Mercurial > hg > Aquinas


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            <h2 id="FP.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44-46)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FP_Q44">Q. 44. THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q45">Q. 45. THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q46">Q. 46. OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/></div>
            <div id="FP_Q44" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q44-p0.1">Q. 44. THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q44-p2"> After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration
                  will be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and
                  government. Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode
                  of procession of creatures from the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things.
               </p><p id="FP_Q44-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q44-p4"><a href="#FP_Q44_A1"> (1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?</a></p><p id="FP_Q44-p5"><a href="#FP_Q44_A2"> (2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent coordinate principle with Him?</a></p><p id="FP_Q44-p6"><a href="#FP_Q44_A3"> (3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes?</a></p><p id="FP_Q44-p7"><a href="#FP_Q44_A4"> (4) Whether He is the final cause of things?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 pr."><a name="30282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30282]
Iª q. 44 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinarum
personarum, considerandum restat de processione creaturarum a Deo.
Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita, ut primo consideretur de
productione creaturarum; secundo, de earum distinctione; tertio, de
conservatione et gubernatione. Circa primum tria sunt consideranda,
primo quidem, quae sit prima causa entium; secundo, de modo
procedendi creaturarum a prima causa; tertio vero, de principio
durationis rerum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum
Deus sit causa efficiens omnium entium. Secundo, utrum materia
prima sit creata a Deo, vel sit principium ex aequo coordinatum ei.
Tertio, utrum Deus sit causa exemplaris rerum, vel sint alia
exemplaria praeter ipsum. Quarto, utrum ipse sit causa finalis
rerum.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q44_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A1-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 1. Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being
                     without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing
                     caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be understood without it; therefore they
                     can exist without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by
                     God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="30283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30283] Iª q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium omne ens esse creatum
a Deo. Nihil enim prohibet inveniri rem sine eo quod non est de
ratione rei, sicut hominem sine albedine. Sed habitudo causati ad
causam non videtur esse de ratione entium quia sine hac possunt
aliqua entia intelligi. Ergo sine hac possunt esse. Ergo nihil
prohibet esse aliqua entia non creata a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient
                     cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are
                     many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="30284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30284] Iª q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad
hoc aliquid indiget causa efficiente, ut sit. Ergo quod non potest
non esse, non indiget causa efficiente. Sed nullum necessarium
potest non esse, quia quod necesse est esse, non potest non esse.
Cum igitur multa sint necessaria in rebus, videtur quod non omnia
entia sint a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by
                     the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore not all beings are from God as from
                     their efficient cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="30285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30285] Iª q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quorumcumque est aliqua causa, in his potest fieri demonstratio per
causam illam. Sed in mathematicis non fit demonstratio per causam
agentem, ut per philosophum patet, in III Metaphys. Non igitur
omnia entia sunt a Deo sicut a causa agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.36" target="asv">Rom. 11:36</a>): "Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 s. c."><a name="30286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30286] Iª q. 44 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Rom. XI, <i>ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt
omnia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q44_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must
                     be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>) when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q11_A3" id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[11], AA[3]</a>,4) that subsisting being must be
                     one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all
                     beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which
                     are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who
                     possesses being most perfectly.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q44_A1-p7"> Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever
                     is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest
                     in heat is the cause of all heat.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 co."><a name="30287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30287] Iª q. 44 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo esse.
Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse
est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit; sicut
ferrum fit ignitum ab igne. Ostensum est autem supra, cum de divina
simplicitate ageretur, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens.
Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse nisi
unum, sicut si albedo esset subsistens, non posset esse nisi una,
cum albedines multiplicentur secundum recipientia. Relinquitur ergo
quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse.
Necesse est igitur omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam
participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius vel minus perfecte,
causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est. Unde et Plato
dixit quod necesse est ante omnem multitudinem ponere unitatem. Et
Aristoteles dicit, in II Metaphys., quod id quod est maxime ens et
maxime verum, est causa omnis entis et omnis veri, sicut id quod
maxime calidum est, est causa omnis caliditatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on
                     what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused.
                     Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since
                     to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible
                     for us to find a being uncaused.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="30288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30288] Iª q. 44 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem
entis quod est causatum, tamen sequitur ad ea qua sunt de eius
ratione, quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens,
sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio. Unde huiusmodi ens non potest
esse, quin sit causatum; sicut nec homo, quin sit risibile. Sed
quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis simpliciter, propter
hoc invenitur aliquod ens non causatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly false
                     in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle
                     says (Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an
                     efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but
                     because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and
                     consequent be possible or impossible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="30289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30289] Iª q. 44 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ex hac ratione quidam moti fuerunt ad ponendum quod
id quod est necessarium non habeat causam, ut dicitur in VIII
Physic. Sed hoc manifeste falsum apparet in scientiis
demonstrativis, in quibus principia necessaria sunt causae
conclusionum necessariarum. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles, in V
Metaphys., quod sunt quaedam necessaria quae habent causam suae
necessitatis. Non ergo propter hoc solum requiritur causa agens,
quia effectus potest non esse, sed quia effectus non esset, si
causa non esset. Haec enim conditionalis est vera, sive antecedens
et consequens sint possibilia, sive impossibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract
                     in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although
                     the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under
                     the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that
                     object from its efficient cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="30290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30290] Iª q. 44 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod mathematica accipiuntur ut abstracta secundum
rationem, cum tamen non sint abstracta secundum esse. Unicuique
autem competit habere causam agentem, secundum quod habet esse.
Licet igitur ea quae sunt mathematica habeant causam agentem, non
tamen secundum habitudinem quam habent ad causam agentem, cadunt
sub consideratione mathematici. Et ideo in scientiis mathematicis
non demonstratur aliquid per causam agentem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q44_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A2-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 2. Whether primary matter is created by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else
                     (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="30291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30291] Iª q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod materia prima non sit creata a Deo. Omne
enim quod fit, componitur ex subiecto et ex aliquo alio, ut dicitur
in I Physic. Sed materiae primae non est aliquod subiectum. Ergo
materia prima non potest esse facta a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, action and passion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first passive
                     principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from
                     the other.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="30292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30292] Iª q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, actio
et passio dividuntur contra se invicem. Sed sicut primum principium
activum est Deus, ita primum principium passivum est materia. Ergo
Deus et materia prima sunt duo principia contra se invicem divisa,
quorum neutrum est ab alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that
                     everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore
                     it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="30293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30293] Iª q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
agens agit sibi simile, et sic, cum omne agens agat inquantum est
actu, sequitur quod omne factum aliquo modo sit in actu. Sed
materia prima est tantum in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi. Ergo
contra rationem materiae primae est, quod sit facta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other nigh
                     unto nothing"---viz. primary matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 s. c."><a name="30294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30294] Iª q. 44 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, XII Confess., duo fecisti, domine, unum
prope te, scilicet Angelum, aliud prope nihil, scilicet materiam
primam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q44_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser
                     mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did
                     not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and
                     separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated,
                     they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of
                     that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter,
                     which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential
                     forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according
                     to
                     Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its
                     form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by a supervening accident to
                     a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered "being" under some
                     particular aspect, either as "this" or as "such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then others
                     there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as
                     "such," but as "beings."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q44_A2-p7"> Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are
                     "such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs
                     to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause
                     of things.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 co."><a name="30295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30295] Iª q. 44 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod antiqui philosophi paulatim, et quasi pedetentim, intraverunt
in cognitionem veritatis. A principio enim, quasi grossiores
existentes, non existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia.
Quorum qui ponebant in eis motum, non considerabant motum nisi
secundum aliqua accidentia, ut puta secundum raritatem et
densitatem, congregationem et segregationem. Et supponentes ipsam
substantiam corporum increatam, assignabant aliquas causas
huiusmodi accidentalium transmutationum, ut puta amicitiam, litem,
intellectum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Ulterius vero procedentes,
distinxerunt per intellectum inter formam substantialem et
materiam, quam ponebant increatam; et perceperunt transmutationem
fieri in corporibus secundum formas essentiales. Quarum
transmutationum quasdam causas universaliores ponebant, ut obliquum
circulum, secundum Aristotelem, vel ideas, secundum Platonem. Sed
considerandum est quod materia per formam contrahitur ad
determinatam speciem; sicut substantia alicuius speciei per
accidens ei adveniens contrahitur ad determinatum modum essendi, ut
homo contrahitur per album. Utrique igitur consideraverunt ens
particulari quadam consideratione, vel inquantum est hoc ens, vel
inquantum est tale ens. Et sic rebus causas agentes particulares
assignaverunt. Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens
inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum
secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia.
Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse
causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas
accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec per formas substantiales,
sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum
quocumque modo. Et sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam
ab universali causa entium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form to form, either accidental
                     or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from
                     which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="30296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30296] Iª q. 44 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod philosophus in I Physic. loquitur de fieri
particulari, quod est de forma in formam, sive accidentalem sive
substantialem nunc autem loquimur de rebus secundum emanationem
earum ab universali principio essendi. A qua quidem emanatione nec
materia excluditur, licet a primo modo factionis excludatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first
                     active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle
                     says (Metaph. xii, text 40).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="30297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30297] Iª q. 44 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod passio est effectus actionis. Unde et rationabile est
quod primum principium passivum sit effectus primi principii
activi, nam omne imperfectum causatur a perfecto. Oportet enim
primum principium esse perfectissimum, ut dicit Aristoteles, in XII
Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything
                     created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if
                     all that belongs to its being is created.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="30298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30298] Iª q. 44 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ratio illa non ostendit quod materia non sit creata,
sed quod non sit creata sine forma. Licet enim omne creatum sit in
actu, non tamen est actus purus. Unde oportet quod etiam illud quod
se habet ex parte potentiae, sit creatum, si totum quod ad esse
ipsius pertinet, creatum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q44_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A3-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 3. Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures
                     are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="30299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30299] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod causa exemplaris sit aliquid praeter Deum.
Exemplatum enim habet similitudinem exemplaris. Sed creaturae longe
sunt a divina similitudine. Non ergo Deus est causa exemplaris
earum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated
                     above
                     <a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q44_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in
                     all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles
                     of the species. Therefore it is necessary to admit
                     self-existing species, as for instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars.
                     Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="30300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30300] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
quod est per participationem, reducitur ad aliquid per se existens,
ut ignitum ad ignem, sicut iam dictum est. Sed quaecumque sunt in
sensibilibus rebus, sunt solum per participationem alicuius
speciei, quod ex hoc patet, quod in nullo sensibilium invenitur
solum id quod ad rationem speciei pertinet, sed adiunguntur
principiis speciei principia individuantia. Oportet ergo ponere
ipsas species per se existentes, ut per se hominem, et per se
equum, et huiusmodi. Et haec dicuntur exemplaria. Sunt igitur
exemplaria res quaedam extra Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because
                     there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing
                     in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="30301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30301] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
scientiae et definitiones sunt de ipsis speciebus, non secundum
quod sunt in particularibus, quia particularium non est scientia
nec definitio. Ergo sunt quaedam entia, quae sunt entia vel species
non in singularibus. Et haec dicuntur exemplaria. Ergo idem quod
prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting
                     life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="30302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30302] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, hoc
idem videtur per Dionysium, qui dicit, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod
<i>ipsum secundum se esse, prius est eo quod est per se vitam esse,
et eo quod est per se sapientiam esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are
                     contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 s. c."><a name="30303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30303] Iª q. 44 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod exemplar est idem quod idea. Sed ideae, secundum quod
Augustinus libro octoginta trium quaest. dicit, <i>sunt formae
principales, quae divina intelligentia continentur</i>. Ergo
exemplaria rerum non sunt extra Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an
                     exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate
                     form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily
                     conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive
                     determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom
                     devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine
                     wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas---i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q15_A1" id="FP_Q44_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[15], A[1]</a>). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not
                     apart from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this
                     manner therefore God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar
                     of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 co."><a name="30304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30304] Iª q. 44 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum. Ad cuius
evidentiam, considerandum est quod ad productionem alicuius rei
ideo necessarium est exemplar, ut effectus determinatam formam
consequatur, artifex enim producit determinatam formam in materia,
propter exemplar ad quod inspicit, sive illud sit exemplar ad quod
extra intuetur, sive sit exemplar interius mente conceptum.
