimus non esse ipsius ut praecedens esse +eius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 8. Whether truth is immutable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, + otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29102] Iª q. 16 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod veritas sit immutabilis. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro II de libero arbitrio, quod veritas non est +aequalis menti, quia esset mutabilis, sicut et mens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains + after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing + is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29103] Iª q. 16 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id +quod remanet post omnem mutationem, est immutabile, sicut prima +materia est ingenita et incorruptibilis, quia remanet post omnem +generationem et corruptionem. Sed veritas remanet post omnem +mutationem, quia post omnem mutationem verum est dicere esse vel +non esse. Ergo veritas est immutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. + For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in + the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification + that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit. + Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29104] Iª q. 16 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +veritas enuntiationis mutatur, maxime mutatur ad mutationem rei. +Sed sic non mutatur. Veritas enim, secundum Anselmum, est rectitudo +quaedam, inquantum aliquid implet id quod est de ipso in mente +divina. Haec autem propositio, Socrates sedet, accipit a mente +divina ut significet Socratem sedere, quod significat etiam eo non +sedente. Ergo veritas propositionis nullo modo mutatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three + propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the + true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="29105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29105] Iª q. 16 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ubi +est eadem causa, et idem effectus. Sed eadem res est causa +veritatis harum trium propositionum Socrates sedet, sedebit, et +sedit. Ergo eadem est harum veritas. Sed oportet quod alterum horum +sit verum. Ergo veritas harum propositionum immutabiliter manet. Et +eadem ratione cuiuslibet alterius propositionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29106] Iª q. 16 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Psalmo XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis +hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before + <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded + from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity + may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in + one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself + has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change + from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of + which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said + before ( + <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself + the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. + Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether + immutable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 co."><a name="29107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29107] Iª q. 16 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, veritas proprie est in solo +intellectu, res autem dicuntur verae a veritate quae est in aliquo +intellectu. Unde mutabilitas veritatis consideranda est circa +intellectum. Cuius quidem veritas in hoc consistit, quod habeat +conformitatem ad res intellectas. Quae quidem conformitas variari +potest dupliciter, sicut et quaelibet alia similitudo, ex mutatione +alterius extremi. Unde uno modo variatur veritas ex parte +intellectus, ex eo quod de re eodem modo se habente aliquis aliam +opinionem accipit, alio modo si, opinione eadem manente, res +mutetur. Et utroque modo fit mutatio de vero in falsum. Si ergo sit +aliquis intellectus in quo non possit esse alternatio opinionum, +vel cuius acceptionem non potest subterfugere res aliqua, in eo est +immutabilis veritas. Talis autem est intellectus divinus, ut ex +superioribus patet. Unde veritas divini intellectus est +immutabilis. Veritas autem intellectus nostri mutabilis est. Non +quod ipsa sit subiectum mutationis, sed inquantum intellectus +noster mutatur de veritate in falsitatem; sic enim formae mutabiles +dici possunt. Veritas autem intellectus divini est secundum quam +res naturales dicuntur verae, quae est omnino immutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of divine truth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29108] Iª q. 16 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, + in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no + truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29109] Iª q. 16 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod verum et ens sunt convertibilia. Unde, sicut ens non +generatur neque corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens, inquantum hoc +vel illud ens corrumpitur vel generatur, ut dicitur in I Physic.; +ita veritas mutatur, non quod nulla veritas remaneat, sed quia non +remanet illa veritas quae prius erat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which + is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates + the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth + of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore + this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression + is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the + first truth remains, but the second is changed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29110] Iª q. 16 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod propositio non solum habet veritatem sicut res aliae +veritatem habere dicuntur, inquantum implent id quod de eis est +ordinatum ab intellectu divino; sed dicitur habere veritatem quodam +speciali modo, inquantum significat veritatem intellectus. Quae +quidem consistit in conformitate intellectus et rei. Qua quidem +subtracta, mutatur veritas opinionis, et per consequens veritas +propositionis. Sic igitur haec propositio, Socrates sedet, eo +sedente vera est et veritate rei, inquantum est quaedam vox +significativa; et veritate significationis, inquantum significat +opinionem veram. Socrate vero surgente, remanet prima veritas, sed +mutatur secunda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when + Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these + propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that + the same truth remains invariable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="29111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29111] Iª q. 16 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod sessio Socratis, quae est causa veritatis huius +propositionis, Socrates sedet, non eodem modo se habet dum Socrates +sedet, et postquam sederit, et antequam sederet. Unde et veritas ab +hoc causata, diversimode se habet; et diversimode significatur +propositionibus de praesenti, praeterito et futuro. Unde non +sequitur quod, licet altera trium propositionum sit vera, quod +eadem veritas invariabilis maneat.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q17" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q17-p0.1">Q. 17. CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q17-p2"> We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:</p><p id="FP_Q17-p3"> (1) Whether falsity exists in things?</p><p id="FP_Q17-p4"> (2) Whether it exists in the sense?</p><p id="FP_Q17-p5"> (3) Whether it exists in the intellect?</p><p id="FP_Q17-p6"> (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 pr."><a name="29112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29112] +Iª q. 17 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de falsitate. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum falsitas sit in rebus. +Secundo, utrum sit in sensu. Tertio, utrum sit in intellectu. +Quarto, de oppositione veri et falsi.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q17_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 1. Whether falsity exists in things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it + will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29113] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in rebus. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>si verum est id quod est, falsum +non esse uspiam concludetur, quovis repugnante</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. + 33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29114] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +falsum dicitur a fallendo. Sed res non fallunt, ut dicit Augustinus +in libro de vera Relig., <i>quia non ostendunt aliud quam suam +speciem</i>. Ergo falsum in rebus non invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16.html">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus + nothing is false. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29115] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, verum +dicitur in rebus per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, ut supra +dictum est. Sed quaelibet res, inquantum est, imitatur Deum. Ergo +quaelibet res vera est, absque falsitate. Et sic nulla res est +falsa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity." + But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29116] Iª q. 17 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod <i>omne corpus +est verum corpus et falsa unitas</i>; quia imitatur unitatem, et +non est unitas. Sed quaelibet res imitatur divinam bonitatem, et ab +ea deficit. Ergo in omnibus rebus est falsitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q17_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where + primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation + to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively + by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when + compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as + directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as + artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they + fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper + operation of his art. + </p><p id="FP_Q17_A1-p7"> In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since + whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents + only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins + themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love + vanity, and seek after lying?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.3" target="asv">Ps. 4:3</a>): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. + Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.3.21" target="asv">Jn. 3:21</a>). + </p><p id="FP_Q17_A1-p8"> But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, + but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as + being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards + any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the + Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even + as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be + called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it + is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally + and + naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, + are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine + says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says + (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In + this + way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many + wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 co."><a name="29117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29117] Iª q. 17 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum verum et falsum opponantur; opposita autem sunt circa +idem; necesse est ut ibi prius quaeratur falsitas, ubi primo +veritas invenitur, hoc est in intellectu. In rebus autem neque +veritas neque falsitas est, nisi per ordinem ad intellectum. Et +quia unumquodque secundum id quod convenit ei per se, simpliciter +nominatur; secundum autem id quod convenit ei per accidens, non +nominatur nisi secundum quid; res quidem simpliciter falsa dici +posset per comparationem ad intellectum a quo dependet, cui +comparatur per se; in ordine autem ad alium intellectum, cui +comparatur per accidens, non posset dici falsa nisi secundum quid. +Dependent autem ab intellectu divino res naturales, sicut ab +intellectu humano res artificiales. Dicuntur igitur res +artificiales falsae simpliciter et secundum se, inquantum deficiunt +a forma artis, unde dicitur aliquis artifex opus falsum facere, +quando deficit ab operatione artis. Sic autem in rebus +dependentibus a Deo, falsitas inveniri non potest per comparationem +ad intellectum divinum, cum quidquid in rebus accidit, ex +ordinatione divini intellectus procedat, nisi forte in voluntariis +agentibus tantum, in quorum potestate est subducere se ab +ordinatione divini intellectus; in quo malum culpae consistit, +secundum quod ipsa peccata falsitates et mendacia dicuntur in +Scripturis, secundum illud Psalmi IV, <i>ut quid diligitis +vanitatem et quaeritis mendacium?</i> Sicut per oppositum operatio +virtuosa veritas vitae nominatur, inquantum subditur ordini divini +intellectus; sicut dicitur Ioan. III, <i>qui facit veritatem, venit +ad lucem</i>. Sed per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, ad quem +comparantur res naturales per accidens, possunt dici falsae, non +simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, +secundum rationem significati, ut dicatur illud esse falsum in +rebus, quod significatur vel repraesentatur oratione vel intellectu +falso. Secundum quem modum quaelibet res potest dici esse falsa, +quantum ad id quod ei non inest, sicut si dicamus diametrum esse +falsum commensurabile, ut dicit philosophus in V Metaphys.; et +sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., quod <i>tragoedus est +falsus Hector</i>. Sicut e contrario potest unumquodque dici verum, +secundum id quod competit ei. Alio modo, per modum causae. Et sic +dicitur res esse falsa, quae nata est facere de se opinionem +falsam. Et quia innatum est nobis per ea quae exterius apparent de +rebus iudicare, eo quod nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, qui +primo et per se est exteriorum accidentium; ideo ea quae in +exterioribus accidentibus habent similitudinem aliarum rerum, +dicuntur esse falsa secundum illas res; sicut fel est falsum mel, +et stannum est falsum argentum. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus, +in libro Soliloq., quod <i>eas res falsas nominamus, quae +verisimilia apprehendimus</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in V +Metaphys., quod <i>falsa dicuntur quaecumque apta nata sunt +apparere aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt</i>. Et per hunc +modum etiam dicitur homo falsus, inquantum est amativus falsarum +opinionum vel locutionum. Non autem ex hoc quod potest eas +confingere, quia sic etiam sapientes et scientes falsi dicerentur, +ut dicitur in V Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. + Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain + non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29118] Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod res comparata ad intellectum, secundum id quod est, +dicitur vera, secundum id quod non est, dicitur falsa. <i>Unde +verus tragoedus est falsus Hector</i>, ut dicitur in II Soliloq. +Sicut igitur in his quae sunt, invenitur quoddam non esse; ita in +his quae sunt, invenitur quaedam ratio falsitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear + to things which they actually are not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29119] Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod res per se non fallunt, sed per accidens. Dant enim +occasionem falsitatis, eo quod similitudinem eorum gerunt, quorum +non habent existentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as + compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29120] Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod per comparationem ad intellectum divinum non dicuntur +res falsae, quod esset eas esse falsas simpliciter, sed per +comparationem ad intellectum nostrum, quod est eas esse falsas +secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p12"><b>Reply to further objection:</b> To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity + except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles + another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in + the majority of instances. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29121] Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum, quod +in oppositum obiicitur, dicendum quod similitudo vel repraesentatio +deficiens non inducit rationem falsitatis, nisi inquantum praestat +occasionem falsae opinionis. Unde non ubicumque est similitudo, +dicitur res falsa, sed ubicumque est talis similitudo, quae nata +est facere opinionem falsam, non cuicumque, sed ut in pluribus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q17_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 2. Whether there is falsity in the senses?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they + are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and + therefore that falsity is not in them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29122] Iª q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in sensu non sit falsitas. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., <i>si omnes corporis sensus +ita nuntiant ut afficiuntur, quid ab eis amplius exigere debemus, +ignoro</i>. Et sic videtur quod ex sensibus non fallamur. Et sic +falsitas in sensu non est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29123] Iª q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in IV Metaphys., quod <i>falsitas non est +propria sensui, sed phantasiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation + do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29124] Iª q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in +incomplexis non est verum nec falsum, sed solum in complexis. Sed +componere et dividere non pertinet ad sensum. Ergo in sensu non est +falsitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29125] Iª q. 17 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>apparet nos in omnibus +sensibus similitudine lenocinante falli</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the + senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the + senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really + are. + </p><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p7"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness + of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is + the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as + in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly, + neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in + so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man. + </p><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p8"> Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound + organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive + defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems + bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed + sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being + directed to other things. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 co."><a name="29126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29126] Iª q. 17 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod falsitas non est quaerenda in sensu, nisi sicut ibi est +veritas. Veritas autem non sic est in sensu, ut sensus cognoscat +veritatem; sed inquantum veram apprehensionem habet de +sensibilibus, ut supra dictum est. Quod quidem contingit eo quod +apprehendit res ut sunt. Unde contingit falsitatem esse in sensu, +ex hoc quod apprehendit vel iudicat res aliter quam sint. Sic autem +se habet ad cognoscendum res, inquantum similitudo rerum est in +sensu. Similitudo autem alicuius rei est in sensu tripliciter. Uno +modo, primo et per se; sicut in visu est similitudo colorum et +aliorum propriorum sensibilium. Alio modo, per se, sed non primo; +sicut in visu est similitudo figurae vel magnitudinis, et aliorum +communium sensibilium. Tertio modo, nec primo nec per se, sed per +accidens; sicut in visu est similitudo hominis, non inquantum est +homo, sed inquantum huic colorato accidit esse hominem. Et circa +propria sensibilia sensus non habet falsam cognitionem, nisi per +accidens, et ut in paucioribus, ex eo scilicet quod, propter +indispositionem organi, non convenienter recipit formam sensibilem, +sicut et alia passiva, propter suam indispositionem, deficienter +recipiunt impressionem agentium. Et inde est quod, propter +corruptionem linguae, infirmis dulcia amara esse videntur. De +sensibilibus vero communibus et per accidens, potest esse falsum +iudicium etiam in sensu recte disposito, quia sensus non directe +refertur ad illa, sed per accidens, vel ex consequenti, inquantum +refertur ad alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that + we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected + erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense + about the object, but not about the fact of sensation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29127] Iª q. 17 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod sensum affici, est ipsum eius sentire. Unde per hoc +quod sensus ita nuntiant sicut afficiuntur, sequitur quod non +decipiamur in iudicio quo iudicamus nos sentire aliquid. Sed ex eo +quod sensus aliter afficitur interdum quam res sit, sequitur quod +nuntiet nobis aliquando rem aliter quam sit. Et ex hoc fallimur per +sensum circa rem, non circa ipsum sentire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation + it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it + represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were + the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason + the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness + of things that are not present in substance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29128] Iª q. 17 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod falsitas dicitur non esse propria sensui, quia non +decipitur circa proprium obiectum. Unde in alia translatione +planius dicitur, quod <i>sensus proprii sensibilis falsus non +est</i>. Phantasiae autem attribuitur falsitas, quia repraesentat +similitudinem rei etiam absentis; unde quando aliquis convertitur +ad similitudinem rei tanquam ad rem ipsam, provenit ex tali +apprehensione falsitas. Unde etiam philosophus, in V Metaphys., +dicit quod umbrae et picturae et somnia dicuntur falsa, inquantum +non subsunt res quarum habent similitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29129] Iª q. 17 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quod falsitas non sit in sensu +sicut in cognoscente verum et falsum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q17_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 3. Whether falsity is in the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands + not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore + falsity does not exist in the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29130] Iª q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in intellectu. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnis qui +fallitur, id in quo fallitur, non intelligit</i>. Sed falsum +dicitur esse in aliqua cognitione, secundum quod per eam fallimur. +Ergo in intellectu non est falsitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the + intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29131] Iª q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus semper est +rectus. Non ergo in intellectu est falsitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood." + But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29132] Iª q. 17 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>ubi compositio intellectuum +est, ibi verum et falsum est</i>. Sed compositio intellectuum est +in intellectu. Ergo verum et falsum est in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q17_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, + as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent + qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in + knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail + with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said + <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about + accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect + by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the + sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of + which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in + the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. + There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth ( + <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can + exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas + in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. + </p><p id="FP_Q17_A3-p6"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs + also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of + the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition + proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. + In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false + of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the + intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this + reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing + at + all. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 co."><a name="29133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29133] Iª q. 17 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut res habet esse per propriam formam, ita virtus +cognoscitiva habet cognoscere per similitudinem rei cognitae. Unde, +sicut res naturalis non deficit ab esse quod sibi competit secundum +suam formam, potest autem deficere ab aliquibus accidentalibus vel +consequentibus; sicut homo ab hoc quod est habere duos pedes, non +autem ab hoc quod est esse hominem, ita virtus cognoscitiva non +deficit in cognoscendo respectu illius rei cuius similitudine +informatur; potest autem deficere circa aliquid consequens ad +ipsam, vel accidens ei. Sicut est dictum quod visus non decipitur +circa sensibile proprium, sed circa sensibilia communia, quae +consequenter se habent ad illud, et circa sensibilia per accidens. +Sicut autem sensus informatur directe similitudine propriorum +sensibilium, ita intellectus informatur similitudine quidditatis +rei. Unde circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur, sicut +neque sensus circa sensibilia propria. In componendo vero vel +dividendo potest decipi, dum attribuit rei cuius quidditatem +intelligit, aliquid quod eam non consequitur, vel quod ei +opponitur. Sic enim se habet intellectus ad iudicandum de +huiusmodi, sicut sensus ad iudicandum de sensibilibus communibus +vel per accidens. Hac tamen differentia servata, quae supra circa +veritatem dicta est, quod falsitas in intellectu esse potest, non +solum quia cognitio intellectus falsa est, sed quia intellectus eam +cognoscit, sicut et veritatem, in sensu autem falsitas non est ut +cognita, ut dictum est. Quia vero falsitas intellectus per se solum +circa compositionem intellectus est, per accidens etiam in +operatione intellectus qua cognoscit quod quid est, potest esse +falsitas, inquantum ibi compositio intellectus admiscetur. Quod +potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod intellectus +definitionem unius attribuit alteri; ut si definitionem circuli +attribuat homini. Unde definitio unius rei est falsa de altera. +Alio modo, secundum quod partes definitionis componit ad invicem, +quae simul sociari non possunt, sic enim definitio non est solum +falsa respectu alicuius rei, sed est falsa in se. Ut si formet +talem definitionem, animal rationale quadrupes, falsus est +intellectus sic definiendo, propterea quod falsus est in formando +hanc compositionem, aliquod animal rationale est quadrupes. Et +propter hoc, in cognoscendo quidditates simplices non potest esse +intellectus falsus, sed vel est verus, vel totaliter nihil +intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we + reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this + sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not + in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29134] Iª q. 17 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, quia quidditas rei est proprium obiectum +intellectus, propter hoc tunc proprie dicimur aliquid intelligere, +quando, reducentes illud in quod quid est, sic de eo iudicamus, +sicut accidit in demonstrationibus, in quibus non est falsitas. Et +hoc modo intelligitur verbum Augustini, quod omnis qui fallitur, +non intelligit id in quo fallitur, non autem ita, quod in nulla +operatione intellectus aliquis fallatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it + is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, + from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29135] Iª q. 17 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus semper est rectus, secundum quod +intellectus est principiorum, circa quae non decipitur, ex eadem +causa qua non decipitur circa quod quid est. Nam principia per se +nota sunt illa quae statim, intellectis terminis, cognoscuntur, ex +eo quod praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q17_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 4. Whether true and false are contraries?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for + "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as + contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29136] Iª q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod verum et falsum non sint contraria. Verum +enim et falsum opponuntur sicut quod est et quod non est, <i>nam +verum est id quod est</i>, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed quod est et +quod non est, non opponuntur ut contraria. Ergo verum et falsum non +sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), + "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29137] Iª q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unum +contrariorum non est in alio. Sed falsum est in vero, quia, sicut +dicit Augustinus in libro Soliloq., <i>tragoedus non esset falsus +Hector, si non esset verus tragoedus</i>. Ergo verum et falsum non +sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei + xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.8.5" target="asv">Jer. 8:5</a>), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29138] Iª q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in +Deo non est contrarietas aliqua, nihil enim divinae substantiae est +contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civit. Dei. Sed Deo +opponitur falsitas, nam idolum in Scriptura mendacium nominatur, +Ierem. VIII, <i>apprehenderunt mendacium</i>; Glossa, <i>idest +idola</i>. Ergo verum et falsum non sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29139] Iª q. 17 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit philosophus, in II Periherm., ponit enim falsam +opinionem verae contrariam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must + be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of + not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it + is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said + except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness + is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch + as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate + apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 co."><a name="29140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29140] Iª q. 17 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod verum et falsum opponuntur ut contraria, et non sicut +affirmatio et negatio, ut quidam dixerunt. Ad cuius evidentiam, +sciendum est quod negatio neque ponit aliquid, neque determinat +sibi aliquod subiectum. Et propter hoc, potest dici tam de ente +quam de non ente; sicut non videns, et non sedens. Privatio autem +non ponit aliquid, sed determinat sibi subiectum. Est enim negatio +in subiecto, ut dicitur IV Metaphys., caecum enim non dicitur nisi +de eo quod est natum videre. Contrarium vero et aliquid ponit, et +subiectum determinat, nigrum enim est aliqua species coloris. +Falsum autem aliquid ponit. Est enim falsum, ut dicit philosophus, +IV Metaphys., ex eo quod dicitur vel videtur aliquid esse quod non +est, vel non esse quod est. Sicut enim verum ponit acceptionem +adaequatam rei, ita falsum acceptionem rei non adaequatam. Unde +manifestum est quod verum et falsum sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily + resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, + as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29141] Iª q. 17 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod id quod est in rebus, est veritas rei sed id quod est +ut apprehensum, est verum intellectus, in quo primo est veritas. +Unde et falsum est id quod non est ut apprehensum. Apprehendere +autem esse et non esse, contrarietatem habet, sicut probat +philosophus, in II Periherm., quod huic opinioni, bonum est bonum, +contraria est, bonum non est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to + it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible + with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and + every falsity in some truth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29142] Iª q. 17 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod falsum non fundatur in vero sibi contrario, sicut nec +malum in bono sibi contrario; sed in eo quod sibi subiicitur. Et +hoc ideo in utroque accidit, quia verum et bonum communia sunt, et +convertuntur cum ente, unde, sicut omnis privatio fundatur in +subiecto quod est ens, ita omne malum fundatur in aliquo bono, et +omne falsum in aliquo vero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing + contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be + nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. + So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false + opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29143] Iª q. 17 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quia contraria et opposita privative nata sunt fieri +circa idem, ideo Deo, prout in se consideratur, non est aliquid +contrarium, neque ratione suae bonitatis, neque ratione suae +veritatis, quia in intellectu eius non potest esse falsitas aliqua. +Sed in apprehensione nostra habet aliquid contrarium, nam verae +opinioni de ipso contrariatur falsa opinio. Et sic idola mendacia +dicuntur opposita veritati divinae, inquantum falsa opinio de +idolis contrariatur verae opinioni de unitate Dei.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q18" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q18-p0.1">Q. 18. THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q18-p2"> Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the + divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise: + </p><p id="FP_Q18-p3"> (1) To whom does it belong to live?</p><p id="FP_Q18-p4"> (2) What is life?</p><p id="FP_Q18-p5"> (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?</p><p id="FP_Q18-p6"> (4) Whether all things in God are life?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 pr."><a name="29144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29144] +Iª q. 18 pr.</span></a> Quoniam autem intelligere viventium +est, post considerationem de scientia et intellectu divino, +considerandum est de vita ipsius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, quorum sit vivere. Secundo, quid sit vita. Tertio, utrum +vita Deo conveniat. Quarto, utrum omnia in Deo sint vita.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q18_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 1. Whether to live belongs to all natural things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind + of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural + things partake of life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29145] Iª q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod omnium rerum naturalium sit vivere. Dicit +enim philosophus, in VIII Physic., quod motus est ut vita quaedam +natura existentibus omnibus. Sed omnes res naturales participant +motum. Ergo omnes res naturales participant vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement + is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). + Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29146] Iª q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +plantae dicuntur vivere, inquantum habent in seipsis principium +motus augmenti et decrementi. Sed motus localis est perfectior et +prior secundum naturam quam motus augmenti et decrementi, ut +probatur in VIII Physic. Cum igitur omnia corpora naturalia habeant +aliquod principium motus localis, videtur quod omnia corpora +naturalia vivant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living + waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29147] Iª q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, inter +corpora naturalia imperfectiora sunt elementa. Sed eis attribuitur +vita, dicuntur enim aquae vivae. Ergo multo magis alia corpora +naturalia vitam habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life + is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29148] Iª q. 18 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Dionysius, VI cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>plantae +secundum ultimam resonantiam vitae habent vivere</i>, ex quo potest +accipi quod ultimum gradum vitae obtinent plantae. Sed corpora +inanimata sunt infra plantas. Ergo eorum non est vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life + manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, + therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: + and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal + begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to + be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, + and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind + of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, + is + called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling + are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any + kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 co."><a name="29149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29149] Iª q. 18 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ex his quae manifeste vivunt, accipere possumus quorum sit +vivere, et quorum non sit vivere. Vivere autem manifeste animalibus +convenit, dicitur enim in libro de vegetabilibus, quod <i>vita in +animalibus manifesta est</i>. Unde secundum illud oportet +distinguere viventia a non viventibus secundum quod animalia +dicuntur vivere. Hoc autem est in quo primo manifestatur vita, et +in quo ultimo remanet. Primo autem dicimus animal vivere, quando +incipit ex se motum habere; et tandiu iudicatur animal vivere, +quandiu talis motus in eo apparet; quando vero iam ex se non habet +aliquem motum, sed movetur tantum ab alio tunc dicitur animal +mortuum, per defectum vitae. Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt +viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent; sive +accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti, +idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter, +prout motus dicitur actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire +dicitur moveri, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ut sic viventia +dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum vel operationem aliquam, ea +vero in quorum natura non est ut se agant ad aliquem motum vel +operationem, viventia dici non possunt, nisi per aliquam +similitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of + the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a + similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal + natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. + Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, + if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact + have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29150] Iª q. 18 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi potest intelligi vel de motu +primo, scilicet corporum caelestium; vel de motu communiter. Et +utroque modo motus dicitur quasi vita corporum naturalium, per +similitudinem; et non per proprietatem. Nam motus caeli est in +universo corporalium naturarum, sicut motus cordis in animali, quo +conservatur vita. Similiter etiam quicumque motus naturalis hoc +modo se habet ad res naturales, ut quaedam similitudo vitalis +operationis. Unde, si totum universum corporale esset unum animal, +ita quod iste motus esset a movente intrinseco, ut quidam +posuerunt, sequeretur quod motus esset vita omnium naturalium +corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, + and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. + Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching + thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from + such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, + either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, + as do living bodies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29151] Iª q. 18 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod corporibus gravibus et levibus non competit moveri, +nisi secundum quod sunt extra dispositionem suae naturae, utpote +cum sunt extra locum proprium, cum enim sunt in loco proprio et +naturali, quiescunt. Sed plantae et aliae res viventes moventur +motu vitali, secundum hoc quod sunt in sua dispositione naturali, +non autem in accedendo ad eam vel in recedendo ab ea, imo secundum +quod recedunt a tali motu, recedunt a naturali dispositione. Et +praeterea, corpora gravia et levia moventur a motore extrinseco, +vel generante, qui dat formam, vel removente prohibens, ut dicitur +in VIII Physic., et ita non movent seipsa, sicut corpora +viventia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing + source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to + possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs + is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the + case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29152] Iª q. 18 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aquae vivae dicuntur, quae habent continuum fluxum, +aquae enim stantes, quae non continuantur ad principium continue +fluens, dicuntur mortuae, ut aquae cisternarum et lacunarum. Et hoc +dicitur per similitudinem, inquantum enim videntur se movere, +habent similitudinem vitae. Sed tamen non est in eis vera ratio +vitae, quia hunc motum non habent a seipsis, sed a causa generante +eas; sicut accidit circa motum aliorum gravium et levium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q18_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 2. Whether life is an operation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain + operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, + sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29153] Iª q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod vita sit quaedam operatio. Nihil enim +dividitur nisi per ea quae sunt sui generis. Sed vivere dividitur +per operationes quasdam, ut patet per philosophum in II libro de +anima, qui distinguit vivere per quatuor, scilicet alimento uti, +sentire, moveri secundum locum, et intelligere. Ergo vita est +operatio quaedam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from + the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29154] Iª q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, vita +activa dicitur alia esse a contemplativa. Sed contemplativi ab +activis non diversificantur nisi secundum operationes quasdam. Ergo +vita est quaedam operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.18.3" target="asv"> Jn. 18:3, </a> "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29155] Iª q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +cognoscere Deum est operatio quaedam. Haec autem est vita, ut patet +per illud Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est autem vita aeterna, ut cognoscant +te solum verum Deum</i>. Ergo vita est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29156] Iª q. 18 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit philosophus, in II de anima, <i>vivere viventibus est +esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q18_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said ( + <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which + the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. + And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said ( + <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly + to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote + the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances + from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the + dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is + given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance + to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is + nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running" + denotes "to run" in the abstract. + </p><p id="FP_Q18_A2-p7"> Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations + from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 co."><a name="29157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29157] Iª q. 18 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut ex dictis patet, intellectus noster, qui proprie est +cognoscitivus quidditatis rei ut proprii obiecti, accipit a sensu, +cuius propria obiecta sunt accidentia exteriora. Et inde est quod +ex his quae exterius apparent de re, devenimus ad cognoscendam +essentiam rei. Et quia sic nominamus aliquid sicut cognoscimus +illud, ut ex supradictis patet, inde est quod plerumque a +proprietatibus exterioribus imponuntur nomina ad significandas +essentias rerum. Unde huiusmodi nomina quandoque accipiuntur +proprie pro ipsis essentiis rerum, ad quas significandas +principaliter sunt imposita, aliquando autem sumuntur pro +proprietatibus a quibus imponuntur, et hoc minus proprie. Sicut +patet quod hoc nomen corpus impositum est ad significandum quoddam +genus substantiarum, ex eo quod in eis inveniuntur tres +dimensiones, et ideo aliquando ponitur hoc nomen corpus ad +significandas tres dimensiones, secundum quod corpus ponitur +species quantitatis. Sic ergo dicendum est et de vita. Nam vitae +nomen sumitur ex quodam exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est +movere seipsum, non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc +significandum, sed ad significandam substantiam cui convenit +secundum suam naturam movere seipsam, vel agere se quocumque modo +ad operationem. Et secundum hoc, vivere nihil aliud est quam esse +in tali natura, et vita significat hoc ipsum, sed in abstracto; +sicut hoc nomen cursus significat ipsum currere in abstracto. Unde +vivum non est praedicatum accidentale, sed substantiale. Quandoque +tamen vita sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a quibus +nomen vitae assumitur; sicut dicit philosophus, IX Ethic., quod +<i>vivere principaliter est sentire vel intelligere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence + and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. + ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. + Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in + this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking + nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case + of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, + such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29158] Iª q. 18 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod philosophus ibi accipit vivere pro operatione vitae. +Vel dicendum est melius, quod sentire et intelligere, et huiusmodi, +quandoque sumuntur pro quibusdam operationibus; quandoque autem pro +ipso esse sic operantium. Dicitur enim IX Ethic., quod <i>esse est +sentire vel intelligere</i>, idest habere naturam ad sentiendum vel +intelligendum. Et hoc modo distinguit philosophus vivere per illa +quatuor. Nam in istis inferioribus quatuor sunt genera viventium. +Quorum quaedam habent naturam solum ad utendum alimento, et ad +consequentia, quae sunt augmentum et generatio; quaedam ulterius ad +sentiendum, ut patet in animalibus immobilibus, sicut sunt ostrea; +quaedam vero, cum his, ulterius ad movendum se secundum locum, +sicut animalia perfecta, ut quadrupedia et volatilia et huiusmodi; +quaedam vero ulterius ad intelligendum, sicut homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces + such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as + are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular + kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by + a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his + whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence, + others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said + to be life eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29159] Iª q. 18 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod opera vitae dicuntur, quorum principia sunt in +operantibus, ut seipsos inducant in tales operationes. Contingit +autem aliquorum operum inesse hominibus non solum principia +naturalia, ut sunt potentiae naturales; sed etiam quaedam +superaddita, ut sunt habitus inclinantes ad quaedam operationum +genera quasi per modum naturae, et facientes illas operationes esse +delectabiles. Et ex hoc dicitur, quasi per quandam similitudinem, +quod illa operatio quae est homini delectabilis, et ad quam +inclinatur, et in qua conversatur, et ordinat vitam suam ad ipsam, +dicitur vita hominis, unde quidam dicuntur agere vitam luxuriosam, +quidam vitam honestam. Et per hunc modum vita contemplativa ab +activa distinguitur. Et per hunc etiam modum cognoscere Deum +dicitur vita aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29160] Iª q. 18 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio +ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q18_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 3. Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously + stated + <a id="FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29161] Iª q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deo non conveniat vita. Vivere enim +dicuntur aliqua secundum quod movent seipsa, ut dictum est. Sed Deo +non competit moveri. Ergo neque vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima + ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed + to Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29162] Iª q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in +omnibus quae vivunt, est accipere aliquod vivendi principium, unde +dicitur in II de anima, quod <i>anima est viventis corporis causa +et principium</i>. Sed Deus non habet aliquod principium. Ergo sibi +non competit vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal + things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29163] Iª q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +principium vitae in rebus viventibus quae apud nos sunt, est anima +vegetabilis, quae non est nisi in rebus corporalibus. Ergo rebus +incorporalibus non competit vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv">Ps. 83:3</a>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29164] Iª q. 18 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII, <i>cor meum et caro mea +exultaverunt in Deum vivum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q18_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live + in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more + perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the + end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and + sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does + no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally + inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action + being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their + inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay. + </p><p id="FP_Q18_A3-p7"> Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as + regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which + the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their + sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move + only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as + have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, + can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the + form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of + their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any + action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose + are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between + the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible + beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual + faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the + art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that + is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship. + </p><p id="FP_Q18_A3-p8"> But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which + it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, + yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, + and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect + degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing + God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 co."><a name="29165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29165] Iª q. 18 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod vita maxime proprie in Deo est. Ad cuius evidentiam, +considerandum est quod, cum vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod +operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab aliis mota; quanto perfectius +competit hoc alicui, tanto perfectius in eo invenitur vita. In +moventibus autem et motis tria per ordinem inveniuntur. Nam primo, +finis movet agentem; agens vero principale est quod per suam formam +agit; et hoc interdum agit per aliquod instrumentum, quod non agit +ex virtute suae formae, sed ex virtute principalis agentis; cui +instrumento competit sola executio actionis. Inveniuntur igitur +quaedam, quae movent seipsa, non habito respectu ad formam vel +finem, quae inest eis a natura, sed solum quantum ad executionem +motus, sed forma per quam agunt, et finis propter quem agunt, +determinantur eis a natura. Et huiusmodi sunt plantae, quae +secundum formam inditam eis a natura, movent seipsas secundum +augmentum et decrementum. Quaedam vero ulterius movent seipsa, non +solum habito respectu ad executionem motus, sed etiam quantum ad +formam quae est principium motus, quam per se acquirunt. Et +huiusmodi sunt animalia, quorum motus principium est forma non a +natura indita, sed per sensum accepta. Unde quanto perfectiorem +sensum habent, tanto perfectius movent seipsa. Nam ea quae non +habent nisi sensum tactus, movent solum seipsa motu dilatationis et +constrictionis, ut ostrea, parum excedentia motum plantae. Quae +vero habent virtutem sensitivam perfectam, non solum ad +cognoscendum coniuncta et tangentia, sed etiam ad cognoscendum +distantia, movent seipsa in remotum motu processivo. Sed quamvis +huiusmodi animalia formam quae est principium motus, per sensum +accipiant, non tamen per seipsa praestituunt sibi finem suae +operationis, vel sui motus; sed est eis inditus a natura, cuius +instinctu ad aliquid agendum moventur per formam sensu apprehensam. +Unde supra talia animalia sunt illa quae movent seipsa, etiam +habito respectu ad finem, quem sibi praestituunt. Quod quidem non +fit nisi per rationem et intellectum, cuius est cognoscere +proportionem finis et eius quod est ad finem, et unum ordinare in +alterum. Unde perfectior modus vivendi est eorum quae habent +intellectum, haec enim perfectius movent seipsa. Et huius est +signum, quod in uno et eodem homine virtus intellectiva movet +potentias sensitivas; et potentiae sensitivae per suum imperium +movent organa, quae exequuntur motum. Sicut etiam in artibus, +videmus quod ars ad quam pertinet usus navis, scilicet ars +gubernatoria, praecipit ei quae inducit formam navis, et haec +praecipit illi quae habet executionem tantum, in disponendo +materiam. Sed quamvis intellectus noster ad aliqua se agat, tamen +aliqua sunt ei praestituta a natura; sicut sunt prima principia, +circa quae non potest aliter se habere, et ultimus finis, quem non +potest non velle. Unde, licet quantum ad aliquid moveat se, tamen +oportet quod quantum ad aliqua ab alio moveatur. Illud igitur cuius +sua natura est ipsum eius intelligere, et cui id quod naturaliter +habet, non determinatur ab alio, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum +vitae. Tale autem est Deus. Unde in Deo maxime est vita. Unde +philosophus, in XII Metaphys., ostenso quod Deus sit intelligens, +concludit quod habeat vitam perfectissimam et sempiternam, quia +intellectus eius est perfectissimus, et semper in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst + actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, + that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is + the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in + movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that + as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the + imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is + in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands + itself + is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement + is an act of the imperfect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29166] Iª q. 18 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys., duplex est actio, +una, quae transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare; +alia, quae manet in agente, ut intelligere, sentire et velle. +Quarum haec est differentia, quia prima actio non est perfectio +agentis quod movet, sed ipsius moti; secunda autem actio est +perfectio agentis. Unde, quia motus est actus mobilis, secunda +actio, inquantum est actus operantis, dicitur motus eius; ex hac +similitudine, quod, sicut motus est actus mobilis, ita huiusmodi +actio est actus agentis; licet motus sit actus imperfecti, scilicet +existentis in potentia, huiusmodi autem actio est actus perfecti, +idest existentis in actu, ut dicitur in III de anima. Hoc igitur +modo quo intelligere est motus, id quod se intelligit, dicitur se +movere. Et per hunc modum etiam Plato posuit quod Deus movet +seipsum, non eo modo quo motus est actus imperfecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle + of life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29167] Iª q. 18 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Deus est ipsum suum esse et suum intelligere, +ita est suum vivere. Et propter hoc, sic vivit, quod non habet +vivendi principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment + to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold + good with incorruptible natures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29168] Iª q. 18 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod vita in istis inferioribus recipitur in natura +corruptibili, quae indiget et generatione ad conservationem +speciei, et alimento ad conservationem individui. Et propter hoc, +in istis inferioribus non invenitur vita sine anima vegetabili. Sed +hoc non habet locum in rebus incorruptibilibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q18_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 4. Whether all things are life in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.28" target="asv">Acts 17:28</a>), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29169] Iª q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia sint vita in Deo. Dicitur enim +Act. XVII, <i>in ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus</i>. Sed non omnia +in Deo sunt motus. Ergo non omnia in ipso sunt vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not + all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29170] Iª q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnia +sunt in Deo sicut in primo exemplari. Sed exemplata debent +conformari exemplari. Cum igitur non omnia vivant in seipsis, +videtur quod non omnia in Deo sint vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, + things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But + this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29171] Iª q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +Augustinus dicit in libro de vera Relig., substantia vivens est +melior qualibet substantia non vivente. Si igitur ea quae in +seipsis non vivunt, in Deo sunt vita, videtur quod verius sint res +in Deo quam in seipsis. Quod tamen videtur esse falsum, cum in +seipsis sint in actu, in Deo vero in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but + never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and + things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29172] Iª q. 18 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +sciuntur a Deo bona, et ea quae fiunt secundum aliquod tempus; ita +mala, et ea quae Deus potest facere, sed nunquam fiunt. Si ergo +omnia sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt scita ab ipso, videtur quod +etiam mala, et quae nunquam fiunt, sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt +scita ab eo. Quod videtur inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3,4</a>), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29173] Iª q. 18 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>quod factum est, in ipso vita erat</i>. +Sed omnia praeter Deum facta sunt. Ergo omnia in Deo sunt vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In God to live is to understand, as before stated + <a id="FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as + understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things + understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 co."><a name="29174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29174] Iª q. 18 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut dictum est, vivere Dei est eius intelligere. In Deo +autem est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, et ipsum +intelligere eius. Unde quidquid est in Deo ut intellectum, est +ipsum vivere vel vita eius. Unde, cum omnia quae facta sunt a Deo, +sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa +vita divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine + power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they + exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, + and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In + another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper + ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And + since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, + but life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29175] Iª q. 18 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod creaturae in Deo esse dicuntur dupliciter. Uno modo, +inquantum continentur et conservantur virtute divina, sicut dicimus +ea esse in nobis, quae sunt in nostra potestate. Et sic creaturae +dicuntur esse in Deo, etiam prout sunt in propriis naturis. Et hoc +modo intelligendum est verbum apostoli dicentis, <i>in ipso +vivimus, movemur et sumus</i>, quia et nostrum vivere, et nostrum +esse, et nostrum moveri causantur a Deo. Alio modo dicuntur res +esse in Deo sicut in cognoscente. Et sic sunt in Deo per proprias +rationes, quae non sunt aliud in Deo ab essentia divina. Unde res, +prout sic in Deo sunt, sunt essentia divina. Et quia essentia +divina est vita, non autem motus, inde est quod res, hoc modo +loquendi, in Deo non sunt motus, sed vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being + of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the + architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence + the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind, + as having a divine existence in that mind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29176] Iª q. 18 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod exemplata oportet conformari exemplari secundum +rationem formae, non autem secundum modum essendi. Nam alterius +modi esse habet quandoque forma in exemplari et in exemplato, sicut +forma domus in mente artificis habet esse immateriale et +intelligibile, in domo autem quae est extra animam, habet esse +materiale et sensibile. Unde et rationes rerum quae in seipsis non +vivunt, in mente divina sunt vita, quia in mente divina habent esse +divinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the + divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the + true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural + things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more + truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this + particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because + it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being + in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the + mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29177] Iª q. 18 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, si de ratione rerum naturalium non esset materia, +sed tantum forma, omnibus modis veriori modo essent res naturales +in mente divina per suas ideas, quam in seipsis. Propter quod et +Plato posuit quod homo separatus erat verus homo, homo autem +materialis est homo per participationem. Sed quia de ratione rerum +naturalium est materia, dicendum quod res naturales verius esse +habent simpliciter in mente divina, quam in seipsis, quia in mente +divina habent esse increatum, in seipsis autem esse creatum. Sed +esse hoc, utpote homo vel equus, verius habent in propria natura +quam in mente divina, quia ad veritatem hominis pertinet esse +materiale, quod non habent in mente divina. Sicut domus nobilius +esse habet in mente artificis, quam in materia, sed tamen verius +dicitur domus quae est in materia, quam quae est in mente; quia +haec est domus in actu, illa autem domus in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by + Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it + cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life + means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so + far as life implies a principle of operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29178] Iª q. 18 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, licet mala sint in Dei scientia, inquantum sub Dei +scientia comprehenduntur, non tamen sunt in Deo sicut creata a Deo +vel conservata ab ipso, neque sicut habentia rationem in Deo, +cognoscuntur enim a Deo per rationes bonorum. Unde non potest dici +quod mala sint vita in Deo. Ea vero quae secundum nullum tempus +sunt, possunt dici esse vita in Deo, secundum quod vivere nominat +intelligere tantum, inquantum intelliguntur a Deo, non autem +secundum quod vivere importat principium operationis.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q19" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q19-p0.1">Q. 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q19-p2"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration + is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect + in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q19-p3"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p4"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p5"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p6"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p7"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p8"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p9"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p10"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p11"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p12"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p13"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p14"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 pr."><a name="29179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29179] +Iª q. 19 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad +divinam scientiam pertinent, considerandum est de his quae +pertinent ad voluntatem divinam, ut sit prima consideratio de ipsa +Dei voluntate; secunda, de his quae ad voluntatem absolute +pertinent; tertia, de his quae ad intellectum in ordine ad +voluntatem pertinent. Circa ipsam autem voluntatem quaeruntur +duodecim. Primo, utrum in Deo sit voluntas. Secundo, utrum Deus +velit alia a se. Tertio, utrum quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate +velit. Quarto, utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum. Quinto, utrum +voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam causam. Sexto, utrum +voluntas divina semper impleatur. Septimo, utrum voluntas Dei sit +mutabilis. Octavo, utrum voluntas Dei necessitatem rebus volitis +imponat. Nono, utrum in Deo sit voluntas malorum. Decimo, utrum +Deus habeat liberum arbitrium. Undecimo, utrum sit distinguenda in +Deo voluntas signi. Duodecimo, utrum convenienter circa divinam +voluntatem ponantur quinque signa.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q19_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 1. Whether there is will in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. + Therefore there is not will in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29180] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit voluntas. Obiectum enim +voluntatis est finis et bonum. Sed Dei non est assignare aliquem +finem. Ergo voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which + cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29181] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +voluntas est appetitus quidam. Appetitus autem, cum sit rei non +habitae, imperfectionem designat, quae Deo non competit. Ergo +voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, + and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29182] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum philosophum, in III de anima, voluntas est movens motum. +Sed Deus est primum movens immobile. Ut probatur VIII Physic. Ergo +in Deo non est voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.2" target="asv">Rom. 12:2</a>): "That you may prove what is the will of God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29183] Iª q. 19 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit apostolus, Rom. XII, <i>ut probetis quae sit voluntas +Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence + by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards + its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same + with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things + without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through + its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain + to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And + so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His + will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 co."><a name="29184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29184] Iª q. 19 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +in Deo voluntatem esse, sicut et in eo est intellectus, voluntas +enim intellectum consequitur. Sicut enim res naturalis habet esse +in actu per suam formam, ita intellectus intelligens actu per suam +formam intelligibilem. Quaelibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem +hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendat in eam; +et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea. Et idem est de qualibet +perfectione naturali, quod est bonum naturae. Et haec habitudo ad +bonum, in rebus carentibus cognitione, vocatur appetitus naturalis. +Unde et natura intellectualis ad bonum apprehensum per formam +intelligibilem, similem habitudinem habet, ut scilicet, cum habet +ipsum, quiescat in illo; cum vero non habet, quaerat ipsum. Et +utrumque pertinet ad voluntatem. Unde in quolibet habente +intellectum, est voluntas; sicut in quolibet habente sensum, est +appetitus animalis. Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit +in eo intellectus. Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita +suum velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by + His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29185] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, licet nihil aliud a Deo sit finis Dei, tamen ipsemet +est finis respectu omnium quae ab eo fiunt. Et hoc per suam +essentiam, cum per suam essentiam sit bonus, ut supra ostensum est, +finis enim habet rationem boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what + it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in + God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29186] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod voluntas in nobis pertinet ad appetitivam partem, +quae licet ab appetendo nominetur, non tamen hunc solum habet +actum, ut appetat quae non habet; sed etiam ut amet quod habet, et +delectetur in illo. Et quantum ad hoc voluntas in Deo ponitur; quae +semper habet bonum quod est eius obiectum, cum sit indifferens ab +eo secundum essentiam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will + is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, + but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when + he said that the first mover moves itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29187] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod voluntas cuius obiectum principale est bonum quod est +extra voluntatem, oportet quod sit mota ab aliquo. Sed obiectum +divinae voluntatis est bonitas sua, quae est eius essentia. Unde, +cum voluntas Dei sit eius essentia, non movetur ab alio a se, sed a +se tantum, eo modo loquendi quo intelligere et velle dicitur motus. +Et secundum hoc Plato dixit quod primum movens movet seipsum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 2. Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other + than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29188] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non velit alia a se. Velle enim +divinum est eius esse. Sed Deus non est aliud a se. Ergo non vult +aliud a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills + anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29189] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +volitum movet voluntatem, sicut appetibile appetitum, ut dicitur in +III de anima. Si igitur Deus velit aliquid aliud a se, movebitur +eius voluntas ab aliquo alio, quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely + satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29190] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +cuicumque voluntati sufficit aliquod volitum, nihil quaerit extra +illud. Sed Deo sufficit sua bonitas, et voluntas eius ex ea +satiatur. Ergo Deus non vult aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things + apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But + this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29191] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, actus +voluntatis multiplicatur secundum volita. Si igitur Deus velit se +et alia a se, sequitur quod actus voluntatis eius sit multiplex, et +per consequens eius esse, quod est eius velle. Hoc autem est +impossibile. Non ergo vult alia a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.3" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:3</a>): "This is the will of God, your sanctification." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29192] Iª q. 19 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod apostolus dicit, I Thess. IV, <i>haec est voluntas Dei, +sanctificatio vestra</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above + <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, + if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that + every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces + its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; + and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, + if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine + will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other + things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness + that other things should be partakers therein. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 co."><a name="29193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29193] Iª q. 19 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus non solum se vult, sed etiam alia a se. Quod apparet a +simili prius introducto. Res enim naturalis non solum habet +naturalem inclinationem respectu proprii boni, ut acquirat ipsum +cum non habet, vel ut quiescat in illo cum habet; sed etiam ut +proprium bonum in alia diffundat, secundum quod possibile est. Unde +videmus quod omne agens, inquantum est actu et perfectum, facit +sibi simile. Unde et hoc pertinet ad rationem voluntatis, ut bonum +quod quis habet, aliis communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Et +hoc praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, a qua, per quandam +similitudinem, derivatur omnis perfectio. Unde, si res naturales, +inquantum perfectae sunt, suum bonum aliis communicant, multo magis +pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, ut bonum suum aliis per +similitudinem communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Sic igitur +vult et se esse, et alia. Sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem, +inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam +participare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding + them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. + Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from + Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29194] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, licet divinum velle sit eius esse secundum rem, +tamen differt ratione, secundum diversum modum intelligendi et +significandi, ut ex superioribus patet. In hoc enim quod dico Deum +esse, non importatur habitudo ad aliquid, sicut in hoc quod dico +Deum velle. Et ideo, licet non sit aliquid aliud a se, vult tamen +aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the + will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing + so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, + which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its + own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it + does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by + understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29195] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in his quae volumus propter finem, tota ratio movendi +est finis, et hoc est quod movet voluntatem. Et hoc maxime apparet +in his quae volumus tantum propter finem. Qui enim vult sumere +potionem amaram, nihil in ea vult nisi sanitatem, et hoc solum est +quod movet eius voluntatem. Secus autem est in eo qui sumit +potionem dulcem, quam non solum propter sanitatem, sed etiam +propter se aliquis velle potest. Unde, cum Deus alia a se non velit +nisi propter finem qui est sua bonitas, ut dictum est, non sequitur +quod aliquid aliud moveat voluntatem eius nisi bonitas sua. Et sic, +sicut alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a +se vult, volendo bonitatem suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, + but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection + consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29196] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex hoc quod voluntati divinae sufficit sua bonitas, +non sequitur quod nihil aliud velit, sed quod nihil aliud vult nisi +ratione suae bonitatis. Sicut etiam intellectus divinus, licet sit +perfectus ex hoc ipso quod essentiam divinam cognoscit, tamen in ea +cognoscit alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as + willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29197] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut intelligere divinum est unum, quia multa non +videt nisi in uno; ita velle divinum est unum et simplex, quia +multa non vult nisi per unum, quod est bonitas sua.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 3. Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills + from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29198] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate velit. +Omne enim aeternum est necessarium. Sed quidquid Deus vult, ab +aeterno vult, alias, voluntas eius esset mutabilis. Ergo quidquid +vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. + Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29199] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +vult alia a se, inquantum vult bonitatem suam. Sed Deus bonitatem +suam ex necessitate vult. Ergo alia a se ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of + all necessity, as above shown ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as + stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29200] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid est Deo naturale, est necessarium, quia Deus est per se +necesse esse, et principium omnis necessitatis, ut supra ostensum +est. Sed naturale est ei velle quidquid vult, quia in Deo nihil +potest esse praeter naturam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ergo +quidquid vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God + does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to + will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since + everything contingent is imperfect and mutable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="29201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29201] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non +necesse esse, et possibile non esse, aequipollent. Si igitur non +necesse est Deum velle aliquid eorum quae vult, possibile est eum +non velle illud; et possibile est eum velle illud quod non vult. +Ergo voluntas divina est contingens ad utrumlibet. Et sic +imperfecta, quia omne contingens est imperfectum et mutabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined + to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent + with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to + Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="29202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29202] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, ab eo +quod est ad utrumlibet, non sequitur aliqua actio, nisi ab aliquo +alio inclinetur ad unum, ut dicit Commentator, in II Physic. Si +ergo voluntas Dei in aliquibus se habet ad utrumlibet, sequitur +quod ab aliquo alio determinetur ad effectum. Et sic habet aliquam +causam priorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore + whatever God wills, He wills necessarily. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6"><a name="29203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29203] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid Deus scit, ex necessitate scit. Sed sicut scientia divina +est eius essentia, ita voluntas divina. Ergo quidquid Deus vult, ex +necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, + we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29204] Iª q. 19 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit apostolus, Ephes. I, <i>qui operatur omnia secundum +consilium voluntatis suae</i>. Quod autem operamur ex consilio +voluntatis, non ex necessitate volumus. Non ergo quidquid Deus +vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to + be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: + thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; + thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not + necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that + he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe + that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary + relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we + will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for + instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as + they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to + it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take + ship + in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for + a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since + the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, + it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, + for + supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 co."><a name="29205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29205] Iª q. 19 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necessarium dicitur aliquid dupliciter, scilicet absolute, et +ex suppositione. Necessarium absolute iudicatur aliquid ex +habitudine terminorum, utpote quia praedicatum est in definitione +subiecti, sicut necessarium est hominem esse animal; vel quia +subiectum est de ratione praedicati, sicut hoc est necessarium, +numerum esse parem vel imparem. Sic autem non est necessarium +Socratem sedere. Unde non est necessarium absolute, sed potest dici +necessarium ex suppositione, supposito enim quod sedeat, necesse +est eum sedere dum sedet. Circa divina igitur volita hoc +considerandum est, quod aliquid Deum velle est necessarium +absolute, non tamen hoc est verum de omnibus quae vult. Voluntas +enim divina necessariam habitudinem habet ad bonitatem suam, quae +est proprium eius obiectum. Unde bonitatem suam esse Deus ex +necessitate vult; sicut et voluntas nostra ex necessitate vult +beatitudinem. Sicut et quaelibet alia potentia necessariam +habitudinem habet ad proprium et principale obiectum, ut visus ad +colorem; quia de sui ratione est, ut in illud tendat. Alia autem a +se Deus vult, inquantum ordinantur ad suam bonitatem ut in finem. +Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non ex necessitate volumus volentes +finem, nisi sint talia, sine quibus finis esse non potest, sicut +volumus cibum, volentes conservationem vitae; et navem, volentes +transfretare. Non sic autem ex necessitate volumus ea sine quibus +finis esse potest, sicut equum ad ambulandum, quia sine hoc +possumus ire; et eadem ratio est in aliis. Unde, cum bonitas Dei +sit perfecta, et esse possit sine aliis, cum nihil ei perfectionis +ex aliis accrescat; sequitur quod alia a se eum velle, non sit +necessarium absolute. Et tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, +supposito enim quod velit, non potest non velle, quia non potest +voluntas eius mutari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by + supposition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29206] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ex hoc quod Deus ab aeterno vult aliquid, non +sequitur quod necesse est eum illud velle, nisi ex +suppositione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for + it can exist without other things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29207] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, licet Deus ex necessitate velit bonitatem suam, non +tamen ex necessitate vult ea quae vult propter bonitatem suam, quia +bonitas eius potest esse sine aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural + or contrary to His nature, but voluntary. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29208] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non est naturale Deo velle aliquid aliorum, quae non +ex necessitate vult. Neque tamen innaturale, aut contra naturam, +sed est voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the + cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not + in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily + will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the + divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be + without it; and such defect accompanies all created good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29209] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod aliquando aliqua causa necessaria habet non +necessariam habitudinem ad aliquem effectum, quod est propter +defectum effectus, et non propter defectum causae. Sicut virtus +solis habet non necessariam habitudinem ad aliquid eorum quae +contingenter hic eveniunt, non propter defectum virtutis solaris, +sed propter defectum effectus non necessario ex causa provenientis. +Et similiter, quod Deus non ex necessitate velit aliquid eorum quae +vult, non accidit ex defectu voluntatis divinae, sed ex defectu qui +competit volito secundum suam rationem, quia scilicet est tale, ut +sine eo esse possit perfecta bonitas Dei. Qui quidem defectus +consequitur omne bonum creatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, + determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="29210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29210] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum ergo +dicendum quod causa quae est ex se contingens, oportet quod +determinetur ab aliquo exteriori ad effectum. Sed voluntas divina, +quae ex se necessitatem habet, determinat seipsam ad volitum, ad +quod habet habitudinem non necessariam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has + a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is + of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other + things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute + necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily + whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="29211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29211] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum +quod, sicut divinum esse in se est necessarium, ita et divinum +velle et divinum scire, sed divinum scire habet necessariam +habitudinem ad scita, non autem divinum velle ad volita. Quod ideo +est, quia scientia habetur de rebus, secundum quod sunt in sciente, +voluntas autem comparatur ad res, secundum quod sunt in seipsis. +Quia igitur omnia alia habent necessarium esse secundum quod sunt +in Deo; non autem secundum quod sunt in seipsis, habent +necessitatem absolutam ita quod sint per seipsa necessaria; propter +hoc Deus quaecumque scit, ex necessitate scit, non autem quaecumque +vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 4. Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason + nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by + its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. + Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29212] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit +enim Dionysius, cap. IV de Div. Nom., <i>sicut noster sol, non +ratiocinans aut praeeligens, sed per ipsum esse illuminat omnia +participare lumen ipsius valentia; ita et bonum divinum per ipsam +essentiam omnibus existentibus immittit bonitatis suae radios</i>. +Sed omne quod agit per voluntatem, agit ut ratiocinans et +praeeligens. Ergo Deus non agit per voluntatem. Ergo voluntas Dei +non est causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which + is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then + by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29213] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id +quod est per essentiam, est primum in quolibet ordine sicut in +ordine ignitorum est primum, quod est ignis per essentiam sed Deus +est primum agens. Ergo est agens per essentiam suam, quae est +natura eius. Agit igitur per naturam, et non per voluntatem. +Voluntas igitur divina non est causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire + is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now + Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature, + and not by His will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29214] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid est causa alicuius per hoc quod est tale, est causa per +naturam, et non per voluntatem, ignis enim causa est calefactionis, +quia est calidus; sed artifex est causa domus, quia vult eam +facere. Sed Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., quod <i>quia +Deus bonus est, sumus</i>. Ergo Deus per suam naturam est causa +rerum, et non per voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29215] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, unius +rei una est causa. Sed rerum creatarum est causa scientia Dei, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas Dei non debet poni causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29216] Iª q. 19 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>quomodo posset aliquid permanere, nisi tu +voluisses?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by + a necessity of His nature. + </p><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p8"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an + end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher + intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary + agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He + must act by intellect and will. + </p><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p9"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; + for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to + the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every + natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself + the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined + and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection + according to the determination of His will and intellect. + </p><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p10"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so + far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode + of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, + and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, + for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the + cause of things. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 co."><a name="29217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29217] Iª q. 19 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est dicere voluntatem Dei esse causam rerum, et Deum +agere per voluntatem, non per necessitatem naturae, ut quidam +existimaverunt. Quod quidem apparere potest tripliciter. Primo +quidem, ex ipso ordine causarum agentium. Cum enim propter finem +agat et intellectus et natura, ut probatur in II Physic., necesse +est ut agenti per naturam praedeterminetur finis, et media +necessaria ad finem, ab aliquo superiori intellectu; sicut sagittae +praedeterminatur finis et certus modus a sagittante. Unde necesse +est quod agens per intellectum et voluntatem, sit prius agente per +naturam. Unde, cum primum in ordine agentium sit Deus, necesse est +quod per intellectum et voluntatem agat. Secundo, ex ratione +naturalis agentis, ad quod pertinet ut unum effectum producat, quia +natura uno et eodem modo operatur, nisi impediatur. Et hoc ideo, +quia secundum quod est tale, agit, unde, quandiu est tale, non +facit nisi tale. Omne enim agens per naturam, habet esse +determinatum. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit determinatum, sed +contineat in se totam perfectionem essendi, non potest esse quod +agat per necessitatem naturae, nisi forte causaret aliquid +indeterminatum et infinitum in essendo; quod est impossibile, ut ex +superioribus patet. Non igitur agit per necessitatem naturae sed +effectus determinati ab infinita ipsius perfectione procedunt +secundum determinationem voluntatis et intellectus ipsius. Tertio, +ex habitudine effectuum ad causam. Secundum hoc enim effectus +procedunt a causa agente, secundum quod praeexistunt in ea, quia +omne agens agit sibi simile. Praeexistunt autem effectus in causa +secundum modum causae. Unde, cum esse divinum sit ipsum eius +intelligere, praeexistunt in eo effectus eius secundum modum +intelligibilem. Unde et per modum intelligibilem procedunt ab eo. +Et sic, per consequens, per modum voluntatis, nam inclinatio eius +ad agendum quod intellectu conceptum est, pertinet ad voluntatem. +Voluntas igitur Dei est causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, + that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29218] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Dionysius per verba illa non intendit excludere +electionem a Deo simpliciter, sed secundum quid, inquantum +scilicet, non quibusdam solum bonitatem suam communicat, sed +omnibus, prout scilicet electio discretionem quandam importat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts + after the mode of intellect and will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29219] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quia essentia Dei est eius intelligere et velle, ex +hoc ipso quod per essentiam suam agit, sequitur quod agat per modum +intellectus et voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness + is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A[2], ad 2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29220] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Pro tanto ergo +dicitur, quia Deus bonus est, sumus, inquantum sua bonitas est ei +ratio volendi omnia alia, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, + and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the + effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing + the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God + all these things are one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29221] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod unius et eiusdem effectus, etiam in nobis, est causa +scientia ut dirigens, qua concipitur forma operis, et voluntas ut +imperans, quia forma, ut est in intellectu tantum, non determinatur +ad hoc quod sit vel non sit in effectu, nisi per voluntatem. Unde +intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de operando. Sed potentia est +causa ut exequens, quia nominat immediatum principium operationis. +Sed haec omnia in Deo unum sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 5. Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to + say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. + Therefore the will of God has some cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29222] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam +causam. Dicit enim Augustinus, libro octoginta trium quaest., +<i>quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse?</i> +Sed agenti voluntario, quod est ratio operandi, est etiam causa +volendi. Ergo voluntas Dei habet aliquam causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned + except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown + <a id="FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus + all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes + to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29223] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in +his quae fiunt a volente qui propter nullam causam aliquid vult, +non oportet aliam causam assignare nisi voluntatem volentis. Sed +voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum, ut ostensum est. Si igitur +voluntatis eius non sit aliqua causa, non oportebit in omnibus +rebus naturalibus aliam causam quaerere, nisi solam voluntatem +divinam. Et sic omnes scientiae essent supervacuae, quae causas +aliquorum effectuum assignare nituntur, quod videtur inconveniens. +Est igitur assignare aliquam causam voluntatis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has + no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29224] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod +fit a volente non propter aliquam causam, dependet ex simplici +voluntate eius. Si igitur voluntas Dei non habeat aliquam causam, +sequitur quod omnia quae fiunt, dependeant ex simplici eius +voluntate, et non habeant aliquam aliam causam. Quod est +inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than + the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29225] Iª q. 19 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnis +causa efficiens maior est eo quod efficitur; nihil tamen maius est +voluntate Dei; non ergo causa eius quaerenda est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, + there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person + that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately + from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. + If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, + in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its + own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It + is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the + premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding. + </p><p id="FP_Q19_A5-p7"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause + of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own + cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands + all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the + cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an + end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this + to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 co."><a name="29226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29226] Iª q. 19 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod nullo modo voluntas Dei causam habet. Ad cuius evidentiam, +considerandum est quod, cum voluntas sequatur intellectum, eodem +modo contingit esse causam alicuius volentis ut velit, et alicuius +intelligentis ut intelligat. In intellectu autem sic est quod, si +seorsum intelligat principium, et seorsum conclusionem, +intelligentia principii est causa scientiae conclusionis. Sed si +intellectus in ipso principio inspiceret conclusionem, uno intuitu +apprehendens utrumque, in eo scientia conclusionis non causaretur +ab intellectu principiorum, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Sed +tamen intelligeret principia esse causas conclusionis. Similiter +est ex parte voluntatis, circa quam sic se habet finis ad ea quae +sunt ad finem, sicut in intellectu principia ad conclusiones. Unde, +si aliquis uno actu velit finem, et alio actu ea quae sunt ad +finem, velle finem erit ei causa volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed +si uno actu velit finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, hoc esse non +poterit, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Et tamen erit verum +dicere quod velit ordinare ea quae sunt ad finem, in finem. Deus +autem, sicut uno actu omnia in essentia sua intelligit, ita uno +actu vult omnia in sua bonitate. Unde, sicut in Deo intelligere +causam non est causa intelligendi effectus, sed ipse intelligit +effectus in causa; ita velle finem non est ei causa volendi ea quae +sunt ad finem, sed tamen vult ea quae sunt ad finem, ordinari in +finem. Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult +hoc.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to + be on account of another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29227] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid sit +Deo causa volendi, sed inquantum vult unum esse propter aliud.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable + to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, + and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have + thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly + unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29228] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum velit Deus effectus sic esse, ut ex causis +certis proveniant, ad hoc quod servetur ordo in rebus; non est +supervacuum, etiam cum voluntate Dei, alias causas quaerere. Esset +tamen supervacuum, si aliae causae quaererentur ut primae, et non +dependentes a divina voluntate. Et sic loquitur Augustinus in III +de Trin., <i>placuit vanitati philosophorum etiam aliis causis +effectus contingentes tribuere, cum omnino videre non possent +superiorem ceteris omnibus causam, idest voluntatem Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will + of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say + that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him + to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this + cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the + order of other causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29229] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, cum Deus velit effectus esse propter causas, +quicumque effectus praesupponunt aliquem alium effectum, non +dependent ex sola Dei voluntate, sed ex aliquo alio. Sed primi +effectus ex sola divina voluntate dependent. Utpote si dicamus quod +Deus voluit hominem habere manus, ut deservirent intellectui, +operando diversa opera, et voluit eum habere intellectum, ad hoc +quod esset homo, et voluit eum esse hominem, ut frueretur ipso, vel +ad complementum universi. Quae quidem non est reducere ad alios +fines creatos ulteriores. Unde huiusmodi dependent ex simplici +voluntate Dei, alia vero ex ordine etiam aliarum causarum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 6. Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the + will of God is not always fulfilled. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29230] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non semper impleatur. Dicit +enim apostolus, I ad Tim. II, quod <i>Deus vult omnes homines +salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire</i>. Sed hoc non +ita evenit. Ergo voluntas Dei non semper impletur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He + wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always + fulfilled. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29231] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +se habet scientia ad verum, ita voluntas ad bonum. Sed Deus scit +omne verum. Ergo vult omne bonum. Sed non omne bonum fit, multa +enim bona possunt fieri, quae non fiunt. Non ergo voluntas Dei +semper impletur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause + may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the + limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, + is not always fulfilled. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="29232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29232] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima, non excludit causas medias, ut +dictum est. Sed effectus causae primae potest impediri per defectum +causae secundae, sicut effectus virtutis motivae impeditur propter +debilitatem tibiae. Ergo et effectus divinae voluntatis potest +impediri propter defectum secundarum causarum. Non ergo voluntas +Dei semper impletur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.113.11" target="asv">Ps. 113:11</a>): "God hath done all things, whatsoever He would." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29233] Iª q. 19 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Psalmo CXIII, <i>omnia quaecumque voluit Deus, +fecit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the + agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that + although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may + fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence + the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside + the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its + effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. + Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen. + For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, + from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first + heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not + produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; + as + does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that + will, when by its justice he is punished. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 co."><a name="29234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29234] Iª q. 19 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est voluntatem Dei semper impleri. Ad cuius +evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum effectus conformetur agenti +secundum suam formam, eadem ratio est in causis agentibus, quae est +in causis formalibus. In formis autem sic est quod, licet aliquid +possit deficere ab aliqua forma particulari, tamen a forma +universali nihil deficere potest, potest enim esse aliquid quod non +est homo vel vivum, non autem potest esse aliquid quod non sit ens. +Unde et hoc idem in causis agentibus contingere oportet. Potest +enim aliquid fieri extra ordinem alicuius causae particularis +agentis, non autem extra ordinem alicuius causae universalis, sub +qua omnes causae particulares comprehenduntur. Quia, si aliqua +causa particularis deficiat a suo effectu, hoc est propter aliquam +aliam causam particularem impedientem, quae continetur sub ordine +causae universalis, unde effectus ordinem causae universalis nullo +modo potest exire. Et hoc etiam patet in corporalibus. Potest enim +impediri quod aliqua stella non inducat suum effectum, sed tamen +quicumque effectus ex causa corporea impediente in rebus +corporalibus consequatur, oportet quod reducatur per aliquas causas +medias in universalem virtutem primi caeli. Cum igitur voluntas Dei +sit universalis causa omnium rerum, impossibile est quod divina +voluntas suum effectum non consequatur. Unde quod recedere videtur +a divina voluntate secundum unum ordinem, relabitur in ipsam +secundum alium, sicut peccator, qui, quantum est in se, recedit a +divina voluntate peccando, incidit in ordinem divinae voluntatis, +dum per eius iustitiam punitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted + application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men + to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose + salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every + class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class + and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, + according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. + This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, + but to the things willed. + </p><p id="FP_Q19_A6-p8"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary + sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, + by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should + be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or + dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently + he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men + to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, + but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in + themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular + circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills + simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such + a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills + takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29235] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod illud verbum apostoli, quod Deus vult omnes homines +salvos fieri etc., potest tripliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ut sit +accommoda distributio, secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult salvos fieri +omnes homines qui salvantur, non quia nullus homo sit quem salvum +fieri non velit, sed quia nullus salvus fit, quem non velit salvum +fieri, ut dicit Augustinus secundo potest intelligi, ut fiat +distributio pro generibus singulorum, et non pro singulis generum, +secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult de quolibet statu hominum salvos +fieri, mares et feminas, Iudaeos et gentiles, parvos et magnos; non +tamen omnes de singulis statibus. Tertio, secundum Damascenum, +intelligitur de voluntate antecedente, non de voluntate +consequente. Quae quidem distinctio non accipitur ex parte ipsius +voluntatis divinae, in qua nihil est prius vel posterius; sed ex +parte volitorum. Ad cuius intellectum, considerandum est quod +unumquodque, secundum quod bonum est, sic est volitum a Deo. +Aliquid autem potest esse in prima sui consideratione, secundum +quod absolute consideratur, bonum vel malum, quod tamen, prout cum +aliquo adiuncto consideratur, quae est consequens consideratio +eius, e contrario se habet. Sicut hominem vivere est bonum, et +hominem occidi est malum, secundum absolutam considerationem, sed +si addatur circa aliquem hominem, quod sit homicida, vel vivens in +periculum multitudinis, sic bonum est eum occidi, et malum est eum +vivere. Unde potest dici quod iudex iustus antecedenter vult omnem +hominem vivere; sed consequenter vult homicidam suspendi. Similiter +Deus antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari; sed consequenter vult +quosdam damnari, secundum exigentiam suae iustitiae. Neque tamen id +quod antecedenter volumus, simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid. +Quia voluntas comparatur ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt, in +seipsis autem sunt in particulari, unde simpliciter volumus +aliquid, secundum quod volumus illud consideratis omnibus +circumstantiis particularibus, quod est consequenter velle. Unde +potest dici quod iudex iustus simpliciter vult homicidam suspendi, +sed secundum quid vellet eum vivere, scilicet inquantum est homo. +Unde magis potest dici velleitas, quam absoluta voluntas. Et sic +patet quod quidquid Deus simpliciter vult, fit; licet illud quod +antecedenter vult, non fiat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is + directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, + though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far + as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29236] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis est secundum quod +cognitum est in cognoscente, actus autem virtutis appetitivae est +ordinatus ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Quidquid autem +potest habere rationem entis et veri, totum est virtualiter in Deo; +sed non totum existit in rebus creatis. Et ideo Deus cognoscit omne +verum, non tamen vult omne bonum, nisi inquantum vult se, in quo +virtualiter omne bonum existit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, + including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of + God, as said above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29237] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod causa prima tunc potest impediri a suo effectu per +defectum causae secundae, quando non est universaliter prima, sub +se omnes causas comprehendens, quia sic effectus nullo modo posset +suum ordinem evadere. Et sic est de voluntate Dei, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 7. Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.6.7" target="asv">Gn. 6:7</a>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has + a changeable will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29238] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit mutabilis. Dicit enim +dominus Genes. VI, <i>poenitet me fecisse hominem</i>. Sed +quemcumque poenitet de eo quod fecit, habet mutabilem voluntatem. +Ergo Deus habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to + pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought + to do to them" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.18.7" target="asv">Jer. 18:7,8</a>) Therefore God has a changeable will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29239] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Ierem. XVIII, ex persona domini dicitur, <i>loquar adversus gentem +et adversus regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud; sed +si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego +poenitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei</i>. Ergo Deus +habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the + law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29240] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid Deus facit, voluntarie facit. Sed Deus non semper eadem +facit, nam quandoque praecepit legalia observari, quandoque +prohibuit. Ergo habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before + <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable + substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable + as regards His will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29241] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +non ex necessitate vult quod vult, ut supra dictum est. Ergo potest +velle et non velle idem. Sed omne quod habet potentiam ad opposita, +est mutabile, sicut quod potest esse et non esse, est mutabile +secundum substantiam; et quod potest esse hic et non esse hic, est +mutabile secundum locum. Ergo Deus est mutabilis secundum +voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Num.23.19" target="asv">Num. 23:19</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29242] Iª q. 19 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Num. XXIII, <i>non est Deus, quasi homo, ut mentiatur; +neque ut filius hominis, ut mutetur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that + certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and + yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before + he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless + we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards + good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not + take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not + so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; + hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and + His knowledge are entirely unchangeable ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 co."><a name="29243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29243] Iª q. 19 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc +considerandum est, quod aliud est mutare voluntatem; et aliud est +velle aliquarum rerum mutationem. Potest enim aliquis, eadem +voluntate immobiliter permanente, velle quod nunc fiat hoc, et +postea fiat contrarium. Sed tunc voluntas mutaretur, si aliquis +inciperet velle quod prius non voluit, vel desineret velle quod +voluit. Quod quidem accidere non potest, nisi praesupposita +mutatione vel ex parte cognitionis, vel circa dispositionem +substantiae ipsius volentis. Cum enim voluntas sit boni, aliquis de +novo dupliciter potest incipere aliquid velle. Uno modo sic, quod +de novo incipiat sibi illud esse bonum. Quod non est absque +mutatione eius, sicut adveniente frigore, incipit esse bonum sedere +ad ignem, quod prius non erat. Alio modo sic, quod de novo +cognoscat illud esse sibi bonum, cum prius hoc ignorasset, ad hoc +enim consiliamur, ut sciamus quid nobis sit bonum. Ostensum est +autem supra quod tam substantia Dei quam eius scientia est omnino +immutabilis. Unde oportet voluntatem eius omnino esse +immutabilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, + we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at + the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of + acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom + He had made. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29244] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod illud verbum domini metaphorice intelligendum est, +secundum similitudinem nostram, cum enim nos poenitet, destruimus +quod fecimus. Quamvis hoc esse possit absque mutatione voluntatis, +cum etiam aliquis homo, absque mutatione voluntatis, interdum velit +aliquid facere, simul intendens postea illud destruere. Sic igitur +Deus poenituisse dicitur, secundum similitudinem operationis, +inquantum hominem quem fecerat, per diluvium a facie terrae +delevit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce + certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in + the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising + of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not + rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, + that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; + or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under + the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine + and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv">Is. 38:1</a>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. + Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His + will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For + men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29245] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima et universalis, non +excludit causas medias, in quarum virtute est ut aliqui effectus +producantur. Sed quia omnes causae mediae non adaequant virtutem +causae primae, multa sunt in virtute et scientia et voluntate +divina, quae non continentur sub ordine causarum inferiorum; sicut +resuscitatio Lazari. Unde aliquis respiciens ad causas inferiores, +dicere poterat, Lazarus non resurget, respiciens vero ad causam +primam divinam, poterat dicere, Lazarus resurget. Et utrumque horum +Deus vult, scilicet quod aliquid quandoque sit futurum secundum +causam inferiorem, quod tamen futurum non sit secundum causam +superiorem; vel e converso. Sic ergo dicendum est quod Deus +aliquando pronuntiat aliquid futurum, secundum quod continetur in +ordine causarum inferiorum, ut puta secundum dispositionem naturae +vel meritorum; quod tamen non fit, quia aliter est in causa +superiori divina. Sicut cum praedixit Ezechiae, <i>dispone domui +tuae, quia morieris et non vives</i>, ut habetur Isaiae XXXVIII; +neque tamen ita evenit, quia ab aeterno aliter fuit in scientia et +voluntate divina, quae immutabilis est. Propter quod dicit +Gregorius, quod <i>Deus immutat sententiam, non tamen mutat +consilium</i>, scilicet voluntatis suae. Quod ergo dicit, +poenitentiam agam ego, intelligitur metaphorice dictum, nam homines +quando non implent quod comminati sunt, poenitere videntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29246] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex ratione illa non potest concludi quod Deus habeat +mutabilem voluntatem; sed quod mutationem velit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness + of the divine will, as has been said above + <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29247] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, licet Deum velle aliquid non sit necessarium +absolute, tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, propter +immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 8. Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, + except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29248] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei rebus volitis necessitatem +imponat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>nullus fit salvus, +nisi quem Deus voluerit salvari. Et ideo rogandus est ut velit, +quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, + 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the + Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.19" target="asv">Rom. 9:19</a>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29249] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis +causa quae non potest impediri, ex necessitate suum effectum +producit, quia et natura semper idem operatur, nisi aliquid +impediat, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed voluntas Dei non potest +impediri, dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. IX, <i>voluntati enim eius +quis resistit?</i> Ergo voluntas Dei imponit rebus volitis +necessitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should + die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, + whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every + true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is + necessary absolutely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29250] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud +quod habet necessitatem ex priori, est necessarium absolute, sicut +animal mori est necessarium, quia est ex contrariis compositum. Sed +res creatae a Deo, comparantur ad voluntatem divinam sicut ad +aliquid prius, a quo habent necessitatem, cum haec conditionalis +sit vera, si aliquid Deus vult, illud est; omnis autem +conditionalis vera est necessaria. Sequitur ergo quod omne quod +Deus vult, sit necessarium absolute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all + good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29251] Iª q. 19 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnia +bona quae fiunt, Deus vult fieri. Si igitur eius voluntas imponat +rebus volitis necessitatem, sequitur quod omnia bona ex necessitate +eveniunt. Et sic perit liberum arbitrium et consilium, et omnia +huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to + intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes + contingent. + </p><p id="FP_Q19_A8-p7"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent + on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second + cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from + producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be + referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is + better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to + act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. + Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that + belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, + which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, + some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has + attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise + contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, + but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 co."><a name="29252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29252] Iª q. 19 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod divina voluntas quibusdam volitis necessitatem imponit, non +autem omnibus. Cuius quidem rationem aliqui assignare voluerunt ex +causis mediis quia ea quae producit per causas necessarias, sunt +necessaria; ea vero quae producit per causas contingentes, sunt +contingentia. Sed hoc non videtur sufficienter dictum, propter duo. +Primo quidem, quia effectus alicuius primae causae est contingens +propter causam secundam, ex eo quod impeditur effectus causae +primae per defectum causae secundae; sicut virtus solis per +defectum plantae impeditur. Nullus autem defectus causae secundae +impedire potest quin voluntas Dei effectum suum producat. Secundo, +quia, si distinctio contingentium a necessariis referatur solum in +causas secundas, sequitur hoc esse praeter intentionem et +voluntatem divinam, quod est inconveniens. Et ideo melius dicendum +est, quod hoc contingit propter efficaciam divinae voluntatis. Cum +enim aliqua causa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus consequitur +causam non tantum secundum id quod fit, sed etiam secundum modum +fiendi vel essendi, ex debilitate enim virtutis activae in semine, +contingit quod filius nascitur dissimilis patri in accidentibus, +quae pertinent ad modum essendi. Cum igitur voluntas divina sit +efficacissima, non solum sequitur quod fiant ea quae Deus vult +fieri; sed quod eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri vult. Vult autem +quaedam fieri Deus necessario, et quaedam contingenter, ut sit ordo +in rebus, ad complementum universi. Et ideo quibusdam effectibus +aptavit causas necessarias, quae deficere non possunt, ex quibus +effectus de necessitate proveniunt, quibusdam autem aptavit causas +contingentes defectibiles, ex quibus effectus contingenter +eveniunt. Non igitur propterea effectus voliti a Deo, eveniunt +contingenter, quia causae proximae sunt contingentes, sed propterea +quia Deus voluit eos contingenter evenire, contingentes causas ad +eos praeparavit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For + the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29253] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod per illud verbum Augustini intelligenda est +necessitas in rebus volitis a Deo, non absoluta, sed conditionalis, +necesse est enim hanc conditionalem veram esse, si Deus hoc vult, +necesse est hoc esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, + but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29254] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod nihil voluntati divinae resistit, +sequitur quod non solum fiant ea quae Deus vult fieri; sed quod +fiant contingenter vel necessario, quae sic fieri vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the + divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, + are absolute necessities. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29255] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod posteriora habent necessitatem a prioribus, secundum +modum priorum. Unde et ea quae fiunt a voluntate divina, talem +necessitatem habent, qualem Deus vult ea habere, scilicet, vel +absolutam, vel conditionalem tantum. Et sic, non omnia sunt +necessaria absolute.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 9. Whether God wills evils?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine + says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should + exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="29256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29256] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit malorum. Omne enim bonum +quod fit, Deus vult. Sed mala fieri bonum est, dicit enim +Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>quamvis ea quae mala sunt, inquantum +mala sunt, non sint bona; tamen, ut non solum bona, sed etiam ut +sint mala, bonum est</i>. Ergo Deus vult mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And + Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that + which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy + when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and + beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="29257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29257] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dicit +Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., erit malum ad omnis (idest +universi) perfectionem conferens. Et Augustinus dicit, in +Enchirid., <i>ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis +pulchritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum, +et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona; ut magis placeant, +et laudabiliora sint, dum comparantur malis</i>. Sed Deus vult omne +illud quod pertinet ad perfectionem et decorem universi, quia hoc +est quod Deus maxime vult in creaturis. Ergo Deus vult mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should + not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil + should exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="29258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29258] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, mala +fieri, et non fieri, sunt contradictorie opposita. Sed Deus non +vult mala non fieri, quia, cum mala quaedam fiant, non semper +voluntas Dei impleretur. Ergo Deus vult mala fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. + Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to + will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore + God wills not evil things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 s. c."><a name="29259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29259] Iª q. 19 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>nullo +sapiente homine auctore, fit homo deterior; est autem Deus omni +sapiente homine praestantior; multo igitur minus, Deo auctore, fit +aliquis deterior. Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente +dicitur</i>. Non ergo volente Deo, fit homo deterior. Constat autem +quod quolibet malo fit aliquid deterius. Ergo Deus non vult +mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either + natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far + as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or + corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies + the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is + only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. + Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not + even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. + Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills + the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, + He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in + willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 co."><a name="29260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29260] Iª q. 19 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum ratio boni sit ratio appetibilis, ut supra dictum est, +malum autem opponatur bono; impossibile est quod aliquod malum, +inquantum huiusmodi, appetatur, neque appetitu naturali, neque +animali, neque intellectuali, qui est voluntas. Sed aliquod malum +appetitur per accidens, inquantum consequitur ad aliquod bonum. Et +hoc apparet in quolibet appetitu. Non enim agens naturale intendit +privationem vel corruptionem; sed formam, cui coniungitur privatio +alterius formae; et generationem unius, quae est corruptio +alterius. Leo etiam, occidens cervum, intendit cibum, cui +coniungitur occisio animalis. Similiter fornicator intendit +delectationem, cui coniungitur deformitas culpae. Malum autem quod +coniungitur alicui bono, est privatio alterius boni. Nunquam igitur +appeteretur malum, nec per accidens, nisi bonum cui coniungitur +malum, magis appeteretur quam bonum quod privatur per malum. Nullum +autem bonum Deus magis vult quam suam bonitatem, vult tamen aliquod +bonum magis quam aliud quoddam bonum. Unde malum culpae, quod +privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult. Sed malum +naturalis defectus, vel malum poenae vult, volendo aliquod bonum, +cui coniungitur tale malum, sicut, volendo iustitiam, vult poenam; +et volendo ordinem naturae servari, vult quaedam naturaliter +corrumpi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil + is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered + to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, + is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is + beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that + the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering + to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by + that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="29261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29261] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod, licet Deus non velit mala, vult +tamen mala esse vel fieri, quia, licet mala non sint bona, bonum +tamen est mala esse vel fieri. Quod ideo dicebant, quia ea quae in +se mala sunt, ordinantur ad aliquod bonum, quem quidem ordinem +importari credebant in hoc quod dicitur, mala esse vel fieri. Sed +hoc non recte dicitur. Quia malum non ordinatur ad bonum per se, +sed per accidens. Praeter intentionem enim peccantis est, quod ex +hoc sequatur aliquod bonum; sicut praeter intentionem tyrannorum +fuit, quod ex eorum persecutionibus claresceret patientia martyrum. +Et ideo non potest dici quod talis ordo ab bonum importetur per hoc +quod dicitur, quod malum esse vel fieri sit bonum, quia nihil +iudicatur secundum illud quod competit ei per accidens, sed +secundum illud quod competit ei per se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore + Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="29262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29262] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod malum non operatur ad perfectionem et decorem +universi nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Unde et hoc quod dicit +Dionysius, quod malum est ad universi perfectionem conferens, +concludit inducendo quasi ad inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone + wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither + wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="29263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29263] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet mala fieri, et mala non fieri, contradictorie +opponantur; tamen velle mala fieri, et velle mala non fieri, non +opponuntur contradictorie, cum utrumque sit affirmativum. Deus +igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult +permittere mala fieri. Et hoc est bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 10. Whether God has free-will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is + He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="29264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29264] Iª q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat liberum arbitrium. Dicit +enim Hieronymus, in homilia de filio prodigo, <i>solus Deus est, in +quem peccatum non cadit, nec cadere potest; cetera, cum sint liberi +arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, + as has been said + <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="29265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29265] Iª q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum et +malum eligitur. Sed Deus non vult malum, ut dictum est. Ergo +liberum arbitrium non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of + the will, not in obedience to necessity." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 s. c."><a name="29266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29266] Iª q. 19 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro de fide, <i>spiritus sanctus dividit +singulis prout vult, idest pro liberae voluntatis arbitrio, non +necessitatis obsequio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not + appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said + to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above + + <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not + necessarily will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 co."><a name="29267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29267] Iª q. 19 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod liberum arbitrium habemus respectu eorum quae non necessario +volumus, vel naturali instinctu. Non enim ad liberum arbitrium +pertinet quod volumus esse felices, sed ad naturalem instinctum. +Unde et alia animalia, quae naturali instinctu moventur ad aliquid, +non dicuntur libero arbitrio moveri. Cum igitur Deus ex necessitate +suam bonitatem velit, alia vero non ex necessitate, ut supra +ostensum est; respectu illorum quae non ex necessitate vult, +liberum arbitrium habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="29268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29268] Iª q. 19 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Hieronymus videtur excludere a Deo liberum arbitrium, +non simpliciter, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod est deflecti in +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De + Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, + inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and + not will to sit down. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="29269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29269] Iª q. 19 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum malum culpae dicatur per aversionem a bonitate +divina, per quam Deus omnia vult, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum +est quod impossibile est eum malum culpae velle. Et tamen ad +opposita se habet, inquantum velle potest hoc esse vel non esse. +Sicut et nos, non peccando, possumus velle sedere, et non velle +sedere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 11. Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so + is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the + divine will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="29270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29270] Iª q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas +signi. Sicut enim voluntas Dei est causa rerum, ita et scientia. +Sed non assignantur aliqua signa ex parte divinae scientiae. Ergo +neque debent assignari aliqua signa ex parte divinae +voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the + expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are + superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="29271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29271] Iª q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne +signum quod non concordat ei cuius est signum, est falsum. Si +igitur signa quae assignantur circa voluntatem divinam, non +concordant divinae voluntati, sunt falsa, si autem concordant, +superflue assignantur. Non igitur sunt aliqua signa circa +voluntatem divinam assignanda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.2" target="asv"> Ps. 110:2</a>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for + the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 s. c."><a name="29272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29272] Iª q. 19 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod voluntas Dei est una, cum ipsa sit Dei essentia. Quandoque +autem pluraliter significatur, ut cum dicitur, <i>magna opera +domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius</i>. Ergo oportet quod +aliquando signum voluntatis pro voluntate accipiatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. + Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus + with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that + punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed + to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just + as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called + by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.10" target="asv">Mat. + 6:10 + </a>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its + primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished + will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; + and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called + will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 co."><a name="29273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29273] Iª q. 19 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in Deo quaedam dicuntur proprie, et quaedam secundum +metaphoram, ut ex supradictis patet. Cum autem aliquae passiones +humanae in divinam praedicationem metaphorice assumuntur, hoc fit +secundum similitudinem effectus, unde illud quod est signum talis +passionis in nobis, in Deo nomine illius passionis metaphorice +significatur. Sicut, apud nos, irati punire consueverunt, unde ipsa +punitio est signum irae, et propter hoc, ipsa punitio nomine irae +significatur, cum Deo attribuitur. Similiter id quod solet esse in +nobis signum voluntatis, quandoque metaphorice in Deo voluntas +dicitur. Sicut, cum aliquis praecipit aliquid, signum est quod +velit illud fieri, unde praeceptum divinum quandoque metaphorice +voluntas Dei dicitur, secundum illud Matth. VI, <i>fiat voluntas +tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>. Sed hoc distat inter +voluntatem et iram, quia ira de Deo nunquam proprie dicitur, cum in +suo principali intellectu includat passionem, voluntas autem +proprie de Deo dicitur. Et ideo in Deo distinguitur voluntas +proprie, et metaphorice dicta. Voluntas enim proprie dicta, vocatur +voluntas beneplaciti, voluntas autem metaphorice dicta, est +voluntas signi, eo quod ipsum signum voluntatis voluntas +dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless + we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="29274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29274] Iª q. 19 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod scientia non est causa eorum quae fiunt, nisi per +voluntatem, non enim quae scimus facimus, nisi velimus. Et ideo +signum non attribuitur scientiae, sicut attribuitur voluntati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual + expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it + is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="29275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29275] Iª q. 19 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod signa voluntatis dicuntur voluntates divinae, non +quia sint signa quod Deus velit, sed quia ea quae in nobis solent +esse signa volendi, in Deo divinae voluntates dicuntur. Sicut +punitio non est signum quod in Deo sit ira, sed punitio, ex eo ipso +quod in nobis est signum irae, in Deo dicitur ira.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 12. Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly + assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates + in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="29276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29276] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter circa divinam +voluntatem ponantur quinque signa, scilicet, prohibitio, +praeceptum, consilium, operatio et permissio. Nam eadem quae nobis +praecipit Deus vel consulit, in nobis quandoque operatur, et eadem +quae prohibet, quandoque permittit. Ergo non debent ex opposito +dividi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A12-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended + in the will of expression. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="29277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29277] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil Deus operatur, nisi volens, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Sed voluntas +signi distinguitur a voluntate beneplaciti. Ergo operatio sub +voluntate signi comprehendi non debet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action + in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under + one division, not being of one order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="29278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29278] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +operatio et permissio communiter ad omnes creaturas pertinent, quia +in omnibus Deus operatur, et in omnibus aliquid fieri permittit. +Sed praeceptum, consilium et prohibitio pertinent ad solam +rationalem creaturam. Ergo non veniunt convenienter in unam +divisionem, cum non sint unius ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared + by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only + in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4"><a name="29279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29279] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +malum pluribus modis contingit quam bonum, quia bonum contingit uno +modo, sed malum omnifariam, ut patet per philosophum in II Ethic., +et per Dionysium in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Inconvenienter igitur +respectu mali assignatur unum signum tantum, scilicet prohibitio; +respectu vero boni, duo signa, scilicet consilium et +praeceptum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that + he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, + or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will + is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for + what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares + his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, + and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself + known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept, + counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.10" target="asv">Mat. 6:10</a>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine + (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually + doing it." + </p><p id="FP_Q19_A12-p7"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with + regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel + to good that is of supererogation. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 co."><a name="29280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29280] Iª q. 19 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod huiusmodi signa voluntatis dicuntur ea, quibus consuevimus +demonstrare nos aliquid velle. Potest autem aliquis declarare se +velle aliquid, vel per seipsum, vel per alium. Per seipsum quidem, +inquantum facit aliquid, vel directe, vel indirecte et per +accidens. Directe quidem, cum per se aliquid operatur, et quantum +ad hoc, dicitur esse signum operatio. Indirecte autem, inquantum +non impedit operationem, nam removens prohibens dicitur movens per +accidens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Et quantum ad hoc, dicitur +signum permissio. Per alium autem declarat se aliquid velle, +inquantum ordinat alium ad aliquid faciendum; vel necessaria +inductione, quod fit praecipiendo quod quis vult, et prohibendo +contrarium; vel aliqua persuasoria inductione, quod pertinet ad +consilium. Quia igitur his modis declaratur aliquem velle aliquid, +propter hoc ista quinque nominantur interdum nomine voluntatis +divinae, tanquam signa voluntatis. Quod enim praeceptum, consilium +et prohibitio dicantur Dei voluntas, patet per id quod dicitur +Matth. VI <i>fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>. +Quod autem permissio vel operatio dicantur Dei voluntas patet per +Augustinum, qui dicit in Enchirid., <i>nihil fit, nisi omnipotens +fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel faciendo</i>. Vel potest dici +quod permissio et operatio referuntur ad praesens permissio quidem +ad malum, operatio vero ad bonum. Ad futurum vero, prohibitio, +respectu mali; respectu vero boni necessarii, praeceptum; respectu +vero superabundantis boni, consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that + mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; + or of prohibition or permission. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="29281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29281] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod nihil prohibet, circa eandem rem, aliquem diversimode +declarare se aliquid velle, sicut inveniuntur multa nomina idem +significantia. Unde nihil prohibet idem subiacere praecepto et +consilio et operationi, et prohibitioni vel permissioni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to + will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will + of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept + and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter + the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="29282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29282] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Deus potest significari metaphorice velle id +quod non vult voluntate proprie accepta, ita potest metaphorice +significari velle id quod proprie vult. Unde nihil prohibet de +eodem esse voluntatem beneplaciti, et voluntatem signi. Sed +operatio semper est eadem cum voluntate beneplaciti, non autem +praeceptum vel consilium, tum quia haec est de praesenti, illud de +futuro; tum quia haec per se est effectus voluntatis, illud autem +per alium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are + assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act + only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="29283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29283] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod creatura rationalis est domina sui actus, et ideo +circa ipsam specialia quaedam signa divinae voluntatis assignantur, +inquantum rationalem creaturam Deus ordinat ad agendum voluntarie +et per se. Sed aliae creaturae non agunt nisi motae ex operatione +divina, et ideo circa alias non habent locum nisi operatio et +permissio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to + evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine + goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject + of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and + these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; + but also with the avoiding of lesser evils. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 4"><a name="29284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29284] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod omne malum culpae, licet multipliciter contingat, +tamen in hoc convenit, quod discordat a voluntate divina et ideo +unum signum respectu malorum assignatur, scilicet prohibitio. Sed +diversimode bona se habent ad bonitatem divinam. Quia quaedam sunt, +sine quibus fruitionem divinae bonitatis consequi non possumus, et +respectu horum est praeceptum. Quaedam vero sunt, quibus perfectius +consequimur, et respectu horum est consilium. Vel dicendum quod +consilium est non solum de melioribus bonis assequendis, sed etiam +de minoribus malis vitandis.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q20" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q20-p0.1">Q. 20. GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q20-p2"> We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found + in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude + and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are + four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q20-p3"> (1) Whether love exists in God?</p><p id="FP_Q20-p4"> (2) Whether He loves all things?</p><p id="FP_Q20-p5"> (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?</p><p id="FP_Q20-p6"> (4) Whether He loves more the better things?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 pr."><a name="29285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29285] +Iª q. 20 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae +absolute ad voluntatem Dei pertinent. In parte autem appetitiva +inveniuntur in nobis et passiones animae, ut gaudium, amor, et +huiusmodi; et habitus moralium virtutum, ut iustitia, fortitudo, et +huiusmodi. Unde primo considerabimus de amore Dei; secundo, de +iustitia Dei, et misericordia eius. Circa primum quaeruntur +quatuor. Primo, utrum in Deo sit amor. Secundo, utrum amet omnia. +Tertio, utrum magis amet unum quam aliud. Quarto, utrum meliora +magis amet.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q20_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 1. Whether love exists in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not + in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29286] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit in Deo. Nulla enim passio est +in Deo. Amor est passio. Ergo amor non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed + to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29287] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor, +ira, tristitia, et huiusmodi, contra se dividuntur. Sed tristitia +et ira non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice. Ergo nec amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He + is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29288] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>amor est vis unitiva et +concretiva</i>. Hoc autem in Deo locum habere non potest, cum sit +simplex. Ergo in Deo non est amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "God is love" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.16" target="asv">Jn. 4:16</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29289] Iª q. 20 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, <i>Deus caritas est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. + For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and + since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily + and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite + that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: + because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally + prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular + and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as + joy + and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards + good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason + all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, + except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love. + Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, + in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also + wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God ( + <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 co."><a name="29290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29290] Iª q. 20 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est ponere amorem in Deo. Primus enim motus +voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor. Cum enim +actus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis tendat in +bonum et malum, sicut in propria obiecta; bonum autem principalius +et per se est obiectum voluntatis et appetitus, malum autem +secundario et per aliud, inquantum scilicet opponitur bono, oportet +naturaliter esse priores actus voluntatis et appetitus qui +respiciunt bonum, his qui respiciunt malum; ut gaudium quam +tristitia, et amor quam odium. Semper enim quod est per se, prius +est eo quod est per aliud. Rursus, quod est communius, naturaliter +est prius, unde et intellectus per prius habet ordinem ad verum +commune, quam ad particularia quaedam vera. Sunt autem quidam actus +voluntatis et appetitus, respicientes bonum sub aliqua speciali +conditione, sicut gaudium et delectatio est de bono praesenti et +habito; desiderium autem et spes, de bono nondum adepto. Amor autem +respicit bonum in communi, sive sit habitum, sive non habitum. Unde +amor naturaliter est primus actus voluntatis et appetitus. Et +propter hoc, omnes alii motus appetitivi praesupponunt amorem, +quasi primam radicem. Nullus enim desiderat aliquid, nisi bonum +amatum, neque aliquis gaudet, nisi de bono amato. Odium etiam non +est nisi de eo quod contrariatur rei amatae. Et similiter +tristitiam, et cetera huiusmodi, manifestum est in amorem referri, +sicut in primum principium. Unde in quocumque est voluntas vel +appetitus, oportet esse amorem, remoto enim primo, removentur alia. +Ostensum est autem in Deo esse voluntatem. Unde necesse est in eo +ponere amorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason + moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, + or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the + proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always + accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says + (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch + as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, + and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It + is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that + is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29291] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod vis cognitiva non movet, nisi mediante appetitiva. Et +sicut in nobis ratio universalis movet mediante ratione +particulari, ut dicitur in III de anima; ita appetitus +intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, movet in nobis mediante +appetitu sensitivo. Unde proximum motivum corporis in nobis est +appetitus sensitivus. Unde semper actum appetitus sensitivi +concomitatur aliqua transmutatio corporis; et maxime circa cor, +quod est primum principium motus in animali. Sic igitur actus +appetitus sensitivi, inquantum habent transmutationem corporalem +annexam, passiones dicuntur, non autem actus voluntatis. Amor +igitur et gaudium et delectatio, secundum quod significant actus +appetitus sensitivi, passiones sunt, non autem secundum quod +significant actus appetitus intellectivi. Et sic ponuntur in Deo. +Unde dicit philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod <i>Deus una et simplici +operatione gaudet</i>. Et eadem ratione, sine passione amat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily change---and + a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64), + the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards + the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is + implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also + to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore + none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their + formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show + ( + <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2; + <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without + attributing passion to Him, as said before ( + <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29292] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in passionibus sensitivi appetitus, est considerare +aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet corporalem transmutationem; et +aliquid quasi formale, quod est ex parte appetitus. Sicut in ira, +ut dicitur in I de anima, materiale est accensio sanguinis circa +cor, vel aliquid huiusmodi; formale vero, appetitus vindictae. Sed +rursus, ex parte eius quod est formale, in quibusdam horum +designatur aliqua imperfectio; sicut in desiderio, quod est boni +non habiti; et in tristitia, quae est mali habiti. Et eadem ratio +est de ira, quae tristitiam supponit. Quaedam vero nullam +imperfectionem designant, ut amor et gaudium. Cum igitur nihil +horum Deo conveniat secundum illud quod est materiale in eis, ut +dictum est; illa quae imperfectionem important etiam formaliter, +Deo convenire non possunt nisi metaphorice, propter similitudinem +effectus, ut supra dictum est. Quae autem imperfectionem non +important, de Deo proprie dicuntur, ut amor et gaudium, tamen sine +passione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since + to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as + possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the + good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, + as above shown ( + <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place + of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another + to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good + to others; yet it implies no composition in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29293] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum +quod quis vult alicui; et in eum cui vult bonum. Hoc enim est +proprie amare aliquem, velle ei bonum. Unde in eo quod aliquis amat +se, vult bonum sibi. Et sic illud bonum quaerit sibi unire, +inquantum potest. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis unitiva, etiam in +Deo, sed absque compositione, quia illud bonum quod vult sibi, non +est aliud quam ipse, qui est per suam essentiam bonus, ut supra +ostensum est. In hoc vero quod aliquis amat alium, vult bonum illi. +Et sic utitur eo tanquam seipso, referens bonum ad illum, sicut ad +seipsum. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis concretiva, quia alium +aggregat sibi habens se ad eum sicut ad seipsum. Et sic etiam amor +divinus est vis concretiva, absque compositione quae sit in Deo, +inquantum aliis bona vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q20_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 2. Whether God loves all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, + and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside + of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29294] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non omnia amet. Quia, secundum +Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., amor amantem extra se ponit, et +eum quodammodo in amatum transfert. Inconveniens autem est dicere +quod Deus, extra se positus, in alia transferatur. Ergo +inconveniens est dicere quod Deus alia a se amet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not + love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not + love things other than Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29295] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor +Dei aeternus est. Sed ea quae sunt alia a Deo, non sunt ab aeterno +nisi in Deo. Ergo Deus non amat ea nisi in seipso. Sed secundum +quod sunt in eo, non sunt aliud ab eo. Ergo Deus non amat alia a +seipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures + with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no + friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29296] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +duplex est amor, scilicet concupiscentiae, et amicitiae. Sed Deus +creaturas irrationales non amat amore concupiscentiae, quia nullius +extra se eget, nec etiam amore amicitiae, quia non potest ad res +irrationales haberi, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Ergo +Deus non omnia amat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.5.7" target="asv">Ps. 5:7</a>): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love + all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29297] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in +Psalmo dicitur, <i>odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem</i>. +Nihil autem simul odio habetur et amatur. Ergo Deus non omnia +amat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29298] Iª q. 20 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti +eorum quae fecisti</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing + is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, + only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some + good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything + that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as + by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, + whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides + the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 co."><a name="29299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29299] Iª q. 20 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus omnia existentia amat. Nam omnia existentia, inquantum +sunt, bona sunt, ipsum enim esse cuiuslibet rei quoddam bonum est, +et similiter quaelibet perfectio ipsius. Ostensum est autem supra +quod voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum et sic oportet quod +intantum habeat aliquid esse, aut quodcumque bonum, inquantum est +volitum a Deo. Cuilibet igitur existenti Deus vult aliquod bonum. +Unde, cum amare nil aliud sit quam velle bonum alicui, manifestum +est quod Deus omnia quae sunt, amat. Non tamen eo modo sicut nos. +Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea +movetur sicut ab obiecto, amor noster, quo bonum alicui volumus, +non est causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e converso bonitas eius, vel +vera vel aestimata, provocat amorem, quo ei volumus et bonum +conservari quod habet, et addi quod non habet, et ad hoc operamur. +Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; + and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf + of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, + is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29300] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod amans sic fit extra se in amatum translatus, +inquantum vult amato bonum, et operatur per suam providentiam, +sicut et sibi. Unde et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., +<i>audendum est autem et hoc pro veritate dicere, quod et ipse +omnium causa, per abundantiam amativae bonitatis, extra seipsum fit +ad omnia existentia providentiis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has + known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within + us, know things existing in themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29301] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, licet creaturae ab aeterno non fuerint nisi in Deo, +tamen per hoc quod ab aeterno in Deo fuerunt, ab aeterno Deus +cognovit res in propriis naturis, et eadem ratione amavit. Sicut et +nos per similitudines rerum, quae in nobis sunt, cognoscimus res in +seipsis existentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with + another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even + as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share + in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore, + God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He + orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account + of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29302] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod amicitia non potest haberi nisi ad rationales +creaturas, in quibus contingit esse redamationem, et +communicationem in operibus vitae, et quibus contingit bene evenire +vel male, secundum fortunam et felicitatem, sicut et ad eas proprie +benevolentia est. Creaturae autem irrationales non possunt +pertingere ad amandum Deum, neque ad communicationem intellectualis +et beatae vitae, qua Deus vivit. Sic igitur Deus, proprie loquendo, +non amat creaturas irrationales amore amicitiae, sed amore quasi +concupiscentiae; inquantum ordinat eas ad rationales creaturas, et +etiam ad seipsum; non quasi eis indigeat, sed propter suam +bonitatem et nostram utilitatem. Concupiscimus enim aliquid et +nobis et aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners + in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they + have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated + by Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29303] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum et idem secundum aliquid amari, +et secundum aliquid odio haberi. Deus autem peccatores, inquantum +sunt naturae quaedam, amat, sic enim et sunt, et ab ipso sunt. +Inquantum vero peccatores sunt, non sunt, sed ab esse deficiunt, et +hoc in eis a Deo non est. Unde secundum hoc ab ipso odio +habentur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q20_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 3. Whether God loves all things equally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.8" target="asv">Wis. 6:8</a>). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29304] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus aequaliter diligat omnia. Dicitur +enim Sap. VI, <i>aequaliter est ei cura de omnibus</i>. Sed +providentia Dei, quam habet de rebus, est ex amore quo amat res. +Ergo aequaliter amat omnia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He + does not therefore love some things more than others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29305] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor +Dei est eius essentia. Sed essentia Dei magis et minus non recipit. +Ergo nec amor eius. Non igitur quaedam aliis magis amat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things + more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29306] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +amor Dei se extendit ad res creatas, ita et scientia et voluntas. +Sed Deus non dicitur scire quaedam magis quam alia, neque magis +velle. Ergo nec magis quaedam aliis diligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and + of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29307] Iª q. 20 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, super Ioann., <i>omnia diligit Deus quae +fecit; et inter ea magis diligit creaturas rationales; et de illis +eas amplius, quae sunt membra unigeniti sui; et multo magis ipsum +unigenitum suum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of + the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because + He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good + itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more + than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God + loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said + <a id="FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 co."><a name="29308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29308] Iª q. 20 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, duplici ratione potest +aliquid magis vel minus amari. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius actus +voluntatis, qui est magis vel minus intensus. Et sic Deus non magis +quaedam aliis amat, quia omnia amat uno et simplici actu +voluntatis, et semper eodem modo se habente. Alio modo, ex parte +ipsius boni quod aliquis vult amato. Et sic dicimur aliquem magis +alio amare, cui volumus maius bonum; quamvis non magis intensa +voluntate. Et hoc modo necesse est dicere quod Deus quaedam aliis +magis amat. Cum enim amor Dei sit causa bonitatis rerum, ut dictum +est, non esset aliquid alio melius, si Deus non vellet uni maius +bonum quam alteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers + all things with a like wisdom and goodness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29309] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod dicitur Deo aequaliter esse cura de omnibus, non quia +aequalia bona sua cura omnibus dispenset; sed quia ex aequali +sapientia et bonitate omnia administrat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the + good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29310] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de intensione amoris ex parte +actus voluntatis, qui est divina essentia. Bonum autem quod Deus +creaturae vult, non est divina essentia. Unde nihil prohibet illud +intendi vel remitti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God + may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29311] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod intelligere et velle significant solum actus, non +autem in sua significatione includunt aliqua obiecta, ex quorum +diversitate possit dici Deus magis vel minus scire aut velle; sicut +circa amorem dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q20_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q20_A4-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 4. Whether God always loves more the better things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human + race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, + but delivered Him up for us all" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.32" target="asv">Rom. 8:32</a>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29312] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non semper magis diligat meliora. +Manifestum est enim quod Christus est melior toto genere humano, +cum sit Deus et homo. Sed Deus magis dilexit genus humanum quam +Christum, quia dicitur Rom. VIII, <i>proprio filio suo non +pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum</i>. Ergo Deus non +semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.6" target="asv">Ps. 8:6</a>). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed + of Abraham He taketh hold" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.16" target="asv">Heb. 2:16</a>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29313] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Angelus est melior homine, unde in Psalmo VIII dicitur de homine, +<i>minuisti eum paulo minus ab Angelis</i>. Sed Deus plus dilexit +hominem quam Angelum, dicitur enim Hebr. II, <i>nusquam Angelos +apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit</i>. Ergo Deus non +semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: + "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, + commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, + not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore + God does not always love more the better things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29314] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Petrus fuit melior Ioanne, quia plus Christum diligebat. Unde +dominus, sciens hoc esse verum, interrogavit Petrum, dicens, +<i>Simon Ioannis, diligis me plus his?</i> Sed tamen Christus plus +dilexit Ioannem quam Petrum, ut enim dicit Augustinus, super illud +Ioan. XXI, <i>Simon Ioannis diligis me? Hoc ipso signo Ioannes a +ceteris discipulis discernitur; non quod solum eum, sed quod plus +eum ceteris diligebat</i>. Non ergo semper magis diligit +meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank + after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: + "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who + need not penance" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.7" target="asv">Lk. 15:7</a>). Therefore God does not always love more + the better things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29315] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +melior est innocens poenitente; <i>cum poenitentia sit secunda +tabula post naufragium</i>, ut dicit Hieronymus. Sed Deus plus +diligit poenitentem quam innocentem, quia plus de eo gaudet, +dicitur enim Luc. XV, <i>dico vobis quod maius gaudium erit in +caelo super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente, quam super nonaginta +novem iustis, qui non indigent poenitentia</i>. Ergo Deus non +semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, + since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="29316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29316] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +melior est iustus praescitus, quam peccator praedestinatus. Sed +Deus plus diligit peccatorem praedestinatum, quia vult ei maius +bonum, scilicet vitam aeternam. Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit +meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Everything loves what is like it, as appears from ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:19</a>): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more + loved by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29317] Iª q. 20 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +unumquodque diligit sibi simile; ut patet per illud quod habetur +Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal diligit sibi simile</i>. Sed intantum +aliquid est melius, inquantum est Deo similius. Ergo meliora magis +diliguntur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown ( + <a id="FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because + God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for + them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the + better things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 co."><a name="29318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29318] Iª q. 20 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est dicere, secundum praedicta, quod Deus magis +diligat meliora. Dictum est enim quod Deum diligere magis aliquid, +nihil aliud est quam ei maius bonum velle, voluntas enim Dei est +causa bonitatis in rebus. Et sic, ex hoc sunt aliqua meliora, quod +Deus eis maius bonum vult. Unde sequitur quod meliora plus +amet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because + He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything + of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby + a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder," + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.9.6" target="asv"> Is. 9:6.</a> + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29319] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Deus Christum diligit, non solum plus quam totum +humanum genus, sed etiam magis quam totam universitatem +creaturarum, quia scilicet ei maius bonum voluit, quia dedit ei +nomen, quod est super omne nomen, ut verus Deus esset. Nec eius +excellentiae deperiit ex hoc quod Deus dedit eum in mortem pro +salute humani generis, quinimo ex hoc factus est victor gloriosus; +<i>factus enim est principatus super humerum eius</i>, ut dicitur +Isaiae IX.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that + nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing + it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.17" target="asv"> Rev 21:17, </a> the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this + respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an + angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but + because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that + he does not give to his own son in sound health. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29320] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod naturam humanam assumptam a Dei verbo in persona +Christi, secundum praedicta, Deus plus amat quam omnes Angelos, et +melior est, maxime ratione unionis. Sed loquendo de humana natura +communiter, eam angelicae comparando, secundum ordinem ad gratiam +et gloriam, aequalitas invenitur; cum eadem sit mensura hominis et +Angeli, ut dicitur Apoc. XXI; ita tamen quod quidam Angeli +quibusdam hominibus, et quidam homines quibusdam Angelis, quantum +ad hoc, potiores inveniuntur. Sed quantum ad conditionem naturae, +Angelus est melior homine. Nec ideo naturam humanam assumpsit Deus, +quia hominem absolute plus diligeret, sed quia plus indigebat. +Sicut bonus paterfamilias aliquid pretiosius dat servo aegrotanti, +quod non dat filio sano.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q20_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the + active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious + of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, + he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For + it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body. + </p><p id="FP_Q20_A4-p12"> Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave + him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ + commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, + and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. + Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect + to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While + others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. + Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was + loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the + weigher of spirits" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29321] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod haec dubitatio de Petro et Ioanne multipliciter +solvitur. Augustinus namque refert hoc ad mysterium, dicens quod +vita activa, quae significatur per Petrum, plus diligit Deum quam +vita contemplativa, quae significatur per Ioannem, quia magis +sentit praesentis vitae angustias, et aestuantius ab eis liberari +desiderat, et ad Deum ire. Contemplativam vero vitam Deus plus +diligit, quia magis eam conservat; non enim finitur simul cum vita +corporis, sicut vita activa. Quidam vero dicunt quod Petrus plus +dilexit Christum in membris; et sic etiam a Christo plus fuit +dilectus; unde ei Ecclesiam commendavit. Ioannes vero plus dilexit +Christum in seipso; et sic etiam plus ab eo fuit dilectus; unde ei +commendavit matrem. Alii vero dicunt quod incertum est quis horum +plus Christum dilexerit amore caritatis, et similiter quem Deus +plus dilexerit in ordine ad maiorem gloriam vitae aeternae. Sed +Petrus dicitur plus dilexisse, quantum ad quandam promptitudinem +vel fervorem, Ioannes vero plus dilectus, quantum ad quaedam +familiaritatis indicia, quae Christus ei magis demonstrabat, +propter eius iuventutem et puritatem. Alii vero dicunt quod +Christus plus dilexit Petrum, quantum ad excellentius donum +caritatis, Ioannem vero plus, quantum ad donum intellectus. Unde +simpliciter Petrus fuit melior, et magis dilectus, sed Ioannes +secundum quid. Praesumptuosum tamen videtur hoc diiudicare, quia, +ut dicitur Prov. XVI, <i>spirituum ponderator est dominus</i>, et +non alius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q20_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better + and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is + said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, + and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In + battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, + but has never done a brave deed." + </p><p id="FP_Q20_A4-p14"> Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, + than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to + a poor man than to a king. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29322] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod poenitentes et innocentes se habent sicut excedentia +et excessa. Nam sive sint innocentes, sive poenitentes, illi sunt +meliores et magis dilecti, qui plus habent de gratia. Ceteris tamen +paribus, innocentia dignior est et magis dilecta. Dicitur tamen +Deus plus gaudere de poenitente quam de innocente, quia plerumque +poenitentes cautiores, humiliores et ferventiores resurgunt. Unde +Gregorius dicit ibidem, quod <i>dux in praelio eum militem plus +diligit, qui post fugam conversus, fortiter hostem premit, quam qui +nunquam fugit, nec unquam fortiter fecit</i>. Vel, alia ratione, +quia aequale donum gratiae plus est, comparatum poenitenti, qui +meruit poenam, quam innocenti, qui non meruit. Sicut centum marcae +maius donum est, si dentur pauperi, quam si dentur regi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according + to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be + given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other + time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="29323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29323] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, cum voluntas Dei sit causa bonitatis in rebus, +secundum illud tempus pensanda est bonitas eius qui amatur a Deo, +secundum quod dandum est ei ex bonitate divina aliquod bonum. +Secundum ergo illud tempus quo praedestinato peccatori dandum est +ex divina voluntate maius bonum, melior est; licet secundum aliquod +aliud tempus, sit peior; quia et secundum aliquod tempus, non est +nec bonus neque malus.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q21" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q21-p0.1">Q. 21. THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q21-p2"> After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q21-p3"> (1) Whether there is justice in God?</p><p id="FP_Q21-p4"> (2) Whether His justice can be called truth?</p><p id="FP_Q21-p5"> (3) Whether there is mercy in God?</p><p id="FP_Q21-p6"> (4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 pr."><a name="29324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29324] +Iª q. 21 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divini amoris, de +iustitia et misericordia eius agendum est. Et circa hoc quaeruntur +quatuor. Primo, utrum in Deo sit iustitia. Secundo, utrum iustitia +eius veritas dici possit. Tertio, utrum in Deo sit misericordia. +Quarto, utrum in omni opere Dei sit iustitia et misericordia.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q21_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q21_A1-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 1. Whether there is justice in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God: + neither therefore does justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29325] Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit iustitia. Iustitia enim +contra temperantiam dividitur. Temperantia autem non est in Deo. +Ergo nec iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh + all things according to the counsel of His will" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29326] Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque facit omnia pro libito suae voluntatis, non secundum +iustitiam operatur. Sed, sicut dicit apostolus, ad Ephes. I, Deus +<i>operatur omnia secundum consilium suae voluntatis</i>. Non ergo +ei iustitia debet attribui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29327] Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, actus +iustitiae est reddere debitum. Sed Deus nulli est debitor. Ergo Deo +non competit iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards + the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="29328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29328] Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid est in Deo, est eius essentia. Sed hoc non competit +iustitiae, dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quod <i>bonum +essentiam, iustum vero actum respicit</i>. Ergo iustitia non +competit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.8" target="asv">Ps. 10:8</a>): "The Lord is just, and hath loved justice." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29329] Iª q. 21 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Psalmo X, <i>iustus dominus, et iustitias +dilexit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds + of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse + of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be + made him?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.35" target="asv">Rom. 11:35</a>). The other consists in distribution, and + is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order + displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, + which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to + the + condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 co."><a name="29330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29330] Iª q. 21 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod duplex est species iustitiae. Una, quae consistit in mutua +datione et acceptione, ut puta quae consistit in emptione et +venditione, et aliis huiusmodi communicationibus vel +commutationibus. Et haec dicitur a philosopho, in V Ethic., +iustitia commutativa, vel directiva commutationum sive +communicationum. Et haec non competit Deo, quia, ut dicit +apostolus, Rom. XI, <i>quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur +ei?</i> Alia, quae consistit in distribuendo, et dicitur +distributiva iustitia, secundum quam aliquis gubernator vel +dispensator dat unicuique secundum suam dignitatem. Sicut igitur +ordo congruus familiae, vel cuiuscumque multitudinis gubernatae, +demonstrat huiusmodi iustitiam in gubernante; ita ordo universi, +qui apparet tam in rebus naturalibus quam in rebus voluntariis, +demonstrat Dei iustitiam. Unde dicit Dionysius, VIII cap. de Div. +Nom., <i>oportet videre in hoc veram Dei esse iustitiam, quod +omnibus tribuit propria, secundum uniuscuiusque existentium +dignitatem; et uniuscuiusque naturam in proprio salvat ordine et +virtute</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring, + meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q21_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html">Q[20], A[1]</a> ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject + of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral + virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside + not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although + not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would + be absurd to praise God for His political virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29331] Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam sunt circa passiones; sicut +temperantia circa concupiscentias, fortitudo circa timores et +audacias, mansuetudo circa iram. Et huiusmodi virtutes Deo attribui +non possunt, nisi secundum metaphoram, quia in Deo neque passiones +sunt, ut supra dictum est; neque appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt +huiusmodi virtutes sicut in subiecto, ut dicit philosophus in III +Ethic. Quaedam vero virtutes morales sunt circa operationes; ut +puta circa dationes et sumptus, ut iustitia et liberalitas et +magnificentia; quae etiam non sunt in parte sensitiva, sed in +voluntate. Unde nihil prohibet huiusmodi virtutes in Deo ponere, +non tamen circa actiones civiles sed circa actiones Deo +convenientes. Ridiculum est enim secundum virtutes politicas Deum +laudare, ut dicit philosophus in X Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom + approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does + according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher + power, God is a law unto Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29332] Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum bonum intellectum sit obiectum voluntatis, +impossibile est Deum velle nisi quod ratio suae sapientiae habet. +Quae quidem est sicut lex iustitiae, secundum quam eius voluntas +recta et iusta est. Unde quod secundum suam voluntatem facit, iuste +facit, sicut et nos quod secundum legem facimus, iuste facimus. Sed +nos quidem secundum legem alicuius superioris, Deus autem sibi ipsi +est lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant, + and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or + necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created + thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to + substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine + operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. + It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. + In this respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is + also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other + animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and + condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according + to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is + not directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting + accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10): + "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it + is also just; since it befits Thy goodness." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29333] Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod unicuique debetur quod suum est. Dicitur autem esse +suum alicuius, quod ad ipsum ordinatur; sicut servus est domini, et +non e converso; nam liberum est quod sui causa est. In nomine ergo +debiti, importatur quidam ordo exigentiae vel necessitatis alicuius +ad quod ordinatur. Est autem duplex ordo considerandus in rebus. +Unus, quo aliquid creatum ordinatur ad aliud creatum, sicut partes +ordinantur ad totum, et accidentia ad substantias, et unaquaeque +res ad suum finem. Alius ordo, quo omnia creata ordinantur in Deum. +Sic igitur et debitum attendi potest dupliciter in operatione +divina, aut secundum quod aliquid debetur Deo; aut secundum quod +aliquid debetur rei creatae. Et utroque modo Deus debitum reddit. +Debitum enim est Deo, ut impleatur in rebus id quod eius sapientia +et voluntas habet, et quod suam bonitatem manifestat, et secundum +hoc iustitia Dei respicit decentiam ipsius, secundum quam reddit +sibi quod sibi debetur. Debitum etiam est alicui rei creatae, quod +habeat id quod ad ipsam ordinatur, sicut homini, quod habeat manus, +et quod ei alia animalia serviant. Et sic etiam Deus operatur +iustitiam, quando dat unicuique quod ei debetur secundum rationem +suae naturae et conditionis. Sed hoc debitum dependet ex primo, +quia hoc unicuique debetur, quod est ordinatum ad ipsum secundum +ordinem divinae sapientiae. Et licet Deus hoc modo debitum alicui +det, non tamen ipse est debitor, quia ipse ad alia non ordinatur, +sed potius alia in ipsum. Et ideo iustitia quandoque dicitur in Deo +condecentia suae bonitatis; quandoque vero retributio pro meritis. +Et utrumque modum tangit Anselmus, dicens, <i>cum punis malos, +iustum est, quia illorum meritis convenit; cum vero parcis malis, +iustum est, quia bonitati tuae condecens est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence + of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with + respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related + to the just, as the general to the special. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29334] Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, licet iustitia respiciat actum, non tamen per hoc +excluditur quin sit essentia Dei, quia etiam id quod est de +essentia rei, potest esse principium actionis. Sed bonum non semper +respicit actum, quia aliquid dicitur esse bonum, non solum secundum +quod agit, sed etiam secundum quod in sua essentia perfectum est. +Et propter hoc ibidem dicitur quod bonum comparatur ad iustum, +sicut generale ad speciale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q21_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q21_A2-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 2. Whether the justice of God is truth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), + it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). + Therefore justice does not appertain to truth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29335] Iª q. 21 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod iustitia Dei non sit veritas. Iustitia +enim est in voluntate, est enim rectitudo voluntatis, ut dicit +Anselmus. Veritas autem est in intellectu, secundum philosophum in +VI Metaphys. et in VI Ethic. Ergo iustitia non pertinet ad +veritatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain + to the idea of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29336] Iª q. 21 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +veritas, secundum philosophum in IV Ethic., est quaedam alia virtus +a iustitia. Non ergo veritas pertinet ad rationem iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.84.11" target="asv">Ps. 84:11</a>): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29337] Iª q. 21 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod in Psalmo LXXXIV dicitur, <i>misericordia et veritas +obviaverunt sibi</i>; et ponitur ibi veritas pro iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q21_A2-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q21_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case + with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists + in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, + our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in + the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his + art. + </p><p id="FP_Q21_A2-p6"> Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's + justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is + suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 co."