Manifestum est autem quod ea quae naturaliter fiunt, determinatas
formas consequuntur. Haec autem formarum determinatio oportet quod
reducatur, sicut in primum principium, in divinam sapientiam, quae
ordinem universi excogitavit, qui in rerum distinctione consistit.
Et ideo oportet dicere quod in divina sapientia sunt rationes
omnium rerum, quas supra diximus ideas, id est formas exemplares in
mente divina existentes. Quae quidem licet multiplicentur secundum
respectum ad res, tamen non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia,
prout eius similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode.
Sic igitur ipse Deus est primum exemplar omnium. Possunt etiam in
rebus creatis quaedam aliorum exemplaria dici, secundum quod
quaedam sunt ad similitudinem aliorum, vel secundum eandem speciem,
vel secundum analogiam alicuius imitationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like
                     to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material
                     house is like to the house in the architect's mind.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="30305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30305] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet creaturae non pertingant ad hoc quod sint
similes Deo secundum suam naturam, similitudine speciei, ut homo
genitus homini generanti; attingunt tamen ad eius similitudinem
secundum repraesentationem rationis intellectae a Deo, ut domus
quae est in materia, domui quae est in mente artificis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man
                     is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior
                     species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="30306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30306] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod de ratione hominis est quod sit in materia, et sic
non potest inveniri homo sine materia. Licet igitur hic homo sit
per participationem speciei, non tamen potest reduci ad aliquid
existens per se in eadem specie; sed ad speciem superexcedentem,
sicut sunt substantiae separatae. Et eadem ratio est de aliis
sensibilibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the
                     same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active
                     intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars
                     in order to be their exemplars.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="30307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30307] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, licet quaelibet scientia et definitio sit solum
entium, non tamen oportet quod res eundem modum habeant in essendo,
quem intellectus habet in intelligendo. Nos enim, per virtutem
intellectus agentis, abstrahimus species universales a
particularibus conditionibus, non tamen oportet quod universalia
praeter particularia subsistant, ut particularium exemplaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes
                     the powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="30308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30308] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius, XI cap. de Div. Nom., per se
vitam et per se sapientiam quandoque nominat ipsum Deum, quandoque
virtutes ipsis rebus datas, non autem quasdam subsistentes res,
sicut antiqui posuerunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q44_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A4-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 4. Whether God is the final cause of all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is not the final cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God
                     needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="30309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30309] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit causa finalis omnium. Agere
enim propter finem videtur esse alicuius indigentis fine. Sed Deus
nullo est indigens. Ergo non competit sibi agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70),
                     because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore
                     He is not the final cause of all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="30310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30310] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, finis
generationis et forma generati et agens non incidunt in idem
numero, ut dicitur in II Physic., quia finis generationis est forma
generati. Sed Deus est primum agens omnium. Non ergo est causa
finalis omnium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not
                     the end of all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="30311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30311] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, finem
omnia appetunt. Sed Deum non omnia appetunt, quia neque omnia ipsum
cognoscunt. Deus ergo non est omnium finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows
                     that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="30312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30312] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
finalis causa est prima causarum. Si igitur Deus sit causa agens et
causa finalis, sequitur quod in eo sit prius et posterius. Quod est
impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord has made all things for Himself."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 s. c."><a name="30313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30313] Iª q. 44 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Prov. XVI, <i>universa propter semetipsum operatus est
dominus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless
                     it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively.
                     For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some
                     things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect
                     agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the
                     First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which
                     is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection
                     and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 co."><a name="30314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30314] Iª q. 44 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod omne agens agit propter finem, alioquin ex actione agentis non
magis sequeretur hoc quam illud, nisi a casu. Est autem idem finis
agentis et patientis, inquantum huiusmodi, sed aliter et aliter,
unum enim et idem est quod agens intendit imprimere, et quod
patiens intendit recipere. Sunt autem quaedam quae simul agunt et
patiuntur, quae sunt agentia imperfecta, et his convenit quod etiam
in agendo intendant aliquid acquirere. Sed primo agenti, qui est
agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicuius
finis; sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quae est
eius bonitas. Et unaquaeque creatura intendit consequi suam
perfectionem, quae est similitudo perfectionis et bonitatis
divinae. Sic ergo divina bonitas est finis rerum omnium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong
                     to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for
                     His own goodness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="30315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30315] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod agere propter indigentiam non est nisi agentis
imperfecti, quod natum est agere et pati. Sed hoc Deo non competit.
Et ideo ipse solus est maxime liberalis, quia non agit propter suam
utilitatem, sed solum propter suam bonitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The form of the thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator,
                     which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator,
                     since the end is more noble than the means to the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="30316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30316] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod forma generati non est finis generationis nisi
inquantum est similitudo formae generantis, quod suam similitudinem
communicare intendit. Alioquin forma generati esset nobilior
generante, cum finis sit nobilior his quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or
                     natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness
                     to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="30317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30317] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod omnia appetunt Deum ut finem, appetendo quodcumque
bonum, sive appetitu intelligibili, sive sensibili, sive naturali,
qui est sine cognitione, quia nihil habet rationem boni et
appetibilis, nisi secundum quod participat Dei similitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows
                     that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things
                     in Him, some of which come into our mind before others.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="30318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30318] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, cum Deus sit causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis
omnium rerum, et materia prima sit ab ipso, sequitur quod primum
principium omnium rerum sit unum tantum secundum rem. Nihil tamen
prohibet in eo considerari multa secundum rationem, quorum quaedam
prius cadunt in intellectu nostro quam alia.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q45" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q45-p0.1">Q. 45. THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q45-p2"> The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called creation, and
                  includes eight points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q45-p3"><a href="#FP_Q45_A1"> (1) What is creation?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p4"><a href="#FP_Q45_A2"> (2) Whether God can create anything?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p5"><a href="#FP_Q45_A3"> (3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p6"><a href="#FP_Q45_A4"> (4) To what things it belongs to be created?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p7"><a href="#FP_Q45_A5"> (5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p8"><a href="#FP_Q45_A6"> (6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p9"><a href="#FP_Q45_A7"> (7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p10"><a href="#FP_Q45_A8"> (8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 pr."><a name="30319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30319]
Iª q. 45 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de modo emanationis
rerum a primo principio, qui dicitur creatio. De qua quaeruntur
octo. Primo, quid sit creatio. Secundo, utrum Deus possit aliquid
creare. Tertio, utrum creatio sit aliquod ens in rerum natura.
Quarto, cui competit creari. Quinto, utrum solius Dei sit creare.
Sexto, utrum commune sit toti Trinitati, aut proprium alicuius
personae. Septimo, utrum vestigium aliquod Trinitatis sit in rebus
creatis. Octavo, utrum opus creationis admisceatur in operibus
naturae et voluntatis.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q45_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A1-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 1. Whether to create is to make something from nothing?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To
                     make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="30320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30320] Iª q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod creare non sit ex nihilo aliquid facere.
Dicit enim Augustinus, contra adversarium legis et prophetarum,
<i>facere est quod omnino non erat, creare vero est ex eo quod iam
erat educendo aliquid constituere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good,
                     and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among
                     all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="30321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30321] Iª q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
nobilitas actionis et motus ex terminis consideratur. Nobilior
igitur est actio quae ex bono in bonum est, et ex ente in ens, quam
quae est ex nihilo in aliquid. Sed creatio videtur esse nobilissima
actio, et prima inter omnes actiones. Ergo non est ex nihilo in
aliquid, sed magis ex ente in ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say
                     that a statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create
                     is not to make something from nothing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="30322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30322] Iª q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, haec
praepositio ex importat habitudinem alicuius causae, et maxime
materialis; sicut cum dicimus quod statua fit ex aere. Sed nihil
non potest esse materia entis, nec aliquo modo causa eius. Ergo
creare non est ex nihilo aliquid facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> On the text of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, "In the beginning God created," etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 s. c."><a name="30323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30323] Iª q. 45 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod super illud Gen. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum</i>
etc., dicit Glossa quod creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q45_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being
                     from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular
                     emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from "not-man,"
                     and white from "not-white."
                     Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being
                     should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is
                     from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is
                     "nothing."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 co."><a name="30324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30324] Iª q. 45 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut supra dictum est, non solum oportet considerare
emanationem alicuius entis particularis ab aliquo particulari
agente, sed etiam emanationem totius entis a causa universali, quae
est Deus, et hanc quidem emanationem designamus nomine creationis.
Quod autem procedit secundum emanationem particularem, non
praesupponitur emanationi, sicut, si generatur homo, non fuit prius
homo, sed homo fit ex non homine, et album ex non albo. Unde, si
consideretur emanatio totius entis universalis a primo principio,
impossibile est quod aliquod ens praesupponatur huic emanationi.
Idem autem est nihil quod nullum ens. Sicut igitur generatio
hominis est ex non ente quod est non homo, ita creatio, quae est
emanatio totius esse, est ex non ente quod est nihil.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when
                     we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="30325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30325] Iª q. 45 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Augustinus aequivoce utitur nomine creationis,
secundum quod creari dicuntur ea quae in melius reformantur, ut cum
dicitur aliquis creari in episcopum. Sic autem non loquimur hic de
creatione, sed sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto." Therefore a change is more
                     perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding
                     to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because
                     the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the
                     privation of the substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which
                     is the term "wherefrom" in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because
                     the term "whereto" is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term "wherefrom" is simply not-being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="30326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30326] Iª q. 45 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod mutationes accipiunt speciem et dignitatem non a
termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem. Tanto ergo perfectior et
prior est aliqua mutatio, quanto terminus ad quem illius mutationis
est nobilior et prior; licet terminus a quo, qui opponitur termino
ad quem, sit imperfectior. Sicut generatio simpliciter est nobilior
et prior quam alteratio, propter hoc quod forma substantialis est
nobilior quam forma accidentalis, tamen privatio substantialis
formae, quae est terminus a quo in generatione, est imperfectior
quam contrarium, quod est terminus a quo in alteratione. Et
similiter creatio est perfectior et prior quam generatio et
alteratio, quia terminus ad quem est tota substantia rei. Id autem
quod intelligitur ut terminus a quo, est simpliciter non ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only
                     order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition
                     "from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing," or can be included in it. If taken in the first
                     sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and
                     its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, "It
                     is made from nothing---i.e. it is not made from anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does
                     not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the
                     first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the
                     material
                     cause, which is denied.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="30327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30327] Iª q. 45 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, cum dicitur aliquid ex nihilo fieri, haec
praepositio ex non designat causam materialem, sed ordinem tantum;
sicut cum dicitur, ex mane fit meridies, idest, post mane fit
meridies. Sed intelligendum est quod haec praepositio ex potest
includere negationem importatam in hoc quod dico nihil, vel includi
ab ea. Si primo modo, tunc ordo remanet affirmatus, et ostenditur
ordo eius, quod est ad non esse praecedens. Si vero negatio
includat praepositionem, tunc ordo negatur, et est sensus, fit ex
nihilo, idest non fit ex aliquo; sicut si dicatur, iste loquitur de
nihilo, quia non loquitur de aliquo. Et utroque modo verificatur,
cum dicitur ex nihilo aliquid fieri. Sed primo modo, haec
praepositio ex importat ordinem, ut dictum est, secundo modo,
importat habitudinem causae materialis, quae negatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A2-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 2. Whether God can create anything?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot create anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient philosophers
                     considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the
                     contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation
                     and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from
                     nothing, or create.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="30328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30328] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit aliquid creare. Quia
secundum philosophum, I Physic., antiqui philosophi acceperunt ut
communem conceptionem animi, ex nihilo nihil fieri. Sed potentia
Dei non se extendit ad contraria primorum principiorum; utpote quod
Deus faciat quod totum non sit maius sua parte, vel quod affirmatio
et negatio sint simul vera. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid ex nihilo
facere, vel creare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore
                     creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the
                     act of what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="30329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30329] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere, ergo creari est aliquid fieri.
Sed omne fieri est mutari. Ergo creatio est mutatio. Sed omnis
mutatio est ex subiecto aliquo, ut patet per definitionem motus,
nam motus est actus existentis in potentia. Ergo est impossibile
aliquid a Deo ex nihilo fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what has been made must have at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same
                     time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already
                     is: and so it would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becoming
                     precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which
                     the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="30330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30330] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
factum est, necesse est aliquando fieri. Sed non potest dici quod
illud quod creatur, simul fiat et factum sit, quia in
permanentibus, quod fit, non est, quod autem factum est, iam est;
simul ergo aliquid esset et non esset. Ergo, si aliquid fit, fieri
eius praecedit factum esse. Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi
praeexistat subiectum in quo sustentetur ipsum fieri. Ergo
impossibile est aliquid fieri ex nihilo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not
                     happen that something is made from nothing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="30331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30331] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
infinitam distantiam non est pertransire. Sed infinita distantia
est inter ens et nihil. Ergo non contingit ex nihilo aliquid
fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 s. c."><a name="30332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30332] Iª q. 45 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et
terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Not only is it impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created
                     by God, as appears from what has been said (
                     <a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[1]</a>). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is
                     not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action
                     of art,
                     but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If
                     therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him.
                     Now it has been shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that
                     God brings things into being from nothing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 co."><a name="30333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30333] Iª q. 45 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod non solum non est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari, sed
necesse est ponere a Deo omnia creata esse, ut ex praemissis
habetur. Quicumque enim facit aliquid ex aliquo, illud ex quo facit
praesupponitur actioni eius, et non producitur per ipsam actionem,
sicut artifex operatur ex rebus naturalibus, ut ex ligno et aere,
quae per artis actionem non causantur, sed causantur per actionem
naturae. Sed et ipsa natura causat res naturales quantum ad formam,
sed praesupponit materiam. Si ergo Deus non ageret nisi ex aliquo
praesupposito, sequeretur quod illud praesuppositum non esset
causatum ab ipso. Ostensum est autem supra quod nihil potest esse
in entibus quod non sit a Deo, qui est causa universalis totius
esse. Unde necesse est dicere quod Deus ex nihilo res in esse
producit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ancient philosophers, as is said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q45_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their
                     action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing." But this has no place in the first emanation
                     from the universal principle of things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="30334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30334] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod antiqui philosophi, sicut supra dictum est, non
consideraverunt nisi emanationem effectuum particularium a causis
particularibus, quas necesse est praesupponere aliquid in sua
actione, et secundum hoc erat eorum communis opinio, ex nihilo
nihil fieri. Sed tamen hoc locum non habet in prima emanatione ab
universali rerum principio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different
                     now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in
                     motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial
                     change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole
                     substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding,
                     so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide
                     as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that
                     when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of
                     signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A1" id="FP_Q45_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing.
                     And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to make"
                     and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="30335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30335] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod creatio non est mutatio nisi secundum modum
intelligendi tantum. Nam de ratione mutationis est, quod aliquid
idem se habeat aliter nunc et prius, nam quandoque est idem ens
actu, aliter se habens nunc et prius, sicut in motibus secundum
quantitatem et qualitatem et ubi; quandoque vero est idem ens in
potentia tantum, sicut in mutatione secundum substantiam, cuius
subiectum est materia. Sed in creatione, per quam producitur tota
substantia rerum, non potest accipi aliquid idem aliter se habens
nunc et prius, nisi secundum intellectum tantum; sicut si
intelligatur aliqua res prius non fuisse totaliter, et postea esse.
Sed cum actio et passio conveniant in substantia motus, et
differant solum secundum habitudines diversas, ut dicitur in III
Physic., oportet quod, subtracto motu, non remaneant nisi diversae
habitudines in creante et creato. Sed quia modus significandi
sequitur modum intelligendi, ut dictum est, creatio significatur
per modum mutationis, et propter hoc dicitur quod creare est ex
nihilo aliquid facere. Quamvis facere et fieri magis in hoc
conveniant quam mutare et mutari, quia facere et fieri important
habitudinem causae ad effectum et effectus ad causam, sed
mutationem ex consequenti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the
                     term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is
                     not the term of movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time. In these things what is being
                     made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was
                     not previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and is already created at the same time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="30336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30336] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod in his quae fiunt sine motu, simul est fieri et
factum esse, sive talis factio sit terminus motus, sicut
illuminatio (nam simul aliquid illuminatur et illuminatum est);
sive non sit terminus motus, sicut simul formatur verbum in corde
et formatum est. Et in his, quod fit, est, sed cum dicitur fieri,
significatur ab alio esse, et prius non fuisse. Unde, cum creatio
sit sine motu, simul aliquid creatur et creatum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is
                     plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two forms.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="30337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30337] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit ex falsa imaginatione, ac si
sit aliquod infinitum medium inter nihilum et ens, quod patet esse
falsum. Procedit autem falsa haec imaginatio ex eo quod creatio
significatur ut quaedam mutatio inter duos terminos existens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A3-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 3. Whether creation is anything in the creature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the
                     creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in
                     the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively
                     is not anything in the creature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="30338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30338] Iª q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod creatio non sit aliquid in creatura. Sicut
enim creatio passive accepta attribuitur creaturae, ita creatio
active accepta attribuitur creatori. Sed creatio active accepta non
est aliquid in creatore, quia sic sequeretur quod in Deo esset
aliquid temporale. Ergo creatio passive accepta non est aliquid in
creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both:
                     since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case it would be necessary for
                     the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the
                     creature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="30339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30339] Iª q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
est medium inter creatorem et creaturam. Sed creatio significatur
ut medium inter utrumque, non enim est creator, cum non sit
aeterna; neque creatura, quia oporteret eadem ratione aliam ponere
creationem qua ipsa crearetur, et sic in infinitum. Creatio ergo
non est aliquid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if creation is anything besides the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident
                     is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and
                     also the term of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident; while
                     the term is after the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action
                     and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="30340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30340] Iª q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
creatio est aliquid praeter substantiam creatam, oportet quod sit
accidens eius. Omne autem accidens est in subiecto. Ergo res creata
esset subiectum creationis. Et sic idem esset subiectum creationis
et terminus. Quod est impossibile, quia subiectum prius est
accidente, et conservat accidens; terminus autem posterius est
actione et passione cuius est terminus, et eo existente cessat
actio et passio. Igitur ipsa creatio non est aliqua res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental
                     form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental
                     form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole
                     substance, something in the thing created.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 s. c."><a name="30341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30341] Iª q. 45 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, maius
est fieri aliquid secundum totam substantiam, quam secundum formam
substantialem vel accidentalem. Sed generatio simpliciter vel
secundum quid, qua fit aliquid secundum formam substantialem vel
accidentalem, est aliquid in generato. Ergo multo magis creatio,
qua fit aliquid secundum totam substantiam, est aliquid in
creato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement,
                     or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in
                     the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all
                     beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when
                     movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above (A[2], ad 2). Hence creation in the
                     creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement,
                     is implied a relation to the principle of motion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 co."><a name="30342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30342] Iª q. 45 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod creatio ponit aliquid in creato secundum relationem tantum.
Quia quod creatur, non fit per motum vel per mutationem. Quod enim
fit per motum vel mutationem, fit ex aliquo praeexistenti, quod
quidem contingit in productionibus particularibus aliquorum entium;
non autem potest hoc contingere in productione totius esse a causa
universali omnium entium, quae est Deus. Unde Deus, creando,
producit res sine motu. Subtracto autem motu ab actione et
passione, nihil remanet nisi relatio, ut dictum est. Unde
relinquitur quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quaedam
ad creatorem, ut ad principium sui esse; sicut in passione quae est
cum motu, importatur relatio ad principium motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God
                     relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God
                     is a real relation, as was said above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A7" id="FP_Q45_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[7]</a>) in treating of the divine names.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="30343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30343] Iª q. 45 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod creatio active significata significat actionem
divinam, quae est eius essentia cum relatione ad creaturam. Sed
relatio in Deo ad creaturam non est realis, sed secundum rationem
tantum. Relatio vero creaturae ad Deum est relatio realis, ut supra
dictum est, cum de divinis nominibus ageretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because creation is signified as a change, as was said above (A[2], ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover
                     and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive
                     creation is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further creation in its creation; because relations,
                     or their entire nature being referred to something, are not referred by any other
                     relations, but by themselves; as was also shown above (
                     <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q42_A1" id="FP_Q45_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[42], A[1]</a>, ad 4), in treating of the equality of the Persons.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="30344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30344] Iª q. 45 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, quia creatio significatur ut mutatio, sicut dictum
est; mutatio autem media quodammodo est inter movens et motum, ideo
etiam creatio significatur ut media inter creatorem et creaturam.
Tamen creatio passive accepta est in creatura, et est creatura.
Neque tamen oportet quod alia creatione creetur, quia relationes,
cum hoc ipsum quod sunt, ad aliquid dicantur, non referuntur per
aliquas alias relationes, sed per seipsas; sicut etiam supra dictum
est, cum de aequalitate personarum ageretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The creature is the term of creation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and
                     is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the
                     part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the
                     creature is it should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature
                     to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="30345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30345] Iª q. 45 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod creationis, secundum quod significatur ut mutatio,
creatura est terminus, sed secundum quod vere est relatio, creatura
est eius subiectum, et prius ea in esse, sicut subiectum accidente.
Sed habet quandam rationem prioritatis ex parte obiecti ad quod
dicitur, quod est principium creaturae. Neque tamen oportet quod,
quandiu creatura sit, dicatur creari, quia creatio importat
habitudinem creaturae ad creatorem cum quadam novitate seu
incoeptione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A4-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 4. Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv)
                     it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly
                     speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="30346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30346] Iª q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod creari non sit proprium compositorum et
subsistentium. Dicitur enim in libro de causis, prima rerum
creatarum est esse. Sed esse rei creatae non est subsistens. Ergo
creatio proprie non est subsistentis et compositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own
                     component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="30347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30347] Iª q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
creatur est ex nihilo. Composita autem non sunt ex nihilo, sed ex
suis componentibus. Ergo compositis non convenit creari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the
                     natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore
                     matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="30348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30348] Iª q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud
proprie producitur per primam emanationem, quod supponitur in
secunda, sicut res naturalis per generationem naturalem, quae
supponitur in operatione artis. Sed illud quod supponitur in
generatione naturali, est materia. Ergo materia est quae proprie
creatur, et non compositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation
                     belongs to them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 s. c."><a name="30349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30349] Iª q. 45 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et
terram</i>. Caelum autem et terra sunt res compositae subsistentes.