><a name="29338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29338] Iª q. 21 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod veritas consistit in adaequatione intellectus et rei, sicut +supra dictum est. Intellectus autem qui est causa rei, comparatur +ad ipsam sicut regula et mensura, e converso autem est de +intellectu qui accipit scientiam a rebus. Quando igitur res sunt +mensura et regula intellectus, veritas consistit in hoc, quod +intellectus adaequatur rei, ut in nobis accidit, ex eo enim quod +res est vel non est, opinio nostra et oratio vera vel falsa est. +Sed quando intellectus est regula vel mensura rerum, veritas +consistit in hoc, quod res adaequantur intellectui, sicut dicitur +artifex facere verum opus, quando concordat arti. Sicut autem se +habent artificiata ad artem, ita se habent opera iusta ad legem cui +concordant. Iustitia igitur Dei, quae constituit ordinem in rebus +conformem rationi sapientiae suae, quae est lex eius, convenienter +veritas nominatur. Et sic etiam dicitur in nobis veritas +iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed + according to the law, it resides in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29339] Iª q. 21 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod iustitia, quantum ad legem regulantem, est in ratione +vel intellectu, sed quantum ad imperium, quo opera regulantur +secundum legem, est in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed + such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect + with its cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29340] Iª q. 21 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod veritas illa de qua loquitur philosophus ibi, est +quaedam virtus per quam aliquis demonstrat se talem in dictis vel +factis, qualis est. Et sic consistit in conformitate signi ad +significatum, non autem in conformitate effectus ad causam et +regulam, sicut de veritate iustitiae dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q21_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q21_A3-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 3. Whether mercy can be attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). + But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29341] Iª q. 21 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod misericordia Deo non competat. +Misericordia enim est species tristitiae, ut dicit Damascenus. Sed +tristitia non est in Deo. Ergo nec misericordia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13</a>): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He + should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29342] Iª q. 21 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +misericordia est relaxatio iustitiae. Sed Deus non potest +praetermittere id quod ad iustitiam suam pertinet. Dicitur enim II +ad Tim. II, <i>si non credimus, ille fidelis permanet, seipsum +negare non potest</i>, negaret autem seipsum, ut dicit Glossa +ibidem, si dicta sua negaret. Ergo misericordia Deo non +competit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.4" target="asv">Ps. 110:4</a>): "He is a merciful and gracious Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29343] Iª q. 21 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Psalmo CX, <i>miserator et misericors +dominus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which + it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum + cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to + dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To + sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, + whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; + and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6] , A[4]</a>). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His + justice, liberality, and + mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown + above ( + <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already + said + <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in + so far as perfections given to things by God + expel defects, it belongs to mercy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 co."><a name="29344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29344] Iª q. 21 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod misericordia est Deo maxime attribuenda, tamen secundum +effectum, non secundum passionis affectum. Ad cuius evidentiam, +considerandum est quod misericors dicitur aliquis quasi habens +miserum cor, quia scilicet afficitur ex miseria alterius per +tristitiam, ac si esset eius propria miseria. Et ex hoc sequitur +quod operetur ad depellendam miseriam alterius, sicut miseriam +propriam, et hic est misericordiae effectus. Tristari ergo de +miseria alterius non competit Deo, sed repellere miseriam alterius, +hoc maxime ei competit, ut per miseriam quemcumque defectum +intelligamus. Defectus autem non tolluntur, nisi per alicuius +bonitatis perfectionem, prima autem origo bonitatis Deus est, ut +supra ostensum est. Sed considerandum est quod elargiri +perfectiones rebus, pertinet quidem et ad bonitatem divinam, et ad +iustitiam, et ad liberalitatem, et misericordiam, tamen secundum +aliam et aliam rationem. Communicatio enim perfectionum, absolute +considerata, pertinet ad bonitatem, ut supra ostensum est. Sed +inquantum perfectiones rebus a Deo dantur secundum earum +proportionem, pertinet ad iustitiam, ut dictum est supra. Inquantum +vero non attribuit rebus perfectiones propter utilitatem suam, sed +solum propter suam bonitatem, pertinet ad liberalitatem. Inquantum +vero perfectiones datae rebus a Deo, omnem defectum expellunt, +pertinet ad misericordiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29345] Iª q. 21 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum igitur +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de misericordia, quantum ad +passionis affectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays + another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or + mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said + to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one + another, as Christ has forgiven you" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.32" target="asv">Eph. 4:32</a>). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy + exalteth itself above judgement" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29346] Iª q. 21 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Deus misericorditer agit, non quidem contra iustitiam +suam faciendo, sed aliquid supra iustitiam operando, sicut si +alicui cui debentur centum denarii, aliquis ducentos det de suo, +tamen non contra iustitiam facit, sed liberaliter vel +misericorditer operatur. Et similiter si aliquis offensam in se +commissam remittat. Qui enim aliquid remittit, quodammodo donat +illud, unde apostolus remissionem donationem vocat, Ephes. V, +<i>donate invicem, sicut et Christus vobis donavit</i>. Ex quo +patet quod misericordia non tollit iustitiam, sed est quaedam +iustitiae plenitudo. Unde dicitur Iac. II, quod <i>misericordia +superexaltat iudicium</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q21_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q21_A4-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 4. Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification + of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that + hath not done mercy" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29347] Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non in omnibus Dei operibus sit +misericordia et iustitia. Quaedam enim opera Dei attribuuntur +misericordiae, ut iustificatio impii, quaedam vero iustitiae, ut +damnatio impiorum. Unde dicitur Iac. II, <i>iudicium sine +misericordia fiet ei qui non fecerit misericordiam</i>. Non ergo in +omni opere Dei apparet misericordia et iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.15" target="asv">Rom. 15</a>). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29348] Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus, ad Rom. XV, conversionem Iudaeorum attribuit iustitiae +et veritati; conversionem autem gentium, misericordiae. Ergo non in +quolibet opere Dei est iustitia et misericordia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and + mercy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29349] Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, multi +iusti in hoc mundo affliguntur. Hoc autem est iniustum. Non ergo in +omni opere Dei est iustitia et misericordia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose + something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29350] Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +iustitiae est reddere debitum, misericordiae autem sublevare +miseriam, et sic tam iustitia quam misericordia aliquid +praesupponit in suo opere. Sed creatio nihil praesupponit. Ergo in +creatione neque misericordia est, neque iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.24.10" target="asv">Ps. 24:10</a>): "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29351] Iª q. 21 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Psalmo XXIV, <i>omnes viae domini misericordia et +veritas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not + every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for + misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice + is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be + lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this + sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according + to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work + of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except + for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something + that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine + will---which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational + soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So + in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, + and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. + For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than + is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness + confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 co."><a name="29352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29352] Iª q. 21 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est quod in quolibet opere Dei misericordia et veritas +inveniantur; si tamen misericordia pro remotione cuiuscumque +defectus accipiatur; quamvis non omnis defectus proprie possit dici +miseria, sed solum defectus rationalis naturae, quam contingit esse +felicem; nam miseria felicitati opponitur. Huius autem necessitatis +ratio est, quia, cum debitum quod ex divina iustitia redditur, sit +vel debitum Deo, vel debitum alicui creaturae, neutrum potest in +aliquo opere Dei praetermitti. Non enim potest facere aliquid Deus, +quod non sit conveniens sapientiae et bonitati ipsius; secundum +quem modum diximus aliquid esse debitum Deo. Similiter etiam +quidquid in rebus creatis facit, secundum convenientem ordinem et +proportionem facit; in quo consistit ratio iustitiae. Et sic +oportet in omni opere Dei esse iustitiam. Opus autem divinae +iustitiae semper praesupponit opus misericordiae, et in eo +fundatur. Creaturae enim non debetur aliquid, nisi propter aliquid +in eo praeexistens, vel praeconsideratum, et rursus, si illud +creaturae debetur, hoc erit propter aliquid prius. Et cum non sit +procedere in infinitum, oportet devenire ad aliquid quod ex sola +bonitate divinae voluntatis dependeat, quae est ultimus finis. +Utpote si dicamus quod habere manus debitum est homini propter +animam rationalem; animam vero rationalem habere, ad hoc quod sit +homo; hominem vero esse, propter divinam bonitatem. Et sic in +quolibet opere Dei apparet misericordia, quantum ad primam radicem +eius. Cuius virtus salvatur in omnibus consequentibus; et etiam +vehementius in eis operatur, sicut causa primaria vehementius +influit quam causa secunda. Et propter hoc etiam ea quae alicui +creaturae debentur, Deus, ex abundantia suae bonitatis, largius +dispensat quam exigat proportio rei. Minus enim est quod sufficeret +ad conservandum ordinem iustitiae, quam quod divina bonitas +confert, quae omnem proportionem creaturae excedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q21_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in + others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat + alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved. + </p><p id="FP_Q21_A4-p9"> In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully + infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.7.47" target="asv">Lk. 7:47</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29353] Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod quaedam opera attribuuntur iustitiae et quaedam +misericordiae, quia in quibusdam vehementius apparet iustitia, in +quibusdam misericordia. Et tamen in damnatione reproborum apparet +misericordia, non quidem totaliter relaxans, sed aliqualiter +allevians, dum punit citra condignum. Et in iustificatione impii +apparet iustitia, dum culpas relaxat propter dilectionem, quam +tamen ipse misericorditer infundit, sicut de Magdalena legitur, +Luc. VII, <i>dimissa sunt ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit +multum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in + the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account + of the promises made to the fathers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29354] Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod iustitia et misericordia Dei apparet in conversione +Iudaeorum et gentium, sed aliqua ratio iustitiae apparet in +conversione Iudaeorum, quae non apparet in conversione gentium, +sicut quod salvati sunt propter promissiones patribus factas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in + them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils + that press on us in this world force us to go to God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29355] Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in hoc etiam quod iusti puniuntur in hoc mundo, +apparet iustitia et misericordia; inquantum per huiusmodi +afflictiones aliqua levia in eis purgantur, et ab affectu +terrenorum in Deum magis eriguntur; secundum illud Gregorii, +<i>mala quae in hoc mundo nos premunt, ad Deum nos ire +compellunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this + way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine + wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29356] Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, licet creationi non praesupponatur aliquid in rerum +natura, praesupponitur tamen aliquid in Dei cognitione. Et secundum +hoc etiam salvatur ibi ratio iustitiae, inquantum res in esse +producitur, secundum quod convenit divinae sapientiae et bonitati. +Et salvatur quodammodo ratio misericordiae, inquantum res de non +esse in esse mutatur.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q22" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q22-p0.1">Q. 22. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q22-p2"> Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both + the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that + is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals, + after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong. + Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q22-p3"> (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?</p><p id="FP_Q22-p4"> (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?</p><p id="FP_Q22-p5"> (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?</p><p id="FP_Q22-p6"> (4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 pr."><a name="29357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29357] +Iª q. 22 pr.</span></a> Consideratis autem his quae ad +voluntatem absolute pertinent, procedendum est ad ea quae +respiciunt simul intellectum et voluntatem. Huiusmodi autem est +providentia quidem respectu omnium; praedestinatio vero et +reprobatio, et quae ad haec consequuntur, respectu hominum +specialiter, in ordine ad aeternam salutem. Nam et post morales +virtutes, in scientia morali, consideratur de prudentia, ad quam +providentia pertinere videtur. Circa providentiam autem Dei +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deo conveniat providentia. +Secundo, utrum omnia divinae providentiae subsint. Tertio, utrum +divina providentia immediate sit de omnibus. Quarto, utrum +providentia divina imponat necessitatem rebus provisis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q22_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q22_A1-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 1. Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence. + But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never + has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29358] Iª q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod providentia Deo non conveniat. Providentia +enim, secundum Tullium, est pars prudentiae. Prudentia autem, cum +sit bene consiliativa, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., Deo +competere non potest, qui nullum dubium habet, unde eum consiliari +oporteat. Ergo providentia Deo non competit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things + that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is no providence in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29359] Iª q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid est in Deo, est aeternum. Sed providentia non est aliquid +aeternum, est enim circa existentia, quae non sunt aeterna, +secundum Damascenum. Ergo providentia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the + intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29360] Iª q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nullum compositum est in Deo. Sed providentia videtur esse aliquid +compositum, quia includit in se voluntatem et intellectum. Ergo +providentia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.3" target="asv">Wis. 14:3</a>): "But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.']." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29361] Iª q. 22 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>tu autem, pater, gubernas omnia +providentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was + shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and + especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness ( + <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21], A[4]</a>). This good of order existing in things created, is + itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of + every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before ( + <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type + of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other + parts are + directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is + past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according + to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself---as for instance, + a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a + family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.45" target="asv">Mat. 24:45</a>), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way prudence or providence may suitably + be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type + of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence + is the divine type itself, seated in + the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards + an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 co."><a name="29362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29362] Iª q. 22 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est ponere providentiam in Deo. Omne enim bonum quod +est in rebus, a Deo creatum est, ut supra ostensum est. In rebus +autem invenitur bonum, non solum quantum ad substantiam rerum, sed +etiam quantum ad ordinem earum in finem, et praecipue in finem +ultimum, qui est bonitas divina, ut supra habitum est. Hoc igitur +bonum ordinis in rebus creatis existens, a Deo creatum est. Cum +autem Deus sit causa rerum per suum intellectum, et sic cuiuslibet +sui effectus oportet rationem in ipso praeexistere, ut ex +superioribus patet; necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem +in mente divina praeexistat. Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem, +proprie providentia est. Est enim principalis pars prudentiae, ad +quam aliae duae partes ordinantur, scilicet memoria praeteritorum, +et intelligentia praesentium; prout ex praeteritis memoratis, et +praesentibus intellectis, coniectamus de futuris providendis. +Prudentiae autem proprium est, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., +ordinare alia in finem; sive respectu sui ipsius, sicut dicitur +homo prudens, qui bene ordinat actus suos ad finem vitae suae; sive +respectu aliorum sibi subiectorum in familia vel civitate vel +regno, secundum quem modum dicitur Matt. XXIV, <i>fidelis servus et +prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam suam</i>. Secundum +quem modum prudentia vel providentia Deo convenire potest, nam in +ipso Deo nihil est in finem ordinabile, cum ipse sit finis ultimus. +Ipsa igitur ratio ordinis rerum in finem, providentia in Deo +nominatur. Unde Boetius, IV de Consol., dicit quod <i>providentia +est ipsa divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae +cuncta disponit</i>. Dispositio autem potest dici tam ratio ordinis +rerum in finem, quam ratio ordinis partium in toto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly + counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. + <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are + doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He + possesses, does belong to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.6" target="asv"> Ps. 148:6</a>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although + at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry + necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: + "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of + His will" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29363] Iª q. 22 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., prudentia proprie +est praeceptiva eorum, de quibus eubulia recte consiliatur, et +synesis recte iudicat. Unde, licet consiliari non competat Deo, +secundum quod consilium est inquisitio de rebus dubiis; tamen +praecipere de ordinandis in finem, quorum rectam rationem habet, +competit Deo, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>praeceptum posuit, et non +praeteribit</i>. Et secundum hoc competit Deo ratio prudentiae et +providentiae. Quamvis etiam dici possit, quod ipsa ratio rerum +agendarum consilium in Deo dicitur; non propter inquisitionem, sed +propter certitudinem cognitionis, ad quam consiliantes inquirendo +perveniunt. Unde dicitur Ephes. I, <i>qui operatur omnia secundum +consilium voluntatis suae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things pertain to the care of providence---namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition; + and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29364] Iª q. 22 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ad curam duo pertinent, scilicet ratio ordinis, quae +dicitur providentia et dispositio; et executio ordinis, quae +dicitur gubernatio. Quorum primum est aeternum, secundum +temporale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done + for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty + is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, + this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect + are one and the same thing, as we have said above + <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19.html">(Q[19])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29365] Iª q. 22 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod providentia est in intellectu, sed praesupponit +voluntatem finis, nullus enim praecipit de agendis propter finem, +nisi velit finem. Unde et prudentia praesupponit virtutes morales, +per quas appetitus se habet ad bonum, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Et +tamen si providentia ex aequali respiceret voluntatem et +intellectum divinum, hoc esset absque detrimento divinae +simplicitatis; cum voluntas et intellectus in Deo sint idem, ut +supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q22_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q22_A2-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 2. Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything + was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29366] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia sint subiecta divinae +providentiae. Nullum enim provisum est fortuitum. Si ergo omnia +sunt provisa a Deo, nihil erit fortuitum, et sic perit casus et +fortuna. Quod est contra communem opinionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many + evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29367] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis +sapiens provisor excludit defectum et malum, quantum potest, ab his +quorum curam gerit. Videmus autem multa mala in rebus esse. Aut +igitur Deus non potest ea impedire, et sic non est omnipotens, aut +non de omnibus curam habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. + vi, 5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, + then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29368] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quae +ex necessitate eveniunt, providentiam seu prudentiam non requirunt, +unde, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., prudentia est recta ratio +contingentium, de quibus est consilium et electio. Cum igitur multa +in rebus ex necessitate eveniant, non omnia providentiae +subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by + God in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>). And particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.80.13" target="asv">Ps. 80:13</a>). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine + providence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29369] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque dimittitur sibi, non subest providentiae alicuius +gubernantis. Sed homines sibi ipsis dimittuntur a Deo, secundum +illud Eccli. XV, <i>Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit +eum in manu consilii sui</i>; et specialiter mali, secundum illud, +<i>dimisit illos secundum desideria cordis eorum</i>. Non igitur +omnia divinae providentiae subsunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>): "God doth not care for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. + Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="29370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29370] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus, I Cor. IX, dicit quod <i>non est Deo cura de bobus</i>, +et eadem ratione, de aliis creaturis irrationalibus. Non igitur +omnia subsunt divinae providentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29371] Iª q. 22 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia, quod <i>attingit a +fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q22_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world + was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in + their individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented + as saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.22.14" target="asv">Job 22:14</a>): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not + consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of + things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers + corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others. + </p><p id="FP_Q22_A2-p9"> We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual + selves. This is mad evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends + as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place + which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the + intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent + principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things + corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle + says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.'Those powers that are, are ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt, + a + Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have + said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine + providence. It has also been shown ( + <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html">Q[14], AA[6]</a>,11) that God knows all + things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge + of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject + to the ordering of that art. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 co."><a name="29372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29372] Iª q. 22 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam totaliter providentiam negaverunt, sicut Democritus et +Epicurei, ponentes mundum factum esse casu. Quidam vero posuerunt +incorruptibilia tantum providentiae subiacere; corruptibilia vero, +non secundum individua, sed secundum species; sic enim +incorruptibilia sunt. Ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXII, <i>nubes +latibulum eius, et circa cardines caeli perambulat, neque nostra +considerat</i>. A corruptibilium autem generalitate excepit Rabbi +Moyses homines, propter splendorem intellectus, quem participant, +in aliis autem individuis corruptibilibus, aliorum opinionem est +secutus. Sed necesse est dicere omnia divinae providentiae +subiacere, non in universali tantum, sed etiam in singulari. Quod +sic patet. Cum enim omne agens agat propter finem, tantum se +extendit ordinatio effectuum in finem, quantum se extendit +causalitas primi agentis. Ex hoc enim contingit in operibus +alicuius agentis aliquid provenire non ad finem ordinatum, quia +effectus ille consequitur ex aliqua alia causa, praeter intentionem +agentis. Causalitas autem Dei, qui est primum agens, se extendit +usque ad omnia entia, non solum quantum ad principia speciei, sed +etiam quantum ad individualia principia, non solum +incorruptibilium, sed etiam corruptibilium. Unde necesse est omnia +quae habent quocumque modo esse, ordinata esse a Deo in finem, +secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. XIII, <i>quae a Deo sunt, ordinata +sunt</i>. Cum ergo nihil aliud sit Dei providentia quam ratio +ordinis rerum in finem, ut dictum est, necesse est omnia, inquantum +participant esse, intantum subdi divinae providentiae. Similiter +etiam supra ostensum est quod Deus omnia cognoscit, et universalia +et particularia. Et cum cognitio eius comparetur ad res sicut +cognitio artis ad artificiata, ut supra dictum est, necesse est +quod omnia supponantur suo ordini, sicut omnia artificiata +subduntur ordini artis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not + the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance + of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, + all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be + that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of + a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause, + outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although + to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one + place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29373] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod aliter est de causa universali, et de causa +particulari. Ordinem enim causae particularis aliquid potest exire, +non autem ordinem causae universalis. Non enim subducitur aliquid +ab ordine causae particularis, nisi per aliquam aliam causam +particularem impedientem, sicut lignum impeditur a combustione per +actionem aquae. Unde, cum omnes causae particulares concludantur +sub universali causa, impossibile est aliquem effectum ordinem +causae universalis effugere. Inquantum igitur aliquis effectus +ordinem alicuius causae particularis effugit, dicitur esse casuale +vel fortuitum, respectu causae particularis, sed respectu causae +universalis, a cuius ordine subtrahi non potest, dicitur esse +provisum. Sicut et concursus duorum servorum, licet sit casualis +quantum ad eos, est tamen provisus a domino, qui eos scienter sic +ad unum locum mittit, ut unus de alio nesciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular + provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows + some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things + are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the + plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: + for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since + God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, + that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from + the + universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there + were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in + His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account + of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things---e.g. casual + and evil things---as removed from the care of divine providence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29374] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliter de eo est qui habet curam alicuius +particularis, et de provisore universali. Quia provisor +particularis excludit defectum ab eo quod eius curae subditur, +quantum potest, sed provisor universalis permittit aliquem defectum +in aliquo particulari accidere, ne impediatur bonum totius. Unde +corruptiones et defectus in rebus naturalibus, dicuntur esse contra +naturam particularem; sed tamen sunt de intentione naturae +universalis, inquantum defectus unius cedit in bonum alterius, vel +etiam totius universi; nam corruptio unius est generatio alterius, +per quam species conservatur. Cum igitur Deus sit universalis +provisor totius entis, ad ipsius providentiam pertinet ut permittat +quosdam defectus esse in aliquibus particularibus rebus, ne +impediatur bonum universi perfectum. Si enim omnia mala +impedirentur, multa bona deessent universo, non enim esset vita +leonis, si non esset occisio animalium; nec esset patientia +martyrum, si non esset persecutio tyrannorum. Unde dicit Augustinus +in Enchirid. <i>Deus omnipotens nullo modo sineret malum aliquod +esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus, +ut bene faceret etiam de malo</i>. Ex his autem duabus rationibus +quas nunc solvimus, videntur moti fuisse, qui divinae providentiae +subtraxerunt corruptibilia, in quibus inveniuntur casualia et +mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence + does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the + author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine + providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and + others of the ancients. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29375] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod homo non est institutor naturae, sed utitur in +operibus artis et virtutis, ad suum usum, rebus naturalibus. Unde +providentia humana non se extendit ad necessaria, quae ex natura +proveniunt. Ad quae tamen se extendit providentia Dei, qui est +auctor naturae. Et ex hac ratione videntur moti fuisse, qui cursum +rerum naturalium subtraxerunt divinae providentiae, attribuentes +ipsum necessitati materiae; ut Democritus, et alii naturales +antiqui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that + he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only + acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards + an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which + these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since + the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise + of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular + under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over + the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that love God, + all things work together unto good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether + withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His + providence. This was the reason that had weight with + Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29376] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod in hoc quod dicitur Deum hominem sibi reliquisse, non +excluditur homo a divina providentia, sed ostenditur quod non +praefigitur ei virtus operativa determinata ad unum, sicut rebus +naturalibus; quae aguntur tantum, quasi ab altero directae in +finem, non autem seipsa agunt, quasi se dirigentia in finem, ut +creaturae rationales per liberum arbitrium, quo consiliantur et +eligunt. Unde signanter dicit, <i>in manu consilii sui</i>. Sed +quia ipse actus liberi arbitrii reducitur in Deum sicut in causam, +necesse est ut ea quae ex libero arbitrio fiunt, divinae +providentiae subdantur, providentia enim hominis continetur sub +providentia Dei, sicut causa particularis sub causa universali. +Hominum autem iustorum quodam excellentiori modo Deus habet +providentiam quam impiorum, inquantum non permittit contra eos +evenire aliquid, quod finaliter impediat salutem eorum, nam +<i>diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum</i>, ut dicitur +Rom. VIII. Sed ex hoc ipso quod impios non retrahit a malo culpae, +dicitur eos dimittere. Non tamen ita, quod totaliter ab eius +providentia excludantur, alioquin in nihilum deciderent, nisi per +eius providentiam conservarentur. Et ex hac ratione videtur motus +fuisse Tullius, qui res humanas, de quibus consiliamur, divinae +providentiae subtraxit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html">Q[19], A[10]</a>), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; + and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the + care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape + the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="29377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29377] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, quia creatura rationalis habet per liberum arbitrium +dominium sui actus, ut dictum est, speciali quodam modo subditur +divinae providentiae; ut scilicet ei imputetur aliquid ad culpam +vel ad meritum, et reddatur ei aliquid ut poena vel praemium. Et +quantum ad hoc curam Dei apostolus a bobus removet. Non tamen ita +quod individua irrationalium creaturarum ad Dei providentiam non +pertineant, ut Rabbi Moyses existimavit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q22_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q22_A3-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 3. Whether God has immediate providence over everything?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must + be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides + for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29378] Iª q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non immediate omnibus provideat. +Quidquid enim est dignitatis, Deo est attribuendum. Sed ad +dignitatem alicuius regis pertinet, quod habeat ministros, quibus +mediantibus subditis provideat. Ergo multo magis Deus non immediate +omnibus providet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. + But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. + If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29379] Iª q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad +providentiam pertinet res in finem ordinare. Finis autem cuiuslibet +rei est eius perfectio et bonum. Ad quamlibet autem causam pertinet +effectum suum perducere ad bonum. Quaelibet igitur causa agens est +causa effectus providentiae. Si igitur Deus omnibus immediate +providet, subtrahuntur omnes causae secundae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, + vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore + He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29380] Iª q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod <i>melius est quaedam nescire +quam scire, ut vilia</i>, et idem dicit philosophus, in XII +Metaphys. Sed omne quod est melius, Deo est attribuendum. Ergo Deus +non habet immediate providentiam quorundam vilium et malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.13" target="asv">Job 34:13</a>): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On which passage Gregory + says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29381] Iª q. 22 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Iob XXXIV, <i>quem constituit alium super terram? Aut +quem posuit super orbem quem fabricatus est?</i> Super quo dicit +Gregorius, <i>mundum per seipsum regit, quem per seipsum +condidit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things belong to providence---namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution + of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because + He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He + gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand + the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs + things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so + that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. + viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and + foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. + The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities + who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The + third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the + gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 co."><a name="29382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29382] Iª q. 22 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ad providentiam duo pertinent, scilicet ratio ordinis rerum +provisarum in finem; et executio huius ordinis, quae gubernatio +dicitur. Quantum igitur ad primum horum, Deus immediate omnibus +providet. Quia in suo intellectu habet rationem omnium, etiam +minimorum, et quascumque causas aliquibus effectibus praefecit, +dedit eis virtutem ad illos effectus producendos. Unde oportet quod +ordinem illorum effectuum in sua ratione praehabuerit. Quantum +autem ad secundum, sunt aliqua media divinae providentiae. Quia +inferiora gubernat per superiora; non propter defectum suae +virtutis, sed propter abundantiam suae bonitatis, ut dignitatem +causalitatis etiam creaturis communicet. Et secundum hoc excluditur +opinio Platonis, quam narrat Gregorius Nyssenus, triplicem +providentiam ponentis. Quarum prima est summi Dei, qui primo et +principaliter providet rebus spiritualibus; et consequenter toti +mundo, quantum ad genera, species et causas universales. Secunda +vero providentia est, qua providetur singularibus generabilium et +corruptibilium, et hanc attribuit diis qui circumeunt caelos, idest +substantiis separatis, quae movent corpora caelestia circulariter. +Tertia vero providentia est rerum humanarum, quam attribuebat +Daemonibus, quos Platonici ponebant medios inter nos et deos, ut +narrat Augustinus IX de Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those + things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more + it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29383] Iª q. 22 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod habere ministros executores suae providentiae, +pertinet ad dignitatem regis, sed quod non habeat rationem eorum +quae per eos agenda sunt, est ex defectu ipsius. Omnis enim +scientia operativa tanto perfectior est, quanto magis particularia +considerat, in quibus est actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His + order, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q22_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], AA[5]</a>,8). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29384] Iª q. 22 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod per hoc quod Deus habet immediate providentiam de +rebus omnibus, non excluduntur causae secundae, quae sunt +executrices huius ordinis, ut ex supra dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and + higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards + evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction + of evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29385] Iª q. 22 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nobis melius est non cognoscere mala et vilia, +inquantum per ea impedimur a consideratione meliorum, quia non +possumus simul multa intelligere, et inquantum cogitatio malorum +pervertit interdum voluntatem in malum. Sed hoc non habet locum in +Deo, qui simul omnia uno intuitu videt, et cuius voluntas ad malum +flecti non potest.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q22_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q22_A4-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 4. Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a "per se" cause, either + present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the + providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot + be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29386] Iª q. 22 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod divina providentia necessitatem rebus +provisis imponat. Omnis enim effectus qui habet aliquam causam per +se, quae iam est vel fuit, ad quam de necessitate sequitur, +provenit ex necessitate, ut philosophus probat in VI Metaphys. Sed +providentia Dei, cum sit aeterna, praeexistit; et ad eam sequitur +effectus de necessitate; non enim potest divina providentia +frustrari. Ergo providentia divina necessitatem rebus provisis +imponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns + the stability of necessity to things provided. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29387] Iª q. 22 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +unusquisque provisor stabilit opus suum quantum potest, ne +deficiat. Sed Deus est summe potens. Ergo necessitatis firmitatem +rebus a se provisis tribuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes + by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29388] Iª q. 22 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Boetius dicit, IV de Consol., quod fatum, <i>ab immobilis +providentiae proficiscens exordiis, actus fortunasque hominum +indissolubili causarum connexione constringit</i>. Videtur ergo +quod providentia necessitatem rebus provisis imponat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some + things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29389] Iª q. 22 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>corrumpere +naturam non est providentiae</i>. Hoc autem habet quarundam rerum +natura, quod sint contingentia. Non igitur divina providentia +necessitatem rebus imponit, contingentiam excludens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs + to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good + in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. + Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has + prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen + by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 co."><a name="29390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29390] Iª q. 22 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod providentia divina quibusdam rebus necessitatem imponit, non +autem omnibus, ut quidam crediderunt. Ad providentiam enim pertinet +ordinare res in finem. Post bonitatem autem divinam, quae est finis +a rebus separatus, principale bonum in ipsis rebus existens, est +perfectio universi, quae quidem non esset, si non omnes gradus +essendi invenirentur in rebus. Unde ad divinam providentiam +pertinet omnes gradus entium producere. Et ideo quibusdam +effectibus praeparavit causas necessarias, ut necessario evenirent; +quibusdam vero causas contingentes, ut evenirent contingenter, +secundum conditionem proximarum causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity + or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly + and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29391] Iª q. 22 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod effectus divinae providentiae non solum est aliquid +evenire quocumque modo; sed aliquid evenire vel contingenter vel +necessario. Et ideo evenit infallibiliter et necessario, quod +divina providentia disponit evenire infallibiliter et necessario, +et evenit contingenter, quod divinae providentiae ratio habet ut +contingenter eveniat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, + whether from necessity or from contingency. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29392] Iª q. 22 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in hoc est immobilis et certus divinae providentiae +ordo, quod ea quae ab ipso providentur, cuncta eveniunt eo modo quo +ipse providet, sive necessario sive contingenter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not + to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember + that properly speaking 'necessary' and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and + of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for + all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29393] Iª q. 22 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod indissolubilitas illa et immutabilitas quam Boetius +tangit, pertinet ad certitudinem providentiae, quae non deficit a +suo effectu, neque a modo eveniendi quem providit, non autem +pertinet ad necessitatem effectuum. Et considerandum est quod +necessarium et contingens proprie consequuntur ens, inquantum +huiusmodi. Unde modus contingentiae et necessitatis cadit sub +provisione Dei, qui est universalis provisor totius entis, non +autem sub provisione aliquorum particularium provisorum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q23" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q23-p0.1">Q. 23. OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q23-p2"> After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination + there are eight points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q23-p3"> (1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p4"> (2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p5"> (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p6"> (4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p7"> (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p8"> (6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p9"> (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p10"> (8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 pr."><a name="29394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29394] +Iª q. 23 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae +providentiae, agendum est de praedestinatione, et de libro vitae. +Et circa praedestinationem quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum Deo +conveniat praedestinatio. Secundo, quid sit praedestinatio; et +utrum ponat aliquid in praedestinato. Tertio, utrum Deo competat +reprobatio aliquorum hominum. Quarto, de comparatione +praedestinationis ad electionem; utrum scilicet praedestinati +eligantur. Quinto, utrum merita sint causa vel ratio +praedestinationis, vel reprobationis, aut electionis. Sexto, de +certitudine praedestinationis; utrum scilicet praedestinati +infallibiliter salventur. Septimo, utrum numerus praedestinatorum +sit certus. Octavo, utrum praedestinatio possit iuvari precibus +sanctorum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q23_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A1-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 1. Whether men are predestined by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God + foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But + human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore + to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done + away. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29395] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homines non praedestinentur a Deo. Dicit +enim Damascenus, in II libro, <i>oportet cognoscere quod omnia +quidem praecognoscit Deus, non autem omnia praedeterminat. +Praecognoscit enim ea quae in nobis sunt; non autem praedeterminat +ea</i>. Sed merita et demerita humana sunt in nobis, inquantum +sumus nostrorum actuum domini per liberum arbitrium. Ea ergo quae +pertinent ad meritum vel demeritum, non praedestinantur a Deo. Et +sic hominum praedestinatio tollitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29396] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnes +creaturae ordinantur ad suos fines per divinam providentiam, ut +supra dictum est. Sed aliae creaturae non dicuntur praedestinari a +Deo. Ergo nec homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them + there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose + to take pity [miserendi]" [*See + <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>]. Therefore men are not predestined. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29397] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Angeli sunt capaces beatitudinis, sicut et homines. Sed Angelis non +competit praedestinari, ut videtur, cum in eis nunquam fuerit +miseria; praedestinatio autem est propositum miserendi, ut dicit +Augustinus. Ergo homines non praedestinantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:12</a>): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are + given us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination + would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="29398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29398] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +beneficia hominibus a Deo collata, per spiritum sanctum viris +sanctis revelantur, secundum illud apostoli, I Cor. II, <i>nos +autem non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, sed spiritum qui ex Deo +est, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis</i>. Si ergo homines +praedestinarentur a Deo, cum praedestinatio sit Dei beneficium, +esset praedestinatis nota sua praedestinatio. Quod patet esse +falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29399] Iª q. 23 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Rom. VIII, <i>quos praedestinavit, hos et +vocavit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of + created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing + God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power + of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; + thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal + life, is led towards it, + directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things + towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a + kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards + the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that + predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 co."><a name="29400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29400] Iª q. 23 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deo conveniens est homines praedestinare. Omnia enim divinae +providentiae subiacent, ut supra ostensum est. Ad providentiam +autem pertinet res in finem ordinare, ut dictum est. Finis autem ad +quem res creatae ordinantur a Deo, est duplex. Unus, qui excedit +proportionem naturae creatae et facultatem, et hic finis est vita +aeterna, quae in divina visione consistit, quae est supra naturam +cuiuslibet creaturae, ut supra habitum est. Alius autem finis est +naturae creatae proportionatus, quem scilicet res creata potest +attingere secundum virtutem suae naturae. Ad illud autem ad quod +non potest aliquid virtute suae naturae pervenire, oportet quod ab +alio transmittatur; sicut sagitta a sagittante mittitur ad signum. +Unde, proprie loquendo, rationalis creatura, quae est capax vitae +aeternae, perducitur in ipsam quasi a Deo transmissa. Cuius quidem +transmissionis ratio in Deo praeexistit; sicut et in eo est ratio +ordinis omnium in finem, quam diximus esse providentiam. Ratio +autem alicuius fiendi in mente actoris existens, est quaedam +praeexistentia rei fiendae in eo. Unde ratio praedictae +transmissionis creaturae rationalis in finem vitae aeternae, +praedestinatio nominatur, nam destinare est mittere. Et sic patet +quod praedestinatio, quantum ad obiecta, est quaedam pars +providentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards + one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not + excluded by Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29401] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Damascenus nominat praedeterminationem impositionem +necessitatis; sicut est in rebus naturalibus, quae sunt +praedeterminatae ad unum. Quod patet ex eo quod subdit, <i>non enim +vult malitiam, neque compellit virtutem</i>. Unde praedestinatio +non excluditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly + said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29402] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod creaturae irrationales non sunt capaces illius finis +qui facultatem humanae naturae excedit. Unde non proprie dicuntur +praedestinari, etsi aliquando abusive praedestinatio nominetur +respectu cuiuscumque alterius finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take + its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of + making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the + notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of + misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown + previously ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html">Q[21], AA[3]</a>,4). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29403] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod praedestinari convenit Angelis, sicut et hominibus, +licet nunquam fuerint miseri. Nam motus non accipit speciem a +termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem, nihil enim refert, quantum ad +rationem dealbationis, utrum ille qui dealbatur, fuerit niger aut +pallidus vel rubeus. Et similiter nihil refert ad rationem +praedestinationis, utrum aliquis praedestinetur in vitam aeternam a +statu miseriae, vel non. Quamvis dici possit quod omnis collatio +boni supra debitum eius cui confertur, ad misericordiam pertineat, +ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to + everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29404] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, etiam si aliquibus ex speciali privilegio sua +praedestinatio reveletur, non tamen convenit ut reveletur omnibus, +quia sic illi qui non sunt praedestinati, desperarent; et securitas +in praedestinatis negligentiam pareret.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A2-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 2. Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore + predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29405] Iª q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio ponat aliquid in +praedestinato. Omnis enim actio ex se passionem infert. Si ergo +praedestinatio actio est in Deo, oportet quod praedestinatio passio +sit in praedestinatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.4" target="asv">Rom. 1:4</a>): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination + but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something + in the predestined. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29406] Iª q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Origenes dicit, super illud Rom. I, <i>qui praedestinatus est etc., +praedestinatio est eius qui non est, sed destinatio eius est qui +est</i>. Sed Augustinus dicit, in libro de praedestinatione +sanctorum, <i>quid est praedestinatio, nisi destinatio +alicuius?</i> Ergo praedestinatio non est nisi alicuius existentis. +Et ita ponit aliquid in praedestinato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine + says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29407] Iª q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praeparatio est aliquid in praeparato. Sed praedestinatio est +praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro de +Praedest. Sanct. Ergo praedestinatio est aliquid in +praedestinatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the + definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore + predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is + in Him is eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29408] Iª q. 23 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +temporale non ponitur in definitione aeterni. Sed gratia, quae est +aliquid temporale, ponitur in definitione praedestinationis, nam +praedestinatio dicitur esse <i>praeparatio gratiae in praesenti, et +gloriae in futuro</i>. Ergo praedestinatio non est aliquid +aeternum. Et ita oportet quod non sit in Deo, sed in +praedestinatis, nam quidquid est in Deo, est aeternum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge + is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, + and not in the predestined. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29409] Iª q. 23 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, quod praedestinatio est praescientia +beneficiorum Dei. Sed praescientia non est in praescitis, sed in +praesciente. Ergo nec praedestinatio est in praedestinatis, sed in +praedestinante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination + is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, + as was proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active + way in the governor. + Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing + in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The + execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 co."><a name="29410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29410] Iª q. 23 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod praedestinatio non est aliquid in praedestinatis, sed in +praedestinante tantum. Dictum est enim quod praedestinatio est +quaedam pars providentiae providentia autem non est in rebus +provisis; sed est quaedam ratio in intellectu provisoris, ut supra +dictum est. Sed executio providentiae, quae gubernatio dicitur, +passive quidem est in gubernatis; active autem est in gubernante. +Unde manifestum est quod praedestinatio est quaedam ratio ordinis +aliquorum in salutem aeternam, in mente divina existens. Executio +autem huius ordinis est passive quidem in praedestinatis; active +autem est in Deo. Est autem executio praedestinationis vocatio et +magnificatio, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. VIII, <i>quos +praedestinavit, hos et vocavit; et quos vocavit, hos et +magnificavit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but + not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">Q[18], A[3]</a>, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its + execution, which passes out to external things, has + an effect in them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29411] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod actiones in exteriorem materiam transeuntes, inferunt +ex se passionem, ut calefactio et secatio, non autem actiones in +agente manentes, ut sunt intelligere et velle, ut supra dictum est. +Et talis actio est praedestinatio. Unde praedestinatio non ponit +aliquid in praedestinato. Sed executio eius, quae transit in +exteriores res, ponit in eis aliquem effectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually + existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we + are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not + to do any unlawful things for the love of life" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.6.20" target="asv">2 Macc. + 6:20 + </a>). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it + implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29412] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod destinatio aliquando sumitur pro reali missione +alicuius ad aliquem terminum, et sic destinatio non est nisi eius +quod est. Alio modo sumitur destinatio pro missione quam aliquis +mente concipit, secundum quod dicimur destinare, quod mente +firmiter proponimus, et hoc secundo modo dicitur II Machab. cap. +VI, <i>Eleazarus destinavit non admittere illicita propter vitae +amorem</i>. Et sic destinatio potest esse eius quod non est. Tamen +praedestinatio, ratione antecessionis quam importat, potest esse +eius quod non est, qualitercumque destinatio sumatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action, + and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to + act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination, + conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29413] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod duplex est praeparatio. Quaedam patientis, ut +patiatur, et haec praeparatio est in praeparato. Quaedam alia est +agentis, ut agat, et haec est in agente. Et talis praeparatio est +praedestinatio; prout aliquod agens per intellectum dicitur se +praeparare ad agendum, inquantum praeconcipit rationem operis +fiendi. Et sic Deus ab aeterno praeparavit praedestinando, +concipiens rationem ordinis aliquorum in salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination + implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination + is anything temporal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29414] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod gratia non ponitur in definitione praedestinationis, +quasi aliquid existens de essentia eius, sed inquantum +praedestinatio importat respectum ad gratiam, ut causae ad +effectum, et actus ad obiectum. Unde non sequitur quod +praedestinatio sit aliquid temporale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A3-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 3. Whether God reprobates any man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29415] Iª q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet. Nullus enim +reprobat quem diligit. Sed Deus omnem hominem diligit, secundum +illud Sap. XI, <i>diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum +quae fecisti</i>. Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as + predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation + will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.9" target="asv">Osee 13:9</a>): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate + any man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29416] Iª q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si +Deus aliquem hominem reprobat, oportet quod sic se habeat +reprobatio ad reprobatos, sicut praedestinatio ad praedestinatos. +Sed praedestinatio est causa salutis praedestinatorum. Ergo +reprobatio erit causa perditionis reproborum. Hoc autem est falsum, +dicitur enim Osee XIII, <i>perditio tua, Israel, ex te est; +tantummodo ex me auxilium tuum</i>. Non ergo Deus aliquem +reprobat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For + it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.14" target="asv">Eccles. 7:14</a>): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, + were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29417] Iª q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nulli +debet imputari quod vitare non potest. Sed si Deus aliquem +reprobat, non potest vitare quin ipse pereat, dicitur enim Eccle. +VII, <i>considera opera Dei, quod nemo possit corrigere quem ipse +despexerit</i>. Ergo non esset hominibus imputandum quod pereunt. +Hoc autem est falsum. Non ergo Deus aliquem reprobat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.2" target="asv">Malachi 1:2,3</a>): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29418] Iª q. 23 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Malach. I, <i>Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio +habui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God does reprobate some. For it was said above + <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things + which are subject to providence, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit + some to fall away from that end; this is called + reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation + is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, + but also something more, as does providence, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit + a person to fall into + sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 co."><a name="29419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29419] Iª q. 23 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus aliquos reprobat. Dictum enim est supra quod +praedestinatio est pars providentiae. Ad providentiam autem +pertinet permittere aliquem defectum in rebus quae providentiae +subduntur, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum per divinam providentiam +homines in vitam aeternam ordinentur, pertinet etiam ad divinam +providentiam, ut permittat aliquos ab isto fine deficere. Et hoc +dicitur reprobare. Sic igitur, sicut praedestinatio est pars +providentiae respectu eorum qui divinitus ordinantur in aeternam +salutem; ita reprobatio est pars providentiae respectu illorum qui +ab hoc fine decidunt. Unde reprobatio non nominat praescientiam +tantum, sed aliquid addit secundum rationem, sicut et providentia, +ut supra dictum est. Sicut enim praedestinatio includit voluntatem +conferendi gratiam et gloriam, ita reprobatio includit voluntatem +permittendi aliquem cadere in culpam, et inferendi damnationis +poenam pro culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. + So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good---namely, eternal life---He is said to hate or reprobated them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29420] Iª q. 23 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Deus omnes homines diligit, et etiam omnes creaturas, +inquantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum, non tamen quodcumque bonum +vult omnibus. Inquantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum quod +est vita aeterna, dicitur eos habere odio, vel reprobare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future + life by the predestined---namely, glory---and of what is received in this life---namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not + the cause of what is in the present---namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of + what is assigned in the future---namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from + the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true---namely, + "Destruction is thy own, O Israel." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29421] Iª q. 23 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliter se habet reprobatio in causando, quam +praedestinatio. Nam praedestinatio est causa et eius quod +expectatur in futura vita a praedestinatis, scilicet gloriae; et +eius quod percipitur in praesenti, scilicet gratiae. Reprobatio +vero non est causa eius quod est in praesenti, scilicet culpae; sed +est causa derelictionis a Deo. Est tamen causa eius quod redditur +in futuro, scilicet poenae aeternae. Sed culpa provenit ex libero +arbitrio eius qui reprobatur et a gratia deseritur. Et secundum hoc +verificatur dictum prophetae, scilicet, <i>perditio tua, Israel, ex +te</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated + cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as + was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of + choice. Whence, although + anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the + use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29422] Iª q. 23 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod reprobatio Dei non subtrahit aliquid de potentia +reprobati. Unde, cum dicitur quod reprobatus non potest gratiam +adipisci, non est hoc intelligendum secundum impossibilitatem +absolutam, sed secundum impossibilitatem conditionatam, sicut supra +dictum est quod praedestinatum necesse est salvari, necessitate +conditionata, quae non tollit libertatem arbitrii. Unde, licet +aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur a Deo, tamen +quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur, ex eius libero arbitrio +contingit. Unde et merito sibi imputatur in culpam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A4-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 4. Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends + his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial + manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and + this belongs to predestination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29423] Iª q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinati non eligantur a Deo. Dicit +enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod, sicut sol corporeus non +eligendo omnibus corporibus lumen immittit, ita et Deus suam +bonitatem. Sed bonitas divina communicatur praecipue aliquibus +secundum participationem gratiae et gloriae. Ergo Deus absque +electione gratiam et gloriam communicat. Quod ad praedestinationem +pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, + some are predestined without election. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29424] Iª q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +electio est eorum quae sunt. Sed praedestinatio ab aeterno est +etiam eorum quae non sunt. Ergo praedestinantur aliqui absque +electione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29425] Iª q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +electio quandam discretionem importat. <i>Sed Deus vult omnes +homines salvos fieri</i>, ut dicitur I Tim. II. Ergo +praedestinatio, quae praeordinat homines in salutem, est absque +electione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.4" target="asv">Eph. 1:4</a>): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29426] Iª q. 23 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Ephes. I, <i>elegit nos in ipso ante mundi +constitutionem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, + as stated above + <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering + of some things towards an end; as was proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end + already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills + their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal + salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above + + <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not + cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election + in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the + cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love + precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of + election and love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 co."><a name="29427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29427] Iª q. 23 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod praedestinatio, secundum rationem, praesupponit electionem; et +electio dilectionem. Cuius ratio est, quia praedestinatio, ut +dictum est, est pars providentiae. Providentia autem, sicut et +prudentia, est ratio in intellectu existens, praeceptiva +ordinationis aliquorum in finem, ut supra dictum est. Non autem +praecipitur aliquid ordinandum in finem, nisi praeexistente +voluntate finis. Unde praedestinatio aliquorum in salutem aeternam, +praesupponit, secundum rationem, quod Deus illorum velit salutem. +Ad quod pertinet electio et dilectio. Dilectio quidem, inquantum +vult eis hoc bonum salutis aeternae, nam diligere est velle alicui +bonum, ut supra dictum est. Electio autem, inquantum hoc bonum +aliquibus prae aliis vult, cum quosdam reprobet, ut supra dictum +est. Electio tamen et dilectio aliter ordinantur in nobis et in +Deo, eo quod in nobis voluntas diligendo non causat bonum; sed ex +bono praeexistente incitamur ad diligendum. Et ideo eligimus +aliquem, quem diligamus, et sic electio dilectionem praecedit in +nobis. In Deo autem est e converso. Nam voluntas eius, qua vult +bonum alicui diligendo, est causa quod illud bonum ab eo prae aliis +habeatur. Et sic patet quod dilectio praesupponitur electioni, +secundum rationem; et electio praedestinationi. Unde omnes +praedestinati sunt electi et dilecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch + as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives + certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the + conferring of grace and glory election is implied. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29428] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, si consideretur communicatio bonitatis divinae in +communi, absque electione bonitatem suam communicat; inquantum +scilicet nihil est, quod non participet aliquid de bonitate eius, +ut supra dictum est. Sed si consideretur communicatio istius vel +illius boni, non absque electione tribuit, quia quaedam bona dat +aliquibus, quae non dat aliis. Et sic in collatione gratiae et +gloriae attenditur electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the + choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above + ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], A[2]</a>). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His + choice." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29429] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quando voluntas eligentis provocatur ad eligendum a +bono in re praeexistente, tunc oportet quod electio sit eorum quae +sunt; sicut accidit in electione nostra. Sed in Deo est aliter, ut +dictum est. Et ideo, sicut dicit Augustinus, <i>eliguntur a Deo qui +non sunt, neque tamen errat qui eligit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent + will, which is to will simply. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29430] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus vult omnes homines +salvos fieri antecedenter, quod non est simpliciter velle, sed +secundum quid, non autem consequenter, quod est simpliciter +velle.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A5-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 5. Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv">Rom. 8:29</a>): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.15" target="asv"> Rom. 9:15</a>: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his + whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29431] Iª q. 23 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod praescientia meritorum sit causa +praedestinationis. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VIII, <i>quos +praescivit, hos et praedestinavit</i>. Et Glossa Ambrosii, super +illud Rom. IX, <i>miserebor cui miserebor</i> etc., dicit, +<i>misericordiam illi dabo, quem praescio toto corde reversurum ad +me</i>. Ergo videtur quod praescientia meritorum sit causa +praedestinationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the + purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than + the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29432] Iª q. 23 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +praedestinatio divina includit divinam voluntatem, quae +irrationabilis esse non potest, cum praedestinatio sit propositum +miserendi, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed nulla alia ratio potest esse +praedestinationis nisi praescientia meritorum. Ergo praescientia +meritorum est causa vel ratio praedestinationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "There is no injustice in God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.14" target="asv">Rom. 9:14</a>). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original + sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things + for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29433] Iª q. 23 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +<i>non est iniquitas apud Deum</i>, ut dicitur Rom. IX. Iniquum +autem esse videtur, ut aequalibus inaequalia dentur. Omnes autem +homines sunt aequales et secundum naturam, et secundum peccatum +originale, attenditur autem in eis inaequalitas secundum merita vel +demerita propriorum actuum. Non igitur inaequalia praeparat Deus +hominibus, praedestinando et reprobando, nisi propter differentium +meritorum praescientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.3.5" target="asv">Titus 3:5</a>): "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He saved us, so He predestined + that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29434] Iª q. 23 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit apostolus, ad Tit. III, <i>non ex operibus iustitiae, +quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos +fecit</i>. Sicut autem salvos nos fecit, ita et praedestinavit nos +salvos fieri. Non ergo praescientia meritorum est causa vel ratio +praedestinationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since predestination includes will, as was said above + <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above + ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], A[5]</a> ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the + part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. + Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. + But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether + God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits. + </p><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p7"> Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing + merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, + and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. + The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.11" target="asv">Rom. 9:11,12</a>): "For when they were + not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall + serve the younger." + </p><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p8"> Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians + taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect + of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other + did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:5</a>), that "we are not + sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act + of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination. + </p><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p9"> And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand + that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good + use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these + seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as + if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and + this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, + if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction + between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a + secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, + as was above shown ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination + may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination + should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent + effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent + as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give + glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination + may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have + any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect + of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to + the prophet Jeremias ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Lam.5.21" target="asv">Lam. 5:21</a>): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, + the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of + predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 co."><a name="29435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29435] Iª q. 23 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum praedestinatio includat voluntatem, ut supra dictum est, +sic inquirenda est ratio praedestinationis, sicut inquiritur ratio +divinae voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra quod non est assignare +causam divinae voluntatis ex parte actus volendi; sed potest +assignari ratio ex parte volitorum, inquantum scilicet Deus vult +esse aliquid propter aliud. Nullus ergo fuit ita insanae mentis, +qui diceret merita esse causam divinae praedestinationis, ex parte +actus praedestinantis. Sed hoc sub quaestione vertitur, utrum ex +parte effectus, praedestinatio habeat aliquam causam. Et hoc est +quaerere, utrum Deus praeordinaverit se daturum effectum +praedestinationis alicui, propter merita aliqua. Fuerunt igitur +quidam, qui dixerunt quod effectus praedestinationis praeordinatur +alicui propter merita praeexistentia in alia vita. Et haec fuit +positio Origenis, qui posuit animas humanas ab initio creatas, et +secundum diversitatem suorum operum, diversos status eas sortiri in +hoc mundo corporibus unitas. Sed hanc opinionem excludit apostolus, +Rom. IX, dicens, <i>cum nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid egissent +boni vel mali, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est, quia +maior serviet minori</i>. Fuerunt ergo alii, qui dixerunt quod +merita praeexistentia in hac vita sunt ratio et causa effectus +praedestinationis. Posuerunt enim Pelagiani quod initium +benefaciendi sit ex nobis, consummatio autem a Deo. Et sic, ex hoc +contingit quod alicui datur praedestinationis effectus, et non +alteri, quia unus initium dedit se praeparando, et non alius. Sed +contra hoc est quod dicit apostolus, II Cor. III, quod <i>non sumus +sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis</i>. Nullum +autem anterius principium inveniri potest quam cogitatio. Unde non +potest dici quod aliquod in nobis initium existat, quod sit ratio +effectus praedestinationis. Unde fuerunt alii, qui dixerunt quod +merita sequentia praedestinationis effectum, sunt ratio +praedestinationis, ut intelligatur quod ideo Deus dat gratiam +alicui, et praeordinavit se ei daturum, quia praescivit eum bene +usurum gratia; sicut si rex det alicui militi equum, quem scit eo +bene usurum. Sed isti videntur distinxisse inter id quod est ex +gratia, et id quod est ex libero arbitrio, quasi non possit esse +idem ex utroque. Manifestum est autem quod id quod est gratiae, est +praedestinationis effectus, et hoc non potest poni ut ratio +praedestinationis, cum hoc sub praedestinatione concludatur. Si +igitur aliquid aliud ex parte nostra sit ratio praedestinationis, +hoc erit praeter effectum praedestinationis. Non est autem +distinctum quod est ex libero arbitrio, et ex praedestinatione; +sicut nec est distinctum quod est ex causa secunda, et causa prima, +divina enim providentia producit effectus per operationes causarum +secundarum, ut supra dictum est. Unde et id quod est per liberum +arbitrium, est ex praedestinatione. Dicendum est ergo quod effectum +praedestinationis considerare possumus dupliciter. Uno modo, in +particulari. Et sic nihil prohibet aliquem effectum +praedestinationis esse causam et rationem alterius, posteriorem +quidem prioris, secundum rationem causae finalis; priorem vero +posterioris, secundum rationem causae meritoriae, quae reducitur ad +dispositionem materiae. Sicut si dicamus quod Deus praeordinavit se +daturum alicui gloriam ex meritis; et quod praeordinavit se daturum +alicui gratiam, ut mereretur gloriam. Alio modo potest considerari +praedestinationis effectus in communi. Et sic impossibile est quod +totus praedestinationis effectus in communi habeat aliquam causam +ex parte nostra. Quia quidquid est in homine ordinans ipsum in +salutem, comprehenditur totum sub effectu praedestinationis, etiam +ipsa praeparatio ad gratiam, neque enim hoc fit nisi per auxilium +divinum, secundum illud Thren. ultimi, <i>converte nos, domine, ad +te, et convertemur</i>. Habet tamen hoc modo praedestinatio, ex +parte effectus, pro ratione divinam bonitatem; ad quam totus +effectus praedestinationis ordinatur ut in finem, et ex qua +procedit sicut ex principio primo movente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was + explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29436] Iª q. 23 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod usus gratiae praescitus, non est ratio collationis +gratiae, nisi secundum rationem causae finalis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular + effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29437] Iª q. 23 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praedestinatio habet rationem ex parte effectus, in +communi, ipsam divinam bonitatem. In particulari autem, unus +effectus est ratio alterius, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He + is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is + necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because + creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that + for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low + place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good + things should never happen, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness + in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, + by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing + them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.22" target="asv">Rom. 9:22,23</a>): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that + is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His + glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.3" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.20" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:20</a>): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto + honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine + will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou + dost not wish to err." + Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it + was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity + of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, + depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of + the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. + Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This + would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. + In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody + of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy + way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.14" target="asv">Mat. 20:14,15</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29438] Iª q. 23 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex ipsa bonitate divina ratio sumi potest +praedestinationis aliquorum, et reprobationis aliorum. Sic enim +Deus dicitur omnia propter suam bonitatem fecisse, ut in rebus +divina bonitas repraesentetur. Necesse est autem quod divina +bonitas, quae in se est una et simplex, multiformiter +repraesentetur in rebus; propter hoc quod res creatae ad +simplicitatem divinam attingere non possunt. Et inde est quod ad +completionem universi requiruntur diversi gradus rerum, quarum +quaedam altum, et quaedam infimum locum teneant in universo. Et ut +multiformitas graduum conservetur in rebus, Deus permittit aliqua +mala fieri, ne multa bona impediantur, ut supra dictum est. Sic +igitur consideremus totum genus humanum, sicut totam rerum +universitatem. Voluit igitur Deus in hominibus, quantum ad aliquos, +quos praedestinat, suam repraesentare bonitatem per modum +misericordiae, parcendo; et quantum ad aliquos, quos reprobat, per +modum iustitiae, puniendo. Et haec est ratio quare Deus quosdam +eligit, et quosdam reprobat. Et hanc causam assignat apostolus, ad +Rom. IX, dicens, volens Deus ostendere iram (idest vindictam +iustitiae), et notam facere potentiam suam, sustinuit (idest +permisit) <i>in multa patientia, vasa irae apta in interitum, ut +ostenderet divitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae, quae +praeparavit in gloriam</i>. Et II Tim. II dicit, <i>in magna autem +domo non solum sunt vasa aurea et argentea, sed etiam lignea et +fictilia; et quaedam quidem in honorem, quaedam in contumeliam</i>. +Sed quare hos elegit in gloriam, et illos reprobavit, non habet +rationem nisi divinam voluntatem. Unde Augustinus dicit, super +Ioannem, <i>quare hunc trahat, et illum non trahat, noli velle +diiudicare, si non vis errare</i>. Sicut etiam in rebus naturalibus +potest assignari ratio, cum prima materia tota sit in se uniformis, +quare una pars eius est sub forma ignis, et alia sub forma terrae, +a Deo in principio condita, ut scilicet sit diversitas specierum in +rebus naturalibus. Sed quare haec pars materiae est sub ista forma, +et illa sub alia, dependet ex simplici divina voluntate. Sicut ex +simplici voluntate artificis dependet, quod ille lapis est in ista +parte parietis, et ille in alia, quamvis ratio artis habeat quod +aliqui sint in hac, et aliqui sint in illa. Neque tamen propter hoc +est iniquitas apud Deum, si inaequalia non inaequalibus praeparat. +Hoc enim esset contra iustitiae rationem, si praedestinationis +effectus ex debito redderetur, et non daretur ex gratia. In his +enim quae ex gratia dantur, potest aliquis pro libito suo dare cui +vult, plus vel minus, dummodo nulli subtrahat debitum, absque +praeiudicio iustitiae. Et hoc est quod dicit paterfamilias, Matt. +XX, <i>tolle quod tuum est, et vade. An non licet mihi quod volo, +facere?</i></p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A6-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 6. Whether predestination is certain?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown," + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.11" target="asv">Rev 3:11</a>), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which + is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29439] Iª q. 23 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio non sit certa. Quia super +illud Apoc. III, <i>tene quod habes, ne alius accipiat coronam +tuam</i>, dicit Augustinus, quod <i>alius non est accepturus, nisi +iste perdiderit</i>. Potest ergo et acquiri et perdi corona, quae +est praedestinationis effectus. Non est igitur praedestinatio +certa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e.g. Peter---may + sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, + is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29440] Iª q. 23 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +posito possibili, nullum sequitur impossibile. Possibile est autem +aliquem praedestinatum, ut Petrum, peccare, et tunc occidi. Hoc +autem posito, sequitur praedestinationis effectum frustrari. Hoc +igitur non est impossibile. Non ergo est praedestinatio certa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore + now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="29441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29441] Iª q. 23 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid Deus potuit, potest. Sed potuit non praedestinare quem +praedestinavit. Ergo nunc potest non praedestinare. Ergo +praedestinatio non est certa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv"> Rom. 8:29</a>: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of + God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29442] Iª q. 23 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod super illud Rom. VIII, <i>quos praescivit, et +praedestinavit</i> etc., dicit Glossa, <i>praedestinatio est +praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, qua certissime +liberantur quicumque liberantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect + should take place from necessity. For it was said above + <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening + from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. + Yet + the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html">Q[22], A[4]</a>). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has + its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">Q[14], A[13]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are + most certain and infallible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 co."><a name="29443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29443] Iª q. 23 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod praedestinatio certissime et infallibiliter consequitur suum +effectum, nec tamen imponit necessitatem, ut scilicet effectus eius +ex necessitate proveniat. Dictum est enim supra quod praedestinatio +est pars providentiae. Sed non omnia quae providentiae subduntur, +necessaria sunt, sed quaedam contingenter eveniunt, secundum +conditionem causarum proximarum, quas ad tales effectus divina +providentia ordinavit. Et tamen providentiae ordo est infallibilis, +ut supra ostensum est. Sic igitur et ordo praedestinationis est +certus; et tamen libertas arbitrii non tollitur, ex qua +contingenter provenit praedestinationis effectus. Ad hoc etiam +consideranda sunt quae supra dicta sunt de divina scientia et de +divina voluntate, quae contingentiam a rebus non tollunt, licet +certissima et infallibilia sint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown: + secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal + sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to + fall, without raising others; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.24" target="asv"> Job 34:24</a>: "He shall + break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the + fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives + the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice + at all good whether done by himself or by others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29444] Iª q. 23 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod corona dicitur esse alicuius, dupliciter. Uno modo, +ex praedestinatione divina, et sic nullus coronam suam amittit. +Alio modo, ex merito gratiae, quod enim meremur, quodammodo nostrum +est. Et sic suam coronam aliquis amittere potest per peccatum +mortale sequens. Alius autem illam coronam amissam accipit, +inquantum loco eius subrogatur. Non enim permittit Deus aliquos +cadere, quin alios erigat, secundum illud Iob XXXIV, <i>conteret +multos et innumerabiles, et stare faciet alios pro eis</i>. Sic +enim in locum Angelorum cadentium substituti sunt homines; et in +locum Iudaeorum, gentiles. Substitutus autem in statum gratiae, +etiam quantum ad hoc coronam cadentis accipit, quod de bonis quae +alius fecit, in aeterna vita gaudebit, in qua unusquisque gaudebit +de bonis tam a se quam ab aliis factis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible, + supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short + of its effect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29445] Iª q. 23 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, licet sit possibile eum qui est praedestinatus, mori +in peccato mortali, secundum se consideratum; tamen hoc est +impossibile, posito (prout scilicet ponitur) eum esse +praedestinatum. Unde non sequitur quod praedestinatio falli +possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above + <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>: and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability + of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to + say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, + thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29446] Iª q. 23 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, cum praedestinatio includat divinam voluntatem, +sicut supra dictum est quod Deum velle aliquid creatum est +necessarium ex suppositione, propter immutabilitatem divinae +voluntatis, non tamen absolute; ita dicendum est hic de +praedestinatione. Unde non oportet dicere quod Deus possit non +praedestinare quem praedestinavit, in sensu composito accipiendo; +licet, absolute considerando, Deus possit praedestinare vel non +praedestinare. Sed ex hoc non tollitur praedestinationis +certitudo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A7-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 7. Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain. + But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.11" target="asv">Dt. 1:11</a>): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him." + Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29447] Iª q. 23 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod numerus praedestinatorum non sit certus. +Numerus enim cui potest fieri additio, non est certus. Sed numero +praedestinatorum potest fieri additio, ut videtur, dicitur enim +Deut. I, <i>dominus Deus noster addat ad hunc numerum multa +millia</i>; Glossa, <i>idest definitum apud Deum, qui novit qui +sunt eius</i>. Ergo numerus praedestinatorum non est certus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged + by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by God cannot be certain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29448] Iª q. 23 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, non +potest assignari ratio quare magis in hoc numero quam in alio, Deus +homines praeordinet ad salutem. Sed nihil a Deo sine ratione +disponitur. Ergo non est certus numerus salvandorum praeordinatus a +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority + of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there + would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.13" target="asv"> Mat. 7:13,14</a>: "For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow + is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number of those pre-ordained + by God to be saved is not certain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29449] Iª q. 23 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +operatio Dei est perfectior quam operatio naturae. Sed in operibus +naturae bonum invenitur ut in pluribus, defectus autem et malum ut +in paucioribus. Si igitur a Deo institueretur numerus salvandorum, +plures essent salvandi quam damnandi. Cuius contrarium ostenditur +Matt. VII, ubi dicitur, <i>lata et spatiosa est via quae ducit ad +perditionem, et multi sunt qui intrant per eam, angusta est porta, +et arcta via, quae ducit ad vitam, et pauci sunt qui inveniunt +eam</i>. Non ergo est praeordinatus a Deo numerus salvandorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29450] Iª q. 23 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de correptione et gratia, <i>certus +est praedestinatorum numerus, qui neque augeri potest, neque +minui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were + to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys + the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above + <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It + must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge, + because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the + sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must + remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the + infinite ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which + are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally, + but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such + numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder + thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; + and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and + uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in + regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and + what + number would befit the essential parts of that universe---that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; + how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, + are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species + is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such + like, is not pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation + of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such + incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. + Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal + pre-ordination. + </p><p id="FP_Q23_A7-p7"> It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for + the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as + there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God + alone is + known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']" + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 co."><a name="29451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29451] Iª q. 23 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod numerus praedestinatorum est certus. Sed quidam dixerunt eum +esse certum formaliter, sed non materialiter, ut puta si diceremus +certum esse quod centum vel mille salventur, non autem quod hi vel +illi. Sed hoc tollit certitudinem praedestinationis, de qua iam +diximus. Et ideo oportet dicere quod numerus praedestinatorum sit +certus Deo non solum formaliter, sed etiam materialiter. Sed +advertendum est quod numerus praedestinatorum certus Deo dicitur, +non solum ratione cognitionis, quia scilicet scit quot sunt +salvandi (sic enim Deo certus est etiam numerus guttarum pluviae, +et arenae maris); sed ratione electionis et definitionis cuiusdam. +Ad cuius evidentiam, est sciendum quod omne agens intendit facere +aliquid finitum, ut ex supradictis de infinito apparet. Quicumque +autem intendit aliquam determinatam mensuram in suo effectu, +excogitat aliquem numerum in partibus essentialibus eius, quae per +se requiruntur ad perfectionem totius. Non enim per se eligit +aliquem numerum in his quae non principaliter requiruntur, sed +solum propter aliud, sed in tanto numero accipit huiusmodi, +inquantum sunt necessaria propter aliud. Sicut aedificator +excogitat determinatam mensuram domus, et etiam determinatum +numerum mansionum quas vult facere in domo, et determinatum numerum +mensurarum parietis vel tecti, non autem eligit determinatum +numerum lapidum, sed accipit tot, quot sufficiunt ad explendam +tantam mensuram parietis. Sic igitur considerandum est in Deo, +respectu totius universitatis quae est eius effectus. Praeordinavit +enim in qua mensura deberet esse totum universum, et quis numerus +esset conveniens essentialibus partibus universi, quae scilicet +habent aliquo modo ordinem ad perpetuitatem; quot scilicet +sphaerae, quot stellae, quot elementa, quot species rerum. +Individua vero corruptibilia non ordinantur ad bonum universi quasi +principaliter, sed quasi secundario, inquantum in eis salvatur +bonum speciei. Unde, licet Deus sciat numerum omnium individuorum, +non tamen numerus vel boum vel culicum, vel aliorum huiusmodi, est +per se praeordinatus a Deo, sed tot ex huiusmodi divina providentia +produxit, quot sufficiunt ad specierum conservationem. Inter omnes +autem creaturas, principalius ordinantur ad bonum universi +creaturae rationales, quae, inquantum huiusmodi, incorruptibiles +sunt; et potissime illae quae beatitudinem consequuntur, quae +immediatius attingunt ultimum finem. Unde certus est Deo numerus +praedestinatorum, non solum per modum cognitionis, sed etiam per +modum cuiusdam principalis praefinitionis. Non sic autem omnino est +de numero reproborum; qui videntur esse praeordinati a Deo in bonum +electorum, quibus omnia cooperantur in bonum. De numero autem +omnium praedestinatorum hominum, quis sit, dicunt quidam quod tot +ex hominibus salvabuntur, quot Angeli ceciderunt. Quidam vero, quod +tot salvabuntur, quot Angeli remanserunt. Quidam vero, quod tot ex +hominibus salvabuntur, quot Angeli ceciderunt, et insuper tot, quot +fuerunt Angeli creati. Sed melius dicitur quod <i>soli Deo est +cognitus numerus electorum in superna felicitate locandus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness. + For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29452] Iª q. 23 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod verbum illud Deuteronomii est intelligendum de illis +qui sunt praenotati a Deo respectu praesentis iustitiae. Horum enim +numerus et augetur et minuitur, et non numerus +praedestinatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the + reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion + of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29453] Iª q. 23 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio quantitatis alicuius partis, accipienda est ex +proportione illius partis ad totum. Sic enim est apud Deum ratio +quare tot stellas fecerit, vel tot rerum species, et quare tot +praedestinavit, ex proportione partium principalium ad bonum +universi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. + The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is + clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge + are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge + of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the + vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption + of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has + chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall + short. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29454] Iª q. 23 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod bonum proportionatum communi statui naturae, accidit +ut in pluribus; et defectus ab hoc bono, ut in paucioribus. Sed +bonum quod excedit communem statum naturae, invenitur ut in +paucioribus; et defectus ab hoc bono, ut in pluribus. Sicut patet +quod plures homines sunt qui habent sufficientem scientiam ad +regimen vitae suae, pauciores autem qui hac scientia carent, qui +moriones vel stulti dicuntur, sed paucissimi sunt, respectu +aliorum, qui attingunt ad habendam profundam scientiam +intelligibilium rerum. Cum igitur beatitudo aeterna, in visione Dei +consistens, excedat communem statum naturae, et praecipue secundum +quod est gratia destituta per corruptionem originalis peccati, +pauciores sunt qui salvantur. Et in hoc etiam maxime misericordia +Dei apparet, quod aliquos in illam salutem erigit, a qua plurimi +deficiunt secundum communem cursum et inclinationem naturae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A8-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 8. Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything + temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. + Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination + therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29455] Iª q. 23 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio non possit iuvari precibus +sanctorum. Nullum enim aeternum praeceditur ab aliquo temporali, et +per consequens non potest temporale iuvare ad hoc quod aliquod +aeternum sit. Sed praedestinatio est aeterna. Cum igitur preces +sanctorum sint temporales, non possunt iuvare ad hoc quod aliquis +praedestinetur. Non ergo praedestinatio iuvatur precibus +sanctorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through + defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the + Spirit of the Lord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been His counsellor?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.34" target="asv">Rom. 11:34</a>). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29456] Iª q. 23 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +nihil indiget consilio nisi propter defectum cognitionis, ita nihil +indiget auxilio nisi propter defectum virtutis. Sed neutrum horum +competit Deo praedestinanti, unde dicitur Rom. XI, <i>quis adiuvit +spiritum domini? Aut quis consiliarius eius fuit?</i> Ergo +praedestinatio non iuvatur precibus sanctorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore + it cannot be furthered by anything. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29457] Iª q. 23 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +eiusdem est adiuvari et impediri. Sed praedestinatio non potest +aliquo impediri. Ergo non potest aliquo iuvari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.25.21" target="asv">Gn. 25:21</a>). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had + never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29458] Iª q. 23 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Genes. XXV, quod <i>Isaac rogavit Deum pro Rebecca +uxore sua, et dedit conceptum Rebeccae</i>. Ex illo autem conceptu +natus est Iacob, qui praedestinatus fuit. Non autem fuisset impleta +praedestinatio, si natus non fuisset. Ergo praedestinatio iuvatur +precibus sanctorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that + prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the + predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings + of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works. + </p><p id="FP_Q23_A8-p7"> Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, + who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against + this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved + to repentance" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.15.29" target="asv">1 Kings 15:29</a>); and that "the gifts and the calling of God are + without repentance" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.29" target="asv">Rom. 11:29</a>). + </p><p id="FP_Q23_A8-p8"> Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and + its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it + is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped + by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does + not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. + So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects, + without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever + helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of + another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must + strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason + it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.10" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:10</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 co."><a name="29459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29459] Iª q. 23 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod circa hanc quaestionem diversi errores fuerunt. Quidam enim, +attendentes certitudinem divinae praedestinationis, dixerunt +superfluas esse orationes, vel quidquid aliud fiat ad salutem +aeternam consequendam, quia his factis vel non factis, +praedestinati consequuntur, reprobati non consequuntur. Sed contra +hoc sunt omnes admonitiones sacrae Scripturae, exhortantes ad +orationem, et ad alia bona opera. Alii vero dixerunt quod per +orationes mutatur divina praedestinatio. Et haec dicitur fuisse +opinio Aegyptiorum, qui ponebant ordinationem divinam, quam fatum +appellabant, aliquibus sacrificiis et orationibus impediri posse. +Sed contra hoc etiam est auctoritas sacrae Scripturae. Dicitur enim +I Reg. XV, porro <i>triumphator in Israel non parcet, neque +poenitudine flectetur</i>. Et Rom. XI dicitur quod <i>sine +poenitentia sunt dona Dei et vocatio</i>. Et ideo aliter dicendum, +quod in praedestinatione duo sunt consideranda, scilicet ipsa +praeordinatio divina, et effectus eius. Quantum igitur ad primum, +nullo modo praedestinatio iuvatur precibus sanctorum, non enim +precibus sanctorum fit, quod aliquis praedestinetur a Deo. Quantum +vero ad secundum, dicitur praedestinatio iuvari precibus sanctorum, +et aliis bonis operibus, quia providentia, cuius praedestinatio est +pars, non subtrahit causas secundas, sed sic providet effectus, ut +etiam ordo causarum secundarum subiaceat providentiae. Sicut igitur +sic providentur naturales effectus, ut etiam causae naturales ad +illos naturales effectus ordinentur, sine quibus illi effectus non +provenirent; ita praedestinatur a Deo salus alicuius, ut etiam sub +ordine praedestinationis cadat quidquid hominem promovet in +salutem, vel orationes propriae, vel aliorum, vel alia bona, vel +quidquid huiusmodi, sine quibus aliquis salutem non consequitur. +Unde praedestinatis conandum est ad bene operandum et orandum, quia +per huiusmodi praedestinationis effectus certitudinaliter impletur. +Propter quod dicitur II Petr. I, <i>satagite, ut per bona opera +certam vestram vocationem et electionem faciatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29460] Iª q. 23 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ratio illa ostendit quod praedestinatio non iuvatur +precibus sanctorum, quantum ad ipsam praeordinationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus + belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" + In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In + this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to + + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:9</a>: "We are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary + causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures + the dignity of causality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29461] Iª q. 23 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquis dicitur adiuvari per alium, dupliciter. Uno +modo, inquantum ab eo accipit virtutem, et sic adiuvari infirmi +est, unde Deo non competit. Et sic intelligitur illud, <i>quis +adiuvit spiritum domini?</i> Alio modo dicitur quis adiuvari per +aliquem, per quem exequitur suam operationem, sicut dominus per +ministrum. Et hoc modo Deus adiuvatur per nos, inquantum exequimur +suam ordinationem, secundum illud I ad Cor. III, <i>Dei enim +adiutores sumus</i>. Neque hoc est propter defectum divinae +virtutis, sed quia utitur causis mediis, ut ordinis pulchritudo +servetur in rebus, et ut etiam creaturis dignitatem causalitatis +communicet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A8-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html">Q[19], A[6]</a>), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by + them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29462] Iª q. 23 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod secundae causae non possunt egredi ordinem causae +primae universalis, ut supra dictum est; sed ipsum exequuntur. Et +ideo praedestinatio per creaturas potest adiuvari, sed non +impediri.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q24" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q24-p0.1">Q. 24. THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q24-p2"> We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q24-p3"> (1) What is the book of life?</p><p id="FP_Q24-p4"> (2) Of what life is it the book?</p><p id="FP_Q24-p5"> (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 pr."><a name="29463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29463] +Iª q. 24 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de libro +vitae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, quid sit liber vitae. +Secundo, cuius vitae sit liber. Tertio, utrum aliquis possit deleri +de libro vitae.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q24_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q24_A1-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 1. Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.4.32" target="asv">Ecclus. 4:32</a>)---i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life + is not predestination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29464] Iª q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod liber vitae non sit idem quod +praedestinatio. Dicitur enim Eccli. XXIV, <i>haec omnia liber +vitae</i>; Glossa, <i>idest novum et vetus testamentum</i>. Hoc +autem non est praedestinatio. Ergo liber vitae non est idem quod +praedestinatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that + to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but + rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29465] Iª q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, in libro XX de Civ. Dei, ait quod liber vitae est +quaedam vis divina, qua fiet <i>ut cuique opera sua bona vel mala +in memoriam reducantur</i>. Sed vis divina non videtur pertinere ad +praedestinationem, sed magis ad attributum potentiae. Ergo liber +vitae non est idem quod praedestinatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the book of life were the same as predestination, there should + also be a book of death, as there is a book of life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29466] Iª q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praedestinationi opponitur reprobatio. Si igitur liber vitae esset +praedestinatio, inveniretur liber mortis, sicut liber vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in a gloss upon + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.29" target="asv"> Ps. 68:29, </a> "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life + those whom He foreknew." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29467] Iª q. 24 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Glossa, super illud Psalmi LXVIII, <i>deleantur de +libro viventium, liber iste est notitia Dei, qua praedestinavit ad +vitam, quos praescivit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among + men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who + formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding ( + <a id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, + of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it + is firmly held in the memory, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.3" target="asv"> Prov. 3:3</a>: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For + things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that + He has predestined some to eternal life, is called + the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him + of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iiTim.11.19" target="asv">2 Tim. 11:19</a>: "The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 co."><a name="29468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29468] Iª q. 24 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod liber vitae in Deo dicitur metaphorice, secundum similitudinem +a rebus humanis acceptam. Est enim consuetum apud homines, quod +illi qui ad aliquid eliguntur, conscribuntur in libro; utpote +milites vel consiliarii, qui olim dicebantur patres conscripti. +Patet autem ex praemissis quod omnes praedestinati eliguntur a Deo +ad habendum vitam aeternam. Ipsa ergo praedestinatorum conscriptio +dicitur liber vitae. Dicitur autem metaphorice aliquid conscriptum +in intellectu alicuius, quod firmiter in memoria tenet, secundum +illud Prov. III, <i>ne obliviscaris legis meae, et praecepta mea +cor tuum custodiat</i>; et post pauca sequitur, <i>describe illa in +tabulis cordis tui</i>. Nam et in libris materialibus aliquid +conscribitur ad succurrendum memoriae. Unde ipsa Dei notitia, qua +firmiter retinet se aliquos praedestinasse ad vitam aeternam, +dicitur liber vitae. Nam sicut Scriptura libri est signum eorum +quae fienda sunt ita Dei notitia est quoddam signum apud ipsum, +eorum qui sunt perducendi ad vitam aeternam; secundum illud II Tim. +II, <i>firmum fundamentum Dei stat, habens signaculum hoc, novit +dominus qui sunt eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we + now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book + of life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of + life; or of things already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens + that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the + book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare, + or relates the deeds of soldiers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29469] Iª q. 24 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod liber vitae potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo, +conscriptio eorum qui sunt electi ad vitam, et sic loquimur nunc de +libro vitae. Alio modo potest dici liber vitae, conscriptio eorum +quae ducunt in vitam. Et hoc dupliciter. Vel sicut agendorum, et +sic novum et vetus testamentum dicitur liber vitae. Vel sicut iam +factorum, et sic illa vis divina, qua fiet ut cuilibet in memoriam +reducantur facta sua, dicitur liber vitae. Sicut etiam liber +militiae potest dici, vel in quo scribuntur electi ad militiam, vel +in quo traditur ars militaris, vel in quo recitantur facta +militum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p8"> Hence the solution of the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29470] Iª q. 24 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet solutio +ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding + to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29471] Iª q. 24 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non est consuetum conscribi eos qui repudiantur, sed +eos qui eliguntur. Unde reprobationi non respondet liber mortis, +sicut praedestinationi liber vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of predestination; + as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29472] Iª q. 24 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod secundum rationem differt liber vitae a +praedestinatione. Importat enim notitiam praedestinationis, sicut +etiam ex Glossa inducta apparet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q24_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q24_A2-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 2. Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge + of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine + life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29473] Iª q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod liber vitae non sit solum respectu vitae +gloriae praedestinatorum. Liber enim vitae est notitia vitae. Sed +Deus per vitam suam cognoscit omnem aliam vitam. Ergo liber vitae +praecipue dicitur respectu vitae divinae; et non solum respectu +vitae praedestinatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of + glory is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29474] Iª q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +vita gloriae est a Deo, ita vita naturae. Si igitur notitia vitae +gloriae dicitur liber vitae, etiam notitia vitae naturae dicetur +liber vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: + "Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.71" target="asv">Jn. 6:71</a>). But the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the + life of grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29475] Iª q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +aliqui eliguntur ad gratiam, qui non eliguntur ad vitam gloriae; ut +patet per id quod dicitur Ioan. VI, <i>nonne duodecim vos elegi, et +unus ex vobis Diabolus est?</i> Sed liber vitae est conscriptio +electionis divinae, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam est respectu vitae +gratiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined + who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29476] Iª q. 24 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod liber vitae est notitia praedestinationis, ut dictum est. Sed +praedestinatio non respicit vitam gratiae, nisi secundum quod +ordinatur ad gloriam, non enim sunt praedestinati, qui habent +gratiam et deficiunt a gloria. Liber igitur vitae non dicitur nisi +respectu gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to + him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed + merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of + glory is an end exceeding + human nature, as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 co."><a name="29477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29477] Iª q. 24 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod liber vitae, ut dictum est, importat conscriptionem quandam +sive notitiam electorum ad vitam. Eligitur autem aliquis ad id quod +non competit sibi secundum suam naturam. Et iterum, id ad quod +eligitur aliquis, habet rationem finis, non enim miles eligitur aut +conscribitur ad hoc quod armetur, sed ad hoc quod pugnet; hoc enim +est proprium officium ad quod militia ordinatur. Finis autem supra +naturam existens, est vita gloriae, ut supra dictum est. Unde +proprie liber vitae respicit vitam gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in + consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things + that are consequent on nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29478] Iª q. 24 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod vita divina, etiam prout est vita gloriosa, est Deo +naturalis. Unde respectu eius non est electio, et per consequens +neque liber vitae. Non enim dicimus quod aliquis homo eligatur ad +habendum sensum, vel aliquid eorum quae consequuntur naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p8"> From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life + of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29479] Iª q. 24 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Unde per hoc etiam +patet solutio ad secundum. Respectu enim vitae naturalis non est +electio, neque liber vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen + to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, + fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book + of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and + knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29480] Iª q. 24 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod vita gratiae non habet rationem finis, sed rationem +eius quod est ad finem. Unde ad vitam gratiae non dicitur aliquis +eligi, nisi inquantum vita gratiae ordinatur ad gloriam. Et propter +hoc, illi qui habent gratiam et excidunt a gloria, non dicuntur +esse electi simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et similiter non +dicuntur esse scripti simpliciter in libro vitae sed secundum quid; +prout scilicet de eis in ordinatione et notitia divina existit, +quod sint habituri aliquem ordinem ad vitam aeternam, secundum +participationem gratiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q24_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q24_A3-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 3. Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge, + which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. + Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29481] Iª q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod nullus deleatur de libro vitae. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in XX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>praescientia Dei, quae non +potest falli, liber vitae est</i>. Sed a praescientia Dei non +potest aliquid subtrahi, similiter neque a praedestinatione. Ergo +nec de libro vitae potest aliquis deleri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal + and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29482] Iª q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Sed +liber vitae est quid aeternum et immutabile. Ergo quidquid est in +eo, est ibi non temporaliter, sed immobiliter et indelebiliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither + therefore can he be blotted out. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29483] Iª q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +deletio Scripturae opponitur. Sed aliquis non potest de novo scribi +in libro vitae. Ergo neque inde deleri potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of the living" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.29" target="asv">Ps. 68:29</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29484] Iª q. 24 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Psalmo LXVIII, <i>deleantur de libro +viventium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For + it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in + the book of life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present righteousness they see in them; + but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from + that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted + out of the book of the living." But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just, + according to the text, "He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out + of the book of life" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.5" target="asv">Apoc. 3:5</a>) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the + opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to + be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained + to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and + from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because + some + are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore those who + are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because they + are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who + are ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of + life + not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though + these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew + a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, + and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 co."><a name="29485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29485] Iª q. 24 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam dicunt quod de libro vitae nullus potest deleri +secundum rei veritatem, potest tamen aliquis deleri secundum +opinionem hominum. Est enim consuetum in Scripturis ut aliquid +dicatur fieri, quando innotescit. Et secundum hoc, aliqui dicuntur +esse scripti in libro vitae, inquantum homines opinantur eos ibi +scriptos, propter praesentem iustitiam quam in eis vident. Sed +quando apparet, vel in hoc seculo vel in futuro, quod ab hac +iustitia exciderunt, dicuntur inde deleri. Et sic etiam exponitur +in Glossa deletio talis, super illud Psalmi LXVIII, <i>deleantur de +libro viventium</i>. Sed quia non deleri de libro vitae ponitur +inter praemia iustorum, secundum illud Apoc. III, <i>qui vicerit, +sic vestietur vestimentis albis, et non delebo nomen eius de libro +vitae</i>; quod autem sanctis repromittitur, non est solum in +hominum opinione; potest dici quod deleri vel non deleri de libro +vitae, non solum ad opinionem hominum referendum est, sed etiam +quantum ad rem. Est enim liber vitae conscriptio ordinatorum in +vitam aeternam. Ad quam ordinatur aliquis ex duobus, scilicet ex +praedestinatione divina, et haec ordinatio nunquam deficit; et ex +gratia. Quicumque enim gratiam habet, ex hoc ipso est dignus vita +aeterna. Et haec ordinatio deficit interdum, quia aliqui ordinati +sunt ex gratia habita ad habendum vitam aeternam, a qua tamen +deficiunt per peccatum mortale. Illi igitur qui sunt ordinati ad +habendum vitam aeternam ex praedestinatione divina, sunt +simpliciter scripti in libro vitae, quia sunt ibi scripti ut +habituri vitam aeternam in seipsa. Et isti nunquam delentur de +libro vitae. Sed illi qui sunt ordinati ad habendum vitam aeternam, +non ex praedestinatione divina, sed solum ex gratia, dicuntur esse +scripti in libro vitae, non simpliciter, sed secundum quid, quia +sunt ibi scripti ut habituri vitam aeternam, non in seipsa, sed in +sua causa. Et tales possunt deleri de libro vitae, ut deletio non +referatur ad notitiam Dei, quasi Deus aliquid praesciat, et postea +nesciat; sed ad rem scitam, quia scilicet Deus scit aliquem prius +ordinari in vitam aeternam, et postea non ordinari, cum deficit a +gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change; + but as regards things foreknown, which can change. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29486] Iª q. 24 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod deletio, ut dictum est, non refertur ad librum vitae +ex parte praescientiae, quasi in Deo sit aliqua mutabilitas, sed ex +parte praescitorum, quae sunt mutabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of + the book of life refers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29487] Iª q. 24 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, licet res in Deo sint immutabiliter, tamen in +seipsis mutabiles sunt. Et ad hoc pertinet deletio libri vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew; + either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is + included in the knowledge of God, although not anew. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29488] Iª q. 24 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod eo modo quo aliquis dicitur deleri de libro vitae, +potest dici quod ibi scribatur de novo; vel secundum opinionem +hominum, vel secundum quod de novo incipit habere ordinem ad vitam +aeternam per gratiam. Quod etiam sub divina notitia comprehenditur, +licet non de novo.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q25" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q25-p0.1">Q. 25. THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q25-p2"> After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the + power of God. About this are six points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q25-p3"> (1) Whether there is power in God?</p><p id="FP_Q25-p4"> (2) Whether His power is infinite?</p><p id="FP_Q25-p5"> (3) Whether He is almighty?</p><p id="FP_Q25-p6"> (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?</p><p id="FP_Q25-p7"> (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?</p><p id="FP_Q25-p8"> (6) Whether what He makes He could make better?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 pr."><a name="29489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29489] +Iª q. 25 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae scientiae +et voluntatis, et eorum quae ad hoc pertinent, restat considerandum +de divina potentia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum in +Deo sit potentia. Secundo, utrum eius potentia sit infinita. +Tertio, utrum sit omnipotens. Quarto, utrum possit facere quod ea +quae sunt praeterita, non fuerint. Quinto, utrum Deus possit facere +quae non facit, vel praetermittere quae facit. Sexto, utrum quae +facit, possit facere meliora.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q25_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A1-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 1. Whether there is power in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary + matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29490] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit potentia. Sicut enim prima +materia se habet ad potentiam, ita Deus, qui est agens primum, se +habet ad actum. Sed prima materia, secundum se considerata, est +absque omni actu. Ergo agens primum, quod est Deus, est absque +potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; + and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, + is God, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3] , A[3]</a>). Therefore, there is no power in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29491] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum philosophum, in IX Metaphys., qualibet potentia melior est +eius actus, nam forma est melior quam materia, et actio quam +potentia activa; est enim finis eius. Sed nihil est melius eo quod +est in Deo, quia quidquid est in Deo, est Deus, ut supra ostensum +est. Ergo nulla potentia est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in + God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29492] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +potentia est principium operationis. Sed operatio divina est eius +essentia, cum in Deo nullum sit accidens. Essentiae autem divinae +non est aliquod principium. Ergo ratio potentiae Deo non +convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, + therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="29493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29493] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, supra +ostensum est quod scientia Dei et voluntas eius sunt causa rerum. +Causa autem et principium idem sunt. Ergo non oportet in Deo +assignare potentiam, sed solum scientiam et voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.88.9" target="asv">Ps. 88:9</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29494] Iª q. 25 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXVIII, <i>potens es, domine, et veritas +tua in circuitu tuo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest + degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something: + whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], AA[1]</a>, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all + ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, + and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. + For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon + by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the + highest degree. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 co."><a name="29495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29495] Iª q. 25 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod duplex est potentia, scilicet passiva, quae nullo modo est in +Deo; et activa, quam oportet in Deo summe ponere. Manifestum est +enim quod unumquodque, secundum quod est actu et perfectum, +secundum hoc est principium activum alicuius, patitur autem +unumquodque, secundum quod est deficiens et imperfectum. Ostensum +est autem supra quod Deus est purus actus, et simpliciter et +universaliter perfectus; neque in eo aliqua imperfectio locum +habet. Unde sibi maxime competit esse principium activum, et nullo +modo pati. Ratio autem activi principii convenit potentiae activae. +Nam potentia activa est principium agendi in aliud, potentia vero +passiva est principium patiendi ab alio, ut philosophus dicit, V +Metaphys. Relinquitur ergo quod in Deo maxime sit potentia +activa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive power + is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only + active power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29496] Iª q. 25 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod potentia activa non dividitur contra actum, sed +fundatur in eo, nam unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu. +Potentia vero passiva dividitur contra actum, nam unumquodque +patitur secundum quod est in potentia. Unde haec potentia +excluditur a Deo, non autem activa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for + both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence. Hence it does not follow that there should + be anything in God nobler than His power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29497] Iª q. 25 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quandocumque actus est aliud a potentia, oportet +quod actus sit nobilior potentia. Sed actio Dei non est aliud ab +eius potentia, sed utrumque est essentia divina, quia nec esse eius +est aliud ab eius essentia. Unde non oportet quod aliquid sit +nobilius quam potentia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In creatures, power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained, + inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence + itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself + all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the + notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of "suppositum" possessing nature, and + under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle of an effect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29498] Iª q. 25 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod potentia in rebus creatis non solum est principium +actionis, sed etiam effectus. Sic igitur in Deo salvatur ratio +potentiae quantum ad hoc, quod est principium effectus, non autem +quantum ad hoc, quod est principium actionis, quae est divina +essentia. Nisi forte secundum modum intelligendi, prout divina +essentia, quae in se simpliciter praehabet quidquid perfectionis +est in rebus creatis, potest intelligi et sub ratione actionis, et +sub ratione potentiae; sicut etiam intelligitur et sub ratione +suppositi habentis naturam, et sub ratione naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; + inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, + which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective + principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of + the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29499] Iª q. 25 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod potentia non ponitur in Deo ut aliquid differens a +scientia et voluntate secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem; +inquantum scilicet potentia importat rationem principii exequentis +id quod voluntas imperat, et ad quod scientia dirigit; quae tria +Deo secundum idem conveniunt. Vel dicendum quod ipsa scientia vel +voluntas divina, secundum quod est principium effectivum, habet +rationem potentiae. Unde consideratio scientiae et voluntatis +praecedit in Deo considerationem potentiae, sicut causa praecedit +operationem et effectum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A2-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 2. Whether the power of God is infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher + (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29500] Iª q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod potentia Dei non sit infinita. Omne enim +infinitum est imperfectum, secundum philosophum, in III Physic. Sed +potentia Dei non est imperfecta. Ergo non est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, + it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29501] Iª q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis +potentia manifestatur per effectum, alias frustra esset. Si igitur +potentia Dei esset infinita, posset facere effectum infinitum. Quod +est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous + movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal + creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23). Therefore, His power is not infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29502] Iª q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus probat in VIII Physic., quod si potentia alicuius +corporis esset infinita, moveret in instanti. Deus autem non movet +in instanti, sed movet creaturam spiritualem <i>per tempus, +creaturam vero corporalem per locum et tempus</i>, secundum +Augustinum, VIII super Genesim ad litteram. Non ergo est eius +potentia infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is immeasurable + is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29503] Iª q. 25 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Hilarius, VIII de Trin., quod Deus est immensae +virtutis, vivens, potens. Omne autem immensum est infinitum. Ergo +virtus divina est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it + is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine + essence ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the + more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the + greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, + since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) it follows that His power likewise is infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 co."><a name="29504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29504] Iª q. 25 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut iam dictum est, secundum hoc potentia activa invenitur +in Deo, secundum quod ipse actu est. Esse autem eius est infinitum, +inquantum non est limitatum per aliquid recipiens; ut patet per ea +quae supra dicta sunt, cum de infinitate divinae essentiae +ageretur. Unde necesse est quod activa potentia Dei sit infinita. +In omnibus enim agentibus hoc invenitur, quod quanto aliquod agens +perfectius habet formam qua agit, tanto est maior eius potentia in +agendo. Sicut quanto est aliquid magis calidum, tanto habet maiorem +potentiam ad calefaciendum, et haberet utique potentiam infinitam +ad calefaciendum, si eius calor esset infinitus. Unde, cum ipsa +essentia divina, per quam Deus agit, sit infinita, sicut supra +ostensum est, sequitur quod eius potentia sit infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to + quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29505] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de infinito quod est ex parte +materiae non terminatae per formam; cuiusmodi est infinitum quod +congruit quantitati. Sic autem non est infinita divina essentia, ut +supra ostensum est; et per consequens nec eius potentia. Unde non +sequitur quod sit imperfecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to + do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: + as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. + Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with + Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power + of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God + would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But + the + power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29506] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod potentia agentis univoci tota manifestatur in suo +effectu, potentia enim generativa hominis nihil potest plus quam +generare hominem. Sed potentia agentis non univoci non tota +manifestatur in sui effectus productione, sicut potentia solis non +tota manifestatur in productione alicuius animalis ex putrefactione +generati. Manifestum est autem quod Deus non est agens univocum, +nihil enim aliud potest cum eo convenire neque in specie, neque in +genere, ut supra ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod effectus eius +semper est minor quam potentia eius. Non ergo oportet quod +manifestetur infinita potentia Dei in hoc, quod producat effectum +infinitum. Et tamen, etiam si nullum effectum produceret, non esset +Dei potentia frustra. Quia frustra est quod ordinatur ad finem, +quem non attingit, potentia autem Dei non ordinatur ad effectum +sicut ad finem, sed magis ipsa est finis sui effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he + shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according + to his reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time; not, however, the power of + an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one body moving another is a + univocal agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then the greater + the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite, it + would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent; + whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and + especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29507] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod philosophus in VIII Physic., probat, quod si aliquod +corpus haberet potentiam infinitam, quod moveret in non tempore. Et +tamen ostendit, quod potentia motoris caeli est infinita, quia +movere potest tempore infinito. Relinquitur ergo secundum eius +intentionem, quod potentia infinita corporis si esset, moveret in +non tempore, non autem potentia incorporei motoris. Cuius ratio +est, quia corpus movens aliud corpus, est agens univocum. Unde +oportet quod tota potentia agentis manifestetur in motu. Quia +igitur quanto moventis corporis potentia est maior, tanto velocius +movet, necesse est quod si fuerit infinita, moveat +improportionabiliter citius, quod est movere in non tempore. Sed +movens incorporeum est agens non univocum. Unde non oportet, quod +tota virtus eius manifestetur in motu ita, quod moveat in non +tempore. Et praesertim, quia movet secundum dispositionem suae +voluntatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 3. Whether God is omnipotent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, + for He is immovable, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore He is not omnipotent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29508] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnipotens. Moveri enim et +pati aliquid omnium est. Sed hoc Deus non potest, est enim +immobilis, ut supra dictum est. Non igitur est omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13.