Ergo horum proprie est creatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q45_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>, ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever
                     being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate
                     substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has
                     being---that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they
                     themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it.
                     Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being."
                     Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they
                     ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 co."><a name="30350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30350] Iª q. 45 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod creari est quoddam fieri, ut dictum est. Fieri autem ordinatur
ad esse rei. Unde illis proprie convenit fieri et creari, quibus
convenit esse. Quod quidem convenit proprie subsistentibus, sive
sint simplicia, sicut substantiae separatae; sive sint composita,
sicut substantiae materiales. Illi enim proprie convenit esse, quod
habet esse; et hoc est subsistens in suo esse. Formae autem et
accidentia, et alia huiusmodi, non dicuntur entia quasi ipsa sint,
sed quia eis aliquid est; ut albedo ea ratione dicitur ens, quia ea
subiectum est album. Unde, secundum philosophum, accidens magis
proprie dicitur entis quam ens. Sicut igitur accidentia et formae,
et huiusmodi, quae non subsistunt, magis sunt coexistentia quam
entia; ita magis debent dici concreata quam creata. Proprie vero
creata sunt subsistentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the proposition "the first of created things is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but
                     to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because
                     it is "this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q45_A1" id="FP_Q45_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. We use a similar way of speaking when we say that "the first visible
                     thing is color," although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="30351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30351] Iª q. 45 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, cum dicitur, prima rerum creatarum est esse, ly esse
non importat subiectum creatum; sed importat propriam rationem
obiecti creationis. Nam ex eo dicitur aliquid creatum, quod est
ens, non ex eo quod est hoc ens, cum creatio sit emanatio totius
esse ab ente universali, ut dictum est. Et est similis modus
loquendi, sicut si diceretur quod primum visibile est color,
quamvis illud quod proprie videtur, sit coloratum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite"
                     is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="30352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30352] Iª q. 45 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod creatio non dicit constitutionem rei compositae ex
principiis praeexistentibus, sed compositum sic dicitur creari,
quod simul cum omnibus suis principiis in esse producitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for creation
                     is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="30353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30353] Iª q. 45 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ratio illa non probat quod sola materia creetur; sed
quod materia non sit nisi ex creatione. Nam creatio est productio
totius esse, et non solum materiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A5-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 5. Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34),
                     what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless
                     can make their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance
                     like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it
                     has no matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="30354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30354] Iª q. 45 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non solius Dei sit creare. Quia secundum
philosophum, perfectum est quod potest sibi simile facere. Sed
creaturae immateriales sunt perfectiores creaturis materialibus,
quae faciunt sibi simile, ignis enim generat ignem, et homo generat
hominem. Ergo substantia immaterialis potest facere substantiam
sibi similem. Sed substantia immaterialis non potest fieri nisi per
creationem, cum non habeat materiam ex qua fiat. Ergo aliqua
creatura potest creare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker.
                     But a "contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which
                     nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature do this.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="30355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30355] Iª q. 45 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quanto maior est resistentia ex parte facti, tanto maior virtus
requiritur in faciente. Sed plus resistit contrarium quam nihil.
Ergo maioris virtutis est aliquid facere ex contrario, quod tamen
creatura facit; quam aliquid facere ex nihilo. Multo magis igitur
creatura hoc facere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we
                     proved above when treating of the infinity of God (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q45_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary
                     to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="30356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30356] Iª q. 45 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
virtus facientis consideratur secundum mensuram eius quod fit. Sed
ens creatum est finitum, ut supra probatum est, cum de Dei
infinitate ageretur. Ergo ad producendum per creationem aliquid
creatum, non requiritur nisi virtus finita. Sed habere virtutem
finitam non est contra rationem creaturae. Ergo non est impossibile
creaturam creare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other
                     creatures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 s. c."><a name="30357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30357] Iª q. 45 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., quod neque boni neque mali
Angeli possunt esse creatores alicuius rei. Multo minus igitur
aliae creaturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes
                     <a href="#FP_Q45_A1" id="FP_Q45_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that to create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and
                     prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first
                     and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii) that "neither
                     intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation." Now to produce being absolutely,
                     not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p7"> It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of another, not by its own power, but instrumentally,
                     inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some have supposed that
                     although creation is the proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause,
                     can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by God created another after
                     itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies.
                     And in the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that
                     the latter can create ministerially, not by its own power.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p8"> But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause,
                     except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. If therefore
                     it effects nothing, according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need of certain
                     instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its
                     own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating
                     is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally
                     to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent.
                     So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally---that
                     is, ministerially.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p9"> And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it
                     requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 co."><a name="30358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30358] Iª q. 45 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod satis apparet in primo aspectu, secundum praemissa, quod
creare non potest esse propria actio nisi solius Dei. Oportet enim
universaliores effectus in universaliores et priores causas
reducere. Inter omnes autem effectus, universalissimum est ipsum
esse. Unde oportet quod sit proprius effectus primae et
universalissimae causae, quae est Deus. Unde etiam dicitur libro de
causis, quod neque intelligentia vel anima nobilis dat esse, nisi
inquantum operatur operatione divina. Producere autem esse
absolute, non inquantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad rationem
creationis. Unde manifestum est quod creatio est propria actio
ipsius Dei. Contingit autem quod aliquid participet actionem
propriam alicuius alterius, non virtute propria, sed
instrumentaliter, inquantum agit in virtute alterius; sicut aer per
virtutem ignis habet calefacere et ignire. Et secundum hoc, aliqui
opinati sunt quod, licet creatio sit propria actio universalis
causae, tamen aliqua inferiorum causarum inquantum agit in virtute
primae causae, potest creare. Et sic posuit Avicenna quod prima
substantia separata, creata a Deo, creat aliam post se, et
substantiam orbis, et animam eius; et quod substantia orbis creat
materiam inferiorum corporum. Et secundum hunc etiam modum Magister
dicit, in V dist. IV Sent., quod Deus potest creaturae communicare
potentiam creandi, ut creet per ministerium, non propria
auctoritate. Sed hoc esse non potest. Quia causa secunda
instrumentalis non participat actionem causae superioris, nisi
inquantum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad
effectum principalis agentis. Si igitur nihil ibi ageret secundum
illud quod est sibi proprium, frustra adhiberetur ad agendum, nec
oporteret esse determinata instrumenta determinatarum actionum. Sic
enim videmus quod securis, scindendo lignum, quod habet ex
proprietate suae formae, producit scamni formam, quae est effectus
proprius principalis agentis. Illud autem quod est proprius
effectus Dei creantis, est illud quod praesupponitur omnibus aliis,
scilicet esse absolute. Unde non potest aliquid operari dispositive
et instrumentaliter ad hunc effectum, cum creatio non sit ex aliquo
praesupposito, quod possit disponi per actionem instrumentalis
agentis. Sic igitur impossibile est quod alicui creaturae conveniat
creare, neque virtute propria, neque instrumentaliter sive per
ministerium. Et hoc praecipue inconveniens est dici de aliquo
corpore, quod creet, cum nullum corpus agat nisi tangendo vel
movendo; et sic requirit in sua actione aliquid praeexistens, quod
possit tangi et moveri; quod est contra rationem creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying
                     it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause
                     of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate
                     matter whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man
                     participates human nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own
                     being, as we have said above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[7], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in "this": and so it
                     is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in
                     an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything
                     whereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore
                     an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards
                     some added perfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x).
                     In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.15" target="asv">Eph. 3:15</a>): "From whom all
                     paternity in heaven and on earth is named." From which evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless
                     something is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="30359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30359] Iª q. 45 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod aliquod perfectum participans aliquam naturam, facit
sibi simile, non quidem producendo absolute illam naturam, sed
applicando eam ad aliquid. Non enim hic homo potest esse causa
naturae humanae absolute, quia sic esset causa sui ipsius, sed est
causa quod natura humana sit in hoc homine generato. Et sic
praesupponit in sua actione determinatam materiam per quam est hic
homo. Sed sicut hic homo participat humanam naturam, ita quodcumque
ens creatum participat, ut ita dixerim, naturam essendi, quia solus
Deus est suum esse, ut supra dictum est. Nullum igitur ens creatum
potest producere aliquod ens absolute, nisi inquantum esse causat
in hoc, et sic oportet quod praeintelligatur id per quod aliquid
est hoc, actioni qua facit sibi simile. In substantia autem
immateriali non potest praeintelligi aliquid per quod sit haec,
quia est haec per suam formam, per quam habet esse, cum sint formae
subsistentes. Igitur substantia immaterialis non potest producere
aliam substantiam immaterialem sibi similem, quantum ad esse eius;
sed quantum ad perfectionem aliquam superadditam; sicut si dicamus
quod superior Angelus illuminat inferiorem, ut Dionysius dicit.
Secundum quem modum etiam in caelestibus est paternitas, ut ex
verbis apostoli patet, Ephes. III, <i>ex quo omnis paternitas in
caelo et in terra nominatur</i>. Et ex hoc etiam evidenter apparet
quod nullum ens creatum potest causare aliquid, nisi praesupposito
aliquo. Quod repugnat rationi creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality.
                     And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce,
                     as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions,
                     whereby the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act;
                     and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a
                     much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of
                     much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="30360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30360] Iª q. 45 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ex contrario fit aliquid per accidens, ut dicitur in
I Physic., per se autem fit aliquid ex subiecto, quod est in
potentia. Contrarium igitur resistit agenti, inquantum impedit
potentiam ab actu in quem intendit reducere agens, sicut ignis
intendit reducere materiam aquae in actum sibi similem, sed
impeditur per formam et dispositiones contrarias, quibus quasi
ligatur potentia ne reducatur in actum. Et quanto magis fuerit
potentia ligata, tanto requiritur maior virtus in agente ad
reducendam materiam in actum. Unde multo maior potentia requiritur
in agente, si nulla potentia praeexistat. Sic ergo patet quod multo
maioris virtutis est facere aliquid ex nihilo, quam ex
contrario.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made;
                     for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite
                     power, yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater
                     power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the
                     potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potentiality is
                     infinite, because there is no proportion between "no potentiality" and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural
                     agent, as there is no proportion between "not being" and "being." And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any
                     more than it has an infinite being, as was proved above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q45_A5-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[2]</a>), it follows that no creature can
                     create.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="30361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30361] Iª q. 45 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod virtus facientis non solum consideratur ex substantia
facti, sed etiam ex modo faciendi, maior enim calor non solum
magis, sed etiam citius calefacit. Quamvis igitur creare aliquem
effectum finitum non demonstret potentiam infinitam, tamen creare
ipsum ex nihilo demonstrat potentiam infinitam. Quod ex praedictis
patet. Si enim tanto maior virtus requiritur in agente, quanto
potentia est magis remota ab actu, oportet quod virtus agentis ex
nulla praesupposita potentia, quale agens est creans, sit infinita,
quia nulla proportio est nullius potentiae ad aliquam potentiam,
quam praesupponit virtus agentis naturalis, sicut et non entis ad
ens. Et quia nulla creatura habet simpliciter potentiam infinitam,
sicut neque esse infinitum, ut supra probatum est, relinquitur quod
nulla creatura possit creare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A6-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 6. Whether to create is proper to any person?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect
                     is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and
                     is more perfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle; whereas the creature proceeds
                     in imperfect similitude. Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of
                     the processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="30362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30362] Iª q. 45 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod creare sit proprium alicuius personae.
Quod enim est prius, est causa eius quod est post; et perfectum
imperfecti. Sed processio divinae personae est prior quam processio
creaturae, et magis perfecta, quia divina persona procedit in
perfecta similitudine sui principii, creatura vero in imperfecta.
Ergo processiones divinarum personarum sunt causa processionis
rerum. Et sic creare est proprium personae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever
                     difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the Persons.
                     But the causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed
                     that "He is the Creator of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by
                     Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He is "Lord and Life-giver." Therefore the causation
                     of creatures belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="30363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30363] Iª q. 45 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
personae divinae non distinguuntur ab invicem nisi per suas
processiones et relationes. Quidquid igitur differenter attribuitur
divinis personis, hoc convenit eis secundum processiones et
relationes personarum. Sed causalitas creaturarum diversimode
attribuitur divinis personis, nam in symbolo fidei patri
attribuitur quod sit creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium;
filio autem attribuitur quod per eum omnia facta sunt; sed spiritui
sancto, quod sit dominus et vivificator. Causalitas ergo
creaturarum convenit personis secundum processiones et
relationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person,
                     this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute---viz. by power,
                     goodness and wisdom---and thus does not belong to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought
                     not to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished
                     in creating according to relations and processions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="30364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30364] Iª q. 45 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
dicatur quod causalitas creaturae attenditur secundum aliquod
attributum essentiale quod appropriatur alicui personae, hoc non
videtur sufficiens. Quia quilibet effectus divinus causatur a
quolibet attributo essentiali, scilicet potentia, bonitate et
sapientia, et sic non magis pertinet ad unum quam ad aliud. Non
deberet ergo aliquis determinatus modus causalitatis attribui uni
personae magis quam alii, nisi distinguerentur in creando secundum
relationes et processiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused are the common work of the whole Godhead.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 s. c."><a name="30365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30365] Iª q. 45 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod communia totius
divinitatis sunt omnia causalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle
                     of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create
                     belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not
                     proper to any one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q45_A6-p7"> Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of
                     things. For as was said above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[8]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman
                     is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the
                     love of
                     his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through
                     His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch
                     as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 co."><a name="30366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30366] Iª q. 45 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod creare est proprie causare sive producere esse rerum. Cum
autem omne agens agat sibi simile, principium actionis considerari
potest ex actionis effectu, ignis enim est qui generat ignem. Et
ideo creare convenit Deo secundum suum esse, quod est eius
essentia, quae est communis tribus personis. Unde creare non est
proprium alicui personae, sed commune toti Trinitati. Sed tamen
divinae personae secundum rationem suae processionis habent
causalitatem respectu creationis rerum. Ut enim supra ostensum est,
cum de Dei scientia et voluntate ageretur, Deus est causa rerum per
suum intellectum et voluntatem, sicut artifex rerum artificiatarum.
Artifex autem per verbum in intellectu conceptum, et per amorem
suae voluntatis ad aliquid relatum, operatur. Unde et Deus pater
operatus est creaturam per suum verbum, quod est filius; et per
suum amorem, qui est spiritus sanctus. Et secundum hoc processiones
personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, inquantum
includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia et
voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="30367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30367] Iª q. 45 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod processiones divinarum personarum sunt causa
creationis sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son
                     receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common
                     to the three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from
                     both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not
                     receive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3</a>), "Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power, but from another; for this preposition "through"
                     usually denotes a mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle." But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both,
                     is attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for
                     this particular
                     appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated (
                     <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q39_A8" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[39], A[8]</a>, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to
                     be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: "Through
                     Whom all things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which
                     belong both government, which brings things to their proper end, and the giving of life---for life consists in a certain interior
                     movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="30368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30368] Iª q. 45 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut natura divina, licet sit communis tribus
personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit, inquantum filius
accipit naturam divinam a patre, et spiritus sanctus ab utroque;
ita etiam et virtus creandi, licet sit communis tribus personis,
ordine tamen quodam eis convenit; nam filius habet eam a patre, et
spiritus sanctus ab utroque. Unde creatorem esse attribuitur patri,
ut ei qui non habet virtutem creandi ab alio. De filio autem
dicitur per quem omnia facta sunt, inquantum habet eandem virtutem,
sed ab alio, nam haec praepositio per solet denotare causam mediam,
sive principium de principio. Sed spiritui sancto, qui habet eandem
virtutem ab utroque, attribuitur quod dominando gubernet, et
vivificet quae sunt creata a patre per filium. Potest etiam huius
attributionis communis ratio accipi ex appropriatione essentialium
attributorum. Nam, sicut supra dictum est, patri appropriatur
potentia, quae maxime manifestatur in creatione, et ideo
attribuitur patri creatorem esse. Filio autem appropriatur
sapientia, per quam agens per intellectum operatur, et ideo dicitur
de filio, per quem omnia facta sunt. Spiritui sancto autem
appropriatur bonitas, ad quam pertinet gubernatio deducens res in
debitos fines, et vivificatio, nam vita in interiori quodam motu
consistit, primum autem movens est finis et bonitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally
                     connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom," and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness"
                     poured out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to "power."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="30369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30369] Iª q. 45 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, licet quilibet effectus Dei procedat ex quolibet
attributorum, tamen reducitur unusquisque effectus ad illud
attributum, cum quo habet convenientiam secundum propriam rationem,
sicut ordinatio rerum ad sapientiam, et iustificatio impii ad
misericordiam et bonitatem se superabundanter diffundentem. Creatio
vero, quae est productio ipsius substantiae rei, reducitur ad
potentiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A7-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 7. Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through
                     its traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above stated (
                     <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q45_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in creatures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="30370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30370] Iª q. 45 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in creaturis non sit necesse inveniri
vestigium Trinitatis. Per sua enim vestigia unumquodque investigari
potest. Sed Trinitas personarum non potest investigari ex
creaturis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo vestigia Trinitatis non sunt
in creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some
                     of their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity
                     in each of these (properties): and so on to infinitude.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="30371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30371] Iª q. 45 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid in creatura est, creatum est. Si igitur vestigium
Trinitatis invenitur in creatura secundum aliquas proprietates
suas, et omne creatum habet vestigium Trinitatis, oportet in
unaquaque illarum inveniri etiam vestigium Trinitatis, et sic in
infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to
                     the relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of
                     the Trinity but of the unity of essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="30372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30372] Iª q. 45 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
effectus non repraesentat nisi suam causam. Sed causalitas
creaturarum pertinet ad naturam communem, non autem ad relationes,
quibus personae distinguuntur et numerantur. Ergo in creatura non
invenitur vestigium Trinitatis, sed solum unitatis essentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that "the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 s. c."><a name="30373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30373] Iª q. 45 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod <i>Trinitatis vestigium in
creatura apparet</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause,
                     but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a "trace": for a trace shows that someone has
                     passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents
                     fire generating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the
                     representation of "image." Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was
                     said above
                     <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q27" id="FP_Q45_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(Q[27])</a>. For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational
                     creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there
                     is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q45_A7-p7"> But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are
                     necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form,
                     whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents
                     the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle
                     from no principle." According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is
                     from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He
                     is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De
                     Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according "as it is one individual," and according
                     "as it
                     is formed by a species," and according as it "has a certain relation of order." And to these also are reduced those three,
                     "number," "weight," and "measure," mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing
                     limited by its principles, "number" refers to the species, "weight" refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the
                     other three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," "species," and "order," and also those he mentions (QQ. 83,
                     qu.
                     18): "that which exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing exists by its substance, is distinct
                     by its form, and agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 co."><a name="30374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30374] Iª q. 45 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod omnis effectus aliqualiter repraesentat suam causam, sed
diversimode. Nam aliquis effectus repraesentat solam causalitatem
causae, non autem formam eius, sicut fumus repraesentat ignem, et
talis repraesentatio dicitur esse repraesentatio vestigii;
vestigium enim demonstrat motum alicuius transeuntis, sed non
qualis sit. Aliquis autem effectus repraesentat causam quantum ad
similitudinem formae eius, sicut ignis generatus ignem generantem,
et statua Mercurii Mercurium, et haec est repraesentatio imaginis.