</a> Therefore He is not omnipotent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29509] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccare aliquid agere est. Sed Deus non potest peccare, neque +seipsum negare, ut dicitur II Tim. II. Ergo Deus non est +omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday + after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much + greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not + omnipotent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29510] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, de +Deo dicitur quod <i>omnipotentiam suam parcendo maxime et miserando +manifestat</i>. Ultimum igitur quod potest divina potentia, est +parcere et misereri. Aliquid autem est multo maius quam parcere et +misereri; sicut creare alium mundum, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ergo +Deus non est omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:20</a>), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those things to + be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in + reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If + God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible, + then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing + at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="29511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29511] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, super +illud I Cor. I, <i>stultam fecit Deus sapientiam huius mundi</i>, +dicit Glossa, <i>sapientiam huius mundi fecit Deus stultam, +ostendendo possibile, quod illa impossibile iudicabat</i>. Unde +videtur quod non sit aliquid iudicandum possibile vel impossibile +secundum inferiores causas, prout sapientia huius mundi iudicat; +sed secundum potentiam divinam. Si igitur Deus sit omnipotens, +omnia erunt possibilia. Nihil ergo impossibile. Sublato autem +impossibili, tollitur necessarium, nam quod necesse est esse, +impossibile est non esse. Nihil ergo erit necessarium in rebus, si +Deus est omnipotens. Hoc autem est impossibile. Ergo Deus non est +omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.1.37" target="asv">Lk. 1:37</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29512] Iª q. 25 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Luc. I, <i>non erit impossibile apud Deum omne +verbum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q25_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there + may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider + the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood + to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said + to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation + to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the + relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all + things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say + that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining + the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is + able to do. + </p><p id="FP_Q25_A3-p8"> It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the + second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation + in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates + sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for + instance, that a man is a donkey. + </p><p id="FP_Q25_A3-p9"> It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds + a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, + the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, + however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of + being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is + numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the + idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea + of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, + not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, + everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God + is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because + it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot + do + them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies + a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 co."><a name="29513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29513] Iª q. 25 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod communiter confitentur omnes Deum esse omnipotentem. Sed +rationem omnipotentiae assignare videtur difficile. Dubium enim +potest esse quid comprehendatur sub ista distributione, cum dicitur +omnia posse Deum. Sed si quis recte consideret, cum potentia +dicatur ad possibilia, cum Deus omnia posse dicitur, nihil rectius +intelligitur quam quod possit omnia possibilia, et ob hoc +omnipotens dicatur. Possibile autem dicitur dupliciter, secundum +philosophum, in V Metaphys. Uno modo, per respectum ad aliquam +potentiam, sicut quod subditur humanae potentiae, dicitur esse +possibile homini. Non autem potest dici quod Deus dicatur +omnipotens, quia potest omnia quae sunt possibilia naturae creatae, +quia divina potentia in plura extenditur. Si autem dicatur quod +Deus sit omnipotens, quia potest omnia quae sunt possibilia suae +potentiae, erit circulatio in manifestatione omnipotentiae, hoc +enim non erit aliud quam dicere quod Deus est omnipotens, quia +potest omnia quae potest. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus dicatur +omnipotens, quia potest omnia possibilia absolute, quod est alter +modus dicendi possibile. Dicitur autem aliquid possibile vel +impossibile absolute, ex habitudine terminorum, possibile quidem, +quia praedicatum non repugnat subiecto, ut Socratem sedere; +impossibile vero absolute, quia praedicatum repugnat subiecto, ut +hominem esse asinum. Est autem considerandum quod, cum unumquodque +agens agat sibi simile, unicuique potentiae activae correspondet +possibile ut obiectum proprium, secundum rationem illius actus in +quo fundatur potentia activa, sicut potentia calefactiva refertur, +ut ad proprium obiectum, ad esse calefactibile. Esse autem divinum, +super quod ratio divinae potentiae fundatur, est esse infinitum, +non limitatum ad aliquod genus entis, sed praehabens in se totius +esse perfectionem. Unde quidquid potest habere rationem entis, +continetur sub possibilibus absolutis, respectu quorum Deus dicitur +omnipotens. Nihil autem opponitur rationi entis, nisi non ens. Hoc +igitur repugnat rationi possibilis absoluti, quod subditur divinae +omnipotentiae, quod implicat in se esse et non esse simul. Hoc enim +omnipotentiae non subditur, non propter defectum divinae potentiae; +sed quia non potest habere rationem factibilis neque possibilis. +Quaecumque igitur contradictionem non implicant, sub illis +possibilibus continentur, respectu quorum dicitur Deus omnipotens. +Ea vero quae contradictionem implicant, sub divina omnipotentia non +continentur, quia non possunt habere possibilium rationem. Unde +convenientius dicitur quod non possunt fieri, quam quod Deus non +potest ea facere. Neque hoc est contra verbum Angeli dicentis, +<i>non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum</i>. Id enim quod +contradictionem implicat, verbum esse non potest, quia nullus +intellectus potest illud concipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29514] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Deus dicitur omnipotens secundum potentiam activam, +non secundum potentiam passivam, ut dictum est. Unde, quod non +potest moveri et pati, non repugnat omnipotentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant + to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. + iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which + is impossible---as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things + if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent + are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God can + do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking + after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29515] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccare est deficere a perfecta actione, unde posse +peccare est posse deficere in agendo, quod repugnat omnipotentiae. +Et propter hoc, Deus peccare non potest, qui est omnipotens. +Quamvis philosophus dicat, in IV Topic., quod potest Deus et +studiosus prava agere. Sed hoc intelligitur vel sub conditione +cuius antecedens sit impossibile, ut puta si dicamus quod potest +Deus prava agere si velit, nihil enim prohibet conditionalem esse +veram, cuius antecedens et consequens est impossibile; sicut si +dicatur, si homo est asinus, habet quatuor pedes. Vel ut +intelligatur quod Deus potest aliqua agere, quae nunc prava +videntur; quae tamen si ageret, bona essent. Vel loquitur secundum +communem opinionem gentilium, qui homines dicebant transferri in +deos, ut Iovem vel Mercurium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme + power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free + will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is + the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21], + A[4] + </a>), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account + of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because + to it pertains the first foundation of all good things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29516] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Dei omnipotentia ostenditur maxime in parcendo et +miserando, quia per hoc ostenditur Deum habere summam potestatem, +quod libere peccata dimittit, eius enim qui superioris legi +astringitur, non est libere peccata condonare. Vel quia, parcendo +hominibus et miserando, perducit eos ad participationem infiniti +boni, qui est ultimus effectus divinae virtutis. Vel quia, ut supra +dictum est, effectus divinae misericordiae est fundamentum omnium +divinorum operum, nihil enim debetur alicui nisi propter id quod +est datum ei a Deo non debitum. In hoc autem maxime divina +omnipotentia manifestatur, quod ad ipsam pertinet prima institutio +omnium bonorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. + But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which + it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible + in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as + to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition + of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">Q[14], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be + impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and + necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29517] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod possibile absolutum non dicitur neque secundum causas +superiores, neque secundum causas inferiores sed secundum seipsum. +Possibile vero quod dicitur secundum aliquam potentiam, nominatur +possibile secundum proximam causam. Unde ea quae immediate nata +sunt fieri a Deo solo, ut creare, iustificare, et huiusmodi, +dicuntur possibilia secundum causam superiorem, quae autem nata +sunt fieri a causis inferioribus, dicuntur possibilia secundum +causas inferiores. Nam secundum conditionem causae proximae, +effectus habet contingentiam vel necessitatem, ut supra dictum est. +In hoc autem reputatur stulta mundi sapientia, quod ea quae sunt +impossibilia naturae, etiam Deo impossibilia iudicabat. Et sic +patet quod omnipotentia Dei impossibilitatem et necessitatem a +rebus non excludit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A4-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 4. Whether God can make the past not to have been?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that + which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise + the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible + accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from + the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29518] Iª q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus possit facere quod praeterita non +fuerint. Quod enim est impossibile per se, magis est impossibile +quam quod est impossibile per accidens. Sed Deus potest facere id +quod est impossibile per se, ut caecum illuminare, vel mortuum +resuscitare. Ergo multo magis potest Deus facere illud quod est +impossibile per accidens. Sed praeterita non fuisse, est +impossibile per accidens, accidit enim Socratem non currere esse +impossibile, ex hoc quod praeteriit. Ergo Deus potest facere quod +praeterita non fuerint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates + ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29519] Iª q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid Deus facere potuit, potest, cum eius potentia non +minuatur. Sed Deus potuit facere, antequam Socrates curreret, quod +non curreret. Ergo, postquam cucurrit, potest Deus facere quod non +cucurrerit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost + virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29520] Iª q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +caritas est maior virtus quam virginitas. Sed Deus potest reparare +caritatem amissam. Ergo et virginitatem. Ergo potest facere quod +illa quae corrupta fuit, non fuerit corrupta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 22</a> ad Eustoch.): "Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted." Therefore, + for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29521] Iª q. 25 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Hieronymus dicit, <i>cum Deus omnia possit, non potest de +corrupta facere incorruptam</i>. Ergo eadem ratione non potest +facere de quocumque alio praeterito quod non fuerit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should + not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, + so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say + that he did not sit, is to say that + it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what + Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if + it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact + that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely, to + make + undone the things that have been done." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 co."><a name="29522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29522] Iª q. 25 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, sub omnipotentia Dei non cadit +aliquid quod contradictionem implicat. Praeterita autem non fuisse, +contradictionem implicat. Sicut enim contradictionem implicat +dicere quod Socrates sedet et non sedet, ita, quod sederit et non +sederit. Dicere autem quod sederit, est dicere quod sit +praeteritum, dicere autem quod non sederit, est dicere quod non +fuerit. Unde praeterita non fuisse, non subiacet divinae potentiae. +Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, <i>quisquis ita +dicit, si Deus omnipotens est, faciat ut quae facta sunt, facta non +fuerint, non videt hoc se dicere, si Deus omnipotens est, faciat ut +ea quae vera sunt, eo ipso quod vera sunt, falsa sint</i>. Et +philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>hoc solo privatur Deus, +ingenita facere quae sunt facta</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, + the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, + not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; + in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible + in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine + power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29523] Iª q. 25 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, licet praeterita non fuisse sit impossibile per +accidens, si consideretur id quod est praeteritum, idest cursus +Socratis; tamen, si consideretur praeteritum sub ratione +praeteriti, ipsum non fuisse est impossibile non solum per se, sed +absolute, contradictionem implicans. Et sic est magis impossibile +quam mortuum resurgere, quod non implicat contradictionem, quod +dicitur impossibile secundum aliquam potentiam, scilicet naturalem. +Talia enim impossibilia divinae potentiae subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to + His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever + God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to + be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So + is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29524] Iª q. 25 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sicut Deus, quantum est ad perfectionem divinae +potentiae, omnia potest, sed quaedam non subiacent eius potentiae, +quia deficiunt a ratione possibilium; ita, si attendatur +immutabilitas divinae potentiae, quidquid Deus potuit, potest; +aliqua tamen olim habuerunt rationem possibilium, dum erant fienda, +quae iam deficiunt a ratione possibilium, dum sunt facta. Et sic +dicitur Deus ea non posse, quia ea non possunt fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot + be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed + from the sinner. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29525] Iª q. 25 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnem corruptionem mentis et corporis Deus auferre +potest a muliere corrupta, hoc tamen ab ea removeri non poterit, +quod corrupta non fuerit. Sicut etiam ab aliquo peccatore auferre +non potest quod non peccaverit, et quod caritatem non amiserit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A5-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 5. Whether God can do what He does not?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He + would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except + what He does. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29526] Iª q. 25 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit facere nisi ea quae facit. +Deus enim non potest facere quae non praescivit et praeordinavit se +facturum. Sed non praescivit neque praeordinavit se facturum, nisi +ea quae facit. Ergo non potest facere nisi ea quae facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; + nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29527] Iª q. 25 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +non potest facere nisi quod debet, et quod iustum est fieri. Sed +Deus non debet facere quae non facit, nec iustum est ut faciat quae +non facit. Ergo Deus non potest facere nisi quae facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them + to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29528] Iª q. 25 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +non potest facere nisi quod bonum est, et conveniens rebus factis. +Sed rebus factis a Deo non est bonum nec conveniens aliter esse +quam sint. Ergo Deus non potest facere nisi quae facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.53" target="asv">Mat. 26:53</a>). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29529] Iª q. 25 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Matt. XXVI, <i>an non possum rogare patrem meum, et +exhibebit mihi modo plus quam duodecim legiones Angelorum?</i> +Neque autem ipse rogabat, neque pater exhibebat ad repugnandum +Iudaeis. Ergo Deus potest facere quod non facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that + as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of + man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, + nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and + from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from + any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present + course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God + does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly + said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes + the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His + justice consists, as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html">Q[21], A[2]</a>), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine + wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man + puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the + wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion + things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could + happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 co."><a name="29530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29530] Iª q. 25 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod circa hoc quidam dupliciter erraverunt. Quidam enim posuerunt +Deum agere quasi ex necessitate naturae; ut sicut ex actione rerum +naturalium non possunt alia provenire nisi quae eveniunt, utpote ex +semine hominis homo, ex semine olivae oliva; ita ex operatione +divina non possint aliae res, vel alius ordo rerum effluere, nisi +sicut nunc est. Sed supra ostendimus Deum non agere quasi ex +necessitate naturae, sed voluntatem eius esse omnium rerum causam; +neque etiam ipsam voluntatem naturaliter et ex necessitate +determinari ad has res. Unde nullo modo iste cursus rerum sic ex +necessitate a Deo provenit, quod alia provenire non possent. Alii +vero dixerunt quod potentia divina determinatur ad hunc cursum +rerum, propter ordinem sapientiae et iustitiae divinae, sine quo +Deus nihil operatur. Cum autem potentia Dei, quae est eius +essentia, non sit aliud quam Dei sapientia, convenienter quidem +dici potest quod nihil sit in Dei potentia, quod non sit in ordine +divinae sapientiae, nam divina sapientia totum posse potentiae +comprehendit. Sed tamen ordo a divina sapientia rebus inditus, in +quo ratio iustitiae consistit, ut supra dictum est, non adaequat +divinam sapientiam, sic ut divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc +ordinem. Manifestum est enim quod tota ratio ordinis, quam sapiens +rebus a se factis imponit, a fine sumitur. Quando igitur finis est +proportionatus rebus propter finem factis, sapientia facientis +limitatur ad aliquem determinatum ordinem. Sed divina bonitas est +finis improportionabiliter excedens res creatas. Unde divina +sapientia non determinatur ad aliquem certum ordinem rerum, ut non +possit alius cursus rerum ab ipsa effluere. Unde dicendum est +simpliciter quod Deus potest alia facere quam quae facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from + justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and + essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which + cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because + His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there + being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things. + Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the + intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance + with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above + <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God + is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by + His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything + which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge + and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the + power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29531] Iª q. 25 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod in nobis, in quibus est aliud potentia et essentia a +voluntate et intellectu, et iterum intellectus aliud a sapientia, +et voluntas aliud a iustitia, potest esse aliquid in potentia, quod +non potest esse in voluntate iusta, vel in intellectu sapiente. Sed +in Deo est idem potentia et essentia et voluntas et intellectus et +sapientia et iustitia. Unde nihil potest esse in potentia divina, +quod non possit esse in voluntate iusta ipsius, et in intellectu +sapiente eius. Tamen, quia voluntas non determinatur ex necessitate +ad haec vel illa, nisi forte ex suppositione, ut supra dictum est; +neque sapientia Dei et iustitia determinantur ad hunc ordinem, ut +supra dictum est; nihil prohibet esse aliquid in potentia Dei, quod +non vult, et quod non continetur sub ordine quem statuit rebus. Et +quia potentia intelligitur ut exequens, voluntas autem ut imperans, +et intellectus et sapientia ut dirigens, quod attribuitur potentiae +secundum se consideratae, dicitur Deus posse secundum potentiam +absolutam. Et huiusmodi est omne illud in quo potest salvari ratio +entis, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem attribuitur potentiae +divinae secundum quod exequitur imperium voluntatis iustae, hoc +dicitur Deus posse facere de potentia ordinata. Secundum hoc ergo, +dicendum est quod Deus potest alia facere, de potentia absoluta, +quam quae praescivit et praeordinavit se facturum, non tamen potest +esse quod aliqua faciat, quae non praesciverit et praeordinaverit +se facturum. Quia ipsum facere subiacet praescientiae et +praeordinationi, non autem ipsum posse, quod est naturale. Ideo +enim Deus aliquid facit, quia vult, non tamen ideo potest, quia +vult, sed quia talis est in sua natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this + than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood + in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things; + and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is false; + for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the + verb "can" (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the present will be signified, but + in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything except that which, if + He did it, would be suitable and just." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29532] Iª q. 25 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Deus non debet aliquid alicui nisi sibi. Unde, cum +dicitur quod Deus non potest facere nisi quod debet nihil aliud +significatur nisi quod Deus non potest facere nisi quod ei est +conveniens et iustum. Sed hoc quod dico conveniens et iustum, +potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, sic quod hoc quod dico +conveniens et iustum, prius intelligatur coniungi cum hoc verbo +est, ita quod restringatur ad standum pro praesentibus; et sic +referatur ad potentiam. Et sic falsum est quod dicitur, est enim +sensus, Deus non potest facere nisi quod modo conveniens est et +iustum. Si vero prius coniungatur cum hoc verbo potest, quod habet +vim ampliandi, et postmodum cum hoc verbo est, significabitur +quoddam praesens confusum, et erit locutio vera, sub hoc sensu, +Deus non potest facere nisi id quod, si faceret, esset conveniens +et iustum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence, + although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon + them another order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29533] Iª q. 25 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet iste cursus rerum sit determinatus istis rebus +quae nunc sunt, non tamen ad hunc cursum limitatur divina sapientia +et potestas. Unde, licet istis rebus quae nunc sunt, nullus alius +cursus esset bonus et conveniens, tamen Deus posset alias res +facere, et alium eis imponere ordinem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A6-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 6. Whether God can do better than what He does?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing + is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29534] Iª q. 25 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit meliora facere ea quae +facit. Quidquid enim Deus facit, potentissime et sapientissime +facit. Sed tanto fit aliquid melius, quanto fit potentius et +sapientius. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid facere melius quam +facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): "If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have + been envious." For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He + would have been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore + make anything better than He does. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29535] Iª q. 25 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, contra Maximinum, sic argumentatur, <i>si Deus potuit, +et noluit, gignere filium sibi aequalem, invidus fuit</i>. Eadem +ratione, si Deus potuit res meliores facere quam fecerit, et +noluit, invidus fuit. Sed invidia est omnino relegata a Deo. Ergo +Deus unumquodque fecit optimum. Non ergo Deus potest aliquid facere +melius quam fecit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine + says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them + all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="29536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29536] Iª q. 25 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id +quod est maxime et valde bonum, non potest melius fieri, quia +maximo nihil est maius. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in Enchirid., +<i>bona sunt singula quae Deus fecit, sed simul universa valde +bona, quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis +pulchritudo</i>. Ergo bonum universi non potest melius fieri a +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again + created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above + all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made + them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="29537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29537] Iª q. 25 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, homo +Christus est plenus gratia et veritate, et spiritum habet non ad +mensuram, et sic non potest esse melior. Beatitudo etiam creata +dicitur esse summum bonum, et sic non potest esse melius. Beata +etiam virgo Maria est super omnes choros Angelorum exaltata, et sic +non potest esse melior. Non igitur omnia quae fecit Deus, potest +facere meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.20" target="asv">Eph. 3:20</a>): "God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29538] Iª q. 25 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur ad Ephes. III, quod <i>Deus potens est omnia facere +abundantius quam petimus aut intelligimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to + the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing + better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be + four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is + after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and + above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better + the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 co."><a name="29539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29539] Iª q. 25 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod bonitas alicuius rei est duplex. Una quidem, quae est de +essentia rei; sicut esse rationale est de essentia hominis. Et +quantum ad hoc bonum, Deus non potest facere aliquam rem meliorem +quam ipsa sit, licet possit facere aliquam aliam ea meliorem. Sicut +etiam non potest facere quaternarium maiorem, quia, si esset maior, +iam non esset quaternarius, sed alius numerus. Sic enim se habet +additio differentiae substantialis in definitionibus, sicut additio +unitatis in numeris, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Alia bonitas est, +quae est extra essentiam rei; sicut bonum hominis est esse +virtuosum vel sapientem. Et secundum tale bonum, potest Deus res a +se factas facere meliores. Simpliciter autem loquendo, qualibet re +a se facta potest Deus facere aliam meliorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is + true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better + than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, "better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner + of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because + He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something + better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards + the substance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29540] Iª q. 25 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, cum dicitur Deum posse aliquid facere melius quam +facit, si ly melius sit nomen, verum est, qualibet enim re potest +facere aliam meliorem. Eandem vero potest facere meliorem +quodammodo, et quodammodo non, sicut dictum est. Si vero ly melius +sit adverbium, et importet modum ex parte facientis, sic Deus non +potest facere melius quam sicut facit, quia non potest facere ex +maiori sapientia et bonitate. Si autem importet modum ex parte +facti, sic potest facere melius, quia potest dare rebus a se factis +meliorem modum essendi quantum ad accidentalia, licet non quantum +ad essentialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature + of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29541] Iª q. 25 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod de ratione filii est quod aequetur patri, cum ad +perfectum venerit, non est autem de ratione creaturae alicuius, +quod sit melior quam a Deo facta est. Unde non est similis +ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things + by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; + as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other + things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be + another and a better universe. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29542] Iª q. 25 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod universum, suppositis istis rebus, non potest esse +melius; propter decentissimum ordinem his rebus attributum a Deo, +in quo bonum universi consistit. Quorum si unum aliquod esset +melius, corrumperetur proportio ordinis, sicut, si una chorda plus +debito intenderetur, corrumperetur citharae melodia. Posset tamen +Deus alias res facere, vel alias addere istis rebus factis, et sic +esset illud universum melius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the + fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from + the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything + better than God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="29543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29543] Iª q. 25 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod humanitas Christi ex hoc quod est unita Deo, et +beatitudo creata ex hoc quod est fruitio Dei, et beata virgo ex hoc +quod est mater Dei, habent quandam dignitatem infinitam, ex bono +infinito quod est Deus. Et ex hac parte non potest aliquid fieri +melius eis, sicut non potest aliquid melius esse Deo.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q26" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q26-p0.1">Q. 26. OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q26-p2"> After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning + this, there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q26-p3"> (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?</p><p id="FP_Q26-p4"> (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect?</p><p id="FP_Q26-p5"> (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?</p><p id="FP_Q26-p6"> (4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?</p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 pr."><a name="29544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29544] +Iª q. 26 pr.</span></a> Ultimo autem, post considerationem +eorum quae ad divinae essentiae unitatem pertinent, considerandum +est de divina beatitudine. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum beatitudo Deo competat. Secundo, secundum quid dicitur Deus +esse beatus, utrum secundum actum intellectus. Tertio, utrum sit +essentialiter beatitudo cuiuslibet beati. Quarto, utrum in eius +beatitudine omnis beatitudo includatur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q26_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A1-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 1. Whether beatitude belongs to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect + by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude + does not belong to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29545] Iª q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo Deo non conveniat. <i>Beatitudo +enim</i>, secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., <i>est status omnium +bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed aggregatio bonorum non +habet locum in Deo, sicut nec compositio. Ergo Deo non convenit +beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not + apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29546] Iª q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo, sive felicitas, est praemium virtutis, secundum +philosophum, in I Ethic. Sed Deo non convenit praemium, sicut nec +meritum. Ergo nec beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of + Lords." ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q26_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.15" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:15</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29547] Iª q. 26 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit apostolus, I ad Tim. ultimo, <i>quem suis temporibus +ostendet Deus beatus et solus potens, rex regum et dominus +dominantium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than + the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, + to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in + a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. + Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 co."><a name="29548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29548] Iª q. 26 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod beatitudo maxime Deo competit. Nihil enim aliud sub nomine +beatitudinis intelligitur, nisi bonum perfectum intellectualis +naturae; cuius est suam sufficientiam cognoscere in bono quod +habet; et cui competit ut ei contingat aliquid vel bene vel male, +et sit suarum operationum domina. Utrumque autem istorum +excellentissime Deo convenit, scilicet perfectum esse, et +intelligentem. Unde beatitudo maxime convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures + is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>), in simplicity and unity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29549] Iª q. 26 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod aggregatio bonorum est in Deo non per modum +compositionis, sed per modum simplicitatis, quia quae in creaturis +multiplicia sunt, in Deo praeexistunt simpliciter et unite, ut +supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even + as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God + has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29550] Iª q. 26 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod esse praemium virtutis accidit beatitudini vel +felicitati, inquantum aliquis beatitudinem acquirit, sicut esse +terminum generationis accidit enti, inquantum exit de potentia in +actum. Sicut igitur Deus habet esse, quamvis non generetur; ita +habet beatitudinem, quamvis non mereatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q26_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A2-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 2. Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said + to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius + (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29551] Iª q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non dicatur beatus secundum +intellectum. Beatitudo enim est summum bonum. Sed bonum dicitur in +Deo secundum essentiam, quia bonum respicit esse, quod est secundum +essentiam, secundum Boetium, in libro de Hebdomad. Ergo et +beatitudo dicitur in Deo secundum essentiam, et non secundum +intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude + is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29552] Iª q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo habet rationem finis. Finis autem est obiectum +voluntatis, sicut et bonum. Ergo beatitudo dicitur in Deo secundum +voluntatem, et non secundum intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in glory, + however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole + of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His + intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29553] Iª q. 26 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Gregorius dicit, XXXII Moralium, <i>ipse gloriosus est, qui, +dum seipso perfruitur, accedentis laudis indigens non est</i>. Esse +autem gloriosum significat esse beatum. Cum igitur Deo fruamur +secundum intellectum, quia visio est tota merces, ut dicit +Augustinus, videtur quod beatitudo dicatur in Deo secundum +intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q26_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual + nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, + by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. + Now in God, to be and to + understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be + assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation + to His beatitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 co."><a name="29554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29554] Iª q. 26 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod beatitudo, sicut dictum est, significat bonum perfectum +intellectualis naturae. Et inde est quod, sicut unaquaeque res +appetit suam perfectionem, ita et intellectualis natura naturaliter +appetit esse beata. Id autem quod est perfectissimum in qualibet +intellectuali natura, est intellectualis operatio, secundum quam +capit quodammodo omnia. Unde cuiuslibet intellectualis naturae +creatae beatitudo consistit in intelligendo. In Deo autem non est +aliud esse et intelligere secundum rem, sed tantum secundum +intelligentiae rationem. Attribuenda ergo est Deo beatitudo +secundum intellectum, sicut et aliis beatis, qui per assimilationem +ad beatitudinem ipsius, beati dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His + essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29555] Iª q. 26 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ex illa ratione probatur quod Deus sit beatus +secundum suam essentiam, non autem quod beatitudo ei conveniat +secundum rationem essentiae, sed magis secundum rationem +intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence + in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the + act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29556] Iª q. 26 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod beatitudo, cum sit bonum, est obiectum voluntatis. +Obiectum autem praeintelligitur actui potentiae. Unde, secundum +modum intelligendi, prius est beatitudo divina, quam actus +voluntatis in ea requiescentis. Et hoc non potest esse nisi actus +intellectus. Unde in actu intellectus attenditur beatitudo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q26_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 3. Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing + else but God Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29557] Iª q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit beatitudo cuiuslibet beati. Deus +enim est summum bonum, ut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est autem +esse plura summa bona, ut etiam ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur +de ratione beatitudinis sit, quod sit summum bonum, videtur quod +beatitudo non sit aliud quam Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to + God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29558] Iª q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est finis rationalis naturae ultimus. Sed esse ultimum +finem rationalis naturae, soli Deo convenit. Ergo beatitudo +cuiuslibet beati est solus Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q26_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41</a>: "Star differeth from star in glory." But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29559] Iª q. 26 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +beatitudo unius est maior beatitudine alterius, secundum illud I +Cor. XV, <i>stella differt a stella in claritate</i>. Sed Deo nihil +est maius. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid aliud quam Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, + the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered + on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, + in accordance with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth + Thee, though he know nought else." But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; + but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 co."><a name="29560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29560] Iª q. 26 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod beatitudo intellectualis naturae consistit in actu +intellectus. In quo duo possunt considerari, scilicet obiectum +actus, quod est intelligibile; et ipse actus, qui est intelligere. +Si igitur beatitudo consideretur ex parte ipsius obiecti, sic solus +Deus est beatitudo, quia ex hoc solo est aliquis beatus, quod Deum +intelligit; secundum illud Augustini, in V libro Confess., +<i>beatus est qui te novit, etiam si alia ignoret</i>. Sed ex parte +actus intelligentis, beatitudo est quid creatum in creaturis +beatis, in Deo autem est etiam secundum hoc, aliquid increatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their + supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29561] Iª q. 26 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod beatitudo, quantum ad obiectum, est summum bonum +simpliciter, sed quantum ad actum, in creaturis beatis, est summum +bonum, non simpliciter, sed in genere bonorum participabilium a +creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> End is twofold, namely, "objective" and "subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing itself" + and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational + creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29562] Iª q. 26 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod finis est duplex, scilicet cuius et quo, ut +philosophus dicit, scilicet ipsa res, et usus rei, sicut avaro est +finis pecunia, et acquisitio pecuniae. Creaturae igitur rationalis +est quidem Deus finis ultimus ut res; beatitudo autem creata ut +usus, vel magis fruitio, rei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q26_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A4-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 4. Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing + false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29563] Iª q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo divina non complectatur omnes +beatitudines. Sunt enim quaedam beatitudines falsae. Sed in Deo +nihil potest esse falsum. Ergo divina beatitudo non complectitur +omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now + none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29564] Iª q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quaedam beatitudo, secundum quosdam, consistit in rebus +corporalibus, sicut in voluptatibus, divitiis, et huiusmodi, quae +quidem Deo convenire non possunt, cum sit incorporeus. Ergo +beatitudo eius non complectitur omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q26_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a> ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29565] Iª q. 26 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod beatitudo est perfectio quaedam. Divina autem perfectio +complectitur omnem perfectionem, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo divina +beatitudo complectitur omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the + divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of + all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which + consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol. + iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, + which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place + of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 co."><a name="29566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29566] Iª q. 26 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidquid est desiderabile in quacumque beatitudine, vel vera +vel falsa, totum eminentius in divina beatitudine praeexistit. De +contemplativa enim felicitate, habet continuam et certissimam +contemplationem sui et omnium aliorum, de activa vero, +gubernationem totius universi. De terrena vero felicitate, quae +consistit in voluptate, divitiis, potestate, dignitate et fama, +secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., habet gaudium de se et de +omnibus aliis, pro delectatione, pro divitiis, habet omnimodam +sufficientiam, quam divitiae promittunt, pro potestate, +omnipotentiam, pro dignitate, omnium regimen, pro fama vero, +admirationem totius creaturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in + God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29567] Iª q. 26 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod beatitudo aliqua secundum hoc est falsa, secundum +quod deficit a ratione verae beatitudinis, et sic non est in Deo. +Sed quidquid habet de similitudine, quantumcumque tenui, +beatitudinis, totum praeexistit in divina beatitudine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q26_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner. + </p><p id="FP_Q26_A4-p8"> We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29568] Iª q. 26 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bona quae sunt in corporalibus corporaliter, in Deo +sunt spiritualiter, secundum modum suum. Et haec dicta sufficiant +de his quae pertinent ad divinae essentiae unitatem.</p></div></div></div></div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q1_A10.html"/> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"/> + ` + </div> + </body> + </html> \ No newline at end of file