Processiones autem divinarum personarum attenduntur secundum actus
intellectus et voluntatis, sicut supra dictum est, nam filius
procedit ut verbum intellectus, spiritus sanctus ut amor
voluntatis. In creaturis igitur rationalibus, in quibus est
intellectus et voluntas, invenitur repraesentatio Trinitatis per
modum imaginis, inquantum invenitur in eis verbum conceptum et amor
procedens. Sed in creaturis omnibus invenitur repraesentatio
Trinitatis per modum vestigii, inquantum in qualibet creatura
inveniuntur aliqua quae necesse est reducere in divinas personas
sicut in causam. Quaelibet enim creatura subsistit in suo esse, et
habet formam per quam determinatur ad speciem, et habet ordinem ad
aliquid aliud. Secundum igitur quod est quaedam substantia creata,
repraesentat causam et principium, et sic demonstrat personam
patris, qui est principium non de principio. Secundum autem quod
habet quandam formam et speciem, repraesentat verbum; secundum quod
forma artificiati est ex conceptione artificis. Secundum autem quod
habet ordinem, repraesentat spiritum sanctum, inquantum est amor,
quia ordo effectus ad aliquid alterum est ex voluntate creantis. Et
ideo dicit Augustinus, in VI Lib. de Trin., quod vestigium
Trinitatis invenitur in unaquaque creatura, secundum quod unum
aliquid est, et secundum quod aliqua specie formatur, et secundum
quod quendam ordinem tenet. Et ad haec etiam reducuntur illa tria,
numerus, pondus et mensura, quae ponuntur Sap. XI, nam mensura
refertur ad substantiam rei limitatam suis principiis, numerus ad
speciem, pondus ad ordinem. Et ad haec etiam reducuntur alia tria
quae ponit Augustinus, modus species et ordo. Et ea quae ponit in
libro octoginta trium quaest. quod constat, quod discernitur, quod
congruit, constat enim aliquid per suam substantiam, discernitur
per formam, congruit per ordinem. Et in idem de facili reduci
possunt quaecumque sic dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge
                     of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we have said (
                     <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q45_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="30375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30375] Iª q. 45 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod repraesentatio vestigii attenditur secundum
appropriata, per quem modum ex creaturis in Trinitatem divinarum
personarum veniri potest, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A creature properly speaking is a thing self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found. Nor
                     is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being
                     is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="30376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30376] Iª q. 45 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod creatura est res proprie subsistens, in qua est
praedicta tria invenire. Neque oportet quod in quolibet eorum quae
ei insunt, haec tria inveniantur, sed secundum ea vestigium rei
subsistenti attribuitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation; as appears from the above
                     <a href="#FP_Q45_A6" id="FP_Q45_A7-p10.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="30377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30377] Iª q. 45 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod etiam processiones personarum sunt causa et ratio
creationis aliquo modo, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A8-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 8. Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is
                     produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and
                     thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="30378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30378] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod creatio admisceatur in operibus naturae et
artis. In qualibet enim operatione naturae et artis producitur
aliqua forma. Sed non producitur ex aliquo, cum non habeat materiam
partem sui. Ergo producitur ex nihilo. Et sic in qualibet
operatione naturae et artis est creatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which
                     is an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it
                     must be produced by creation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="30379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30379] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
effectus non est potior sua causa. Sed in rebus naturalibus non
invenitur aliquid agens nisi forma accidentalis, quae est forma
activa vel passiva. Non ergo per operationem naturae producitur
forma substantialis. Relinquitur igitur quod sit per
creationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident
                     in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason
                     applies to other things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="30380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30380] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
natura facit sibi simile. Sed quaedam inveniuntur generata in
natura non ab aliquo sibi simili, sicut patet in animalibus
generatis per putrefactionem. Ergo eorum forma non est a natura,
sed a creatione. Et eadem ratio est de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow
                     that nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="30381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30381] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod
non creatur, non est creatura. Si igitur in his quae sunt a natura
non adiungatur creatio, sequitur quod ea quae sunt a natura, non
sunt creaturae. Quod est haereticum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 s. c."><a name="30382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30382] Iª q. 45 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus, super Gen. ad Lit., distinguit opus propagationis,
quod est opus naturae, ab opere creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A8-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but
                     previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from
                     not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they
                     asserted that they pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms were given or
                     caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this
                     opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting,
                     but is that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone,
                     as shown above
                     <a href="#FP_Q45_A4" id="FP_Q45_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be
                     "concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q45_A8-p8"> Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is presupposed to the work of nature.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 co."><a name="30383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30383] Iª q. 45 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod haec dubitatio inducitur propter formas. Quas quidam posuerunt
non incipere per actionem naturae, sed prius in materia extitisse,
ponentes latitationem formarum. Et hoc accidit eis ex ignorantia
materiae, quia nesciebant distinguere inter potentiam et actum,
quia enim formae praeexistunt in materia in potentia, posuerunt eas
simpliciter praeexistere. Alii vero posuerunt formas dari vel
causari ab agente separato, per modum creationis. Et secundum hoc
cuilibet operationi naturae adiungitur creatio. Sed hoc accidit eis
ex ignorantia formae. Non enim considerabant quod forma naturalis
corporis non est subsistens, sed quo aliquid est, et ideo, cum
fieri et creari non conveniat proprie nisi rei subsistenti, sicut
supra dictum est, formarum non est fieri neque creari, sed
concreata esse. Quod autem proprie fit ab agente naturali, est
compositum, quod fit ex materia. Unde in operibus naturae non
admiscetur creatio, sed praesupponitur ad operationem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made, not as though they were made "directly," but only "indirectly."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="30384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30384] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod formae incipiunt esse in actu, compositis factis, non
quod ipsae fiant per se, sed per accidens tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its
                     like according to quality, but according to species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="30385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30385] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod qualitates activae in natura agunt in virtute
formarum substantialium. Et ideo agens naturale non solum producit
sibi simile secundum qualitatem, sed secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to which
                     they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are
                     created by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper
                     agent is required, in the shape of a univocal generator.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="30386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30386] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ad generationem animalium imperfectorum sufficit
agens universale, quod est virtus caelestis, cui assimilantur non
secundum speciem, sed secundum analogiam quandam, neque oportet
dicere quod eorum formae creantur ab agente separato. Ad
generationem vero animalium perfectorum non sufficit agens
universale, sed requiritur agens proprium, quod est generans
univocum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are
                     called creatures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="30387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30387] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod operatio naturae non est nisi ex praesuppositione
principiorum creatorum, et sic ea quae per naturam fiunt, creaturae
dicuntur.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q46" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q46-p0.1">Q. 46. OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q46-p2"> Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures, about which there are three points for treatment:</p><p id="FP_Q46-p3"><a href="#FP_Q46_A1"> (1) Whether creatures always existed?</a></p><p id="FP_Q46-p4"><a href="#FP_Q46_A2"> (2) Whether that they began to exist in an article of Faith?</a></p><p id="FP_Q46-p5"><a href="#FP_Q46_A3"> (3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 pr."><a name="30388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30388]
Iª q. 46 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
principio durationis rerum creatarum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.
Primo, utrum creaturae semper fuerint. Secundo, utrum eas
incoepisse sit articulus fidei. Tertio, quomodo Deus dicatur in
principio caelum et terram creasse.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q46_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q46_A1-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 1. Whether the universe of creatures always existed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything
                     which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore
                     the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in potentiality
                     to existence, which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from
                     privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist
                     without form: while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist:
                     which is impossible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="30389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30389] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod universitas creaturarum, quae mundi nomine
nuncupatur, non incoeperit, sed fuerit ab aeterno. Omne enim quod
incoepit esse, antequam fuerit, possibile fuit ipsum esse, alioquin
impossibile fuisset ipsum fieri. Si ergo mundus incoepit esse,
antequam inciperet, possibile fuit ipsum esse. Sed quod possibile
est esse, est materia, quae est in potentia ad esse, quod est per
formam, et ad non esse, quod est per privationem. Si ergo mundus
incoepit esse, ante mundum fuit materia. Sed non potest esse
materia sine forma, materia autem mundi cum forma, est mundus. Fuit
ergo mundus antequam esse inciperet, quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing
                     extends so long is exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its power does not extend to any determinate
                     time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not: but everything which has a beginning at some time
                     is, and at some time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there
                     are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did
                     not begin to exist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="30390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30390] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
quod habet virtutem ut sit semper, quandoque est et quandoque non
est, quia ad quantum se extendit virtus alicuius rei, tandiu est.
Sed omne incorruptibile habet virtutem ut sit semper, non enim
virtutem habet ad determinatum durationis tempus. Nullum ergo
incorruptibile quandoque est et quandoque non est. Sed omne quod
incipit esse, quandoque est et quandoque non est. Nullum ergo
incorruptibile incipit esse. Sed multa sunt in mundo
incorruptibilia, ut corpora caelestia, et omnes substantiae
intellectuales. Ergo mundus non incoepit esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and
                     also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="30391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30391] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
nullum ingenitum incoepit esse. Sed philosophus probat in I
Physic., quod materia est ingenita; et in I de caelo et mundo, quod
caelum est ingenitum. Non ergo universitas rerum incoepit esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body
                     where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world
                     there was a vacuum; which is impossible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="30392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30392] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
vacuum est ubi non est corpus, sed possibile est esse. Sed si
mundus incoepit esse, ubi nunc est corpus mundi, prius non fuit
aliquod corpus, et tamen poterat ibi esse, alioquin nunc ibi non
esset. Ergo ante mundum fuit vacuum, quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before.
                     But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement.
                     Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only in a movable thing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="30393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30393] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
de novo incipit moveri, nisi per hoc quod movens vel mobile aliter
se habet nunc quam prius. Sed quod aliter se habet nunc quam prius,
movetur. Ergo ante omnem motum de novo incipientem, fuit aliquis
motus. Motus ergo semper fuit. Ergo et mobile, quia motus non est
nisi in mobili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For
                     nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable
                     thing, there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there before. And the will, without itself being
                     changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined change,
                     at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow,
                     but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because
                     time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so
                     the same conclusion follows as before.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="30394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30394] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, omne
movens aut est naturale, aut est voluntarium. Sed neutrum incipit
movere, nisi aliquo motu praeexistente. Natura enim semper eodem
modo operatur. Unde, nisi praecedat aliqua immutatio vel in natura
moventis vel in mobili, non incipiet a movente naturali esse motus,
qui non fuit prius. Voluntas autem absque sui immutatione retardat
facere quod proponit, sed hoc non est nisi per aliquam immutationem
quam imaginatur, ad minus ex parte ipsius temporis. Sicut qui vult
facere domum cras, et non hodie, expectat aliquid futurum cras,
quod hodie non est; et ad minus expectat quod dies hodiernus
transeat, et crastinus adveniat; quod sine mutatione non est, quia
tempus est numerus motus. Relinquitur ergo quod ante omnem motum de
novo incipientem, fuit alius motus. Et sic idem quod prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p8">
                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is
                     not in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning and end, because there is no
                     time except "now" which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time cannot begin or end, and consequently
                     neither can movement, the measure of what is time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 7"><a name="30395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30395] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid est semper in principio et semper in fine, nec incipere
nec desinere potest, quia quod incipit, non est in suo fine; quod
autem desinit, non est in suo principio. Sed tempus semper est in
suo principio et fine, quia nihil est temporis nisi nunc, quod est
finis praeteriti, et principium futuri. Ergo tempus nec incipere
nec desinere potest. Et per consequens nec motus, cuius numerus
tempus est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p9">
                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, God is before the world either in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only,
                     therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior
                     in duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the world, which is impossible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 8"><a name="30396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30396] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
aut est prior mundo natura tantum, aut duratione. Si natura tantum,
ergo, cum Deus sit ab aeterno, et mundus est ab aeterno. Si autem
est prior duratione; prius autem et posterius in duratione
constituunt tempus, ergo ante mundum fuit tempus; quod est
impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p10">
                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause,
                     requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by
                     reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears
                     from the above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q46_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Since therefore God is
                     eternal, the world is also eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 9"><a name="30397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30397] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea,
posita causa sufficienti, ponitur effectus, causa enim ad quam non
sequitur effectus, est causa imperfecta, indigens alio ad hoc quod
effectus sequatur. Sed Deus est sufficiens causa mundi; et finalis,
ratione suae bonitatis; et exemplaris, ratione suae sapientiae; et
effectiva, ratione suae potentiae; ut ex superioribus patet. Cum
ergo Deus sit ab aeterno, et mundus fuit ab aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p11">
                     <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore
                     the world is eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 10"><a name="30398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30398] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 10</span></a> Praeterea,
cuius actio est aeterna, et effectus aeternus. Sed actio Dei est
eius substantia, quae est aeterna. Ergo et mundus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.5" target="asv">Jn. 17:5</a>), "Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.22" target="asv">Prov. 8:22</a>), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 s. c."><a name="30399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30399] Iª q. 46 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Ioan. XVII, <i>clarifica me, pater, apud temetipsum,
claritate quam habui priusquam mundus fieret</i>; et Proverb. VIII,
<i>dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum, antequam quidquam
faceret a principio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p13">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will
                     them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above
                     (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that, absolutely
                     speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will
                     that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world
                     depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot
                     be proved by demonstration.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p14"> Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively, demonstrative---viz. in order to contradict the reasons
                     of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three
                     ways. Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras,
                     Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this
                     subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is
                     probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing
                     to say from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 co."><a name="30400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30400] Iª q. 46 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
nihil praeter Deum ab aeterno fuisse. Et hoc quidem ponere non est
impossibile. Ostensum est enim supra quod voluntas Dei est causa
rerum. Sic ergo aliqua necesse est esse, sicut necesse est Deum
velle illa, cum necessitas effectus ex necessitate causae
dependeat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ostensum est autem supra quod,
absolute loquendo, non est necesse Deum velle aliquid nisi seipsum.
Non est ergo necessarium Deum velle quod mundus fuerit semper. Sed
eatenus mundus est, quatenus Deus vult illum esse, cum esse mundi
ex voluntate Dei dependeat sicut ex sua causa. Non est igitur
necessarium mundum semper esse. Unde nec demonstrative probari
potest. Nec rationes quas ad hoc Aristoteles inducit, sunt
demonstrativae simpliciter, sed secundum quid, scilicet ad
contradicendum rationibus antiquorum, ponentium mundum incipere
secundum quosdam modos in veritate impossibiles. Et hoc apparet ex
tribus. Primo quidem, quia tam in VIII Physic. quam in I de caelo,
praemittit quasdam opiniones, ut Anaxagorae et Empedoclis et
Platonis, contra quos rationes contradictorias inducit. Secundo,
quia, ubicumque de hac materia loquitur, inducit testimonia
antiquorum, quod non est demonstratoris, sed probabiliter
persuadentis. Tertio, quia expresse dicit in I Lib. Topic., quod
quaedam sunt problemata dialectica, de quibus rationes non habemus,
ut utrum mundus sit aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter,
                     but according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to
                     any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed
                     to impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="30401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30401] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, antequam mundus esset, possibile fuit mundum esse,
non quidem secundum potentiam passivam, quae est materia; sed
secundum potentiam activam Dei. Et etiam secundum quod dicitur
aliquid absolute possibile, non secundum aliquam potentiam sed ex
sola habitudine terminorum, qui sibi non repugnant; secundum quod
possibile opponitur impossibili, ut patet per philosophum, in V
Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before
                     it received that power, it did not exist.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p17"> Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible things never
                     began to exist; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="30402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30402] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod illud quod habet virtutem ut sit semper ex quo habet
illam virtutem, non quandoque est et quandoque non est, sed
antequam haberet illam virtutem, non fuit. Unde haec ratio, quae
ponitur ab Aristotele in I de caelo, non concludit simpliciter quod
incorruptibilia non incoeperunt esse, sed quod non incoeperunt esse
per modum naturalem, quo generabilia et corruptibilia incipiunt
esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p18">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive
                     its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from
                     which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin
                     by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and
                     heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q46_A1-p18.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[1]</a>, ad 2).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="30403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30403] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Aristoteles, in I Physic., probat materiam esse
ingenitam, per hoc quod non habet subiectum de quo sit. In I autem
de caelo et mundo, probat caelum ingenitum, quia non habet
contrarium ex quo generetur. Unde patet quod per utrumque non
concluditur nisi quod materia et caelum non incoeperunt per
generationem, ut quidam ponebant, praecipue de caelo. Nos autem
dicimus quod materia et coelum producta sunt in esse per
creationem, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p19">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which
                     there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before
                     the world was.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="30404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30404] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod ad rationem vacui non sufficit in quo nihil est, sed
requiritur quod sit spatium capax corporis, in quo non sit corpus,
ut patet per Aristotelem, in IV Physic. Nos autem dicimus non
fuisse locum aut spatium ante mundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p20">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas
                     hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q45_A2" id="FP_Q46_A1-p20.1" shape="rect">Q[45], A[2]</a>, as 2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys. viii), is valid against those who admitted the
                     existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal
                     movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things
                     began to exist movement also existed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="30405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30405] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod primus motor semper eodem modo se habuit primum autem
mobile non semper eodem modo se habuit, quia incoepit esse, cum
prius non fuisset. Sed hoc non fuit per mutationem, sed per
creationem, quae non est mutatio, ut supra dictum est. Unde patet
quod haec ratio, quam ponit Aristoteles in VIII Physic., procedit
contra eos qui ponebant mobilia aeterna, sed motum non aeternum; ut
patet ex opinionibus Anaxagorae et Empedoclis. Nos autem ponimus,
ex quo mobilia incoeperunt, semper fuisse motum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p21">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce
                     an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must
                     take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else,
                     and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the
                     form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter.
                     Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different
                     kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say
                     of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it
                     presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time "after" and not in time "before," according to an imaginary
                     succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as
                     acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His
                     action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was
                     fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it
                     was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is
                     not so manifest of what always was.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="30406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30406] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
quod primum agens est agens voluntarium. Et quamvis habuit
voluntatem aeternam producendi aliquem effectum, non tamen produxit
aeternum effectum. Nec est necesse quod praesupponatur aliqua
mutatio, nec etiam propter imaginationem temporis. Aliter enim est
intelligendum de agente particulari, quod praesupponit aliquid, et
causat alterum, et aliter de agente universali, quod producit
totum. Sicut agens particulare producit formam, et praesupponit
materiam, unde oportet quod formam inducat secundum proportionem ad
debitam materiam. Unde rationabiliter in ipso consideratur quod
inducit formam in talem materiam et non in aliam, ex differentia
materiae ad materiam. Sed hoc non rationabiliter consideratur in
Deo, qui simul producit formam et materiam, sed consideratur
rationabiliter in eo, quod ipse producit materiam congruam formae
et fini. Agens autem particulare praesupponit tempus, sicut et
materiam. Unde rationabiliter consideratur in eo, quod agit in
tempore posteriori et non in priori, secundum imaginationem
successionis temporis post tempus. Sed in agente universali, quod
producit rem et tempus, non est considerare quod agat nunc et non
prius, secundum imaginationem temporis post tempus, quasi tempus
praesupponatur eius actioni, sed considerandum est in eo, quod
dedit effectui suo tempus quantum voluit, et secundum quod
conveniens fuit ad suam potentiam demonstrandam. Manifestius enim
mundus ducit in cognitionem divinae potentiae creantis, si mundus
non semper fuit, quam si semper fuisset, omne enim quod non semper
fuit, manifestum est habere causam; sed non ita manifestum est de
eo quod semper fuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p22">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after" belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning
                     and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that
                     any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need not be if movement be a beginning. The same
                     applies to the "now" of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant "now," as
                     being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward
                     this reason (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 7"><a name="30407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30407] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum
dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IV Physic., prius et posterius est
in tempore, secundum quod prius et posterius est in motu. Unde
principium et finis accipienda sunt in tempore, sicut et in motu.
Supposita autem aeternitate motus, necesse est quod quodlibet
momentum in motu acceptum sit principium et terminus motus, quod
non oportet, si motus incipiat. Et eadem ratio est de nunc
temporis. Et sic patet quod ratio illa instantis nunc, quod semper
sit principium et finis temporis, praesupponit aeternitatem
temporis et motus. Unde Aristoteles hanc rationem inducit, in VIII
Physic., contra eos qui ponebant aeternitatem temporis, sed
negabant aeternitatem motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p23">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity.
                     Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above
                     heaven there is nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other
                     dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 8"><a name="30408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30408] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum
dicendum quod Deus est prior mundo duratione. Sed ly prius non
designat prioritatem temporis, sed aeternitatis. Vel dicendum quod
designat aeternitatem temporis imaginati, et non realiter
existentis. Sicut, cum dicitur, supra caelum nihil est, ly supra
designat locum imaginatum tantum, secundum quod possibile est
imaginari dimensionibus caelestis corporis dimensiones alias
superaddi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p24">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> As the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from
                     the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q41_A2" id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.2" shape="rect">Q[41], A[2]</a>). Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was produced
                     by Him,
                     except as preordained by His will---that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare
                     its author.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 9"><a name="30409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30409] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum dicendum
quod, sicut effectus sequitur a causa agente naturaliter secundum
modum suae formae, ita sequitur ab agente per voluntatem secundum
formam ab eo praeconceptam et definitam, ut ex superioribus patet.
Licet igitur Deus ab aeterno fuerit sufficiens causa mundi, non
tamen oportet quod ponatur mundus ab eo productus, nisi secundum
quod est in praedefinitione suae voluntatis; ut scilicet habeat
esse post non esse, ut manifestius declaret suum auctorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p25">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> Given the action, the effect follows according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents
                     acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore
                     from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which
                     has being after not being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 10"><a name="30410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30410] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 10</span></a> Ad decimum
dicendum quod, posita actione, sequitur effectus secundum
exigentiam formae quae est principium actionis. In agentibus autem
per voluntatem, quod conceptum est et praedefinitum, accipitur ut
forma quae est principium actionis. Ex actione igitur Dei aeterna
non sequitur effectus aeternus, sed qualem Deus voluit, ut scilicet
haberet esse post non esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q46_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q46_A2-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 2. Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that
                     is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world;
                     indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="30411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30411] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod mundum incoepisse non sit articulus fidei,
sed conclusio demonstrabilis. Omne enim factum habet principium
suae durationis. Sed demonstrative probari potest quod Deus sit
causa effectiva mundi, et hoc etiam probabiliores philosophi
posuerunt. Ergo demonstrative probari potest quod mundus
incoeperit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from
                     something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which
                     are the arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world
                     was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have
                     begun.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="30412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30412] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
necesse est dicere quod mundus factus est a Deo, aut ergo ex
nihilo, aut ex aliquo. Sed non ex aliquo, quia sic materia mundi
praecessisset mundum; contra quod procedunt rationes Aristotelis
ponentis caelum ingenitum. Ergo oportet dicere quod mundus sit
factus ex nihilo. Et sic habet esse post non esse. Ergo oportet
quod esse incoeperit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which works by intellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts
                     by intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="30413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30413] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
quod operatur per intellectum, a quodam principio operatur, ut
patet in omnibus artificibus. Sed Deus est agens per intellectum.
Ergo a quodam principio operatur mundus igitur, qui est eius
effectus, non fuit semper.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some
                     fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always
                     exist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="30414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30414] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
manifeste apparet artes aliquas, et habitationes regionum, ex
determinatis temporibus incoepisse. Sed hoc non esset, si mundus
semper fuisset. Mundum igitur non semper fuisse manifestum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration.
                     Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="30415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30415] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
certum est nihil Deo aequari posse. Sed si mundus semper fuisset,
aequipararetur Deo in duratione. Ergo certum est non semper mundum
fuisse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to
                     pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 6"><a name="30416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30416] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, si
mundus semper fuit, infiniti dies praecesserunt diem istum. Sed
infinita non est pertransire. Ergo nunquam fuisset perventum ad
hunc diem, quod est manifeste falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p8">
                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite
                     series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be
                     an infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 7"><a name="30417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30417] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, si
mundus fuit aeternus, et generatio fuit ab aeterno. Ergo unus homo
genitus est ab alio in infinitum. Sed pater est causa efficiens
filii, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo in causis efficientibus est
procedere in infinitum, quod improbatur in II Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p9">
                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal:
                     therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with
                     certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 8"><a name="30418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30418] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, si
mundus et generatio semper fuit, infiniti homines praecesserunt.
Sed anima hominis est immortalis. Ergo infinitae animae humanae
nunc essent actu, quod est impossibile. Ergo ex necessitate sciri
potest quod mundus incoeperit; et non sola fide tenetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p10">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in
                     one God," etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God
                     created heaven and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated.
                     Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 s. c."><a name="30419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30419] Iª q. 46 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, fidei
articuli demonstrative probari non possunt, <i>quia fides de non
apparentibus est</i>, ut dicitur ad Hebr. XI. Sed Deum esse
creatorem mundi, sic quod mundus incoeperit esse, est articulus
fidei, dicimus enim, credo in unum Deum et cetera. Et iterum,
Gregorius dicit, in Homil. I in Ezech., quod Moyses prophetizavit
de praeterito, dicens in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram;
in quo novitas mundi traditur. Ergo novitas mundi habetur tantum
per revelationem. Et ideo non potest probari demonstrative.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p11">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above
                     of the mystery of the Trinity (
                     <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle
                     of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence
                     it is said
                     that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always.
                     Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot
                     be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures
                     is not among these, as was said above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>). But the divine will can be manifested by
                     revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science.
                     And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that
                     are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of
                     faith.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 co."><a name="30420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30420] Iª q. 46 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod mundum non semper fuisse, sola fide tenetur, et demonstrative
probari non potest, sicut et supra de mysterio Trinitatis dictum
est. Et huius ratio est, quia novitas mundi non potest
demonstrationem recipere ex parte ipsius mundi. Demonstrationis
enim principium est quod quid est. Unumquodque autem, secundum
rationem suae speciei, abstrahit ab hic et nunc, propter quod
dicitur quod universalia sunt ubique et semper. Unde demonstrari
non potest quod homo, aut caelum, aut lapis non semper fuit.
Similiter etiam neque ex parte causae agentis, quae agit per
voluntatem. Voluntas enim Dei ratione investigari non potest, nisi
circa ea quae absolute necesse est Deum velle, talia autem non sunt
quae circa creaturas vult, ut dictum est. Potest autem voluntas
divina homini manifestari per revelationem, cui fides innititur.
Unde mundum incoepisse est credibile, non autem demonstrabile vel
scibile. Et hoc utile est ut consideretur, ne forte aliquis, quod
fidei est demonstrare praesumens, rationes non necessarias inducat,
quae praebeant materiam irridendi infidelibus, existimantibus nos
propter huiusmodi rationes credere quae fidei sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For
                     some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by
                     proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. For they hold that the world
                     has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible
                     way it was always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in
                     the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the
                     world always was, because its Maker always existed." To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts
                     by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent
                     must be the principle of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker
                     to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily
                     if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; because creation, by which He produced
                     the world, is not a successive change, as was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q45_A2" id="FP_Q46_A2-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[45], A[2]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="30421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30421] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, XI de Civ. Dei,
philosophorum ponentium aeternitatem mundi, duplex fuit opinio.
Quidam enim posuerunt quod substantia mundi non sit a Deo. Et horum
est intollerabilis error; et ideo ex necessitate refellitur. Quidam
autem sic posuerunt mundum aeternum, quod tamen mundum a Deo factum
dixerunt. <i>Non enim mundum temporis volunt habere, sed suae
creationis initium, ut quodam modo vix intelligibili semper sit
factus. Id autem quomodo intelligant, invenerunt</i>, ut idem dicit
in X de Civ. Dei. <i>Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate
semper fuisset in pulvere, semper subesset vestigium, quod a
calcante factum nemo dubitaret; sic et mundus semper fuit, semper
existente qui fecit</i>. Et ad hoc intelligendum, considerandum est
quod causa efficiens quae agit per motum, de necessitate praecedit
tempore suum effectum, quia effectus non est nisi in termino
actionis, agens autem omne oportet esse principium actionis. Sed si
actio sit instantanea, et non successiva, non est necessarium
faciens esse prius facto duratione; sicut patet in illuminatione.
Unde dicunt quod non sequitur ex necessitate, si Deus est causa
activa mundi, quod sit prior mundo duratione, quia creatio, qua
mundum produxit, non est mutatio successiva, ut supra dictum
est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made
                     after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some
                     of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix, text 4).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="30422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30422] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod illi qui ponerent mundum aeternum, dicerent mundum
factum a Deo ex nihilo, non quod factus sit post nihilum, secundum
quod nos intelligimus per nomen creationis; sed quia non est factus
de aliquo. Et sic etiam non recusant aliqui eorum creationis nomen,
ut patet ex Avicenna in sua metaphysica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except
                     as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human
                     intellect, but not the divine intellect (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A7" id="FP_Q46_A2-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[14], AA[7]</a>,12).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="30423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30423] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod illa est ratio Anaxagorae, quae ponitur in III
Physic. Sed non de necessitate concludit, nisi de intellectu qui
deliberando investigat quid agendum sit, quod est simile motui.
Talis autem est intellectus humanus, sed non divinus, ut supra
patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable
                     to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents,
                     were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such particular
                     changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="30424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30424] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod ponentes aeternitatem mundi, ponunt aliquam regionem
infinities esse mutatam de inhabitabili in habitabilem, et e
converso. Et similiter ponunt quod artes, propter diversas
corruptiones et accidentia, infinities fuerunt inventae, et iterum
corruptae. Unde Aristoteles dicit, in libro Meteor., quod ridiculum
est ex huiusmodi particularibus mutationibus opinionem accipere de
novitate mundi totius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because
                     the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="30425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30425] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod, etsi mundus semper fuisset, non tamen parificaretur
Deo in aeternitate, ut dicit Boetius, in fine de Consolat., quia
esse divinum est esse totum simul, absque successione; non autem
sic est de mundo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there
                     is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there
                     is an infinite number of mean terms.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 6"><a name="30426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30426] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
quod transitus semper intelligitur a termino in terminum.
Quaecumque autem praeterita dies signetur, ab illa usque ad istam
sunt finiti dies, qui pertransiri poterunt. Obiectio autem procedit
ac si, positis extremis, sint media infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p18">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity "per se"---thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes
                     that are "per se" required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and
                     so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity "accidentally" as regards efficient causes; for instance,
                     if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one
                     cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after
                     the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise
                     it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as
                     the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes---viz. the grade of a particular
                     generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if
                     the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 7"><a name="30427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30427] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum
dicendum quod in causis efficientibus impossibile est procedere in
infinitum per se; ut puta si causae quae per se requiruntur ad
aliquem effectum, multiplicarentur in infinitum; sicut si lapis
moveretur a baculo, et baculus a manu, et hoc in infinitum. Sed per
accidens in infinitum procedere in causis agentibus non reputatur
impossibile; ut puta si omnes causae quae in infinitum
multiplicantur, non teneant ordinem nisi unius causae, sed earum
multiplicatio sit per accidens; sicut artifex agit multis martellis
per accidens, quia unus post unum frangitur. Accidit ergo huic
martello, quod agat post actionem alterius martelli. Et similiter
accidit huic homini, inquantum generat, quod sit generatus ab alio,
generat enim inquantum homo, et non inquantum est filius alterius
hominis; omnes enim homines generantes habent gradum unum in causis
efficientibus, scilicet gradum particularis generantis. Unde non
est impossibile quod homo generetur ab homine in infinitum. Esset
autem impossibile, si generatio huius hominis dependeret ab hoc
homine, et a corpore elementari, et a sole, et sic in
infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to
                     be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity.
                     But this was disproved above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A4" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[4]</a>). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as
                     Augustine says
                     [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a circuit of souls---viz.
                     that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters
                     will be given later (
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.2" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A6" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.3" shape="rect">Q[118], A[6]</a>). But be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or
                     least some creature, as an
                     angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 8"><a name="30428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30428] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum
dicendum quod hanc rationem ponentes aeternitatem mundi
multipliciter effugiunt quidam enim non reputant impossibile esse
infinitas animas actu; ut patet in metaphysica Algazelis, dicentis
hoc esse infinitum per accidens. Sed hoc improbatum est superius.
Quidam vero dicunt animam corrumpi cum corpore. Quidam vero quod ex
omnibus animabus remanet una tantum. Alii vero, ut Augustinus
dicit, posuerunt propter hoc circuitum animarum; ut scilicet animae
separatae a corporibus, post determinata temporum curricula, iterum
redirent ad corpora. De quibus omnibus in sequentibus est agendum.
Considerandum tamen quod haec ratio particularis est. Unde posset
dicere aliquis quod mundus fuit aeternus, vel saltem aliqua
creatura, ut Angelus; non autem homo. Nos autem intendimus
universaliter, an aliqua creatura fuerit ab aeterno.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q46_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q46_A3-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 3. Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part
                     of time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being; and
                     time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. Therefore creation was not in the beginning
                     of time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="30429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30429] Iª q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod creatio rerum non fuit in principio
temporis. Quod enim non est in tempore, non est in aliquo temporis.
Sed creatio rerum non fuit in tempore, per creationem enim rerum
substantia in esse producta est; tempus autem non mensurat
substantiam rerum, et praecipue incorporalium. Ergo creatio non
fuit in principio temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies
                     a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore,
                     since to be created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="30430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30430] Iª q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus probat quod omne quod fit, fiebat, et sic omne fieri
habet prius et posterius. In principio autem temporis, cum sit
indivisibile, non est prius et posterius. Ergo, cum creari sit
quoddam fieri, videtur quod res non sint creatae in principio
temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the
                     beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="30431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30431] Iª q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ipsum
etiam tempus creatum est. Sed non potest creari in principio
temporis, cum tempus sit divisibile, principium autem temporis
indivisibile. Non ergo creatio rerum fuit in principio
temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 s. c."><a name="30432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30432] Iª q. 46 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Gen. I dicitur, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et
terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude
                     three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the
                     beginning" are expounded---viz. "of time." And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and
                     the other of evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded---"in the Son."
                     For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated
                     to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.24" target="asv">Ps. 103:24</a>), "Thou hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning---that is, in the
                     Son; according to the word of the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.16" target="asv">Col. 1:16</a>), "In Him"---viz. the Son---"were created all things." But others said that corporeal
                     things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"---i.e.
                     before all things---"God created heaven and earth." For four things are stated to be created together---viz. the empyrean
                     heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 co."><a name="30433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30433] Iª q. 46 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod illud verbum Genes. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et
terram</i>, tripliciter exponitur, ad excludendum tres errores.
Quidam enim posuerunt mundum semper fuisse, et tempus non habere
principium. Et ad hoc excludendum, exponitur, in principio,
scilicet temporis. Quidam vero posuerunt duo esse creationis
principia, unum bonorum, aliud malorum. Et ad hoc excludendum,
exponitur, in principio, idest in filio. Sicut enim principium
effectivum appropriatur patri, propter potentiam, ita principium
exemplare appropriatur filio, propter sapientiam, ut sicut dicitur,
omnia in sapientia fecisti, ita intelligatur Deum omnia fecisse in
principio, idest in filio; secundum illud apostoli ad Coloss. I, in
ipso, scilicet filio, condita sunt universa. Alii vero dixerunt
corporalia esse creata a Deo mediantibus creaturis spiritualibus.
Et ad hoc excludendum, exponitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum
et terram, idest ante omnia. Quatuor enim ponuntur simul creata,
scilicet caelum Empyreum, materia corporalis (quae nomine terrae
intelligitur), tempus, et natura angelica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because
                     together with time heaven and earth were created.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="30434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30434] Iª q. 46 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod non dicuntur in principio temporis res esse creatae,
quasi principium temporis sit creationis mensura sed quia simul cum
tempore caelum et terra creata sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because, since
                     in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one point in a given movement---that is, whilst anything is in
                     the process of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after," because what is in the beginning of movement
                     or in its term is not in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the
                     term of movement, as was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q45_A2" id="FP_Q46_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[45], AA[2]</a>,3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="30435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30435] Iª q. 46 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi intelligitur de fieri quod
est per motum, vel quod est terminus motus. Quia cum in quolibet
motu sit accipere prius et posterius, ante quodcumque signum in
motu signato, dum scilicet aliquid est in moveri et fieri, est
accipere prius, et etiam aliquid post ipsum, quia quod est in
principio motus, vel in termino, non est in moveri. Creatio autem
neque est motus neque terminus motus, ut supra dictum est. Unde sic
aliquid creatur, quod non prius creabatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according
                     to some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from it time begins.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="30436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30436] Iª q. 46 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod nihil fit nisi secundum quod est. Nihil autem est
temporis nisi nunc. Unde non potest fieri nisi secundum aliquod
nunc, non quia in ipso primo nunc sit tempus, sed quia ab eo
incipit tempus.</p></div></div></div></div>


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date	Sat, 13 Jul 2024 18:07:47 +0000
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